

DOCUMENTS ON
BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY
1919—1939

EDITED BY
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FIRST SERIES

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PREFACE TO THE COLLECTION

THE decision to publish a Collection of Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39, was announced in the House of Commons by Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on March 29, 1944, in the following terms:

'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have decided to publish the most important documents in the Foreign Office archives relating to British foreign policy between 1919 and 1939. The documents will be published in a series of volumes which will be issued one by one as and when they are ready. The volumes will form a continuous chronological series, but in order to make available as soon as possible documents dealing with events most relevant to the outbreak of the present war, it is proposed, for purposes of publication, to divide the work into two parts: the first part to begin with the year 1919, and the second part to begin with the year 1930. The preparation of each part will be undertaken simultaneously.'

Mr. E. L. Woodward, Professor of International Relations in the University of Oxford and Fellow of Balliol College, was entrusted by the Secretary of State with the general planning and production of the Collection. Mr. Rohan Butler, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, joined Mr. Woodward as co-editor in January 1945, and has undertaken the production of the first series, while Mr. Woodward has continued the production of the second series of volumes.

In carrying out the instructions of the Secretary of State the editors have been faced with three main problems: (i) what documents were to be printed in the collection, (ii) how were these documents to be arranged, and (iii) what editorial notes were necessary for the assistance of readers?

The nature of these problems of selection, arrangement, and annotation can be described as follows:

(i) *Selection of documents*

In 1913 the number of dispatches, &c., received at the Foreign Office was 68,119. The figures for the years 1935-8 were 169,248 in 1935, 187,878 in 1936, 201,323 in 1937, 223,879 in 1938. Obviously a large proportion of these papers dealt with matters outside the range of high policy, but in recent times the extension of the field of State action and the consequent increase in the number of questions discussed between Government and Government have changed the nature of foreign policy in comparison with the traditional interpretation given to it in the nineteenth century. The problem of selecting the documents relevant to the present Collection is therefore more complicated than in the case of the *Documents on the Origins of the War* (of 1914-18). It has been necessary to make a more elaborate 'scale of priorities' and to determine the place of documents in this scale according to their bearing upon the course of events leading to the outbreak of war in 1939. Since the

first business of British diplomacy has long been the maintenance of peace, the course of events between 1919 and 1939 may be described more specifically from a diplomatic point of view as the breakdown of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In a scale of priorities thus decided the first right of entry had to be given to instructions sent to His Majesty's Missions abroad, to reports from these Missions of business transacted with foreign Governments, and to records of negotiations conducted through representatives of foreign Governments in London. It has also been necessary to include records, in some cases *verbatim*, of the proceedings of international conferences attended by Ministers of State.

The first duty of the editor, therefore, has been to print these indispensable documents and then, in the space available without making the Collection so unwieldy that it would defeat its purpose, to include other documents of an informative rather than of an executive kind. Such 'informative' documents consist for the most part of dispatches and telegrams from His Majesty's Missions abroad on the general political and economic situation in the countries within their sphere of observation. In the years after 1919 reports on economic conditions were more frequent and also more technical than in earlier times, and it is possible only by reading these reports to measure the level of expert knowledge upon which decisions of policy were based.

Without any of these 'informative' documents, therefore, the present collection would be incomplete, but it is impracticable, owing to their number and bulk, to publish all of them. Here again, on the principle of a 'scale of priorities', those documents have been chosen which bear directly upon the main decisions of policy.

In order to allow publication in full of as many unprinted documents as possible, two other principles of selection have been adopted, although in each case exceptions have been made. (1) Documents, especially those of great length, already available to the public have not been reprinted. Thus, as a general rule, published minutes and reports of the proceedings of the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations and of Conferences or other meetings held under the auspices of the League have not been included. These League documents contain declarations and acts of policy of the highest importance. Without reference to them it is impossible to obtain a complete account of the attitude of His Majesty's Government on the issues of the years covered by the present collection. The question of bulk, however, has made republication impracticable. (For example, the minutes of the second part of the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference take up 620 folio pages of print.)

(2) Foreign Office minutes on incoming dispatches and telegrams have not been included except in cases where these minutes add important details of fact not otherwise recorded. As a rule it is unnecessary to print minutes since the executive decisions taken on incoming material are given in the outgoing dispatches and telegrams. In any case, in view of the custom of the Foreign Office since 1919, the number of such minutes is very great and their

inclusion would more than double the size of the collection. It would rarely be possible to make a selection from the minutes since each writer refers to the previous minute and one minute is, therefore, not intelligible unless read in its full context. This consideration applies also to the final minutes by the Secretary of State. Furthermore, in view of the very great increase in the business of the Secretary of State, it has become impossible for him as a habit to write his views at length in the form of minutes on documents submitted to him. Even so, the practice of successive Secretaries of State since 1919 has varied to such an extent that the inclusion of their minutes would give a misleading impression.

(ii) *Arrangement of documents*

After determining the principles upon which the collection should be based, the editors had to decide roughly between two methods of arrangement: (a) chronological, (b) according to subject. On a chronological method documents would be printed strictly according to date and irrespective of their contents and subject-matter. This method has the advantage of allowing the reader to see the business of the Foreign Office as it appeared to the Secretary of State and to the members of the Department who had to deal simultaneously with a number of widely different negotiations and problems, i.e. the method makes it easier to see the mutual interaction and interrelation of these problems. On the other hand, the disadvantages of a chronological method without any 'sorting out' into subjects are too obvious to need mention. These disadvantages are especially troublesome for readers wishing to follow the history of any one problem or of the relations between Great Britain and any single country.

After full consideration the editors decided to adopt a compromise between the two methods, with emphasis upon the method of arrangement according to subject. Each volume, as far as possible, will cover documents within a given period of time. The volumes in their order will represent a chronological series, but they will be divided into chapters each of which will deal with a subject defined in the chapter-heading; a subject and not necessarily a country, since many subjects affect negotiations with more than one country.

(iii) *Annotation of documents*

As in the case of the selection of the documents, the problem of annotation is simple up to a point and is then determined by the question of space. The editors must supply (i) cross-references within the collection, (ii) short summaries of dispatches and telegrams not included in the collection but referred to in documents selected for printing. Where these references are unimportant or not relevant the documents concerned are noted as 'Not printed'.

Beyond this point there is hardly any limit to the possible number and length of footnotes. In fact, the limit is set by the need to economize space.

The notes, therefore, are confined to the mention of the most important facts and dates necessary for understanding the sequence of events and negotiations with which the documents are concerned.

The editors have also supplied an analytical table of contents for each volume. They propose to provide a general index for the volumes of each of the two series.

E. L. WOODWARD
ROHAN BUTLER

June 1946

PREFACE

TO VOLUME I, FIRST SERIES

IN planning the present collection of documents on British foreign policy it was decided that it should cover the twenty years from June 28, 1919, to September 3, 1939, from the signature of the treaty of peace with Germany at the end of the First World War to the declaration of war upon Germany by the United Kingdom at the beginning of the Second World War. The first volume therefore opens immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles.

The documentation for 1919 is necessarily upon an exceptionally large scale. In surveying the archival material of the period in the Foreign Office it became evident that it would be impossible to give an adequate account of British foreign policy at that time unless the publication of telegrams and dispatches were preceded by that of the most important of the relevant records of the Peace Conference at Paris. The present volume therefore contains the records of the secret proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations) from July 1 to October 15, 1919. This has necessitated a certain departure from the arrangement of material primarily according to subject (cf. paragraph ii of the Preface to the Collection), for the problems confronting the Supreme Council from day to day were manifold. Any attempt to split up the records of its proceedings and regroup them under particular subject-headings would have been arbitrary and unsatisfactory. The sequence of the records as they are now printed is accordingly that of the originals. Cross-references have, however, been provided in some number for the assistance of readers.

The Heads of Delegations, meeting as the Supreme Council, were, in the words of the British representative, Mr. Balfour (document No. 2), 'the lawful heirs of the Council of Four', which had constituted the centre of authority within the Peace Conference until the departure from Paris of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George after the signature of the treaty of peace with Germany. The Council of Heads of Delegations was left to control the pacification and remodelling of Europe during the six uneasy months between the signature of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, and the entry into force of that treaty on January 10, 1920. During that period all relations between the Allied Powers and Germany were more or less conditioned by the fact that the peace, though signed, was not yet in force in accordance with the concluding stipulation of the treaty concerning the deposit of ratifications: a signal instance of the importance in practice of the technical provisions of a diplomatic instrument. The significance of this state of affairs, entailing as it did the continuation of the system of the armistice, is illustrated in the present volume in connexion with the negotiations between the Supreme Council and the German Government

in such matters as the withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces, the annulment of the article in the Weimar Constitution which contemplated the union of Germany and Austria, and the disposal of German aeronautical material. This last negotiation, in particular, reflected the fact that the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control for Germany, like the many other commissions constituted under the Treaty of Versailles, could not function officially pending the entry into force of the treaty.

But when the Council of Heads of Delegations began its work the treaty of peace with Germany was at least signed, whereas those with the other enemy Powers were not. The Council accordingly devoted its main attention to what Mr. Balfour called 'the immense operation of liquidating the Austrian Empire' (document No. 37). The broad outlines for the settlement of central and south-eastern Europe had previously been indicated by the development of the new nationalities in that area, and had been agreed by the Council of Four. Much important work, however, remained to be done in connexion with the drafting and presentation of the treaties of peace with Austria and Bulgaria, signed respectively as the Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye on September 10 and the Treaty of Neuilly on November 27, 1919. The treaty with Hungary was delayed until 1920 owing to uncertainties attendant upon the political situation in that country, and to complications connected with the Rumanian intervention. All these matters are fully illustrated in the present volume. It contains less material bearing upon the question of Fiume and the Adriatic since such negotiations as there were at that period upon this issue were largely conducted outside the formal sessions of the Supreme Council. It is hoped to make good this deficiency in subsequent volumes.

The general peace settlement naturally had to take account of the outstanding fact that, besides the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the Ottoman and Russian Empires had also foundered during the First World War. Repercussions of the Greek occupation of Smyrna engaged the attention of the Supreme Council to some extent during the latter part of 1919, but the drafting of the treaty of peace with Turkey was deferred until the beginning of the following year. During the period covered by the present volume the Supreme Council gave preliminary consideration to the eastern frontiers of Rumania and Poland, but it did not usually deliberate upon the problems presented by developments in Russia, except for certain specific questions, such as that of the trade embargo. This latter provides an example of the way in which economic questions overlapped with the political. Another instance is the question of Teschen. And it is noticeable how, with winter coming on, concern over the coal shortage in Europe ran like a black seam through the deliberations of the Council.

Such, most briefly, was the main scope of the discussions within the Council of Heads of Delegations during the period under review. That it is in no sense a full summary of the many questions which came up for day-to-day decision will be clear to readers of this volume. The records of these decisions and discussions, with their copious appendices, are, literally, voluminous.

They are indeed among the longest of all the sets of records of the Paris Peace Conference. This partly explains why the minutes of the Council of Heads of Delegations (series H. D.), unlike the other main records of the Peace Conference, have never been included in the Confidential Print of the Foreign Office. The present text has been printed direct from the stencilled typescript, sometimes barely decipherable, of the original copies. (This does not apply to documents Nos. 1 and 2 which, together with No. 3, bear the I. C. notation of the records of the Supreme Council in its earlier forms; the change-over to the new H. D. notation did not occur until July 7, 1919, but I. C. 200-201A, documents Nos. 1-3, are in fact the first records of the Council of Heads of Delegations and are printed as such.)

In order to reduce this bulk of documentation to manageable compass appreciable omissions of matter of minor importance have been made. These omissions have been made with a view to clarity and concision, and all are plainly indicated. In cases where minutes of particular items have been omitted their headings have nevertheless been retained in order that the reader may have a general idea of the nature of the matter not printed. If a minute is thus omitted any appendix to that minute is also automatically omitted unless, exceptionally, the contrary is specified. Where omitted matter could be held to be of marginal importance a summary of it has been provided.

The minutes of the proceedings of the Council of Heads of Delegations were prepared by the Joint Secretariat in agreed English and French texts, the English text being supplied by the British member, who was drawn from the War Cabinet Secretariat forming part of the British Delegation. Until September 15, 1919, this secretariat reproduced and circulated the English text of the minutes and appended documents. The English text enjoyed equal validity with the French; indeed it is recorded on the authority of Captain Abraham, the British member of the Joint Secretariat, that these minutes were prepared '*originally* in English', copies being supplied by him to his French colleague for translation. The Joint Secretariat occasionally circulated corrigenda to earlier minutes, and the documents here printed are as amended by such corrigenda.

When Mr. Lloyd George visited Paris in the middle of September, 1919, shortly after the return of Mr. Balfour to England (cf. documents Nos. 57 and 58), he decided that the War Cabinet Secretariat attached to the British Delegation should be closed forthwith since he considered that full British minutes of the proceedings of the Supreme Council were no longer necessary in view of the fact that no British Cabinet Minister would remain in Paris. Document No. 57 (H. D. 53 of September 15, 1919) was the last English text to be issued by the British Delegation, the preparation of these texts being thereafter transferred to the American Delegation (American Commission to Negotiate Peace). On September 18 Sir Eyre Crowe, who became head of the British Delegation in place of Mr. Balfour, telegraphed to Lord Curzon that 'the United States, French and Italian Delegations, however, insist on the necessity of a full record of the proceedings of the Council if future disputes and misunderstandings are to be avoided. They are determined to

maintain the Joint Secretariat, and strongly protest against the withdrawal of the British member. They point out that resolutions and minutes drawn up without British concurrence would have no authority. . . . There is, so far as I know, no precedent for the absence of any adequate record of the proceedings of so important an international body as the Council, which contains Cabinet Ministers of other Powers, though no longer any of Great Britain, and I cannot but feel that if only for the future understanding of the decisions of the Conference such records ought to be kept.' In answer to this representation Sir Eyre Crowe was informed by a telegram of September 22 that the Prime Minister had approved the appointment of a British secretary, and British representation on the Joint Secretariat was restored. But the preparation and circulation of the English texts of minutes and appended documents remained with the American Delegation. In the documents so prepared American spellings have been anglicized.

It will be appreciated that the records here printed, which include a considerable number of translations, were often prepared under pressure. The drafting sometimes shows traces of this, but no attempt has been made to amend it except in certain cases in which it seemed desirable to clarify the text. In such cases all editorial matter is printed in square brackets, all matter in parentheses being as in the original. All footnotes are editorial unless the contrary is stated. The footnotes include references to relevant printed sources of documentary material. Since the preparation of the present volume a number of these references have been in some measure superseded by the publication of the full text of the proceedings of the Council of Heads of Delegations in the official American series of *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. The references in question have, however, been retained for the sake of bibliographic convenience.

The original notation of the Peace Conference records in i. c. and n. d. serial numbers is printed at the head of each document. The Foreign Office file numbers are not printed since, with one exception, the reference is uniform and it seemed economical not to repeat it throughout. This general reference for the documents in this volume is Confidential/General/141. The exception is document No. 3 which carries 1919 Peace Conference reference 511/1/2/15140. All editorial references to documents in the original refer to those under these numbers.

The editor has been allowed full independence and freedom in the choice of documents. In taking responsibility therefor, and for all editorial matter in this volume, he wishes to thank officials of the Foreign Office who have so kindly helped him. In particular he is grateful to the staff of the Reference Room and other branches of the Foreign Office Library for their indispensable care and co-operation in securing for him the necessary material, to Miss A. Norman for her secretarial assistance, and to the Hon. Margaret Lambert for very valuable help in matters of research.

ROHAN BUTLER

April 1947

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. Proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations) before the signature of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. July 1–September 9, 1919	1–663
CHAPTER II. Further Proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations). September 10–October 15, 1919	664–969

MAPS

1. Lines of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces (Appendix A to No. 19) *Facing p. 216*
2. Map illustrating the Report of August 22, 1919, on the Questions of Teschen and Orava by the combined Commissions on Polish and on Czechoslovak Affairs *Facing p. 618*

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

N.B. Items in brackets are not printed but may be summarized in footnotes.

CHAPTER I

Proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations) before the signature
 ° of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.
 July 1-September 9, 1919

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
1 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 4 p.m. I.C. 200.	July 1	1. Nomination of a Commission to supervise the execution of the treaty of peace with Germany. 2. Commission to organize the Reparation Commission. 3. Constitution of the Supreme Council. 4. Finality of the Council's decisions. [5. Reply to Austrian Notes.] 6. Agenda for future meetings. 7. Committee for Bulgaria.	1 2 3 3 4 4 5
BARON VON LERSNER Versailles	June 30	App. A. Note to M. Clemenceau concerning deliberations in regard to occupied zones of Germany.	6
2 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. I.C. 201	July 2	1. Question of Bessarabia: hearing of MM. Maklakoff and Bratiano. 2. Appointment of Commission to supervise the execution of the treaty with Germany. 3. Appointment of Commission to organize the Reparation Commission. 4. Co-ordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs to delimit the frontiers of Bulgaria. 5. Austrian Treaty: resolution regarding a time-limit for counter-proposals. 6. Austrian Treaty: resolution that modifications in conditions of peace with Germany be taken into account. 7. Austrian Treaty: frontier between Austria and Hungary. 8. Austrian Treaty: recognition of frontiers of neighbouring States. 9. Question of communication to the press of the proceedings of the Supreme Council.	6 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 13
3 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3 p.m. I.C. 201 A	July 5	1. Presence of Experts at meetings of the Council. 2. Political and economic situation in Hungary; consideration of possible Allied military action. 3. Appointment of Allied High Commissioner for Armenia.	14 14 22

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
MR. HOOVER Paris M. 335	July 1	App. A. Letter to Mr. Lansing concern- ing the situation in Hungary.	23
4 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 1	July 7	1. Situation in Italy; Allied Commission to inquire into incidents at Fiume. 24 2. Progress of preparation of the treaty with Austria. 28 [3. Boundary Commission for the Austro- Italian frontier.] 29 4. Participation of Finnish troops in advance on Petrograd. 29 [5. Norwegian claims (Spitzbergen) and question of the Finno-Norwegian frontier.] 30 6. Reply to Austrian Note on League of Nations. 30 7. Removal of commercial censorship at the same time as the raising of the blockade of Germany. 31 8. Request of Yugoslav Delegation for Austrian notes concerning Yugoslavia. [9. Repatriation of certain Armenians.] 31 10. Question of direct relations between General Gough and the German Command in the Baltic Provinces. 31 11. Records of proceedings of the Supreme Council and distribution of minutes. 31	
5 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 2	July 8	1. Situation in Italy: incident at Fiume. 32 2. Appointment of Allied Commission to inquire into incidents at Fiume. 34 3. Instructions to Commission of Inquiry. 34 4. Stoppage of supply trains at Modane. 34 5. Question of direct relations between General Gough and the German Command in the Baltic Provinces; proposed credit for pay of Russian forces in Libau. 34 [6. Report of Committee on Repatria- tion of Austrian Prisoners of War.] 36 7. Reply to the Austrian Note on the economic clauses of the Treaty. 36 8. Communication and publication of replies to Austrian Notes. 36	
6 MEETING OF HEADS OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS: 5 p.m. H. D. 2 A	July 8	Dispatch of a French warship to Fiume. 37	
7 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 3	July 9	1. Appointment of Allied Commission to inquire into incidents at Fiume. 38 2. Situation in Italy. 38 3. Stoppage of trains at Modane. 39 4. Action of German troops withdrawing from territory to be ceded to Poland. 39 5. Treaty of peace with Bulgaria: sum- moning of Bulgarian Delegation to Paris. 39	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
7 <i>Continued</i>	July 9	6. Consideration of military means to oblige Hungary to respect the Armistice.	39
		7. Sale of securities by the Hungarian Government.	41
		8. Frontiers between Yugoslavia and Hungary.	42
		9. Question of approval of the Air Convention.	43
		10. Repatriation of Czechoslovak forces from Siberia.	43
		11. Approval of report of Military Representatives regarding Allied Control Commissions for Germany.	45
		12. Allied Army of Occupation in Bulgaria.	45
		13. Ratification by Germany of the Treaty of Versailles.	47
MR. GIBSON Warsaw	July 3	App. A. Report upon seizure by German troops in West Prussia of horses and farm implements.	47
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL. Versailles. S. W. C. 438	July 8	App. B. Report on measures to be taken regarding Hungary.	47
FINANCIAL COMMISSION. W. C. P. 1116 B & C	July 7	App. C. Draft Note from the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to M. Béla Kun, and draft communication to the press, concerning seizure of securities by the Hungarian Government.	50
COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS.		App. D. Report on Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier in the Prekomurje.	51
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL. Versailles. S. W. C. 436		App. E. Organization of the Allied Control Commissions for Germany.	52
8 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 4	July 10	1. Question of communicating records of the Peace Conference to French Parliamentary Committee.	57
		2. Appointment of Allied Commission to discuss with Germany details of the Rhineland Agreement.	58
		3. Polish advance in Lithuania.	59
		4. Sale of securities by the Hungarian Government.	59
		5. Preparation of treaty with Bulgaria.	60
		6. Instructions to representatives of the Allied Commission for Fiume.	60
		7. Question of approval of the Air Convention.	61

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
8 <i>Continued</i>	July 10	8. Report by Signor Crespi on the stoppage of supply trains at Modane.	63
		9. Question of reply to German Note regarding the evacuation of Polish territory.	64
		10. Frontiers of Austria with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.	64
COMMISSION FOR REPLIES TO AUSTRIAN NOTES ON TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS		App. A. Report on Austrian frontiers with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.	65
9 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 5	July 11	1. Frontiers of Austria with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.	67
		[2. Frontier stations in Austria.]	70
		3. Question of reply to German Delegation regarding the evacuation of Polish territory.	70
		[4. Question of Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia.]	70
		5. Raising of the blockade of Germany.	71
		6. Question of blockade in the Baltic.	71
		7. Consideration of proposed military measures against Hungary: hearing of Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and Roumanian Representatives, with Marshal Foch.	72
HERR VON HANIEL Versailles No. 122	June 25	App. A. Letter to M. Clemenceau with regard to the timing of the cession of German territories to Poland.	77
ALLIED BLOCKADE COMMITTEE	July 11	App. C. Note with regard to the raising of the blockade of Germany.	78
GENERAL PELLÉ Prague	July 8	App. D. Report to M. Clemenceau concerning the Hungarian military position and the question of Allied intervention.	78
10 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 6	July 12	1. Question of Teschen.	79
		2. Question of Orava.	80
		3. Blockade of Russia.	80
		[4. Question of Tientsin.]	81
		5. Communication by the Yugoslav Government of a document illustrating Italian co-operation with Austrian military authorities.	81
		6. Consideration of a wireless message from M. Béla Kun.	82
		7. Supply trains at Modane.	83
		8. Greek action in Asia Minor.	83
M. BÉLA KUN Budapest SSS No. 121	July 11	App. B. Telegram to M. Clemenceau regarding the cessation of Hungarian-Czechoslovak hostilities and non-withdrawal of Roumanian forces in Hungary.	85

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
	ITALIAN DELEGATION	July 12	App. D. Memorandum on Greek action in Asia Minor.	86
11	MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 7	July 15	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Correspondence with M. Béla Kun. 2. Armistice on Esthonian Front. 3. Question of Blockade in the Baltic. [4. Revision of Treaties of 1839.] 5. Allied Army of Occupation in Silesia during the plebiscite. 6. Allied occupation of Bulgaria; proposed conversation between M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos concerning Bulgaria. 7. Proposed assistance to Poland in the area ceded by Germany. 8. Italian action in Bulgaria. 9. Consideration of a letter from M. Venizelos concerning Asia Minor. 	87 88 88 92 92 93 94 95 95
	M. BÉLA KUN Budapest		App. A. Telegram to M. Clemenceau requesting that the Supreme Council should require the Roumanian forces in Hungary to comply with its instructions for withdrawal.	95
	COLONEL DU PARQUET Libau	July 9	App. B. Report upon conclusion of an armistice on July 3 between German, Esthonian and Latvian forces.	97
	ALLIED BLOCKADE COMMITTEE AND EASTERN BLOCKADE COMMITTEE W. G. P. 1133 AND 1133A	July 11	App. C. Note on trade with Soviet Russia; addendum by British Delegation.	98
	MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Versailles S. W. G. 440 (77 M.R.)	July 10	App. E. Report on the composition and size of the army of occupation in the plebiscite area of Upper Silesia.	100
	MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Versailles S. W. G. 444 (79 M.R.)	July 11	App. F. Report on help to be given to Poland in the event of trouble in the area ceded by Germany.	102
	GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY		App. G. Dispatch to M. Clemenceau on situation in Bulgaria; possible Bulgarian resistance to conditions of peace.	104
	M. VENIZELOS Paris	July 10	App. H. Letter to M. Clemenceau concerning Turkish military preparations in Anatolia.	105
12	MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 8	July 16	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Statement by M. Venizelos regarding the situation in Anatolia: MM. Tittoni and Venizelos to seek agreement regarding the delimitation of Italian and Greek zones of occupation. [2. Treaty with Austria: (a) protection of minorities: (b) Reschen Pass and Predyl Pass railways.] 	106 109

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
12 <i>Continued</i>	July 16	3. Approval of reports of the Committee to supervise the execution of the treaty of peace with Germany: (a) general recommendations, (b) Schleswig, (c) Poland, East Prussia, Danzig.	109
		4. Question of committees to supervise the execution of economic and colonial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.	110
COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY		App. A. General recommendations with regard to the execution of the territorial clauses.	111
	July 11	App. B. Report on Schleswig.	111
		App. C. Report on Poland, East Prussia, and Danzig.	113
13 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H.D. 9	July 17	[1. Report of Commission to examine Italian claims in Tientsin.]	117
		2. Report from Mr. Hoover on the revictualling of Austria: provision of food and raw materials for Austria to be one of the first considerations of the Reparation Commission provided that Austria deliver arms and ammunition to Czechoslovakia.	118
		3. Report by Marshal Foch on plan for military operations against Hungary: consultation with Czechoslovak, Roumanian, and Yugoslav delegates.	121
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	July 17	App. B. Note on possible Allied military action in Hungary.	127
14 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10 a.m. H.D. 10	July 18	1. Proposal to send commissioners to inquire into disorders in Anatolia.	130
		2. Fraternization of Italian and Bulgarian Officers at Dedeagach.	131
		3. Consideration of a telegram from President Wilson regarding policy in Turkey.	131
		4. Agreement between M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos regarding Greek and Italian zones of occupation in Anatolia: consultation with M. Venizelos.	132
		5. Proposed military operations against Hungary.	137
SHEIKH-UL-ISLAM MOUSTAFA SABRI Constantinople	July 15	App. A. Telegram to M. Clemenceau complaining of Greek action in the Vilayet of Smyrna.	138
15 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 4 p.m. H.D. 11	July 18	[1. Question of the Südbahn.]	139
		2. Report by M. Loucheur with regard to the interpretation of the Rhineland Convention: reply to German notes adopted.	140
		3. Reservation by the Italian Delegation on the subject of the Austrian Peace Treaty.	141

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
15 <i>Continued</i>	July 18	4. Nomination of a commission of inquiry for Asia Minor.	142
		5. Question of a military commission for Hungary.	142
		6. Question of Russian prisoners in Germany; Presentation of Mr. Hoover's report.	142
		7. Communication from Mr. Hoover with regard to Russian Armenia; request to Georgian authorities to facilitate transport of supplies.	145
		8. Repatriation of Czechoslovak Forces in Siberia.	145
COMMISSION ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE		App. A. Draft reply to two German notes regarding the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine; two notes from the German Peace Delegation.	146
MR. HOOVER Paris W. C. P. 1146	July 16	App. B. Memorandum on feeding of Russian prisoners in Germany.	159
16 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 12	July 21	1. (a) Question of hastening treaty of peace with Bulgaria. (b) Report by M. Tittoni of result of his conversation with M. Venizelos. (c) Explanation by M. Tardieu concerning Bulgarian frontiers.	161
		2. Question of appointing an Allied military commission of inquiry for Hungary; visit of General Boehm to Vienna.	163
		3. Consideration of report of the Military Representatives on the army of occupation for Upper Silesia.	164
		4. Consideration of report of the Military Representatives on assistance to Poland in the ceded territory in case of disturbance.	164
		5. Appointment of an Allied commission of inquiry for Asia Minor; a Greek Officer to follow the work of the commission.	165
		6. Appointment of a commission of administration for the plebiscite zone in Upper Silesia.	166
		7. Consideration of report of the Financial Commission regarding financial assistance to the Baltic States.	166
		8. Decision as to the supervision of the execution of the economic and colonial clauses of the treaty with Germany.	167
		9. Withdrawal of Yugoslav forces in the Klagenfurt Basin.	168
		10. Removal by Germans of material from Danzig.	169
CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE		App. A. Report on Bulgarian frontiers.	169

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
M. BÉLA KUN Budapest No. 237-55	July 21	App. B. Telegram to M. Clemenceau: Hungarian forces compelled to cross the Theiss in opposition to Roumanian forces.	174
FINANCIAL COMMISSION	July 11	App. F. Report on financial assistance to the Baltic States.	174
M. PICHON Paris	July 21	App. G. Note to M. Clemenceau regarding war material captured by Yugoslav forces at Klagenfurt.	175
COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING POPULATION OF DANZIG	July 7	App. H. Appeal to the Supreme Council to protect their interests.	176
17 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. II. D. 13	July 25	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hungarian affairs: proposals made by General Boehm to Allied representatives in Vienna. 2. Extension of the time limit accorded to the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments for arriving at an agreement concerning Teschen. 3. Adoption of the military, naval, and aerial clauses for the treaty of peace with Bulgaria. 4. Consideration of clauses of the Bulgarian peace treaty relating to responsibilities. 5. Nominations to the commission to delimit the new frontier between Germany and Belgium. 6. Procedure for appointing the commission to delimit the Saar Territory. 7. Sale of State property in Schleswig. 8. Evacuation of territories ceded by Germany to Poland; approval of a note to the German Delegation concerning the opening of negotiations with regard to preparatory measures to be taken. 9. Allied Commissioners for East Prussia; approval of a note to the German Delegation. [10. Clauses in the peace treaty with Bulgaria with regard to prisoners of war.] 11. Consideration of Austrian reply on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to Czechoslovakia. 12. Instructions to be given to commission of inquiry into the events in Asia Minor. 13. Blockade of Russia. 14. Declaration to be made by the Austrian Government with regard to vessels sunk by Austrian naval forces. 15. Coal position in Italy. 16. Languages of treaties. 17. Credentials of German diplomatic agents. 	176 179 179 181 184 184 185 186 186 187 188 188 190 190 191 191

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
BARON VON LERSNER Versailles	July 8	App. D. Note proposing negotiations with Poland concerning local arrangements for the German withdrawal from eastern territories ceded by Germany.	191
COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY	July 23	App. E. Proposed reply to the German note of July 8.	192
BARON VON LERSNER Versailles	July 16	App. F. Note to M. Clemenceau inquiring concerning Allied Commissioners for Memel and Danzig.	192
COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY	July 23	App. G. Proposed reply to the German note of July 16.	193
AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE		App. J. Trade with Soviet Russia; attitude of President Wilson.	193
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. M. Draft note to Baron von Lersner concerning the credentials of German diplomatic agents.	194
18 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 14	July 26	1. Polish-Lithuanian dispute with regard to demarcation line. 195 2. Rupture of communications at Warsaw. 195 3. Hungarian affairs; consultation with Marshal Foch and Mr. Hoover; proposals made by General Boehm. 196 4. Determination of the strength of the Allied Army of Occupation on the left bank of the Rhine. 199 5. Composition of the Allied Army of Occupation in the plebiscite zone of Upper Silesia. 200 6. Blockade of Russia; approval of a telegram to President Wilson. 201	
CAPT. GREGORY Vienna	July 25	App. A. Telegram to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace reporting on communications between Allied representatives and General Boehm.	201
MR. BALFOUR Paris	July 25	App. D. Proposed telegram to President Wilson on the subject of the blockade of Russia.	202
19 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 15	July 26	1. Line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces. (<i>Map at App. A: see p. 216.</i>) 203 2. Hungarian affairs; issue of declaration to the press; question of military consultations with Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia. 205 3. Steps to be taken to compel the German authorities to terminate hostilities in Silesia; nominations to the plebiscite commission for Upper Silesia and the commission to delimit the eastern frontiers of Germany. 210	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
19 <i>Continued</i>	July 26	4. Consideration of the economic clauses for insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria.	211
		5. Adoption of reparation clauses for the treaty with Bulgaria.	211
		6. Consideration of the financial clauses for the treaty with Bulgaria.	212
		7. Nominations to the commission to delimit the frontier between Belgium and Germany.	213
		8. Declaration proposed by the Commission on Baltic Affairs to be addressed to the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.	213
		9. Dispatch of a Karelian Delegation to the Peace Conference.	216
		[10. Dispatch of a Delegation of Swabians from the Banat.]	216
20 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 p.m. H. D. 16	July 28	1. Distribution of minutes of the meetings of the Supreme Council.	216
		2. Italian proposal for the creation of an inter-allied organization for the distribution of raw materials.	217
		[3. Distribution of rolling-stock in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria.]	219
		[4. Re-establishment of postal communication with Germany.]	219
		5. Blockade of Hungary.	219
		6. Imports into Serbia; stoppages at Fiume.	221
		7. Clauses for insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria on ports, waterways, and railways; question of Western Thrace.	222
FRENCH DELEGATION	July 21	App. B. Note on imports into Serbia.	224
FRENCH DELEGATION	July 24	App. C. Note on Bulgarian access to the Aegean.	224
21 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 17	July 28	1. Appointment of a committee to co-ordinate questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the Treaty of Versailles (Conference of Ambassadors).	225
		2. Question of the disposal of the German and Austro-Hungarian fleets; Scapa Flow incident.	226
		[3. Nomination of a director for the Port of Kehl.]	228
		4. Yugoslav claims in the Banat; attribution of the island of Ada-Kalessi to Roumania.	228
		5. Allied forces for the plebiscite in Schleswig.	229
		6. Procedure with regard to Austrian proposals on the subject of minorities.	230

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY	July 23	App. A. Note recommending the appointment of a committee to co-ordinate questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the Treaty of Versailles.	231
ALLIED ADMIRALS Paris	June 27	App. B. Joint note concerning the disposal of the German and Austro-Hungarian fleets.	232
22 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 18	July 29	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Procedure for answering Austrian notes. 235 2. Extension of the time accorded to the Austrian Delegation for presenting observations upon the draft treaty. 236 [3. Re-establishment of postal communication with Germany.] 236 4. Question of the creation of an Allied organization for the distribution of raw materials. 236 [5. Appointment of a commission for the distribution of rolling-stock in enemy countries.] 237 6. Adoption of the economic clauses for insertion in the treaty of peace with Bulgaria. 238 7. Line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces; attitude of General Pilsudski. 239 8. Question of replying to a letter from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg with regard to responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. 240 9. Hearing of M. Venizelos regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria. 241 	
MUSSULMAN DEPUTIES FOR WESTERN THRACE Sofia	Dec. 31 1918	App. E. Letters to M. Venizelos and General Franchet d'Esperey requesting an Allied occupation of Thrace.	242
M. VENIZELOS Paris		App. F. Observations on a note of July 24 by the American Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia concerning Western Thrace.	244
23 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 19	July 30	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bulgarian frontiers. 247 2. Consideration of clauses for insertion in the peace treaty with Bulgaria on ports, waterways, and railways. 247 3. Political clauses in the peace treaty with Bulgaria; adoption of provisions for the protection of minorities. 248 4. German attitude in the Baltic Provinces; approval of General Gough's proposals. 249 5. Disposal of enemy warships; Scapa Flow incident. 249 6. Preparation of conditions of peace with Hungary. 252 	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
23 <i>Continued</i>	July 30	7. Consideration of representations by the Yugoslav Delegation concerning the financial and reparation clauses of the treaty with Bulgaria.	252
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 3581	July 28	App. C. Note to M. Clemenceau enclosing correspondence and transmitting proposals with regard to the withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces.	253
24 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 20	July 31	1. Frontiers of Bulgaria. 2. Military measures for the occupation of Danzig and Memel. [3. Request of the Swedish Legation in Paris to be heard on the subject of the Aland Islands.]	258 266 266
GENERAL SACKVILLE- WEST Versailles S. W. C. 430 I	July 24	App. A. Report on military and naval measures to be taken for the occupation of Danzig and Memel.	267
25 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 21	Aug. 1	1. Consideration of a communication from the German Government on the subject of the surrender of officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. 2. Consideration of information from Germany with regard to the number of men under arms there and the arming of students in Munich. 3. Consideration of a telegram from General Franchet d'Esperey with regard to the military position in Bulgaria. 4. Consideration of a telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Klagenfurt relative to the execution in that area of the decision of the Peace Conference. 5. Organization of the High Command of the Allied Army of Occupation in Western Germany after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. 6. Consideration of further claims by Yugoslavia: (a) frontier in Prekomurje, (b) Baranya. 7. Yugoslav claims: (a) Bacska, (b) Banat. 8. Occupation of Prekomurje by Yugoslav troops. 9. Roumanian frontiers in Bukovina. 10. Bessarabian question; the Dobrudja. 11. Financial clauses for the treaty with Bulgaria; Yugoslav claims. 12. Question of distribution of enemy aeronautic material. 13. Question of delivery of arms and munitions to Czechoslovakia.	271 273 274 275 275 276 276 277 277 278 281 283 283
GENERAL NUDANT Cologne	Aug. 1	App. A. Telegram to Marshal Foch transmitting a message from the German Government on the question of the surrender of officers charged with war crimes.	284

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
	FRENCH DELEGATION	July 31	App. B. Note on the strength of the German Army.	284
	FRENCH DELEGATION	July 14	App. C. German document concerning recruitment in the University of Munich.	286
	ALLIED MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES Klagenfurt	July 29	App. E. Telegram concerning dispositions in Klagenfurt basin.	288
	COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS	July 22	App. F. Note with regard to Yugoslav claims in the Prekomurje and Baranya.	288
	COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS	July 25	App. G. Note with regard to claims in the Banat, Bačka, and the Island of Ada-Kalasi.	290
	COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS	July 30	App. I. Note concerning Bukovina.	291
	ITALIAN DELEGATION	July 27	App. L. Note on the delivery by Austria to Czechoslovakia of arms and munitions.	292
26	MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 22	Aug. 2	1. Situation in Hungary; fall of the Hungarian Soviet Government. [2. Danish request regarding expenses of the plebiscite in Slesvig.] [3. Danish request for warships at Flensburg.] [4. Reference to a commission of articles proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the peace treaty with Bulgaria.] 5. Strength of the Bulgarian army; situation in Bulgaria. [6. Scale of pay for officers attached to Control Commissions in Germany.] 7. Repatriation and support of Russian prisoners of war in Germany; responsibility placed upon the German Government. 8. Question of a proposed treaty regarding access to the Baltic. 9. Roumanian amendment for insertion in the economic clauses of the treaty with Bulgaria.	294 297 297 297 298 300 300 302 303
	LT.-COL. ROMANELLI Budapest	Aug. 1	App. A. Wireless message to M. Clemenceau regarding the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Government and consequent developments.	303
	M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Aug. 2	App. B. Reply to Lt.-Col. Romanelli.	304
	MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Versailles s. w. c. 448	July 25	App. F. Report on the means of repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany.	304

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
BRITISH DELEGATION	June 13	App. G. Memorandum on the entrances to the Baltic.	307
27 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 23	Aug. 4	1. Situation in Hungary; consultation with Marshal Foch and Mr. Hoover; adoption of telegrams to the Roumanian and Yugoslav Governments; nomination of an Allied Military Mission to proceed to Budapest.	308
		[2. Hearing of a Swedish statement on the subject of the Aland Islands.]	314
		3. Hearing of General Baird on the situation in Bulgaria.	314
		4. Appointment of Allied Commissioners for negotiations between the German and Polish Governments.	318
LT.-COL. ROMANELLI Budapest No. I. W. 136	Aug. 3	App. A. Wireless message to M. Clemenceau transmitting a request from the Hungarian Government for support by small Allied contingents.	318
	Aug. 4	App. C. Telegram from Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government requesting that Roumanian forces in Hungary should conform to the policy of the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	319
	Aug. 4	App. D. Telegram from Supreme Council to the French Minister at Belgrade requesting that surplus food supplies be made available by Yugoslavia for Vienna and Budapest.	319
MARSHAL FOCH	Aug. 4	App. F. Draft Telegram to General Franchet d'Esperey with regard to the disarmament of Bulgaria.	319
28 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 24	Aug. 5	1. Approval of instructions to General Franchet d'Esperey regarding the disarmament of Bulgaria.	320
		2. Situation in Hungary: telegrams from Capt. Gregory and Lt.-Col. Romanelli; approval of instructions to the Allied Military Mission at Budapest; adoption of a telegram to the Roumanian, Yugoslav, and Hungarian Governments.	321
		3. Coal situation in Europe; statement by Mr. Hoover; proposal to constitute a European Coal Commission.	325
		4. Question of the treaty for the protection of minorities in Czechoslovakia.	329
		5. Situation in Bulgaria; hearing of M. Venizelos; Greek position with regard to Thrace and Asia Minor.	330
		App. A. Telegram to the Governments of Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.	333
		App. B. Directive for the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	333
GENERAL PARASKEVOPOULOS Smyrna	Aug. 2	App. D. Dispatch to M. Venizelos respecting disturbances at Aidin.	334

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
MOHAMMEDANS OF WESTERN THRACE Kavalla	July 29	App. E. Telegram to M. Venizelos in favour of liberation from Bulgarian rule.	335
29 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 25	Aug. 6	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Question of the surrender of German officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. 336 2. Situation in Hungary; adoption of a telegram to the Roumanian Govern- ment refusing to recognize the imposi- tion of a separate Roumano-Hungar- ian armistice; hearing of Roumanian representatives. 336 3. Turkish satisfaction at the constitution of a commission of inquiry into events at Smyrna. 343 4. Repatriation of Czechoslovak forces in Siberia. 344 5. Situation in the Baltic Provinces; action of General von der Goltz. 345 6. Appointment of Allied Commissioners to negotiate between the German and Polish Governments; addition of a Japanese representative. 346 7. Approval of the draft treaty for the protection of minorities in Czecho- slovakia. 346 8. Approval of the draft treaty for the protection of minorities in Roumania. 347 [9. Reply to the note of the Austrian Delegation on the protection of minorities.] 348 10. Proposal by M. Venizelos for the encouragement of voluntary emigra- tion in the Balkans. 348 [11. Eventual restitution to the Allies of rolling-stock moved beyond the armis- tice frontier in violation of the Armis- tice of Villa Giusti.] 349 12. Reconciliation of certain clauses of the treaty of peace with Austria with those of treaties to be concluded with Allied States constituted from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 349 13. Reference to the Supreme War Council of the question of the dispatch of war material to Yugoslavia. 349 14. Adoption of measures to prevent Germany from disposing of aero- nautical material. 350 [15. Liberation of prisoners of war formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Army, now nationals of an Allied State.] 351 [16. Immediate liberation of Turkish prisoners of war in Egypt.] 351 	
MR. BALFOUR Paris	Aug. 5	App. A. Letter to M. Dutasta regarding the surrender of German war criminals.	352

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
COLONEL LOGAN Paris	Aug. 6	App. B. Letter to Colonel Wallace enclosing a telegram from Budapest transmitting the terms of a Roumano-Hungarian armistice.	352
GENERAL DUVAL Paris	July 31	App. I. Note to M. Clemenceau enclosing a British report from Berlin relative to a German infraction of the air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.	355
30 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 26	Aug. 7	1. Consideration of telegrams concerning the situation in Hungary; telegram to be sent to the Roumanian Government. 2. Bulgarian frontiers; question of Thrace. 3. Adoption of the frontier between Roumania and Czechoslovakia. 4. Question of Teschen. 5. Belgian claims in East Africa.	356 361 364 364 365
MR. J. F. DULLES Paris		App. A. Memorandum relative to the armistice terms presented by Roumania to Hungary.	366
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris		App. B. Telegram to General Gorton transmitting a representation from the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government.	367
LORD MILNER and M. ORTS Paris	May 30	App. D. Anglo-Belgian agreement relative to German East Africa.	369
31 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 27	Aug. 8	1. Financial situation in Fiume. 2. Situation in Hungary. 3. Procedure for replying to Austrian notes. 4. Sale of State property by the Turkish Government. 5. Reparation and financial clauses in the peace treaty with Bulgaria. 6. Adoption of Marshal Foch's proposals with regard to German military forces on the right bank of the Rhine. 7. Allied forces of occupation for Upper Silesia, Danzig, and Memel. [8. Clearance of battlefields.] 9. Organization of Allied Control Commissions for Germany. 10. Co-ordination of the military clauses in the draft treaties with Hungary and Austria. 11. German prisoners in the custody of the American Armies. 12. Blockade of Soviet Russia.	370 370 371 371 373 374 375 379 379 380 381 381
SIGNOR TITTONI Paris	Aug. 7	App. A. Note to M. Clemenceau regarding the financial situation at Fiume.	382
CAPT. GREGORY Vienna	Aug. 7	App. B. Situation in Budapest.	383

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
M. DEFRANCE Constantinople	Aug. 1	App. C. Telegram regarding the sale of State property by the Turkish Government.	383
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Aug. 4	App. E. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to the proposed strength of German forces on the right bank of the Rhine.	384
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Aug. 6	App. F. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to troops of occupation for Upper Silesia, Danzig, and Memel.	385
PRESIDENT WILSON Washington	[Aug. 2]	App. H. Reply to the Allied inquiry of July 27 regarding the proposed blockade of Soviet Russia.	386
32 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 28	Aug. 11	1. Situation in Hungary. 2. Consideration of a letter from the Czechoslovak Delegation relative to the Roumanian occupation of Hungary. 3. Situation in Armenia; telegram from Colonel Haskell; Allied inability to provide troops. 4. Execution of clauses 227-30 of the Treaty of Versailles. 5. Exchange of goods between countries of Central Europe. 6. Consideration of a note from Supreme Economic Council on the economic policy of the Allies in Russia. [7. Improvement of the railway from Chambéry to Turin.] 8. Repatriation of Czechoslovak forces in Siberia. 9. Proposals to prevent Germany from disposing of aeronautical material.	387 388 389 390 392 392 393 393 394
ALLIED MISSIONS, AND THE ARCHDUKE JOSEPH Budapest	Aug. 8-9	App. A. Four telegrams to the Peace Conference regarding the situation in Hungary.	394
GENERAL DUPONT Berlin	Aug. 4	App. C. Note to Marshal Foch regarding the surrender of German war criminals.	397
33 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 29	Aug. 12	1. Instructions to committees preparing clauses for the treaty with Hungary. 2. Situation in Hungary. 3. Frontiers of Bulgaria in Thrace. 4. Recognition of the Republic of Austria under that title only. 5. Consideration of clauses proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria. 6. Consideration of clauses on responsibilities for the treaty with Hungary.	399 399 399 402 402 402
M. J. CAMBON Paris M. 452		App. B. Appellation of the Republic of Austria.	403

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
34 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H.D. 30	Aug. 13	1. Situation in Hungary; telegrams from the Allied Military Mission in Budapest; status of the Mission.	404
35 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 5 p.m. H.D. 31	Aug. 14	1. Hungarian affairs; consideration of a note from the Roumanian Government and agreement of a reply thereto.	409
		2. Consideration of economic clauses for the treaty with Bulgaria.	412
		3. Greek participation in the commission of inquiry into events at Smyrna.	413
M. ANTONESCU Paris		App. A. Note to M. Pichon denying that the Roumanian Government had favoured the assumption of power in Hungary by the Government of the Archduke Joseph.	414
ROUMANIAN DELEGATION		App. B. Reply of the Roumanian Government to the communications of the Peace Conference presented at Bucharest on August 9.	414
M. PICHON Paris		App. C. Telegram to the Roumanian Government in reply to the Roumanian note delivered on August 14.	416
M. SERRUYS Paris	Aug. 12	App. D. Note to M. Clemenceau concerning economic clauses in the peace treaty with Bulgaria.	417
M. DEFRAUCE Constantinople	Aug. 11	App. E. Telegram relative to the composition of the Allied commission of inquiry for Smyrna; Greek participation.	418
36 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H.D. 32	Aug. 18	1. Situation in Hungary; Allied lack of confidence in the new Hungarian Government.	418
		2. Situation in Silesia; strikes and conflicts between German and Polish elements.	421
		3. Programme of work for the Conference.	425
		4. Functions of the Editing Committee with regard to the treaty with Austria.	425
		5. Action by General Franchet d'Esperey with regard to Bulgarian disarmament.	426
		6. Reported recall of General von der Goltz.	427
		7. Occupation by Austrian forces of German-speaking districts of Western Hungary.	427
		8. Occupation of Prekomurje by Yugoslav forces.	428
		9. Frontier in the Baranya.	428
		[10. Distribution of expenses of the Delimitation Commissions.]	429
		[11. Allowances to officers on Commissions of Control in Germany.]	429
GENERAL BANDHOLTZ Budapest	Aug. 15	App. A. Telegram to M. Clemenceau regarding the situation at Budapest.	429

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
ARCHDUKE JOSEPH Budapest No. 132	Aug. 16	App. B. Communication to M. Clemenceau concerning the formation of a new Hungarian Government.	429
		App. C. Telegram to the Allied Military Mission at Budapest concerning the Allied refusal to recognize the new Hungarian Government.	430
MR. HOOVER Vienna Ham No. 1158	Aug. 18	App. D. Telegram to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace concerning unrest in Upper Silesia.	430
37 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 33	Aug. 19	1. Functions of the Editing Committee with regard to the treaty with Austria; character of the new Austrian State.	431
		2. Blockade of Soviet Russia.	437
		3. Liechtenstein and Vorarlberg.	439
		4. Situation in Silesia; action to be taken.	439
BRITISH DELEGATION No. 265 M. 460	Aug. 13	App. A. Note regarding measures to prevent goods reaching Soviet Russia.	442
FRENCH DELEGATION	[? Aug. 17]	App. B. Note communicating a telegram from the French Naval Attaché at Stockholm concerning a proposal to run the blockade of Soviet Russia.	443
BRITISH DELEGATION M. 471	Aug. 19	App. C. Proposed resolution regarding Liechtenstein and Vorarlberg.	443
GENERAL HENRYS Warsaw	Aug. 19	App. D. Telegram regarding unrest in Upper Silesia.	444
MR. GIBSON WARSAW	Aug. 18	App. E. Telegram to Mr. Polk regarding unrest in Upper Silesia.	444
MARSHAL FOCH Paris		App. F. Draft telegram to Generals Nudant and Dupont concerning communications to be made to the German Government with regard to the unrest in Upper Silesia.	445
38 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 34	Aug. 20	1. Turkish representation on the commission of inquiry at Smyrna.	446
		2. Situation in the Baltic States; question of their status; formation of the North-West Russian Government.	446
		3. Evacuation of Latvia by German forces.	449
		4. Situation in Silesia; approval of telegrams to Sir P. Wyndham and General Dupont.	450
		5. Adoption of military, naval, and air clauses for insertion in the treaty of peace with Hungary.	452
		6. Adoption of replies to the German Delegation concerning the calculation of war damages in devastated territories and the restitution of certain topographical plans.	453

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
38 Continued	Aug. 20	[7. Request of the Yugoslav Delegation to be heard on the subject of the financial and reparation clauses in the treaty with Bulgaria.]	453
		8. Situation in Hungary; telegram from the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	454
		9. Intentions of the Austrian Delegation with regard to signing the treaty of peace.	454
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Aug. 18	App. A. Note to M. Clemenceau on the evacuation of Latvia by German forces.	455
M. HAGUENIN Berlin	Aug. 19	App. B. Telegram regarding the situation in Upper Silesia.	458
POLISH DELEGATION		App. C. Note concerning the situation in Upper Silesia.	459
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 3972	Aug. 19	App. D. Telegram transmitting to General Dupont a message from M. Pichon regarding the situation in Upper Silesia.	460
COMMITTEE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REPARATION COMMISSION		App. F. Proposed reply to a German note with respect to the estimation of war damages in the devastated regions.	461
MR. POLK Paris M. 477		App. I. Proposed communication from M. Clemenceau to the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	462
39 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 35	Aug. 21	1. Roumanian requisitions in Hungary.	463
		2. Anglo-Belgian agreement regarding mandated territory in East Africa.	463
		3. Coal situation in Central Europe and the position in Upper Silesia; report by Mr. Hoover; proposed mission of Mr. Hoover to Berlin.	463
		4. Situation in Hungary; report by Mr. Hoover.	468
GENERAL DUPONT Berlin		App. B. Telegrams relative to the situation in Upper Silesia.	470
		App. C. Instructions for Mr. Hoover's proposed mission to Berlin.	471
40 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 36	Aug. 22	1. Affairs in Silesia; instructions to General Dupont and Colonel Good-year.	471
		2. Allied troops for the plebiscite zone in Upper Silesia.	474
		3. Consideration of a report from the Economic Commission with regard to the Austrian counter-proposals.	476
		4. Sale of aeronautic material by Germany.	479
		5. Alleged Roumanian intentions in the Banat.	480
		6. Situation in Hungary.	481
		7. Use of the port of Danzig.	481

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
40 <i>Continued</i>	Aug. 22	8. Dispatch to Germany of advance elements of Control Commissions.	481
		[9. Use by the British and American armies of rolling-stock taken over from the German authorities under the Armistice.]	482
		10. Dispatch to Flensburg of a member of the Schleswig Plebiscite Commission.	482
CAPT. GREGORY Vienna	Aug. 21	App. A. Telegram to Mr. Hoover transmitting a report from Colonel Good-year on unrest in Upper Silesia.	482
M. HAGUENIN Berlin	Aug. 21	App. B. Telegram reporting on German-Polish relations and the constitution of committees of the German National Assembly.	483
		App. C. Telegram to General Dupont (Berlin) respecting activities of commissions for Upper Silesia.	483
GENERAL DUVAL Paris	Aug. 17	App. E. Report to M. Clemenceau concerning German aeronautical material.	484
M. FONTENAY Belgrade	Aug. 20	App. F. Telegram concerning alleged Roumanian designs in the Banat.	486
	Aug. 22	App. G. Telegram informing the Allied Military Mission in Budapest of Allied inability to conclude peace with the existing Hungarian Government.	487
CAPT. GREGORY Vienna Ham No. 1192	Aug. 22	App. H. Telegram to Mr. Hoover concerning the political situation in Hungary.	488
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 3940	Aug. 17	App. J. Note to M. Clemenceau concerning the dispatch to Germany of advance elements of Control Commissions.	488
41 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3.30 p.m. H. D. 37	Aug. 23	1. Roumanian requisitions in Hungary; adoption of a telegram to the Roumanian Government; prohibition of delivery of war material to Roumania.	490
		2. Situation in Silesia.	491
		3. German prisoners of war in Allied countries.	491
		4. Composition of Allied forces for plebiscite areas in Eastern Europe.	493
		5. Sale of aeronautical material by Germany; conditional adoption of a telegram to the German Government.	495
		6. Blockade of Soviet Russia.	495
		7. Approval of a declaration to be signed by Austria with regard to the suspension of commercial relations with Hungary.	495
		8. Consideration of clauses dealing with ports, waterways, and railways in the treaty with Austria.	496

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
41 <i>Continued</i>	Aug. 23	9. Consideration of clauses on ports, waterways, and railways in the treaty with Bulgaria.	497
		10. Regulation of traffic on the Danube.	497
		11. Question of the draft treaty on the subject of the cost of liberation of territories in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.	497
		12. Question of the draft agreement relative to the contribution payable by Italy for the liberation of territories belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.	498
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris		App. A. Telegram to the Roumanian Government with regard to Roumanian requisitions in Hungary.	498
COLONEL GOODYEAR Mährisch Ostrau	Aug. 22	App. B. Telegram to Mr. Hoover concerning the situation in Upper Silesia.	500
		App. C. Draft telegram to the Interallied Armistice Commission transmitting a communication to the German Government respecting the sale of aeronautical material.	501
ALLIED BLOCKADE COMMITTEE	Aug. 21	App. D. Draft note to the German Government respecting the trade embargo against Soviet Russia.	501
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL M. 491		App. H. Draft letter from M. Clemenceau to the Roumanian Government respecting the regulation of traffic on the Danube.	502
42 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3:30 p.m. H. D. 38	Aug. 25	1. Consideration of the report of the commission of inquiry into incidents at Fiume.	505
		2. Chairmanship of Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	505
		3. Situation in Hungary; telegram from General Bandholtz.	505
		4. Sale of material by American and British troops of occupation in Germany.	507
		5. Consideration of a notification to the Turkish Government by the American High Commissioner at Constantinople regarding Armenian massacres; possibility of a French contingent for Armenia.	508
		6. Consideration of the proposed allied reply to the Austrian observations on the draft treaty of peace; questions of Gmünd, Marburg, Radkersburg, and Carinthia.	509
		7. Approval of the draft agreement regarding the contribution of Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia to the cost of liberating the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.	512

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
42 <i>Continued</i>	Aug. 25	8. Approval of the draft agreement regarding the Italian contribution towards cost of liberating the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.	512
		9. Proposal by M. Tardieu; prohibition of all action tending to overthrow the Austrian State as constituted by the treaty of peace.	512
ALLIED COMMISSION OF INQUIRY Fiume	Aug. 9	App. A. Report on incidents at Fiume.	514
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION Budapest N. 181 and T. 180	Aug. 23-4	App. B. Two telegrams to the Supreme Council respecting the situation in Hungary.	522
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Aug. 25	App. C. Telegram from the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government requesting a reply to its telegram of August 23.	523
FRENCH DELEGATION	Aug. 23	App. D. Sale of material by British and American troops in Germany.	523
M. DEFRANCE Constantinople	Aug. 23	App. E. Telegram on the action of Admiral Bristol in presenting a memorandum to the Turkish Government before consultation with the Allied High Commissioners.	524
CO-ORDINATION COM- MITTEE FOR THE REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION	Aug. 25	App. F. Note to the Supreme Council transmitting the draft Allied reply to the observations of the Austrian Delegation on the draft treaty of peace.	525
43 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 39	Aug. 26	1. Situation in Upper Silesia.	541
		2. Consideration of the report upon incidents at Fiume.	542
		3. Consideration of the draft allied reply to the Austrian observations on the draft treaty; questions of Radkersburg and Marburg; economic organization of Central Europe.	544
		4. Violation of the peace treaty with Germany by article 61 of the new German Constitution contemplating an Austro-German union.	550
		5. Question of the note to the Roumanian Government relative to regulation of traffic on the Danube.	551
GENERAL DUPONT Berlin	Aug. 25	App. A. Telegram to Marshal Foch reporting objections to the proposed Allied Commission for Upper Silesia.	551
44 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 40	Aug. 27	1. Consideration of the economic clauses of the treaty with Austria; economic relations between Austria and the New States of Central Europe.	552
		2. Supply of coal to Austria by Czechoslovakia and Poland.	554

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
44 <i>Continued</i>	Aug. 27	[3. Col de Reschen and Pas de Predil Railway.] 555	
		4. Situation in Upper Silesia. 555	
		5. Publication of the Allied telegram of August 23 to the Roumanian Government. 555	
		6. German prisoners of war; constitution of an Allied Committee for repatriation. 555	
		7. Question of a plebiscite in Styria. 558	
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris		App. C. Telegram to General Dupont respecting the Allied Commission for Upper Silesia. 560	
45 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 41	Aug. 28	1. Procedure of the Supreme Council. 561	
		2. Repatriation of German prisoners of war; nominations to the Allied Committee. 561	
		3. Consideration of article 61 of the German Constitution contemplating an Austro-German union. 562	
		4. Question of the reply to the Austrian observations on the subject of the frontiers of Styria. 562	
		5. Question of the reply to the Austrian observations with regard to part 3 of the draft treaty. 562	
		6. Question of the reply to the Austrian observations with regard to ports, waterways, and railways. 563	
		[7. Question of the reply to the Austrian observations on the subject of the labour clauses.] 564	
		8. Drafting of the covering letter to the reply to the Austrian Delegation. 565	
46 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 42	Aug. 29	1. Rejection of a plebiscite in Styria; Radkersburg attributed to Austria, and Marburg to Yugoslavia. 566	
		2. Question of the reply to the Austrian Delegation regarding labour clauses. 568	
		3. Question of the admission of Austrian and German Labour Delegates to the International Labour Conference at Washington. 568	
		4. Situation in Armenia. 569	
		5. Postponement of consideration of the draft covering letter to the reply to the Austrian Delegation. 570	
		6. The question of article 61 of the new German Constitution. 570	
		[7. Col de Reschen and Pas de Predil Railway.] 570	
		8. The question of Vorarlberg. 571	
		9. Execution of the recommendations of the Allied Commission on incidents at Fiume. 572	
		10. Blockade of Soviet Russia: the American attitude. 572	
		11. Form of treaties with New States. 573	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
COL. HASKELL Tiflis		App. A. Telegram to M. Clemenceau urging the need for an Allied military contingent in Armenia.	574
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. B. Note with regard to the dispatch of a French force to Armenia.	574
47 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 43	Aug. 30	1. Adoption of the covering letter in reply to the Austrian counter-proposals. 575 2. The question of article 61 of the German Constitution. 578 [3. Draft article for the treaty with Austria for the settlement of differences between States called upon to conclude special conventions.] 580 4. Languages of the peace treaty with Austria. 581 5. The question of the proposed treaty for the protection of minorities in Yugoslavia. 581	
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Aug. 29	App. C. Opinion upon article 61 of the German Constitution. 581	
		App. E. Divergences between the English and French texts of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 582	
48 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 44	Sept. 1	1. Adoption of a draft treaty with Yugoslavia for the protection of minorities; question of a special régime in Macedonia. 583 2. Frontiers of Bulgaria in Thrace. 589 3. Situation in Armenia. 591 4. Repatriation of German prisoners of war in British and American custody. 591 5. The question of article 61 of the new German Constitution. 592	
M. VENIZELOS Paris	Aug. 24	App. B. Letter to M. Clemenceau respecting the proposed alternative solutions to the question of Thrace. 593	
PRESIDENT WILSON Washington		App. C. Telegram concerning the question of Thrace. 594	
		App. E. Draft note to the German Government respecting article 61 of the German Constitution. 595	
49 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 45	Sept. 2	1. Adoption of a note to the German Government respecting article 61 of the German Constitution. 596 2. Situation in Silesia. 597 3. Adoption of a Bulgarian frontier-line in Thrace; Bulgarian economic access to the Aegean; Allied military occupation of certain areas in Thrace. 597 4. Proposed Roumanian frontier in the Dobrudja; Roumanian action in Hungary; proposed Allied ultimatum to Roumania. 598	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
49 <i>Continued</i>	Sept. 2	[5. Proposed addition to article 263 of the treaty with Austria.]	601
		6. Allied replies to the Austrian counter-proposals not to constitute authoritative interpretations of the peace treaty.	602
M. BERTHELOT Paris		App. A. Revised draft letter to the German Government respecting article 61 of the German Constitution.	603
CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE	Sept. 1	App. B. Report on the southern frontier of Bulgaria.	603
ADMIRAL TROUBRIDGE Budapest	Aug. 30	App. C. Telegram to the British Delegation respecting Roumanian demands on Hungary.	604
GENERAL GORTON Budapest No. G. 45	Aug. 30	App. D. Telegram to the British Delegation respecting Roumano-Hungarian relations.	605
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION Budapest Nos. 191, 206, 215, 225	Aug. 26-31	App. E. Four telegrams respecting the situation in Hungary; new Hungarian Government; letter of M. Friedrich to the Mission.	605
50 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 46	Sept. 3	1. Evacuation of Albania.	609
		2. Roumanian affairs.	610
		[3. Question of the allotment of rolling-stock found in Hungary.]	612
		4. Postponement of consideration of the proposed treaty with Poland relating to Eastern Galicia.	612
		5. Request of the Czechoslovak Delegation to be heard on the subject of Teschen.	612
		6. Adoption of an economic clause for the treaty with Bulgaria.	613
		7. Question of the completion of the draft treaty with Bulgaria.	615
		[8. Opinion of the Financial Commission on certain proposals of M. Venizelos for the treaty with Bulgaria.]	616
COMMISSIONS ON POLISH AND ON CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS	Aug. 22	App. C. Report on the questions of Teschen and Orava.	616
51 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 47	Sept. 4	1. Question of sending advance elements of Allied Commissions of Control to Germany.	619
		2. Prolongation of the time allowed the Austrian Delegation for the consideration of the Allied reply.	620
		3. Roumanian affairs; Sir G. Clerk to proceed to Bucharest with an Allied communication to the Roumanian Government.	620
		[4. Clauses relative to immigration proposed for insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria.]	623
		5. Question of Teschen; hearing of M. Benes.	624

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 4243	Sept. 3	App. A. Note to M. Clemenceau enclosing and commenting on a report by Captain Laperche of a conversation with Baron von Lersner concerning the dispatch to Germany of advance elements of Allied Control Commissions.	628
ROUMANIAN DELEGATION	Sept. 3	App. C. Note to M. Clemenceau relating to Roumanian and Hungarian Affairs.	629
M. DE SAINT-AULAIRE Bucharest	Aug. 30	App. D. Telegram reporting M. Bratianu's views with regard to the Roumanian occupation of Hungary.	630
MR. BALFOUR Paris		App. E. Allied letter to the Roumanian Government respecting Roumanian policy in Hungary.	630
52 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 48	Sept. 5	1. Situation in Silesia. 2. Question of the Dobrudja; Roumano-Bulgarian frontier to be unchanged by the peace treaty with Bulgaria. 3. Question of Teschen; hearing of the Polish and Czechoslovak Delegations. 4. Instructions to Sir G. Clerk on his mission to Bucharest. 5. Access of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea.	633 633 635 641 641
GENERAL DUPONT Berlin	Sept. 1	App. A. Unrest in Silesia.	641
AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE		App. B. Draft article relative to the attribution of the Dobrudja proposed for insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria.	642
53 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 49	Sept. 8	[1. Language to be used in the Conventions replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels.] 2. Sending to Germany of advance elements of the Commissions of Control. 3. Question of replying to the note of the German Delegation regarding article 61 of the German Constitution. 4. Protest of the Yugoslav Delegation against the treaty for the protection of minorities in Yugoslavia. 5. Roumanian reservation regarding article 60 of the treaty of peace with Austria.	642 642 643 644 646
BARON VON LERSNER Versailles No. 17	Sept. 5	App. B. Note respecting article 61 of the German Constitution. App. C. Draft reply to the note from the German Delegation regarding article 61 of the German Constitution.	650 652
ROUMANIAN DELEGATION	Sept. 8	App. F. Note to M. Clemenceau communicating a Roumanian reservation respecting article 60 of the treaty with Austria.	652

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
54 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 50	Sept. 9	1. Violation of the Treaty of Versailles by virtue of articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution. 653 2. Adoption of a reply to the note of the Roumanian Delegation on the subject of the provisions for minorities in the treaty with Austria. 661 3. Possible refusal of the Yugoslav Delegation to sign the peace treaty with Austria; timing of the signature of the treaty. 661 4. Modifications to the draft treaty for the protection of minorities in Yugoslavia. 662 5. Hungarian affairs. 662 6. Adoption of the draft convention replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels. 663	
MR. BALFOUR Paris	Sept. 8	App. B. Draft letter to the Roumanian Delegation regarding its reservation on article 60 of the peace treaty with Austria. 663	

CHAPTER II

Further Proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations) September 10–October 15, 1919

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
55 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11.15 a.m. H. D. 51	Sept. 10	1. Time-limit for signing the Air Convention. 664 2. Violation of the Treaty of Versailles by virtue of certain articles in the German Constitution. 665 3. Question of Teschen. 666 4. Question of the presentation of the Bulgarian peace terms. 670	
MR. BALFOUR Paris		App. A. Draft note to the German Government relative to articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution. 670	
JAPANESE DELEGATION		App. B. Draft declaration relative to article 61 of the German Constitution. 672	
56 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 52	Sept. 11	1. Aircraft industry in Germany. 672 2. Adoption of a note to the German Delegation and a draft declaration relating to article 61 of the German Constitution. 673 3. Agreement to hold a plebiscite in Teschen and Orava. 674 4. Question of admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the Labour Conference at Washington. 674 [5. Rights and privileges of Allied work-people admitted to Enemy Territories and vice versa.] 676	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
56 <i>Continued</i>	Sept. 11	6. Languages of the Air Convention.	676
		7. Question of the presentation of the treaty to the Bulgarian Delegation.	676
		8. Question of the signature of the Austrian Treaty by Yugoslav Representatives.	676
		9. Question of instructions to be given to the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	677
GENERAL GROVES Paris AS/c/595	Sept. 10	App. A. Letter to General Seely enclosing and commenting on a German memorandum relative to civil aviation in Germany.	677
DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. B. Draft note to the German Government and draft declaration relative to article 61 of the German Constitution.	680
COMMISSIONS ON POLISH AND ON CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS	Sept. 10	App. C. Report on the question of Teschen.	682
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION Budapest	Sept. 9	App. E. Situation in Hungary; request for instructions.	685
57 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 53	Sept. 15	1. Emir Feisal's journey to London.	685
		2. Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria.	686
		3. Demand for instructions from the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	686
		4. Future of the Peace Conference; outstanding questions: (a) Turkey, (b) Russia, (c) the Adriatic, (d) League of Nations, (e) Trial of the former German Emperor and of accused officers.	688
		5. Syria and Cilicia.	690
		6. Russia; question of a Polish advance on Moscow.	694
		7. Future of the Peace Conference; question of British representation.	694
		8. Russia; consultation with Marshal Foch concerning possible operations by Polish forces in Russia or the Baltic Provinces.	696
		9. Question of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.	698
		10. Trial of the former German Emperor.	698
		11. Trial of accused German officers.	699
		12. Question of Fiume.	699
BRITISH DELEGATION	Sept. 13	App. B. <i>Aide-mémoire</i> in regard to the occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia pending a decision in regard to mandates.	700
58 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 4 p.m. H. D. 54	Sept. 15	1. German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces; employment of Polish forces.	701
		2. Question of Fiume and the Adriatic.	705
		3. Incidents at Fiume; Allied blockade.	708

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
58 <i>Continued</i>	Sept. 15	4. Question of the signature by Yugoslav representatives of the treaty of peace with Austria and the treaty for the protection of minorities in Yugoslavia; attitude of Roumania.	708
		5. Instructions to the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.	709
SIGNOR TITTONI Paris	Sept. 15	App. A. The question of the Adriatic.	710
59 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H.D. 55	Sept. 17	1. Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by German forces.	711
		2. Languages of the Air Convention.	715
		3. Peace conditions with Bulgaria; territorial, political, reparation, and economic clauses.	715
		4. Arrangements for the presentation of the treaty to the Bulgarian Delegation.	720
MR. POLK Paris	Sept. 16	App. A. Letter to M. Clemenceau opposing the employment of Polish forces in the Baltic Provinces.	720
MARSHAL FOCH Paris		App. B. Draft note to the German Government concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	720
60 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H.D. 56	Sept. 18	[1. Admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the International Labour Conference at Washington.]	722
		2. Consideration of a draft note to the German Delegation relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces; hearing of General Gough.	722
		3. Agreement as to the occupation of Western Thrace by Allied forces.	728
		4. Arrangements for the delivery of conditions of peace to the Bulgarian Delegation.	730
GENERAL WEYGAND Paris		App. B. Draft note to the German Delegation concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	731
61 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H.D. 57	Sept. 19	1. Situation in Hungary.	732
		2. Occupation of Western Thrace by Allied forces.	732
		3. Status of Eastern Galicia.	733
		4. Coal Supply of Austria.	740
		[5. Allowances for officers of the Allied Commissions of Control.]	741
SIR G. CLERK Bucharest	Sept. 12-13	App. A. Telegrams regarding the communication to M. Bratianu of the Allied Note.	741
MESSRS. DULLES and NICOLSON Paris	Sept. 18	App. B. Demarcation line for the occupation of Western Thrace by Allied forces.	741
COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS	Aug. 23	App. C. Report submitting a draft treaty relative to the status of Eastern Galicia.	742

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
62 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 58	Sept. 22	1. Agreement as to the limits of the occupation of Western Thrace by Allied forces. 2. Arrangements for the plebiscite in Teschen, Spisz, and Orava. [3. Allowances for Allied Commissions of Control in Germany.] 4. Evacuation of Koritzza by French troops. 5. Repatriation of Czechoslovak troops from Siberia. 6. Arrangements for the German signature of the declaration with regard to article 61 of the German Constitution.	755 756 761 761 761 762
COMMISSIONS ON POLISH AND ON CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS	Sept. 17	App. B. Draft agreement concerning the holding of a plebiscite in Teschen, Spisz, and Orava.	762
63 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H. D. 59	Sept. 23	1. Question of the disposal of certain German tankers. 2. Plebiscite at Teschen. [3. Allowances for officers of the Allied Commissions of Control.] 4. Roumanian attitude towards Hungary; question of the trade embargo against Roumania. 5. Hearing of M. Paderewski on the question of Eastern Galicia. 6. Arrangement of the work of the Supreme Council.	764 766 768 768 770 772
GENERAL BANDHOLTZ Budapest No. 74	Sept. 16	App. A. Transmission of a telegram from Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council reporting on his mission to Bucharest.	772
SIR G. CLERK Bucharest	Sept. 19	App. B. Telegram to the Supreme Council relative to Roumanian conduct in Budapest.	774
SIR G. CLERK Bucharest	Sept. 19	App. C. Telegram to Sir E. Crowe reporting proposed movements.	774
64 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 60	Sept. 25	[1. Convention of the Plenary Labour Commission.] 2. Question of the disposal of certain German tankers. [3. Question of Spitzbergen.] 4. Recognition of the Portuguese claim to Kionga. 5. Organization of Allied Commissions of Control for Austria. 6. Mission of Sir George Clerk. 7. German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. 8. Blockade of Soviet Russia. 9. Status of Eastern Galicia. 10. Determination of the eastern frontiers of Poland.	775 775 776 776 776 777 777 781 784 785
AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE		App. H. Note relative to the blockade of Soviet Russia.	786

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
BRITISH DELEGATION		App. I. Draft relative to the blockade of Soviet Russia.	786
COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS		App. J. Addition to article 12 of the draft statute for Eastern Galicia.	786
MR. POLK Paris	Sept. 25	App. K. Memorandum relative to the draft statute for Eastern Galicia.	787
COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS	Sept. 1	App. L. Report on the eastern frontiers of Poland.	788
65 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 61	Sept. 26	1. Question of the disposal of certain German tankers.	792
		2. Proposed treaty with New States relating to reciprocal relations in transferred territories.	793
		3. Repatriation of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia.	795
		4. Distribution of Allied troops in the plebiscite areas.	795
		5. Consideration of the report of the Commission on Baltic Affairs on the occupation of Memel.	795
		6. Selection of military experts under article 163 of the Treaty of Versailles.	796
		7. Question of a communication to German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	796
		8. German property in territory to be ceded to Poland.	796
		9. The question of Eupen and Malmedy.	797
		10. Question of the publication of documents connected with the Treaty of Versailles.	798
EARL CURZON London	Sept. 25	App. A. Telegram to Sir E. Crowe relative to German tankers.	799
COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION OF POLITICAL CLAUSES OF THE TREATY WITH GERMANY	Sept. 5	App. E. Note enclosing and commenting on a German circular relative to German property in territories to be ceded to Poland.	799
BARON VON LERSNER Versailles	Aug. 1	App. F. Note to M. Clemenceau protesting against a notice issued under Belgian authority at Eupen.	801
BARON VON LERSNER Versailles	Aug. 5	App. G. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to Belgian action in Eupen and Malmedy.	802
COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION OF POLITICAL CLAUSES OF THE TREATY WITH GERMANY	Sept. 5	App. H. Note to the Supreme Council submitting a draft reply to German notes relative to Eupen and Malmedy.	803
BRITISH DELEGATION	Aug. 26	App. I. Note to M. Dutasta with regard to the publication of documents relating to the Treaty of Versailles.	804

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
66 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 62	Sept. 27	1. Disposal of certain German tankers. [2. Authorization for German ships to proceed to Turkish ports.] 3. Adoption of a communication to the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. 4. Proposals relative to the Air Conven- tion. 5. Question of the publication of docu- ments relative to the treaty of Ver- sailles. [6. Insertion in the treaty with Hungary of an article identical with article 310 of the treaty with Austria.] 7. Creation of a Commission to study the repatriation of enemy prisoners in Siberia. 8. Signature of the decision taken by the Allied and Associated Powers for the organization of a plebiscite at Teschen.	805 808 808 811 812 812 812 813
FRENCH DELEGATION	Sept. 24	App. A. Note on German tankers.	814
GERMAN DELEGATION Versailles	Sept. 26	App. C. Résumé of conversations between an American representative and Baron von Lersner.	816
DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. D. Draft note to the German Govern- ment relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	817
	Sept. 27	App. E. Revised note to the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	818
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Sept. 18	App. F. Note relative to the Air Conven- tion.	819
67 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 63	Sept. 29	1. German ships sold during the war to Dutch navigation companies. 2. Sale of aeronautical material by the German Government. [3. Adoption of a report from the Military Representatives at Versailles on the distribution of enemy aeronautical material.] [4. Removal of rolling-stock beyond the armistice frontier in violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti.] [5. Distribution of German submarine engines and parts.] 6. Blockade of Soviet Russia. [7. Delimitation of the frontier between Austria and Hungary.] 8. Roumanian activities in Hungary.	821 821 823 824 824 826 826
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Sept. 27	App. A. Letter to M. Clemenceau relative to the sale of aeronautical material by the German Government.	827
DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. E. Status of blockade measures against Soviet Russia.	828

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
FRENCH LEGATION Stockholm		App. F. Swedish attitude towards the blockade of Soviet Russia.	829
		App. G. Allied note to Neutral Governments relative to the blockade of Soviet Russia.	830
GENERAL BANDHOLTZ Budapest No. 88	Sept. 24	App. I. Telegram concerning the Roumanian attitude towards the arming of Hungarian police.	830
68 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 64	Sept. 30	1. Cost of Allied armies of occupation in Germany.	831
		2. Proposed supply of oil by Germany to Lithuania.	834
		3. Procedure for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria.	835
		4. General economic situation of Europe.	836
		[5. Appointment of arbitrators for the division of tonnage on the river Danube.]	837
		6. Consideration of a protest from the Greek Delegation regarding the composition and functioning of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.	837
		7. British proposal for investigation of complaints arising from incidents at Smyrna.	838
		8. Question of the Åland Islands.	838
		9. Questions of Karelia and Petchenga.	838
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Versailles	Apr. 22	App. A. Report relative to the cost of the maintenance of the troops of occupation in Rhenish Territory.	839
SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL	Sept. 29	App. C. Note for the Supreme Council on procedure for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria.	844
FRENCH DELEGATION	Sept. 20	App. D. General economic situation of Europe.	845
MARQUIS DELLA TORRETTA Paris	Aug. 25	App. I. Note to M. Dutasta concerning the questions of Karelia and Petchenga.	846
69 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 65	Oct. 2	[1. Negotiations with the Netherlands regarding the modification of the Convention of Mannheim.]	849
		2. Military supplies for the Polish Government.	849
		[3. Designation of members of the Commission for the repatriation of enemy prisoners of war from Siberia.]	851
		4. Repatriation of Polish, Yugoslav, and Roumanian troops from Siberia.	852
		5. Transfer of the Russian battleship <i>Volya</i> to General Denikin.	852
		[6. Applications from Finland, Norway, and the Netherlands for admission to the Labour Conference at Washington.]	853

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
69 <i>Continued</i>	Oct. 2	7. Procedure to be followed in notifying Neutral Governments regarding the blockade of Soviet Russia.	853
		8. Situation in the Comitats of Western Hungary; dispatch of an Allied Military Mission.	853
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Sept. 29	App. C. Note to M. Clemenceau enclosing and commenting upon a Polish memorandum requesting Allied assistance in military supplies.	855
BRITISH DELEGATION	Sept. 30	App. E. Proposal to transfer the Russian battleship <i>Volya</i> to General Denikin.	860
70 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 66	Oct. 7	1. Reply to the German note relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	861
		2. Maintenance and repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.	862
		3. Organization at Vienna of a sub-commission of the Organizing Committee of the Reparation Commission.	864
		4. Adoption of a telegram to the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments respecting the supply of coal to Austria.	865
		5. Dispatch of Allied officers to Upper Silesia to ensure the normal output of coal.	865
		[6. Appointment of a Commission charged with the provisional redistribution of the rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.]	866
		[7. Allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany.]	867
		8. Question of the nomination of the plebiscite commission for Teschen.	867
		9. Delimitation of Greek and Italian zones of occupation in Asia Minor.	868
		10. Postponement of consideration of the observations of the Roumanian Delegation respecting the clauses concerning ports, waterways, and railways in the treaty of peace with Hungary.	872
		11. Postponement of the appointment of a Committee for the execution of Colonial Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.	872
BARON VON OW- WACHENDORF Düsseldorf	Oct. 3	App. A. Note from the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by German forces.	872
BRITISH DELEGATION	Sept. 30	App. B. Russian prisoners in Germany.	873
EUROPEAN COAL COMMISSION	Oct. 1	App. D. Draft telegram to the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments relative to the supply of coal to Austria.	876
SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 60	Sept. 25	App. E. Telegram to General Malcolm relative to the proposed dispatch of Allied officers to Upper Silesia to ensure coal production.	877

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
COLONEL LOGAN Paris		App. F. Distribution of rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.	877
BRITISH DELEGATION	Oct. 2	App. H. Note transmitting a report by General Milne relative to the delimitation of Italian and Greek zones of occupation in Asia Minor.	879
71 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 67	Oct. 10	[1. Question of admission of German and Austrian delegates to the International Labour Conference at Washington.]	881
		2. Prolongation of the time allowed the Bulgarian Delegation for the presentation of observations on the conditions of peace.	881
		[3. Question of German and Austro-Hungarian ships in Spanish ports.]	882
		4. Adoption of a note to the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	882
		5. Russian prisoners of war in Germany.	883
		6. Situation in the Baltic Provinces.	884
		7. Statement by Sir G. Clerk on the situation in Roumania and Hungary.	884
		8. Dispatch to Budapest of a sub-committee to determine the reparation value of material removed from Hungary by the Roumanians.	889
		9. Composition of Allied forces of occupation.	890
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Oct. 7	App. D. Draft note to the German Government regarding the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	890
SIR E. CROWE Paris		App. E. Addition to the draft note to the German Government.	891
MARSHAL FOCH Paris		App. F. Draft resolution respecting Russian prisoners of war in Germany.	891
SIR G. CLERK Paris	Oct. 7	App. G. Letter to M. Clemenceau enclosing a report (with annexes) of his mission to Bucharest and Budapest.	892
MR. POLK Paris		App. I. Proposed resolution regarding the establishment at Budapest of a special commission of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission.	908
72 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 68	Oct. 11	1. Admission of German and Austrian Representatives to the International Labour Conference at Washington.	909
		2. Consideration of notes to the Roumanian Government and to M. Friedrich.	909
		3. Roumanian action in Bessarabia.	911
		4. Russian prisoners of war in Germany.	912
		5. Approval of constitution of Allied Commissions of Control for Austria.	913
		6. Restoration of Russian war material taken by Germany.	913
		7. Proposed insertion in the treaty of peace with Hungary of an article identical with article 36 of the treaty with Austria.	914

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
72 <i>Continued</i>	Oct. 11	8. Question of the attribution of Western Galicia.	914
		[9. Allowances to the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany.]	915
		10. Alleged delivery of war material by the Roumanian Government to General Denikin.	915
MR. POLK Paris		App. A. Draft note to Baron von Lersner regarding the admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the International Labour Conference at Washington.	916
SIR G. CLERK and M. BERTHELOT Paris		App. B. Draft Allied communication to the Roumanian Government with regard to questions outstanding.	916
		App. C. Draft telegram inviting M. Friedrich to reform the Hungarian Government.	919
MM. KRONPENSKY and SCHMIDT Paris	Sept. 26	App. D. Note to M. Clemenceau protesting against Roumanian action in Bessarabia.	919
GENERALS WEYGAND and SACKVILLE-WEST		App. E. Draft resolution respecting Russian prisoners of war in Germany.	921
SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Versailles	Oct. 6	App. F. Organization of Allied Commissions of Control for Austria.	922
RUSSIAN EMBASSY Paris	Oct. 6	App. G. Note to the American Delegation respecting Russian war material in Germany.	926
FRENCH DELEGATION	Oct. 9	App. I. Question of the attribution of Western Galicia to Poland.	927
73 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H. D. 69	Oct. 13	1. Publication of the diplomatic instruments signed at St. Germain.	928
		2. Correction of the minutes of the meeting of the 10th October.	928
		3. Consideration of a draft note to M. Friedrich; agreement to dispatch an Allied envoy to Budapest.	930
		4. No immediate publication of the Allied note to the Roumanian Government.	931
		5. Distribution of Allied forces in the plebiscite areas.	931
		6. Adoption of replies to notes of the German Government respecting the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.	935
		7. German ships acquired during the war by Dutch navigation companies.	935
		8. Question of the execution of articles 100-4 of the Treaty of Versailles respecting Danzig.	936
		9. Sale of air material to Sweden by Germany.	937

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
73 <i>Continued</i>	Oct. 13	[10. Admission of Luxemburg to the International Labour Conference at Washington.]	937
	Aug. 7 f.	Apps. A & B. Dossier of correspondence between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Delegation relative to the administration of the occupied territory of the Rhine.	937
BRITISH DELEGATION	Oct. 10	App. C. German ships acquired during the war by Dutch navigation companies.	954
BRITISH DELEGATION	Oct. 7	App. E. Sale by the German Government to Sweden of aerial material.	955
74 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 70	Oct. 15	1. Adoption of a note to the German Government relative to German ships transferred during the war to Dutch navigation companies.	956
		2. Situation in the Baltic Provinces.	958
		3. Question of the occupation of Danzig and Memel.	958
		4. Composition of Allied forces of occupation.	959
		[5. Organization of commissions of delimitation.]	960
		6. Arrangements in connexion with the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	961
		7. Procedure for the adhesion of Neutral States to the Covenant of the League of Nations.	962
		8. Arrangements for the convocation of the Council of the League of Nations.	963
		9. Wearing of uniform by the members of the Allied Commissions of Control in Germany.	964
		10. Adoption of a note to the German Government respecting the district of Memel.	965
BRITISH DELEGATION	Oct. 14	App. A. Draft note from the Supreme Council to the German Government relative to German ships acquired during the war by Dutch navigation companies.	965
FRENCH DELEGATION	Oct. 13	App. E. Arrangements in connexion with the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	966
GENERAL SECRETARIAT		App. F. Procedure for the adhesion of Neutral States to the Covenant of the League of Nations.	967
GENERAL SECRETARIAT	Oct. 14	App. G. German request that Allied officers of control in Germany wear civilian clothes after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	968
COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION OF THE POLITICAL CLAUSES OF THE TREATY WITH GERMANY	Oct. 14	App. H. Draft note to Baron von Lersner regarding Memel.	969

CHAPTER I

Proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations) before the signature of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye

July 1—September 9, 1919

No. 1

PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS. 106

I. C. 200.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 1, 1919, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Béarn, Captain de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. de Martino.

Japan: Baron Makino.

ALSO PRESENT: *France*: M. Pichon, M. Loucheur. *Japan*: Viscount Chinda.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieutenant Burden. *British Empire*: Captain Abraham. *France*: Captain A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieutenant Zanchi. *Japan*: M. Saburi.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

I. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the first business with which the Council should deal was the appointment of a Commission to watch over the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany when ratified.

Nomination of Commission to supervise the Execution of the Treaty with Germany

MR. BALFOUR said that he had intended to nominate Sir Eyre Crowe.¹

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his nominee was M. Tardieu.² The Commission was to have no executive power, but should superintend the work of all Commissions dealing with the details of the provisions of the

¹ Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and member of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference.

² French Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference and Chairman of the Central Territorial Committee of the Conference.

Treaty. The Commission would report to the Council from time to time what progress was being made, and what further action might be needed.

MR. LANSING said that he would have to consider what nomination to make.

M. TITTONI said that he could give the name of the Italian member on the following day.

BARON MAKINO nominated M. Otchiai.³

(It was agreed that the nominations should be made at the meeting on the following day.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Loucheur⁴ to explain the functions of a Commission to deal with the reparation clauses of the Treaty and to explain the necessity for its labours to begin at once, seeing that the Germans had already made certain enquiries regarding the execution of the provisions concerning the occupied districts. (See Annex [Appendix] A.)

M. LOUCHEUR said the proposal was to nominate a Commission with one member and one assistant from each of the five following States:—France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Belgium.

M. TITTONI asked whether the Commission would deal with the devastated districts on all fronts, including the Italian.

M. LOUCHEUR replied in the affirmative, but added that it was not intended to form the Commission at once in its final shape. Each Government would be able to consider the question at leisure, especially as there would be a big staff and a very large organisation. What he proposed for the time being was a Commission to prepare the ground. It was to this Commission that he suggested that each of the Powers mentioned should nominate one Delegate and one assistant. During the intermediate period between the nomination of this Commission and the formation of the ultimate organisation, he thought that this body should be authorised to converse with the Germans with the object of shaping a plan for procedure in the future. Sub-Commissions to deal with finance, rebuilding, &c., could be set up at a later time.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that this Commission would have a dual function:—

- (1) To organise the future Reparation Commission provided for in the Treaty.
- (2) To deal with the Germans and the problems raised by them in the meantime.

He further asked why Serbia was excluded.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it was intended that Serbia should take the place of Belgium whenever the question of Serbian devastated territory arose. Japan would take the place of Belgium in matters regarding the Far East

³ Secretary-General of the Japanese Delegation to the Peace Conference.

⁴ French Minister of Industrial Reconstruction and member of the French Delegation to the Peace Conference.

and damage at sea. The preliminary organisation, however, should, he suggested, be done by nominees of the five Powers first mentioned. There would, therefore, be four permanent members in the final Commission and one changeable member. He would ask that the nominations should be made within twenty-four hours, and that the Commission should meet on the afternoon of the 3rd July, 1919.

(It was agreed that the nominations should be made at the meeting on the following day.)

3. MR. LANSING said that he had not brought a second United States Delegate with him, under the impression that this was to be a Council of Five.

Constitution of the Council M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was indeed to be a Council of Five, but he had asked M. Pichon⁵ to come as he would himself have to leave the Meeting.

MR. LANSING said that his experience was that, in a Council of Ten, in practice one Delegate spoke. The other did not, but by sitting in the Council he became acquainted with the whole course of the work, and was therefore prepared at any moment to take charge, should his colleague for any reason be unable to attend.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had no objection to raise if it were desired that two Delegates from each nation should be present.

MR. BALFOUR said that the mere presence of a large number made a physical difference. He thought conversation was simpler and more informal at a gathering of five. Even a silent Delegate interposed between each of the spokesmen cramped the conversation. There had been many objections no doubt to the procedure in the Council of Four, but there had been this great advantage.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Mr. Lansing insisted on his point of view. He himself shared Mr. Balfour's.

MR. LANSING said he would not insist, but he felt the advantage of having a second Delegate present. The day's proceedings could be talked over with the second Delegate with much advantage to both. He pointed out that there must always be others present in the room. He was strongly in favour of having enough Secretaries present to make a full and agreed record of what took place.

M. TITTONI said that he saw good reasons for both points of view, but he was prepared to agree to a Council of Five if his colleagues desired it.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that a start should be made with a Council of Five, subject to alteration if necessary.

(This was agreed.)

4. MR. LANSING asked whether the decisions reached by the Council were final.

Finality of the Council's Decisions M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the affirmative.

⁵ French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the following subjects had been suggested:—
Frontiers in the following areas:—

*Agenda for
future Meetings*

1. The Banat.
2. Bukovina.
3. Bessarabia.

M. DUTASTA said that the frontiers in the Banat had been fixed and the decision had been communicated to the Yugo-Slavs and to the Roumanians. The frontiers in Bukovina had also been settled but not yet communicated.

(It was decided that the communication should be made.)

M. TITTONI enquired whether the frontiers had been only recommended by Committees or whether they had been fixed by decisions of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had been fixed by the Council.⁷

M. Clemenceau asked whether anything had been done regarding Bessarabia.

M. DUTASTA replied that, as this subject concerned Russia, no decision had been made, but the matter had been studied by the Roumanian Committee.

MR. BALFOUR thought that it was unnecessary to reach a decision concerning Bessarabia, as no Treaty of Peace had to be made either with Russia or with Roumania. He thought that there were many questions of importance of which no doubt the Bessarabian question was one, but in his opinion the Council should first deal with whatever was required to bring about peace with the enemy States.

M. TITTONI thought that the Council should make an effort to eliminate elements of disturbance and that the area in question was very disturbed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with M. Tittoni. Mr. Balfour's proposals followed the logical order, but facts were louder than logic. He thought the Council should attempt to suppress disorder as much as possible. He suggested that M. Tardieu should be heard on the following day for half an hour on Bessarabia. No decision need be taken there and then.

MR. BALFOUR said that if that half-hour was not required for other purposes, he would be delighted to hear M. Tardieu.

⁶ The text of minute 5 is printed, with minor verbal variation, by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz in *The Treaty of St. Germain* (California and London, 1935), p. 66. This minute recorded a brief discussion, originated by Mr. Lansing, on the organization of committees to consider Austrian counter-proposals to portions of the draft treaty presented to the Austrian delegation (see No. 2, note 7). In conclusion it was agreed that M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, should on the following day make a full report on the situation as regards the committees concerned. Appendix B to minute 5, containing a draft resolution by Mr. Lansing (not adopted) on the organization of committees, is also printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-7.

⁷ The preceding section of minute 6 is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, pp. 556-7.

MR. LANSING asked who would represent the Russians.

M. PICHON suggested that M. Maklakoff⁸ might be heard.

M. TITTONI said that if a Russian was to be heard, a Roumanian should also be heard.

MR. LANSING suggested that if this were done, they should be heard separately.

(This was agreed, and it was decided that M. Tardieu should be asked to make a report on the following day regarding Bessarabia, and that M. Maklakoff, on behalf of Russia, and a Roumanian Delegate should be heard separately on the same subject.)

7. MR. BALFOUR observed that there could be no peace with Bulgaria without determining Bulgarian frontiers. He suggested that this subject be examined by a Committee. The Greek Committee, however, could not deal with the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece without knowing the boundaries of Turkey. The whole Turkish question was still unsolved and was to be solved as a whole hereafter. He would suggest that the Committee be instructed to consider provisionally the Enos-Midia line as the probable frontier of the future State of Constantinople.

*Committee
for Bulgaria*

(It was agreed that on the following day nominations should be made for the special Committee regarding Bulgaria.

The Agenda for the following day was therefore:—

1. Nominations for a Commission to supervise the execution of the Treaty with Germany.
2. Nomination of an Organising Commission for Reparation.
3. Nominations for a Committee on Bulgarian Affairs.
4. Report of M. Dutasta regarding procedure in dealing with Austrian notes.
5. Hearing of M. Tardieu, M. Maklakoff and a Roumanian Delegate regarding Bessarabia.)

MR. LANSING said that he would like to add two short proposals to the Agenda. He had prepared two draft resolutions. (See Annexes C and D.)⁹

(It was agreed that these draft resolutions should be considered and that the next meeting should take place at 3.30 p.m. on the following day.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

July 1, 1919.

⁸ Russian Ambassador at Paris appointed in 1917 by the Provisional Russian Government of M. Kerensky. M. Maklakoff had been relieved of his position by the Soviet Government and was in 1919 a member of the Russian Political Conference in Paris in the interest of the administration of Admiral Kolchak.

⁹ Not printed. For the texts of these resolutions see No. 2, minutes 5 and 6 respectively.

German Peace Delegation

Mr. President,

VERSAILLES, June 30, 1919.

I have the honour, under instructions from the German Government, to inquire of Your Excellency when and where the deliberations in regard to the occupied regions are to begin.

Please to accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER,¹⁰

His Excellency the President
of the Peace Conference, M. Clemenceau.

¹⁰ Head of the German Peace Delegation in succession to Herr von Haniel, who had left Versailles after the signature of the treaty of peace with Germany on June 28, 1919.

No. 2

PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS. 107

I. C. 201.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 2, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

France: M. Tardieu; SECRETARIES, Captain de Saint-Quentin, M. de Béarn.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, Marquis Paterno, M. Bertelé.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

ALSO PRESENT: U.S.A.: Professor Coolidge, Dr. R. H. Lord, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Major D. W. Johnson, Mr. Whitehouse. *British Empire*: Hon. H. Nicolson, Mr. A. Leeper, Major Temperley. *France*: M. Laroche. *Italy*: Count Vannutelli-Rey, Colonel Castoldi. *Russia*: M. Maklakoff (for part of Meeting). *Roumania*: M. Bratiano, M. Misu, M. Diamandy, M. Pellivan (for part of Meeting).

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieutenant Burden. *British Empire*: Captain E. Abraham. *France*: Captain A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieutenant Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. TARDIEU explained that M. Pichon was unavoidably prevented from attending the meeting. He asked Mr. Lansing to take the chair.

*Question of
Bessarabia*

MR. LANSING requested M. Tardieu to take the chair himself.

M. TARDIEU did so. He said that he had been asked to open the discussion on Bessarabia by explaining the views of the Committee which had studied the question. He read the Report made by the Committee:—

‘The Committee, after taking into consideration the general aspirations of the population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region

from the geographical and ethnical points of view, as well as the historical and economic arguments, pronounces itself in favour of joining Bessarabia to Roumania.

'It considers that this measure should be effected in a form which will safeguard the general interests of Bessarabia, more especially as concerns its relations with the neighbouring countries, and which will guarantee the rights of minorities in conformity with the provisions of the League of Nations.'

Since the Committee had reported, a protest had been received from M. Tchaikowsky on behalf of the Russian Committees in Paris, protesting against any annexation by Roumania, stating that Russia could not recognise any such act, and further alleging that the Roumanian troops had behaved in a very arbitrary manner in the country. M. Tchaikowsky ended by demanding a free plebiscite.

MR. LANSING said that the practical question was to know whether a decision regarding Bessarabia could find a place in any of the Treaties of Peace.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that he had made the same remark on the previous day. He had thought it was important to do all that was necessary to complete the Treaties first. M. Clemenceau, however, had thought the Bessarabian question pressing, and had therefore urged that it should be taken up. Mr. Lansing, however, had pointed out that no resolution could be adopted on the subject, and this statement had not met with any dissent.

MR. LANSING observed that the powers accorded to him as a Plenipotentiary were limited to the negotiation of Peace. They did not enable him to deal with a conflict between two friendly Powers. President Wilson, no doubt, might have been able to deal with such a question. He himself was not in that position.

M. TARDIEU said that it had been decided on the previous day to hear a Russian and a Roumanian representative. They had been asked to come, and each would doubtless say what he thought should be the frontier line in Bessarabia. Should the two agree, which he admitted was not likely, Mr. Lansing would not be placed in the difficulty to which he alluded. Should they not agree, the Council would then be forced to see what further action could be taken. He would point out, however, that it was difficult to make a Treaty with Roumania if one of her frontiers were left gaping. He suggested that M. Maklakoff should be heard.

MR. LANSING agreed to this, but pointed out, however, that if any resolution were asked for, he could not take any share in it. He had given this warning in order that no false impression should be produced.

(At this stage M. Maklakoff entered the room, and was asked by M. Tardieu to express his views on Bessarabia.)

M. MAKLAKOFF said that two memoranda had already been sent to the Peace Conference on the subject of Bessarabia; he would endeavour to give the gist of the argument. In the first place, he must point out that no portion

of the domains of the Russian State could be disposed of by third parties without the consent of that State. Not even the Peace Conference could assume that power. He and his friends had no authority to speak for any constituted Government of Russia. He wished to make this point quite clear at the outset. As to the merits of the question, he would observe that there had never been any agreement between Roumania and Russia authorising the former to demand Bessarabia. Roumania had entered the war on certain terms, but these had not touched the question of Bessarabia. Roumania could therefore base no claim on any clause in any Treaty. Neither could Roumania claim the right of conquest. These two arguments being set aside, it was alleged that Bessarabia should go to Roumania in virtue of the principle that peoples had the right to dispose of themselves. He would not discuss this principle, subject to limitations though it might be. He would admit it, and he would further admit that if there were any Russian subjects of Roumanian nationality who wished to unite under one flag with the rest of their countrymen, Russia would be well advised to permit it. Russia was big enough to make a sacrifice of this kind, but it was the very statement that Bessarabia desired to join Roumania that he challenged. Bessarabia was not a Roumanian country as a whole. Such demonstrations of a desire to join Roumania as had occurred among a portion of the population were mere *camouflage*. It was on the question of fact that he joined issue and refused to admit the legitimacy of the Roumanian claim. He would point out that the word Bessarabia was often wrongly used. He would not go back to remote antiquity. In the eighteenth century Bessarabia had been part of Moldavia, which was then a Turkish province. The Christians in those parts had always been under the moral protection of Russia. In 1812, a few months before the Napoleonic invasion, Bessarabia became a Russian province, captured from Turkey. There were at that time some 300,000 inhabitants. At the present time there were some 3,000,000. Over forty years later the Crimean War had taken place and, in the Peace of Paris, the territory captured from Russia had been restored to her, in exchange for small areas, and Izmail and Akkerman had been added to Moldavia. The rest of the country, *i.e.* the major part, had remained Russian since 1812. Then, in 1878, at the Treaty of Berlin, the Dobrudja had been added to Roumania, giving her access to the Black Sea, and territory twice as large as the portion of Bessarabia she had held. This small portion was given back to Russia to secure Russia's access to the Danube. Ethnographically, the last census had not established a Moldavian majority in the country. There was no reason to allege that the statistics had been falsified in any manner. Parts of the country were completely Russian. There were, however, four districts in the centre which were mainly Moldavian. It was only in these districts that the question of a plebiscite arose. These districts might be united to Roumania should the population really wish it. He would not, in principle, raise any objection. The Roumanians, however, declared that Bessarabia had already expressed its will. This he denied. Immediately after the Russian revolution, municipalities elected by universal suffrage had been set up. They were the best

organs for the expression of the popular will. They had not asked to be annexed to Roumania. These municipalities had since been dissolved by the Roumanians, and their representatives had protested against the Roumanian desire to annex the country. The vote, however, had since been secured from the Sfatul Tserii, which was an emanation of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers, the latter being largely composed of Moldavian deserters. This body had resolved to make Bessarabia part of a Russian Federated Republic. This was in December 1917. In the following March, when Roumania had been forced to accept Peace, and M. Marghiloman was in power, this statesman had got into touch with the Sfatul Tserii and obtained from it a vote in favour of joining Roumania, with guarantees of local autonomy. When Roumanian troops had entered Bessarabia, invited to do so, he admitted, even by Russians, in order to re-establish order, the same body, after an interval of six months, had voted for annexation to Roumania, but out of 160 members only 46 had voted. It was a matter for surprise that a revolutionary assembly should have voted in favour of its inclusion in a monarchy. The whole vote, he submitted, was open to suspicion. It had been given during a military occupation of the country, and it was a minority vote of an arbitrarily self-appointed body. If he believed that the people backed this vote, he might be disposed to acquiesce in it, but he felt quite sure that a free plebiscite would yield a completely different result. Therefore, he asked that there should be a proper consultation of the people. He reminded the Council that there had been a time when the catastrophe in Russia imperilled the success of the Allied cause in the war. If the war had ended disastrously, and Roumania had sought compensation from Russia for the losses brought upon her by Russia's failure to continue the war, he would have understood the Roumanian claim; but Roumania had now come out on the side of the victors, among whom Russia was not. Roumania had got all she had fought for and all she had asked for before the war. Therefore, he protested with the greatest energy against the claim now made by Roumania, especially as it was not founded, as alleged, on the desire of the majority of the population. Finally, he would say that if there were districts showing a small Moldavian majority, wishing to join Roumania, he would be disposed to let them go. As it was, he constantly received complaints even from Moldavians in Bessarabia of the treatment which they received at the hands of the Roumanians. The vote of the Sfatul Tserii was being used quite fallaciously to justify what a reasonably conducted plebiscite would undoubtedly upset. He pointed out that similar votes had been obtained in Lithuania and in Latvia in favour of annexation by Germany. Any decision annexing Bessarabia to Roumania would be a source of permanent grievance, and would do harm to Roumania, which would not be in a position to absorb an unwilling population. The most he could admit was a plebiscite in the districts in which the Moldavian population was predominant.

(M. Maklakoff explained his views with the help of a map, and then withdrew.)

M. TARDIEU suggested that M. Bratiano¹ should only be questioned in regard to the vote alluded to by M. Maklakoff.

M. TITTONI said that the Council was in full possession of ethnical statistics and that it was unnecessary to hear M. Bratiano on that subject.

(At this stage M. Bratiano, M. Misu,² M. Diamandy³ and M. Pellivan⁴ entered the room.)

M. TARDIEU, addressing M. Bratiano, said that the members of the Council had studied the ethnological question thoroughly. They would like to know what degree of sincerity and authority M. Bratiano attributed to the vote obtained in the Sfatul Tserii.

MR. LANSING interposed that it mattered little how that vote had been obtained. It was more important to know how the consultation of the people could be carried out in the future.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the question put by M. Tardieu arose from the statement made by M. Maklakoff.

M. TARDIEU said that there was a connection between the two. He therefore asked M. Bratiano to reply.

M. BRATIANO said that he believed the vote alluded to did express the will of the people and had been given in full freedom. He admitted that the Assembly was a revolutionary one, but similar assemblies had expressed the will of the people in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. The Roumanian occupation had found that Assembly in power and in control of the country. Its authority had resulted from the various successive developments which had taken place in Russia since the downfall of Czarism. Mr. Lansing had suggested a plebiscite. Bessarabia, he would point out, was a Roumanian country attached by force to the Russian throne for over 100 years. When Russian autocracy fell, Bessarabia had come back to Roumania. The Roumanians had been called in by the people and even by the only Russian authority recognised at the time, namely, the Ukrainian Government. Difficulties did not arise on the question of nationality. It was the social question which caused all the trouble. The Bolsheviks were dissatisfied with the Roumanian Government merely because it established governmental order. The agrarian reforms introduced made the peasant pay for the land obtained by the expropriation of the landowners. The landowners, on their side, grumbled because they were expropriated.

MR. LANSING said that he wished to put a plain question to M. Bratiano. Would he object to a plebiscite?

M. BRATIANO replied that he did. He did so because the choice offered to the people would be that between Bolshevism and order. It was dangerous to offer such a choice to a country on the border of disturbed Russia. Should

¹ Roumanian Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

² Roumanian Minister in London and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

³ Roumanian Delegate Plenipotentiary.

⁴ Director of Justice in Bessarabia and Roumanian technical expert at the Peace Conference.

the Roumanians withdraw their troops there would be endless tumult in the country.

MR. LANSING asked whether M. Bratiano, if given possession of the country, would agree to a plebiscite in two years.

M. BRATIANO said that he would not, as only revolutionary agitation would result from the knowledge that a plebiscite would take place in that period.

MR. LANSING asked whether M. Bratiano would object to a plebiscite at any other specified time in the future.

M. BRATIANO said that he would object still more strongly, as it would only prolong the agitation. He further begged to be allowed to state that the possession of Bessarabia by Russia would only perpetuate an anachronism. It had been for the Russian Empire a stage on the road to Constantinople. It could no longer serve that purpose. Russia owed Roumania a great debt as being largely responsible for her misfortune. Circumstances pointed very clearly to the best way in which Russia could discharge that debt. It would be by the cession of Bessarabia.

(At this point the Roumanian Delegates withdrew.)⁵

2. The following nominations were made:—

<i>Appointment of Commission to supervise the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany</i>	United States of America	. Mr. J. F. Dulles.
	Great Britain Sir Eyre Crowe.
	France M. Tardieu.
	Italy M. Scialoja.
	Japan M. Otchiai.

3. The following nominations were made:—

<i>Appointment of Commission to organise Reparation Commission provided for in the Treaty of Peace with Germany</i>	United States of America	. Mr. J. F. Dulles.
	Great Britain Colonel the Hon. S. Peel.
	France M. Loucheur.
	Italy M. Crespi.
	Japan M. Mori.

4. MR. BALFOUR said that he had an explanation to make regarding the form in which the question had been put on the Agenda. He understood that the Committee on Greek Affairs had been unable to deal with the frontier between Greece and Bulgaria without knowledge of the ultimate border-line between Greece and Turkey. It was for this reason that he had suggested that the Enos-Midia line should be assumed provisionally as a frontier between

⁵ M. Tardieu subsequently reported of this hearing that: 'M. Maklakoff and M. Bratiano had expressed the Russian and Roumanian points of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision.' (See No. 25, minute 10.)

Greece and the future territory of Constantinople. This could be used as a working hypothesis.

M. TARDIEU suggested that the Co-ordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to deal with this subject and to hear the various experts dealing with the different frontiers of Bulgaria.

(It was finally agreed that the Co-ordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to delimit the frontiers of Bulgaria and to make a report to the Council.)

M. TITTONI gave notice that Colonel Castoldi would take the place of the Marquis Salvago Raggi on the Committee.

5. The following resolution was proposed by Mr. Lansing and adopted:—

*Austrian Treaty.
Resolution pro-
posed by the
United States
Delegation⁶*

‘That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference shall notify the Austrian Delegation that it will be allowed a period of not more than ten days, counting from the date upon which it will receive the last section of the Conditions of Peace,⁷ in which to make such counter-proposals or observations as it may see fit.’

6. MR. LANSING proposed the following resolution:—

*Austrian Treaty.
Resolution pro-
posed by the
United States
Delegation⁶*

‘That the modifications which were made in the Conditions of Peace with Germany as a result of the German counter-proposals or for any other reasons shall, in so far as they may be applicable, be made *ipso facto* in the Conditions of Peace with Austria.’

M. TITTONI said that he had a reservation to make. Germany had been given an option of furnishing labour as a means of reparation. Italy had a superfluity of labour and did not desire that labour should be offered her as a form of reparation.

MR. LANSING suggested that, if this were the only reservation, the text proposed, together with M. Tittoni’s reservation, should be sent to the Drafting Committee for suitable modification and incorporation in the Treaty.

(This was agreed.)

7. MR. BALFOUR observed that he had pointed out on the previous day that the frontier between Austria and Hungary required speedy attention.

*Austrian Treaty.
Frontier between
Austria and
Hungary⁶*

(It was agreed that the Committee newly set up to answer the Austrian notes regarding frontiers should endeavour to report on the following day.)

⁶ Minutes 5, 6, and 7 are printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 67–8.

⁷ The terms of the Conditions of Peace presented to the Austrian delegation at St. Germain-en-Laye on June 2, 1919, were incomplete and in proof. The draft of the treaty remained incomplete on July 2. See No. 4, minute 2.

8. M. TARDIEU pointed out that there was a clause in the draft Treaty with Austria requiring Austria to recognise 'the following frontiers' of neighbouring countries. As it was not likely that these frontiers would be completely settled before the signature of Peace with Austria, it was desirable to alter the wording and to require the assent of Austria to frontiers to be fixed later by the Allied and Associated Powers.

(This was agreed, and the question was referred to the Drafting Committee.)

M. TITTONI remarked that he assumed it was established that the ultimate decision regarding frontiers was a matter not for the League of Nations but for the present Conference of Allied and Associated Powers. He wished to make the same reservation as had been made by the Italian Delegation regarding the Treaty with Germany.

9. MR. LANSING expressed the view that there should be a *communiqué*.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the Council to be the lawful heirs of the Council of Four which had issued no *communiqués*. He suggested that this example should be followed.

M. TITTONI said that he was indifferent.

M. MAKINO said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour.

M. TARDIEU asked Mr. Lansing if he insisted on his view.

MR. LANSING said that he thought it was preferable to issue a *communiqué*, which could be made brief. His experience was that information always leaked out, through one Delegation or another. The Delegation most faithful to secrecy suffered.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the *communiqué* was so judiciously framed as to contain no information he was indifferent.

(After some discussion, it was decided that for the present no *communiqué* should be issued.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

July 2, 1919.

⁸ Minute 8 is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 298.

No. 3

I. C. 201 A] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 5, 1919, at 3.0 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. de Martino.

Japan: H.E. Baron Makino.

ALSO PRESENT: U.S.A.: Mr. H. Hoover. *British Empire*: Sir William Goode. *Italy*: M. Crespi.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. *British Empire*: Capt. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier.

INTERPRETER: PROFESSOR P. J. MANTOUX.

1. (At M. Clemenceau's request, it was agreed that experts should not be present at Meetings of the Council but should only enter the room if specifically requested to do so by the Chairman.)
- Presence of Experts at Meetings of the Council*

(During the following discussion, Mr. Hoover,¹ Sir William Goode,² and M. Crespi³ were invited to remain.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover to explain the economic position in Hungary.

Situation in Hungary MR. HOOVER said that the problem was that of the economic rehabilitation of Central Europe. As matters stood, there was no hope of removing and distributing the Hungarian harvest unless the Danube and the railways across Hungary were reopened for traffic. The question, therefore, was not merely an internal Hungarian question. It was one of external economic relations. The action of the Hungarians had tied up the Danube and with it a large proportion of the river craft used on it. Further, the withdrawal of the German Armies from South-Eastern Europe had left behind it in Hungary a large quantity of rolling stock and river craft. In order, therefore, to set the economic life of Central Europe going again, it was necessary to have control of these essential means of transport. The third aspect of the question was largely political. Bolshevik ideas were impregnating the working classes throughout the area. Unless some means could be devised of abating the infection, the economic regeneration of Central and South-Eastern Europe would be difficult. Bela Kun's government was spending a great deal of money on sending Bolshevik missionaries to industrial centres outside Hungary. This re-acted on production. Moreover, the military power of the Hungarian Government was growing. A kind of nationalist passion was thereby put at the service of the revolutionary theories advocated by the Government. It was not likely that Bela Kun would abstain from spreading his theories outside the borders of Hungary by the help of this military force. The next probable victim after Czecho-Slovakia was Austria. The social and political aspects of the question, Mr. Hoover said, were not his province, but he would like to observe that Bela Kun's party until the last three weeks had not represented methods of violence. Latterly, however, executions had increased, which indicated that opposition was growing in the country and that the methods of red terror were being resorted to. Previously, it might have been possible to treat the Hungarian

¹ Chairman of the American Relief Administration, and of the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

² British Director of Relief Missions and member of the Supreme Economic Council.

³ Member of the Italian Delegation and of the Supreme Economic Council.

revolutionary party with indulgence. Now that it shewed a tendency to overflow its frontiers, it must be considered as an economic danger to the rest of Europe.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover what he thought of the Szegedin group.⁴

MR. HOOVER replied that this group appeared to him to be composed of extreme re-actionaries without any notable intellectual capacity. For instance, their deliberations of late had been devoted to the question of the resumption of the right of duelling. He did not expect much help from that party. It appeared, however, that discontent with the Bela Kun Government was growing among the working classes. Information from British sources had been received to the effect that the Trade Unions would gladly see the Government upset. Communism would not appear to have penetrated very deeply into the population and the Government was becoming, like that in Russia, a tyranny of a minority. Another difficulty applying to any solution that might be suggested was the obvious duplicity of Bela Kun. In support of this, Mr. Hoover quoted the following messages interchanged between Lenin and Bela Kun:—

1. *Message sent by Lenin from Moscow to Bela Kun at Budapest on 19th June, 1919 (includes following):*

‘It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us. Try and organise postal communications with us by aeroplane.’

2. *Message sent on June 21st by Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow) in reply to his telegram of June 19th:*

‘I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. I am very proud of being one of your best pupils, but I think in one point I am superior to you, namely, in the question of “mala fides”. I think I know the Entente very well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can occur, but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your note.’

The authenticity of these messages was supported by the fact that they had been revealed first by British sources and subsequently intercepted by Austrian wireless. Of the various solutions proposed in the memorandum he had submitted (Appendix A), no doubt the military occupation of Budapest would be the best. He believed it would be welcomed by the population, but it was

⁴ A Hungarian political group in opposition to the régime of M. Béla Kun was formed at Szeged at the end of May 1919. In this group, which constituted itself as a government, Count J. Károlyi was Prime Minister, Count P. Teleki Foreign Minister, and Admiral Horthy Minister of War.

no doubt beset with difficulties. The alternatives to this policy were a more or less mitigated recognition of the Bela Kun Government. The plan he had suggested was that the various Inter-Allied Commissions working in the neighbourhood should establish economic relations with the Hungarians. There need be no direct recognition by the Governments, but by this side entrance it might be possible to obtain the opening of the river and the setting in motion of the means of transport and thereby the distribution of necessary supplies. He admitted that this might possibly strengthen Bela Kun's Government, but, on the other hand, Bela Kun was supporting himself in favour with the working class on the back of the blockade. All the hardships of the situation were attributed to the blockade. By removing it, the Powers would deprive him of this argument and he might find it more difficult to plead his case. Whether this would neutralise the advantage of semi-recognition, he did not know.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what was being done to re-victual Hungary.

MR. HOOVER replied that nothing at all was being done. At the time when Bela Kun came to power, the Economic Council was about to re-victual Budapest, as the situation there was thought urgent. The Communist Government, however, had, on coming into power, made a stringent search for all supplies and had, by careful re-distribution, managed to feed the population tolerably well. It appeared clear that they would reach the next harvest without starvation. Communism, therefore, had saved the Allied and Associated Powers considerable expenditure on food and supplies, as, since the establishment of the Communist Government, nothing whatever had been sent to Hungary.

M. TRITONI said that the question of Hungary was one of the most difficult the Conference had to deal with. The Bela Kun Government was a serious threat to the neighbouring countries, including Italy. There had been two periods in this movement. In the first a peaceful revolution had been brought about. The effect of this stage had been the most dangerous. The Russian Revolution had been represented to the people of Europe as being accompanied by carnage and general destruction. The Hungarian revolution had been quiet. It was, therefore, more attractive and more dangerous. It appeared to many in other countries that the sequestration of private fortunes for re-distribution and the re-allotment of house room were excellent measures which might be imitated to advantage in their own countries. The second period, however, appeared to reproduce the methods of the Russians. Not only were there executions, but methodical and systematic massacres had been instituted. It was very necessary, therefore, to suppress the volcano. The means of doing it, however, were not clear. He admitted he had no suggestions to make. The blockade obviously was not a solution. If rigidly enforced, all non-Bolsheviks would starve and Bolsheviks would eat. If, on the other hand, food were imported into the country, the Government would only grow stronger. He would welcome any feasible solution that might be proposed, but he had none to make himself. There was one point, however, to which he wished to draw special attention, and that was the reported

seizure of all securities in Budapest by the Bela Kun Government. Should these securities amounting to 6 milliards of francs be exported and sold abroad, it would be useless to demand reparation from Hungary. There would be nothing left to take possession of. He thought it was imperative to put a stop to this.

MR. BALFOUR said that, in his extremely lucid statement, Mr. Hoover had approached a question of which he recognised the great complexity from the economic side alone. The economic problem was how to make transit by all means of communication through Hungary serve the purposes of equitable distribution of means of subsistence in South-Eastern Europe. This could not be brought about unless the situation in Hungary were radically changed. Neither Mr. Hoover nor M. Tittoni offered any plan for a complete alteration of that situation. He believed, therefore, that the case must be approached from the military side. A short time ago⁵ the Council of Four had sent orders to the Hungarian, Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian Governments with the object of producing Peace among them. These orders had only been half carried out. Many things had happened since. M. Bratiano, in a private conversation, had told him that the Roumanians could not and would not retire from the Theiss until the Hungarians had been disarmed. The Hungarians were withdrawing from Czecho-Slovakia and massing their troops in Hungary. Universal armament had been ordered. If the Roumanians, therefore, retired from the Theiss which they could defend, they did not know what line they could hold, seeing their commitments on other frontiers. He thought there was force in the argument put forward by M. Bratiano. He had caused further enquiries to be made and had discovered that the Hungarians had not carried out their armistice engagements. They had not reduced their troops to six divisions; in fact, they appeared to have doubled their forces. He therefore suggested that the Military Authorities be requested, through their agents on the spot, to order the Hungarians to disarm in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice.⁶ This was not only the right of the Allied Powers but their duty. It should be made known in Hungary itself that until this had been done there could be no kind of negotiations with the Hungarian Government. Should it persist in breaking the terms of the armistice, military action should follow. He had some hope that the threat alone would overthrow Bela Kun's Government. Should it not, the Powers were bound to do to Hungary what they would have done to Germany had

⁵ On June 13, 1919. Texts of the telegrams of that date sent by the Supreme Council to the Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Roumanian Governments are printed by D. H. Miller in *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924 f.), vol. xvi, pp. 406-9. For the earlier sequence of events see No. 26, note 3.

⁶ The reference was to the Armistice of Villa Giusti, concluded on November 3, 1918, between representatives of the Italian Supreme Command and the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command, as supplemented by the military convention of November 13, 1918, relating to Hungary, which was signed at Belgrade by representatives of General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in South-East Europe (Armies of the Orient), and of the Hungarian Government. Texts of both agreements are printed in Cmd. 53 of 1919.

she broken the armistice.⁷ To carry this out it would be necessary to organise the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak, Serbian and French troops at hand. When the Hungarians had been disarmed there would then be no excuse for the Roumanians not to retire. After this, when Hungary had been put into her right place, negotiations could be undertaken either with Bela Kun or his successors. By this means the evil of giving credit to Bela Kun, which Mr. Hoover had shown was to be feared, would be avoided. At the present time Vienna was in danger and perhaps Roumania. This could be stopped by prompt military action, which would be justified by Hungary's flagrant breach of the armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would like to state his opinion, though he feared it would not be a very clear one. He had agreed thus far with all the speakers. The situation reminded him of the La Fontaine fable in which a gathering of rats decided to hang a bell round a cat's neck. All agreed this was desirable but no one knew how to do it. He thought that the situation had been accurately described by Mr. Hoover. He acquiesced in all M. Tittoni had said, and he thought Mr. Balfour had said excellent things. But how were the Powers to do what he proposed? France was demobilising and could not stop the process. At the end of October there would be but three classes with the Colours; that was to say the Army would be on a peace footing. The French Chamber was resolutely opposed to intervention in Russia. He thought the Chamber was right, seeing the results hitherto

⁷ On June 16, 1919, the Allied and Associated Powers had presented their reply to the observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace (see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1919*, vol. cxii, p. 244 f.), in which they requested from the German Delegation a declaration 'within five days from the date of this communication that they are prepared to sign the Treaty as it stands to-day'. On that day and on June 17 and 20 the Supreme Council (Council of Four) considered military action to be taken against Germany should she return a negative reply or fail to answer before the expiration of the time-limit and therefore of the armistice, due on June 23 in consequence of a 48-hour extension. In this connexion Marshal Foch explained to the Supreme Council a plan for an advance by 39 Allied divisions into Germany 'in two bounds' from the line of the river Rhine to that of the river Weser and up the valley of the Main with the object of severing southern from northern Germany and preparing for a further advance, in case of need, with the political centres of Weimar and Berlin as the ultimate objectives; it was hoped that it might prove possible to mount co-ordinated operations from the east by Polish and possibly Czechoslovak forces. On June 20 the Supreme Council authorized Marshal Foch 'to commence his advance immediately on the expiration of the Armistice' at 7 p.m. on June 23, 1919. At 4 p.m. on June 23 the Supreme Council, having previously refused a German offer of signature with certain reservations and a subsequent German request for a further 48-hours extension of the time-limit, met 'at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris'. At 5 p.m. the Council proceeded to discuss the sinking of the German fleet at Scapa Flow two days previously. No satisfactory reply had by that hour been received from the German Delegation. At 5.40 p.m. the meeting concluded as follows during an observation by Mr. Balfour, as recorded by Sir M. Hankey: 'As to squeezing the Germans . . . (At this point M. Dutasta, followed by Colonel Henri and Captain Portier, entered the room, with a note from the German Delegation expressing willingness on behalf of the German Republic to sign, under compulsion, a dishonourable peace. (See Annexure A [not printed]). Orders were given for guns to be fired. No further discussion took place.)' Cf. also Count L. Aldrovandi Marescotti: *Nuovi ricordi e frammenti di diario* (Milan, 1938), p. 74 f.

obtained; a milliard or so was being thrown away on the expedition in Siberia. This was an absurd expense and could not continue. If Parliament, therefore, decline to fight Bolshevism in Russia, it would equally refuse to fight it in Hungary. Mr. Balfour's argument that the Hungarians had accepted the armistice and had then broken it and therefore deserved coercion was a strong one, if indeed they had accepted it. But what troops did Mr. Balfour mean to use to coerce the Hungarians? He had mentioned Czechs, Roumanians and French.

MR. BALFOUR added and Scrbs.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they would require money. He for one could not supply any. Moreover, Germany for the time being seemed ready to fulfil her engagements and to behave well. Should the Germans, however, see the Entente thoroughly embarrassed in Hungary this attitude might change. The march on Budapest had been thought of before. In particular the Italians seemed disposed to go there, and he heard that General Segré⁸ had gone to Rome to advocate the policy.

M. TITTONI said that the Italian Parliament was of the same mind as the French.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no strong economic argument could be brought to bear on the Hungarians. Whether the blockade were raised or not, little effect could be produced on internal policy. The population could hold out. He had some doubts about the capacity of the Czechs to fight the Hungarians. The Roumanians might or might not be willing. At the present time they seemed considerably dissatisfied with the Peace Conference. There were no British or American troops available. French and Italian troops therefore seemed called upon to do the work. He must state clearly that for his part he could not undertake it. He had consulted Marshal Foch and General Franchet d'Esperey, who had often wished to march on Budapest. He had asked for plans, and had been supplied with a plan more ambitious than that of Napoleon's march on Moscow. French, British and Italian contingents were required. The fact was that both the peoples and the Parliaments of the Entente countries were anxious to settle the crisis more quickly than was really possible. After the vast upheaval of the war and the pulverization of military forces, and, on top of it, the universal inclination towards social revolution, it was hardly possible to produce order in a short time. The Conference had tried to establish justice in the world. This was not the first time that such an attempt had been made. All knew what had resulted before. It was now clear to all who had taken part in the Conference how difficult it was to draw even frontiers equitably. His Italian colleague would doubtless agree with him. People like the Russians, who had been slaves under a terrible despotism, had thought that liberty could be exercised without self-control. They had betrayed their Allies and caused them immense losses. The evil had spread. Italy, though an old and wise community, had been shaken up. Great Britain and France had had their troubles. There had been disaffection in the French Navy and even in the

⁸ Head of the Italian Military Mission in Vienna.

Army. The world was sick of fighting. The Conference had therefore to deal with revolutions in military power, alterations of frontiers, and social revolutions inspired by no [*sic*] ideas. It had been thought that the Russian people would recover. That was a mistake; owing to the vastness of the Russian territory, somehow the Russian people had survived its own disasters, but all intervention to assist them to establish a reasonable Government had been in vain. Now the evil had attacked Hungary, which had not been anticipated, as it was a country of peasants and relatively rich. The policy he had to offer was not one of which he was proud. It was simply this—to hold the issues and to wait. He said this after taking into consideration the feelings of the Entente peoples, and of their Parliaments. All were in a hurry to cease fighting, and to resume normal life. They were probably wrong, but that feeling could not be gainsaid. This was not a noble policy, and might be said to look like impotence. He would not deny it. But, after losing hundreds of thousands of lives and spending the national treasure, he thought no other policy was possible. As to Hungary, he knew the country a little. Before the war the people had been the slaves of Germany, merely because they thought that Germany was the strongest power, but there was more common-sense there than in Russia. He had been struck in Mr. Hoover's statement by the fact that the trades unions were sick of the Communist Government. He would therefore follow Mr. Balfour's policy so far as to threaten Hungary with intervention should they not observe the armistice. Then he would consult the military experts. If military action had to be undertaken, all would have to help, and much money would have to be spent. In the meantime, however, he hoped that Providence might furnish some means of escape. It was not his nature to temporise, but in this case he would. Hungary could be surrounded by a 'cordon sanitaire'; Communism would not last long in that country. If the Generals recommended a plan similar to that shown him some months ago by Marshal Foch, he felt sure that no Government would undertake the task of coercing Hungary. It was not a showy policy that he recommended, but it was the best he could offer.

MR. LANSING observed that there was one question of urgent necessity, namely, that of making peace with Hungary. To do this it was necessary to have someone there to make peace with. Did the Council propose to make peace with Bela Kun? If not, with whom? If it could not be made with Bela Kun, pressure must be brought to bear on him to go. The only means of doing this appeared to be military means.

(At this point General Bliss, General Sackville-West, General Thwaites, General Belin and General Cavallero⁹ entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked General Bliss to show what forces and what methods he thought would be necessary to compel Bela Kun's Government to respect the armistice, if other means failed, and what hope of success he entertained.

⁹ Generals Bliss, Sackville-West, Belin, and Cavallero were respectively the American, British, French, and Italian military representatives on the Supreme War Council. General Thwaites was the British Director of Military Intelligence.

GENERAL BLISS said that some six weeks ago, at the request of the Council of Four, the Military Representatives at Versailles had made a report on the means that might be taken to prevent a Hungarian attack on Czecho-Slovakia. The report had been to the effect that if military measures had to be resorted to, the troops used must be those on the spot, namely, Roumanian, Serbian and French troops. It was then believed that the troops available locally would be sufficient. This was the opinion of the French General Staff. Since then, however, Bela Kun's troops had increased from 150,000 to 220,000 armed men. The situation had also changed in other respects, and he was unable to say whether the troops then considered sufficient would be sufficient now. There had been an inconclusive discussion in the Council of Four on the report. Since that date he knew nothing of what had been decided. If the plan then recommended had been thought workable, it should have been submitted to General Franchet d'Esperey. This, as far as he knew, had not been done. Moreover, he could not say whether the Roumanians and Serbians would act. As far as he was concerned, he thought the question required renewed study at Versailles, in order that he might exchange views with his colleagues on the new situation.

GENERAL CAVALLERO agreed with General Bliss that a new study of the subject was necessary. The action now required was not quite the same as that contemplated previously, and in the meantime the Hungarian army had increased.

GENERAL BELIN said that all the Military Representatives had agreed that a demonstration of force would have been sufficient when they were previously consulted. He still believed that a demonstration by the forces locally available would be enough to overthrow the Bela Kun Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not wish the Military Advisers to restrict their recommendations to the employment of forces at present on the spot. If more were required, he expected them to say so.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that he was in accord with his Military colleagues. He would like to re-consider the question.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how soon a report could be obtained.

GENERAL BLISS said that if all the information required were available, the report could be made within 48 hours.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether, in view of the flagrant breach of the armistice by Bela Kun's Government, it would not be well to warn him at once that he must observe the armistice. He would be ready, however, if his colleagues preferred it, to wait 48 hours until the report of the Military Representatives had been received.

(It was agreed that the report be awaited.)

GENERAL BLISS pointed out that it would be necessary to consult the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be sufficient to consult Marshal Foch, who had all the necessary information from General Franchet d'Esperey.

MR. LANSING asked that the Military Representatives add to their report

a brief account of the armament at the disposal of the Hungarian Army, and of their means of replenishing this armament. In particular, he would like to know whether it was made within the country or imported from without.

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

‘It was decided that the Military Representatives at Versailles in consultation with Marshal Foch, should examine the military possibilities of enforcing on Hungary respect for the Armistice conditions accepted, and make a report to the Council in 48 hours. The Military Representatives were also asked to report on the means of munitionment at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.’)

(The Military Experts then withdrew.)

M. TITTONI then suggested that the Allies take steps to forbid the exportation of all the securities seized by the Bela Kun Government, as the disposal of these securities abroad would render nugatory any claim for reparation on Hungary.

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

‘That the Financial Commission be asked to submit at a very early date to the Council, a proposal for preventing the sale abroad of securities seized by order of the Bela Kun Government in Hungary.’)

3. At MR. LANSING’s proposal (see Annexure B¹⁰), the following resolution was adopted:—

High Commissioner for Armenia

‘Colonel W. N. Haskell, U.S.A., is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge of all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organizations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to co-operate with and give support to Colonel Haskell.’

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

July 5, 1919.

¹⁰ Not printed. This appendix comprised: (i) A copy of a letter headed ‘Supreme Economic Council, Paris, June 27, 1919’, from Mr. Hoover to President Wilson forwarding a recommendation ‘that a single temporary resident Commissioner should be appointed to Armenia’, this commissioner to be the joint representative of the Allied governments in all their relations with the *de facto* Armenian Government, ‘to supervise and advise upon various governmental matters in the whole of Russian and Turkish Armenia, and to control relief and repatriation questions pending the determination of the political destiny of this area’. Mr. Hoover considered that ‘the ideal man for this position would be General Harbord, as I assume under all the circumstances it would probably be desirable to appoint an American. Should General Harbord be unable to undertake the matter, I am wondering whether you would leave it to us to select the man in conjunction with General Pershing.’ (ii) A copy of a letter of June 28, 1919, from Sir M. Hankey, secretary to the Council of Four, to M. Dutasta informing him that the Council had that day accepted Mr. Hoover’s proposal and agreed that the Council of Ten should be asked to concert the necessary arrangements to give effect to this decision. M. Dutasta was asked to lay the matter before the Council of Ten.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF RELIEF.

PARIS, 1 July, 1919.

Hon. Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State,
Hotel de Crillon,
Paris.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

At the meeting of the Supreme Economic Council yesterday I was requested to lay before the Council of the Heads of States the pressing economic situation in South Eastern Europe which arises out of the political situation in Hungary. Due to the special geographical and economic position of the territory now held by Bela Kun's Government, the whole economic destiny of the surrounding States is almost absolutely in his hands, and it is therefore impossible to re-establish economic life or public order until this situation is dealt with.

With the coming arrival of peace in the surrounding States and of the harvest, it is critical that some solution should be found at once or there can be no economic rehabilitation upon which peace can be maintained. Furthermore, unless the various international traffics can be established across Hungary, it is hopeless to expect the surrounding territories to provide themselves with food or employ their people, thus necessitating continued charitable relief and outside financial support. I have had the advantage of conferences with not only the American representatives throughout the old Austrian Empire, the visit of Colonel Logan, who is the Chief of our Staff to that Territory, but with [*sic*] conferences with the Allied officials who are on the many economic missions which were maintained in this area. I have asked Colonel Logan to formulate a memorandum as to the facts as believed by these representatives with regard to Bela Kun, and to also formulate some suggestions made by the American representatives on the Danube River Commission as a possible solution. These memoranda are forwarded herewith.¹¹

There appears to me to be four alternative courses open:

First. A military occupation of Budapest under the control of the principal Allies and the expulsion of Bela Kun's Government. If this course were adopted it should be done with a declaration that a freely elected National Assembly would be called at once to erect a government and to sign peace.

Second. To continue refusal to recognise Bela Kun's Government, but to open economic negotiations through the informal commissions, preferably the Danube River Commission and possibly also the Railways Mission, which we have installed in the old Austrian Empire, and as a result of so doing to abandon the blockade, but not formally to recognise the Bela Kun Government.

Third. To undertake a middle course, such as outlined in the attached memorandum,¹¹ of opening the country by economic agreement with Bela Kun and at the same time policing it with troops under Allied direction to see that order was maintained and agreements carried out.

Fourth. To present the peace terms to Bela Kun, thus recognising fully and trusting him not to disturb the world outside of Hungary.

¹¹ Not attached to the original of this appendix.

Some definite policy is critically necessary if the disorganisation of German-Austria is to be prevented, and if the economic collapse of the surrounding States is to be prevented.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER.

No. 4

H. D. I.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 7, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. British Empire: Capt. E. Abraham. France: Capt. A. Portier. Italy: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that before beginning the subjects on the Agenda he had a statement to make on what was going on in Italy. He did not wish to make difficulties worse, but the situation was such that it was to be feared that massacres might occur. He had received dispatches which he could show his colleagues, regarding the position at Fiume.¹ Disturbances had taken place there, caused it was alleged by the misconduct of a French soldier. This was the Italian account and he would not dispute it. It might be true, and in any case similar things had happened elsewhere without leading to any serious consequences. There had followed in the Italian press a virulent attack on France and on Great Britain, but especially on France, and it could readily be believed that it was inspired by German influence. The French ambassador had made a protest to M. Nitti.² M. Nitti had declared that he could not control the press. It was surprising that M. Nitti could not control the Italian press, seeing the power he had over the press outside his own country. At Fiume things had gone from bad to worse, and there was a movement tending to the expulsion of French and British troops. When the Allied Council had addressed a memorandum³ to M. Tittoni, President Wilson had wanted to ask the Italian Government to evacuate Fiume. He had begged President Wilson not to insist on this, as it appeared to him that all the Allies had an equal right to maintain troops there. As there were French and British troops in Fiume, it was only fair

¹ For the position at Fiume see No. 42, appendix A.

² Italian Prime Minister in succession to Signor Orlando, who resigned on June 19, 1919. In Signor Nitti's administration Signor Tittoni was Minister for Foreign Affairs in succession to Baron Sonnino.

³ For negotiations relative to the question of the Adriatic see Vol. IV of this series.

that Italian troops should be there, provided they remained as representatives of the Alliance. He recalled [he] said this in order to show that he was not anti-Italian. The latest news from Fiume was that the condition there was going from bad to worse. French fatigue parties passing through the streets had been attacked with grenades and revolvers. Attacks had been made on British troops, but not so openly. Isolated men had been maltreated. The Italian general said he could not put a stop to these disturbances as long as French and British troops remained in the town. This was not all. At Genoa French soldiers had been knifed, and similar things had happened in other Italian towns. French consuls at Milan and elsewhere had sent him newspaper cuttings threatening a renewal of the Sicilian Vespers. In addition to this there was evidence of Government action. Supply trains for Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were being detained [detained] at Modane on some futile pretext of paying customs dues. These supplies were urgently required and it was obvious that they were stopped by Government action. Further, the French Consul at Rhodes reported that, at the very time when the Peace Conference was asking M. Tittoni to withdraw Italian troops from Southern Asia Minor, 3,300 men had been sent two days ago to occupy a further point in Asia Minor. The French Ambassador in Rome, who had been most violently attacked, had been told by General Albricci⁴ that these attacks would cease if better news came from Paris. This was an attempt to bring pressure on the Peace Conference. Against this attempt he now made the strongest protest. He would not deliberate under threats and he would not tolerate pressure of this kind. From an official person specially qualified, whose name he did not wish to give, but would if necessary, he learnt that Admiral Thaon di Revel⁵ had put a stop to mine-sweeping, and had ordered that new mines be kept in readiness in case of war with France. He was prepared to show this information if they wished it, to Mr. Balfour and to Mr. Lansing. It was further hinted that this news should not be taken too seriously, but that it might be allowed to leak out in order to influence the Conference. He had hitherto resisted two things. First, abominable attacks by the Italian Press, and secondly, the temptation to make a reply to attacks in the French Press which was being manoeuvred on behalf of Italy against the French Government. He could, by making a public statement put a stop to all this but he had restrained himself in order not to make things worse. If these things did not cease however, he would be forced to answer. This would produce a disastrous diplomatic situation which he wished to avoid. It was for this reason that he addressed M. Tittoni in the Council. He wished to know what was at the bottom of all this. Why, when the Council was deliberating about Asia Minor, were fresh Italian troops sent there? Why was there no official protest by the Italian Government against the virulent Press campaign conducted against Fiume? He did not suggest the Italian Government should apply the censorship; but it could make a statement in refutation of what was alleged. In any case he would not be influenced by pressure. If he had to make a choice, he would allow [*sic*] French

⁴ Italian Minister of War.

⁵ Chief of the Italian Naval General Staff.

soldiers to be murdered in Fiume. He had ordered back French troops from Italy where they had once been welcome in times of stress, but were now no longer well received. Nothing, however, would stop him from keeping French troops in Fiume where they had a right to be.

M. TITTONI said that he thought the Fiume incidents most deplorable. He was deeply concerned at the outbreak of dissensions among troops which had bled in the same cause. He also had received dispatches which he would not quote as they might give explanations of the origin of the outbreak not altogether in accord with those mentioned by M. Clemenceau. He thought there should be an inquiry into the incidents and suitable punishment for those responsible. At all costs friendship must be restored between the Allies. He suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission be appointed to enquire into the events at Fiume and that its findings should be awaited before any decision was taken.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the Commission would also enquire into what had taken place at Genoa.

M. TITTONI said that his proposal was confined to Fiume. The Italian Government had shown its anxiety to put matters right by sending General Caneva immediately to make an enquiry. General Caneva was an army commander, a senator and a man of judicial temper. He would certainly do his very best.

M. CLEMENCEAU interposed that no complaint was made against General Graz[i]oli⁶ in person.

M. TITTONI continuing said that as regards the events in Genoa an enquiry was taking place. He would inform the French Government of the result as soon as possible. Irresponsible acts should not be allowed to compromise the good relations of the Governments. It was essential that the Governments should remain closely united.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Consul at Milan reported danger of massacres.

M. TITTONI said that he was going there on the following day. This showed the importance he attached to the subject. During his absence M. Crespi would take his place. But he would beg the Council to await his return before dealing with questions specially concerning Italy. M. Clemenceau had spoken of threats aimed at the Conference. He felt bound to deny matters formally that [*sic*] there was any ground for such a belief. It would be puerile on the part of the Italian Government to attempt to coerce the Conference. Italy was represented by himself at the Conference and he trusted that the spirit of friendship and conciliation shown by him would be recognised. As to the statements attributed to General Albricci and to Admiral Thaon di Revel, he felt certain that whatever they might have said had been greatly distorted. He could, if necessary, ask these officers for explanations, but he was bound to say that he could not believe what was attributed to them. As to the Italian Press, it was certainly true that M. Nit[t]i could not muzzle it. The same papers that attacked France were also conducting a

⁶ General Grazioli was in command of the Allied forces in occupation of Fiume.

most violent attack on him. Party feeling in Italy was very strong and the violence of expression in the Italian Press at the present time had never been equalled. As to the alleged influencing of the French Press, he felt bound to deny that anything of the sort was going on. Since joining the Delegation he had seen all that took place and could find no evidence to that effect. He was ready, however, to do anything that might satisfy M. Clemenceau. He would also point out that the censorship had just been abolished in Italy. As regards Asia Minor he was not aware of the events alleged. To make sure that no misunderstanding took place he had summoned General Bongiovanni⁷ to Paris in order to give him his instructions personally. These instructions would be entirely in accordance with the confidential interview he had had with his colleagues a few days ago.⁸ As to the transit of supply trains to Serbia he was informed that certain customs dues were legitimately required. These dues Serbia promised to pay but her present attitude made it reasonable to doubt whether she would pay. Not only food was being shipped, but arms and munitions as well. There was a report that the Serbians had asked the Czecho-Slovaks to join them in an attack upon Italy. He would at a later date give fuller information in writing on this subject to his colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had no wish to continue the debate and that M. Tittoni's proposal for an Inter-Allied Enquiry at Fiume gave him satisfaction for the moment, provided it be made at once.

MR. LANSING said that he agreed. He thought it would be necessary to select a military man and he would like to consult General Bliss. He thought it would be better to select an officer from Headquarters rather than one serving on the spot.

MR. BALFOUR said that he also was in favour of a Commission to enquire into the events at Fiume. It was the first duty of the Council to prevent the development of these unfortunate incidents into matters of international concern. He thought the method suggested by M. Tittoni a good one. He could not immediately nominate an officer and he was inclined to agree with Mr. Lansing that the best selection would be an officer not serving in Italy nor in the Adriatic. He would have to consult his military advisers. He felt it was scarcely necessary to say that he entirely agreed with his colleagues regarding the folly and wickedness of attempting to influence the decisions of the Conference by pressure from without. The effect would be exactly the reverse of that desired by anyone employing such methods.

MR. LANSING said that he had a suggestion to make regarding the work of the Commission. It should not only make an enquiry, in order to determine the immediate responsibilities for what had occurred, but should also make recommendations regarding what should be done in the future. He could see no reason himself why the forces maintained by the Allies in Fiume should not be reduced to equal contingents of police.

⁷ In command of the Italian Expeditionary Force in the Eastern Mediterranean.

⁸ The reference was probably to a discussion of Italian questions at a private meeting of the heads of the American, British, French and Italian delegations on July 4, 1919. See Vol. IV of this series.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that each of the delegations should designate their officers on the following day and give them their instructions.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was not sure he could arrange to have the officer present on the following day.

MR. LANSING expressed the same opinion.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed to the extension of the duties of the Commission suggested by Mr. Lansing, but he would stipulate that no suggestions be made to the Commissioners and that they be left to propose their own solutions.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, to speak plainly, it could not be tolerated that Fiume should continue to be governed in the name of the King of Italy.

M. TITTONI said that this was not done by the Italian Authorities but by the local municipality.

(It was decided that an Inter-Allied Commission of military officers should be appointed to make an enquiry into the incidents at Fiume and to recommend means of improving the situation for the future.

It was agreed that the American, British, French and Italian Delegations should nominate their respective commissioners on the following day and that these should receive collective instructions from the Council.)

2. (The Members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Fromageot⁹ to tell the Council in what state the Austrian Treaty was.

Date and manner of handing the conditions of Peace to the Austrian Delegation M. FROMAGEOT said that the Treaty was ready, its articles and its pages numbered. It only required a last revision which could be completed by the following evening.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the question of frontiers was solved.

M. FROMAGEOT said that all that had been sent to the Drafting Committee had been put into shape.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Council wished to know what was missing.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that he was unable to answer this as he was not aware of the intentions of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had hoped M. Fromageot would be able to tell him what the Council had omitted.

M. FROMAGEOT said that Article 27 of the Treaty provided a frontier entirely surrounding Austria. On some points it was stipulated that the exact line should be fixed at a later time. The Drafting Committee at one time had been told that they would have to insert the frontiers of the neighbouring States. Later the Committee had been told to insert a clause requiring Austria to recognise such frontiers as might be laid down thereafter.¹⁰

MR. LANSING said he wished to know whether the Treaty in its present form was final.

M. FROMAGEOT said he was unable to answer this question.

⁹ Legal Adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference.

¹⁰ See No. 2, minute 8.

MR. BALFOUR said that after examining Article 27 he observed that the old frontier between Austria and Hungary was maintained. He understood that the question of altering this frontier had been referred to a Commission.¹¹ This Commission had not yet reported, and its conclusions therefore had not been accepted by the Council.

MR. LANSING said that certain portions of the Treaty had been handed to the Austrians. There remained other portions—Financial, Economic and the Reparation Clauses which had not been handed to them. He wished to know whether these were completed. If so, he suggested that these portions be sent to the Austrian Delegation.

MR. FROMAGEOT argued that for ease of reference it would be better to present the whole Treaty to the Austrians at one time with all the articles in due series.

(After some further discussion it was decided that the Commissions considering the boundaries of Austria should report to the Council on the 9th July, 1919.)

3.

*Boundary Commission
for frontier between
Austria and Italy*

[Not printed]¹²

4. The Council had before it the following document:—

*Participation of
Finnish troops
in advance on
Petrograd*

'The French Delegation have informed the Commission on Baltic Affairs of a telegram from the French High Commissioner in Siberia, from which it appears that Admiral Koltchak's Government¹³ have asked the Allied Governments to support

at Helsingfors the request which they have addressed to General Mannerheim to commence operations against Petrograd as soon as possible.

'The Commission do not consider that they can recommend the Allied Governments to take the responsibility of involving the Finns in warlike operations whose chances of success it is difficult for them to judge at a distance. They feel, however, that the Finnish Government have been stopped several times in their desire to take action against the Bolsheviks of Petrograd by the fact that they do not know how any initiative of this kind would be viewed by the Allied Governments.

'The Commission therefore think they can recommend the following suggestion to the Council of Ten:

'A joint telegram should be addressed to the British, United States, Italian and French Chargés d'Affaires at Helsingfors requesting them to inform General Mannerheim's Government that in case they felt able to grant the request to act made to them by Admiral Koltchak, the Allied

¹¹ See No. 2, minute 7.

¹² After some discussion it was decided to rectify an omission in the draft treaty by inserting 'a provision to establish a Boundary Commission of five members to draw the frontier between Austria and Italy'.

¹³ For Admiral Kolchak's Government see Vol. III of this series.

Governments, without bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have no objection to that operation.'

(It was agreed that a joint telegram to the above effect be drafted in the name of the Council by M. Pichon.)

5.

(a) Norwegian¹⁴
Claims.
Spitzbergen

[Not printed]¹⁴

(b) Frontier between
Norway and
Finland

[Not printed]¹⁴

(c) Norwegian claim
for reparation
against Germany

[Not printed]¹⁴

6. M. MANTOUX read the proposed reply. (Annexure A.)¹⁵

MR. BALFOUR thought that a somewhat over eager invitation was extended to Austria to come into the League.
Reply to Austrian Note on League of Nations

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would consent to any alteration in wording Mr. Balfour would care to make.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that it was perhaps desirable to encourage the Austrians, both by reason of the threat of Bolshevik Hungary at their very doors, and also in order to dispel their tendency to join Germany.

MR. BALFOUR said that if soft words were likely to give the Austrians encouragement, which might be true, he would withdraw his criticism.

(The draft reply proposed by the Sub-Committee of the Commission on the League of Nations was approved.)

¹⁴ (a) In the course of discussion 'M. Tittoni said that he was informed that there were extensive coal deposits in Spitzbergen. He asked that the coal situation in Italy be taken into consideration in any decision taken regarding those coal deposits. The future of Italy in respect to coal was very unpromising. Since the acquisition of the Saar Valley coal-field by France, France could obtain coal at 50 francs or 60 francs a ton. Coal in Italy cost 250 francs a ton. The prospect for Italian industries dependent on coal fuel was therefore hopeless unless this situation could be remedied. (It was agreed to appoint a Sub-Commission consisting of one representative each of the U.S.A., Great Britain, France and Italy to consider the claims of various Powers to Spitzbergen, and to make a report to the Council. M. Pichon was asked to invite all the neutral Powers interested to present their views to the Commission). (b) 'It was agreed that it would be difficult for the Peace Conference to intervene in a frontier question between two neutral States, and no decision for the time being was taken on the subject.' (c) 'It was decided to refer the Norwegian claims against Germany for damage to Norwegian shipping at sea to the Reparation Commission.'

¹⁵ Not printed. This appendix contained a draft in English dated July 4, 1919. The draft having been approved by the Supreme Council, the reply, dated July 8, was communicated to the Austrian Delegation on July 9. (Cf. No. 5, final minute.) French and German texts of this note are printed in *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye* (Deutschösterreichische Staatsdruckerei, Vienna, 1919) vol. i, pp. 318-19. An English translation is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 269-70; also, *ibid.*, pp. 257-68, a translation of the Austrian note of June 23, 1919, to which the allied note was in reply.

7. M. TITTONI expressed the view that commercial censorship was part and parcel of the blockade. It must, therefore, logically cease at the same time. It might be maintained by an arbitrary act, but could not be maintained legally.

Removal of Commercial Censorship at the same time as of Blockade on Germany (It was agreed that the commercial censorship as being part of the measures constituting a blockade on Germany should be abolished at the same time as the blockade.)

8.

Request of Jugo-Slav Delegation for Austrian notes concerning Jugo-Slavia (It was agreed that the Jugo-Slav Delegation should receive copies of the Austrian Notes and counter proposals concerning Jugo-Slavia.)

9.

Repatriation of certain Armenians

[Not printed]

10. MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to draw attention to a matter which had not been put on the agenda. General Gough represented the Allies in the Baltic Provinces. Orders had been given for the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces;¹⁶ this order they were carrying out but imperfectly. For instance they had been ordered to withdraw from Riga. They had removed five miles outside Riga and there halted. General Gough complained that he could only get into touch with the Germans by circuitous methods. He could not hasten the process of German evacuation very much. He asked whether he could be given authority to treat direct with the German Command on this matter.

MR. LANSING said that he agreed in principle, but would like before giving an answer to consult his military advisers.

(It was agreed that this question be put on the agenda for the next meeting.)

11. (It was decided that the proceedings of the Council be recorded by the Joint Secretariat, and that the procès-verbaux be distributed on the same scale as those of the Council of Heads of States.)

Record of Proceedings of Council and distribution of Minutes

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 7, 1919*

¹⁶ For the withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces see Vol. III of this series.

H. D. 2.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 8, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Crespi; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Ashida.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had bad news to give to the Council. He had a report of a still graver incident in Fiume. Nine French soldiers had been killed. The day before, General Grazioli had requested the French General to withdraw from the city with his troops. The same request was apparently made to the Serbians. What the Serbians replied, he did not know. The French General refused. It was on the morrow of this that the mob, encouraged by an Italian officer, had attacked a small French post. Sailors from the fleet had come ashore to join in the assault and warships in the harbour had fired on the post. This had led to the death of nine men.

MR. LANSING said that he had had a report on the previous afternoon, which he had communicated to M. Tittoni, to the effect that a French post of Annamite troops had been attacked by the mob. Then forces had been landed from Italian ships and the barracks of the Annamites had been surrounded. It was at this stage that some of the latter had been killed. The report quoted a British observer who had seen three Annamites stabbed to death while holding up their hands in token of surrender. In addition to this, a French packet boat had been fired on by Italian volunteers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was more than could be endured. No one in France would submit to treatment of this sort. Therefore, his first act was to ask his colleagues what should be done. He assumed that they were ready to defend the rights of France as he was ready to defend theirs. The Italian Government had installed in Fiume a gang of men, known as volunteers, who controlled the city in the name of the King of Italy. It was to help these volunteers that the Italian General asked his Allied colleagues to withdraw from the city. He therefore proposed to retire with his British and American colleagues and to make his decision after consultation with them.

M. CRESPI said that he wished to express on behalf of his Government the sincerest regret for what had taken place. He was deeply impressed by the reports received by his colleagues. He, himself, had no news later than that

which had been on the previous day in M. Tittoni's hands. He was therefore taken by surprise. He hoped and believed that the reports referred to the same incident as has [*sic*] been mentioned on the previous day, namely, to the incident of Sunday.¹ The information in the hands of the Italian Delegation was to the effect that after provocation caused by a French soldier, rioting began. It was alleged that a French soldier had fired first. He had been supported by other men who came from a small post and fired on the crowd. Italian soldiers had then intervened to restore order, then French sailors had fired from ships. The information, therefore, was not quite the same as that in the hands of M. Clemenceau.

MR. LANSING said that he had no other information than that of which he had given an account. It was therefore possible that it was a new version of the Sunday incident mentioned on the previous day.

MR. BALFOUR said that by every account it was a deplorable affair. He, himself, had no information. He had no means, therefore, of judging whether there had been one incident or two. He asked M. Clemenceau whether his dispatches related to events of Sunday or to subsequent events.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the event described had taken place on the 6th.

MR. BALFOUR said it might then perhaps be assumed that everything had taken place on one day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this might be true. On the previous day he had not known how serious the matter was. He had then been content with a Commission of Enquiry. Now he thought this was not enough. He could not allow French soldiers to be murdered. It must also be borne in mind that on the day before the incident or incidents, the Italian General had desired the French troops to be removed ten kilometres west of the town in order to avoid trouble. The Italian General had no right to demand anything of the sort and the French General had rightly refused. The dispatch he had received concluded by asking that Allied warships should be sent to Fiume.

M. CRESPI pointed out that according to M. Clemenceau's news, the Italian General had not given any orders to his French colleague but had only made a proposal. Moreover, General Grazioli, the day before the incident, had driven through Fiume in the same car with General Savy in order to show the good understanding existing between the two Commanders. He had done everything he could to avoid disturbances. Incidents of this kind where troops of various nations were gathered were liable to occur everywhere.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that incidents of this kind had not occurred elsewhere. There was no instance of British or American ships firing on French troops nor of French ships firing on British troops. On the previous day, he had not known that the Italian warships had acted in this manner. He must therefore insist on consulting his British and American colleagues separately

¹ July 6, 1919.

as to the action to be taken. He proposed that they should withdraw together.

M. CRESPI said that he would, himself, withdraw.

(At this point the Italian members of the Meeting withdrew.)²

2. M. CLEMENCEAU nominated General Naulin as French representative.

Appointment of MR. LANSING nominated Major-General C. P. Sumneral.

Inter-Allied MR. BALFOUR said that he was unable to nominate an officer

Commission to at that moment.

enquire into inci- M. CRESPI said he would make his nomination on the
dents at Fiume following day.

3. The following instructions were accepted:—

Instructions 'That the inter-allied Commission of Enquiry for Fiume shall
to Commission investigate and report the facts as to the incident or incidents of
of Enquiry violence, which have recently taken place in that town, and record
their opinion on the responsibility therefor. They should further
submit to the Supreme Council as soon as possible their recommendations as
to the best means of preserving peace and safety hereafter.'

4. M. CLEMENCEAU handed M. Crespi a Note regarding the stoppage of
trains at Modane.³

Stoppage of M. CRESPI said that it was a technical matter and that he
supply trains would reply on the following day.
at Modane

5. MR. BALFOUR said that he had prepared the following draft resolution:—

Question of direct In order to expedite the evacuation of the Baltic States by
relations between Germany in accordance with the decision taken by the Council
General Gough of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on June 12th and
and the Germans communicated to the German Government by Marshal Foch,
(see H.D. I, para- vide his telegram No. 3029 dated June 18th to the President of
graph 10)⁴ the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission at Spa,⁵ it is resolved:

- (a) that General Gough shall be authorised to deal directly with local enemy commanders in the Baltic States on matters arising from the above decision;
- (b) that General Gough shall have similar powers with regard to the execution of any subsequent decisions of the Allied and Associated Governments in connection with the German troops now in the Baltic States, all such decisions being in the first instance communicated to the German Government through the usual channels;
- (c) that Marshal Foch will be informed of this resolution and will be requested to communicate its substance to the German Government,

² For the separate discussion between the French, British, and American delegates see No. 6. Signor Crespi evidently rejoined the meeting after this discussion.

³ See No. 4, minute 1.

⁴ No. 4, minute 10.

⁵ See Vol. III of this series.

with a request that the German Commanders in the Baltic States may be given the necessary instructions.

There was also a resolution of the Commission on Baltic Affairs:—

The Baltic Commission having been informed of the contents of the telegram[s] from General Gough and Colonel Tallents⁶ of 25th, 26th and 27th June respecting the necessity of an immediate credit of £500,000 in order to pay Russian and Lettish troops in Libau required for maintenance of order, consider that it is urgently necessary that this sum should at once be placed at the disposal of General Gough on grounds of military necessity as otherwise the position of the Interallied Mission and of General Gough will become shortly untenable in Latvia, and it will be impossible to enforce the evacuation of the German troops.

The Commission, however, desire to draw attention to the fact that this £500,000 is only sufficient to meet immediate military necessities and they therefore recommend that enquiries should be made as to what securities in the way of timber, flax or other raw materials the three Baltic States can give for a loan.

In case such a loan can be raised either from one or more of the Allied and Associated Governments or from private banking institutions on the basis of such security it is recommended that the above advance of £500,000 should ultimately be merged in this loan.

The first was intended to place General Gough in direct relation with the Germans in order to ensure their retirement from the Baltic Provinces.

The second related to a different point though it was also connected with the retirement of the Germans. It appeared that the Germans had been paying the Russian Forces in those parts. These forces must be maintained, therefore paid. General Gough required £500,000 to do this. He supposed that there was no choice but to agree. He confessed that it was news to him that the Germans had hitherto paid these troops. If, however, the Allies had to become the paymasters of these forces, he thought it best to entrust the money to General Gough, the Allied Representative, on the spot for proper disbursement.

MR. LANSING observed that this was a new proposal. The United States were in a difficult position in matters of this kind. He knew of no fund out of which such a cost could be defrayed. American laws were very stringent on the subject of spending money. Until July 1st, while the President was in Paris, there had been funds which he could spend at his discretion. At present there were no funds available. The only means of raising money for such a purpose that he could think of was a loan. Seeing that there was no recognised Government in the countries in question,⁷ it did not appear possible to raise a loan.

⁶ British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces.

⁷ The principal Allied Powers did not accord recognition *de jure* to the Governments *de facto* of Esthonia and Latvia until January 26, 1921. The Lithuanian Government was recognised *de jure* on December 20, 1922.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was not clear to him how the French contribution could be raised.

(It was decided to accept the first resolution and to refer the second for report to the Financial Commission.)

6.

*Report of Committee on
Repatriation of Austrian
prisoners of War*

[Not printed]

7. After some discussion the French text (see Annex II)⁸ was accepted with slight alterations. The adjective 'German' was suppressed in connection with the expression Austria or 'Austrian' and the sentence regarding the boycotting of Serbian cattle was struck out.

*Reply to the Austrian
Note on the economic
clauses of the Treaty*

7. [sic] (It was decided that the answers accepted by the Council regarding economic questions, the League of Nations⁹ and Consular and Diplomatic Agents in South America should be handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 9th July, and that the replies should be given to the Press on the evening of the 9th July, so as to be published on the morning of the 10th.)

*Communication
of replies to
Austrian Notes
and publication
in the Press*

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 8, 1919.*

⁸ Not printed. The approved text was published in the press on July 10 in accordance with the decision recorded below. In this note the Allied and Associated Powers announced revisions to certain draft articles of the treaty with Austria by way of concession to Austrian representations concerning: (i) The effect on the economic existence of Austria which would be likely to result if the allied successor states to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were to have the right to retain and liquidate all property possessed in those states by Austrian nationals or companies; the Allied Powers now agreed, subject to certain qualifications, to prohibit such retention and liquidation. (ii) The non-reciprocity of what subsequently became articles 217-20 of the treaty, prohibiting Austrian discrimination against Allied trade in such matters as import and export duties. In this connexion the Allied note maintained that the Austrian argument was weakened by what subsequently became article 222, which contemplated the conclusion between Austria on the one hand and Czechoslovakia or Hungary on the other of special customs and economic arrangements, the advantage of which did not need to be extended to the other Allied Powers: such arrangements not to exceed five years in duration. The note went on to state that conditions resulting from the war absolutely precluded the possibility of the Allies undertaking to open their markets at once to Austrian products on terms as favourable in every respect as they might be in a position to accord to other nations. The Allied and Associated Powers declared, however, that they were prepared to add to what subsequently became article 232 a paragraph embodying an agreement that, unless the League of Nations should decide otherwise, an Allied Power should not after the expiry of three years from the coming into force of the treaty be entitled to invoke the obligation imposed upon Austria by articles 217-20 unless that Allied Power accorded correlative treatment to Austria.

⁹ See No. 4, minute 6.

H. D. 2 A.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of American, British and French Delegations held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday July 8, 1919, at 5.0 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

France: M. Clemenceau.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that what he proposed to do was to send a French warship to Fiume. He wished to know whether his colleagues would agree. There was a French warship at Constantinople which could reach Fiume in four days. He would prefer to act in complete agreement with his colleagues.

MR. LANSING said that there were no American troops in Fiume. There were, however, some Naval officers. He thought perhaps it would be wise to obtain a report on the incidents from the British Admiral.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had been insulted and that the French flag must be shown.

MR. LANSING said that the Italian troops were, unfortunately, very much in the majority at Fiume. It was for this reason that the crowd had been encouraged to attack the French. He had this in his mind on the previous day when he suggested that the Allied troops should be reduced to equal contingents of police.

MR. BALFOUR said that he saw no objection to the sending of a French man-of-war. In the meantime, he would do all he could to obtain the evidence of the British Admiral.

MR. LANSING agreed. He thought, himself, that the Italians were to blame. American troops had also been insulted, but it might appear, on further investigation, that there were extenuating circumstances. Should this prove to be the case, M. Clemenceau would, no doubt, stop his warship by wireless.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the ship must appear at Fiume. It could be withdrawn, if necessary, after 48 hours stay there, but the French flag must be shown.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought both the British and American Governments would act in a similar manner in similar circumstances.

MR. LANSING said that he thought perhaps they would have done so without consulting their colleagues.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that this action would not put a stop to the enquiry which had been proposed on the previous day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not mean in any way to interfere with

that decision. All he wished to maintain was that an enquiry alone would not be sufficient after what had occurred.

(After obtaining the agreement of his colleagues, M. Clemenceau gave orders for the despatch of a French Warship to Fiume.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

July 8, 1919.

No. 7

H. D. 3.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 9, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon.

Italy: M. Crespi; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Ashida.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. *British Empire:* Capt. E. Abraham. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. For Great Britain, General Watts was appointed.

*Appointment of
Inter-Allied Com-
mission to enquire
into incidents at
Fiume*

M. CRESPI said that he could not at present nominate an Italian officer. He thought that there would be an officer on the spot and it was agreed that he should join his colleagues at Fiume and be sent the same instructions as were given to them.

(It was agreed that the officers nominated should attend the Council the following day at 3.30 p.m. to receive their instructions. As it was not possible for General Watts to be present, it was agreed that General Thwaites should attend to receive instructions in his stead. It was also agreed that General Cavallero should attend to receive instructions in place of the Italian officer to be nominated.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked if any of his colleagues had any news from Italy.

*Situation
in Italy*

MR. BALFOUR said he had nothing save what he had shown the Chairman on the previous day. Though there was a British Admiral and a British colonel commanding a battalion in Fiume, he had received no news from them. He had telephoned to London, asking for more news to be sent him.

M. CRESPI said that he had received a despatch from M. Nitti and one from Fiume. It appeared from these despatches that no incidents had occurred since Sunday. In any case, the Italian Government was determined to maintain order.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Military Attaché in Rome again reported the words of General Albricci, to which he had previously alluded. The French Ambassador was also of the opinion that an attempt was being made to influence the Conference.

M. CRESPI said that he was quite sure this was a complete misunderstanding.

3. M. CRESPI said that he was not able to reply at once to the document *Stoppage of Trains at Modane* handed to him by M. Clemenceau on the previous day. He would, however, furnish a reply at the next meeting.

4. MR. LANSING said that, before taking up the subjects on the Agenda, he wished to draw attention to a dispatch (Appendix A) he had received two days previously from Warsaw. It was to the effect that the retiring German troops were removing, as they left, horses, cattle, agricultural implements and everything necessary for the cultivation of the next harvest. This might be the act of irresponsible soldiery, but it was necessary to put a stop to it.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that M. Dutasta should proceed at once to the Germans at Versailles and make a formal complaint to them on behalf of the Council.

(This was agreed to.)

5. (On MR. BALFOUR's proposal, it was agreed to summon the Bulgarian Government to send a Delegation to Paris to receive the Peace Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria: Summoning of Bulgarian Delegation to Paris Terms. The Secretary-General was asked to take the necessary steps.)

6. MR. LANSING proposed that this question should be taken up before the first question on the Agenda. He thought the two questions *Military Means to Oblige the Hungarians to respect the Armistice* were connected and that the means of action should be determined before addressing any communication to Bela Kun.

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites entered the room.)

GENERAL BLISS was asked to make a statement and said that all that was necessary was mentioned in the report. (Appendix B.)

The report was then read by M. MANTOUX.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not doubt that the appreciation of the Military Representatives was accurate. If the Allied Powers, France, Great Britain, Italy, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia and Serbia, were too weak to deal with one recalcitrant power, the position was one of great humiliation. That, perhaps, did not matter much, but Bela Kun was turning Hungary into a military stronghold of revolution. Buda-Pest had become an armed camp and all the factories were making munitions. Propaganda was being carried on in the most dangerous fashion in the neighbouring countries. If the Allies must sit still and see the Armistice broken before their eyes, they were bound to lose prestige. Central Europe was likely to lose more than prestige. The Bulgarians had just been summoned to Paris to hear the Peace Terms. Was it likely that they would obey if they saw that the Allies could not even coerce a fragment of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy? The

Bulgarians were only half disarmed and would feel that they could defy the Conference. The situation in Central Europe was both difficult and critical. The wave of disturbance might go west as well as east. The situation would, he thought, grow more critical if it were manifest that the Conference could not control a small and defeated nation, which was not only breaking the terms of the Armistice, but, in alliance with the Russian Soviet Government, attempting to cause general revolution. He did not favour wild military adventures, but he did not like a confession of impotence.

MR. LANSING said that he had nothing to add to what Mr. Balfour had said. He thought Allied prestige should be maintained. Bolshevism would spread to Austria, if it appeared to be successful in Hungary. He wondered whether the contribution suggested for Serbia in the report of the Military Representatives was not under-estimated. He was not aware that Serbia was fighting or anticipated fighting on any other front. He therefore suggested that the Military Representatives should get into touch with the authorities of Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia and Roumania, in order to find out what these States could do to help.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he must remind Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing that there were neither British nor American troops at hand. The French had two divisions, but other help would be required. He suggested that the Military Representatives, after conferring as suggested by Mr. Lansing, should return, together with Marshal Foch, and tell the Council what results they had obtained. He felt sure that Marshal Foch would ask for British and American troops.

MR. BALFOUR said it would be necessary for him to summon Sir Henry Wilson.¹ Only the British Cabinet could decide whether any British troops were to be employed. He would ask Sir Henry Wilson to consult the Cabinet before coming over to Paris, in order that he might be in a position to state what could be done.

GENERAL BLISS observed that it would not be of much use for the Military Representatives to consult the Czech, Serbian and Roumanian military authorities as to the number of troops at their disposal, unless there were means of knowing whether their Governments would consent to give troops for this purpose or not.

MR. LANSING said that, perhaps, the best course would be to confer with the Heads of the Czecho-Slovak, Yugo-Slav and Roumanian Delegations in Paris.

(It was then agreed that the Heads of the Czecho-Slovak, Yugo-Slav and Roumanian Delegations be invited to attend the Council on Friday, 11th July, and that Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson be also asked to be present, in order to discuss the possibility of military action against Hungary.)

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites withdrew.)

¹ Chief of the Imperial General Staff. (Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson did not go to Paris in this connexion, but he conferred with Marshal Foch upon the matter on July 19, while the latter was in London on a brief visit. Cf. Major-General Sir C. Callwell: *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*, London, 1927, vol. ii, pp. 203-4.)

7. The Council had before them the following documents:—

- Sale of Securities by Government of Bela Kun*
1. A Report of the Financial Commission.
 2. A draft Joint Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers, and to the Government[s] of the German Empire and of Austria.
 3. A draft Joint Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kun.
 4. A draft communication to the Press.

(All these documents² are contained in Appendix C.)

MR. LANSING thought that the result of the previous discussion showed that no action could usefully be taken at present.

MR. BALFOUR thought that there could be no harm in telling Bela Kun, on behalf of the Conference, that he was considered to be a thief. He might

² Documents 1 and 2 are not printed. The report of the Financial Commission, dated July 7, 1919 (document 1), was made in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council recorded at the conclusion of No. 3, minute 2. The Financial Commission estimated that by seizing all bonds and securities deposited in the banks of Hungary the Hungarian Government would procure for itself 'from four to six milliard crowns'. The Commission gave it as its opinion that 'the only really effective means of protecting the interests threatened would be that suggested by the Colonel, Chief of the Italian Military Commission at Budapest, who proposes to sequester for purposes of conservation all the bonds deposited in Hungarian banks and to place these banks under the control of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers. But it believes that these measures can only be carried out if the Allied and Associated Governments have at their disposal the military forces required for enforcing them on the Hungarian communist government and for ensuring their maintenance. The decisions which the Supreme Council will take on this subject will determine the possibility of preventing Bela Kun from carrying out his purpose of seizing all the assets deposited in the Hungarian banks and sending them abroad. Anyhow, the Financial Commission suggests to the Supreme Council the following measures which it believes are such as to at least mitigate the effects of the orders given by Bela Kun even if they do not afford complete protection to Allied and Associated interests.' The Financial Commission went on to suggest the dispatch of documents 2 and 3 and that 'the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers may require their nationals to make a declaration of all securities deposited with Hungarian banks of which they are the owners. This declaration might subsequently be completed by opposition to the sale of such securities in all the countries which have adopted legislation allowing of such opposition.' In conclusion the Commission expressed the view that the dispatch of the proposed note to the Hungarian Government 'would only have the value of a protest if it were not backed up by force of arms.'

For the texts of documents 2 and 4 as subsequently approved by the Supreme Council see No. 8, minute 4. The main differences between the original and the approved drafts of document 2 were: (i) The second paragraph of the approved draft was substituted for the original: 'The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed a formal protest to the Communist Government.' (ii) In the third paragraph of the approved draft the phrase 'a fund created for the purpose of a destructive propaganda in foreign countries' was substituted for the original: 'a fund for subsidising bolshevist action not only in Hungary but also in foreign countries.' (iii) The fourth paragraph of the approved draft was substituted for the original: 'It appears to them that joint action is essential, on the one hand, for opposing the propaganda of Bela Kun, and on the other for mitigating, in respect of all depositors, both Hungarian and foreign, the consequences of a measure of spoliation.' (iv) The final paragraph of the approved draft was new.

take no notice of it and put the communication in the waste paper basket, but it could do him no harm. He thought Bela Kun should be warned that his right to steal funds for his own political purposes was not recognised. He did not think that the letters drafted were very suitably worded, but, in substance, he thought they might be adopted.

MR. LANSING said that his objection referred specially to the note addressed to Bela Kun. He did not like threats which could not be followed by action. He thought the less the Conference had to do with him the better, and the less he was regarded as a power the better. The letter addressed to other Governments and that addressed to the Press, he did not object to. He thought they would produce the desired effect without a direct threat to Bela Kun. He also pointed out that the expressions 'bolshevik' and 'communist' should be expunged from these letters.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would not object to the omission of the document addressed to Bela Kun, which he admitted was not likely to have much effect on him.

M. CRESPI said that the question had been closely examined in the Commission. It had been recognised that the letter addressed to Bela Kun would not produce much effect, but it was necessary, before taking action in Allied countries regarding the sales of securities, to furnish such action with a legal ground. The only legal ground in this instance could be an official protest against the anticipated action of the Hungarians. The letter was therefore proposed for its legal rather than for its political effect.

MR. LANSING said that he could not agree with this point of view. A lawless government, unrecognised by any other government, had no legal standing at all. He thought the Allies would have as strong a legal position whether they informed an outlaw that he was doing wrong or whether they addressed no remonstrances to him at all.

M. CRESPI then suggested that the three letters should be sent back to the Commission to be re-drafted in such a manner as to contain a clear declaration that the Allied Powers defined Bela Kun's proceedings as thefts. The drafting would be done in accordance with the views expressed by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing.

(This was agreed to, and M. Crespi undertook to obtain a re-draft by the Financial Commission.)

8. (At this point M. Tardieu, Mr. Nicolson,³ and Mr. Leeper⁴ and M. Vannutelli-Rey⁵ entered the room.)

*Frontiers between
the Serb-Croat-
Slovene States
[sic] and
Hungary*

The Council had before them the recommendations of the Yugo-Slav Committee (Appendix D).

These recommendations were adopted.

(The Experts then withdrew.)

³ British expert on the Central Territorial Committee and on the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs.

⁴ British expert on the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.

⁵ Italian expert on the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.

9. MR. LANSING said that he was unable to act on this subject. He must take the Convention⁶ to Washington. The economic side of the question had not been discussed in America. He suggested that as the matter did not really concern the Peace Conference it might be carried through by ordinary diplomatic methods.

After some further discussion Mr. Lansing agreed that the Convention might be discussed inasmuch as it concerned European Powers—American adhesion being reserved.

(It was decided that the subject be put on the agenda for the following day on this understanding.)

10. (At this point the Military Representatives entered the room.)

Repatriation of Czecho-Slovak forces from Siberia GENERAL BLISS said that a short time ago the Council of Four had sent to the Military Representatives at Versailles a project of Mr. Winston Churchill's⁷ for repatriating the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia. These troops numbered some 60,000 men. The proposal combined the repatriation of these troops with a movement regarded as useful to the Allied cause. One group of 30,000 men at present in the neighbourhood of Omsk was to operate on Koltchak's right flank and to gain contact with the North Russian forces, and thus to reach Archangel. The other portion was to be repatriated by sea in American ships from Vladivostok. The Military Representatives were asked to examine this proposal together with Czecho-Slovak authorities. He, himself had an interview with M. Benes as a consequence of which M. Benes had attended a meeting at Versailles. Before agreeing to the movement of Czecho-Slovak troops to Archangel, M. Benes wished to know whether Allied troops would remain in Northern Russia or whether they would be removed before winter, irrespective of the arrival of the Czechs in time for shipment from Archangel before the port was icebound. Thus the matter could not be proceeded with until it was known whether or not the Allied forces in North Russia would await the arrival of the Czecho-Slovaks. He had written a letter to that effect which hitherto had remained unanswered.

MR. BALFOUR said that at the time of Mr. Winston Churchill's proposal there had been, he understood, a fair prospect of a junction of the Czecho-Slovak forces with the Inter-Allied troops in North Russia. Since Koltchak's reverses⁸ this junction appeared less probable; in fact there now seemed to be little chance for the Czecho-Slovaks of reaching the White Sea before the ice set in. The question for them, therefore, was whether the Allied troops would wait for them. He was informed that the British Government meant to withdraw its troops before the winter.⁸ If the Czechs therefore were unable to reach Archangel before November, he could not promise that they would find British troops awaiting them. He believed that the same applied to the other Allied contingents in North Russia. If this was so it appeared to follow that all the Czech troops must be repatriated from Vladivostok. The result

⁶ The reference was to the draft Convention relating to International Air Navigation, which was published as Cmd. 266 of 1919 before the convention was signed on October 13, 1919.

⁷ Secretary of State for War and Air.

⁸ Cf. Vol. III of this series.

of this would be that part of the Siberian Railway would be deprived of the troops guarding it and Koltchak would have to fill the gap. Therefore, the only point to be dealt with immediately was the question whether Allied troops would stay in North Russia through the winter. As far as Great Britain was concerned, the answer was 'No'.

M. PICHON said that the French Government also meant to recall the French troops from Archangel. He pointed out that the withdrawal of the Czecho-Slovaks had a very serious result on the whole situation in Siberia.

GENERAL BELIN stated that these troops were guarding 1300 kilometres of railway. If withdrawn they must be replaced. It appeared that Japan and the United States must be called upon to fill the gap. The Czechs were at present along the central portion of the line. The Japanese and American troops lay to the east of them. As the Czechs were moved towards Vladivostok the American and Japanese might move westward into their place. There were at the present time 5000 Czechs in Vladivostok. Their immediate shipment would give some satisfaction to opinion in Czecho-Slovakia.

M. CRESPI said that Italian action would be in conformity with French and British action.

M. MATSUI said that Mr. Churchill had enquired some time ago whether Japanese troops could replace the Czecho-Slovaks on the Siberian Railway. He was now informed that it was the question of finding troops to guard 1300 kilometres. The Japanese General had not felt authorised to reply without consulting his Government. He doubted whether there were enough Japanese troops in Siberia to undertake so large a task. If more were required he was not at present able to say what view the Japanese Government would take. He had already telegraphed to his Government on the subject and would do so again.

MR. LANSING said that the problem now before the Council appeared to be a military one with which he could not deal. The political question was whether the Czecho-Slovaks should be evacuated from Siberia. The answer to this was in the affirmative, provided it were militarily possible.

M. PICHON said it would be possible if the Americans would send a few troops to reinforce the Japanese.

GENERAL BLISS said he thought this could not be done. American troops had been sent to Siberia to help the Czecho-Slovaks to leave it. Once the Czecho-Slovaks had left there would be no pretext to justify the retention of American troops in the country.

M. PICHON said that if the United States would not take on the task it remained for the Japanese to do so; otherwise the whole country would become a prey to Bolshevism.

M. MATSUI said that he was not in a position to state whether the Japanese Government would undertake so much. He would consult it and say that the Conference desired that Japan should be responsible for the guarding of the Siberian Railway.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question now being discussed was not the one on the agenda. Without knowing how much the American and Japanese

Governments were prepared to do it was difficult to see any solution to the military difficulty which had been raised.

MR. LANSING said that the question on the agenda was whether the Czechs could be shipped from Archangel. The answer to this was in the negative. They must, therefore, be shipped from Vladivostok.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as Mr. Lansing expressed no hope of American assistance it was desirable to know whether the Conference wished to invite Japan to undertake the defence of the Siberian Railway.

MR. LANSING said that before giving a final answer he would like to consult Washington. He suggested that the Government at Washington should be consulted by the President of the Conference.

(It was then agreed that the Military Representatives at Versailles should prepare a draft dispatch to be sent by M. Clemenceau to the American and Japanese Governments regarding the necessity of providing for the defence of the Siberian Railway after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops.)

II.

*Report of Military
Representatives regarding
Military, Naval and Air
Control Commissions*

(The Report of the Military Representatives (Appendix E) was accepted.)

12. MR. LANSING observed that this question was one between France, Great Britain and Italy, and that America was not concerned.⁹

M. CLEMENCEAU, alluding to documents appended (Appendix F),¹⁰ asked M. Crespi how many troops Italy were prepared to send.

M. CRESPI said that Italy would send two battalions if Great Britain sent two.

⁹ The United States of America was not at war with Bulgaria.

¹⁰ Not printed. This appendix comprised: (i) Two consecutive telegrams of July 7 from General Franchet d'Esperey at Constantinople to the French Minister of War (M. Clemenceau) in which the general reported that the Italian General Mombelli had informed him that according to orders from the Italian Government the Italian detachment for the allied force in Bulgaria would 'include' one battalion; General Franchet d'Esperey further reported that as regards a British detachment, General Milne could place at his disposal one battalion which would be stationed in Bulgarian Thrace, but that no orders had been received from the British Government. General Franchet d'Esperey asked that the British Government be requested 'to be good enough to issue instructions to General Milne so that I may forthwith proceed with the organization of the occupation of Bulgaria'. (ii) A 'Note concerning the Troops of Occupation in Bulgaria', dated July 7, 1919. The provenance of this note (text in English) was not indicated but it was apparently of French origin and based on proposals from General Franchet d'Esperey (cf. M. Clemenceau's allusion below to 'the proposals made by General Franchet d'Esperey'). This note set out the facts summarized in the statement below by General Bliss and stated that the proposed British and Italian contingents 'are both obviously inadequate'. The note concluded: 'In order that the occupation should be truly interallied in character and in order to be in a position to add to the two French divisions such forces as is [sic] necessary to complete the total strength it is requested that the Italian and British detachments should be *tactical units capable of a military role*, that is to say, they should at least consist of: an Italian regiment including 3 battalions, a British brigade including 2 battalions.'

MR. BALFOUR said he was not prepared to say how many British troops would be sent.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not support the proposals made by General Franchet d'Esperey that there should be three British battalions and two Italian,¹¹ while there were two French divisions in the country. France had no special interest in Bulgaria. He personally did not care who possessed Cavalla.¹² He did not agree to maintain two French divisions in Bulgaria while Great Britain had only one platoon, and Italy two battalions. The French Army was being demobilised, and a number of the troops in Bulgaria would be automatically recalled. In his opinion, there should be an Inter-Allied occupation in equal shares, or none.

GENERAL BLISS said that on the 9th June the Military Representatives had made recommendations, which had been approved on the 16th June by the Council of Four. It had been agreed that two French divisions should be maintained, and that Great Britain and Italy should both be represented. On consultation, Great Britain had offered one platoon, and Italy one battalion. Now General Franchet d'Esperey called attention to the insufficiency of the British and Italian contribution.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation had changed, as he was now forced to demobilise, and remove his troops from Bulgaria, unless his Allies took their share. The only Great Power which had not been demobilised was Italy. Why they had not done so was their business. The only people with interests at stake in Bulgaria were the Greeks, and they sent their troops to Smyrna.

M. CRESPI said that M. Clemenceau had more than once declared that Italy had not demobilised. He wished to make a formal and official statement that Italy had demobilised as much as France, and had even demobilised one class more than France.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if that was so, Italy could take her share of the watch on Bulgaria. Meanwhile, she was sending 40,000 troops across the Black Sea to Baku.

M. CRESPI said that the British Government had requested that the British troops in the Caucasus be relieved by the Italians. He was not aware that Italy had as yet decided to send even one man.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had nevertheless received official telegrams in support of what he said.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that he had just given General Thwaites a statement in complete contradiction of the information mentioned by M. Clemenceau.

(It was then decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles the question of devising means for an equal Inter-Allied occupation of Bulgaria.)

¹¹ These respective British and Italian strengths reversed those proposed in Appendix F. See note 10 above.

¹² The future status of the port of Kavalla was at that time under deliberation (cf. No. 11, minute 6).

13. M. CLEMENCEAU announced that, according to the Havas Agency, *Ratification of the Weimar Assembly had ratified the Treaty, the Rhine Convention, and the Protocols of the Treaty, by 208 votes against Germany* 115.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 9, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 7

The American Minister at Warsaw reports under date of 3rd July that he had been informed by Colonel Grove,¹³ who received the information from the Polish Delegation from West Prussia, that the German troops in withdrawing from the west bank of the Vistula were clearing out horses and farm implements from Polish and German inhabitants alike. It would seem that these seizures were possibly the work of soldiery without orders. Should this continue it will be impossible to reap this year's harvest. It would also prevent seeding their next year's crop and result in this district having to import rather than export foodstuffs.

APPENDIX B TO No. 7

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

S. W. C. 438]

*Report on the Measures to be taken regarding Hungary*¹⁴

On July 5th the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers charged¹⁵ the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council:

- (a) To examine from the military point of view the means at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers to compel Hungary to comply with the conditions of the armistice accepted by her;¹⁶
- (b) To give the Supreme Council information regarding the manufacture and the stocks of munitions at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.

In their Joint Note No. 43 of June 7th, 1919,¹⁷ the Military Representatives already considered the military measures to be taken eventually against Hungary in order to put an end to the Hungarian attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks.

At that time the greater part of the Hungarian forces was concentrated on the Czecho-Slovak front; the Hungarian Command had only left weak covering forces in the East (Rumanian front) and in the South (Franco-Serbian front).

¹³ Chief of the Polish Division of the American Relief Administration.

¹⁴ This report is printed by F. Deák in *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1942), pp. 467-70.

¹⁵ See No. 3, minute 2.

¹⁶ Note in original: 'The Italian Military Representative said that he must repeat the declaration which he had already made before, namely that he could only consider the armistice of November 3rd, 1918 (Armistice of the Villa Giusti), as the military convention of General Franchet d'Esperey had not been recognised by the Italian Government.' (See No. 3, note 6.)

¹⁷ Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

The execution of the military operation set forth in its broad lines in the Joint Note above mentioned would seem therefore to have been capable of realisation without any great difficulties if it had been undertaken immediately.

Since the 7th June, however, the military situation in Hungary has appreciably changed.

Dispositions of the Hungarian Army

On the intervention of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the Government of Bela Kun agreed to stop its attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks, and moreover to order its troops to evacuate Czecho-Slovak territory under the conditions laid down by General Pellé in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

From the latest information received from General Pellé it would appear:—

That the evacuation of the above-mentioned territory by the Hungarian troops has been carried out within the time limit prescribed.

That the greater part of the Hungarian troops who were on the Slovak front and who have been liberated as a result of this evacuation, are in process of concentration in the regions of Miskolcz (150 kilometres N.E. of Buda Pesth), Cegled and Kecskemet (80 to 100 kilometres S.E. of Buda Pesth), where they are in a position to threaten both the Rumanian and the Franco-Serb forces.

It appears also that the Government of Buda Pesth is at the present moment forming 2 new divisions of infantry, which will bring the total number of the Hungarian forces up to 8-10 divisions of infantry and 2 divisions of cavalry, or 100,000 to 120,000 combatant troops. Recent information points to these troops being disciplined, well-equipped, provided with numerous machine-guns and considerable artillery, and to their supplies of ammunition, though no precise information is forthcoming,¹⁸ allowing them to offer considerable resistance; and lastly to their being animated by a very strong national feeling.

Under these conditions, and taking into consideration the force that the Hungarian Command would in the ordinary course of events be obliged to maintain on the Czecho-Slovak front, it does not seem an exaggeration that on the Rumanian and Franco-Serbian fronts alone the Armies of the Entente, in case of offensive action against the Hungarian Army, would have to fight a force of at least 90,000 to 100,000 good troops.

¹⁸ Note in original: 'From the latest returns received by the British and French Military Representatives the Hungarian Army has at its disposal material and stocks of munitions from the old Honvéd, from the Mackensen Army, which was disarmed in Hungary, and an unknown quantity of arms and munitions which have been sent from Austria. [Under the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the Honvéd was a Hungarian defence force composed of reserve regiments.]

'The possibility of manufacturing war material in Hungary is little known. A great effort would appear to have been made and 6 or 7 factories appear to be in full working order, of which

- 1 is for the manufacture of guns,
- 1 for the manufacture of small arms,
- 2 for the manufacture of explosives (20,000 shells per day?),
- 1 for the manufacture of aeroplanes,
- 1 for the manufacture of monitors, gun-boats and material for river craft.

'There is no indication of the manufacture of ammunition for infantry; this does not, however, appear to be deficient. Hungary is drawing from the mines of Salgo-Tarjan and from the region of Miskolcz 550 wagon loads of raw material (lignite and iron) per day.'

It must be added that Buda Pesth, the seat of the Hungarian Government and the final objective of the Entente Armies, appears now to have been transformed into a veritable fortress provided with successive lines of defence extending to a great distance and a strong defensive organisation, the capture of which would without doubt entail a great effort if the Hungarian Government had not beforehand asked for peace.

Dispositions of the Allied Armies

The Allied and Associated Powers could oppose to the Hungarian Army:—

(1) *Conditional on the agreement of the Rumanian and Serbian Governments.*

6 Rumanian Divisions.	} 60,000 men.
1 „ Cavalry Division.	
2 French Divisions.	16,000 „
1 Serbian Division.	8,000 „

in all, 84,000 men of which two-thirds belong to the Rumanian Army.

It must moreover be noted that the Rumanian troops have been forced to evacuate, after the initial success of the Hungarian offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, the bridge-heads which they had occupied on the right bank of the Theiss, and are consequently in a disadvantageous position to undertake operations against the Hungarians.

(2) *Conditional on the agreement of the Government of Prague.*

Such weak Czecho-Slovak forces as it has been possible to re-organise up to date after the reverses of last month, amounting to at the most:—

2 Divisions 20,000 men.

The remainder of the Czecho-Slovak Army will probably not be available for action for two months.

In any case the Entente would have at its disposal for the proposed operation only a total force, including Czecho-Slovaks, of

100,000 to 110,000 men

with which to oppose

100,000 to 120,000 Hungarians.

Conclusions

In consideration of the above, the Military Representatives are of opinion that the proposed operation is possible, but presents a great element of risk if measures are not taken to ensure the reinforcement of the Allied forces in time.

The Military Representatives further consider they should draw the attention of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to the following points:—

(1) The possibility of undertaking this action depends absolutely on the consent of the Serbian, Rumanian and Czecho-Slovak Governments.

(2) Serious difficulties must be expected in the carrying out of the operation, viz.:—

(a) Changes in the dispositions of the Hungarian Army in process of concentration between the Theiss and the Danube to the South of Budapest and in the region of Miskolcz.

(b) The loss by the Rumanian forces of the bridgeheads which they had occupied on the right bank of the Theiss.

(c) The defensive organisation carried out round Budapest.

(3) If the operation is contemplated it is of importance to postpone the retirement of the Rumanian troops from the region East of the Theiss.

With these reserves and if a military operation against the Hungarian Army is decided on by the Supreme Council in spite of the difficulties set forth above and the large expenditure involved, the general plan of operations contemplated by the Military Representatives in their Joint Note No. 43 of June 7th¹⁷ still appears capable of execution in its broad lines. It would be for the General Commanding-in-Chief the operating Armies to modify the plan as circumstances may dictate.

In any case the Military Representatives insist, if the success of the operation is to be assured, on the necessity of the operations being under the direction of one Commander accepted by the Rumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak Governments. The General Commanding-in-Chief, the Allied Armies of the East is the sole Commander who appears for the moment to be in a position to make the necessary dispositions without loss of time and consequently to ensure the necessary co-ordination of action.

G. AL BELIN.	C. SACKVILLE- WEST.	UGO CAVALLERO.	TASKER H. BLISS.
	Major General,		
Military	Military	Military	Military
Representative,	Representative,	Representative,	Representative,
French Section,	British Section,	Italian Section,	American Section,
Supreme War	Supreme War	Supreme War	Supreme War
Council.	Council.	Council.	Council.

Given at Versailles on the 8th July, 1919.

APPENDIX C TO No. 7

Document 3¹⁹

W. C. P. 1116.B.] *Translation.*

FINANCIAL COMMISSION OF THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS

July 7th, 1919.

Joint Draft Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kun

According to information received by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers the Communist Government of Budapest has given order[s] to the banks on Hungarian territory to deliver up to it all bonds and securities and values²⁰ held by them on deposit; and it would appear that this order has already begun to be carried out.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers consider that these securities and values,²⁰ in as much as they are not the property of their nations, are the security for the credits on account of war reparations.

They make formal protest against all measures aiming at disposing of the same.

They also declare that they consider as a qualified theft²¹ all seizure of securities and values²⁰ belonging to their nationals.

¹⁹ For the omission of Documents 1 and 2 of this appendix see note 2 above.

²⁰ French *valeurs* = valuta.

²¹ Apparently a mistranslation of *vol qualifié* = an aggravated theft.

They warn the communist Government that they consider as null and void all measures which it has decreed for their confiscation, and that they hold the Hungarian Government responsible for all loss which may result from same to themselves and to their nationals.

Document 4

W. G. P. 1116.C.] *Translation.*

July 7th, 1919.

Draft Communication to the Press

According to information received, the Communist Government of Budapest has ordered the banks on Hungarian territory to deliver up to it the securities and values²⁰ which they hold on deposit; and it would seem that steps have been taken to carry out this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have addressed to Bela Kun a formal protest, stating that they consider as a qualified theft²¹ the seizure of all securities and values belonging to their nationals, and warning the communist Government that they will hold as null and void all measures of confiscation, and that they will hold the Hungarian Government responsible for all losses which may result therefrom to them and to their nationals.

The (French) owners of securities deposited in Hungary are requested to declare same to (the Commission of Claims, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as soon as possible; which they have already done [*sic*].

Moreover, owners of such securities are advised to make the declarations foreseen by the Law of June 15th, 1872 on oppositions, to the Syndical Chamber of Brokers of Paris.

APPENDIX D TO No. 7

Frontier between Yugo-Slavia and Hungary in the Prekomurje

A. DEMAND OF THE SERBO-CROAT-SLOVENE DELEGATION

The Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation no longer claim the eastern districts inhabited by a compact Magyar population and the northern districts which are connected with the valley of the Raab by their economic interests.

B. DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE

(1) *Principles.*

(a) The Committee considers that from the geographical point of view the new frontier claimed by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation is of an artificial character like the former one, as indeed is unavoidable in any delineation of the Yugo-Slav salient to the north of the Mur.

(b) It notes that this salient, thus reduced, is inhabited by a population of which three-quarters are Slovene.

(c) It recognises that from a general political point of view the fate of the Slovene race, united under the Austro-Hungarian domination and in its resistance to Germanisation, but now inevitably destined to be split up as a result of the partition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is worthy of all attention.

(2) *Conclusions.*

The Committee proposes to assign to Yugo-Slavia the part of the Prekomurje now claimed by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation.

The geographical boundary is as follows:—

The *talweg* of the Lendva upstream to a point to be determined on the ground to the south of point 265.

Thence, a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a north-north-westerly direction to point 209 (3 kilometres west of Nemesnep) and leaving Pincze, Csente, Hidveg, Gönterhaza, Zsitkőcz and Kebele-Szentmarton to Yugo-Slavia; and Lendva-Ujfalú, Dedes, Gaborjanhaza, Bödehaza and Lendva-Jakabfa to Hungary.

Thence, in a north-westerly direction as far as point 295, approximately the crest line separating the basins of the river Nemesnepi in the north and the river Kebele in the South.

Thence a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a northerly direction to point 313 (about 10 kilometres to the south of Szt. Gotthard) passing over points 291-319 and leaving Kisszerdahely, Domonkosfa, Kapornak, Domaföld with its railway station, and Nagydolány to Yugo-Slavia; and Szemerecz and Kotormány to Hungary.

Thence, in a westerly direction as far as point 371 (about 10 kilometres to the south-south-east of Fehring) approximately the crest-line separating the basins of the Rába in the north and the Mur in the south.

Thence, a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a south-westerly direction to the old frontier between Austria and Hungary to the east of point 400, and leaving Gedoudvár to Yugo-Slavia and Bonisfalva to Hungary.

A. W. A. LEEPER.

APPENDIX E TO No. 7

s. w. c. 436.] *Organisation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control referred to in Articles 203-210 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany*

GENERAL

Part I

Formation of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control

Article 1. Three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control shall be created, viz.:—

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

These Commissions shall enter upon their duties as from the date of the coming into force of the *Treaty of Peace*.

Article 2. The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Military Clauses (Article 208).

The President of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a French General.²²

²² Note in original: 'In view of the great importance of this Commission, the Military Representatives are of opinion that its President should be a General Officer chosen with

Article 3. The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Naval Clauses (Article 209).

The President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a British Admiral.

Article 4. The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Aeronautical Clauses (Article 210).

The President of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a British Brigadier-General.

Article 5. The General Officers and Admiral referred to in Articles 2, 3, and 4 shall mutually detail a permanent representative (assisted if necessary by other Officers) for the purpose of maintaining liaison between them.

Part II

Powers of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control

Article 6. The powers of each of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control are defined in Articles 203 to 210 of the Treaty of Peace.

In addition to the application of the Military Clauses (Articles 159 to 180), the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control shall enforce Articles 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Naval Clauses.

Article 7. The general clauses (Articles 211–212 of the Treaty of Peace) shall be under the supervision of the President of the Military, Naval or Aeronautical Commissions of Control as the case may be.

Part III

Expenses of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control

Article 8. The maintenance and expenses of the Commissions of Control and their working expenses are chargeable to Germany in accordance with Article 207 of the Treaty of Peace.

These expenses shall be paid direct, through the President of the Commissions, to the parties concerned, by the Allied and Associated Governments, who shall obtain repayment of such expenses from the German Government.²³

Article 9. The German Government will be notified of the accommodation required for the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, and will provide such accommodation in accordance with Article 206 (paragraph 1) of the Treaty of Peace.

Part IV

Duration of activities of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control

Article 10. The duration of the activities of each Commission shall be limited to the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses under its supervision, for special reference to his military standing and reputation, as well as his energy and activity. They recommend that he should be selected from the General Officers in Command of Army Corps.²³

²³ Note in original: 'The American Representatives make a reservation on this paragraph to the effect that legislative action by Congress will be necessary before the United States can adopt the procedure proposed.'

which a time limit is fixed in the Treaty of Peace; and in case the execution be not completed within the period fixed, this fact will be reported by the Commission concerned to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for a decision as to the action to be taken.

Until a decision is reached the Commission will continue to supervise the execution of the particular clause in question.

ORGANISATION OF THE MILITARY INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 11. The General Officer presiding over the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Staff which shall include Officers of each of the Armies of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and of Belgium.

He shall moreover be assisted by the necessary technical personnel (legal, financial and other experts). It will sit at Berlin.

Article 12. The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall include three Sub-Commissions:—

- (a) A Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament and Material.
- (b) A Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training.
- (c) A Sub-Commission for Fortifications.

Article 13. Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament, and Material.

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 164-172, 180, 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by a British General Officer, assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; and shall sit at Berlin.

The Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Munich, Dresden and Stuttgart and at such other places as may be found necessary. The total number of officers necessary for this Sub-Commission will be decided by the President; it will probably not exceed about 20 Officers. It will be assisted by a technical staff of about 4-8 Officers, specially entrusted with the execution of Articles 168 and 169.

Article 14. Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training.

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 159-163 and 173-178 of the Treaty of Peace, particularly as regards the abolition of military schools provided for in Article 176.

It shall be presided over by a French General Officer assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; and shall sit at Berlin.

The Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Munich, Dresden and Stuttgart and at such other places as may be found necessary.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission will be decided by the President; it will probably not exceed about 30 Officers.

Article 15. Sub-Commission for Fortifications.

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 180, 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by an American General Officer and divided into two sections:—

- (1) The Section making the returns (*faisant le recensement*) of fortifications to be maintained (Articles 180 and 196) which shall sit at Berlin and have delegates at Munich, Dresden, Stuttgart and Königsberg.

- (2) The Section dealing with dismantling which shall operate from Kiel (Article 195) with a branch at Stettin, and from Mayence (Article 180) with branches at Strassburg and Cologne.

The Sub-Commission shall consist of about 15 Officers in all, 5 in the first and 10 in the second Section (exact numbers to be decided by the President). The second Section shall be provided with a large subordinate personnel to superintend the work of dismantling.

Article 16. The Officers representing each nation on the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control might be provided as far as possible in the following proportions:—

United States of America	3 in 20.
Great Britain	4 in 20.
France	5 in 20.
Italy	4 in 20.
Belgium	2 in 20.
Japan	2 in 20.

ORGANISATION OF THE NAVAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 17. The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control which is charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses of the Peace Treaty will consist of:—

The Main Commission with necessary Staff, with Headquarters in Berlin.

A Sub-Commission (A) consisting of Professional and Technical Officers for dealing with matters set forth below.

A Sub-Commission (B) similarly composed and constituted for a similar purpose.

It is important that the execution of Article 115 of the Treaty of Peace which deals with the destruction of the fortifications of Heligoland shall be entrusted to a Sub-Commission of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

A Sub-Commission (C) shall be constituted for this purpose.

Article 18. The Main Commission will consist of:—

Vice Admiral Sir E. F. B. Charlton, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

Contre Admiral M. F. A. Grasset,

Rear Admiral P. Orsini, R.I.N.,

Rear Admiral H. A. Wiley, U.S.N.,

Commander M. Sakonji, I.J.N.

or such Officers as may be designated by their respective Governments to succeed them.

Article 19. Sub-Commission 'A' will consist of about 8 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the British Navy.

Sub-Commission 'B' will consist of about 9 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the French Navy.

Sub-Commission 'C' will consist of about 4 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the British Navy.

An Interpreter will be attached to each Sub-Commission.

Article 20. As soon as possible after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, the Main Commission shall proceed in men-of-war to Germany and travel to

Berlin to meet the representatives appointed by the German Government and notify them of the procedure which will be adopted by the Commission of Control.

Article 21. The date of the proposed visit to Berlin will be arranged in conjunction with the Commissions for the execution of the Military and Air Clauses.

Article 22. With regard to the allocation of responsibilities to the Sub-Commissions 'A' and 'B'—

Sub-Commission 'A' shall deal with:—

- (1) The surrender of ships.
- (2) The breaking-up of ships under construction.
- (3) The allowance of ammunition on board ships still in commission.
- (4) The reduction of personnel.

Sub-Commission 'B' shall deal with:—

The surrender of all other stocks of munitions and war material and the stoppage of manufacture.

The foregoing allocation is tentative and not to be regarded as arbitrary, as experience may show it to be desirable to amend it. It is based on the geographical situation in so far as Sub-Commission 'A' will deal with the Naval Ports and the Admiralty in Berlin, while Sub-Commission 'B' will be required to exercise supervision in various centres in Germany.

Article 23. Should it be found desirable or necessary, the personnel of Sub-Commissions 'A' and 'B' shall be interchangeable.

ORGANISATION OF THE AERONAUTICAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 24. The Headquarters of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission shall be at Berlin.

Article 25. The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall consist of 6 Sub-Commissions:—

- 1 Sub-Commission on Production.
- 1 Sub-Commission on Naval Aircraft and Dirigibles.
- 4 Sub-Commissions on Military Aircraft.

Article 26. The Sub-Commission on Production shall supervise particularly the execution of the Clauses contained in Article 201.

It shall sit at Berlin, and be presided over by a French Colonel, assisted by the necessary technical staff.

Article 27. The Sub-Commission on Naval Aircraft and Dirigibles shall supervise as regards those types of Aircraft, the Clauses contained in articles other than Article 201.

It shall be presided over by a British Lieutenant-Colonel.

Article 28. The Sub-Commissions on Military Aircraft shall supervise as far as this class of aircraft is concerned, the execution of clauses other than those contained in Article 201.

A Sub-Commission at Berlin shall be presided over by an American Brigadier-General.

A Sub-Commission at Stuttgart shall be presided over by a French Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Sub-Commission at Munich shall be presided over by an Italian Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Sub-Commission at Dresden shall be presided over by a Belgian Lieutenant-Colonel.

Article 29. The details of the organisation of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control are set forth in the attached Table²⁴ which is put forward as an indication. The total numbers involved are:—

Officers 196.

Other Ranks 381.

Interpreters 25.

²⁴ A slip affixed to the original noted that only a summary of this table was attached. This summary (not printed) tabulated the detailed distribution of personnel and transport between Berlin, Stuttgart, Munich and Dresden.

No. 8

H. D. 4.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, July 10, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon.

Italy: M. Crespi; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Col. Grant. *British Empire:* Capt. E.

Abraham. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

I. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had a question to submit to his colleagues.

*Communication of
Procès-Verbaux to
French Parliamentary
Committee*

In the Council of Four there had been a question, before President Wilson left, about the secrecy of the minutes of proceedings in the Council. President Wilson had taken the view that these minutes could not be communicated.

Mr. Lloyd George had not adopted a very firm attitude on the subject. He (M. Clemenceau) had said that he would not be able to refuse them to a Parliamentary Committee. At the present moment the Parliamentary Committee was asking for the Procès-Verbaux of the Commission on the League of Nations. These procès-verbaux had been printed and kept secret. He thought there could be no objection to showing these documents to the Parliamentary Committee but this raised a question of the communication of other similar records. He would like to know from his Colleagues whether they would agree to the communication of records of discussions other than those of the Council of Four.

MR. LANSING said that personally he had no objection whatever but he did not know what the feelings of the President might be. He would like to have the opportunity of finding out.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether he might give his Parliamentary Committee the minutes of the League of Nations [Commission].

MR. LANSING said that he did not feel sure.

M. MANTOUX then gave an account of the conversation on this subject which had taken place in the Council of Four on the 28th of June, at the Senate, at Versailles.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not believe that any harm would result from the communication of the record in question to a Committee of the French Chamber. This, however, might create a precedent which might be inconvenient. For instance, he questioned whether it would be desirable to communicate the records of the present Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was not in question. The present Council was the successor of the Council of Four and these minutes must remain secret. He referred for the present to the proceedings of commissions.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether he proposed to communicate the proceedings of the Council of Ten.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the negative.

MR. LANSING said that even in respect to the deliberations of Committees embarrassing questions arose. For instance, concerning Responsibilities there had been very frank discussions.¹ It might be imprudent to communicate all that was consigned in the minutes on that matter. President Wilson had been chairman of the Commission on the League of Nations and before the minutes were communicated he ought to be consulted.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Lansing if he would consult President Wilson regarding the request he had made about the minutes of the Commission on the League of Nations.

MR. LANSING agreed to do so.

(At this point M. Loucheur entered the room.)

2. M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to submit a proposal regarding the Inter-Allied Commission to negotiate with Germany on the subject of the Rhineland agreement, slightly different from that put forward on the previous day by the British Delegation. He proposed the following:—

*Draft Resolution
relating to
negotiations with
Germany on the
subject of the
Rhineland
Agreement*

‘An Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed to discuss with the Germans the details of the Convention in accordance with the terms of the letter addressed on the 27th June by

M. Clemenceau to the German Delegation at Versailles.² The Commission shall be composed of one representative for Great Britain, for France, for the United States, and for Belgium. In case of need this Commission

¹ The reference was to the proceedings of the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties.

² In this letter the German Delegation had been informed that the Rhineland Convention must be signed on the same day as the Treaty of Versailles but that the Allied and Associated Powers would not object to subsequent meetings with German representatives in order to discuss details.

shall consult on military matters the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.'

(The above proposal was accepted.)

M. LOUCHEUR further pointed out that the British member, Mr. Wise, had been nominated. He would be glad to know the names of the other Commissioners.

M. CLEMENCEAU nominated M. Loucheur for France.

MR. LANSING said that he would notify the Secretariat later.

M. LOUCHEUR asked that Belgium be approached through the Secretariat General.

(This was agreed to.)

M. Loucheur then withdrew.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that according to news he had received the Poles had made an advance in Lithuania in defiance of the orders of the Conference. He thought that Marshal Foch should be requested on behalf of the Council to order the Poles to withdraw.

*Polish Advance
in Lithuania*

(It was agreed that the dispatch received by M. Clemenceau should be sent to Marshal Foch in order that the latter should take suitable action.)

4. M. CRESPI said that on the previous day he had submitted three notes, one addressed to Bela Kun, another to various Governments, and a third to the Press.³ Mr. Lansing had objected to the first, and the other two had been sent back to the Financial Commission for re-drafting. He now submitted two re-drafts.

*Sale of Securities
by the Govern-
ment of Bela Kun*

(After some discussion, the following drafts were adopted:—

*Joint Note of the Prin-
cipal Allied and Asso-
ciated Governments to
the Governments of the
Allied, Associated and
Neutral Powers and to
the Governments of the
German Empire and of
Austria*

1. According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers hereby declare that this action is nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

The Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Government of to the danger which may be incurred to all countries by the constitution of a fund created for the purpose of a destructive propaganda in foreign countries.

It appears to them that common action is required to defeat this policy and to protect depositors threatened with spoliation.

They therefore propose to the Government of to forbid or at all events to supervise the importation and negotiation of all securities coming

³ See No. 7, minute 7.

from Hungary. It would also be useful to establish a control over all Hungarian securities.

*Communication to the Press.*⁴

2. According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers consider this to be nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

They call the attention of the Governments of all the Associated and Allied and Neutral Powers and also the Governments of the German Empire and Austria to the danger which may arise for all countries from the constitution of funds for the purpose of supporting propaganda in foreign countries. They request that all these Governments will take the necessary steps to prevent the realisation or sale within their territories of the securities stolen by Bela Kun.)

MR. LANSING asked in relation to these proposals, whether the censorship on Hungarian mails was to be maintained.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that as a state of war still existed with Hungary censorship would automatically remain in force.

M. CRESPI said that he had just received from Austria a complaint that 15,000,000 kroner had been introduced into the country and that these were probably the product of sales of securities in Hungary.

5. (It was decided that all Commissions dealing with matters necessary for Treaty of the Treaty with Bulgaria be asked to report not later than July 25th. Peace with It was further decided that the Bulgarian Government be asked to Bulgaria send a deputation to Paris on that date.)

6. (At this stage General Naulin, General Summeral, General Thwaites (representing General Watts), General Cavallero (representing General di Robilant) entered the room.)

Instructions to representatives of the Inter-Allied Commission for Fiume

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing the Generals, said that they were being sent to Fiume to enquire into the events that had taken place there. They were requested to proceed to Fiume as quickly as possible and to devote all their efforts to discovering the truth about the incidents. Their enquiry was of the greatest importance to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies. The Italian member of the Commission, General di Robilant would join it on its way and the British representative, General Watts would follow very shortly. The Commission should report to the Council and apply for assistance should it find any difficulty in carrying out its task.

⁴ On July 15, 1919, there was published in the British press a dispatch on this subject under a Paris dateline of July 14. This dispatch reproduced, not the approved communication printed below, but, with only verbal amendment, the first two paragraphs of the rejected draft printed as Document 4 in No. 7, appendix C.

MR. LANSING asked whether the instructions drafted on the 8th⁵ had been given to the Generals.

(It was agreed that these instructions should be given in writing to each member of the Commission.)

(The Generals then withdrew.)

7. (General Sykes, General Groves,⁶ Mr. Hurst,⁷ General Duval,⁸ General Cavallero and Rear Admiral Knapp⁹ entered the room.)

*Approval of
Air Convention*

MR. LANSING said that the American representatives had no authority to negotiate an agreement.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that Mr. Hurst be heard on the legal aspect of the question.

MR. HURST said that Article 319 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany foreshadowed an early acceptance of the air convention. He had been informed of the difficulty experienced by the American Delegation in agreeing to the convention. He pointed out that similar difficulties had arisen at the Hague in 1907, and the solution adopted then was to leave the question of signature open for eleven months. It would be easy in this instance to permit the postponement of signature until June 1920. This would give time for full discussion and would entail no alteration in the draft. It would also permit the fulfilment of what was provided for in the treaty with Germany.

MR. LANSING said that he had made a similar proposal on the previous day but since then he had learned that the American experts had made certain reservations. On reference to America, should Congress uphold these reservations it would be impossible to get the American signature to the Convention in its present form. There had not yet been an opportunity to discuss the economic side of the Convention with the heads of American industry. There were questions of customs and patents which required to be examined. America might therefore be deprived of the possibility of adhering to a very important Convention. For this reason he did not think the method proposed by Mr. Hurst a suitable one.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood it would be in accordance with international practice to make reservations at the time of signature. The Convention in its present form had been largely assented to and it would be a great misfortune if nothing were done to carry out the arrangements foreshadowed in the Treaty. He thought, therefore, it might be possible to adopt the plan proposed by Mr. Hurst, providing that the deferred signature might be accompanied by reservations to the substance. This could not be done in

⁵ See No. 5, minute 3.

⁶ Generals Sykes and Groves were British representatives on the Aeronautical Commission of the Peace Conference.

⁷ Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office and a member of the Drafting Committee.

⁸ French representative on the Aeronautical Commission.

⁹ American representative on the Aeronautical Commission.

a Treaty of Peace but might be done in a Treaty of this kind. He hoped that this method might reconcile the two views.

MR. LANSING said that the document before him appeared to be a report. He was prepared to accept the report with the reservations expressed by the American expert. What was being discussed was the proposed rules. These he could not accept.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that if any change were made in the Convention he could not guarantee that the numerous Powers concerned in drawing it up would adhere to it in its new shape. The consent of each must be given on its own initiative.

MR. LANSING said that he was not himself endowed with full powers to sign such a Convention. He asked Mr. Balfour if he was.

MR. BALFOUR said that he believed that he was possessed of such powers.

MR. HURST suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to prepare the Convention for signature. The question of full powers was one for each Government to determine. The treaty with Germany seemed to suppose that the Convention would be signed in a short time. The formula he had suggested would enable full powers to be issued and further consideration to be taken by any Government concerned.

GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that the project had been completely drafted with the exception of the preamble.

MR. LANSING quoted Article 18 of the Convention as one of those to which he objected.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Lansing how long he thought it would take him to obtain the agreement of his Government should it be willing to accept the Convention.

MR. LANSING replied that he thought this might be done in three weeks.

GENERAL DUVAL said he thought this delay would be regretable. At the present time aircraft were confined within frontiers and it would be very discouraging to the industry to find the Convention had been postponed. The whole incentive to establishing long-distance commercial air navigation might disappear and each State might establish preferential rules in favour of its own nationals.

MR. LANSING observed that the reservations made by the American experts required discussion. He was prepared to discuss them on the following day. If agreement could be reached the process would be hastened. He did not like the disposition shown to press the American Delegation to accept what it did not approve.

MR. BALFOUR said he sympathised with Mr. Lansing's view but he would ask him in return to sympathise with the British and French view. In the United States it was possible to fly thousands of miles within one national territory. In Europe it was difficult to fly 500 miles without crossing a frontier. If commercial flying was to be of any value it was vital that frontiers should be crossed without difficulty. He would therefore ask Mr. Lansing to help in this matter in order that European material interests should not suffer.

MR. LANSING said he understood the principal reason alleged for speedy signature was that the industry interested in flying should know exactly how it stood and so avoid loss on its enterprises. In this connection he asked whether the reservations made by the United States directly affected the question.

GENERAL DUVAL said he thought they did not.

MR. LANSING suggested that while the United States Government were considering the Convention, European industry might be told that their Governments meant to sign the Convention.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the delay of three weeks proposed by Mr. Lansing be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that though this represented a loss of three weeks of summer weather he would consent if this were likely to lead to an agreement.

(It was agreed that the subject be brought up again in three weeks.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the House of Commons was anxious to see this Convention. He would like to know whether his Colleagues had any objection to the Convention being shown.

(It was agreed that the proposed Convention might be published.)¹⁰

8. M. CRESPI said that he had looked through the document handed to him by

Report by M. Crespi on the stoppage of supply trains at Modane M. Clemenceau. This document declared that trains carrying military material for Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia, Roumania, Poland and the French Army in the East had been held up. It concluded, however, by stating that supplies for the French troops had passed unhampered. He wished to draw attention to this admission. The note made no mention of consignments of food. Presumably therefore food had been allowed to proceed. Difficulties, however, had arisen by reason of the state of things on the Eastern Frontier of Italy. There was considerable tension of feeling among the Yugo-Slavs and conflicts of patrols had been frequent. He had received news on the previous day of a fight between a Yugo-Slav patrol on the one hand and a patrol on the other composed of four Italians and one Frenchman which had resulted in the death of two Yugo-Slavs. The Italian military authorities had discovered on a train declared to be a food train a wagon full of machine guns. Lately a whole train composed of 32 trucks had gone to Serbia carrying heavy bombing aeroplanes. Three trains of this character had been observed proceeding to Serbia. These were French trains and there were French soldiers on them.

MR. LANSING asked whether there was anything improper in the dispatch of arms from one Ally to another. As far as he was concerned he was prepared to sell arms to the Serbians as Allies.

M. CRESPI said that 14 tanks had also been dispatched in the same direction. The Italian military authorities thought that the Serbs were mobilizing against Italy. He therefore proposed that the Inter-Allied Military

¹⁰ See No. 7, note 6.

Representatives at Versailles should lay down some limit to the armaments sent in that direction. He would like to know why it was necessary for Serbia to receive so much equipment. He therefore proposed that some supervision should be exercised by Marshal Foch and by the military advisers at Versailles.

MR. LANSING asked whether M. Crespi proposed that the enquiry should extend to mobilisation on both sides of the Italian frontier.

M. CRESPI replied that it was necessary for Italy to take precautions.

MR. LANSING observed that the Serbs perhaps also thought alike.

M. CRESPI said that he could prove that Italy was demobilising. Moreover she had demobilised two classes more than France. He had with him the decree ordering demobilisation.

MR. LANSING asked how many Italian troops there were in Istria.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that on the armistice frontier from the Tyrol to Istria there were from 700 to 800 thousand men. He did not know how many of these were concentrated in Istria. There might be 100 thousand. There was in addition perhaps half a million men in the interior. Italy had demobilised two and a half million men.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Crespi to furnish him with a reply in writing. He had been much struck by the assertion in M. Crespi's remarks of a right to impede the passage of arms from one Ally to another.

(M. CRESPI agreed to furnish the written reply on the following day.)

9. MR. BALFOUR said that he had no time to consider this reply.

*Reply to German Note on the subject of the evacuation of Poland.*¹¹ MR. LANSING suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to draft a reply in case the Council should decide to send one.

(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee should be asked to put up a draft for consideration on the following day.)

10. M. TARDIEU gave an explanation of the report of the Commission (Appendix A). He pointed out that the American proposal involved reopening the question of the frontiers between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. As there had been no agreement in the Commission, he begged leave to make a personal suggestion. He thought that Czecho-Slovakia could do without most of what had been conceded at Gmünd, and the bulk of the territory attributed to her at Feldsberg. Thus with a very slight alteration the historic frontier of Bohemia would be maintained. The very slight addition to this frontier, which he suggested, would be sufficient to safeguard the economic situation. In compensation for this, Czecho-Slovakia might be given the bridgehead of Pressburg. All needful precautions might be taken against the militarisation of the ground on the right bank of the Danube. In any case this strip was so shallow as to be militarily indefensible.

Frontier between Austria and Hungary

¹¹ See No. 9, appendix A.

MR. BALFOUR thought that on the face of it there was much to recommend M. Tardieu's proposal.

M. TARDIEU added that the political effect in Czecho-Slovakia of altering the frontier announced on June 2nd without any ostensible reason save counter-proposals from Austria, must be taken into consideration. It might encourage undesirable tendencies in the country.

MR. LANSING said that this would appear to be an argument against any change. If so, it would apply to Pressburg as well.

M. TARDIEU said that it was for this reason he proposed to neutralise the effect of altering the frontier between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia by offering the latter Pressburg as a compensation.

MR. LANSING suggested that M. Tardieu should formulate his proposal and illustrate it by a line on the map on the following day in order that time should be given to consider the new proposal.

(This was agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 10, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 8

Report of Commission Drafting Reply to Austrian Note on Territorial Clauses¹²

1. *Frontiers of Austria with Hungary.*

The Commission entrusted with the preparation of replies to Austrian Notes on territorial questions, having heard M. Kramar and M. Benes,¹³ submits the following:—

(1) The United States, British, French and Japanese Delegations consider that the frontier should be fixed at the blue line shown on the map appended hereto.¹⁴ The result of this fresh line is:—

(a) On the one hand, to hand over about 250,000 Germans to Austria as well as territory which has up to the present furnished 40% of its supplies to feed Lower Austria.

(b) On the other hand, to leave in Hungarian territory—as pointed out by Messrs. Kramar and Benes—the railway from Pressburg to Agram (via Szentjano, Csorna and Nagy-Kanisza), the other railway, from Pres[s]-burg towards the south (via Wiener-Neustadt) being already in Austrian territory, and the Czecho-Slovak Government having asked that its two railway terminal points towards the Adriatic should not be in the hands of a single State.

(2) The Italian Delegation, whilst recognising the weight of the arguments used in coming to the above decision, is of the opinion that the ethnical, economic and

¹² The original of this appendix also contained a French text of this report.

¹³ MM. Kramar and Benes were respectively the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia.

¹⁴ Map not appended to original.

military considerations which have influenced it would be adequately guaranteed if economic and other servitudes were imposed on Hungary in such a manner as to meet Austria's requirements. Provided such servitudes were arranged for, the Italian Delegation considers that no change in sovereignty would be necessary or desirable. In view of the severe territorial conditions already imposed on Hungary, it would not be advisable, in its opinion, to demand fresh territorial sacrifices.

(3) As regards the portion of the above-named line from the north of Kittsee to Pressburg, and the territory south of that town, including its suburbs, railway station, and the junction of the Pressburg-Agram and Pressburg-Wiener Neustadt railways:

- (a) the British, French and Japanese Delegations consider that the territory in question should be handed over to the Czecho-Slovak State;
- (b) the American Delegation raises no objection thereto, on condition that these remarks are complied with as regards the frontier between Austria and the Czecho-Slovak State (Feldsberg and Gmünd).
- (c) the Italian Delegation is against any cession of territory, being apprehensive of its political effect on relations between Hungary, Austria and the Czecho-Slovak State, but agrees either that the latter should be given control of the railway station and junction on Hungarian territory, or alternatively that the territory in question should be placed under the sovereignty of the League of Nations for a period to be determined.

The other Delegations, whilst not admitting the Italian point of view, would agree to the said territory not being used for any military purpose.

2. *Frontier of Austria with the Czecho-Slovak State.*

After hearing M. Kramar and M. Benes, the Commission entrusted with the preparation of replies to the Austrian notes on territorial questions submits the following:—

(1) The French and Japanese Delegations recommend the retention of the line notified on 2nd June to the Austrian Delegation.

(2) The United States Delegation recommends the adoption of the historical frontier, subject only to the reservation that the variations in the course of the Thaya and the Morava should be taken into account.

(3) The British Delegation, while adhering to the original line should no compromise be effected, would if necessary agree to the . . . proposal,¹⁵ on condition, however, that the Czecho-Slovak State received part of the territory situated south of Pressburg on the right bank of the Danube, and also positive guarantees for the free use of the river Thaya and the Feldsberg railway.

In any case, the British Delegation thinks the frontier should follow the median line of the Morava and the Thaya river-beds, those two rivers being internationalised on that part of their course.

(4) The Italian Delegation, though also adhering in principle to the retention of the original line, would if necessary accept alterations of detail on the Feldsberg district, but refuses to consider the cession of the Pressburg bridgehead by way of compensation. It is also in agreement with the British Delegation with regard to the fixing of the frontier at the median lines of the Morava and of the Thaya, and with regard to the internationalisation of those rivers.

¹⁵ Punctuation as in the original. The French text read: 'la proposition américaine.'

H. D. 5.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 11, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. R. Lansing; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon.

Italy: M. Crespi; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. *British Empire*: Capt. E.

Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. PICHON took the Chair and explained that M. Clemenceau was detained in the Peace Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. *Frontier of Austria with Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia* He sent his apologies and would come later. (At this stage M. Tardieu, General Le Rond,¹ M. Laroche,² Mr. Leeper, M. Stranieri,³ Mr. Dulles⁴ and Mr. Hudson⁵ entered the room.)

M. TARDIEU said that he had been asked on the previous day to mark on a map the compromise he had suggested.⁶ This compromise gave back to the Austrians half of the ground given to the Czecho-Slovaks in the neighbourhood of Gmünd, only leaving the junction of the railways within Czecho-Slovakia. In the region of Feldsberg, two-thirds of the territory was returned to Austria, only the railway and river remaining in Czecho-Slovakia. In compensation to Czecho-Slovakia for this reduction of territory, he proposed to attribute to her the bridgehead at Pressburg and the railway junction. He would add that in the area round Feldsberg left to Czecho-Slovakia, there were a number of Czechs, which was not the case in the rest of the territories mentioned.

M. CRESPI said that the Italian delegation had made reservations particularly in respect to the bridgehead. He could see no reason for bringing Czecho-Slovakia across the Danube. There were no military reasons and he thought it would be a cause of perpetual dissension between the two States. The possession of an isolated bridgehead had an offensive appearance both against Austria and against Hungary. Politically therefore there was little

¹ Member of the French delegation and chairman of the sub-commission on the determination of frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia and between Austria and Hungary.

² Chief of the European Section in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and French expert on the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs.

³ Italian representative (for the frontier between Austria and Czechoslovakia) on the committee for the study of the observations of the Austrian delegation on the political clauses concerning Europe in the conditions of peace.

⁴ Mr. A. W. Dulles was American representative on the sub-commission on the determination of frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia and between Austria and Hungary.

⁵ American substitute representative on the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

⁶ See No. 8, minute 10.

to recommend the transaction. The Italian delegation would prefer to satisfy the Czechs in any other region than this.

MR. LANSING asked what Mr. Crespi thought of the other changes suggested by M. Tardieu.

M. CRESPI said that the Italian delegation thought that it would be best to leave the frontier as previously decided, and also that no change should be made at Pressburg.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood M. Crespi's feeling about the possession of the bridgehead. Against this he would set the consideration that nowhere else had a town been cut in two by a national frontier. There was an integral part of the town on the right bank of the Danube. If the river were taken as a boundary, an economic and social unit would be arbitrarily divided—moreover from the main town, the railway station, the electric works and the public gardens would be cut off, and a customs barrier would be established on the bridge connecting the two parts of the city.

M. CRESPI said that he was told that the portion on the right bank of the river was not an integral part of the city but a suburb.

MR. LANSING said that the United States had considerable experience of divided cities on the Mexican border. This kind of arrangement caused the greatest possible friction. He thought it was a mistake to make a river divide in two a town, both parts of which had grown up together under one municipal authority, and had never been separate. If, therefore, changes were to be made in other parts of the frontier, he would be disposed to allow the whole of Pressburg on both sides of the river to go to Czecho-Slovakia. Compensation could be given to the German population by frontier rectification elsewhere.

M. PICHON asked whether he was right in believing that Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing accepted M. Tardieu's proposal which M. Crespi rejected.

MR. LANSING said that he was not quite in agreement on all points. M. Tardieu wished to give the railway junction near Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia. He did not think this necessary.

M. TARDIEU said that this junction exclusively served Czecho-Slovak interests. His proposal withdrew one line entirely from the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia. He considered, therefore, the retention of this junction as economically essential.

MR. LANSING said that he was informed that 99 per cent. of the population in the Gmünd area was German. He therefore proposed that the historic line should be reverted to.

M. TARDIEU said that on the previous day he understood that a compromise was to be sought. His instructions were that if a compromise could not be reached, the frontier announced on June 2nd was to be adhered to. He would add that according to the Czechs, a good deal of the population was Czech though he did not make himself personally responsible for this statement. Undoubtedly the majority was of German speech, whether or not of Czech origin. Further, the Czecho-Slovak Government had somehow learnt that an alteration of frontier was contemplated and M. Kramarcz

had already made a protest. It must be remembered that there was a new Government at Prague inclined to seek a balance between the Allied and Associated Powers and German influence. If the compromise he suggested were accepted, the Czechs would no doubt complain.

MR. LANSING said that he would like to give Pressburg to the Czechs but not without full compensation, namely, the return of the German speaking inhabitants around Gmünd. As to the Feldsberg area, with the exception of four villages, containing he was told, 4,000 Germans and only 260 Czechs, which might without disadvantage be restored to Austria, he was content with M. Tardieu's proposal. In the Gmünd region he would like to return to the historic frontier. He disliked the salient created by the proposal.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Tardieu's compromise was like all compromises, open to criticism. Nevertheless, he accepted and supported it as the best way out of a difficult situation. In effect the Council was taking from the Czechs something already officially given to them. The problem was therefore, not quite an open one. It involved undoing something already done. He thought that if the portion of Pressburg on the right side of the Danube be given to the Czechs while the bulk of the German speaking people near Feldsberg and near Gmünd were restored to Austria, neither side ought to complain.

MR. LANSING said that he would prefer to avoid the use of the word 'bridge-head'. He would prefer to say that a suburb of Pressburg was restored to the city. The line proposed in Feldsberg with the exception of the four villages in the south east of the district, to which he had referred, he would accept. In order to obtain agreement he would also accept the line proposed in the region of Gmünd.

M. TARDIEU said that he would like to add two remarks. The Committee thought that the course of the Morava and Thaya which now became a frontier line should be internationalised. The second remark was that the railway going south from Pressburg which was attributed to Hungary should have a servitude imposed on it ensuring free circulation for the Czechoslovak State. He would suggest that in the Treaty with Austria an addition be made to Article 313 to the following effect:—

After the first railway mentioned, the second should be:—

'from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom—Csorna—Hegyfalu—Zalabér—Zala Szt Ivan—Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu—Szombathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.'

The second as at present mentioned should become the third.

Similar provision should be made in the Treaty with Hungary regarding the railway which was to be within the Hungarian boundary.

(It was decided⁷ to accept for the Austrian frontier the compromise proposed by M. Tardieu, subject to a slight modification proposed by Mr. Lansing.

⁷ This decision is printed with verbal variation by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 467.

The slices of territory attributed to Czecho-Slovakia in excess of the former administrative frontier should be reduced in the regions of Gmünd and Feldsberg to a minimum by way of compensation for the suburb of Pressburg situated on the right bank of the Danube.

M. Tardieu's Commission was asked to define the new frontier line and to forward it to the Drafting Committee.

It was further decided that the cost [courses] of the Morava and of the Thaia insofar as they became frontier lines should be internationalised.

It was also decided to modify Article 313 of the Treaty with Austria by the addition after the first railway mentioned of a second

'from Bratislava (Pressburg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom-Csorna-Hegyfalu-Zalabér-Zala Szt Ivan-Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu-Szombathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.'

The second railway at present mentioned should become the third.

And to insert a similar provision to article 313 in the treaty with Hungary.)

2.

*Note from Commission
on Ports, Waterways
and Railways, on frontier
stations in Austria*

[Not printed]⁸

3. With reference to a letter from the German Delegation of June 25th (see Appendix A), it was for consideration whether an answer should be sent.

*Answer to German
Delegation regard-
ing evacuation of
Polish territory*

MR. BALFOUR expressed the opinion that it was undesirable to send any answer. His colleagues concurred in this opinion, and it was decided that no answer should be sent.

4.

*Treaty between Prin-
cipal Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers and
Czecho-Slovakia*

[Not printed]⁹

⁸ After a short discussion it was decided to insert in the Treaty of St. Germain what subsequently became the second paragraph of article 319.

⁹ Signor Crespi asked that this question be adjourned and Mr. Lansing agreed as he wished to have examined the differences between this treaty (subsequently signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919: Treaty Series, 1919, No. 20, Cmd. 479) and that with Poland (signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919: Treaty Series, 1919, No. 8, Cmd. 223). These treaties related to the protection of minorities. (See No. 28, minute 4, & note 6.) Signor Crespi then referred to a suggestion made by Baron Sonnino on June 17 for certain additional clauses of general application relative to the reciprocal relations of territories formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. These draft clauses (Appendix B in original: not printed) proposed arrangements in such miscellaneous matters as the business and professional interests of persons in such territories, insurance companies, payment of family allowances, disposal of archives and records, contracts, return to Italy of certain rolling-stock, pensions, railway rates, Adriatic coasting trade and fisheries, recovery of removed works of art, &c. Signor Crespi explained that the proposals were to the effect that the political clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria should be generalised in such a way as to apply to all the New States formed out of the former Dual Monarchy'. After

5. (M. Clemenceau entered the room and the members of the Drafting Committee were summoned.)

*Ratification
of Treaty
by Germany*¹⁰

MR. HURST read the following:—

‘On the Ratification by Germany of the Treaty
of Peace.

Note for the Supreme Council

‘Article 6 of the law, dated February 10th, 1919, of the German Empire, relating to the provisional exercise of the Imperial Power, provides that:—

“The Affairs of the Empire are conducted by an Imperial President. The Imperial President will represent the Empire in international matters, will conclude in the name of the Empire Treaties with foreign Powers, and will accredit and receive ambassadors.

“Declaration of war and Treaties of Peace are made in conformity with the law of the Empire.”

‘The instrument of ratification signed by President Ebert, and counter-signed by Bauer, President of the Council of Ministers, mention being made of the approval of the “legislative bodies”, appears to fulfil the above stipulation.

‘It may be deemed that Article 4 of the same law, dealing with the preparation of the future constitution of the Empire, lays down that the territory of the German States cannot be altered without the consent of those States, but this provision appears only to restrict the powers of the National Assembly on this subject.

‘In these circumstances, the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Peace of June 28th, 1919, forwarded by the Government of the German Empire, is not in the opinion of the Drafting Committee open to objection, but may be regarded as complete, and in due form, from the international point of view.’

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it followed from this opinion of the Drafting Committee that the blockade on Germany must be raised from the 12th of July, in accordance with a letter received by him from the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee. (See Appendix C.)

(It was decided to accept the interpretation given by the Drafting Committee, and to terminate the blockade on Germany from the 12th July, 1919.)

6. MR. BALFOUR said that in connection with this subject he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that a blockade on Russia had been conducted under the guise of a blockade on Germany. The latter being now removed, it was for consideration whether any form of blockade could be continued with the object of preventing

some discussion it was decided to refer Baron Sonnino’s proposal to the committee for the study of the observations of the Austrian delegation on the political clauses concerning Europe in the conditions of peace. At this point the experts withdrew from the meeting.

¹⁰ Minute 5 is printed by D. H. Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. xvi, pp. 487–8.

the passage of supplies and arms to the Russian Soviet Government. This Government had not been recognised and the Allies were not at war with it. It did not seem possible, therefore, legally to declare a blockade on it. Nevertheless, it was obviously a serious matter to allow Sweden and other countries to furnish Soviet Russia with the means of fighting our friends. He suggested this matter be considered and discussed at a very early date.

(It was decided to put on the agenda for the following meeting the question of the consequences of the termination of the blockade on Germany on the unofficial blockade of Russia.)

7. At this stage M. Misu, M. Vaida-Voevod and M. Plessia of the Roumanian Delegation; M. Pachich and M. Vesnitch of the Serbian Delegation; and M. Kramarcz and M. Benes of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation; Marshal Foch, General Weygand,¹² the Versailles Military Representatives and General Thwaites entered the room.

Military measures to be taken against Hungary. Hearing of Czecho-Slovak, Serbian, and Roumanian Representatives with Marshal Foch. See H.D. 3,¹¹ para. 6, and Appen. B

M. PICHON gave the delegates a short account of what had taken place in Council at previous meetings on this subject. He also read to them the report made by the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles regarding the military measures to be taken to enforce respect

for the armistice on Hungary.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to say what he thought of the projected operation.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles contained no projected operation. It merely stated what forces were available for action. He understood the purpose was to make Hungary respect the conditions of the armistice. In the meantime Hungarian forces had increased from six to nine divisions, and the success obtained over the Czechs had improved the morale of these forces. If Hungary was to respect the armistice, she must be forced to reduce these troops to six divisions, and also to withdraw from certain territories. 84,000 men were said to be available for use to effect this. This number was small for the purpose. The main contributor to this number was Roumania. Not only was the total not great, but there was no cohesion between the various elements contributing to it. The Roumanian Army was under Roumanian Command, the Serbian army was under Serbian Command, the Czech Army was under a French General, and the French troops under French Command. A single Command was obviously the first requisite for a successful campaign. Moreover, the probable length of the operations must be taken into account. It seemed unlikely that the desired end could be obtained by one rapid stroke. If this were the case the troops above mentioned would require reinforcement. Obviously assistance must be looked for in this from the neighbouring states. Before making a plan it must be known what these states would do, how much they would contribute, and whether they would agree to act under one Command.

¹¹ No. 7.

¹² Chief of General Staff to Marshal Foch.

The desired results were:—first to defeat the Hungarian army, and second to occupy Budapest. The first alone was difficult with the forces locally available. The second was still more difficult, as Budapest was the central fortress of the Hungarian plain. It was a considerable city, and if taken would require a large occupying force. Before embarking on the adventure there must first be a political understanding between the States taking part in it. Secondly a military understanding. Thirdly, a plan of operations.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether he required more troops than were placed at his disposal. If so, would he name a figure.

MARSHAL FOCH said he would have to study the question. The whole operation was conditioned, first by the terms of the agreement that might be made between the States concerned, and secondly by the probable length of the operations.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked the Roumanian representatives to state the views of their Government.

M. MISU said that the Roumanian Government would certainly take into consideration the desires of the Conference. Roumania was greatly interested in the condition of Hungary by reason of its neighbourhood. Roumania was already bearing a heavy burden and maintaining seven divisions in Hungary. Two army corps were forming in Transylvania and were not yet ready. Four divisions were maintained on the Russian front, and two more were being mobilised with the help of equipment supplied by the Allies. He agreed with Marshal Foch that the first requisite was an understanding between the Governments concerned. On behalf of the Roumanian Government he felt entitled to say that a very willing spirit would be shown.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked the Serbian representatives to express the views of their Government.

M. VESNITCH said he entirely agreed with Marshal Foch that a single Command was necessary. With this proviso he thought that the forces at present available, if assisted with arms and munitions, could achieve success without much difficulty. It should also be impressed on the Government at Budapest that the Allied and Associated Powers were absolutely at one, and seriously intended to have their will respected. This would produce a moral effect perhaps even greater than the military effect of the forces employed. As to Serbia's share, he had no instructions from the Serbian Government, but he thought he could go so far as to say that Serbia would make her contribution and he was prepared to advise his Government to do so. He must point out that Serbia herself was threatened at certain points and he would ask that, during the campaign, Serbia be guaranteed by the Powers against threats from without. He mentioned, for example, that the Bulgarians had not yet been disarmed.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how many troops Serbia would contribute.

M. VESNITCH replied that Serbia would contribute what the Military Representatives at Versailles had asked for, namely, one division.

M. PICHON said that he hoped Serbia might contribute more.

M. VESNITCH said that perhaps the Serbian Government might see its way

to making a larger contribution, but he could make no undertaking on its behalf.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how far he thought the Serbian Government would go.

M. VESNITCH replied that this depended on general circumstances.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that an army could not be made of general circumstances.

M. VESNITCH said that the Military Representatives at Versailles had considered one division necessary.

GENERAL BELIN explained that the report made by the Military Representatives had merely stated what troops were believed to be available. The figure mentioned was not a desideratum but a statement of what was ready for immediate use. The report had also stated that the troops locally available would require reinforcements.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was evidently desirable to have exact figures. Once they were obtained, Marshal Foch could be asked if they were sufficient. M. Vesnitch had said that Serbia would contribute a division, but, if so, must be protected against the Bulgarians. In other words, what he offered with one hand he withdrew with the other.

M. VESNITCH said that he had declared Serbia's readiness to help. Nevertheless, the precarious condition of the country must be taken into account. He was prepared to offer the whole of the Serbian Army on condition that, while it was away from home, the house should not be burgled. One division had been mentioned in the report of the Military Representatives; he had understood that they desired one division. He now understood from General Belin that more, if possible, would be acceptable. It was necessary, however, for the Serbian military authorities to judge what could be done under the circumstances. The first business of Serbia was to ensure her own existence. She was being asked to make an effort in the common cause and on her behalf he had expressed her readiness to do her best. Marshal Foch had said that action must be preceded by political agreement between the countries concerned, namely, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. He would like to observe that, as a military action was required and that as, for success, it ought to be rapid, a great deal of valuable time would be lost in conducting negotiations at Belgrade, Budapest [?Bucharest] and Prague. He thought it would be best to place the available forces directly under Marshal Foch's command.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Vesnitch if he could inform the Council of the present distribution of the Serbian Army.

M. VESNITCH gave the following information:—

1. The Morava division in the Banat.
2. The Drina division in Batchka and Slavonia.
3. The Danube division in Croatia and Slovenia.
4. The Choumadia division in Belgrade (one regiment) and on the Bulgarian frontier.

5. The Timok division in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Fiume.
6. The Yugo-Slav division in the Sandjak, on the Albanian frontier, in old Serbia and in Montenegro.
7. The Vardar Brigade in Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU then asked the Czecho-Slovak representatives to state the case for their Government.

M. KRAMARCZ said that the Hungarian situation was undoubtedly a threat to Czecho-Slovakia. His Government did not desire Hungary to have a larger army than that allowed to her in the armistice, but the present moment was not propitious for action by Czecho-Slovakia against Hungary. When Czecho-Slovakia was attacked, the moment was more propitious. At that time, Czecho-Slovakia had mobilised 150,000 men, but munitions and equipment were lacking. The Conference had then imposed an armistice between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. The Hungarians had observed this armistice and had evacuated Czecho-Slovakian territory.¹³ What pretext, therefore, was there for the Czechs to attack the Hungarians? The proposal now was to demand the reduction of the Hungarian forces to the number stipulated, but so far as Czecho-Slovakia was concerned, the Hungarians had fulfilled the conditions of the armistice required of them. He agreed with M. Vesnitch that a political agreement between the three States was not desirable. The question was one concerning the Entente. It related to the armistice negotiated between Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers. No doubt Czech troops, if employed, would do their duty, but before they could be employed the Government at Prague must be consulted.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired what contribution from Czecho-Slovakia had been suggested in the Versailles report.

M. KRAMARCZ replied 20,000 men. He did not conceal that Czecho-Slovakia had more men than this available, but he could not say whether the Government at Prague would consent to act. As the Council knew, the Government had lately changed.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had just received a letter from General Pellé¹⁴ dated 8th July. He read this letter to the Council. (Appendix D.) It followed from this letter that Hungary was determined to re-act against fate. It would seize its opportunity when the Allied nations had demobilised and disarmament had set in. He would like to explain that the preliminary understanding he had referred to was the kind of understanding that could be obtained in the Council. He did not suggest that the negotiations be carried on in Praguc, Bucharest and Belgrade.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Balfour whether any British help could be expected.

MR. BALFOUR replied that he had repeated to the British War Cabinet the argument he had set forth to the Council. He thought the Powers could not submit to a continued breach of the armistice by Hungary. This affected

¹³ See Appendix D.

¹⁴ The French general previously referred to by Marshal Foch as being in command of the Czechoslovak army.

central Europe and perhaps even the whole of Europe. Unless this were put a stop to, there was no hope of peace or of restoring the economic condition of central Europe. It was of the utmost importance to act quickly. He thought an effort must be made and that all Allied countries must contribute. A decision on this subject was one of a very momentous character. Up to the present time, he had received no answer from the British War Cabinet. He did not know whether General Thwaites had received any answer from the War Office.

GENERAL THWAITES said that he had received no answer.

M. CRESPI said that he had telegraphed to Rome in the same sense as Mr. Balfour. He thought all were agreed in regarding the question as one of European importance. He had so far received no answer. The question, however, was being considered. Italy was passing through a critical time. Demobilisation had proceeded even further than he had stated on the previous day. (M. Crespi handed to M. Clemenceau a paper on this subject—Appendix E.)¹⁵ Italy was threatened by her own Bolsheviks. A general strike was possible if Italy acted against the Bolsheviks, whether in Russia or elsewhere. He expected M. Tittoni to be back in Paris on the following Sunday.¹⁶ He would then be able to make a statement on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the result of the discussion did not appear to furnish Marshal Foch with a very coherent force.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, if the military resurrection of Hungary was to be prevented, action should be rapid. If all the Governments co-operated, he thought success could be achieved.

M. BENES said that one precaution must be taken if a campaign against Hungary were started. When the Magyars had attacked Czecho-Slovakia, it was found that there was considerable Austrian connivance with the Hungarians. It would be necessary to take all precautions that Austria did not hamper the military action undertaken by the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, to sum up, there appeared to be six Roumanian divisions, two French, one Serbian and a doubtful quantity of Czecho-Slovaks.

M. BENES said there were troops in Czecho-Slovakia, but a scarcity of equipment. He was therefore not prepared to state a figure.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would be glad to know what contribution Great Britain would make. Perhaps Mr. Balfour would be able to state this on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR said that he hoped this might be so. There were no British troops at present on the spot.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the question was whether any could be sent.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not know.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether he could act on this information.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that preparations could be made. After discovering what each could contribute and the dates on which the contributions

¹⁵ Not appended to the original.

¹⁶ July 13, 1919.

could be made, he thought that he would be able in a fortnight to elaborate the first outlines of a plan.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Marshal Foch should give a sketch of the plan of operations in a week, in order that the matter should be kept before the Council's attention.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, if he were to do this, he must be authorised to treat with the Governments concerned and to find out from them what they could undertake to supply and at what period they could fulfil their undertakings.

M. KRAMARCZ said that he did not know whether his Government would contribute to the operations, but should it do so he must ask that action be taken at Vienna, in order that munitions and arms stored there be delivered to Czecho-Slovakia.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that this point should be explained to Marshal Foch.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch after consulting the authorities of the countries concerned, should formulate the plan of operations and report progress to the Council in a week's time.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 11, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 9

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION, VERSAILLES, 25th June, 1919.

W.C.P. 1125.]

No. 122.

Mr. President,

The Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate the following to you.

'The German Government is informed that among the oriental territories that Germany must cede in accordance with the Peace Treaty as well as among the administrations and minor military authorities there, doubt exists and wrong views are held as to the time when this cession must take place. In order to avoid misunderstandings and disagreeable incidents, and in the interests of the two parties, it seems necessary to inform the interested circles immediately that the Treaty of Peace will not come into force as soon as it is signed, but only at the time stated in the different Clauses of the Treaty, and until then, the actual state of affairs are [*sic*] still in force. As to that which concerns the territories situated within the line of demarcation, all that is necessary has been done on the German side. The Allied and Associated Powers are requested, without delay, to take corresponding measures in connection with the territories situated beyond this line.'

Accept, Mr. President, &c.

VON HANIEL.

To His Excellency,

Monsieur Clemenceau,

President of the Peace Conference.

APPENDIX C TO No. 9

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

PARIS, le 11 juillet 1919.

Note pour le Conseil Suprême des Chefs de Gouvernement

Levée du Blocus.

Les délégués alliés et associés du blocus ayant pris connaissance de la note de la Délégation allemande du 10 juillet relative à la ratification du Traité de Paix et demandant la levée immédiate du Blocus,

Estiment:

que si cette communication est considérée par le Conseil Suprême des Chefs de Gouvernement comme la notification officielle 'de la ratification régulière et complète' envisagée dans la lettre adressée le 27 juin à la délégation allemande par le Président de la Conférence de la Paix

le Blocus de l'Allemagne pourra être levé dès le 12 juillet.

Ils demandent si cette opinion est partagée par le Conseil des Chefs de Gouvernements.

Pour le Ministre et par autorisation

Le Conseiller d'Ambassade, Sous-Directeur des Relations Commerciales.

APPENDIX D TO No. 9

Le General Pellé,

A Monsieur le Président du Conseil

Ministre de la Guerre,

(E.M.A.) Paris.

PRAGUE, le 8 juillet, 1919.

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous en rendre compte, les troupes hongroises ont évacué avant le 4 juillet au soir, terme fixé, le territoire de la République Tchéco-Slovaque jusqu'à la frontière déterminée par le radiogramme du Président de la Conférence de la Paix du 13 juin. Une zone neutre de quatre kms. — deux kms. de part et d'autre de la frontière — a été établie.

Quel que soit le motif exact qui ait imposé à l'armée hongroise cette retraite, il y a lieu de craindre que la trêve qui en résulte ne soit que momentanée.

Malgré les difficultés de la situation intérieure le Gouvernement hongrois continue de pousser les armements.

Au cours du récent repli, de nombreux officiers français, anglais, américains se sont trouvés en contact avec les troupes magyares. Ils ont pu converser avec des fonctionnaires civils et militaires de tout grade de l'ancien régime, servant le Gouvernement bolchevique, avec des chefs du mouvement bolchevique de Buda-Pest, avec des hommes du peuple, ouvriers transformés en chefs de bande ou en commandants de régiment.

Tous ces officiers apportent le même témoignage. Ils n'ont rencontré aucun hongrois qui ne paraisse décidé à lutter jusqu'au bout, pour rétablir son pays dans ses anciennes frontières, tout au moins pour reconquérir la Slovaquie. Les Hongrois cultivés, en particulier les officiers de l'ancienne armée, s'efforçaient de donner à ces étrangers une haute idée de la discipline et de la valeur de leurs troupes; ils s'attachaient en même temps à leur prouver le bien fondé des revendications nationales. Les Bolcheviques de tout rang ne se révélaient pas moins fanatiquement plus brutalement l'affirmation [*sic*] de leurs droits et ne reculaient devant aucun moyen violent de magyarisation.

Le peuple hongrois a confiance dans l'avenir. *Dans quelques mois les armées de l'Entente auront démobilisé et les forces militaires hongroises seront au point : le sort de la Slovaquie sera vite réglé.*

Mais comme je l'ai montré déjà dans ma note du 11 juin, la frontière tracée à la Tchéco-Slovaquie par la Conférence de la Paix comme [? donne] aux Hongrois tous les avantages stratégiques; elle est pour l'armée tchéco-slovaque indéfendable, ou plus exactement le seul moyen de la défendre serait prévenir si possible l'ennemi et de prendre l'initiative des opérations.

La situation deviendrait plus fâcheuse encore si les hongrois, maîtres de Vienne, entouraient la *Slovaquie Occidentale* sur trois côtés.

Si le bolchevisme s'implante et se développe en Hongrie, à la faveur de la tolérance dont il a joui jusqu'à présent de la part de l'Entente, il ne saurait tarder beaucoup à s'emparer de Vienne, d'où il menacera l'Italie et la Suisse ou rejoindra la Bavière.

Si le bolchevisme de Buda-Pest cède la place à un gouvernement moins ennemi de l'ordre social, mais également dominé par le courant nationaliste, la guerre reprendra dans l'Europe Centrale sous une autre forme, mais toujours contre nos intérêts vitaux.

Aujourd'hui, comme hier, une intervention militaire de l'Entente, contre la Hongrie, m'apparaît d'une nécessité inéluctable. A défaut d'autre motif, la violation manifeste par l'État Hongrois des conditions de désarmement fixées par la convention d'armistice, légitime cette intervention. L'effort à accomplir sera plus coûteux demain qu'il ne l'eût été il y a quelques semaines; il sera davantage encore s'il est de nouveau différé.

PELLÉ.

No. 10

H. D. 6.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 12, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Henry White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon.

Italy: M. Crespi; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

SECRETARY-GENERAL: M. Dutasta.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel U. S. Grant. British Empire:

Lieut.-Commndr. Bell. France: Capt. A. Portier. Italy: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(At this point M. Cambon¹ entered the room.)

I. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had before them a proposal of Mr. Lansing to the effect that the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments should be given 10 days to arrive at an understanding between themselves on the Teschen question. He requested M. Cambon to explain his point of view.

¹ M. Jules Cambon was a French Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference and Chairman of the Commissions on Czechoslovak and on Polish Affairs.

M.⁷ CAMBON said that the Teschen question had been much discussed: no particular solution had been accepted; for it was hoped that MM. Paderewski² and Benes would be able to come to an understanding. They had not been able to do so, with the result that conflict continued in the area in question. It was therefore necessary to arrive at some solution and he thought that Mr. Lansing's proposal was a good one.

(After some discussion it was decided to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal and to grant a period of 10 days to the Governments of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the question of Teschen.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Lansing had submitted a proposal to the effect that the Orava question should be referred to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees, in order that they might correct the frontier previously adopted, in a manner which should conform to the ethnographical data on the subject. He therefore asked the experts to accept the ethnographical frontier and asked M. Cambon for his opinion.

The Orava question
M. CAMBON said that the Czecho-Slovak Committee had examined the question with care: the Committee in question had decided to grant Orava to Czecho-Slovakia as a compensation. At present the populations affected were stated to be dissatisfied and Mr. Lansing had asked for a re-examination of the question.

MR. WHITE³ said that two peasants had visited President Wilson on the 28th June and that they had spoken to him on behalf of 50,000 inhabitants of the region in question.

M. CAMBON thought that the two committees might meet and submit a new proposal.

MR. BALFOUR said that President Wilson desired strongly that the question should be examined afresh.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question should be referred to the committees, which should be asked to make a new examination of the question, without being bound by any obligation to return to the ethnographical frontier line.

(It was therefore decided that the question of the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should be referred to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees for examination and report.)

(At this point M. Cambon withdrew.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had to look into the effect upon the Russian blockade of the termination of the blockade of Germany.

Blockade of Russia
MR. BALFOUR said that whilst he recognised how urgent and important the question was, he had found that it raised points of such

² M. Paderewski was Polish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

³ Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Peace Conference. Mr. White temporarily replaced Mr. Lansing on the Supreme Council after the latter's departure from Paris on July 12, 1919.

difficulty that he would be grateful if the Council would put off the discussion to its next meeting.

(Mr. Balfour's proposal was agreed to.)

4.

*Question of
Tientsin*

[Not printed]⁴

5. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he was obliged to submit to the Council a document which had been communicated officially by the Serbian delegation (see Appendix A⁵). It had been found in Klagenfurt in the office of the Senior Officer of the district. The document seemed to show that the Austrians had been informed of the movements of the Serbian army by the indiscretion of the Italian authorities.

*A document
communicated
by the Serbian
Government*

(It was decided to communicate the document to the various delegations for their scrutiny.)

⁴ After discussion 'it was decided to nominate a special committee to examine the Italian demand that a clause which should cede to Italy the Austrian concession in Tientsin should be introduced into the Peace Treaty with Austria. The American delegation accepted the proposal whilst making a reservation that it would not be bound by the findings of the committee appointed.'

M. Clemenceau had sponsored the proposal to appoint this committee. Mr. White had objected but ultimately 'stated that he agreed to the nomination of a committee, but that he would be opposed to its decisions. The United States had renounced all claims to any concession and was, moreover, opposed to concessions in principle. He could not, therefore, recognise the necessity of nominating any committee.' Mr. Balfour stated 'that he did not see what good would come of it in view of the American right of veto. The work of the committee would be without effect, but if it could give any satisfaction to the Italian delegation, he would not be opposed to the nomination of the committee.'

⁵ Not printed. This document was headed:

'Service des Renseignements.

Succursale Villach

Renseignement No. 281 confidentiel

S.H.S.—Situation

Au Bureau de renseignements du Commandant
provincial autrichien-allemand

à Klagenfurth.

Villach, le 29 mai 1919.'

This report gave detailed information, supplied by agent Kl. 19, as to the dispositions of Yugoslav units in the Wurzen-Krainburg-Radmannsdorf area. The report concluded:

'Pareille information est expédiée au bureau de renseignements à Klagenfurth et à l'officier de renseignements italien à Paris, Tenente Parenti.

'Lieutenant Parenti mande: Une division serbe est arrivée à midi à Eisenkappel. Après la prise de cette localité, la division s'est partagée en deux parties, dont une brigade a pris la direction vers Kühnsdorf; la seconde brigade celle vers Vellach [sic]. L'ennemi possède beaucoup d'artillerie. Les effectifs de toutes les troupes ennemies se trouvant au front carinthien sont évalués à 20 jusqu'à 25,000 hommes. Les forces militaires italiennes peuvent être prêtes à marcher en 5 heures. Les deux formations sont expédiées par téléphone au Bureau de Renseignements à Klagenfurth le 29 mai 1919.

'Prière de vouloir bien contrôler la véracité des informations fournies par Kl. 19 et de

*Copie
cacheté-confidentiel*

6. M. CLEMENCEAU produced a document addressed to him directly by
Bela Kun.

*Wireless message
from Bela Kun*

M. MANTOUX then read it aloud (see Appendix B).

MR. BALFOUR stated that it seemed to him that the Council was in a very difficult position with regard to the document in question. It should be remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had approached Hungary with a view to making that country withdraw its troops from Czecho-Slovakia on the condition that an analogous order should be imposed upon Roumania. Hungary had accepted and had withdrawn its troops. Roumania had not obeyed the order. M. Bratiano had said in a private conversation with him that it would be impossible for Roumania to withdraw her troops before Hungary had disarmed. The argument was strong. Roumania was threatened by Russian Bolshevism on its eastern frontier and by Hungarian Bolshevism on its western frontier. Up to the present time the country had managed to hold its own, owing to the fact that on the Hungarian side, it was protected by the line of the Theiss which could easily be defended. The Roumanians stated that if they were to abandon this line and attempt to defend themselves further back, they would have no guarantee against an attack from Bela Kun which, if made, would make it difficult for Roumania to defend herself. Although M. Bratiano had not made a precise statement to that effect, he had given the impression that if Hungary had disarmed according to the conditions of the Armistice, Roumania would carry out the wishes of the Allies and would retire to the line which had been laid down. M. Bratiano had further explained that Hungary by withdrawing its forces from Czecho-Slovakia had not lessened the danger to Roumania, which was on the contrary more than ever menaced by the Hungarian movement.

faire connaître la hauteur de la rémunération à payer à celui-ci qui jusqu'à présent n'a pas été payé.

CAPITAINE RIMITZ. m.p.

Détachement Hozersko. O. No. 243.

'Au commandant de la division de la Drave, je donne connaissance de l'information ci-dessus faite par les espions ennemis sur nos forces et nos positions. Cette pièce fut trouvée le 8 juin dans une table de la maison dans laquelle se trouvait le bureau du Commandant provincial à Klagenfurth.

Klagenfurth le 11 juin 1919.

Le Commandant

COLONEL DOBR. MILENKOVIC. m.p.

Copie vérifiée par Lieutenant-Colonel

Signature illisible.'

Appendix A also contained translations of covering notes transmitting copies of the document in question. In one of these notes, dated July 4, 1919, from the Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Army to General Pruneau, head of the French Military Mission at Belgrade, it was stated that 'the Serbian Headquarters Staff has been informed on several occasions that the Italian military authorities were giving the Austrians information upon the positions of our army, and upon the movements of our troops in Slovenia and Carinthia. . . I beg that you will ask the General Commander-in-Chief to cause the Italian Mission to be withdrawn from Ljubliana.'

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he supposed that Bela Kun's ready obedience to the orders he had received could be explained in this way.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the Roumanians would be justified in not withdrawing their army so long as the Hungarians were not prevented from reinforcing theirs and from manufacturing munitions and war materials.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed that Mr. Balfour should prepare a reply.

M. CRESPI said that new facts had to be taken into consideration, which had occurred since the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops. Massacres and looting subversive of human rights had taken place. The Italian representative, who was President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, had formally protested to the Government of Bela Kun and had been able to prevent certain executions.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that a reply should be given to the effect that no discussion could be undertaken with Bela Kun so long as he did not comply with the Armistice conditions.

M. PICHON said that the Italian representative had evidently done everything within his power. He drew the attention of the Council to a telegram received by him (see Annex C⁶).

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that Mr. Balfour's proposal was the best.

(It was therefore decided to send the following telegram in reply to the wireless telegraphic message sent by Bela Kun to M. Clemenceau:—

'The Peace Conference cannot discuss any matter with you whilst you do not carry out the conditions of the Armistice.')

6.7 M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether M. Crespi had the report on this subject asked for by the Conference.

*Supply trains
at Modane*

M. CRESPI said that the report in question would be ready during the afternoon. The examination that had been made showed that the trains had not been held up at Modane except for a few hours on account of customs formalities.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would examine the report.

7. M. CRESPI said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the following note on the subject of the actions of the Greeks in Asia Minor. (See Annex [Appendix] D.)

*Greeks in
Asia Minor*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that even though the Greeks had passed the lines of demarcation laid down, they were none the less in the country with the authorisation of the Peace Conference, and this could not be pleaded for the Italians, who, in spite of our wishes and of our decisions, had occupied

⁶ Not printed. The undated telegram summarized in this appendix stated that there was rising indignation in Budapest against 'the judicial sentences passed after the last anti-Bolshevist movement'; these included eleven death sentences. The message also stated that a Hungarian note had been sent to Vienna demanding satisfaction for accusations made in Viennese newspapers against the Hungarian Government. The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that it was impossible for him to act as requested and M. Béla Kun was asked to recall M. Czobel, the Hungarian Minister in Vienna.

⁷ In error for 7.

the country.⁸ In a full Conference, at which M. Orlando and M. Sonnino were present, Italy had been asked to withdraw her troops. She had not done so. If the Greeks had acted in the manner described in the note, it was regrettable, but how could they be blamed for it? He therefore proposed that Mr. Balfour should send a despatch to the British Commodore on the spot, instructing him to report on the situation.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would do so; but was the Commodore to confine his enquiry to the actions of the Greeks in the region in question, without taking note of the actions of the Italians?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that what the Italians had done was well-known. The Italian forces were in the region in violation of a formal decision of the Conference. M. Orlando and M. Sonnino had taken no notice of the requests made to them, nor of the decisions made. Together with Mr. Balfour, he had sent a memorandum to M. Tittoni, to which a reply had just been received. It had been agreed that the Italians should send no more troops into the regions in question, and in spite of this, three thousand more had been sent. He therefore proposed that an enquiry should be made by the British Commodore, but he did not see how he could place any blame upon the Greeks.

M. CRESPI said that M. Tittoni would soon be back, and that he, personally, did not wish to enter into the discussion, more particularly as a memorandum had been sent. He would confine himself to saying that the Italian Government thought that it possessed rights over the region in question by virtue of Article 9 of the Treaty of London.⁹ He none the less thanked the Council for the proposal for an enquiry, which he agreed to.

(It was decided that Mr. Balfour should direct the British Commodore in command on the Coast of Asia Minor to send in a report on the subject of the incidents that had occurred between the Greeks and Italians in the region in question.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 12, 1919.

⁸ On May 6, 1919, in the absence of any Italian representative from the Supreme Council (Council of Four), President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau, having regard to information which suggested to them the likelihood of a landing of Italian forces at Smyrna, agreed that Greek forces might be authorized to land there. The Supreme Council, in the absence of an Italian representative, consulted with M. Venizelos concerning the operation on May 7, 10, and 11. In accordance with a decision taken during these discussions, Signor Orlando, at a meeting of the Supreme Council on May 12, was informed of the intended landing of Greek forces and small Allied detachments at Smyrna. Signor Orlando agreed to this operation in principle and it was decided that an Italian detachment should participate. On the same day, as subsequently, representations were made to Signor Orlando in the Supreme Council concerning independent Italian landings elsewhere in Asia Minor, which had been made without prior consultation with the other Allied Powers. Signor Orlando was unable to obtain from the other members of the Supreme Council retrospective agreement to these Italian landings.

⁹ The text of the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, is printed in Cmd. 671 of 1920. Article 9 of this treaty ran:

'Generally speaking, France, Great Britain and Russia recognise that Italy is interested in the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that, in the event of the total or partial

Wireless from Budapest.

SSS No. 121 from Budapest W.840 11/7 at 21.15.

To:—M. Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference,
Paris.

Mr. President. In your dispatch of 13th June you assured me that as soon as our troops had evacuated the territories ceded to the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, and had retired behind the frontiers assigned to the federated socialist republic of Hungary, the Roumanian troops would make an analogous movement of evacuation, and would retire behind the frontiers laid down in great detail in your note. In the reply which I then gave, as well as in the dispatch which I sent subsequently, I stated that the federated socialist republic of Hungary was desirous of showing how anxious it was to avoid any useless bloodshed, and would therefore agree to your demand. And that I have kept my word has been proved by facts. At the same time I took the liberty of requesting that you would give us the necessary guarantees that the Roumanian troops should carry out the orders of the Allied and Associated Powers. I was also of the same opinion as you, when you stated that frontier lines acquired by force of arms could not be held. As I did not receive the guarantees, I stated in my last dispatch, that I accepted as a personal guarantee, or assurance, that the Roumanian troops would evacuate the regions to the East of the Theiss, which were completely devastated. You have doubtless been informed, Mr. President, that our troops broke off the fighting in which they had become engaged with the troops of the Czecho-Slovak Republic by the action of these latter. On the 24th June our troops occupied the lines which marked the neutral zone established by General Pellé. The Roumanian troops should, therefore, have conformed to the orders and instructions issued by the Allied and Associated Powers, contained in your dispatch of the 13th June; they should have retired behind the lines laid down, thereby giving some evidence of a desire for peace on their part and of a wish to accede to your desires in the matter of frontiers acquired by force of arms. In spite of your promise the Roumanian troops have made no movement of withdrawal, but, subsequently to the 24th June, have made several violent attacks more particularly at Tiszaluc; these attacks were beaten off with serious loss by the Red Army. However much we may regret the shedding of blood, we consider it to be a duty imposed on us by your very word, to prevent the Roumanian troops from re-opening such conflicts, in defiance of the formal instructions of the Allied and Associated Powers. We do not wish to dilate on the exactions and the bad conduct which characterise the daily doings of the Roumanian troops. On this point it will be sufficient to tell you, Mr. President, that

partition of Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia, where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which formed the subject of an Italo-British convention. The zone which shall eventually be allotted to Italy shall be delimited, at the proper time, due account being taken of the existing interests of France and Great Britain.

‘The interests of Italy shall also be taken into consideration in the event of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire being maintained and of alterations being made in the zones of interest of the Powers.

‘If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy any territories in Turkey in Asia during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering on the province of Adalia within the limits indicated above shall be reserved to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it.’

the devastations of General Hindenburg in the invaded departments of Northern France are perfect oases when compared to the conditions brought about by the savagery of the Roumanian troops in the economic life of the countries that they have occupied. Allow me to ask you, Mr. President, whether your word, and the engagements of the Allied and Associated Powers are sufficient to cause the Roumanian troops to retire behind the frontiers assigned to them in your dispatch of 13th June. We believe that you have means of preventing unnecessary shedding of blood even though you address your instructions to persons whose desire for peace has not been proved so strongly as the wishes of the federated socialist republic of Hungary, which, after conducting a series of successful engagements, was willing to cause all useless shedding of blood to cease.

With regard to the republic of Czecho-Slovakia we beg you, Mr. President, to make your wishes and those of the Allied and Associated Powers effective in the matter of the hostile attitude taken up by the Roumanian troops. The federated socialist republic of Hungary brought about a cessation to the hostilities opened up by the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia despite the fact that the Hungarian troops were successful. We beg that you will repeat your instructions of the 13th June and make the wishes of the Allied and Associated Powers respected. It is only in this way that the federated socialist republic will be able to justify its conciliatory attitude in the eyes of its supporters, by having accepted the guarantees given in your declaration. I hope that the Allied and Associated Powers will be able to impose respect for their wishes, and maintain their prestige in the eyes of the Roumanian troops.

Budapest, 11th July.

BELA KUN

Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX D TO NO. 10

Memorandum dated July 12, 1919

It is known that the Greeks were obliged by the Turks to evacuate Aidin on the 1st July, but they were able to reoccupy it on the 5th. After this date they have continued to advance to the south of the line laid down by the Council of Four, at its meeting of the 19th May (Ajassuluk-Aidin).

It should be noted that the Council of Four laid down that the Greeks should not be allowed to occupy any territory outside the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali without being authorised to do so by the Senior Naval Officer, that is to say, by the British Commodore. It follows, that, as the Commodore opposed the re-occupation of Aidin by the Greeks with a view to avoid[ing] useless bloodshed, it was only right that he should have been obeyed. But on the other hand, as we have said, the Greeks had not only re-occupied Aidin but have gone to a distance of 20 to 25 kilometres to the south of the line laid down; in consequence of this, they have been brought face to face with the Italian troops, on whose patrols they have fired. The Greek aeroplanes have directed machine-gun fire against the Italian troops marching from Giroba towards the Meander; whilst the Greek artillery has fired on the Italian positions. In view of these considerations the British Commodore has uselessly ordered the Greek Commissioner to respect his orders, which are, that the Greek troops should immediately withdraw to the north of the Aidin railway. It would seem that orders have come from Paris, at the same time, telling the Greek Commissioner at Smyrna to re-occupy Aidin, in

spite of the contrary orders given by the British Commodore, who, on several occasions, has given evidence of his indignation at the disregard of his instructions. I have therefore the honour to demand that the Supreme Council shall give it to be understood to the Greek Delegation that the orders of the British Commodore are to be respected.

No. 11

H. D. 7.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 15, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, Capt. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. British Empire: Capt. E. Abraham. France: Capt. A. Portier. Italy: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a communication from Bela Kun, which was a reply to that sent him on behalf of the Council according to the decision taken on July 12th. (See H. D. 6¹. Minute 5².)

*Correspondence
with Bela Kun*

M. MANTOUX read the communication from Bela Kun. (Appendix A.)

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that Bela Kun had right on his side. He had been told that, if his troops evacuated Czecho-Slovakia, the Roumanians would be ordered to evacuate the part of Hungary they had invaded, but they had not done so. Mr. Balfour had since informed the Council that the Roumanians could not safely carry out the order. It was a pity this point of view had not been explained before the order was made. Nevertheless, whatever reasons the Roumanians might allege, if the Conference did not order them to withdraw and could not enforce the order, the Council would be in a bad position.

MR. BALFOUR admitted there was force in M. Clemenceau's remarks. He believed that the Council of Four would not have taken the decision it took on June 12th, to arrange an Armistice involving the withdrawal of the Roumanians, had they known that the Hungarians were breaking the most essential terms of the original Armistice. This had not been known until both President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had left Paris. M. Clemenceau had not been aware of it, as he had expressed doubt when the matter was first brought to his notice. No doubt the Council was in an unsatisfactory position, but it would be in a worse if it were to order the Roumanians to withdraw. M. Bratiano, in his farewell visit, had expressed himself very firmly and concisely. He said that the Powers had no authority to demand

¹ No. 10.

² In error for minute 6.

of Roumania a retreat which they could not protect. Unless the Powers could guarantee the safe withdrawal of the Roumanian troops and the secure holding of another line of defence against a superior enemy, it would be unfair to enforce the demand on Roumania. According to the military advice he had received, in view of the increase of the Hungarian army, Roumanian national existence might be at stake if this were done. In his communication, Bela Kun alleged breaches of the Armistice by the Czecho-Slovaks and by the Roumanians. It was the business of the military authorities to see that the Armistice was carried out. He thought that the military authorities had not treated the politicians very well, as they had not kept them informed of the breaches of the Armistice whether by one side or by the other. He would, therefore, propose to send Bela Kun's letter to Marshal Foch before any reply was made, and to ask the latter for a report regarding the way in which both the Hungarians and our own Allies had respected or broken the Armistice. He thought it might be possible to reply that, when the Council had addressed Bela Kun in June, it was not aware that Hungary was breaking the Armistice in doubling her army. If, however, the Hungarians now agreed to respect the terms of the Armistice, the Council would obtain the withdrawal of the Roumanians. It might further be stated that the frontier between Hungary and Roumania had already been fixed by the Peace Conference and that no amount of local fighting would alter this decision to Hungary's advantage or detriment. He wished to draw attention to a communication he had had from General Greenland,³ to the effect that the Hungarian population on the eastern side of the Theiss were greatly alarmed at the prospect of the Roumanians withdrawing, lest they be left thereby to the tender mercies of Bela Kun.

(It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original Armistice Conditions by all parties concerned.)

2. At M. Clemenceau's request, M. Mantoux read a lengthy document *Armistice on Esthonian Front* (Appendix B), which it was decided should be circulated and discussed at a future meeting.
3. The Council had before it a Joint Note by the Allied Blockade Committee *Question of Blockade in the Baltic* and the Eastern Blockade Committee (w. c. p. 1133) and a Note by the British Delegation (w. c. p. 1133 A). (Both of these documents are contained in Appendix C.)

(At this point, Sir W. Mitchell Thomson,⁴ Mr. Waterlow,⁵ Captain Fuller,⁶ M. Seydoux⁷ and Mr. J. F. Dulles entered the room.)

³ The reference is uncertain but it appears probable that Greenland may be a mistake for Greenly. General Greenly was Head of the British Military Mission in Roumania.

⁴ A British representative on the Supreme Economic Council.

⁵ Member of the British Delegation on the Supreme Economic Council.

⁶ Head of the Naval Section of the British Delegation.

⁷ Chief of the Blockade Section in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a French representative on the Supreme Economic Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council was considerably embarrassed in dealing with this question. He read paragraph 7 of the Joint Note.

M. SEYDOUX said that the question had been raised by the Supreme Economic Council, which had received in reply a communication of the decision taken on June 17th by the Council of Four, in the following terms:

'After the acceptance of the Conditions of Peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary. On the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council it was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council is asked, however, to examine whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevik Russia.'

This decision was communicated by Sir Maurice Hankey in a letter to Mr. McCormick.⁸ (Appendix D.⁹)

Sweden had now opened the question and it was necessary to find some solution. The solution suggested was contained in the terms of the last clause of paragraph 7 of the Joint Note. This applied only to the Baltic. In the Black Sea, the position was less acute. There were few countries anxious or able to import much into Russia. In Petrograd, however, the situation was critical. It was but a few hours' steam from Stockholm and Copenhagen. The means suggested were, he admitted, opportunist methods, based on the fact that naval hostilities were taking place in the Baltic. It might be possible without declaring a blockade, which was legally impossible, to proceed on the ground of these hostilities to enforce an embargo which should only be raised at the discretion of the Allied Powers. There was, however, another way out. The Allied and Associated Powers had offered help to Admiral Koltchak on certain terms. If this help was to be given to him, it must be given at all points. If neutrals were to be allowed to furnish supplies to the Bolsheviks whom he was fighting, Allied assistance elsewhere would be neutralised. The neutrals might therefore be told that the Allied and Associated Powers would consider it an unfriendly act on their part should they send supplies to Bolsheviks. This could now be stated with more confidence since help had been promised to Admiral Koltchak. He suggested that the Council adopted one or other of the two plans proposed.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Seydoux's statement was very clear. The question was an extremely embarrassing one. The Council was being hampered at every turn by difficult questions of international law, both in

⁸ Representative of the United States for blockade on the Supreme Economic Council and, at the time of Sir M. Hankey's communication (dated June 17, 1919), Chairman of the Council by rotation.

⁹ Not printed. In Sir M. Hankey's communication of the above-quoted decision of the Council of Four the word 'not' in the first sentence was underlined, also the words 'an abstinence from any positive measures' and 'public announcement indicating the resumption of such' in the second sentence.

relation to new States and to unrecognised or *de facto* Governments. There were two areas to be considered, first the gulf of to [*sic*] Finland, and second the Black Sea. The White Sea was already provided for. Trade with the Baltic States of Finland, Latvia etc., need cause no concern because trade with them would not lead to the percolation into Soviet Russia of any arms or ammunition. Of the two doors into Soviet Russia, one would be closed by ice at the end of November. Until that date, the means of stopping trade from passing through it which had been suggested amounted to this—that neutral States be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers were not making a formal blockade on Soviet Russia; but, seeing that active hostilities were in progress in the Gulf of Finland, they must insist on the right of turning back trading vessels from the zone of operations. The waters in question were mined, and operations must for success be provided with secrecy. He did not suggest that trading vessels should be subject to capture, sunk or proceeded against in Prize Courts; only that they should be sent back to their port of origin. This course was no doubt open to objection, but less so, he thought, than any other, and it seemed the best that could be done to carry out the policy laid down by the Council of Four. As to the Black Sea, he understood there was a proposal to recognise a blockade to be declared by Koltchak and Denekin. These methods he would be inclined to accept.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as temporary expedients the proposals put forth by M. Seydoux might be adopted.

M. SEYDOUX said it must be clearly understood that no legal right could be appealed to. In order to endow Koltchak and Denekin with some powers to enforce the blockade, he suggested that they might be supplied with a destroyer or two by the Allied Powers.

M. TITTONI said that the proposals were expedients, but as he could see no better, he would accept them.

MR. WHITE said that all that had been suggested amounted to a pacific blockade. The American Government was extremely sensitive regarding matters of this kind. Without special instructions he would hesitate to accept any proposal tending to stop traffic on the High Seas in time of Peace.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his view, what was proposed was not quite a pacific blockade. The régime in the Gulf of Finland was not peace. Even though it might not legally be war, active hostilities were being waged. As the Soviet Government had not been recognised these hostilities could not lawfully be considered war; since it appeared that war could only be waged against a recognised Government. The military operations going on had an object accepted by all the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, to preserve the small border Republics which had sprung up in the north-west of Russia. Commerce, therefore, should not be allowed to interfere with these operations. He thought the suggestion made in the last paragraph of the addendum by the British Delegation to the Joint Note might be adopted.

M. TITTONI observed that the Powers could not escape the anomaly of

assisting Koltchak in one quarter, and allowing his enemies to be assisted in another.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that President Wilson had offered his help to Koltchak.

MR. WHITE said that he was willing to send a cable message to Washington, explaining the views of his colleagues, but he could not accept them without reference to his Government. Theoretically there was peace with Russia. He would ask whether he might join in the proposal before the Council which he understood his Colleagues all accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he fully understood Mr. White's position, but the question addressed to the British Government by the Swedes had to be answered. He did not know how long the answer could be postponed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Mr. White inform the Council of the views of his Government within two days.

MR. DULLES said that it would be necessary to explain to President Wilson why the question was re-opened. At the time when the Council of Four had made its decision, it was well aware that the present situation was bound to come about. The question had been considered first in the Blockade Council, then in the Supreme Economic Council, and lastly, in the Council of the Heads of Governments. No aspect of the situation, therefore, had been lost sight of and the very contingency now being discussed was that in view when Sir Maurice Hankey sent his note to the Supreme Economic Council. It would, therefore, be necessary to inform President Wilson of whatever new circumstance might exist which justified the re-opening of the question.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was no doubt quite accurate to say that the Council of the Heads of Governments had decided that nothing could be done, and it was doubtless reasonable to say that President Wilson must be informed of the reason why the present Council desired a different decision. He would point out that, in the decision of the Council of Four, Hungary was coupled with Russia. Nevertheless, a blockade on Hungary had been imposed. At the time of the letter, there was some hope that Petrograd would fall; this would have removed all necessity for a blockade. It might, further, be pointed out that the Soviet Government was conducting active hostilities against the small Baltic States. Should the Powers not protect the latter, the Soviet Government could land troops in the rear of their forces and destroy them. Hence it was necessary for the Powers to maintain maritime control of the Baltic. This could not be done without active operations, as the Soviet had ships and shewed fight. It was impossible to carry on naval operations in narrow waters and to allow merchant shipping to go through with food and arms. The removal of the blockade was, therefore, inconsistent with the conduct of the policy unanimously favoured by the Powers.

MR. DULLES observed that the blockade on Hungary was maintained because the Powers were still at war with Hungary. They had never been at war with Russia.

(It was agreed that Mr. Dulles should draft a telegram to be sent in the name of the Council to President Wilson, explaining the reasons for main-

taining in the Baltic and the Black Sea an embargo on merchant shipping trading with Soviet Russia.

It was further agreed that the subject should again be put on the agenda on the 17th instant.)

4.

*Revision of
Treaties of 1839*

[Not printed]¹⁰

5. The Council had before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles. (Appendix E.)

*Allied Army of
Occupation in
Silesia during
Plebiscite* (At this point, the Military Representatives and their Chiefs of the Staff, entered the room.)

MR. BALFOUR said that he had read the report. The only difficulty he found was in finding 13,000 men.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had none to offer. He counted on Mr. Balfour.

MR. BALFOUR said he had none to offer. He counted on General Bliss.

GENERAL BLISS said that it was not beyond the limits of possibility that Allied troops might be entirely dispensed with. The Inter-Allied Commission which was to conduct the plebiscite, was to spend six months studying the country. It would be able to report whether order could be maintained without armed forces. It had been provided that there should be neither German nor Polish troops in the area. He suggested, therefore, that the Commission, together with its staff, which would be numerous, should go to the country and report later whether it required an Allied force or not.

MR. BALFOUR quoted paragraph 'D' of the general considerations set forth in the report and pointed out that it seemed to have been the intention that the Commission should have an Allied force until local police could be organised. If, however, General Bliss considered that the risk of doing without an Allied force could be taken, he would not insist on a pedantic adherence to the original intention.

GENERAL BLISS said that the plebiscite was not to take place until six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. This would give the Commission plenty of time to find out whether an armed force could or could not be dispensed with.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what would happen should the Commission find that they required troops.

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the provision excluding any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation. He asked whether this should be held to apply to police forces.

GENERAL BLISS thought that it did not apply to police forces.

MR. BALFOUR asked when the Commission was to proceed to Silesia. He also asked whether members had been nominated.

MR. WHITE said that he understood the Commission was to proceed to

¹⁰ It was agreed that at 10.30 a.m. on July 29, 1919, there should be held at the Quai d'Orsay the first meeting of the commission charged with the revision of the treaties of 1839 which had made the independence and neutrality of Belgium the subject of international guarantee. (Cf. *British and Foreign State Papers, 1838-39*, vol. xxvii, p. 990 f.)

Silesia 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. As to nomination, so far as the United States were concerned, no American member could be appointed until the American Senate had ratified the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was informed that the Commission to supervise the execution of the clauses of the Treaty had examined this question and that it could furnish a report at the next meeting.

(The question was therefore postponed till the following day.)

6. The Council had before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council. (Appendix E.¹¹)

Occupation of Bulgaria by Great Britain, France and Italy in equal proportions

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that in spite of the platonic recommendations of the Military Representatives, it appeared from the footnote that Italy would contribute one battalion, Great Britain 40 men, America none, while France had in the area two divisions, two-thirds of which he proposed to demobilise. The only way out of the difficulty that he could think of was to ask the Italians who were on good terms with the Bulgarians to stand surety for their good behaviour.

M. TITTONI said that he was not aware of any special intimacy between Italy and Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he could show M. Tittoni evidence to that effect. He made no complaint, in fact he would be glad if Italian policy could produce in Bulgaria the results desired by the Conference. The only end in view was to make the Bulgarians behave peacefully towards the Greeks.

M. TITTONI said that Italian policy was to conform with the policy of the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had dreamt that Italy was inaugurating a new policy, and was now seeking to make friends with her neighbours in the Adriatic, applying in case of misunderstanding to her Allies for arbitration, which would be most willingly undertaken.

M. TITTONI said that he was quite willing to conform with M. Clemenceau's dream.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if an agreement between the Bulgarians and the Greeks could be arranged through Italy it would be a great service to the Allied cause. The Bulgarians and [?had] been summoned to be in Paris on the 25th. There remained only ten days. If in this period M. Tittoni could give the Allies a foretaste of the new policy, the situation on the arrival of the Bulgarians would be much easier.

M. TITTONI said he would be very pleased to do his best.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Tittoni should have private conversations on behalf of the Council with M. Venizelos.

MR. BALFOUR asked to what extent disarmament had proceeded in Bulgaria.

¹¹ This reference was apparently confused with the previous reference to appendix E in minute 5. No report from the military representatives on the occupation of Bulgaria is appended to the original. The report in question was evidently presented in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council recorded in No. 7, minute 12.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the situation unsatisfactory. He did not think that General Franchet d'Esperey had controlled events very successfully according to the instructions given him. He had the impression that the Bulgarians meant to resort to force should they be dissatisfied with their new frontiers. He was asking General Franchet d'Esperey's opinion on Bulgaria and its present condition from the military point of view. If, meanwhile, M. Tittoni would have a talk with M. Venizelos, good results might be obtained.

MR. BALFOUR said that he presumed that M. Tittoni's conversation with M. Venizelos would be on the basis of what had been decided at the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it must undoubtedly be on the basis that the Entente was victorious, and that Bulgaria had been defeated.

M. TITTONI asked that he might be supplied with the requisite information by his colleagues.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the intention was that M. Tittoni should discuss frontiers with M. Venizelos.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he suggested no plan whatever. He left the whole matter to M. Tittoni's ingenuity. He had heard among other things that Greece thought of giving Bulgaria a share in the port of Kavalla. If so this was a good beginning which deserved encouragement.

(M. Tittoni agreed to engage in conversation with M. Venizelos, and report the results obtained daily to the Council.)

It was further decided that General Franchet d'Esperey should furnish as soon as possible all available information regarding the military situation of Bulgaria.)

7. The Council had before it a report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council. (Appendix F.)

Assistance to be given to Poland in the area ceded by Germany M. CLEMENCEAU asked General Belin what the conclusion of the report was.

GENERAL BELIN said that it was proposed that the Frontier Delimitation Commission should begin to function at once instead of waiting for the time appointed, namely, 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think there was any authority to set the Commission at work before its time. This could only be done by agreement with the Germans. Should they refuse the Council could do nothing. It was important not to exceed Treaty rights. In this connection he wished to inform the Council that the Germans had approached him with a request for permission to occupy Frankfurt with troops by reason of disturbances expected there. On the strength of the Treaty he had refused this request. It was therefore hardly possible to ask Germany for favours. He suggested that the report expected from the Commission to supervise the execution of the Treaty be awaited.

(It was therefore decided to postpone the consideration of this question till the following day, when the report of the Commission to Supervise the Execution of the Treaty would be heard.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to read a despatch he had received from
Action of the General Franchet d'Esperey. (Appendix G.)
Italians M. TITTONI said he would immediately make an enquiry into
in Bulgaria the allegations made in this despatch.

9. M. CLEMENCEAU caused a letter from M. Venizelos to be read. (See
Appendix H.)

Letter from M. TITTONI said that he denied in a most formal manner the
M. Venizelos allegations made in this letter. Greek troops were refusing to
concerning obey the orders of the British Admiral on the ground that they
Asia-Minor were receiving direct instructions from the Peace Conference
sent to them by M. Venizelos. It would be necessary for the Conference to
settle this matter. The British Admiral's powers would have to be increased.
The Italian Commander was in complete accord with the British Commodore
at Smyrna. He had himself summoned General Bongiovanni and given him
personal instructions that no further Italian troops should be landed, and
that no new localities should be occupied. He was, moreover, to act only in
concert with the British Admiral. It was necessary to enforce a similar line
of conduct on the Greeks. The Turks at present believed that they were
being invaded by the Greeks, and that they must fight them. The Greeks
must conform to a common plan, and must realise that they formed part of
the forces of the Allied Powers. The Greeks must therefore first halt on their
present positions.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that M. Venizelos be asked to attend the Council
in order to give a frank explanation of what was going on. He would like to
ask the Military Experts what they thought of the allegation made in the
letter read by M. Clemenceau that there were 300,000 well-armed Turkish
troops in the field. The British Military Experts were of opinion that this was
far from the mark.

GENERAL BELIN replied that he thought that these figures [?were] very
much exaggerated. He agreed that there were perhaps some 60,000 men in
all Anatolia.

(It was agreed that M. Venizelos should be invited to attend the Council
on the following day to discuss the situation in Asia-Minor.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 15, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 11

Radio de Budapesth.

A Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix, Paris.

En réponse à notre radiotélégramme du 11 juillet, la Conférence de la Paix, au
lieu d'ordonner la retraite aux troupes roumanes, vient de nous adresser un
télégramme disant que d'après la non-observation de notre part de la convention
d'armistice, on ne saurait, pour le moment, traiter avec nous. Nous aurions aimé
à voir les faits précis par lesquels la convention d'armistice fut violée de notre part.

Nous éprouvons d'autant plus de plaisir à voir préciser ces faits, qu'à notre regret, nous sommes en mesure de relever tout de suite toute une série de violations de la convention d'armistice commises par les Gouvernements des États Alliés et Associés et en premier lieu, par ceux du Royaume de Roumanie et de la République Tchéco-Slovaque. Nous nous contentons de dénoter tout brièvement le fait que les troupes royales roumaines continuent toujours à occuper la ligne de la Tisza, bien que, aux termes de la convention militaire du 13 novembre, la ligne de démarcation serait celle du fleuve Maros.

Des régions entières ont été dévastées, tous les moyens mobiles de production, de même que toutes les productions alimentaires enlevées. La convention militaire du 13 novembre ne connaît pas la ligne du Danube en tant que ligne de démarcation, ce qui n'empêche pas cependant les troupes tchéco-slovaques d'occuper la ligne du Danube. La Rousska-Kraina, partie fédérative de la République des Conseils de Hongrie, se trouve sous la domination de la force armée tchèque et roumaine. Nous rappelons à la Conférence de la Paix que les troupes de la République Tchéco-Slovaque s'étaient déjà avancées, contrairement à la convention d'armistice, jusqu'au sud de Miskolcz, lorsque nos troupes, pour défendre les intérêts vitaux du pays, ont pris à leur tour l'offensive, en refoulant victorieusement les troupes tchéco-slovaques. Nous avons, nonobstant, retiré nos troupes du territoire repris des tchéco-slovaques en nous appuyant sur la promesse de Monsieur Clémenceau qu'en ce cas, les troupes royales hongroises *[sic]* se retireront à leur tour sur la ligne fixée par la Conférence de la Paix dans son télégramme du 13 juillet [juin] adressé au Gouvernement des Conseils Hongrois. Il peut être clairement démontré que la violation des stipulations de l'armistice et le renoncement à l'effusion de sang eurent lieu en dehors de notre volonté. Ce sont les troupes tchéco-slovaques et roumaines qui passèrent la ligne de démarcation et tout ce qui est arrivé après est la conséquence directe de cette offensive. Les pays précités n'ont pas respecté et ne respectent pas à présent non plus, le traité d'armistice conclu au nom des États Alliés et Associés, qu'ils violent à tout moment à ce point qu'à cause de leur attitude contraire aux principes du droit des gens, ce traité peut être considéré comme non-existant.

Ayant constaté tout ce qui précède, nous sommes forcés de poser encore une fois la question à la Conférence de la Paix, si l'ordre de Monsieur Clémenceau, comme Président de la Conférence de la Paix, est obligatoire ou non pour les troupes du Gouvernement royal roumain. Doivent-elles exécuter l'ordre de Monsieur Clémenceau de se retirer de la Tisza sur la ligne désignée dans le télégramme du 13 juillet [juin]? Pouvons-nous compter sur ce que la promesse de Monsieur Clémenceau va être remplie par les troupes royales roumaines? Nous faisons remarquer à la Conférence de la Paix qu'il ne s'agit pas dans l'aspect de négociations mais de l'observation de la promesse de Monsieur Clémenceau, ou plutôt de l'exécution de l'ordre de la Conférence de la Paix de la part des troupes royales roumaines.

Le Gouvernement de la République des Conseils de Hongrie, ayant fait tout son possible pour que les stipulations de l'armistice soient exécutées dans le sens de la Convention militaire du 13 novembre, rien ne s'oppose à des négociations ultérieures. Il désire, cependant, en se basant sur la promesse de Monsieur Clémenceau, que l'ordre soit donné aux troupes royales roumaines de commencer sans délai l'évacuation des territoires désignés dans le télégramme du 13 juin.

BELA KUN

Commissaire du Peuple aux Affaires Étrangères.

*Rapport du 9 juillet 1919 de notre Attaché Militaire du Parquet, à Stockholm, sur les conditions de l'armistice conclu sur le front esthonien*¹²

Chargé par missions alliées de traiter armistice entre belligérants sur le front esthonien, je me suis . . .¹³ Riga 1^{er} juillet. Ai examiné d'abord conditions . . .¹³ Von der Goltz puis ai traversé lignes allemandes et esthoniennes seul avec deux soldats allemands porteurs drapeaux blancs et drapeau tricolore bombardement et tir fusils et mitrailleuses esthoniens au départ j'ai été très mal reçu par Esthoniens et Chefs divers, sauf Général Peder. J'ai dû faire appel toute mon énergie pour parvenir au but malgré mauvais vouloir et grossièreté. Peder me dit être étonné que j'aie pu parvenir jusqu'à lui. Ces conditions d'armistice d'abord très dures ont pu être fortement adoucies mais ils ont refusé de transiger sur question occupation de Riga (douteux) par troupes esthoniennes.

J'étais muni des pleins pouvoirs des missions alliées et de Von der Goltz pour signer armistice mais j'estimai ne pas pouvoir le faire sur ces bases sans nouvelle consultation. Je parvins vers ligne allemande matin 2 juillet j'ai subi 2 bombardements allemands en cours de route, mais cessèrent le feu quand aperçurent drapeau blanc. J'ai demandé Von der Goltz croix de Fer pour deux soldats allemands qui m'ont accompagné et se conduisirent bravement. Mon intervention sur le front esthonien produit grande impression à Riga bombardé par Esthoniens 1 et 2 juillet. Victimes dans population civile, destructions et incendies; le 2 juillet soir réunion sur le front allemand et [?] ferme Strassdenhof 12 kilomètres est de Riga des représentants missions alliées, Esthoniens, Allemands, Landwehr, troupes lettonnes pour conclusion armistice qui fut signé 3 juillet, 3 heures 1/2 du matin.

Clauses: 1°—Cessation des hostilités terre, mer, air 3 juillet midi.

2°—Troupes allemandes retirées de Letton[i]e aussitôt que possible en accord avec traité de paix. Aucun mouvement en avant des troupes allemandes sauf contre bolchevicks de république russe soviét, en accord avec traité de paix.

3°—Officiers et troupes allemandes quitteront sur le champ de Riga [*sic*] et faubourg, évacuation à terminer pour 5 juillet 18 heures sauf officiers et troupes nécessaires à évacuation et garde des dépôts allemands.

4°—Officiers alliés assureront que dépôts non-militaires restent sur place.

5°—Landeswehr quittera pont Riga et faubourg et se retirera derrière Duna; évacuation à terminer pour 5 juillet 18 heures.

6°—Esthoniens sur positions occupées 3 juillet à 3 heures du matin.

7°—Allemands rétabliront communications libres par route, voie ferrée, télégraphe entre Riga et Libau.

8°—Mission alliée assure temporairement administration Riga avec Gouvernement Letton.

9°—Disposition de détail à régler sous Direction Chef Mission Alliée. Armistice bien exécuté jusque 5 juillet soir où Allemands et Landwehr ont évacué complètement la ville et faubourgs.

Ai quitté Riga 6 juillet pour rentrer Libau par vapeur américain. Ordre parfait à Riga, population soulagée, troupes lettonnes assure[nt] ordre service et garde de la ville, police municipale entrée en fonctions municipal idem (*sic*) Ministère Ulmanis

¹² Cf. Vol. III of this series.

¹³ The text here is uncertain.

quitte Liban pour Riga le 8 juillet matin sur navire Saratow Mission anglaise pour Riga 7 juillet soir. Mission française partira dès que avis sera envoyé. Concentration russe en Lettonie constitue danger actuellement car effectifs sont importants, ravitaillement pas assuré et difficile. Dans ces conditions danger que les Russes fassent pillage et tournent au bolchevisme; embarquement des troupes allemandes à Liban constituera danger pour la sécurité de la ville qui est parfaitement calme depuis allemands [*sic*]. Il y a lieu en tout cas les amener au dernier moment seulement dans port de guerre et complètement leur interdire accès de la ville. Désordres sont à craindre causés par troupes allemandes. Il y a lieu de prescrire évacuation des Allemands au sud et à l'ouest Mitau où grande concentration constitue actuellement danger pour Riga et Gouvernement national. On parle de conspiration ourdie à Mitau par Allemands et parti Nédra.

PARQUET.

APPENDIX C TO NO. II

Document I

W. C. P. 1133.]

Trade with Bolshevik Russia

Note for Supreme Council of Principal Allied and Associated States

The Allied Blockade Committee and the Comité de Blocus de l'Orient, Paris, who are charged by the Supreme Blockade Council with the executive control of Blockade, find it necessary to call the urgent attention of the Supreme Council to the question of commerce with Bolshevik Russia.

2. The Committees venture to recall to the Council that on June 7th a Note was presented by the Blockade Council to the Council of Four pointing out that it had in fact been possible during the Blockade of Germany to maintain, as part of such Blockade, effective restrictions upon commerce with Bolshevik Russia, either by means of agreements with neutral States or by the actual exercise of naval control; but that with the raising of the German Blockade, it would be difficult to continue to apply such restrictions to Bolshevik Russia, unless measures were directly framed towards that end. They therefore enquired whether the Council of Four desired that upon the raising of the Blockade of Germany:

- (a) A formal blockade of Bolshevik Russia[n] ports in the Baltic and Black Sea should be proclaimed by the Allies, or
 - (b) That negotiations should be entered into with the neutrals to secure the maintenance of guarantees against re-export to Bolshevik Russia.
3. The Council of Four replied on June 17th that they did not desire that either (a) or (b) should be adopted, but that no further announcement should be made as to the possibility of trade with Bolshevik Russia, and that they trusted that in fact the physical difficulties in the way of commerce would prevent its resumption.

4. The Committees were in hopes that, as regards the Baltic and the Black Sea, which are the two zones of difficulty, the question might have been rendered more simple by the events which seemed at the time quite likely to occur before the raising of the German Blockade. These events were (a) the fall of Petrograd, and (b) the Proclamation by Admiral Koltchak of a blockade of the Bolshevik ports in the Black Sea, and the recognition of such a blockade as effective. The occurrence

of either of these events would have gone far to solve the difficulty in the respective zones.

5. It has now, however, become apparent that neither event is likely to antedate the raising of the German Blockade, and the Committees respectfully point out that in these circumstances absence of a definite policy will place the executive authorities in an impossible position. Already enquiries are being made—not only by Allied nationals, but also by neutrals, such as Sweden and Denmark, as to the treatment likely to be given to goods shipped to destinations in Bolshevik Russia—and, upon the raising of the German Blockade (which is now probably only a matter of days, if not of hours) the executive authorities must be enabled to reply to such enquiries.

6. The Committees therefore respectfully, but very earnestly, beg for an immediate statement as to the pleasure of the Supreme Economic Council upon the following enquiries:—

7. Upon the raising of the Blockade of Germany:

- (a) Are the nationals of the Allied States to be free to trade with Bolshevik Russia?
- (b) If not, are neutrals to be free to conduct such trade?
- (c) If (a) and (b) are answered in the negative, how are the contemplated restrictions to be enforced?
- (d) In particular, having regard to the naval hostilities which are actually occurring at this moment, especially in the Gulf of Finland, it is [? is it] still regarded as undesirable for the Allies to proclaim a local blockade of the Neva ports.

Document 2

W. C. P. 1133 A.]

Trade with Bolshevik Russia

Addendum by British Delegation to Joint Note on Russian Blockade by Allied Blockade Committee and Eastern Blockade Committee

1. The methods hitherto used to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia included every weapon known to the Blockade. They may be summarised as:—

- (a) Physical, e.g. control at Constantinople by Allied Naval Command who refuse permits for vessels to proceed to Black Sea ports in the occupation of Bolsheviks and enforce their control through patrols:
- and (b) Conventional, e.g. agreements with neutral governments, under which these governments agreed to add Bolshevik Russia to the destinations to which export was prohibited under their agreements with the Associated Powers. These agreements will terminate with the raising of the German Blockade tomorrow.

2. Two possible courses were suggested to the Council of Four on the 7th June.

- (i) To proclaim a Formal Blockade of all Bolshevik Russia, thus regularising the continued exercise of physical control.
- (ii) To invite the neutral governments to enter into special arrangements to retain their prohibitions against export to Bolshevik Russia after the

termination of the main agreements upon the raising of the German Blockade, thus securing the retention of conventional control.

Both proposals were rejected by the Council of Four on the 17th June.

It is now suggested for consideration that a physical control might be at least adopted as regards the Gulf of Finland, where active hostilities exist at present, and that this might be regularised by a notification by the Allies that under existing circumstances traffic into and out of ports in the Gulf of Finland can only be conducted under permit from the Allied Naval Command there.

W. MITCHELL-THOMSON.

Paris, 11th July 1919.

APPENDIX E TO NO. II

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

S. W. C. 440 (77 M. R.)] *Report on the Composition and Size of the Army of Occupation in the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia*

On June 25th [26th], the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers decided to ask the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles to examine the following question:—

‘Composition and size of the Army of Occupation in the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia, and the method of occupation of this Area.’

General Considerations

The Area in question is defined by Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

On the other hand, by the terms of the annexure which was made to that Article:—

- (a) The German troops and authorities must evacuate the area submitted for a Plebiscite after the coming into force of the Treaty and within a maximum period of 15 days (para. 1).
- (b) This Area shall be occupied by troops of the Allied and Associated Powers. (Para. 2.)
- (c) The Plebiscite Area shall be immediately placed under the authority of an International Commission composed of 4 members to be appointed by the United States of America, France, the British Empire and Italy. (Para. 2.)
- (d) It shall be the duty of the Commission to maintain order with the help of troops to be placed at its disposal and, to the extent which it shall consider necessary, of a police force to be recruited from the native inhabitants of the country. (Para. 3.)

Character of the Forces of Occupation

From the terms of the Treaty, which it seemed useful to recall above, it results that any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation is excluded.

It is equally indispensable not to admit any Polish units, if there is not to be a danger of the result of the plebiscite losing its character of sincerity which is essential.

Size of the Forces of Occupation

In fixing their strength, consideration must be taken of the following particulars:—

- (1) The population of the plebiscite area is estimated at about 1,632,000 inhabitants (of which 570,000 are Germans and 1,062,000 Poles).
- (2) There are present in this area two elements in the population of such different mentality and tendencies that they will only accept the new condition of affairs with reluctance. This may provoke serious trouble if the forces available do not allow of all necessary measures being taken in time.
- (3) This situation will assuredly continue up to the day of the plebiscite; it is even possible that it will tend to increase as the date approaches for taking the vote which is to definitely decide the future of the country.
- (4) The existing local police, composed mostly of Germans, would not seem to offer any guarantee of impartiality, however, at the present time or during any of the period preceding the plebiscite; consequently, this police should be probably disbanded as soon as possible, and reconstituted and increased.
- (5) The territory in question includes important industrial centres in which the total population attains 450,000 and which can easily become centres of disturbances.
- (6) Serious social movements have already arisen in this country; Councils of Workmen and Soldiers have been set up, which the Treaty of Peace with Germany has ordered to be dissolved (Paragraph 1 of the Annexure of Article 88 of the Treaty).

Consequently, the Military Representatives are agreed in considering that an armed force of 1 Division (about 13,000 men) is, at least for the time being, indispensable to guarantee the maintenance of order and ensure the authority of the Inter-Allied Commission.

It will be for the President of the International Commission to propose either a reduction of this force or their repatriation as soon as the creation and increase of the police force and gendarmerie, organised on the spot, shall permit.

G. AL BELIN.	C. SACKVILLE- WEST, Major- General.	UGO CAVALLERO.	STANLEY D. EMBICK.
Military	Military	Military	Military
Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council.	Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council.	Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council.	Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council.

Given at Versailles the 10th July, 1919.

Certified to be a true copy of the original document.

Versailles,
10th July, 1919.

C. L. WICKS (Capt.)
Secretary,
British Section,
Supreme War Council.

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

S. W. C. 441 (79 M. R.)] *Report on the Help to be given to Poland in the Event of Trouble in the Area ceded by Germany*

In two Resolutions, dated June 26th and 27th, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers charged the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles:—

- (1) To enquire how the Poles could best be assisted to establish their authority in the area ceded by Germany to Poland, in the event of trouble arising in that area;
- (2) To determine:—
 - (a) The needs of the Polish Army in equipment and supplies;
 - (b) The means of satisfying these needs;
 - (c) From what sources these needs could best be made good.

First Question

In the course of their enquiry, the Military Representatives have found that the troubles likely to occur in the territories in question might arise:—

- (a) Either from a direct armed attack by Germany;
- (b) Or from excesses committed by the German troops during their retirement, or from purely local disturbances, as a result of the country being carried away by local propaganda organisations for many months past, or from the too abrupt taking over by the Poles of the territories the population of which was still permeated by German influence and administrative customs.

In the first case an armed attack by Germany would be a violation of the Treaty of Peace which she has signed and ratified. In this instance the Allied and Associated Powers appear to have at their disposal only the following means of punishment:—

- (1) Restoration of the blockade.
- (2) Inter-Allied naval action.
- (3) Military action by the Allied Armies of the Left Bank of the Rhine, with a view to an occupation of especially important points in Germany as a guarantee, such as the Ruhr Basin and the Frankfort region, etc. This action, as also the employment of all other available troops against Germany would be directed and ordered according to the plan which the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies would be called upon to furnish.

In the second case (excesses committed by German troops and purely local disturbances etc.) the Military Representatives consider that the assistance to be given to the Poles to allow them to establish their authority in the territories ceded by Germany could include:—

- (a) Preventive measures.
- (b) Assistance in material.

(a) *Preventive measures.*

From the information given to the Military Representatives by General Dupont with the Mission at Berlin, it appears that an intervention on the spot and at the right time by a few capable Allied officers of sound judgment would ensure a certain moral authority and would prevent in all probability most of the excesses to be feared, or at any rate the aggravation of those excesses.

These Officers could be taken from among those nominated to form part of 'The Commission of Delimitation' to be constituted 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany to 'determine on the spot the frontier line of Germany'. (Article 87 of the Treaty.)

It would be indispensable, however, for this Commission to be on the spot the day after the coming into force of the Treaty. While preparing the work of delimitation, which must be started on the 15th day, it would superintend the operation of taking over and evacuation, and would protect the Polish and German populations against any excesses. In this case, the Commission must have a considerable personnel and sufficient means of transport to enable it to travel quickly from place to place and settle the differences which are bound to arise, and to smooth over difficulties of every kind.

A General Officer to be appointed by the French Government, and well acquainted with German and Polish affairs, would appear in every way suited to be President of this Commission and to organize its work.

The Military Representatives call the attention of the Supreme Council to the urgency of taking a decision on this particular point.

(b) *Material Assistance.*

In this case all necessary measures must be taken to hasten the sending to Poland of the numerous important orders placed in Allied countries by the Polish Army for material, as also orders which are now being carried out for material, the delivery of which will apparently be delayed owing to insufficiency of transport.

It would seem, therefore, apparent that sea transport to Dantzig must be used (as well as railways).

Second Question

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council consider that they should point out that a Convention dated June 14th, 1919, concluded between the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers and the Polish Government, confers on Marshal Foch the Chief Command of Polish Armies.

Under these circumstances and in accordance with the recommendations which they have addressed to the Supreme Council concerning the supplies for the forces of the Baltic States,

The Military Representatives Consider:—

- (1) that Marshal Foch should be asked to determine, through General Henrys, his delegate at Warsaw, the nature and amount of supplies of all sorts which may be necessary for the Polish Army in addition to the orders already placed;
- (2) that if it is necessary later to divide between the Powers the extra supplies considered necessary, this division should only be made when the exact nature and total quantity of the supplies is known;

(3) that at this moment all facilities must be given to the Polish Requisitioning Commissions accredited to the Governments to carry out their work.

G. AL BELIN.	C. SACKVILLE- WEST, Major- General.	UGO CAVALLERO.	STANLEY D. EMBICK. for
Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council.

Given at Versailles on 11th July, 1919.

Certified to be a true copy of the original Document.

Versailles, 11th July, 1919.	C. L. WICKS (Capt.) Secretary, British Section, Supreme War Council.
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APPENDIX G TO NO. 11

QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES ARMÉES ALLIÉES EN ORIENT.

Juillet 1919.

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey à Monsieur le Président du Conseil

J'ai insisté auprès du Président du Conseil bulgare à mon retour de Hongrie, en passant par Sofia, pour que la Bulgarie accepte les conséquences de sa défaite et démobilise effectivement son armée.

Le Gouvernement actuel paraît disposé à obéir à l'Entente, mais il n'en est pas de même de l'armée.

Le parti communiste, qui prend pour tremplin l'intégrité nationale, travaille activement les jeunes officiers bulgares. On entame des tractations avec les Turcs pour que la Bulgarie et la Turquie se prêtent un appui mutuel. L'Italie affiche ouvertement ses sympathies pour la Bulgarie. Le Général Bertrammon, commandant la brigade Ivres, a, dans un dîner privé, porté un toast à l'armée et à la nation bulgares et a reconnu la légitimité de cette cause.

Il est possible que, dans une telle ambiance, la Bulgarie résiste aux conditions de paix qui lui sont imposées.

Il sera facile de réprimer, avec les forces dont nous disposons, cette résistance, si elle se manifeste sous la forme d'un mouvement populaire à Sofia. Mais la répression sera plus difficile s'il s'agit d'une sédition militaire s'étendant dans tout le pays; cette sédition doit être prévue et si possible prévenue.

Il faut que l'aventure de Smyrne nous serve d'exemple. Aucune limite n'a été imposée aux Grecs dans leur progression, les Turcs n'ont pas été avertis: le résultat de ce manque de précautions ne s'est pas fait attendre.

Aussi serait-il essentiel que je fusse suffisamment prévenu à l'avance des conditions de paix à la Bulgarie et du moment où cette paix sera notifiée. Comme je l'ai télégraphié il sera nécessaire à ce moment d'envoyer des missions alliées suffisamment nombreuses dans lesquelles à côté du pavillon français devront

figurer les pavillons anglais et italien. Sous notre contrôle, l'avance grecque se ferait progressive.

J'espère ainsi pouvoir d'une part tenir en respect la Bulgarie dont nous occupons les principaux centres et les mines de charbon, et d'autre part éviter des massacres comme ceux d'Asie Mineure.

GÉNÉRAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.

APPENDIX H TO NO. II

DÉLÉGATION HELLÉNIQUE AU CONGRÈS DE LA PAIX.

PARIS, le 10 juillet.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que d'après les nouvelles qui me parviennent de Constantinople, les préparatifs militaires poursuivis par la Turquie dans un indéniable esprit agressif, prennent une ampleur telle que l'on risque de voir la guerre se rallumer dans toute l'Anatolie et rendre impossible le règlement des affaires d'Orient.

Près de 60.000 hommes se seraient déjà concentrés à Konia. La mobilisation continue dans tout le pays et il est probable qu'une force totale de 300.000 hommes sera bientôt sur pied de guerre. Les Chefs de cette organisation, à laquelle collabore le Ministre de la Guerre lui-même, auraient à leur disposition du matériel et des munitions en quantité suffisante pour une pareille armée.

Ces informations sont à la connaissance du commandement militaire allié à Constantinople.

Je dois dire que ce qui ajoute à la gravité de ces nouvelles c'est que les Turcs paraissent encouragés dans leurs desseins par les autorités italiennes.

En effet, il est avéré que la zone occupée par des forces italiennes au sud d'Aidin, a servi aux Turcs de base d'opération dans leurs agressions successives contre les troupes helléniques au nord de Méandre. La première division hellénique vient de saisir des proclamations turques datées du 4 juillet, où il est fait état d'un télégramme expédié de Mylassa par le Général italien pour rassurer les Turcs qu'ils n'ont rien à craindre des Grecs car leurs troupes sont obligées de se retirer au nord de Méandre et qu'au cas où elles ne le feraient pas, les forces italiennes prendraient les mesures nécessaires.

D'autre part, deux personnages jeunes-turcs très influents, Mahmoud Essad et Chukri, viennent de passer de Lausanne à Milan, avec l'intention de se diriger, par les soins des autorités italiennes sur un point de la côte de Smyrne. Il se pourrait qu'ils fussent accompagnés de leur ami Kiazim Nourri, député d'Aidin, parent de l'ex- vali de Smyrne Rahmi Bey.

Dans ces conditions, je crains, Monsieur le Président, que la situation ne s'aggrave au point de compromettre le règlement que la Conférence de la Paix projette en Orient, si de promptes et énergiques mesures ne sont prises par les Puissances Alliées et Associées pour entraver la mobilisation de l'armée turque et mettre un terme aux encouragements rencontrés jusqu'ici par les fauteurs de désordres.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, etc.

VENIZELOS.

Son Excellence

Monsieur Clemenceau,

Président de la Conférence de la Paix.

H. D. 8.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 16, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, Capt. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel Grant. *British Empire:* Capt. E. Abraham. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(M. Venizelos was introduced.)

(Captain Fuller, Major Temperley,¹ Captain Macindoe, and Mr. Butler, entered the room.)

1. M. VENIZELOS said that on the 18th June he had sent a letter to the President of the Peace Conference calling attention to the concentration of Turkish troops in various places, notably the Smyrna region. On June 23rd the situation had appeared to him to be so disquieting that he had told the Greek General to take such action as was necessary in order that he should not be driven into the sea. What he must ask the Council to grant him was either a definite line or liberty of action for his troops. He pointed out that there were three railway lines converging on Smyrna. His suggestion would be that Greek troops should occupy these lines up to a fixed point. He would further suggest that in the space left between the Greek and Turkish advance posts small detachments, for instance a company, of Allied troops, be placed. The moral effect of this would be great and would probably render any conflict unlikely. He wished to put an end to the present situation in Smyrna. This situation was such that he was compelled to keep a whole army there. There were five Greek divisions in the area. He wished to reduce them to two. This would enable him to reinforce his troops in Macedonia against the Bulgarians.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos to indicate on the map the area in Anatolia occupied by Greek troops.

M. VENIZELOS did so. He further stated that if there were real collaboration between the Greek and the Italian troops and if this collaboration were manifest to the Turks the situation would be completely remedied.

M. TITTONI agreed.

M. VENIZELOS said that he did not wish to extend Greek occupation. All that he wanted was to be safe in Smyrna and to maintain his hold on certain

¹ Assistant British representative on the Sub-commission on Territorial Questions appointed by the Central Territorial Committee.

places the population of which was entirely Greek. He was well aware that no conquest would influence the decisions of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he understood the Greek population was entirely on the coast.

M. VENIZELOS replied that it extended to 80 or 100 kilometres inland.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos for his estimate of the number of Greeks in Smyrna.

M. VENIZELOS replied that there were 230,000 Greeks and 95,000 Turks and the rest of the population was of other nationalities. A large number of Greeks lived on the land and cultivated figs and grapes, in fact these Anatolian Greeks were among the best Greek cultivators.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Venizelos apparently considered the Greeks in Smyrna formed a majority.

M. VENIZELOS said he did.

MR. BALFOUR said that without going far back into the history of the case, he would like to put the present situation on a sound basis. There were three separate armies in the area; one Greek, one Italian and one Turkish. The last was of uncertain size, largely composed, presumably, of irregulars, formidable for attacks on lines of communication but not for a set battle. How this had come about was not very material. M. Venizelos had sent troops to Smyrna and beyond at the invitation of the Council of Four. Italy had sent troops because of her local interests and because she interpreted the Treaty of London as giving her certain rights. Unquestionably much of the trouble arose not from the action of the Turks but from the mutual distrust of the Greek and Italian troops. There were, therefore, three bodies of troops all afraid of attack from each other. According to his information the Turks were undoubtedly actuated by fear in all that they had done. They saw the Greeks at Smyrna spreading out to Aidin and elsewhere. This seemed to them the prelude of a great advance; this might lead to massacres. If it were made clear to the Turks that there would be no advance beyond a definite line it might be possible to control them, especially if they realised that it would not be armed action but the deliberations of the Council that would prescribe the final settlement. As to the relations between the Greeks and Italians M. Venizelos had just stated and M. Tittoni had previously more than once stated that he would base no claim to territory on armed occupation. Both agreed that the Peace Conference alone had the right to determine frontiers. M. Tittoni, while recognising this, had made an appeal to the Council begging that he be not asked to withdraw Italian troops entirely from Asia Minor by reason of the effect this would produce in Italy. M. Venizelos was in Asia Minor at the request of the Council, but no limit had been laid down to his advance. It was clear that the machinery for the co-operation of the Greek Commander and the British Commodore had not worked smoothly. It would therefore be best to lay down the principle that there were definite lines within which the Greek and Italian troops must remain and the Turks could then be told that there was to be no trespass beyond this line if they maintained a proper attitude. He would like to remind the

Council that General Allenby was still technically in authority over the whole of Turkey in Asia on behalf of the Allied Powers. This fact had been lost sight of and he had not been consulted either by the Council of Ten or by the Council of Four, nor had the Italians or Greeks referred to him. Nevertheless, he still remained the Military Representative of the Powers in Asiatic Turkey. He suggested that General Allenby be asked to send officers to investigate the situation at Smyrna and to mark out the boundaries of each force. Thus any difficulty as between Greece and Italy or Greece and Turkey would be avoided and the scheme would be in harmony with the general course employed elsewhere for managing conquered territory during the armistice.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed in the main with Mr. Balfour. All advance should be stopped and the Turks should be convinced that there was no intention to declare war on them and that the armistice continued. Both the Greeks and the Italians should stay where they were. He would also favour the interposition of Allied troops between the Greeks and the Turks.

Regarding the collaboration of the Greek and the Italian Armies, Mr. Balfour suggested that the delimitation of their spheres should be carried out by General Allenby. He, himself, thought that direct agreement between the two would be more rapid and more satisfactory. Should no agreement be reached, another authority could then be called in.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was disposed to favour M. Tittoni's plan. If need be, he might even agree to the employment of General Allenby should M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos fail to reach an agreement. Happily this seemed unlikely. As to the means of reassuring the Turks, he thought this could best be done by the Conference directly. He hoped that on the following day M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos would be able to bring a definite agreement to the Council. It would then be possible to send the Turks a message telling them exactly what to expect and that the ultimate solution would not be prejudged by any military occupation.

MR. WHITE asked who would deliver the message on behalf of the Conference. He thought perhaps this should be General Allenby, as the Turks had the greatest respect for military authority.

MR. BALFOUR agreed as General Allenby was Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Powers.

M. TITTONI asked whether Admiral Calthorpe, High Commissioner in Constantinople, would not be the right authority.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not quite agree with Mr. Balfour. General Allenby commanded in Syria and Mesopotamia, not, he thought, in Anatolia. When the Greeks had been sent to Smyrna, General Allenby had not been consulted. Admiral Calthorpe had been informed. The Conference could correspond with the Turks and had already done so. Surely a direct message from the Council would have more effect on the Turkish Government than anything else, especially if it be made clear to the Turks that the Italians and Greeks would stop their advance.

MR. BALFOUR said perhaps the advance would not be arrested for long.

M. TITTONI said that if he and M. Venizelos made themselves personally responsible, he thought there would be no further advance of their respective forces.

MR. WHITE said that it was of great importance that the communication to the Turks should be made in the name of the Conference, otherwise they would think that the Italians and Greeks had plotted to partition the country. He doubted, however, whether the authority of the Sultan really controlled events in Anatolia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was perhaps true as the rebellion of the Turks had been spontaneous and not controlled in Constantinople.

M. TITTONI said that the General in command had nevertheless come from the capital.

M. VENIZELOS observed that it might be necessary for the Greek troops to make certain movements. It was therefore desirable that some military authority should lay down exactly in what conditions it would be safe for the Greek advance to be halted. Where Greek and Italian troops were neighbours, both could safely halt on the same line; where the Greeks faced the Turks, it might be necessary to occupy a few additional points.

M. TITTONI said he thought the whole front should halt, otherwise the Turks would not believe in the message sent to them.

(It was decided that M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos should seek an agreement regarding the delimitation of the Italian and Greek zones of occupation in Asia Minor and that they should submit the result of their conversation to the Council as soon as possible.)

In case an agreement were reached, a communication would be made in the name of the Council to the Turkish Government informing the latter of the decision taken and offering assurances regarding the intentions of the Allied Governments.)

(At this stage M. Venizelos and the experts withdrew.)

2.

Treaty with Austria.

[Not printed]²

(a) *Protection of
Minorities*

(b) *Article 312 regarding
Reschen pass and
Predyl pass railways*

[Not printed]

3. (a) *General Recommendations.*

M. TARDIEU read and explained the General Recommendations contained in Appendix A.

*Reports of the Com-
mittee to supervise
the execution of the
Treaty of Peace
with Germany*

(The Report was accepted.)

² For the decision taken on this matter see N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 582.

(b) *Schleswig.*

M. TARDIEU read and explained the report contained in Appendix B.

(With the exception of the passage at the end of paragraph 8, requiring the German Government to issue certain orders to its military and civil authorities in the third zone and under certain conditions to evacuate the area, the report was accepted.)

It was pointed out that these provisions went beyond the stipulations of the Treaty.

(It was therefore agreed to suppress these passages, and only to ask the German Government to abstain from making any arrests for political reasons in the area concerned.)

With this exception, the report was accepted.)

M. TITTONI said that should the Inter-Allied Commission consider that the voting had been influenced by German action in the third zone, the result might be declared void.

.(This was agreed to.)

With regard to Article 3 of the Report, MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that the American and British arrangements were complete. There was some difficulty about the French arrangements, but the British Admiral had undertaken to step into the breach and furnish the required number of troops should French troops be lacking. He suggested, therefore, that the arrangements made by the Americans and British be allowed to proceed and that French help be called for only in case of need.

(This was agreed to.)

(c) *Poland, East Prussia and Dantzig.*

M. TARDIEU read and explained the report given in Appendix C.

(The proposals contained in it were accepted, and it was agreed that the nominations for the Commission should be made on the 18th instant.)

On the subject of the supply of an Inter-Allied force, M. Tardieu expressed the hope that it might be possible to do without. In any case, the Commission could proceed to the spot without troops, and report at a later date whether it required any.

4. M. TARDIEU pointed out that the Committee over which he presided had been asked to provide for the execution of the political and territorial clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. M. Loucheur presided at a Committee to supervise the execution of the Reparation Clauses. There remained economic and colonial clauses, the execution of which was at present supervised by no Committee. He suggested that the former be entrusted to the Supreme Economic Council. The latter

*Committee to supervise
execution of Economic
and Colonial Clauses
of the Treaty with
Germany*

might, perhaps, be dealt with by the Committee which had just met in London to consider the question of Mandates.

(It was agreed that this question should be brought up on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 16, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO NO. 12

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX.

Comité d'Exécution des Clauses Territoriales.

Rapport au Conseil Supérieur

RECOMMANDATIONS D'ORDRE GÉNÉRAL

Vu le grand nombre de commissions de diverses natures qui devront entrer en action soit immédiatement après la mise en vigueur du Traité, soit à une date proche de cette mise en vigueur;

Vu la nécessité de préparer dès maintenant ces différents organes, si l'on veut qu'ils soient en état de fonctionner à la date fixée;

Vu d'autre part, l'impossibilité de procéder à aucune nomination ni demande de crédits, tant que le traité n'aura pas été ratifié par les Parlements;

Le Comité a l'honneur de recommander que:

1° — Chaque gouvernement crée un service spécial chargé de préparer la constitution desdits organes;

2° — Cette préparation porte sur l'évaluation des dépenses, le recrutement du personnel, la réunion du matériel et la rédaction du projet de loi demandant ouverture des crédits.

APPENDIX B TO NO. 12

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX.

Comité d'Exécution des Clauses Territoriales.

Rapport au Conseil Suprême

Partie III

Section 12

SLESVIG

Le Comité a l'honneur de faire au Conseil Suprême les recommandations suivantes:

1. *Constitution de la Commission.*

L'article 109 prévoyant l'entrée en action de la Commission dès la mise en vigueur du Traité, il y a lieu d'en préparer dès maintenant le personnel et le matériel.

2. *Présidence de la Commission.*

En raison de l'intérêt pratique qu'il y a à faciliter la liaison entre l'amiral anglais Commandant en Chef les Forces Navales envoyées par les divers Gouvernements intéressés pour garantir la liberté du plébiscite dans les deux zones du Slesvig, le

Comité est d'avis que la Présidence de la Commission devrait être attribuée aux Représentants anglais (art. 109, par. 1^{er}).

3. *Forces militaires à la disposition de la Commission.*

Le Comité, ayant appris que le Comité des amiraux, assisté de Généraux, a été chargé de faire des propositions à ce sujet, ne croit pas devoir en formuler (art. 109, par. 1^{er}).

4. *Dépenses de la Commission et du Plébiscite.*

Le Comité propose que la seconde moitié des dépenses (la première étant à la charge de l'Allemagne) soit à la charge du Danemark et que cette décision soit notifiée au Gouvernement danois (art. 109, par. 1^{er}).

5. *Personnes devant prendre part au vote.*

Le Comité propose que :

a) Le Gouvernement allemand soit dès maintenant invité à préparer le retour au lieu dont ils sont originaires des militaires, officiers, sous-officiers et soldats de l'armée allemand[e] nés dans la partie du Slesvig soumise au plébiscite (art. 109, par. 2 b).

b) La même invitation soit adressée au Gouvernement allemand en ce qui concerne les personnes que le dit Gouvernement aurait expulsées de la partie du Slesvig soumise au plébiscite et qui seraient domiciliées en Allemagne (art. 109, par. 2 b).

c) Les Gouvernements alliés et associés s'assurent que tous les prisonniers de guerre originaires du Slesvig, ont été ou seront, dès la mise en vigueur du Traité, renvoyés dans leurs foyers.

6. *Biens d'Etat.*

Comme suite à la lettre du Ministre de Danemark au Président de la Conférence en date du 22 juin signalant des vent[es] frauduleuses de biens d'Etat, le Comité propose de notifier au Gouvernement allemand et au Gouvernement danois que les Puissances alliées et associées considèrent comme nulle toute [? vente] de biens immobiliers d'Etat intervenue depuis le 11 novembre 1918 dans la partie du Slesvig soumise au plébiscite.

7. *Réquisitions abusives.*

Le Comité, constatant qu'à l'inverse des autres sections du Traité relatives à des plébiscites, la section relative au Slesvig n'interdit pas, au moment de l'évacuation par les troupes et autorités allemandes, les réquisitions en espèces et en nature, propose d'aviser le Gouvernement allemand que de telles réquisitions ne seront pas tolérées dans la partie du Slesvig soumise au plébiscite.

8. *Au sujet de la 3^{ème} zone.*

Le plébiscite dans la troisième zone (jusqu'à la ligne Eider-Schlei) inscrite dans le projet de traité remis le 7 mai à la Délégation allemande, a été effacé dans le texte définitif à la demande du Gouvernement danois.

Toutefois, la réponse au Mémoire allemand en date du . . . juin porte que l'évacuation aura lieu jusqu'à la ligne ci-dessus et cette disposition dont le Gouvernement danois demande le maintien n'a pas d'équivalent dans les articles du traité.

Le Comité, tout en reconnaissant que l'évacuation temporaire de ladite zone par les troupes et autorités supérieures allemandes, peut contribuer à la sincérité du vote dans les deux autres zones, n'estime pas que, vu le texte définitif du traité, les Gouvernements alliés et associés aient le droit de l'exiger de l'Allemagne.

Il propose toutefois que le Gouvernement allemand soit invité (à prescrire à ses autorités militaires et civiles dans ladite zone la plus stricte réserve notamment) à s'abstenir de toute arrestation pour motifs politiques, telles que celles qui ont eu lieu dans les dernières semaines (étant entendu que, si la Commission Internationale signalait de leur part des menées de nature à fausser le résultat du vote, l'évacuation serait immédiatement exigée).

9. *Résumé.*

Le présent Rapport conclut donc:

- a) à 4 décisions à prendre par les Gouvernements alliés et associés.
- b) à 5 communications à adresser par eux au Gouvernement allemand, copie de ces communications devant être remise au Gouvernement danois.
- c) à une communication à adresser au Gouvernement danois.

LE PRÉSIDENT DU COMITÉ.

Note. The passages within the brackets³ were not accepted.

APPENDIX C TO NO. 12

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX.

Commission d'exécution des clauses territoriales.

11 juillet.

Rapport au Conseil Supérieur

POLOGNE — PRUSSE ORIENTALE — DANTZIG

I. *Article 87*

1^o — *Date d'arrivée de la Commission.*

Le traité prévoit la constitution d'une commission de 7 Membres — 5 nommés par les principales puissances alliées et associées, un par l'Allemagne, un par la Pologne pour délimiter la frontière occidentale de la Pologne.

Cette Commission devra être constituée 15 jours après la mise en vigueur du Traité.

Mais, dès cette mise en vigueur, la présence de la Commission sur place paraît indispensable pour que — comme il est prévu pour la Silésie, — elle puisse surveiller l'évacuation ainsi que le passage du territoire et de la population de la souveraineté allemande à la souveraineté polonaise. La note envoyée le 8 juillet par la délégation allemande⁴ donne à penser que l'Allemagne reconnaîtra l'intérêt de cette proposition.

Le Comité recommande en conséquence que la Commission soit [?] constituée de façon à pouvoir être sur place dès l'entrée en vigueur du Traité. Les Gouvernements allemand et polonais en devront être avertis.

2^o — *Composition de la Commission.*

Le Comité estime que tous les moyens doivent être fournis à la Commission de mener son travail aussi rapidement que possible, d'abord en raison de l'agitation qui règne dans ces régions, ensuite parce que la préparation du vote, dans les territoires en plébiscite, devant commencer (sauf en Silésie) dès le 15^e jour la frontière doit être tracée aussi vite que possible entre ces territoires et les pays annexés purement et simplement. Or la frontière à délimiter par la Commission se développe sur plus de 800 kilomètres.

Le Comité recommande en conséquence que la Commission comprenne, pour

³ i.e. parentheses.

⁴ See No. 17, appendix D.

chaque délégation, un nombre d'officiers permettant sa subdivision au moins en deux sous-commissions opérant simultanément et dont la Commission se bornera à concentrer et reviser les conclusions.

Chaque délégation devra donc comprendre :

- un commissaire titulaire, chef de mission,
- un officier adjoint,
- deux officiers techniques.

Chaque sous-commission serait constituée, pour chaque puissance, par le commissaire ou son adjoint et un officier technique. L'adjoint aurait la délégation du commissaire chef de mission pour voter en son nom.

3° — *Présidence.*

Toutes les affaires germano-polonaises ayant été traitées depuis six mois, au nom des Alliés, par le Général Dupont, chef de la mission française à Berlin, le Comité recommande, pour des raisons d'ordre pratique que la Présidence de la Commission soit confiée à [?] officier général.

Chaque nation dispose d'une voix. Si donc le Président vote dans une sous-commission, le Commissaire français ne vote pas.

4° — *Action des sous-commissions.*

Le Comité recommande à titre d'indication pour la Commission :

1° — que la première sous-commission soit chargée de la délimitation des frontières orientales et occidentales de la zone à annexer sans plébiscite au Nord de la Netze, y compris la partie de cette rivière qui sert de limite,

qu'elle s'installe à Graudenz le second jour à dater de la mise en vigueur, pour surveiller l'exécution du transfert de souveraineté;

qu'elle commence ses travaux de délimitation le 16^e jour par la frontière des pays à plébiscite de l'est, passe ensuite à la portion occidentale au Nord et au Sud de Konitz où aucune limite administrative ne sert de démarcation et termine par les secteurs où la frontière coïncide avec des limites de cercles ou de Province,

2° — que la deuxième sous-commission soit chargée des frontières au sud de la Netze depuis cette rivière à hauteur de Kreuz jusqu'à la frontière incluse des pays silésiens à plébiscite;

qu'elle s'installe à Lisse du 2^e au 15^e jour, pour surveiller l'exécution du transfert de souveraineté,

qu'elle commence son travail de délimitation le 16^e jour par la partie particulièrement délicate de la frontière entre Birnbaum et Rawitch; qu'elle le continue par la région de Kem[p]en et la limite avec la Silésie où le plébiscite ne doit pas commencer avant six mois, et qu'elle s'occupe en dernier lieu des portions définies par les limites administratives.

Le Comité rappelle que le fonctionnement de la Commission [?] est défini par l'instruction de la Commission géographique interalliée du 21 juin 1917, et que sa composition est déterminée, au point de vue technique, par cette Commission géographique.

II. Article 83. Et Annexe

1° — *Nomination de la Commission d'administration.*

Le Comité recommande que cette Commission soit constitué de façon à pouvoir entrer en action dès la mise en vigueur du traité, pour les mêmes raisons que ci-dessus.

2° — *Troupes nécessaires.*

Le Comité se réfère au rapport dont a été chargé le Conseil Militaire de Versailles.

3° — *Délimitation de la Haute-Silésie soumise au plébiscite.*

Bien que le Traité ne l'indique pas explicitement, le Comité pense que cette délimitation sera faite par la Commission de l'article 87.

III. Article 95

1° — *Date du Plébiscite.*

Le traité n'en fixe pas. Le Comité croit devoir laisser à la Commission le soin de cette fixation. Il signale toutefois que sans ajourner le plébiscite plus que de raison il pourrait être utile de laisser aux Polonais Mazuriens le temps de se dégager de leurs dirigeants aristocratiques et ecclésiastiques, avant de les faire voter.

2° — *Entrée en action de la Commission.*

Le Comité remarque que la Commission ne doit entrer en action que quinze jours après la mise en vigueur du traité.

Or, dans ce délai de quinze jours, pendant lequel s'effectuera l'évacuation, le Traité ne prévoit aucune surveillance. La Commission arrivera donc le 15^e jour dans un pays où ne fonctionnera plus aucune autorité, et où l'on n'aura même pas pris la précaution de dissoudre les conseils d'ouvriers et soldats et les sociétés militaires, organismes d'opposition possibles.

Le Comité recommande en conséquence que les Commissaires prévus par l'article 95 arrivent sur place (le 2° jour) comme en Silésie. En attendant le 1[5]^e jour, date fixée pour leur entrée en fonction pour l'administration du territoire et l'organisation du vote, ils exerceront le contrôle de l'évacuation prévue, par les dits articles. Ils pourront prescrire le maintien en exercice de certaines autorités, et dissoudre les conseils et société[s] dont l'action est dangereuse. Pour l'exercice de ces attributions ils se conformeront aux prescriptions prévues pour la Silésie au [?]cours] de l'annexe à l'article 88, et pourront s'installer à Allenstein.

3° — *Forces Militaires.*

Le traité ne prévoit aucune force militaire alliée à la disposition de la Commission. Si les précautions indiquées au précédent sont prises, des troupes ne semblent pas devoir être nécessaires. Si la Commission en juge autrement, elle a pouvoir pour les réclamer.

4° — *Délimitation.*

La limite orientale des zones de plébiscite coïncidant en totalité avec les limites administratives, une commission spéciale de délimitation n'est pas nécessaire.

IV. Article 97

1° — *Date et condition du plébiscite.*

Même observation que pour l'article 95.

2° — *Entrée en action de la Commission.*

Même observation que pour l'article 95. La Commission pourrait s'installer le deuxième jour à Marienwerder.

3° — *Forces militaires.*

Le Traité prévoit que des forces alliées pourront accompagner la Commission. Mais, pas plus qu'à l'article 95, ces forces ne semblent devoir être indispensables. Toutefois on remarquera que, aux termes du Traité, la Prusse orientale n'est pas démilitarisée et que le nombre de forces allemandes qui l'occuperait n'est pas limité par rapport à l'effectif total de l'armée allemande.

4° — *Délimitation.*

Même observation que pour l'article 95.

V. *Article 99*

Le Comité signale que le Traité ne prévoit aucun organe pour l'administration temporaire du territoire de Memel, jusqu'à ce qu'une décision ait été prise sur sa souveraineté.

La Commission réserve toute proposition à ce sujet en égard au rapport demandé aux experts militaires et navals sur l'occupation de Memel et pense qu'il appartient au Conseil Suprême de statuer directement sur la base dudit rapport.

VI. *Articles 100 to [sic] 104*

La détermination et l'organisation du territoire de Danzig étant réglées en détail par les articles 100 à 104 du Traité et confiées à un Haut Commissaire Spécial, il n'y a lieu à aucune proposition.

Toutefois une certaine confusion peut naître du fait que l'article 101 prévoit la nomination par les principales puissances alliées et associées d'un Haut Commissaire pour présider la Commission de délimitation du Territoire, et que l'article 103 prévoit qu'un Haut Commissaire de la Société des Nations devra donner son accord dans l'élaboration d'une constitution de la Ville libre :

[L]e [Ha]ut Commissaire de l'article 101, n'étant chargé que d'une tâche toute technique de délimitation, un fonctionnaire de l'ordre administratif paraît devoir être temporairement désigné par les Puissances alliées et associées jusqu'à ce que la Société des Nations ait nommé le Haut Commissaire prévu à l'article 103.

Le Comité recommande pour des raisons pratiques que cet administrateur temporaire soit désigné aussitôt que possible et appartienne à la même nationalité que le commandant des forces navales chargé d'assurer la liberté des communications par mer avec Danzig étant bien entendu que le choix de cet administrateur provisoire ne préjugera en rien le choix du Haut Commissaire.

VII

1° — *Questions à traiter avec le Gouvernement Allemand.*

Les problèmes d'évacuation et de transfert de souveraineté à résoudre dans les territoires objet des articles ci-dessus poseront probablement certaines questions qui devront être traitées à Berlin avec le Gouvernement allemand dans telle forme que détermineront les puissances alliées et associées.

Au surplus, malgré la différence des régions prévue, il y aura nécessairement, au point de vue des relations avec le Gouvernement allemand en ce qui concerne l'évacuation et le transfert de souveraineté, unité de matière entre les diverses parties de la Prusse Orientale et de la Prusse Occidentale.

Le Comité pense en conséquence qu'il pourrait y avoir intérêt à ce que le Président de la Commission prévue à l'article 87 soit informé, pendant la période d'évacuation et de transfert de souveraineté, de l'activité des diverses commissions

de délimitation et centralise les communications qu'elles auraient à faire, à cet égard, aux autorités alliées et associées chargées des communications avec le Gouvernement allemand.

Il est bien entendu que son activité, ainsi définie, prendrait fin, dès que les territoires soumis au plébiscite seraient complètement évacués et que les commission[s] d'administration pourraient commencer leur travail de préparation du vote.

2° — *Polonais prisonniers dans les pays alliés.*

Le Comité, désireux de présenter diverses recommandations relatives aux prisonniers d'origine polonaise, a cru devoir les transmettre à la Commission des prisonniers de guerre, chargée d'étudier l'ensemble de la question.

Il signale en tout cas que les Commissions alliées de délimitation et de plébiscite devront être avisées des départs des prisonniers, afin d'être à même de surveiller leur arrivée.

3° — *Note de la Délégation polonaise.*

Le Comité recommande que la note de la Délégation polonaise du 5 juillet et toutes notes de même nature soient transmises aux Commissions de délimitation ou de plébiscite en annexe de leurs instructions.

No. 13

H. D. 9.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, July 17, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, Capt. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

I.

*Report of Commission to
examine Italian claims
in Tientsin*

[Not printed]¹

¹ The Supreme Council adopted the report of the commission, which did not satisfy the Italian claims. For an American text of this report and the decision of the Supreme Council see N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 686-7. In the discussion of the report 'M. Tittoni said he wished to make the following declaration: The Italian Delegation expresses the wish that the minutes of to-day's sitting of the Supreme Council should show that His Majesty's Government, while giving its assent to what is set forth in article 22, Part IV, Section IV, of the draft text of the Conditions of Peace with Austria, insists, nevertheless, on the soundness of its claims submitted in 1917 by the Royal Legation at Peking to the Chinese Government for a rectification of the boundary line separating the Italian concession of Tien-Tsin from the former Austro-Hungarian concession'.

2. (Mr. Hoover, M. Seydoux, M. Crespi and Mr. Gorvin² entered the room.)
Report from Mr. Hoover on the revictualling of Austria MR. HOOVER gave a summary and explanation of the memorandum annexed in Appendix A.³

M. PICHON asked how much, in Mr. Hoover's estimation, had been spent on the revictualling of Austria.

MR. HOOVER said that he estimated that to complete the present programme up to the 15th of August, eighty million dollars would have been spent.

M. PICHON asked whether Mr. Hoover thought there were securities in Austria enough to cover the cost of the scheme he proposed to undertake.

MR. HOOVER said that he doubted whether the sums already spent could be recovered for three or four years. Everything that could be realised had already been realised. The Austrian Authorities latterly had gone so far as to offer the national art galleries in payment for food.

M. PICHON said that under these circumstances it seemed hardly possible to advance money.

M. TRITONI said that the alternative was Bolshevism.

MR. HOOVER said that his hope was if priority were given to payment for food, even over payment of reparations, the Austrian Government might take heart and set to work in order to meet its liabilities. This was the only means of giving the present Government enough encouragement for it to hold on. Should the harvest succeed in Hungary, there would be a surplus of food in that country. It was only allied help that had hitherto kept Austria from Bolshevism. The Hungarians were employing most active propaganda. Should they take the place of the Allies in the supply of food, it could hardly be expected that the Austrians would not join them and become Bolshevik. It seemed clear that the Austrian Delegation sincerely wished to keep a moderate Government in power in Austria. If they could be assured by the Powers that the help he suggested would be given them, he thought they might resist Bolshevism.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Mr. Hoover had made out a most serious case. He was not quite sure that the Bolsheviks in Hungary would have much food to spare. He was told that Bela Kun had quarrelled with the peasants, who would be inclined to resist requisition. The main point was that it was desirable to set up Austria economically. She could not be left to starve. Food must be advanced to her either on such securities as existed, or she must be put in a way to earn money. She could not produce the food she required, as the territory left her by the Treaty was insufficient. Mr. Hoover's proposal was first to encourage the Austrians by a promise, and secondly, to tell the Reparation Committee to think first of making Austria

² British member of the staff of the Supreme Economic Council.

³ Not printed. This appendix contained a letter of July 11, 1919, from Mr. Hoover to Mr. Lansing enclosing a memorandum of even date by Mr. Hoover on Austria and an undated translation of note no. 680 of July 9 from Dr. Renner, the Austrian Chancellor, to the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. Mr. Hoover's letter and memorandum are printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 102-5. The Austrian note is printed in French and German in *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye*, vol. i, pp. 313-14.

a paying concern before getting money out of her. This appeared to him to be the most statesmanlike method. If a man were kept alive by charity, he could not be asked to pay his debts. He was not quite sure, however, what the functions of the Reparation Commission were, or whether the Council could give it orders as suggested by Mr. Hoover.

MR. HOOVER said the wording of the German Treaty enabled the Reparation Commission to furnish food and raw material to Germany, and to obtain payment for these in priority to payment of reparation. In any case, as the Reparation Commission had complete control of all resources, no other body could intervene.

M. CRESPI said that the Reparation Commission had the right to raise resources with the object of obtaining food. The Reparation Commission could certainly be given orders by the Governments as it was itself merely an agent of the Government[s].

(At this point M. Clemenceau entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how payment for food would be obtained.

M. CRESPI said that money could be raised by taxation. Hungarian food might turn Austria Bolshevik. It was for this reason that Italy had sent food into Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was ready to accept Mr. Hoover's plan, but he would take the opportunity of telling the Austrians that they must give up the arms and ammunition in Austria to the Czechs.

MR. HOOVER suggested that the Austrians might be told that the food supplies would cease unless they did so.

M. TITTONI considered that the question of the delivery of the arms should be kept quite separate from the question of food. Those arms represented one of the securities in Austria for the payment of reparation. He did not say that the arms should not be delivered, but an equivalent in value should be available for the reparation fund.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was most urgent to send the arms to Czecho-Slovakia at once.

MR. HOOVER said that this difficulty had already arisen. Trade had been arranged between Austria and Serbia. Five steel bridges were to be given to Serbia in exchange for food. The same objection had been raised, that these bridges represented a security for the payment of reparation. The Czechs were prepared to exchange coal for arms, but once the Czechs had given coal and the Serbians food, there was no means of making them contribute anything towards the reparation fund.

MR. BALFOUR said that if M. Tittoni's thesis were carried to its logical extremity, all Austrian trade would be put a stop to. Austria could get neither food nor anything else. He had no wish to reduce the reparation fund to Italy's detriment. He thought it imperative that Austria should be fed, and Czecho-Slovakia armed.

M. TITTONI said that he acquiesced regarding food, which was a matter of primary necessity. It was not so vital a matter to arm the Czechs. Italy and the other Allies should get some equivalent for the liquidation of a valuable

Austrian security. If the Czechs were ready to give coal in exchange, Italy should obtain her share of this coal, for the coal situation in Italy was as bad as that in Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his opinion it was to Allied interests that the Czechs should be armed. If so, it was nearly as important that commerce between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia should be carried on as between Austria and Serbia for food. He thought nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the passage of arms from Vienna to Prague.

M. TITTONI said that Italy recognised the need of Austria for food, but, as to coal, Italy needed it just as badly. Italy must therefore have her share in the coal which paid for the arms.

MR. HOOVER said that the amount of the surplus of Bohemian coal was infinitesimal, and barely enough to supply the needs of Vienna. Moreover, the Czechs had ceased to export coal because they received no arms from Austria. Austria was afraid of exporting these arms out of fear of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. By a threat to withhold food, the Austrians could be prevailed on to deliver the arms. They could also be promised, in case they did so, Bohemian coal. The Italians, short as they were of coal, had realised Austrian needs, and had themselves supplied coal to Vienna.

M. CRESPI observed that it was the duty of the Reparation Commission to see that all Austrian securities were not one by one spent to the detriment of the common reparation fund.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would be content to allow the arms to go, and to find out afterwards in what way payment could be obtained. So long as they were delivered to the Czechs, he did not mind in what way the re-adjustment was made for the benefit of the reparation fund.

MR. HOOVER suggested that if his formula were adopted, a few lines might be added regarding the sending of arms to Czecho-Slovakia.

(It was therefore agreed that the following reply should be made to the Austrian Delegation:—

‘In respect to the Request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five, and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Reparations Commission.

The Council wishes, however, to make this assurance contingent on an undertaking by the Austrian Government. The delivery of arms to Czecho-Slovakia has been greatly delayed despite the offer of coal in exchange. It must be understood that the continuation of the present supplies of food to Austria, as well as the above assurances, depend on the execution by Austria of the delivery of the arms and ammunition required by Czecho-Slovakia.’

The question raised by M. Tittoni was remitted for further study to the Supreme Economic Council.)

*Report of Marshal
Foch on Plan for
Military Operations
against Hungary*

3. (At this stage, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, M. Benes, M. Kramarcz, M. Pachich, M. Misu, and M. Vaida-Voevodé entered the room.)

MARSHAL FOCH read a memorandum annexed to these minutes in Appendix B. He also quoted from a telegram sent on the 10th July to the British War Office by Colonel Cunningham from Vienna to the effect that the red army was composed of 9 divisions, one of which, the 4th infantry division, had been disbanded. Each division could only muster a small number of rifles. For instance, the 9th division had only 2 to 3,000 rifles. To liberate Hungary from Communism in one week a force of 8 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armoured cars as possible would suffice.

MR. BALFOUR said that one statement in the very remarkable report read by Marshal Foch gave him some apprehension. He referred to the passage in which Marshal Foch alluded to the necessity of establishing in Hungary a Government with which the Entente could negotiate peace. Such a Government would not appear to be a Hungarian Government, but one set up by the Entente Powers. The Peace would be represented for all time, not as one between the Powers and the Hungarian people, but as a Peace between the Powers and their own puppets. This would furnish a weapon to all the enemies of the Entente. He would not ask Marshal Foch to say how this difficulty could be avoided, as the Marshal would doubtless reply, with justice, that that was the business of the politicians.

M. TITTONI said that the Hungarian situation was a very difficult one. As to the military proposals, he had nothing to say, but, regarding the political side, he had some observations to make. Hungary was ruled by a small minority. 80 per cent. of the Hungarian troops were against Bela Kun, so were the peasants and the bourgeoisie. At Szeged, there was an opposition Government which was a nationalist centre. If the Council determined to have Hungary attacked by Czech, Roumanian and Serbian troops, Bela Kun would be able to drape himself in the national colours, and pose as a patriotic Hungarian. In the end, it would not be Bela Kun who would be destroyed, but the Hungarian nation. If the Allies, on the other hand, could act in concert with the Szeged Government, they would appear as the deliverers of the country from tyranny. All the Governments had to contend with the criticism and opposition of the Labour parties in their own countries. It was therefore highly opportune to appear to act on behalf of the majority in Hungary. He made no criticism of the military means proposed by Marshal Foch, but he thought they should be accompanied by political action of the kind he had described.

MR. WHITE asked in what manner M. Tittoni would suggest that this political action should be begun.

M. TITTONI said that he would send Allied Agents to get into touch with the Government at Szeged before any military action began.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had, in his report, asked for Governmental

instructions. When the armies set out for Budapest, they would be preceded by proclamations conveying the intentions of their Governments. It was for the Governments to determine what these proclamations should be.

M. BENES said that he thought M. Tittoni's proposals were based on wrong premises. From information he had received, the Hungarian Officers, though not sharing Bela Kun's opinions were loyal to him, because they thought the Communist Government would give them means of fighting their neighbours. All of them were passionately attached to the integrity of Hungary. They would like to win back for it Transylvania, Croatia and Slovakia. There was no hope of seducing these Officers. As to the civilians, no doubt the bourgeois parties would like to be rid of Bela Kun, but they would not co-operate with the neighbouring nations to that end. If the Powers began to negotiate with the Magyars, they must count with the suspicions and mistrust of the Roumanians, of the Yugo-Slavs and of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Magyars did not admit their defeat. They remained Imperialist in spirit and they would use any conversation they might have with the Great Powers to turn the tables on their neighbours. He thought for these reasons that there were strong objections to the course of negotiating with any Hungarian Party.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Benes whether he agreed to Marshal Foch's plan.

M. BENES said that he did but not to M. Tittoni's.

M. KRAMARCZ said that the armies must march under the banner of 'Respect for the Armistice'. The existence of a Hungarian army forced the neighbouring countries to remain armed. They were anxious to disarm and demobilise. Enforcement of the Armistice Conditions was a complete and sufficient justification for action, and it would serve as an answer to criticism. He had the same fears and interests as M. Tittoni, but he was convinced that there should be no talk with any Hungarian parties, as this would only revive Hungarian nationalist ambition. Action should be taken on military grounds if only to uphold the decrees of the Conference.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD said that he agreed with M. Kramarcz and M. Benes. He thought it was necessary not to give Bela Kun a pretext for posing as a defender of his country. The majority of the Hungarian population wished to remain quiet and to be ruled neither by a communist nor by a reactionary government. When the Allied armies had taken Buda-pest, they might proclaim to the people that it was open to them to choose their own Government. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, however, should consult non-Magyar elements as well. There were Roumanians, Serbs and Slovaks of Hungary who knew the devices of the parties and who could help the Commander-in-Chief.

GENERAL BLISS said that the general purpose aimed at was one he would gladly see carried out, but only the Head of his Government could decide on any action in this respect. In spite of all disguises it was manifest that what was proposed was a renewal of war on Hungary with the object of destroying its present Government. If action was to be based on the pretext of a breach of the Armistice by Hungary, the Allies must be quite clear that the fault

was entirely on the side of the Hungarians. In the Armistice arranged by General Franchet d'Esperey on the 13th November at Belgrade, a certain line had been fixed by Article I. North and west of this line the Serbians and Roumanians respectively were not to advance. The second Article required the demobilisation of the Hungarian Army down to six Infantry Divisions and two Cavalry Divisions. It was alleged that the Hungarians had broken Article II.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether there was anything in Clause I forbidding the Serbians and Roumanians to cross the line.

GENERAL BLISS said that the Roumanians should not have crossed west of the line. When they had been relieved of German domination, they had crossed the line in spite of General Franchet d'Esperey. He had then tried to stop them on another line further west, but without avail. The matter had been discussed in Paris and the discussions had led to the establishment of a neutral zone approximately representing the line fixed in the Treaty of 1916.⁴ Even this, however, had not stopped the Roumanian advance. At a meeting held by the Military Representatives at Versailles on the 25th February, 1919, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d'Esperey had given the following evidence:—

'On November 7th, 1918, General Franchet d'Esperey and Count Karolyi had met at Belgrade to sign a supplementary armistice with Hungary on the same lines as General Diaz⁵ had signed with Austria. At that time Roumania was still under German domination and therefore only French, Serbian and Hungarian representatives were present at Belgrade. They all knew the terms of the Hungarian armistice. A certain zone was to be definitely occupied and further zones could be occupied for strategic reasons. The armistice was signed on November 13th, and the Hungarians had made no difficulties and had carried out all the conditions. The French and Serbians advanced as agreed. The only difficulties occurred with Roumania.

'Without informing General Franchet d'Esperey, the Roumanians had advanced, especially in the region of Klausenburg. The Hungarians at once protested that this was a breach of the armistice conditions. The Roumanians replied that they were in agreement with the Hungarians. This was not correct, but eventually an agreement was reached. The Roumanians were allowed to advance up to a line well in advance of the armistice line. This was reported to the Allied Governments.

'Unfortunately, the Roumanians advanced still further with the result that certain incidents took place; the Roumanians oppressed the local population and the Hungarians became incensed. Up to that time the position had not become serious, however.

'The Roumanians stated that they feared an attack by Hungarian armies; that was absolutely impossible. Hungary had no organised troops,

⁴ The Treaty of Bucharest, concluded between Roumania and the Powers of the Entente on August 17, 1916.

⁵ Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Armies. (Cf. No. 3, note 6.)

whereas the Roumanian army was well organised. Naturally there was much unrest in Hungary and some Bolshevism, but nothing important, and Bolshevism in Transylvania was not apparent. The Roumanians had for some time tried to advance to the Treaty line, but General Franchet d'Esperey had refused so far though he had sent a mission to make enquiries into alleged atrocities. The information received was that the local situation was quite quiet.

'Taking these facts into consideration the Roumanians should remain on their present line as all the trouble had been caused by their advance. It was not for him to give advice on a political question, but the Roumanians should not be allowed to cross the line Arad-Grosswardein-Szatmar-Nemeti and it would be preferable to send Allied troops there; a neutral zone would be of no advantage as there were not sufficient Allied troops to guard it.

'To maintain order it would be sufficient to garrison Grosswardein and Stulinar[?Szatmar] with Allied troops; there were already some at Arad.'

In spite of this the neutral zone had been accepted. The Roumanians had advanced to the Eastern limit of this zone and finding it empty had proceeded as far as the Theiss. An American observer had informed him that as soon as the Hungarians came to know of the decision taken on March 12th,⁶ the Karolyi Government would go. He had written a letter to this effect to the Council. The Hungarian Government had only received information on the 19th. On that very date the Karolyi Government resigned and handed over its powers to Bela Kun. Bela Kun had succeeded in raising an Army solely to repel the unwarranted invasion of the Roumanians. The violation of the armistice was first made by the Roumanians in spite of the Powers and at a time when the Hungarian Army had gone to pieces. If the Council meant to take action on the ground that the Armistice had been violated, it should examine carefully at what date the Hungarian Army had been reconstituted. He was confident that it would be found that this had taken place after the violation of the armistice by the Roumanians.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had three observations to make on General Bliss's very important statement. In the first place he agreed with him that

⁶ The reference is uncertain. The Supreme Council is recorded as having taken decisions on March 12, 1919, concerning the departure of the Austrian Imperial Family from Austria and payments on the Austro-Hungarian debt, but none concerning military dispositions in Hungary (cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. iv, p. 331 f.). The decision to establish a neutral zone between the Hungarian and Roumanian forces was taken by the Supreme Council on February 26, 1919, and was communicated for execution to General Franchet d'Esperey. On March 20 Lt.-Col. Vyx, head of the Allied Military Mission in Hungary, acting on behalf of General Lobit, Provisional Commander of the Allied Armies in Hungary, communicated the decision of February 26 to Count M. Károlyi, head of the Hungarian Government. On March 21 Count Károlyi replied to Colonel Vyx that his government would not bear the responsibility for the execution of this decision and had that day resigned. The government of Count Károlyi was succeeded by that of M. Béla Kun, as stated by General Bliss.

the American delegates and he himself as British representative could not initiate a considerable military policy without consulting the Governments at home. He personally could not authorise a new war, or the resumption of an old war, without reference to London. In the second place he begged to dissent entirely, as far as he was concerned, from the allegation made by General Bliss that the breach of the armistice was merely alleged as a pretext for attacking the Communist Government of Hungary. He wished it to be understood that he was not animated by any consideration of Hungarian internal politics, little though he might approve of Bela Kun. He agreed with M. Kramarcz that it was intolerable to allow the Hungarian State to become a military stronghold, from which economic and political disturbances radiated over Central Europe. When he insisted on the disarmament of Hungary by reason of her breach of the armistice, he was not disguising his intention, but stating exactly what he wished. Without the disarmament of Hungary, there could be no peace or settlement of frontiers in Central Europe. On the third point he spoke with more diffidence. General Bliss's argument was based on the view that the Allied Powers were precluded from sending troops across the line beyond which the Hungarians were not to advance, according to Article I of the Armistice. He was surprised at this view. The Article forbade the Hungarians to go beyond the line, but did not explicitly forbid the Allies to cross it. Clause III moreover gave the Allies the 'right of occupying all places and strategic points which may be permanently fixed by the general Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies'. It was difficult to reconcile this with General Bliss's interpretation of Article I. (For the Military Convention see Appendix C.7) There was another small point on which he did not wish to rely, namely, that when the Convention was signed, Roumania was not a belligerent. He would like to be told by experts in military jurisprudence whether the Roumanian advance, regrettable though it might have been, amounted to a breach of the Armistice in the same sense as the obvious and important breach made by Hungarians.

GENERAL BLISS said that the interpretation of Article I of the Armistice did not require a lawyer. The very word Armistice meant the laying down of arms by both sides on a given line in order that civil plenipotentiaries should negotiate. It could not impose a purely unilateral obligation. As to Article III giving the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies the right to occupy strategic points, no such provision had been made in the Armistice with Germany. But it had been feared that hostilities with Germany might begin again, and when the Armistice Convention with Austria had been negotiated, it had been stipulated that the Allied Armies should have passage through Austrian territory in order to threaten Germany from the South. A similar provision had also been made in the Convention with Hungary. The provision, however, did not mean that any Allied Commander could occupy any point he liked without reference to the Commander-in-Chief. Roumanian action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of General Franchet d'Esperey.

M. KRAMARCZ said he did not wish to enter into the legal question.

⁷ Not printed. See No. 3, note 6.

Czecho-Slovakia was threatened by the Hungarians. The Army of the Hungarians kept Czecho-Slovakia and other countries armed and mobilised. This was the only question for consideration.

M. PACHICH said he agreed with M. Kramarcz, M. Benes, and M. Vaida. Action ought to be taken to force Bela Kun to fulfil Hungary's engagements under the Armistice. The Yugo-Slavs had reason to expect that they would be the third victim of Hungary. Hungarians undoubtedly desired to re-establish Hungary in her historic frontiers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that all concerned had now expressed their views. Two Governments, however, had to be consulted before action could be taken.

MARSHAL FOCH observed that on July 11th, when he had been asked to study a plan of operations, the principle of action itself had not been in question. If it was questioned now, it would seem that the Council was in contradiction with itself.

MR. BALFOUR said that he dissented entirely from what Marshal Foch had just said. He could not consult his Government on the propriety of military operations unless he knew what their nature was and what chance of success they offered.

MR. WHITE said that as he understood the case, Marshal Foch had been asked to make a report to send to the Governments. Marshal Foch had made a most able report. He could not commit his Government and even the President would have to be assured that the proposal did not involve a new war before he could assent without consulting the Senate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was not a subject that could be discussed. Each of the members of the Council was free to consult his Government. Marshal Foch had presented a remarkable report showing that success could be hoped for without a great expenditure of effort. General Bliss had put forward certain questions which deserved close examination. He would remind the Council that Mr. Balfour had lately drafted a telegram in which the Council had informed Bela Kun that it could not hold any conversations with him as long as he did not respect the Armistice.⁸ No one had then raised any objection.

MR. WHITE said that he wished that he had followed his usual method, and asked for time to consider the matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would like to point out that a state of war with Hungary still existed and there could be no question of a new war.

M. TITTONI asked that the greatest secrecy be observed regarding the discussion.

(It was agreed that the discussion should be resumed on the following day at 10.30 by the Members of the Council.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris.

July 17, 1919.

⁸ See No. 10, minute 6.

17 juillet 1919.

Note sur une Action Eventuelle en Hongrie

Le Conseil Suprême des Puissances Alliées et Associées a décidé, le 11 juillet, que le Maréchal Foch, 'après avoir consulté les autorités des divers Gouvernements intéressés, établirait un plan d'opérations contre la Hongrie, et qu'il tiendrait le Conseil au courant de ses travaux dans un délai de huit jours'.

En exécution de cette décision:

Le Général Pellé, pour l'Armée Tchéco-Slovaque;

Le Général Pechitch, pour l'Armée Serbe;

Le Général Prezan, pour l'Armée Roumaine;

ont été invités à faire connaître les forces que les Gouvernements Tchéco-Slovaque, Serbe et Roumaine pourraient respectivement consacrer à l'opération éventuelle projetée.

De son côté, le Général d'Espercy a été prié d'indiquer les conditions dans lesquelles il pourrait renforcer la puissance offensive de l'Armée française de Hongrie.

D'après les renseignements déjà reçus, la situation se présente comme il suit au 16 juillet:

Armée Tchéco-Slovaque.— M. Masaryck met à la disposition de l'Entente toutes les forces armées de la République, soit:

6 D.I. sur le front, prêtes à entrer en action;

2 D.I. en formation, prêtes le 18 juillet.

Effectif approximatif global: 100,000 hommes.

Ces forces ont été réorganisées et recomplétées sous la direction de la Mission Militaire Française; elles sont actuellement en bonnes conditions pour reprendre les opérations offensives.

Toutefois, le besoin de munitions d'artillerie se fait impérieusement sentir: les entrepôts sont presque vides, la production insignifiante.⁹ Seule, l'Autriche dispose des stocks nécessaires. Il est donc indispensable et urgent d'intervenir à Vienne pour que les envois de munitions soient immédiatement entrepris.¹⁰

Armée Serbe.— Le Gouvernement serbe peut mettre, dès à présent, à la disposition de l'Entente:

14 Bataillons	} valeur 1 D.I. 1/2 et 1 D.C.
12 Escadrons	
12 Batteries	

soit 18 à 20,000 hommes de troupes excellentes qui seront prêtes et à pied d'œuvre le 18 juillet.

Le Gouvernement Serbe demande toutefois, comme condition de sa coopération, l'appui bienveillant de l'Entente, afin de faire cesser toute cause de friction avec

⁹ Note in original: 'Actuellement 4 coups par jour et par pièce, qui seront portés à 8 vers le 15 août.'

¹⁰ Note in original: 'A cet effet, demander au G.al Segré et au G.al Hallier de hâter l'expédition des commandes déjà effectuées à Vienne par le Gouvernement Tchéco-Slovaque et non encore livrées. Agir également auprès de la Délégation autrichienne de St-Germain pour lui demander d'intervenir auprès de son Gouvernement afin que toutes facilités soient données pour ces expéditions.'

l'Italie, et d'assurer la protection du territoire serbe contre les troupes et comitadjis bulgares.¹¹

Armée Roumaine.— Une réponse définitive n'est pas encore parvenue sur les possibilités du Gouvernement Roumain.

Il paraît admissible de compter, *dès à présent*, sur la totalité des forces de l'Armée Roumaine de l'Ouest, établie sur la Theiss, soit :

6 D.I. et 1 D.C. représentant 75.000 h. environ.

Cet effectif sera probablement renforcé du fait du recomplètement des unités à l'effectif de guerre, par prélèvement sur les dépôts de la région Transylvaine qui comptent environ 20.000 hommes.

L'Armée roumaine de l'Ouest, après ses récents succès sur l'Armée hongroise, est dans de bonnes conditions matérielles et morales pour reprendre la lutte.

Il est à prévoir cependant que la Roumanie, pour engager toutes ses forces de l'Ouest hors de ses frontières, demandera à être mise en mesure de se reconstituer de nouvelles réserves à l'intérieur, en mobilisant de nouvelles divisions. Il sera donc nécessaire, sans doute, de lui fournir les effets d'équipement et d'habillement dont elle aura besoin.

Cette aide matérielle pourrait lui être donnée par l'Angleterre et l'Amérique (dont les contingents ne participent pas à l'opération projetée) en continuant les envois précédemment effectués ou encore en cours de transport.

Armée Française de Hongrie.— Elle est actuellement disponible avec ses deux D.I., sa brigade de cavalerie, ses éléments d'armée (3 groupes lourds, 2 Cies de chars blindés, une escadrille).

Effectif 25.000 hommes, dont 20.000 combattants environ.

L'Infanterie est au complet. L'Artillerie et les services sont à recompléter en personnel.

Les moyens matériels seraient également à renforcer par prélèvement sur les disponibilités de l'Armée d'Orient.¹²

Au total, et sous réserve de confirmation des renseignements sur l'armée roumaine, l'effectif global dont la mise en œuvre contre la Hongrie serait possible dans un délai de quelques jours, s'élèverait à :

Armée Tchéco-Slovaque	8 D.I.		100,000 h.
Armée Serbe	1½ D.I.	1 D.C.	20,000 h.
Armée Roumaine	6 D.I.	1 D.C.	75,000 h.
Armée Française de Hongrie	2 D.I.	½ D.C.	25,000 h.
Total Général	17½ D.I.	2½ D.C.	220,000 h.

dont 160.000 combattants environ.

En présence de ces forces, l'Armée Hongroise compte, d'après les derniers renseignements :

8 D.I.

3 Bdes d'Infanterie.

4 Bdes de gardes frontières.

2 D.C. (?)

¹¹ Note in original: 'L'arrivée en Bulgarie des 30^e et 156^e D.I. Françaises venant du Dniester permettra de donner cette dernière garantie au Gouvernement Serbe. (Mouvements terminés vers la fin de juillet).'

¹² Note in original: 'Le G.al d'Esperey n'a pas encore répondu à la demande qui lui a été adressée à ce sujet.'

au total, 10 à 11 D.I. et 2 D.C. d'un effectif global de 150.000 hommes, dont 100 à 120.000 combattants environ, d'une valeur imprécisée.

De la comparaison des forces en présence, il résulte que l'Entente possède, sur place, une *supériorité numérique* notable par rapport à la Hongrie.

La disposition même de ces forces, qui encerclent les forces hongroises, constitue également une condition avantageuse pour des opérations offensives.

Mais il importe de remarquer, dès à présent, que ces troupes, appartenant à quatre nationalités différentes, ne peuvent espérer un résultat sérieux qu'à la condition d'être actionnées par une direction commune.

Il est donc nécessaire de les placer sous une même *Direction Supérieure*, agréée par les Gouvernements Roumain, Serbe et Tchéco-Slovaque.

C'est à cette Direction qu'il appartiendra d'établir le plan d'action militaire.

Il y a lieu, dès maintenant, d'organiser cette Direction et de réaliser les ententes nécessaires avec les Etats-Majors des diverses Armées intéressées.

Il est à présumer, d'autre part, qu'une action alliée, combinée de la sorte, par un effort commun des Armées Alliées résultant d'une direction unique, amènera ces Armées, à bref délai, aux Portes de Buda-Pesth.

Dans cette situation, il s'agira d'établir en Hongrie un Gouvernement d'ordre, avec lequel l'Entente puisse signer une paix répondant à ses vues. D'où la nécessité de prévoir, dès maintenant, un programme d'*action politique*, succédant à l'action militaire, et fixant au Commandement les directives de la Conférence pour l'établissement du nouveau Gouvernement Hongrois.

Muni de ces directives, le Commandement pourra déterminer le régime provisoire d'occupation du pays, et faire refluer les troupes alliées, devenues disponibles, au-delà de leurs frontières respectives.

En résumé:

Les forces dont dispose l'Entente paraissent suffisantes pour entreprendre, à très bref délai et avec chances de succès, une opération militaire contre l'Hongrie, aux conditions suivantes:

- 1°) — Une Direction Supérieure unique des opérations est à organiser;
- 2°) — On demande à la Conférence de donner des directives qui permettent à cette Direction Supérieure d'asseoir un nouveau Gouvernement répondant aux vues de l'Entente, et de régler les conditions de l'occupation ultérieure du pays;
- 3°) — Les moyens matériels des troupes sont à compléter, ce qui comporte:
 - une intervention auprès du Gouvernement de Vienne, et auprès de sa Délégation de Saint-Germain, pour la fourniture des munitions aux Tchéco-Slovaques;
 - la livraison de matériel, d'équipement et d'habillement à la Roumanie par les Puissances de l'Entente;
- 4°) — Enfin, il y a lieu d'envisager également l'organisation du ravitaillement de la population civile hongroise, ravitaillement qui serait assuré et contrôlé par l'organisation anglaise chargée du fonctionnement de la ligne de communication fluviale du Danube.

H. D. 10.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 18, 1919, at 10.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARY, Sir Percy Loraine, Bt.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, Capt. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Lieut. Burden. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received a dispatch stating that the Greeks had committed atrocities in Smyrna and its neighbourhood. *Proposal to send Commissioners to enquire into disorders in Anatolia* (Appendix A.) The Sheikh-ul-Islam formally accused them. He wished to propose to his Colleagues that they should send a Commission of Enquiry. The Council was not without responsibility, seeing that it had sent the Greeks to Smyrna.

MR. BALFOUR said he had been much concerned about the reports from Asia Minor. A question had been asked in the House of Commons. It had been found on investigation that the Greeks had in fact committed atrocities. M. Venizelos had been greatly perturbed, and had himself been forced to admit the truth of the allegations.

M. TITTONI said that fighting between the Turks and Greeks must be put an end to. It was very bitter, and no quarter was given on either side.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether his colleagues would be prepared to agree at once to the dispatch of the Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would prefer, before deciding to do this, to discuss the whole question of Asia Minor. He did not object to the proposal in itself, though he would point out that if Commissions of Enquiry had to be sent to investigate all charges of atrocities throughout the world, he did not think he would be able to lay his hand on a sufficient number of officers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he proposed to send French Commissioners, even if his Colleagues appointed none. He would, however, prefer that they should do so.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no objection, but that it was more important to prevent recurrences of atrocities in the future than to investigate those which had already taken place. Control could only be exercised by the Conference through the local Commander-in-Chief.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Balfour's plan would only result in the issuing of a proclamation, which would have no effect at all. The Allies would have to deal with the Turks hereafter, and it must be made clear to

them that they did not send the Greeks to Smyrna merely to commit atrocities.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. It was very important to make the Turks feel that the Allies did not propose to have them massacred.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the atrocities complained of had been committed by soldiers. They should be checked by the Commander-in-Chief in Anatolia. Orders of the Council could be sent and executed through him. He would have certain proposals to make on this subject, and he thought that M. Clemenceau's plan would fit in with his own.

(It was decided that the question of appointing a Commission of Enquiry should be postponed till the Meeting in the afternoon.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received an account of proceedings at Dedeagatch which, seeing that Italy as well as the other Allies was still at war with Bulgaria, deserved comment and perhaps action by the Italian Government. (For this information see Appendix B.¹)

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that the behaviour of the Italian officers in fraternising with the Bulgarians was, if correctly reported, highly reprehensible. He undertook to have an enquiry made into the matter, and asked that M. Clemenceau's information be handed to him.

3. MR. WHITE informed the Council that he had received the following telegram from President Wilson, and asked his colleagues what answer he should give on their behalf:—

*Telegram from
President Wilson
regarding policy
in Turkey*

'Respecting the decision announced in your telegram of June 30th, to postpone further discussion of the Treaty with the Ottoman Government until the Government of the United States is in a position to say whether it will be able to undertake a mandate for a part of Turkish territory, I am afraid that the delay which this will involve will be very considerable and should like to know what attitude towards Turkey the Powers propose to take in the meantime.'

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the only attitude the Powers could adopt as far as he knew was one of expectancy. He was for certain reasons not ready to talk about Asia Minor. He did not know what kind of declaration the President expected the Council to make.

MR. WHITE said he thought perhaps the President had the maintenance of order in his mind.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that on this subject the Council would take the necessary measures in concert. As to the future he could at present enter into no pledges. If the Greeks, Turks, and Italians were fighting it was not his fault.

MR. WHITE asked if M. Clemenceau's intention was to wait until the

¹ Not printed. This appendix contained a brief French report, dated July 18, 1919, stating that on July 7 Italian officers at Dedeagach had given a soirée which was enlivened by a Bulgarian military band and repeated cries of '*Vive l'Italie! Vive la Bulgarie!*'

Government of the United States was in a position to say whether it would undertake a mandate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would not undertake to wait indefinitely. For the time being he could make no statement. When other work had been done, the Council would do its best to settle the affairs of Turkey. All he could say in reply to the President's message was that the Council had taken note of it. President Wilson knew full well what the difficulties were. He wished to obtain a mandate in Armenia and an American Commissioner had been appointed.² He asked for part of Cilicia, and was favourably disposed towards accepting a mandate for Constantinople. The question of Constantinople was one of the greatest importance for Europe. It had caused wars in the past, and required the closest study.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that no definite answer could at present be given to President Wilson. The President was unfortunately prevented by the American Constitution from undertaking anything for the time being. Meanwhile the Council would try and maintain order in Turkey.

(It was agreed that Mr. White should reply in the above sense to the President's telegram.)

4. M. TITTONI read the following agreement between himself and M. Venizelos:—

*Agreement between
M. Tittoni and
M. Venizelos
regarding Greek and
Italian zones of
occupation in
Anatolia*

‘La ligne de partage entre les deux occupations grecque et italienne en Asie Mineure commence de l’embouchure de la rivière du K. Menderez, elle en suivra le cours jusqu’à la hauteur de la route Ayassuluk–Scalanova, de là elle suivra la ligne de l’occupation grecque de Ayassuluk et de la vieille Ephèse.

‘De la vieille Ephèse elle suivra une ligne distante en moyenne de 600 mètres du chemin de fer Smyrne–Aidin à l’ouest puis au sud du dit chemin de fer, et qui sera fixée sur place par les deux Gouvernements grec et italien, pour permettre aux troupes grecques de protéger le chemin de fer des coups de main de la part de Comitagis.

‘Ensuite arrivera jusqu’à la rivière Muschluk–Deresi qu’elle suivra jusqu’à sa jonction avec le Menderez.

‘De là elle suivra le thalweg du Menderez vers l’Est jusqu’à . . .³ [Keuehk] (carte de Kiepert au 400.000, ed. 1911).

‘Les deux Gouvernements s’engagent à ne pas dépasser la ligne ci-dessus établie. Cette occupation d’ailleurs n’a qu’un caractère provisoire répondant à l’état de fait actuel, la délibération sur le régime définitif de ces régions étant réservé à la Conférence.

‘Chacun des Gouvernements des deux Etats s’engage à accorder sur le territoire qu’il occupe pleine et entière protection aux con-nationaux de l’autre. Des instructions seront données aux deux commandements afin que les officiers de[s] deux armées entretiennent les uns vis-à-vis des autres les relations les plus amicales [sic].’

² See No. 3, minute 3.

³ Punctuation as in original.

He explained that the expression 'occupation' implied occupation at the present time.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question must be considered from a larger aspect than that of a friendly agreement between the Greeks and the Italians. The Entente had told the Greeks to go to Smyrna. Since their arrival there was a divergence of opinion as to whether they had or had not obeyed the instructions of the British Naval authority on the spot. Commodore Fitz-Maurice considered that they had exceeded their orders, which were not to go beyond the Sandjak of Smyrna. This might not be the fault of M. Venizelos, but nevertheless it would seem that the harm was done. As to the Italians (he knew this was not M. Tittoni's policy) they had gone to Asia Minor without informing their Allies, and they had made successive advances into the country, also without informing them. The Council of Three had informed M. Orlando that there could be no possible conversations until the Italian troops had been entirely withdrawn. Then a change of Government had taken place in Italy, and there had been a friendly meeting with M. Tittoni. M. Tittoni had said that the Italian Government would be put into a very serious difficulty if the British and French Governments insisted on the total withdrawal of the Italian troops.⁴ No formal decision had been taken as a result of this declaration, but the French and British Governments had not insisted.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it had been decided to send M. Tittoni an answer.

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that, in effect, nothing had been done. There were, therefore, in Anatolia, Greek troops who were disobeying orders, and Italian troops who were there without orders. From this resulted a difficult and confused situation. He was anxious that no national susceptibilities should be hurt, but he supposed that the Council also had susceptibilities. He thought, therefore, that he might suggest that the whole method of procedure should be altered. The Greeks had been told to consult a naval officer before making any movement. It was not the business of a naval officer to know all the intricacies of land operations. This system had not worked well. The Italian troops, on the other hand, acted in an irresponsible manner, and were under no Allied control. Would it not be better for the orders of the Council to be conveyed to all the troops in Asia Minor through its local Commander-in-Chief? In Eastern Europe, General Franchet d'Esperey was the medium for the Council's policy and Marshal Foch in the rest of Europe. Why should the same procedure not be adopted in Asia Minor, where the Commander-in-Chief was General Allenby? It was not because General Allenby was a British officer that he suggested this, but because he was Commander-in-Chief. There might even be some advantage in his being British, seeing that the British Government had no interests in the region affected. He suggested, therefore, that General Allenby be utilised as an agent of the Council just as Marshal Foch and General Franchet d'Esperey in other parts of the world. If this were done, the Turks would

⁴ See No. 4, note 8.

realise that the Conference did not approve of outrages, and that they were to be put a stop to. The face of both Greeks and Italians would be saved, and order would be established in Turkey. This solution would not only be logical, but would conduce to sound administration. This method could not injure Italian pride, as there were Italian troops at Konia already under General Allenby's command. A very difficult situation could thus be regularised and some order could be made to reign over the trespasses of the Greeks and the unauthorised presence of the Italians.

M. PICHON said that he thought that General Milne was directly in command.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought that was the case, but that General Milne was under the superior authority of General Allenby.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that to speak his mind freely, though he had great respect for General Allenby, he felt that, in Turkey, he acted as a British officer receiving orders from the British Government rather than as an Allied Commander-in-Chief. The effect of his activities was distinctly anti-French. This ambiguous situation was unsatisfactory. General Allenby commanded British troops as a British General. As an Allied Commander-in-Chief he refused to allow French troops to be relieved. He refused to allow them to enter Syria. He placed them in Cilicia, knowing that the mandate of Cilicia was likely to go to the Americans. All his agents were consistently against the French. On every occasion, he said that the unpopularity of the French troops rendered their relief or their stationing in Syria undesirable. There was a pyramid of files on this subject, and he could prove what he said. General Hamelin had telegraphed that he did not dare celebrate the 14th of July, to which he (M. Clemenceau) had replied, ordering that the day should be celebrated. It had been done and there had been no trouble. In Damascus, the French had been welcomed, in spite of all General Allenby had said. As a result of all this, a condition of confidence did not exist. He would have more to say on the subject later, but he was so anxious to make peace, that he did not absolutely refuse Mr. Balfour's proposals, provided some assurance would be given that General Allenby would consider himself not a British, but an Allied agent.

MR. BALFOUR said that he regretted M. Clemenceau had raised the vexed question of Syria.⁵ He did not believe that his charges against General Allenby could be sustained. M. Clemenceau said that he had provoked agitation against the French.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Allenby's agents had done so even if he had not. He had also refused to allow the relief of French troops already in the country.

MR. BALFOUR said that he felt sure that no responsible British officer desired to impair French popularity in Syria. They knew that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain accept a mandate in Syria. The British Government, therefore, had no motive for creating difficulties in the path of others. He did not wish to pursue this matter, but only to enter his caveat

⁵ For this question see Vol. IV of this series.

against these allegations. M. Clemenceau might be thoroughly assured that any officer, British or other, to whom the work was entrusted, would be impartial. He thought, in fact, the officer in charge would be General Milne, acting under the directions of General Allenby. This said, he did not think he need add anything to the arguments he had previously used.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not disagreed with the proposal, but had felt it necessary to make a reservation.

MR. WHITE said that he was inclined to approve of Mr. Balfour's proposal. An arrangement made only between the Italians and Greeks would not reassure the Turks. The proposal would regularise the position of the Italians, who had gone to the country without the authority of the Conference. The Commander-in-Chief would be able to issue orders to Turks, Greeks and Italians, and thus the Conference would be put in charge of the situation.

M. TITTONI said that (as Mr. White had observed), the proposal under discussion would amount to an official recognition of Italian presence in Asia Minor. He took note of this, as he thought that this ultimately must be done. Italian troops were there. They could not physically be there and officially not be there. He, personally, had not sent them there, but he was, nevertheless, in an equivocal position and he would like it regularised.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that though M. Tittoni was not responsible for sending Italian troops to Asia Minor, he seemed disposed to take advantage of their presence there. He trusted that whatever arrangements were made, M. Tittoni would not base any claim on this situation again.

M. TITTONI said that he undertook not to plead accomplished facts, but to rely entirely on justification based on title.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that provisionally the Council should accept the arrangements made between the Greeks and the Italians, and that it should also accept Mr. Balfour's proposal as giving the Council a means of being obeyed, provided only that the question of substance was entirely reserved. On this understanding only would he accept these arrangements. He suggested that M. Venizelos be asked to come into the room to express his formal adhesion to the arrangement made with M. Tittoni.

(M. Venizelos then entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing M. Venizelos, said that the Council was about to take two decisions, to one of which he was a Party.

M. VENIZELOS said that he was in full agreement with M. Tittoni.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the agreement was accepted by the Council subject to the proviso that it did not affect the ultimate decision either on Greek or on Italian rights. Furthermore, the local Commander-in-Chief would be in control of all troops—Turkish, Greek and Italian. They would have to obey the orders of General Milne. It was probable also that Commissioners would be sent to enquire into the atrocities which it was reported had been committed by Greek troops. M. Venizelos was doubtless aware of what had taken place.

M. VENIZELOS said that he fully understood. He would, however, observe that the Government at Constantinople was not in full control of the situation. Action at the Capital therefore might not produce all the effect desired in Anatolia. The Committee of Union and Progress still had more power than appeared on the surface.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that M. Venizelos himself did not always control the actions of his countrymen.

M. VENIZELOS said that whenever excesses had been complained of, he had caused the culprits to be severely punished. There had been two executions. He did not wish to conceal anything and was quite ready to accept the Commission of enquiry. He wished, however, to leave a note with the Council, asking for the execution of two Clauses of the Armistice,⁶ namely the disarmament of Turkey and the control of railways either by Allied troops or failing them by Greek troops and Allied Officers. (See Appendix C.⁷) He further asked that he might be heard when the Council came to determine the southern frontier of Bulgaria.

(This was agreed to.)

(M. Venizelos then withdrew and it was decided that his note should be submitted to the experts.)

(It was decided provisionally to accept the agreement reached between M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos, as given above.)

It was further decided to adopt the following Resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour:—

1. Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief. The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna, and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3. Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.

⁶ The reference was to the Armistice of Port Mudros, concluded on October 30, 1918, between Admiral Calthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, and the Turkish representatives. (Cf. *British and Foreign State Papers (1917-18)*, vol. cxi, pp. 611-13.) The clauses in question were nos. 15 and 20.

⁷ Not printed. The note was as summarized by M. Venizelos. As regards railways, it proposed the occupation of the lines converging upon Smyrna, at least as far as Balikesiri to the north and Ala Shehr to the east.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU questioned whether it would be useful to discuss this matter before Mr. Balfour and Mr. White had obtained the views of their Governments.

Military operations against Hungary

MR. WHITE said that he would like more precise information before he consulted his Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that the policy he would like to see carried out was:—

- (1) that the execution of the armistice by Hungary was required by the Conference;
- (2) that if the armistice were carried out, Roumanian troops should withdraw to the original frontier;
- (3) that the Allies could not negotiate Peace with those who were breaking their engagements;
- (4) that the Conference could not tolerate the continuation of conditions which would make Peace, Commerce and disarmament in Central Europe impossible.

Unless satisfactory evidence of compliance were obtained the necessary steps should be taken to enforce the will of the Conference. His attention had been drawn that morning to certain figures given on the previous day by Marshal Foch regarding the forces at the disposal of Bela Kun. (See H. D. 9 para. 3,⁸ first statement by Marshal Foch.) His own hypothesis had been that the Hungarians were trying to collect an aggressive force to attack their neighbours. If this was untrue, the policy built upon it naturally must be abandoned, but if the hypothesis were true, he would recommend his Government to agree to military action.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that four Officers representing each of the Powers concerned should be sent to Hungary to verify the military situation and that Bela Kun be asked to allow them to make their investigation. Should he refuse, he would be admitting his guilt. Should he accept, the Council would be in a position to form an accurate judgment. A short time ago the Council had addressed him and said that no further conversation could be held with him because he had broken the Armistice. He had replied that a breach of the Armistice had been committed not by him but by the Roumanians.⁹ The Council before acting, wished to know the exact truth.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection but he would like to re-enforce this action. The Council was dealing with a man whose ill-faith was proverbial. He had already used such communication as he had had with the Powers for his own advantage. He represented a small minority ruling an immense majority which was deprived of the means of rebelling. If his permission were solicited, this would increase his prestige. The Commission should be sent to Hungary without asking for his consent.

⁸ No. 13, minute 3.

⁹ See No. 10, minute 6, and No. 11, minute 1.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he entirely agreed.

MR. WHITE drew attention to the resolution of the Council recorded in H. D. 7 para. 1¹⁰, taken on July 15th:—

‘It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original armistice conditions by all parties concerned.’

M. CLEMENCEAU said that information obtained direct from the country would be more valuable than any information accessible to Marshal Foch.

M. TITTONI said that the Commission should be numerous in order that it should produce a great moral effect.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that four General Officers would be sufficient. Instructions could be given to them, before they started, by the Council.

MR. WHITE said that he would prefer to reserve his opinion until the afternoon’s meeting.

(It was agreed that the decision should be postponed until the next meeting at 4 p.m. on the same day.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 18, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO NO. 14

Télégramme du Sheikh-ul-Islam

AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 15 juillet,

20 h. 45, reçu le 16 à 19 h.

Son Excellence, M. Clemenceau, Président de la Conférence de la Paix. Après l’occupation de la ville de Smyrne, occupation que rien ne justifiait d’ailleurs, les troupes hellènes se sont étendues graduellement sur les autres parties du vilayet. Elles y occupent différentes localités dont les populations sont en grande majorité ou en totalité musulmanes.

L’entrée des troupes hellènes dans chacune de ces localités est suivie de toutes sortes de violences et d’atrocités contre les éléments musulmans, atrocités auxquelles participent aussi les Grecs indigènes.

Les quartiers musulmans sont incendiés et leurs habitants mis à mort sans merci, les enfants et les femmes ne sont pas épargnées. Celles-ci sont violées et tuées avec des raffinements de cruauté. Tel a été le mort [? sort] de la ville d’Aidin, une des principales villes de la province ainsi que d’autres localités où l’énorme majorité de la population est musulmane.

Des milliers de Musulmans ont péri et plus de 150.000 ont été obligés pour échapper au[x] massacres et aux horreurs, de quitter leurs foyers, et de se réfugier à l’intérieur du pays où ils se trouvent actuellement sans abri et dans un état de dénuement complet.

Ces faits pourraient être constatés facilement par une commission d'enquête dont nous sollicitons l'envoi immédiat sur les lieux.

D'autre part les autorités helléniques font venir dans la province, pour les installer, un grand nombre de Grecs des autres provinces de la Turquie ou de l'extérieur en vue de remplacer les indigènes [?qui] s'en étaient éloignés.

Ce fait, rapproché de ceux qui précèdent ne permet pas de douter que le but poursuivi est évidemment de faire périr les Musulmans en les exterminant systématiquement ou en les obligeant à quitter leurs foyers sous l'influence de la terreur, et de les remplacer par des Grecs.

Profondément ému par le danger qui menace les populations musulmanes du vilayet de Smyrne, le Gouvernement impérial croit de son devoir de le signaler à la bienveillance attentive des grandes Puissances Alliées.

Le Gouvernement impérial est persuadé que ces puissances ne manqueront pas dans leur juste et haute appréciation de prendre toutes les dispositions qu'elles jugeront efficaces de prendre pour mettre fin à une situation qui, il en a la ferme conviction, ne répond ni à leurs intentions ni aux sentiments de justice et d'équité dont elles sont animées envers tous les peuples.

La plus juste de ces dispositions et celle qui répondrait en même temps le mieux aux principes du Président Wilson, serait évidemment la prompte évacuation par les Hellènes des territoires qu'ils ont occupés en Asie-Mineure et sur lesquels ils n'ont aucun droit valable.

LE GRAND VIZIR PAR INTÉRIM, LE SHEIKH-UL-ISLAM MOUSTAFA SABRI.

No. 15

H. D. 11.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 18, 1919, at 4.0 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARIES, Sir Ian Malcolm., K.C.M.G., Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, Capt. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel Grant. *British Empire:* Lieut.-Com. Bell. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

I.

*Südbahn
question*

[Not printed]¹

¹ The question concerned the financial position and technical reorganization of the Südbahn railway company in consequence of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. After a short discussion the Supreme Council accepted, subject to subsequent approval by Signor Crespi, the draft for article 320 of the Treaty of St. Germain.

2. M. LOUCHEUR said that the question only concerned France, Great Britain, the United States and Belgium. The Representatives of these countries had received the Report (see Annex [Appendix] A).

*Report by M.
Loucheur on the
Rhineland Con-
vention*

M. TITTONI asked whether the Commission² dealt with the economic questions.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it did not do so, but that a Report had been accepted unanimously by the Experts: it was based on the two German notes annexed to the Report. In order to summarise the question it was sufficient to say that the Germans in their note had always desired to modify the text of the Treaty as submitted to them, and that they had further attempted to interpret it in their own way. Our Commission had always rejected the modifications asked for, but it had always taken up a conciliatory attitude in questions of interpretation. The Commission thought that in acting in this way it was following the political lead which had been given to it. Amongst the modifications asked for, it had been thought necessary to reject the one which dealt with an Imperial Commission. The Commissioner who would have been nominated by the Germans ought, according to them, to be consulted by the Inter-Allied Commission which ought only to act in agreement with him. The Germans had also given a wrong interpretation to certain terms in the Convention; they had thought the terms in question full of pitfalls. They thought that the Allies desired to intervene in questions of primary education and in religious problems. They had been reassured and told that such a thing had never been in the intentions of the Allies. During the discussions there had only been one difficult point. The Germans had stated that the Imperial Commissioner had been nominated: they had been told in reply that the Commissioner should be acceptable to the Allies. In addition to this it had not been possible to agree to the Commissioner being a Representative of the Federal States. The Germans had been told that if all the Federal States agreed to nominate the same person he would be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the German Constitution had been examined.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the German Constitution had been carefully examined. The remarks made to the German Delegates on the subject of the Commissioner had been suggested to them by the members of the Commission for the Rhine Convention. In addition, by one of the Clauses of the Convention given we had the right of having delivered to us persons who having committed crime on the left bank of the Rhine, had taken refuge on the right. The Germans replied that they could not accept this clause on account of the question of extradition. They had been told that the question of extradition did not arise since both the banks of the Rhine were German territory. The proposals had therefore been rejected and the clause in question upheld. If the report were accepted, it was proposed that it should

² The reference was evidently to the Commission on the Left Bank of the Rhine of which M. Loucheur was chairman.

be sent in the form of a note to the German Delegation by the President of the Peace Conference.

(The reply to the German notes on the Rhine Convention unanimously recommended by M. Loucheur's Commission was therefore accepted, and it was further decided that an English text should be presented along with the French one after examination by the Drafting Committee.)

3. M. TITTONI said he wished to present the following note in the name of the Italian Government:—

*Reservation by the
Italian Delegation
on the subject of
the Austrian
Peace Treaty*

The Italian Delegation reminds the Conference in the following terms of the reservation which it had made previously in similar terms with regard to the Peace Treaty with Germany: the first reservation had been accepted by the Supreme War Council at its meeting of the 16th June. The

Italian Delegation thinks that the stipulations contained in the Convention of the League of Nations do not apply to territorial questions, or to such arrangements as may arise out of them; for these latter have been part of the duties of the Peace Conference, and have not yet been definitely settled.'

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Tittoni's statement amounted to this: the Italian frontiers have not yet been settled. If, therefore, the Italian Delegation agreed to sign the Treaty without reservation, as this latter includes the Covenant of the League of Nations, they might be compelled to accept decisions which they did not fully know beforehand. It would not be just, and for this reason the Italian reservation had been made.

M. TITTONI said that the reservation only applied to frontiers not yet settled. He thought that the duty of settling such frontiers fell to the Peace Conference, and not to the League of Nations.

MR. BALFOUR said he agreed entirely, but that he wished to ask a question. If the reservation were accepted and an agreement arrived at with regard to frontiers, could Italy at some future time, ten years hence possibly, raise the question again on the plea that it had made reservations? He therefore asked that the reservation should lapse at the date of the settlement of the frontier question.

M. TITTONI said that the text of his reservation allowed for that, since it dealt with frontiers 'not yet definitely settled'. When once the frontiers were settled the reservation lapsed.

MR. WHITE said that they were only called upon to take note of a reservation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that possibly they might be called upon to take note of it under Mr. Balfour's interpretation.

M. TITTONI said that all that was asked for was that the frontiers between Italy and Jugo-Slavia should be settled by the Council and not by the League of Nations.

(Cognisance was taken of the following reservation made by M. Tittoni on behalf of Italy:—

'The Italian Delegation desired to recall and the [to] renew in the

following terms the reservation made by it on the subject of the Treaty with Germany which the Supreme Council accepted at its Meeting on June 16th.

The Italian Delegation is of the opinion that stipulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations are not applicable to territorial questions and to the arrangements connected therewith, which having been made the subjects of consideration by the Peace Conference have not yet been settled.")

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were called upon to send out a Commission of Enquiry into Asia Minor.

Nomination of a Commission of enquiry in Asia Minor
MR. WHITE said that he had examined the question, and that he did not think he was able to reply to it without first referring it to his Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that he accepted the principle of the Committee of Enquiry, but that he could not nominate his representatives before Monday.³

M. TITTONI said that he was in the same position as Mr. Balfour.

(It was decided to send a Commission to Asia Minor consisting of one Commissioner each from Great Britain, France and Italy. The participation of the United States in this Commission was referred to the American Government.)

5. The question of nominating a Military Commission to enquire into the situation in Hungary was adjourned until Monday,³ so as to await Mr. Balfour's and Mr. White's acceptances.

6. At this moment the experts, General Bliss, Mr. Hoover, General Belin, General Cavallero, Col. MacReady, Col. Kisch, and Commandant Lacombe entered the room.

Question of Russian prisoners in Germany.
Mr. Hoover's Report
MR. HOOVER summarised the report contained in Annex [Appendix] B.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question involved shipping.

MR. HOOVER said that M. Clemenceau's remark was true, but that a decision had to be arrived at as to the port into which the boats were to be sent and the method of transport by railway. The repatriation of the prisoners might take two to three months, and they would have to be fed during the period.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the question was a military one, and that it should be studied by the military experts at Versailles.

MR. BALFOUR said that the British Red Cross had spent nearly a million pounds in the up-keep of these prisoners. This would have to be discontinued on account of the approaching demobilisation, but that the Red Cross organisation was willing to devote its stores to this purpose, they [*sic*] would suffice to feed the prisoners for 15 days.

MR. HOOVER remarked that the stock in question would only feed the

³ July 21, 1919.

35,000 prisoners in the charge of the British Red Cross, and that it would not supply the other prisoners.

MR. BALFOUR asked why the Germans should not be approached in this matter. We have undertaken the feeding of these prisoners for seven months without being obliged to do so. The Allies have done it in order to prevent the Germans from repatriating the prisoners under circumstances disadvantageous to themselves. Ought not, therefore, the Germans to be invited to take charge of the feeding of the prisoners? He was told by his experts that Marshal Foch might quite well deal with the question.

MR. WHITE said a plan of repatriation had been accepted by the Council of Ten in the month of June. He thought that the Ukrainians and the Poles had prevented the plan from being put into execution.

MR. HOOVER said that the military authorities ought, therefore, to investigate the means of transport necessary, and study the question of feeding the prisoners. It should not be forgotten that a political question also arose, since the Allies had maintained the prisoners in Germany in order to prevent them joining the Bolsheviks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think Marshal Foch could deal with the question, which was a political and financial one. The Allies were not dealing with prisoners taken by themselves, but with prisoners made by an enemy army. He, therefore, proposed to deal with the political and financial questions. Once they were decided upon, the manner in which they could be carried out could be investigated. He desired to have the opinion of his Military Experts on the point in question, which was, after all, a problem of military politics. It had been desired to avoid sending the Russian prisoners lest they should reinforce the Bolshevik Army or spread themselves out over Poland. The danger to-day was not so great as far as Poland was concerned, and Military Experts could deal with it.

GENERAL BLISS said that the question did not seem to him to be in a condition to be submitted to Versailles. It contained two problems. Mr. Hoover had stated that there were no funds available for feeding the prisoners. How could they be supported, therefore, if the Germans refused to have anything to do with it? After that, the question arose as to how they should be repatriated and this raised the following problems: Firstly, were the prisoners to be repatriated immediately? Secondly, were they to be repatriated through Poland to the nearest Russian territory? Thirdly, were they to be repatriated to Black Sea Ports? Fourthly, if one of these alternatives is accepted, who would undertake to execute it? Fifthly, who would undertake to send the supplies and the personnel necessary in the interval? Could not the proposal made by the Economic Commission on the 17th June⁴ be accepted? In any case, it was necessary to take immediately the necessary measures for repatriating the prisoners. Some solution had to be adopted rapidly, because the operations would require a good deal of time and must be concluded before winter. If the proposal is accepted, our own Delegation and the Allied Delegations could telegraph to their Governments to obtain the necessary

⁴ The reference is uncertain.

following terms the reservation made by it on the subject of the Treaty with Germany which the Supreme Council accepted at its Meeting on June 16th.

The Italian Delegation is of the opinion that stipulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations are not applicable to territorial questions and to the arrangements connected therewith, which having been made the subjects of consideration by the Peace Conference have not yet been settled.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were called upon to send out a Commission of Enquiry into Asia Minor.

Nomination of a Commission of enquiry in Asia Minor MR. WHITE said that he had examined the question, and that he did not think he was able to reply to it without first referring it to his Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that he accepted the principle of the Committee of Enquiry, but that he could not nominate his representatives before Monday.³

M. TITTONI said that he was in the same position as Mr. Balfour.

(It was decided to send a Commission to Asia Minor consisting of one Commissioner each from Great Britain, France and Italy. The participation of the United States in this Commission was referred to the American Government.)

5. The question of nominating a Military Commission to enquire into the *Commission of Enquiry situation in Hungary* was adjourned until Monday,³ so as *for Hungary* to await Mr. Balfour's and Mr. White's acceptances.

6. At this moment the experts, General Bliss, Mr. Hoover, General Belin, General Cavallero, Col. MacReady, Col. Kisch, and Commandant Lacombe entered the room.

Question of Russian prisoners in Germany. MR. HOOVER summarised the report contained in Annex [Appendix] B.

Mr. Hoover's Report

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question involved shipping.

MR. HOOVER said that M. Clemenceau's remark was true, but that a decision had to be arrived at as to the port into which the boats were to be sent and the method of transport by railway. The repatriation of the prisoners might take two to three months, and they would have to be fed during the period.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the question was a military one, and that it should be studied by the military experts at Versailles.

MR. BALFOUR said that the British Red Cross had spent nearly a million pounds in the up-keep of these prisoners. This would have to be discontinued on account of the approaching demobilisation, but that the Red Cross organisation was willing to devote its stores to this purpose, they [*sic*] would suffice to feed the prisoners for 15 days.

MR. HOOVER remarked that the stock in question would only feed the

³ July 21, 1919.

35,000 prisoners in the charge of the British Red Cross, and that it would not supply the other prisoners.

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⁴ The reference is uncertain.

powers. The repatriation must be carried out as rapidly as possible. The Military Authorities could then be put in touch with the question and may study the best means of carrying out the repatriation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it involved a great danger for Poland. As far as the Russian prisoners were concerned, the question was not one of feeding 35,000 under the charge of the British Red Cross, but of supplying all.

GENERAL BLISS said that some decision must be arrived at, because the repatriation will take a long time.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question should have been presented to the Council at an earlier date.

MR. BALFOUR said that Marshal Foch had received a communication on the subject four months ago.

MR. HOOVER said that the Council had been put in touch with the question four months ago, and that it was noted that nothing had been done. There was a solution possible. There were Armies of Occupation in Germany with the necessary Army Service Corps Units attached. The Armies of Occupation had been reduced in number on account of demobilisation with the result that the Army Service Corps Units could take charge of the prisoners.

MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Hoover's solution was very ingenious, but that it only settled one of the two questions, that of feeding. The repatriation question remained open, and to settle it more tonnage was necessary together with the consent of the Polish Government with regard to the passage across that country of the prisoners in question. The method of repatriation was the most difficult. Were the Military Authorities at Versailles competent to resolve the question? If they were not, a special Committee would be necessary in which the Versailles Experts should be represented, together with Naval Experts and possibly political Experts.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council could decide on political questions.

MR. BALFOUR said that at the present time 500 Americans were dealing with the supplies and feeding stock. It had been said to him that these 500 Americans were about to be withdrawn, but that the Army Service Corps Units in the Armies of Occupation could carry on the work. The Commission would, therefore, only be concerned with the question of railways, ports, etc.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, under these circumstances, the question could very well be dealt with by the Military Experts at Versailles, to whom Naval Experts could be joined. His proposal was accepted.

(It was therefore agreed:

- (a) That upon the failure of the supplies already provided for the feeding of Russian prisoners now in Germany, they should be fed and supplied by the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation until repatriated.
- (b) That the means of repatriation of the Russian prisoners now in Germany and maintained at the cost of the Allies should be referred for study to the Military Representatives at Versailles with whom would be associated for this purpose the Naval Advisers.)

7. MR. HOOVER made a short résumé of the memorandum contained in Appendix C.⁵ He drew the attention of the Council, moreover, to the fact that the Georgian Authorities had only agreed to allow the supplies to pass through their territory on condition of a certain proportion being given to them. They now demanded one-half of the supplies. This demand was not from necessity, because they did not lack food, but was made simply for the purpose of speculation. For this reason, the Council was asked to send a menacing telegram to the Georgian Authorities, in order to facilitate the transport of supplies during two or three months. The future destiny of Georgia depended on the Conference, and there was every hope that they would yield to our wishes.

*Communication
from Mr. Hoover
with regard to
Russian Armenia*

(It was therefore decided that M. Clemenceau, as Chairman of the Peace Conference, should send the following telegram in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Government of Georgia:—

‘The Council has been made aware of the interference of the Georgian authorities when food supplies were sent into Armenia in an endeavour on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death amongst these unfortunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms, that such interference and that such action taken by the Georgian Authorities together with the continuance of such action must entirely prejudice their case. The Council therefore expects that the Authorities in Georgia shall not only give the privileges of transportation over the Railway routes at which [*sic*] they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies at no more than the normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the Authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement.’)

8. M. PICHON read an extract from a report of the military authorities dated 11th July, who had studied the question.

*Repatriation of
the Czecho-
Slovak Forces in
Siberia*

BARON MAKINO said that he wished to make a remark. It had been decided some time back by the Supreme Council that the Czecho-Slovaks should be evacuated through Omsk to Archangel, and that the Japanese Government should then be asked to protect the railway. He had telegraphed to his Government in that

⁵ Not printed. In this memorandum, dated July 16, 1919, Mr. Hoover stated: ‘The Relief Administration, cooperating with the various Allied authorities, has been for months striving to meet the terrible situation of starvation in Russian Armenia. Some 50,000 tons of food have been provided and the only method of access to this area is over the railway from Batoum, and this railway is in the territory of the so-called Georgian Government. The railway is operating partially under the direction of the British Military Authorities, who have given every cooperation in endeavouring to move the supplies. . . . It is impossible to depict the situation in Armenia for up until the last sixty days the population has been eating the dead. During this last two months the movement of relief supplies has been sufficient to somewhat stem the tide but there has never been ten days’ supplies ahead of actual starvation.’ After drawing attention to the obstruction of the transport of supplies by the Georgian authorities, Mr. Hoover concluded by suggesting the dispatch of the telegram, the text of which was adopted by the Supreme Council.

sense. Their reports tended to show that since the Czecho-Slovaks did not accept the proposal the Japanese Government had suspended its decision. The question now was of repatriation by Vladivostock. This was a new proposal which must be submitted to the Japanese Government. It was probable that it would wish to obtain all the information possible and possibly would desire to consult the local authorities. The examination would take several days during which it would be impossible for him to reply to the Supreme Council.

(After a short discussion it was decided that with regard to the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks from Siberia, that M. Clemenceau should send a copy of the following telegram to the American Government and that Baron Makino should send the same telegram to the Japanese Government:—

‘In view of the condition and wishes of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers consider it urgently necessary that arrangements should be made for the systematic repatriation of the troops from Vladivostock.

This involves the replacement of these troops along that portion of the trans-Siberian railway which is at present guarded by them. Information is therefore requested as to whether the American/Japanese Government will furnish the necessary effectives or will co-operate with the Japanese/American Government to this end. A similar telegram has been addressed to the Japanese/American[s].’⁶

Villa Majestic, Paris.

18th July, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 15

Document 1

Projet de Réponse aux deux Mémoires allemands relatifs à l'Occupation de la Rive Gauche du Rhin

Paragraphe 1 et 2.—*Observations préliminaires.*—Les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés ont toujours eu l'intention de rendre l'occupation le moins lourde possible aux populations civiles de la rive gauche du Rhin, sous la réserve que l'Allemagne exécutera strictement les clauses du Traité de Paix.

§ 3. Articles 3 et 5 de la Convention.—*Application de la Législation allemande.*—Le Gouvernement Allemand a accepté dans la Convention le pouvoir, reconnu à la Haute Commission, d'émettre des ordonnances ayant force de loi pour assurer l'entretien, la sécurité et les besoins des forces militaires alliées.

Il est entendu que, sous cette réserve, la législation actuelle ou future de l'Empire et celle des Etats fédérés, y compris celle promulguée depuis la Révolution allemande, est applicable dans les territoires occupés. Il appartiendra à la Haute Commission d'apprécier, par cas d'espèce, dans quelle mesure les dites législations ne portent pas atteinte à la sécurité et aux besoins des forces militaires alliées.

Paragraphe 4.—*Exercice du droit législatif de la Haute Commission.*—Il n'y a pas d'objection à reconnaître que, sous les réserves ci-dessus, la population bénéficiera

⁶ This telegram is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919. Russia* (Washington, 1937), p. 289.

du libre exercice de ses droits personnels et civiques, de la liberté religieuse, de la liberté de presse, de vote, d'association et que les rapport[s] politiques, juridiques, administratifs et économiques des Territoires occupés par [?avec] l'Allemagne non occupée ne seront pas entravés, non plus que la circulation.

Toutefois les Alliés ne peuvent souscrire à l'obligation d'un accord préalable entre la Haute Commission et le Représentant de l'Allemagne pour l'élaboration des ordonnances. Celui-ci pourra être *entendu* s'il s'agit d'une matière rentrant dans ses attributions, sauf cas d'urgence.

Paragraphe 5.— *Institution d'un Commissariat civil d'Empire.*

a) L'institution d'un Commissariat civil d'Empire, Représentant de l'Empire, peut être reconnue par les Alliés.

b) Toutefois, il convient de remarquer que cet organisme n'est pas prévu par le texte de la Convention et que le personnel choisi devra recevoir l'agrément préalable et révocable des Gouvernements alliés.

c) La compétence du Commissaire d'Empire ne s'étendra qu'aux matières qui, aux termes de la Constitution allemande, ressortissent de l'Autorité d'Empire.

Les Alliés et Associés ne peuvent en effet, *sans violation du droit international*, insérer, dans un texte, que le Commissaire Impérial représentera obligatoirement les Etats, Républiques ou Provinces dont la législation interne doit être respectée et est sujette à des variations ou à des modifications.

Si toutefois les Autorités compétentes des divers Etats fédérés se mettaient d'accord pour la désignation d'un même Commissaire, les Alliés n'y feraient pas obstacle. Néanmoins, la Haute Commission conservera toujours le pouvoir d'entrer en contact avec toutes autorités locales, pour les affaires de leur compétence.

Paragraphe 6.— *Effectif des troupes d'occupation.*— Les Gouvernements alliés se réservent de faire connaître en temps opportun les effectifs maintenus en Territoires occupés.

Paragraphe 7.— *Effectif des forces de police.*— Il n'y a pas d'obstacle à ce que la Haute Commission consulte les Autorités allemandes intéressées, mais il lui appartient de régler l'organisation des forces de police.

Paragraphe 8.— *Rédaction des Ordonnances de la Commission.*— La Haute Commission pourra recueillir utilement l'avis préalable (sauf cas d'urgence) du Commissaire d'Empire ou des Autorités allemandes compétentes, sans qu'il y ait là pour elle une obligation non prévue par la Convention.

Paragraphe 9.— *Privilège de juridiction conféré par les Commandants d'Armée.*— Il est exact que l'attribution de ce privilège peut être précisée. En principe, il est reconnu qu'il ne doit pas être conféré à des citoyens allemands.

Par contre, les Alliés, qui ne veulent pas que le trouble soit jeté dans les Territoires occupés, ne sauraient admettre que des actions judiciaires soient intentées par les Autorités Allemandes compétentes pour des faits politiques ou commerciaux afférents à la période de l'Armistice, alors que [? ces] faits n'ont pas donné lieu à des poursuites judiciaires de la part des Autorités Alliées.

Paragraphe 10.— *Privilège de juridiction pour les affaires civiles.*— Le texte de la Convention prévoit formellement que les diverses personnes militaires ou accréditées par l'aut[orité] militaire seront uniquement justiciables des juridictions militaires alliées, non seulement au criminel, *mais même au civil*.

En ce qui concerne les contrats passés à *titre privé* soit par les militaires, soit par leurs familles, on peut admettre néanmoins, comme le demande le mémoire, que ces affaires seront portées devant les tribunaux allemands, sauf, en cas d'abus, droit d'évocation réservé à la Haute Commission.

Cette observation ne s'applique pas au cas visé par l'article III de la Convention, alinéa 6.

En tous cas, les affaires à la fois civiles et criminelles doivent être jugées par les juridictions militaires.

Paragraphe 11.— *Législation pénale*.—Les juridictions allemandes lorsqu'elles seront saisies, appliqueront le code pénal allemand, mais, conformément aux principes du droit international, les juridictions militaires alliées ne peuvent appliquer que les lois édictées dans le pays duquel elles relèvent.

Paragraphe 12.— *Livraison des inculpés*.—La proposition du mémoire allemand n'est pas admissible. Le texte de la conven[ti]on est formel et conforme à la logique, il exige que soient livrés aux autorités alliées les inculpés de crimes ou délits perpétrés contre les personnes ou les biens des forces alliées, même si les inculpés étaient réfugiés en territoires non occupés.

D'ailleurs il n'y a pas extradition, au sens juridique du mot, les territoires occupés faisant partie du territoire allemand.

Paragraphe 13.— *Circonscriptions administratives et polit[iques]* (Art. V).—Le mémoire du gouvernement allemand s'inquiète de savoir si les ordonnances de la Haute Commission modifieront les circonscriptions administratives et politiques pour les besoins de l'occupation.

La Convention ne prévoit rien à ce sujet. Il n'a pas été dans les intentions des Alliés que la Commission puisse modifier les circonscriptions administratives et politiques.

Paragraphe 14.— *Finances*.—Il est entendu que l'Administration civile comprend l'Administration financière et que les recettes de l'Empire et des Etats seront perçues dans les territoires occupés et gérées par les Administrations allemandes compétentes.

Paragraphe 15.— *Droit de révocation des fonctionnaires*.—La demande du mémoire constituerait une modification au texte de la Convention.

On peut toutefois envisager que les révocations de fonctionnaires pourront être prononcées sans délai sur ordre de la Haute Commission, soit par le Commissaire d'Empire soit par l'autorité allemande compétente — sauf cas d'urgence. La Haute Commission conserve en tous cas le droit de révoquer elle-même les fonctionnaires en cas de nécessité.

Paragraphe 16.— *Paiement des réquisitions*.—Les Alliés entendent conserver le droit que leur donne l'article VI de la Convention, mais ils ne se refusent pas à étudier av[ec] les autorités allemandes compétentes un règlement d'application.

Paragraphe 17.— *Logement des troupes de services*.—C'est une question de fait qui ne peut être réglée que par un examen des espèces, et les Alliés feront cet examen dans un esprit conciliant pour satisfaire aux besoins légitimes des services publics.

Paragraphe 18.— *Exemption d'impôts*.—Il est entendu que les exemptions d'impôts ne sauraient s'étendre aux impôts réels occasionnés par des transactions ou des actes effectués à titre privé, et en dehors des besoins du service.

D'autre part, il est reconnu qu'un contrôle devra être établi par la Haute Commission Interalliée en ce qui conc[erne] les privilèges et exemptions douanières conférés par l'article IX aux troupes d'occupation et à leur personnel civil et militaire.

Paragraphe 19.— *Clauses douanières*.—A la date de ce jour, les alliés et associés ne considèrent pas qu'il y ait lieu de faire usage des dispositions de l'article 270; ils se réservent formellement d'apprécier dans la suite s'il convie[ndrait] ou non d'en faire application.

Paragraphe 21.— *Postes et télégraphes*.— Il y a lieu, comme le demande le mémoire allemand, de modifier la réglementation en vigueur. Une ordonnance de la Haute Commission y pourvoira. La liberté de communiquer par lettre, télégraphe et téléphone sera rétablie entre les territoires occupés et les territoires non occupés, sous les réserves générales des droits de la Haute Commission, ou des conséquences de l'état de siège s'il vient à être déclaré.

Paragraphe 22.— *Etat de siège*.— L'état de siège étant fonction immédiate de la sécurité des armées, l'engagement ne peut être pris de consulter en tous les cas, et notamment en cas d'urgence, le Commissaire d'Empire.

Il est entendu que les Alliés, comptant sur une collaboration loyale de l'autorité allemande, ne manqueront pas de la consulter chaque fois que les circonstances le lui permettront.

Paragraphe 24.— *Arrêtés des diverses Autorités Militaires*.— En principe et conformément à la demande présentée dans le mémoire allemand, il entre dans les intentions des autorités alliées de considérer que les divers arrêtés rendus par les autorités militaires de l'occupation pour la période de l'armistice seront périmés après que le Traité de Paix entrera en vigueur. Toutefois, il appartient exclusivement à la Haute Commission de ménager les transitions indispensables.

La Haute Commission prononcera par ordonnance l'abrogation ou l'adaptation de ces arrêtés.

Cette ordonnance sera rendue dans le plus bref délai possible après la date de la mise en vigueur du traité.

Paragraphe 25.— *Expulsés*.— Les interdictions de séjour dans les territoires occupés ont été prononcées en raison de la nécessité de maintenir l'ordre public et de faire respecter les décisions prises régulièrement par l'autorité militaire alliée pendant l'Armistice.

Il ne saurait être admis que les personnes expulsées pourront rentrer dans leurs foyers du fait même que le Traité de Paix entrera en vigueur.

Ceux qui en feront la demande devront s'adresser à la Haute Commission qui examinera chaque cas particulier dans un esprit conciliant.

Paragraphe 26.— *Juridictions*.— Prière de bien vouloir se référer aux observations présentées plus haut à propos des paragraphes 9-10 et 11 du mémoire allemand.

Paragr. 27.— *Circonscriptions administratives*.— La Convention prévoit que les Administrations locales allemandes aussi bien celles des districts que celles des provinces conserveront leurs attributions légales.

Paragr. 28.— *Autorité des Gouvernements des Etats fédérés*.— Il est tout à fait impossible de souscrire à la suggestion contenue dans ce paragraphe, à savoir que l'express[ion] 'sous l'autorité du Gouvernement Central Allemand' doive être interprétée comme suit 'Sous l'Autorité du Gouvernement Central Allemand et des Gouvernements des Etats fédérés allemands'.

L'article 3 de la Convention annexé[e] au Traité de Paix est précis et l'expression: 'gouvernement central allem[and]' est limitative.

Il va de soi que la hiérarchie légale sera respectée mais il est impossible aux Alliés, qui ont signé la Paix avec le Gouvernement Central Allemand, et qui n'entendent pas s'immiscer dans l'organisation intérieure de l'Allemagne, de maintenir de force l'organisation des Etats, dont la constitution allemande elle-même prévoit des modifications possibles.

Ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut à propos du paragraphe 5 'Institution du Commissariat Civil d'Empire' les Alliés ne peuvent, sans violation du droit international, insérer dans un texte qu'ils s'engagent à maintenir une organisation et une

législation internes que les populations allemandes elles-mêmes peuvent être amenées à modifier.

Paragraphe 29.— *Fonctionnaires*.— Ainsi que le fait remarquer le mémoire allemand il n'y aura plus, après la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, d'agents chargés de contrôler les autorités allemandes dans les cercles, etc.

Mais dans l'intérêt des populations, la Haute Commission a pouvoir de maintenir des représentants fixes, chargés d'établir la liaison entre les Administrations locales allemandes, les Autorités Militaires locales, et la Haute Commission elle-même.

En ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires, le mémoire allemand reconnaît le droit de révocation par la Haute Commission. Il en résulte que la Haute Commission a le moyen de ne pas accepter la nomination de fonctionnaires, dont l'intervention pourrait susciter des désordres.

Paragraphe 30.— *Enseignement*.— L'enseignement public, ainsi que le fait remarquer le mémoire allemand, fait partie de l'administration civile et sera régi par les lois allemandes.

Le Gouvernement allemand n'a donc pas à craindre que l'enseignement de langues étrangères soit introduit par ordre des puissances occupantes.

Paragraphe 31.— *Législation*.— Cette question a été traitée plus haut à propos du paragraphe 3 du mémoire allemand.

Paragraphe 32.— *Réquisitions*.— Le Gouvernement allemand demande que l'exercice du droit de réquisition soit aussi limité que possible.

Les autorités alliées sont tout à fait d'accord avec le Gouvernement allemand pour penser que la réquisition doit être peu fréquente, et motivée par des circonstances particulières[s].

La Haute Commission pourra entendre à ce sujet toutes les observations qui lui seront présentées et elle édictera un règlement dans un esprit d'équité et de conciliation.

Toutefois, il n'est pas possible de souscrire à la demande présentée dans le mémoire allemand à la fin de ce paragraphe, à savoir que les réquisitions soient exercées uniquement par l'intermédiaire du Commissaire de l'Empire.

Paragraphe 33.— *Répartition des Troupes — Logement*.— La répartition des troupes et l'étude des questions relatives au logement des officiers et de leurs familles feront l'objet d'une étude approfondie de la part de la Haute Commission. Les résultats en seront communiqués ultérieurement.

Toutes les observations ci-dessus sont formulées sous réserve des droits dévolus à la Haute Commission, de la possibilité de déclarer l'Etat de siège, et de la stricte exécution du Traité de Paix par l'Allemagne.

Document 2

Première Note Allemande

VERSAILLES, le 12 juillet 1919.

Messieurs,

Art. I.— L'arrangement concernant l'occupation militaire des territoires rhénans a été ratifié par le gouvernement allemand ensemble avec le traité de Paix. L'Allemagne sait qu'à la teneur de ces stipulations rien ne pourra plus être changé. Une étude approfondie et la connaissance de ce qui s'est passé dans les diverses régions rhénanes, notamment dans les différent[es] positions succinctes il [sic] sera indispensable de s'entendre sous beaucoup de rapports sur des questions de détail.

Voilà pourquoi le gouvernement allemand a demandé aux gouvernements des Puissances occupantes d'entrer en pourparlers sur ces questions.

Art. II.— Pour la population du territoire rhénan occupé, il est d'une importance fondamentale d'être bientôt renseigné sur la forme que va prendre, pendant la longue durée de l'occupation sa vie politique, sociale et économique. L'Allemagne s'est vue contrainte d'acquiescer à l'occupation militaire de ces régions et de faire par là incombler, bien à regret, à la population du territoire rhénan des fardeaux particulièrement lo[urds] dont l'Allemagne non-occupée n'a pas à porter la charge. De là résulte pour le Gouvernement de la République Allemande l'obligat[i]on de faire, de son côté, tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour permettre aux régions rhénanes de supporter ces fardeaux spéciaux. Mon gouvernement est convaincu qu'il sera possible de réaliser et d'exécuter l'arrangement, sans par là porter atteinte aux garanties militaires, auxquelles aspirent les Puissances Alliées et Associées par l'occupation de sorte que la population des régions occupées jouisse des bienfaits de la paix, dont après les temps de dure épreuve qu'étaient pour elle la guerre et l'armistice, elle a un besoin pressant et qu'ensemble avec [le] reste de l'Allemagne elle soit mise à même de participer, conf[or]mément à son importance à reconstruire la patrie allemande et à s'acquitter des lourdes obligations encourues par le traité de paix.

Art. III.— A présent, je me permettrai d'aborder la discussion en détail des questions contenues dans les différe[nts] articles de l'arrangement.

L'article 5 prévoit que l'administration civile des provinces, gouvernements, cercles ruraux, etc., devra rester réservée aux autorités allemandes et que ladite admini[stration] civile devra être gérée conformément aux lois allemandes et s[ous] contrôle supérieur du gouvernement central allemand. Mon gouvernement aime à croire que cette disposition ne s'applique pas seulement à des lois de l'Empire ou des Etats fédéraux déjà promulguées, mais qu'elle s'étend de la même manière à la législation de l'Empire et des Etats fédéraux futurs et que not[amment] elle embrasse aussi toutes les lois et ordonnances promulguées depuis la révolution allemande et maintenues comme valides [?] sur ces entrefaites par l'assemblée nationale allemande et par les assemblées nationales de Prusse, de Bavière, de Bade, de Hesse et d'Oldenburg [sic].

C'est à ce droit de législation reconnu par les Alliés qu'à l'Allemagne sur les territoires rhénans, qu'est portée une atteinte par le fait qu'à l'article 3 les Alliés se sont réservé d'émettre des ordonnances au fur et à mesure qu'il faudra assurer l'entretien, la sécurité et les besoins des forces militaires des Alliés. Ces décrets devront passer en loi dès le jour de leur promulgation et ils devront par là primer toutes les lois ou ordonnances émises par l'Empire ou par les Etats fédératifs. La conception 'sécurité, entretien et besoins des forces militaires' est tellement vaste qu'en fin de compte on pourra faire rentrer là-dessous chaque question économique, sociale et juridique. Par exemple en Allemagne la durée du travail dans les mines est maintenant fixée à 7 heures, dans l'agriculture comme pour toutes les branches de l'activité industrielles et commerciales à 8 heures. Je me demande si la Haute Commission serait autorisée par l'article 3 à changer ces dispositions par voie d'ordonna[nce] parce qu'un travail si diminué ne donnerait plus entière satisf[isac]tion aux besoins des forces militaires.

D'autre part, je ne méconnais pas du tout qu'on ne pourra guère nier aux gouvernements alliés le droit d'émettre des ordonnances. De là, qu'il importera de faire un arrangement et de donner des garanties qu'on aille faire usage de ce droit de publier des décrets qu'en sorte de ne point entraver la reconstitution

politique, économique et sociale de l'Allemagne. C'est par cette raison que mon gouvernement attache la plus grande valeur à ce que, par un arrangement supplémentaire, un principe suprême soit établi pour l'exercice des droits de législation, de juridiction et d'administration des alliés. Ce principe suprême devrait avoir la teneur suivante :

Art. IV.— qu'à la population sera garanti le libre exercice de leurs droits personnels et civiques notamment le libre exercice du culte religieux, la liberté du vote, de la presse, des réunions et des associations.

2° — que les rapports politiques, juridiques, administratifs et économiques des territoires occupés avec l'Allemagne non occupée seront rétablis et assurés.

3° — que le mouvement des personnes et des marchan[dises] et le service [?d']information entre les territoires occupés et ceux non-occupés ne seront entravés d'aucune manière.

Dans le cas où ledit principe ci-dessus serait reconnu par les gouvernements alliés, les ordonnances par eux émises n'interviendraient que comme exécution de ce principe, susceptibles d'être soumises à certaines restrictions pour des cas particuliers. Sur des restrictions semblables dans des cas particuliers, il faudrait arriver à un accord préalable entre la Haute Commission et le Représentant de l'Allemagne.

Art. V.— Mon gouvernement a constaté avec satisfaction que les Alliés aient créé un organe dans la Haute Commission, qui est le représentant suprême des Alliés. Mon Gouvernement dans le but de faciliter sa tâche à la Haute Commission et de créer un organe homogène pour la population allemande et pour les diverses autorités existant dans les territoires occupés, a installé un Commissaire d'Empire qui serait le représentant suprême du gouvernement de l'Empire et des gouvernements des Etats fédératifs en question. Car [? on] me permettra bien de rappeler que d'après la structure constitutionnelle de l'Allemagne, le gouvernement central allemand n'est compétent que sous certains rapports, tandis que sous d'autres rapports considérables sont compétents les gouvernements de Prusse, celui de Bavière pour le Palatinat, celui de Hesse pour la Hesse rhénane, celui de Bade pour la tête de pont de Kehl et celui d'Oldenbourg pour la principauté de Birkenfeld.

Le Commissaire d'Empire serait lui seul autorisé à négocier avec la Haute Commission. Il aurait pour ainsi dire à exercer des fonctions diplomatiques, en tant qu'on en peut parler en territoire propre.

Pour cette haute fonction a été désigné par le Gouvernement allemand M. von Starck, jusqu'à présent président du gouvernement de Cologne.

Je prierais donc les gouvernements des Puissances Alliées et Associées de bien vouloir se déclarer d'accord de l'installation de ce Commissaire d'Empire.

Art. VI.— Si alors on voudra me permettre d'aborder les différents articles dans un coup d'œil rapide il est de la dernière importance pour mon gouvernement de connaître le nombre des troupes d'occupation et leurs effectifs pour ce qui est aussi des officiers et des chev[aux] que les Alliés après la démobilisation et après l'établiss[ement] d'un état de permanence ont l'intention d'entretenir dans [les] régions rhénanes. Sans des renseignements exacts sur la force numérique de ces troupes et, par conséquent, sur les frais de leur entretien mon gouvernement se verrait dans l'impossibilité d'établir un budget correct — base de la vie de chaque Etat — et de balancer d'avance les recettes et les dépenses.

Art. VII.— En outre l'article I prévoit que le nombre des forces policières sera déterminé par les alliés. Quant à cela, je prierais la Haute Commission de bien vouloir se mettre en rapport avec le Commissaire d'Empire, qui donne[ra] les

renseignements requis sur le nombre de la gendarmerie, police de l'Etat et des Communes, indispensables. Vu la criminalité causée par les souffrances de la guerre, vu l'état d'agitation que les grèves déréglées ont fait naître dans la population des classes ouvrières, il faut que le nombre des gendarmes et des agents de sûreté soit considérablement plus élevé qu'avant la guerre.

Art. VIII.— Pour l'article 3 sub voce *a*, je formule la prière qu'en principe la Haute Commission veuille reconnaî[tre de] devoir consulter, avant que soit émises des ordonnances, l'op[inion] du Commissaire d'Empire.

C'est dans l'intérêt du fonctionnement de l'administration. Lois de l'Empire, lois d'Etats fédéraux promulgués [*sic*] par 5 Etats, dans le gouvernement de Wiesbaden en outre des lois anciennes du temps du vieux duché de Nassau avant l'année 1866, des ordonnances provin . . .⁷ [*?* provinciales] sont valides dans les territoires rhénans. Bref, toute la diversité et tout le manque de clarté du droit public en vigu[eur en] Allemagne. C'est que les membres français de la Haute Commission ne pourront que malaisément se faire une idée de l'é[stat] compliqué du droit public allemand vis-à-vis de la simplicité et de la clarté de la législation française.

Art. IX.— Les dispositions dans l'article 3 sub voce *d* et *e* sont d'une force incisive toute spéciale. Qu'il faille soumettre les forces militaires des Alliés à un traitement particulier quant à la juridiction, je le reconnais. Mais il faut éclaircir ce qu'on entend par des personnes qui sont attachées aux forces militaires et à qui les généraux commandant en chef des armées[s] d'occupation font avoir des laissez-passer révocables et ce qu'il faut entendre par toutes les personnes employées par les troupes ou étant à leur service. Mon gouvernement aime à croire qu'il ne s'agit que de ressortissants des Alliés et non pas de nationaux allemands. Il compte avec certitude sur ce que des ressortissants allemands resteront soumis à sa juridiction . . .⁷ ère. Ce serait défavorable à une bonne justice, si à des ressortissants allemands l'exterritorialité était conférée par la remise d'un laissez-passer révocable ou par leur emploi au service [*?* des] forces militaires. Par là, on arriverait à créer tout bonnement deux classes de citoyens allemands; dont l'une serait soumise à la juridiction allemande et dont l'autre y échapperait. Le droit des gens ne reconnaît l'exterritorialité que pour des nationaux étrangers et non pas pour les propres ressortissants. Les conséquences d'une autre manière de voir, on me permettra bien de les exposer, le cas échéant.

Art. X.— Je demande à être informé si par juridiction militaire il faudra aussi entendre la juridiction civile, si les troupes, leur personnel, les familles des officiers et des fonctionnaires civils devront aussi être soustraits à la juridiction allemande pour ce qui est de tous les contrats, achats et comma[n]des faits pour leur besoin privé. A moi cela semble impossible. Si [*?* d']un achat, un bail ou une commande il résulte des contestations en justice, il faudrait intenter ces litiges civils devant le tribunal du juge allemand. Pour ce qui est de l'exécution des sentences, il faudrait f[aire] un arrangement spécial.

Art. XI.— De plus, mon gouvernement aime à croire q[u'à] tous les actes incriminables s'appliquera le code pénal allemand d'après les maximes générales de droit.

Art. XII.— A besoin aussi d'être éclairci l'article [4] qui prévoit une stipulation propre à causer en Allemagne la plus vive excitation. C'est un des pilier[s] du droit allemand qu'un Allemand ne doit jamais être extradé à un gouvernement étranger quelconque dans le but d'une poursuite judiciaire ou d'une punition. Ce principe-là, on l'a enfreint dans l'article 4. On fait incomber aux autorités allemandes

⁷ The text is defective.

l'engagement d'extrader chaque Allemand accusé d'un crime ou d'un délit perpétrés contre la personne ou les biens des forces armées. Je présume qu'il soit une condition essentielle pour la compétence des cours martiales que le coupable se soit trouvé sur territoire occupé pendant qu'il a commis le délit ou le crime dont il est accusé. La procédure à employer devra être exactement fixée.

XIII.— L'article 5 n'affecte point l'organisation administrative, à moins que la Haute Commission ne croit néces[sai]rement par voie d'ordonnance d'adapter l'administration aux besoins et aux conditions de l'occupation militaire. Je serais très reconnaissant de savoir ce qu'on entend par là. A en croire la teneur une simple ordonnance de la Haute Commission serait à même de changer les frontières d'Etat entre la Prusse et la Bavière, entre la Bavière et la Hesse. Je suis sûr qu'on n'a point voulu dire cela attendu que par là les droits civiques des habitants seraient le plus profondément affectés.

XIV.— Je demande de bien vouloir me confirmer que par administration civile il faut aussi entendre l'administration financière, de sorte que les recettes de l'Empire et des Etat[s] fédéraux perçu[c]s dans le territoire occupé pourront sans entrav[es] être versées aux caisses centrales de l'Empire et des Etats fédéraux, c'est à dire à Berlin, Munich, Karlsruhe, Darmstadt et Oldenbourg. J'attache beaucoup de valeur à ce que cela soit constaté, parce que pendant l'état de guerre on avait souvent défendu des versements semblables.

XV.— Certaine disposition fait une impression particulièrement pénible, à savoir celle qui dit que les autori[tés] allemandes devront être tenues, sous peine d'être révoquées, à se soumettre à toutes les ordonnances. Il va sans dire qu'un fonctionnaire allemand quelconque obéira à une ordonnance émise selon toutes les règles. En outre, je prie de bien vouloir faire faire la révocation par l'intermédiaire du Commissaire d'Empire et de vouloir, par conséquent, accorder à ce dernier la responsabilité d'examiner et d'éclaircir l'état des choses.

XVI.— Au sujet de l'article 6 ce qu'on ressent comme étant extraordinaire c'est qu'après le rétablissement de l'état de paix la convention de la Haye réglant les usages de la guerre sur terre et ne visant que le cas de guerre doive être mise en vigueur. L'arrangement dans l'alinéa 2 concernant la constatation des réquisitions est en désaccord avec une loi promulguée par l'Empire en date du 2 mars et . . .⁸ Je serais très reconnaissant si par une confection spéciale l'on pouvait obtenir que les stipulations de ladite loi de l'Empire, tenant compte dans la plus large mesure des désirs de la population, fussent appliquées. En fait, l'Allemagne étant tenue à subvenir aux frais entiers de l'entretien, on devrait tout de même se remettre à elle de la manière d'indemniser ses propres ressortissants. Il serait seulement requis de faire coopérer des officiers de l'armée d'occupation pour constater l'espèce du dommage causé. De la manière d'indemnisation on pourrait se rapporter à l'Allemagne. Les questions sont tellement difficiles et complexes qu'elles ne pourraient être réglées que par des experts de part et d'autre. En particulier il faudra dresser un tarif et il faudra prendre soin d'établir la plus grande homogén[é]ité possible dans le territoire occupé afin qu'un[c] part de la population ne soit pas placée dans une situation meilleure ou plus mauvaise que l'autre.

XVII.— Pour l'article 7 il faudra examiner si l'on ne pourra [p]as remettre à la disposition de la population civile gravement éprouvée un nombre considérable de locaux à présent utilisés.

Au sujet de l'article 8 alinéa a il sera attaché au Commissaire d'Empire un expert militaire. Le Gouvernement allemand présumerait volontiers qu'en requérant et

⁸ Punctuation as in original. The date of this law was March 2, 1919: cf. document 3.

en arrangeant les terrains on aura les plus grands égards possibles à la détresse économique de la population. C'est ce qui s'applique de même au droit des Alliés de prendre possession d'un établissement public ou privé quelconque. A présent, de vastes sanatoria pour phthisiques et pour névropathiques sont réquisitionnés, et par là la possibilité de guérison de ces maladies justement est devenue problématique. La lutte contre la tuberculose est de caractère international et n'a rien à voir avec les frontières politiques. J'en appelle à des hommes de haute compétence, comme M. Léon Bourgeois, Président des institutions internationales pour la lutte contre la tuberculose, qui, peu d'années avant la guerre, a admiré sous ma conduite nos institutions allemandes. Il faut que les sanatoria soient évacués le plus vite possible pour les classes non aisées et qu'ils soient rendus à leur destination propre.

XVIII.— *L'article 9* a besoin d'être éclairci quant à son alinéa I. Je présume qu'on n'exige que l'exemption de l'impôt personnel, mais non pas celle de l'impôt réel, c'est-à-dire que si, par exemple, un officier ou un fonctionnaire acquérait des immeubles pendant la durée de l'occupation le personnage en question aurait à acquitter l'impôt sur les immeubles et d'autres impôts réels ou l'impôt sur la patente. On aura également à stipuler qu'aucun Allemand ou personnage neutre ne devra appartenir au personnel exempt d'impôt. On ne pourrait nullement tolérer qu'un Allemand en se faisant incorporer dans le personnel des troupes d'occupation acquit de ce chef le privilège d'exemption d'impôt. Que les provision[s] de bouche, armes, vêtements, équipement et provisions de toute espèce destinés à l'usage des troupes alliées ou pour la Haute Commission jouissent de libertés et de libre entrée, voilà ce à quoi nous ne trouverions pas à redire. Le libellé qui veut que toutes ces marchandises, pourvu seulement qu'elles soient adressées à des autorités militaires ou à des cantines de mess d'officiers, puissent entrer exemptes de droit ne nous paraît pas croyable. C'est ce qui renverserait tout le fonctionnement douanier de l'Allemagne. C'est comme qui dirait une énorme voie d'eau dans la coque du navire allemand, voie d'eau qui laisserait entrer l'eau librement de sorte à faire sombrer le vaisseau. Voilà ce qui ne peut point être l'intention des Alliés, qui ne peuvent pas ne pas avoir le désir d'amener la reconstruction de l'Allemagne. Mais cette dernière ne pourra s'effectuer qu'à condition qu'à la frontière allemande la protection douanière soit intégralement maintenue. Pour se garantir de la contrebande il serait requis de faire enregistrer par la statistique toutes les marchandises à destination des Alliés de manière à pouvoir à tous moments constater si elles n'entrent pas en arborant un faux pavillon, mais qu'elles sont, au contraire, vraiment destinées pour les troupes alliées. Sous ce rapport, aussi, les détails du procédé seraient à régler.

XIX.— Le Gouvernement allemand aime à croire qu'on ne fera point usage de la stipulation de l'article 270 des conditions de paix et que la frontière douanière coïncidera avec la frontière de l'Empire.

XX.— En ce qui concerne *l'article 10*, je l'interprète de telle manière que le commandant en chef ne va user de sa faculté de commandement suprême que pour des buts militaires et que pour tout le reste les voies ferrées et les lignes de bateaux à vapeur resteront soumises aux administrations centrales à Berlin, Munich et Karlsruhe. Tout particulièrement il est de rigueur qu'un trafic par chemin de fer ait lieu sans entraves entre les territoires occupés et ceux non-occupés et que l'horaire soit réglé comme en temps de paix par les administrations intéressées. On aura à arriver à un arrangement spécial concernant la remise des permis de circulation pour officiers.

XXI.— De même quant à l'article 11, on aura probablement à faire une convention particulière entre des experts commissionnés des Alliés et l'administration des postes de l'Empire allemand. A ce sujet aussi j'appuie sur ce qu'on ne devra réclamer des privilèges que pour des buts militaires. En particulier, la libre communication par lettres, par télégraphe et téléphone entre les territoires occupés et ceux non-occupés et par là l'abolition de toutes les restrictions présentement en vigueur, surtout celle de la censure postale, sont indispensables.

XXII.— Concernant l'article 13 j'ose faire la prière de bien vouloir ne décréter l'état de siège qu'après avoir préalablement consulté le commissaire d'Empire. Si le nombre des forces policières est suffisant et que le trafic libre est [?] non entravé entre les territoires occupés et ceux non-occupés soit établi et qu'enfin la reconstitution économique de l'Allemagne fasse des progrès, j'ai pleine confiance qu'alors il se trouvera être superflu de décréter l'état de siège.

XXIII.— Qu'on veuille bien me permettre de résumer mon exposé en peu de phrases:

Mon Gouvernement a l'impression que l'arrangement conclu ne tient pas dûment et suffisamment compte du complet changement de la situation générale de l'état de guerre dans l'état de paix. Le Haut Commandement des troupes alliées a riposté à différentes reprises à la Commission d'armistice allemande: 'Nous sommes encore en guerre.' A présent, cependant, que l'Assemblée nationale allemande a ratifié des Conditions de Paix et que les instruments de ratification seront sous peu échangés, nous passons bien dans l'état de paix.

Les énormes fardeaux et obligations dont s'est chargée l'Allemagne et dont elle s'efforcera de s'acquitter d'une manière honnête et loyale jusqu'à l'extrême limite de ses forces ne pourront être supportés qu'à condition que les territoires rhénans occupés, eux aussi, avec leur industrie, leur agriculture et tous leurs métiers développés au dernier degré aideront sans réserve aucune à les porter. Voilà ce qui nécessite, en dépit de l'occupation militaire, le rétablissement de l'état de paix. Les intérêts des Alliés coïncident à ce sujet avec ceux de l'Allemagne. Moins toutes les conditions d'existence dans les territoires occupés seront entravées, moins l'occupation sera pesante et resserrante — et plus l'Allemagne pourra complètement s'acquitter de nos obligations.

En ayant pleine confiance que les Alliés apprécieront cette manière de voir et qu'ils en tiendront compte, nous autres Allemands abordons ces pourparlers.

LEWALD.

Dr. MICHAELIS BASCH.

Document 3^o

Deuxième Note Allemande

ARTICLE 3

§ 24.— Non seulement le Commandant en Chef des troupes alliées et associées, mais aussi les différents commandants d'armées, généraux, commandants, commandants de places etc. ont émis pendant l'armistice en vertu du règlement de la guerre de terre de la Haye de nombreux décrets ayant force de loi en sorte qu'ainsi il existe pour le moment un droit excessivement bigarré supprimant l'unité juridique et provoquant une grande insécurité dans la vie commerciale. Il doit être supposé que tous ces décrets seront annulés au moment de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et de l'institution de la Haute Commission.

⁹ This document is missing from the filed original and has been supplied from another source.

§ 25.— La même situation de droit se poserait concernant les décrets spéciaux des autorités militaires susnommées, notamment concernant les interdiction[s] de séjour dans les territoires occupés, par suite desquelles beaucoup d'habitants ont été chassés de leurs foyers. Il est supposé que ces personnes peuvent maintenant retourner tranquillement dans leur patrie et qu'à l'avenir ni la Haute Commission, ni les autorités militaires n'auront le droit d'émettre des décrets de ce genre.

§ 26.— Comme, d'après le chef *e*, les tribunaux de guerre des troupes d'occupation ont été déclarés compétents seulement pour les crimes et délits contre la personne ou les biens des armées des Puissances Alliées et Associées il doit en être déduit que le jugement des infractions aux décrets émis par la Haute Commission d'après le chif [?chef] *a* qui n'ont pas pour but la protection des personnes et des biens des armées ne sont pas de la compétence de ces tribunaux de guerre.

ARTICLE 5

§ 27.— L'organisation de l'administration en provinces, gouvernements, cercles ruraux et urbains et communes est une institution spéciale à la Prusse qui n'existe pas dans cette graduation dans les autres Etats fédéraux intéressés à l'occupation, par exemple la Bavière n'a pas de provinces mais bien des districts. Dans la province rhénane de la Prusse les communes rurales font partie des cantons. Différentes administrations spéciales ont une propre organisation territoriale, dont les frontières ne correspondent pas aux circonscriptions de l'administration intérieure, par exemple en Prusse l'administration des impôts directs, les administrations des chemins de fer, les commissions générales, etc.

§ 28.— L'expression 'sous l'autorité du Gouvernement central allemand' est interprétée en ce sens qu'il faut entendre par là également les Gouvernements des Etats fédéraux allemands.

§ 29.— Après la mise en vigueur de l'arrangement il n'y a plus de place pour l'institution des 'administrateurs ou contrôleurs' adjoints aux autorités allemandes dans certains secteurs des territoires occupés. Sous réserve du droit de la Haute Commission d'exiger la révocation des fonctionnaires, le Gouvernement allemand est libre à l'avenir en ce qui concerne la nomination, le déplacement et la révocation de ses fonctionnaires indifféremment du fait que ceux-ci soient originaires du territoire occupé ou non-occupé.

Paragraphe 30.— L'administration de l'enseignement public fait partie de l'Administration civile et sera par suite régie par les lois allemandes. L'arrangement ne permet pas d'introduire par ordre de l'occupant l'enseignement de langues étrangères.

Paragraphe 31.— Rien ne s'oppose plus maintenant à la mise en vigueur de lois de l'Empire allemand ou des Etats fédéraux dont l'extension sur le territoire occupé a été empêchée jusqu'à présent par les autorités d'occupation parce qu'elles avaient été décrétées après l'armistice en sorte que p. ex. les élections pour les représentants communaux dans les territoires occupés peuvent avoir lieu bientôt en vertu du nouveau droit de suffrage démocratique.

ARTICLE 6

Paragraphe 32.— L'exécution sévère de cet arrêt pourrait entraîner une paralysie de toute la vie économique dans les pays occupés vu que ni un commerçant ni un fabricant pourrait prendre ses dispositions ou faire ses calculs, s'il avait toujours à craindre que le jour suivant déjà toutes ses combinaisons pourraient être renversées par la réquisition de ses marchandises ou de sa fabrique. De même

aucun agriculteur oserait courir le risque d'introduire de l'étranger ou même seulement de l'Allemagne inoccupée du bétail et surtout des chevaux s'il se sentait constamment sous le coup d'un[e] réquisition qui lui prendrait son bétail qu'il venait d'introduire à gros frais. Il semble donc inévitable de préciser ces questions de manière que la sûreté de la vie économique ne s'en présente pas trop [*sic*]. En ce qui concerne l'évaluation des frais de réquisition et des dommages causés par des troupes d'occupation, l'article 6 prévoit des comités locaux d'une composition mixte présidée par une personne nommée par la Haute Commission. Quant au droit matériel d'après lequel ces évaluations devraient se faire, l'article n'en parle pas, quoique précisément ceci serait de la plus grande importance pour la population en question. L'Empire allemand a réglé la question d'évaluations et de remboursements des réquisitions exécutées par les troupes d'occupation dans les provinces rhénanes ainsi que des dommages de guerre occasionnés par les dites troupes par une loi pénale spéciale, qui a été émise sous la date du 2 mars 1919 et qui a été imprimée sur les pages 261 et suivantes de l'année courante du *Reich[s]-gesetzblatt*. L'exécution de cette loi dans la zone occupée par les Anglais bat son plein et n'a pas été l'objet jusqu'à présent de plaintes ni du côté des autorités d'occupation anglaises ni du côté de la population. Les commandants des autres zones d'occupation par contre ont défendu l'exécution de cette loi et ont commencé de leur côté indépendamment avec l'estimation et le remboursement des dédommagements de réquisitions. Et en plus dans les différentes zones d'occupation l'exécution s'est faite d'après des principes divers et des tarifs divers. Il est évident que la différence de systèmes est la cause d'un mécontentement de la population. Il faut ajouter que plusieurs autorités d'occupation semblent faire usage à cette occasion des lois de leurs pays qui ne s'accordent aucunement avec les besoins allemands. C'est ainsi par exemple que d'après un décret de l'Etat-Major de la 10^e Armée Française, 4^e Bureau, il est interdit de payer des dédommagements de réquisitions au cas que les mobiliers ou immeubles appartiennent aux sociétés suivantes :

- 1^o — Aux Etats Fédéraux.
- 2^o — Aux administrations publiques civiles ou militaires.
- 3^o — Aux provinces, aux cercles, et aux autres communes.
- 4^o — Aux sociétés de transport de toute sorte (à voie ferrée, par eau, ou par terre).
- 5^o — Aux sociétés de charbonnage et d'éclairage.
- 6^o — A toutes les autres sociétés assurant le service public ou les intérêts publics.

D'après la loi allemande le fisc de l'Empire allemand est obligé de prendre à sa charge les frais de tous les engagements qui sont en rapport avec l'armistice ou le Traité de Paix. Le fisc de l'Empire n'est pas identique avec le fisc des états fédéraux. Le droit allemand ne connaît pas 'les sociétés assurant le service public ou les intérêts publics'. Les puissances d'occupation n'ont guère d'intérêt à empêcher l'Empire allemand de dédommager les administrations de chemins de fer, des états fédéraux et d'autres stations fiscales, les provinces, les cercles et les autres communes, les usines à gaz et d'électricité, suivant la loi allemande. Vu la situation actuelle dans la zone d'occupation française, que d'un côté l'exécution de la loi de l'Empire allemand du 2. 3. 1919 est strictement défendue, et que d'autre côté il existe l'ordonnance française, adressée à ses propres autorités, de ne pas dédommager les services de guerre que nous venons de mentionner plus haut, il se trouve une lacune qui à la longue nous mènera à un état de choses intenable. Quant à la

zone d'occupation belge la situation est semblable. Une communication publiée en avril de l'année suivante [sic] permettrait l'interprétation suivante:

1. Les réquisitions effectuées (?avant) le 1^{er} mai de l'année courante ne seront ni évaluées ni remboursées du côté belge.
2. De même ne sera pas évalué ni remboursé le logement, indifféremment, s'il y a lieu avant ou après le 1^{er} mai de l'année courante.
3. Les communes ne seront pas dédommées pour les paiements des réquisitions qu'elles ont effectuées à l'ordre des Belges.

Vous trouvez donc également ici une triple lacune. Ce serait à l'avantage général si on arrivait par l'application du droit allemand qui a été formé d'après les besoins des pays rhénans à une solution commune au sujet de l'estimation et du remboursement des indemnités. Si les Puissances d'occupation tenaient à prendre part aux travaux de recherches des dommages, on pourrait facilement trouver une force [sic] à ce sujet par mesure administrative sans qu'il fût nécessaire d'abroger la loi allemande. Les réquisitions ne devraient se faire que par le Commandant en Chef des troupes alliées et associées ou par les commandants en chef des diverses puissances et en cas qu'elles fussent d'importance, seulement par l'intermédiaire du Commissaire de l'Empire qui aurait la tâche de prendre l[es] mesures nécessaires afin de garantir l'exécution des réquisitions.

ARTICLE 8

§ 33.— Les fonctionnaires civils, les officiers et leurs familles pouvant être logés en suivant les règlements concernant les cantonnements actuellement en vigueur dans chaque armée, l'Allemagne exprime le désir de ce qu'un exemplaire de ces règlements lui soit bientôt remis. Comme probablement des règlements concernant le logement des familles font défaut dans les différentes armées, il est nécessaire d'établir un accord spécial. Il est également nécessaire de fixer plus clairement l'étendue du terme de la 'famille'.

Les troupes d'occupation devraient être le plus possible concentrées dans certaines garnisons et non pas dispersées sur tout le territoire. Lors de la dislocation il devrait être tenu compte des emplacements existant pour le logement des troupes et de la pénurie d'habitations très grande en beaucoup d'endroits. Il est de toute importance d'apprendre bientôt quels sont les endroits envisagés pour les garnisons de longue durée, afin de pouvoir entreprendre au besoin les installations nécessaires, en vue d'éviter d'établir des casinos d'officiers dans les maisons privées.

APPENDIX B TO NO. 15

PEACE CONFERENCE

W. C. P. 1146.] *Feeding of Russian prisoners in Germany*

MEMORANDUM BY MR. HOOVER

It will be recollected that the Allied Governments made certain agreements with the Germans for the retention of Russian prisoners in Germany, and made undertakings for the support of these prisoners by the Allied Governments. Their food supply and support has been carried out through the French Government, the British Red Cross, the American Red Cross, with a personnel of about 800 Allied officers, doctors, etc., under the general direction of the Inter-Allied Military

Mission at Berlin. The Supreme Economic Council has appealed to arrange for such food supply, and the measures above recited were finally, to a considerable degree, instituted at the inspiration of that Council.

The British Red Cross have already notified of the withdrawal of their entire personnel on the first of August. This will immediately leave some 35,000 of the prisoners without supervision. The American Army will necessarily demobilize their entire personnel some time in the month of August. The Red Cross Societies are withdrawing their financial support and the funds for the provision of food and clothing (except those provided by the French Government) are absolutely exhausted, and I understand that even these are about to be withdrawn. The Supreme Economic Council has no means by which any further provision can be made in this matter.

The retention of these prisoners was primarily a military measure instituted under the Allied Military authorities and it would appear to me must now become a proper concern of the various War Departments. There are apparently over 200,000 prisoners left, of whom it is desired to repatriate approximately 25,000 as recruits to the Russian Northern Army. Of the balance, some 40,000 should be repatriated to Southern Russia and the remainder to Central Russia. The prisoners are not entirely free from Bolshevik ideas, which may have a political bearing on the destinations to which they are repatriated. The large majority have no desire to fight either for or against the Bolsheviks, and their sole desire is to return to their families whom they have not seen for five years. In any event, it is necessary to provide at once some measure of food, clothing, and personnel to supervise distribution pending repatriation, and beyond this it is necessary to immediately provide for their repatriation. This latter operation will require some months, but they must be repatriated before winter.

I understand the German authorities are demanding the immediate repatriation of these prisoners, as it required a force of some 18,000 German troops to guard them. The prisoners themselves are demanding their repatriation. I understand that their boots and clothing are in such condition that they cannot be marched to any destination, and, in any event, they would probably indulge in brigandage unless repatriated under military supervision. The points therefore to be decided are:

1. Are the prisoners to be repatriated at once?
2. Are they to be repatriated to the nearest Russian point through Poland?
3. Are they to be repatriated by sea to Black Sea ports?
4. If either of these alternatives, who is to pay for the cost thereof, and who is to undertake it?
5. Who is to furnish the food and personnel for their care in the meantime?

I would like to emphasize that the relief agencies under co-ordination through the Supreme Economic Council have now practically exhausted their resources and cannot take part in this matter, so that other arrangements must be set up at the earliest possible moment.

HERBERT HOOVER.

16th July, 1919.

H. D. 12.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 21, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieut. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (a) MR. BALFOUR said that before starting with the subjects on the Agenda, he would like to observe that there was not a single item on it touching Peace with Bulgaria, or indeed touching any Treaty of Peace at all. The subjects for discussion were no doubt important subjects, but the Bulgarians were to come to Paris on the following Friday.¹ He thought it would be discreditable if the Conference were not ready to hand them a Treaty on their arrival, or shortly after it. He understood that the delay came from the re-opening of the frontier question. The Reparation and Financial Clauses were delayed in consequence. Unless the ultimate size of Bulgaria were known, it was difficult to estimate what sums she would be able to pay. Another question that was delayed was that of responsibilities, and the method of procedure to be adopted against persons who had broken the laws of war. He had enquired why Clauses similar to those inserted in the Treaties with Germany and with Austria were not adopted for the Treaty of Bulgaria, and he had been given the following explanations. In the other Treaties it had been stipulated that if the crime had been committed to the detriment of a Frenchman, the trial should be in a French Court, and if against an Englishman, in an English Court. If against Nationals of several countries, in a mixed Court. It appeared, however, that a Greek, Serbian, or Roumanian Court would not be regarded as offering a fair trial to a Bulgarian who had committed an offence against a Greek, Serbian or Roumanian. This might or might not be, but whatever the merits of the case, he thought the Council should insist that the work be terminated rapidly. He would suggest that M. Clemenceau should request the Commissions to expedite their labours.

MR. WHITE said that he would like to add a word to Mr. Balfour's remarks. He wished to propose that the Council should give authority to the Commission on New States to take up the protection of minorities clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria. He understood that the Economic Clauses and the clauses prepared by the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission were ready.

¹ July 25, 1919.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Mr. White's information was not quite accurate. The Port question, for instance, was held up pending a decision as to whether or not Bulgaria was to have Dedeagatch.

MR. WHITE said that in any case the Commission on New States might get to work on Clauses for the protection of minorities.

(It was agreed that the Commission on New States be asked to prepare for the Treaty with Bulgaria Clauses for the protection of Minorities.)

(b) M. TITTONI said that in accordance with the request of his colleagues,² he had discussed the question of frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria with M. Venizelos. The latter demanded the whole of Eastern and Western Thrace, and declined to reduce his claims in any respect. It was therefore impossible to obtain any concession and the question must be decided by the Council. Consequently he considered his mission ended as he could obtain nothing further from M. Venizelos.

(c) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Tardieu to explain the situation regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

*Explanation by
M. Tardieu*

(M. Tardieu entered the room.)

M. Clemenceau said that the Bulgarians were expected to arrive in four days. He asked him, as President of the Commission dealing with Bulgaria, to explain to what extent the Treaty was ready for them.

M. TARDIEU said that he was only President of the Commission dealing with the frontier question. In that Commission, the result obtained was total disagreement between the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand, and the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other. M. Tardieu then read and explained the report contained in Appendix A. He said that he would like to add a few words in support of the opinions he had himself backed in the Commission. In Western Thrace there was no choice between Greece and Bulgaria on ethnological grounds. The vast majority of the population was Turkish. The country, however, was not to be given to the Turks. The next most numerous population was, according to French statistics, Greek—according to other statistics, Bulgarian. It was very likely that the war had brought about alterations in the relative proportions of the population. As to the possession of a Port, the Bulgarians had a good Port on the Black Sea. The internationalisation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles would give them free access to the open sea. As to discontent, there would undoubtedly be discontent in Bulgaria, but the Balkans were the natural home of discontent, and the only question was whether discontent should be chiefly on the side of those who had fought against us, or mainly among the Balkan Nations who had fought for us. He would remind the Council that the impossible desire to produce union in the Balkans had wasted precious months during the war. It led to the Allied defeat at the Dardanelles, and to numerous troubles in Salonika. The mistakes made in the war should not be repeated in the Peace. As to the ultimate disposal of

² See No. 11, minute 6.

Eastern Thrace, he did not wish to prejudice the question. It might perhaps be most fitting to attribute it to the territory of Constantinople should the Council decide not to give it to Greece. The point was, not who got it, but who lost it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question was evidently one which the Council must solve. He was prepared to discuss it at once, but he was afraid that Mr. White would not be able, without consulting his Government, to reach a decision immediately.

MR. WHITE said this was so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that unfortunately he could not be present in the Council on the following day, and that M. Pichon also would be unavoidably detained in Brussels. He was not sure that a meeting could be held on Wednesday.³ He hoped that by Thursday Mr. White could obtain the views of his Government.

MR. WHITE said that he would send a second telegram that very evening to endeavour to obtain instructions by Thursday.

MR. BALFOUR said that he regretted the delay as he regarded the matter as very urgent. He would, however, as it was necessary, assent to a postponement until Thursday.

(In view of the importance of terminating at the earliest possible moment, the preparation of the Treaty of [?with] Bulgaria, it was decided that the first item on the Agenda for Thursday, July 24th, should be the determination of the frontiers of Bulgaria.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had just received a communication from Bela

*Appointment of an
International Com-
mittee of Enquiry
for Hungary*

Kun announcing that he proposed to attack the Roumanians, in order to enforce upon them respect for the Armistice arranged by the Powers. (Appendix B.) M. Clemenceau added that he did not know whether the Roumanians would be able to resist the attack. They had two divisions with which to oppose it. French troops were not far off and General Franchet d'Esperey had ordered them to fire if attacked. This news perhaps rendered the appointment of the Committee unnecessary.

MR. BALFOUR said that he considered himself authorised to nominate a General to go to Hungary. The General in question was Major-General Gorton.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Generals might proceed to the front and report on what was going on there.

MR. WHITE said that he had, as yet, received no orders from Washington.

M. TITTONI said that, according to news from a good source, General Boehm, who had been Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, had paid a visit to Vienna. He had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief but appeared to be still in touch with Bela Kun. It would seem, from what he had said in Vienna, that an effort was being made to convert the Communist Government of Hungary into a Socialist Government. He suggested that the Allied Representatives at Vienna be asked to enquire into this report and inform the Council of the results of their enquiry.

(It was decided not to nominate the Committee of Enquiry until such time as Mr. White should have obtained the views of his Government. It was

³ July 23, 1919.

further decided that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna should be asked for information regarding the visit of General Boehm to that city, and to investigate the report that he had declared that he was trying to bring about a movement in Hungary aiming at the transformation of the present Communist Government of Bela Kun into a Socialist Government. The truth and eventual importance of the alleged scheme should be verified.)

(At this point, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites entered the room.)

3. The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives on the Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia. (Appendix C.⁴)

Report of the Military Representatives on Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia

GENERAL BELIN read the conclusions of the report to the effect that 1 division of 13,000 men would be required.

MR. BALFOUR asked whence this division could be obtained.

GENERAL BELIN said that, in the first draft of the report, it had been suggested that the division should be drawn from the troops employed in the occupation of the Rhineland. He would suggest, therefore, that Marshal Foch be asked if he could spare the troops. These troops would not be lost to Marshal Foch's command: they would be stationed on the confines of Poland and Prussia, and, should any trouble arise requiring armed intervention, these troops, which would remain under Marshal Foch's orders, could be utilised to co-operate with any movements made in the west.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch's estimate for the troops of occupation was 150,000 men. He would certainly be able to spare 13,000 from this number. He entirely agreed with the judicious remarks of General Belin. The division would, no doubt, be composed of international elements.

(It was agreed that the report of the Military Representatives, together with the suggestion that the necessary troops should be furnished by the Army of Occupation on the Rhine, be approved in principle and be submitted to Marshal Foch for his views regarding the possibility of furnishing the division required and on its composition.)

4. The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives. (Appendix D.⁵)

Report of the Military Representatives on Assistance to Poland in the ceded territory in case of Disturbance

GENERAL BELIN read the conclusions of the Report under the heading 'Material Assistance'.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the means of transport to Poland were unsatisfactory. An inter-allied train, laden with munitions on its way to Poland, had been blown up on German territory. The German Government did not appear to be involved. The train was guarded by Polish soldiers, who had apparently been neglectful. It would perhaps, therefore, be advantageous to organise transport by sea.

⁴ Not printed. This appendix was identical with No. 11, appendix E, q.v.

⁵ Not printed. This appendix was identical with No. 11, appendix F, q.v.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the only port available was Dantzig and that Allied control over it was not very good.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation at Dantzig had improved. The turbulent elements were quieter and the German Government appeared to be resigned to losing the port. He suggested that the best plan would be to ask Marshal Foch to telegraph to General Nudant in Berlin to open negotiations with the German Government regarding transport by sea.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch be asked to initiate negotiations with the German Government for the transport of material for Poland to Dantzig.)

GENERAL BELIN then read the conclusions of the report under the heading 'Preventive Measures'. He explained that there were Allied officers serving in the Polish Army. Some of these might be nominated in advance to posts on the Delimitation Commission, which, as such, was only to be appointed 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. These officers might, in anticipation of their future duties, undertake to supervise the handing over of the ceded districts.

(This proposal was agreed to.)

It was decided that Marshal Foch be requested to report on the possibility of appointing Allied Officers serving in the Polish Army, who would ultimately be nominated to the Delimitation Commission, to supervise the transfer of the ceded territory from Germany to Poland.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a letter from M. Venizelos regarding the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry. (See Appendix E.⁶) M. Venizelos desired that a Greek Commissioner be appointed. This proposal did not appear to be very acceptable.

*Appointment of Inter-
Allied Commission of
Enquiry in Asia Minor*

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the Council had sent French and Italian officers to investigate the incidents at Fiume.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the case was different. At Fiume the incidents had occurred as between Nationals of the Great Powers. In Asia Minor the incidents concerned Greeks and Turks. It appeared to him unreasonable to appoint a Greek to investigate a case of that kind. If his colleagues disagreed with him, however, he would not press this point of view.

M. TITTONI said that he was of the same opinion as M. Clemenceau. The investigating Commission would be the direct emanation of the Council. It should, therefore, conform to the composition of the Council. If a Greek officer were to be appointed to the Commission in Asia Minor, it might be argued on the same lines that M. Venizelos should have remained in the room, at a previous meeting, when the Council deliberated on the subject of the Greek occupation in Anatolia.

MR. BALFOUR said that in the early days of the Conference, it had been

⁶ Not printed. M. Venizelos' letter, dated July 19, 1919, was as indicated by M. Clemenceau.

laid down that Powers with limited interests should be represented when matters directly affecting them were discussed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were heard on matters regarding their interests, but the deliberations were conducted by the Five Powers.

MR. WHITE said that he thought the argument on both sides was strong, and that he had no very definite preferences.

MR. BALFOUR asked the military experts present in the room whether they thought the collaboration of a Greek officer would be conducive to a sound finding.

GENERAL THWAITES expressed the opinion that it was undesirable to appoint a Greek officer.

GENERAL BLISS said that the presence of officers of all Allied Nations would give an appearance of impartiality. He did not feel strongly on the subject, but he was inclined personally to think that there should be officers from each of the Allied Nations on the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the presence of a Greek officer on the Commission would doubtless not matter much.

M. TRITTONI objected to it as creating a precedent, which challenged the whole mechanism of the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Greek officer would go as a representative of the Powers.

(After some further discussion it was agreed that M. Venizelos be informed that he might appoint a Greek officer to follow the labours of the Commission. This officer would not, however, have a vote on the Commission and would take no part in its finding.)

The following nominations were then made:—

For Italy	General Dallolio.
„ France	General Franchet d'Esperey to nominate an officer.
„ Great Britain	General Milne to nominate an officer.
„ United States of America	An officer to be appointed after a reply from Washington had been received.

It was decided that the Commission should begin its labours at once, and should gather as early as possible at Constantinople.)

6.

Appointment of a Commission of Administration in the Plebiscite zone of Upper Silesia

(It was agreed that nominations to this Commission should be communicated to the Secretary-General on the following day.)

7.

Report of Financial Commission regarding the financial Assistance to the Baltic States

MR. BALFOUR said that the report (Appendix F) was to the effect that the Commission was unable to say whether the money required by General Gough was really necessary, whether the Allied Governments could furnish the money and what security existed for repayment. For all the assistance given to the Council, the Commission might as well not have reported at all. He quoted from a telegram from General Gough to the effect that

the Germans were paying 15 million marks a month to support the Baltic Landwehr and the troops of Prince Lieven,⁷ and suggesting that to deliver Latvia and Russia from financial obligation to Germany, the Germans be ordered to continue payment into a British bank to the account of the Ulmanis Government⁷ as a portion of the reparation due from Germany. Mr. Balfour added that it was surprising that the Germans should be able to pay such a sum while all the Entente Powers together could not afford half a million a month.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the matter could not be settled at that meeting.

(The question was therefore postponed.)

8. M. TARDIEU said that, as he had previously explained,⁸ there was a Commission to supervise the execution of the Territorial and Political Clauses of the Treaty, and another to supervise the execution of the Reparation and Financial Clauses. There were, however, two other important chapters in the Treaty requiring similar Commissions, namely, the Economic and Colonial. He pointed out that the existing committees could not perform this work. He, therefore, proposed that a Committee be appointed to supervise the execution of these Clauses of the Treaty.

*Appointment of Com-
missions to Supervise
Execution of Economic
and Colonial Clauses
of Treaty with Ger-
many*

BARON MAKINO said that, as regards the Colonial Clauses, the most important of these were covered by the work of the Reparation Commission, and the remainder by the Committee dealing with Mandates. The work of these two bodies appeared to cover the main part of the Articles dealing with German colonies. If anything were left over, there might be a reason for appointing a new Commission, and he would be glad to know what remained over.

M. TARDIEU said that he agreed. The Reparation Commission could, he thought, in a few hours deal with all questions which the Committee on Mandates left untouched. All he wished was that some body should be required to do the necessary work on behalf of the Council.

BARON MAKINO suggested that the Committee on Mandates should be asked to make a report.

(After some further discussion, the two following resolutions were then adopted:—

1. That the supervision of the execution of the Economic Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Economic Commission. The Commission was asked to report to the Council at an early date.
2. That the supervision of the execution of the Colonial Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Mandates Committee. The Committee was asked to report to the Council at an early date.)

⁷ Cf. Vol. III of this series. (For the Ulmanis Government cf. No. 29, note 7).

⁸ See No. 12, minute 4.

9. M. TARDIEU said that he had just seen a letter which had not been communicated to the Commission dealing with the question of *The Evacuation of Klagenfurt* (Appendix G.)

M. TITTONI observed that the question relating to war material was totally different from that of the Armistice line.

M. TARDIEU said that the Council had required a line to be drawn behind which the two belligerent parties could withdraw. It had then been thought right that this line should, as nearly as possible, be the boundary between the plebiscite areas. This had been done. An argument was now raised by the Yugo-Slavs against withdrawing behind the line on the plea that there was a certain stock of arms and munitions captured by them from the Austrians which they were entitled to remove. He thought this excuse for not withdrawing should not be tolerated.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had imagined that it had been arranged that the Serbs should retire leaving behind them a small guard under Allied officers to watch these stores, to which it appeared they had a legitimate title. There appeared to be no serious objection to the execution of this plan. The stores belonged to the Serbs and should they have to abandon them they would have a real grievance.

M. TITTONI said that the matter was not as clear to him as it seemed to be to Mr. Balfour. Mr. Balfour seemed convinced that these stores belonged to the Serbs. The Serbs had occupied the territory in which these stores were after the armistice. They had no right, therefore, to claim as war booty material taken after the armistice. These stores represented a security for the reparation due from Austria. In it the Serbs were entitled not to the whole, but to one-fifth. The whole question should therefore be handed over to the Reparation Commission. If all the armaments in Austria were bartered away, there would finally remain nothing in the country to pay reparation. Further, he thought the presence of Serbian troops, even in small numbers, was incompatible with the due observance of the plebiscite. As it was, the inhabitants complained that the Serbians threatened them. The same plan therefore should be adopted in this territory as was adopted in the areas in dispute between Germans and Poles. A police force was required, but not one representing either claimant.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Tittoni's argument was a strong one, but it could hardly apply to a very small section of Serbian troops posted to guard a building. This he thought was all that the proposed force amounted to. He would like to ask at what date the plebiscite was to take place.

M. TARDIEU said that M. Tittoni's observation might have force at the time when the plebiscite was to occur, but this was to be from three to six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Treaty had not yet been signed.

MR. BALFOUR said that long before this the munitions would have been removed, and the Serbian guard would have gone with them.

M. TARDIEU said that he would suggest a slight modification of Mr. Balfour's proposal, namely, that instead of a Serbian guard, the Allied generals

in the area be asked to take charge of the stores, and to give the Serbians a receipt.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:—

‘It was decided that the troops of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be required to evacuate the whole of zone “B” in the Klagenfurt Basin, in conformity with the boundary already communicated to them.’ The arms and stores claimed by them will be handed over for custody to the Allied Generals, who will furnish a receipt for the same.’)

10. M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was a complaint communicated by
Removal of material from Danzig by Germans M. Paderewski that the Germans were removing from Dantzig all that was necessary for the working of the factories. The complaint emanated from a Committee of the working population of Danzig. (See Appendix H.)

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that Marshal Foch be asked to deal with the question.

(It was decided to refer the document communicated by M. Paderewski regarding German action in Danzig to Marshal Foch for suitable action.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 21, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO NO. 16

CONFÉRENCE DES PRÉLIMINAIRES DE PAIX.

Rapport sur les Frontières Bulgares présenté au Conseil Suprême par le Comité Central des Questions Territoriales

Le Comité central territorial, chargé par décision du Conseil suprême en date du 2 juillet,¹⁰ de proposer un tracé de frontière pour la Bulgarie, a l'honneur de formuler l'avis suivant:

I. FRONTIÈRE DE DOBROUDJA

L'unanimité n'a pu s'établir. Les avis exprimés sont les suivants:

1^o Le Comité, moins la Délégation américaine, estime qu'il n'est pas possible, par décision de la Conférence, d'imposer à la Roumanie un déplacement de la frontière existant en 1914;

2^o La Délégation américaine ne croit pas qu'il soit sage de séparer les différents éléments de la question dans le règlement des territoires roumains. Elle estime en outre que les Puissances sont qualifiées, dans l'intérêt d'une paix qu'elles ont à garantir, pour demander à la Roumanie de restituer les territoires qu'elle a annexés par la force en 1913, alors qu'elle reçoit maintenant de la main de ces Puissances des territoires beaucoup plus étendus enlevés à l'Autriche grâce aux efforts militaires des Puissances alliées et associées.

3^o Le Comité, moins la Délégation américaine, estime que, sans faire une suggestion à cet égard au Gouvernement roumain, la Conférence pourrait simple-

⁹ See No. 25, appendix E.

¹⁰ See No. 2, minute 4.

ment interroger ce Gouvernement sur ses intentions en ce qui concerne le maintien ou le déplacement éventuel de la frontière de 1914.

4° En conséquence, pour le moment, le Comité, moins la Délégation américaine, propose le maintien de la frontière de 1914.

II. FRONTIÈRE NORD (MOINS LA DOBROUDJA)

A l'unanimité, le Comité propose le maintien de la frontière existante.

III. FRONTIÈRE OUEST

A l'unanimité, le Comité propose la frontière décrite dans le rapport de la Commission des affaires yougo-slaves en date du 6 avril,¹¹ sauf l'amendement suivant, relatif à la région du Timok :

(Rapport n° 2, du 6 avril 1919, relatif aux frontière[s] de la Yougo-Slavie, page 16, ligne 9) ;

suivant l'ancienne frontière jusqu'au point à l'est de Vksivor où elle rencontre la rivière Besdanica ;

de là vers le nord-est et jusqu'en un point du cours de la rivière Timok à choisir près de la cote 38 à l'ouest de Bregowo ;

une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain suivant d'une façon générale la ligne de partage des eaux entre les bassins du Timok au nord-ouest et de la Topolovitsa et de la Delejna au sud-est, en passant par les cotes 367 et 374 tout en laissant à l'État serbe, croate, slovène, les localités de Halovo, Sipikovo (ainsi que la route réunissant ces deux localités) et Kojilovo, et à la Bulgarie les localités de Kosovo, Rakitnica et Brecovo ;

de là jusqu'au Danube l'ancienne frontière entre la Bulgarie et la Serbie.

Cet amendement est motivé, non par des raisons militaires, mais en vue de rendre possible la police de la voie ferrée. Il porte au maximum, en chiffres ronds, sur 20 kilomètres en longueur et 3 en largeur.

IV. FRONTIÈRE SUD

L'unanimité n'a pu s'établir.

Les Délégations britannique, française et japonaise, proposent la ligne bleue de la carte jointe au rapport de la Commission des affaires grecques en date du 30 mars.¹² Les Délégations américaine et italienne proposent la frontière de 1913, amendée, au profit de la Bulgarie, par le traité turco-bulgare de 1915.

Les Délégations britannique, française et japonaise rappellent que la Délégation américaine à la Commission des affaires grecques avait accepté, sans faire de réserves, la ligne bleue ci-dessus, et que la Délégation italienne, tout en formulant une réserve sur l'attribution totale à la Grèce de la Thrace orientale, s'était déclarée d'accord en principe sur la ligne bleue.

Les Délégations britannique, française et japonaise expriment à ce propos leur regret que, s'agissant pratiquement, bien que dans deux commissions différentes,

¹¹ This frontier had been accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 16, 1919. A record of the discussion in the Council on that occasion is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iv, pp. 720-1.

¹² This report had been considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 16, 1919. A record of the discussion of it in the Council is printed op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 716-17. For the trace of the 'blue line' see No. 33, note 2.

de la même question, les Délégations américaine et italienne aient émis, à quatre mois de distance, deux avis différents.

La Délégation américaine fait remarquer que dans le rapport de la Commission des affaires grecques, la Délégation américaine a expliqué son acceptation des demandes de la Grèce dans les termes suivants :

‘La Délégation des États-Unis se réserve le droit de modifier la frontière, qu’elle accepte, suivant l’attribution éventuelle du territoire de la Thrace orientale.’

La Délégation américaine fait remarquer que cette réserve a été dictée par la croyance que si la Thrace orientale était rattachée à l’Etat international, il n’y aurait aucune raison sérieuse d’annexer à la Grèce le territoire de la Thrace occidentale qui n’est pas grecque; elle fait remarquer en outre que dans le premier rapport du Comité central territorial au Conseil suprême le Délégué américain a refusé son adhésion à la frontière proposée par la Commission des affaires grecques et s’est au contraire abstenu de formuler des propositions quelconques basées sur le rapport de la Commission des affaires grecques au sujet de la région en question.

Se basant sur ces réserves explicites et implicites, et, en outre, sur le fait que le Comité central territorial chargé de tracer les frontières de la Bulgarie a le devoir de se mettre à l’œuvre avec des vues plus larges que celles de Commissions territoriales spéciales et avec le dessein unique d’arriver à la décision qui contribuera le mieux à l’établissement d’une paix juste et durable, la Délégation américaine ne peut adopter le point de vue des Délégations britannique, française et japonaise.

La Délégation italienne s’associe à cette observation en se référant aux réserves formelles qu’elle a déjà présentées à ce sujet et qui sont mentionnées au procès-verbal n° 16, page 3 du Comité central territorial.

Ces observations faites sur les conditions du désaccord, ce désaccord, quant au fond, est motivé comme suit :

1° Point de vue américain et italien

La Délégation américaine exprime l’avis suivant :

a) La Bulgarie n’a pas acquis la Thrace occidentale par droit de conquête, mais par suite d’une cession consentie volontairement par la Grèce et ses alliés ennemis de la Bulgarie qui, bien qu’ils fussent vainqueurs, reconnurent la sagesse qu’il y avait à accorder à la Bulgarie vaincue ce débouché naturel vers la mer. Le pays fut occupé par des troupes helléniques et non bulgares; et la Bulgarie n’est entrée en possession qu’à la suite du retrait volontaire des forces helléniques. Les titres de la Bulgarie à la possession de la Thrace occidentale n’étaient l’objet d’aucune contestation au commencement de la guerre actuelle. Le seul point encore en discussion à Bucarest était de savoir si la Bulgarie ne devait pas obtenir plutôt plus que moins de territoire sur la mer Egée. La Délégation américaine pense qu’on serait mal avisé en infligeant à une nation, dans le but de la punir, la perte d’un territoire auquel elle a de justes titres au point de vue légal, ethnique et économique.

b) Le rapport de la Commission des Affaires grecques contient une erreur fondamentale quand il déclare, comme premier argument à l’appui de ses conclusions, que :

‘La population non musulmane de la Thrace bulgare est plutôt grecque que bulgare’, et que : ‘Les droits ethniques de la Grèce sont donc supérieurs à ceux de la Bulgarie.’

Les statistiques sur lesquelles reposent ces assertions sont antérieures en date à la cession de la Thrace occidentale à la Bulgarie; le verbe ne pourrait donc s’employer qu’au passé. La population non musulmane *était* grecque plus que bulgare, à un

très faible degré, avant que le territoire n'ait passé à la Bulgarie. Un fait bien connu cependant et qui n'est pas contesté, c'est qu'à mesure que les troupes helléniques se retiraient de la Thrace occidentale, par suite de sa cession à la Bulgarie, une partie de la population grecque a évacué la région; et cet exode a continué depuis, tandis qu'il arrivait un flot de Bulgares pour remplacer les Grecs. Les témoignages portant sur de prétendues déportations de Grecs en dehors de cette région, sont contradictoires. En tout cas, la majorité relativement légère du côté grec aurait été, inévitablement, remplacée par une majorité relative bulgare grâce à des causes naturelles à la suite de la cession de ce territoire à la Bulgarie.

Les témoignages sont contradictoires sur la question de savoir si la majorité mahométane préférerait être sous l'autorité bulgare ou grecque, au cas où il serait impossible d'avoir une administration turque. Les dépositions des huit députés musulmans¹³ ne sont pas entièrement convaincantes. On doit noter que la langue maternelle d'une grande proportion de ces mahométans est le bulgare, tandis que peu d'entre eux parlent le grec; il est donc difficile de croire que ces populations de langue bulgare préféreraient être sous l'autorité de la Grèce plutôt que sous celle de la Bulgarie. Les deux principaux arguments que la Commission des Affaires grecques a fait valoir à l'appui de ses conclusions, perdent ainsi de leur force.

c) L'absence de tout accès direct par terre à la mer Méditerranée compromettra gravement le développement économique de la Bulgarie. La promesse faite par la Grèce de n'entraver en rien le transit et d'accorder des facilités dans les ports du territoire hellénique ne représente pas l'équivalent d'un accès direct à la mer, même en temps de paix; en temps de guerre cela n'aurait aucune valeur. Ce principe a été entièrement reconnu par les Puissances quand elles ont tenu à assurer cet accès à la mer dans le cas de la Pologne. La route par la mer Noire et les Dardanelles ne remplace pas l'accès direct puisque c'est une voie détournée qui sera par conséquent plus longue et plus coûteuse.

d) Même si l'on pouvait en fait surmonter les inconvénients économiques, il serait impossible de convaincre le peuple bulgare que son développement futur n'est pas entravé par la perte de ce que toutes les nations apprécient le plus hautement. Il garderait un profond ressentiment de l'injustice commise en lui imposant ces frontières, et ce sentiment serait une menace inévitable pour la paix future du monde.

e) La cession par la Turquie à la Bulgarie, en 1915, du territoire voisin d'Andrinople a réparé une injustice grave imposée à la Bulgarie en 1913, lorsque la Turquie ferma l'issue naturelle de la vallée de la Maritza et coupa la seule ligne de chemin de fer conduisant au port de la Bulgarie sur la mer Egée. Il est essentiel de maintenir cette rectification, car il serait vain de donner à la Bulgarie une position sur la mer si la route naturelle d'accès à cette dernière doit rester bloquée.

Les arguments ethnographiques, économiques et politiques, aussi bien que la possession de fait appuyée sur des titres valables, tout est en faveur du maintien des frontières bulgares telles qu'elles existent à l'heure actuelle.

En conséquence la Délégation américaine fait la proposition suivante:

'La frontière sud de la Bulgarie sera celle qui existait après la cession par la Turquie en 1913 [1915] du territoire voisin d'Andrinople, sous réserve du droit des principales Puissances alliées et associées de rattacher à l'Etat international telle partie dudit territoire qu'il paraîtrait désirable.'

La Délégation italienne s'associe aux observations et conclusions de la Délégation américaine.

¹³ See No. 22, appendix E.

a) Au point de vue historique ou moral, la Bulgarie n'a aucun titre à la Thrace occidentale. Ce territoire lui avait été donné après la seconde guerre balkanique, par la Grèce et la Serbie, comme preuve de leur désir de vivre en termes amicaux et confiants avec un allié qui venait de les trahir. La Bulgarie a fait de cette générosité un abus flagrant : elle est entrée dans cette guerre uniquement dans un but de rapine ; elle a conduit cette guerre de la façon la plus barbare et pour la seconde fois a été complètement battue.

Dans ces conditions, les trois Délégations estiment que la Bulgarie n'a pas justifié la confiance qui lui avait été primitivement accordée, ni qu'il serait politique de la récompenser pour son entrée dans la guerre européenne par un accroissement de territoire, comme le comporte le programme américain.

b) La Bulgarie, au point de vue ethnique, n'est pas justifiée à réclamer la Thrace occidentale, territoire dans lequel l'élément bulgare ne venait qu'en troisième ligne d'après les dernières statistiques turques (1910). Les trois Délégations considèrent que la valeur de ces statistiques n'a en rien été changée par le fait que des déportations ou émigrations en masse de la population grecque ont eu lieu depuis l'occupation bulgare. Admettre un pareil critérium serait accorder une prime à la persécution des allogènes et établir un précédent qui, dans d'autres cas, celui de l'Arménie par exemple, conduirait aux plus injustes conclusions.

En ce qui concerne les aspirations de la population musulmane de la Thrace occidentale, il y a le témoignage de huit sur douze des députés musulmans au Parlement bulgare qui, dans une récente pétition adressée au Général Franchet d'Esperey s'exprimaient ainsi : 'Ce serait injuste de nous laisser sous le plus cruel et le plus impitoyable des jougs, le joug de la domination bulgare.'¹³

Pour ces raisons, les trois Délégations maintiennent que les conclusions de la Commission des Affaires grecques étaient complètement justifiées.

c) En ce qui concerne l'accès de la Bulgarie à la mer, les trois Délégations considèrent que la situation économique de la Bulgarie bénéficiera du Traité de paix tel qu'elles proposent actuellement de l'imposer.

D'un côté son débouché sur la mer Noire sera rendu meilleur et plus sûr par l'internationalisation des Détroits et du Danube.

D'un autre côté, le débouché naturel de la Bulgarie en Méditerranée n'est pas situé en Thrace occidentale, mais en territoire grec soit à Cavalla, soit à Salonique. Le Gouvernement grec s'est d'ailleurs offert à donner à la Bulgarie des privilèges spéciaux et des facilités dans l'un de ces deux ports et la Commission des Ports et Voies d'eau a élaboré des dispositions particulières pour rendre cette offre effective.

Le cas de la Pologne n'est pas comparable à celui de la Bulgarie puisque, quelle que soit la solution, la Bulgarie aura toujours libre accès à la mer par ses frontières Nord et Est.

d) Les trois Délégations admettent sans conteste qu'en cas de guerre entre la Grèce et la Bulgarie, les droits obtenus par cette dernière à Cavalla ou à Salonique seront sans effet. Mais elles n'estiment pas cependant qu'un argument purement militaire ou stratégique puisse l'emporter sur d'autres considérations.

Elles admettent aussi qu'enlever la Thrace occidentale à la Bulgarie fera naître, en Bulgarie même, d'amers ressentiments. Elles soutiennent cependant que cette solution est juste en elle-même et que le ressentiment causé à la Grèce et à la Serbie par le don à la Bulgarie de ce territoire auquel elle n'a pas droit, serait au moins équivalent à celui que la perte de ce territoire éveillerait en Bulgarie.

c) Les trois Délégations admettent également que les rectifications de frontières obtenues par la Bulgarie de la Turquie en 1915 sont d'une grande valeur économique pour la Bulgarie. Elles font toutefois observer que le territoire en question est presque entièrement habité par des populations grecques et turques; or ces Délégations répugnent à violer le principe ethnique dans le but de donner à la Bulgarie des avantages économiques qui précisément constituaient le prix payé à la Bulgarie pour son entrée en guerre contre les Puissances alliées. Elles sont convaincues que l'esprit militariste en Bulgarie ne serait qu'encouragé par cette manière de faire et que l'opinion bulgare serait amenée à croire qu'une guerre aussi injustifiée, aussi inhumaine et aussi malheureuse fut-elle est en fin de compte un moyen avantageux de satisfaire ses appétits.

Les trois Délégations, se tenant à la question précise posée par le Conseil suprême et réservant le problème de l'attribution de la Thrace orientale, concluent donc, de la façon la plus formelle, que cette province, avec ce qui a été ajouté en 1915, doit être cédée par la Bulgarie aux principales Puissances alliées et associées.

Le Président du Comité:

ANDRÉ TARDIEU.

APPENDIX B TO No. 16

Radio de Budapest Nr. 237 à 55 le 21/7 à 1 h 30.

A Monsieur Clemenceau. Président de la Conférence de la Paix.

En face de l'attitude des Roumains, devenue agressive au mépris de la volonté de l'Entente, nous étions forcés de passer la Tisza et d'essayer de faire respecter par les Roumains la volonté de l'Entente.

BELA KUN

Commissaire des Affaires Etrangères.

APPENDIX F TO No. 16

M. 559.] *Financial Assistance to the Baltic States: Report of Financial Commission*

Commission Financière des Principales
Puissances Alliées et Associées.

Le Président de la Commission Financière,
à Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême.

11 juillet, 1919.

Le Conseil Suprême a renvoyé à l'examen de la Commission Financière une résolution de la Commission des Affaires Baltiques relative à l'aide financière à apporter aux trois Etats de la Baltique.¹⁴

D'après cette résolution, il y aurait une nécessité urgente, pour des raisons militaires, à mettre immédiatement à la disposition du Général Gough, Chef de la Mission Interalliée en Latvie, un crédit de £500.000 pour la paye des troupes russes et lettonnes employées à Libau au maintien de l'ordre. Ce crédit de £500.000 ne permettrait du reste que faire face aux besoins militaires immédiats, et les sommes ultérieurement indispensables ne pourraient être dès maintenant fixées.

¹⁴ See No. 5, minute 5.

Il s'agirait donc d'une aide financière dont il est pour le moment impossible de prévoir l'importance.

Si les membres du Conseil Suprême estiment qu'il y a des avantages politiques et militaires importants à faire immédiatement des avances aux Etats de la Baltique ou à autoriser les emprunts que ces Etats pourraient émettre, ils jugeront sans doute opportun d'engager leurs Gouvernements à obtenir des Parlements respectifs les autorisations nécessaires et les crédits indispensables.

En ce qui concerne le côté financier de la question, la Commission Financière croit devoir faire remarquer qu'à son avis, il ne peut être examiné que par les Ministres des Finances des Gouvernements intéressés, et qu'elle sortirait de son rôle en se substituant aux différentes Trésoreries pour apprécier soit la possibilité, soit la modalité d'une aide financière à apporter aux Etats de la Baltique.

APPENDIX G TO NO. 16

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE.

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.

Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales.

PARIS, le 21 juillet 1919.

*Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Monsieur le Président du Conseil Ministre
de la Guerre. Etat-Major Général*

Matériel de guerre pris par les Yougo-Slaves à Klagenfurt.

Il résulte des télégrammes du Général Hallier, confirmés par des informations que m'a communiquées la Délégation britannique que les Yougo-Slaves expriment l'intention de n'évacuer le secteur de Klagenfurt que quand une décision sera intervenue au sujet de l'attribution du matériel de guerre pris par eux aux Autrichiens. Ils réclament pour eux ce matériel, et prétendent ne pas quitter Klagenfurt avant l'arrivée de détachements intéralliés chargés de le garder et parmi lesquels ils demandent à être représentés dans la proportion d'un cinquième.

Il paraît difficile d'établir à qui, des Autrichiens ou des Yougo-Slaves, appartient la responsabilité des hostilités qui ont éclaté récemment dans cette région et qui ont provoqué l'intervention de la Conférence. Il est donc également difficile de se baser sur cette responsabilité pour déterminer l'attribution du matériel de guerre en question.

D'après les renseignements qui vous seraient parvenus, il ne s'agirait pas d'ailleurs, d'un matériel important. D'autre part les Yougo-Slaves ont précisément besoin de matériel de guerre; ils éprouvent la plus grande difficulté à se faire livrer du matériel de l'ancienne armée austro-hongroise, dont la plus grande partie a du reste été prélevée par le Gouvernement italien.

Enfin, il semble que nous ayons intérêt à accroître leurs ressources à cet égard, pour le cas où leur intervention serait envisagée en Hongrie.

Pour toutes ces raisons, il me paraît qu'il y aurait lieu de faire droit de la demande des Yougo-Slaves et de leur attribuer le matériel qu'ils réclament. Par contre, ils devraient se retirer immédiatement du secteur de Klagenfurt, derrière la ligne de démarcation tracée par la Conférence. Si le matériel ne pouvait être enlevé, la mission intéralliée pourrait envisager en effet des mesures conservatoires, ne devant en aucune façon prendre le caractère d'une occupation intéralliée, puisque le territoire au nord de la ligne de démarcation doit être occupé par les

Autrichiens. Toutefois une décision du Conseil Suprême des Principales Puissances Alliées et Associées est nécessaire.

Me référant à votre lettre du 16 juillet No. 6851, B S/J, j'ai donc l'honneur de faire savoir qu'à mon avis il vous appartient de provoquer d'urgence cette décision en saisissant le Conseil d'une proposition à cet égard et en la faisant mettre à l'ordre du jour d'une de ses plus prochaines séances. Il y a, en effet, tout intérêt à régler cette question dans le plus bref délai possible.

Je serais heureux d'être avisé de la suite que vous aurez cru devoir donner à la présente dépêche.

APPENDIX H TO No. 16

DANTZIG. 7. 7. 19.

To the Council of Four.

The Dantzig working classes are faced with a problem threatening their very existence (as?) the local authorities can arrange no prospects of work for the future. Part of the factories, etc., are being, and will be, closed, owing to lack of materials and power. The working classes will very shortly be starving, and riots among the workers are to be feared, which will not be in the interests of the new Free Town.

Time presses, and the working classes therefore appeal to the Council of Four to safeguard their working interests.

THE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING
POPULATION OF DANTZIG.

No. 17

H. D. 13.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 25, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm, K.C.M.G.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire:* Lieut.-Commander Bell. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. WHITE stated that before dealing with the questions on the Agenda he would like to communicate to the Council some information that had been received with regard to General Boehm's visit to Vienna. The information in question had been transmitted through Mr. Hoover whom he requested the Council to ask for information.

(At this moment Mr. Hoover entered the room.)

MR. HOOVER stated that the proposal in question had been submitted to the Allied representatives at Vienna by General Boehm, who had been the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevik Hungarian armies. General Boehm had stated that if he could be suitably supported by the Allies and given certain assurances, more particularly on the subject of raising the blockade, and the importation of foodstuffs, together with the re-opening of traffic on the Danube, he, on his part, would be ready to set up a social democratic government with himself as temporary dictator. Bela Kun would be deposed from power; all terrorist actions would cease, and order would be restored.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he had seen Mr. Hoover on the previous evening who had communicated the contents of the telegram to him, and that, moreover, he had had the advantage of discussing the matter with his Military Experts. He now wondered whether the best way of getting rid of Bela Kun was by means of military intervention. It was now possible that the best solution lay in adopting the suggestions contained in Mr. Hoover's telegram. As the Hungarians had now assumed the offensive and had crossed the Theiss they opened their flank to an attack from the south by the Serbian and French armies. It was evident that it would be preferable to conduct military operations with Hungarian assistance, but the following question presented itself. Was it possible to place full confidence in General Boehm? Even though it were possible to place full confidence in him, he would not be disposed to enter into an elaborate political arrangement with him. He thought that it would be best to direct General Boehm to carry out his promises by means of the army which he stated was under his control, and to tell him to confine his action to establishing some kind of military dictatorship with a view to calling a Constituent Assembly which should be in a position to express its will freely. Such a solution had a great advantage. In each of our countries there are sections of opinion which, without being actually Bolshevik, have none the less a certain sympathy for Bolshevik programmes. These portions of the public were most strongly opposed to military action against the Bolsheviks. All these disadvantages would be avoided by proceeding through General Boehm. He would be given the moral support of the Allies, who would promise him the guarantees demanded, if he was actually in a position to set up his dictatorship and to convene the Assembly which would determine the future of Hungary. The one question which had to be determined was whether confidence could be placed in General Boehm's promises. Before deciding, it was necessary to have a formal assurance to the effect that he was able to carry out his promises, because, if he were not, fresh delay would be caused by entering into further discussions, which would prejudice the opportunity of successful military action which now presented itself.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he believed it would be well to take this question up again on the following day, in order that the Council might have time to reflect upon it. He considered it would be well to have Marshal Foch at the meeting in order that he might give his advice on the military situation.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the important question was to know whether the Allies could have complete confidence in General Boehm.

MR. COOLIDGE¹ stated that he had with him a copy of a telegram which he had personally sent three months ago. In this he had stated that General Boehm was very popular in Hungary, that he had a strong political party supporting him, that his political views did not tend to the extremists and other parties of the Left, but rather inclined to those of the Right. He further observed that General Boehm was not a military man, but was none the less popular in army circles and with the working classes and that, if the situation had not changed since the time in question, he still had a powerful political faction behind him.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Council had any reason to believe that General Boehm was solely actuated by personal ambitions, and was working for his own selfish interests.

MR. COOLIDGE stated that he did not believe this to be the case, for the reason that General Boehm had mentioned in the course of his conversations three men whom he, Mr. Coolidge, knew personally, and whose names he had mentioned in his telegram and in whom he had the greatest confidence.

MR. HOOVER asked whether the Supreme Council could not at once establish a general principle, and declare that it was ready to sustain any non-terrorist Government and furnish supplies of food to it. By doing this the Council would in no way bind itself adversely, even though the movement instituted by General Boehm should fail. Military operations should always be preceded by a political declaration. The important thing he believed was to make such a declaration at once.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the proposition tended [?extended] to raising the blockade and furnishing food supplies to the country without undertaking military operations.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the difficulty was not in going to Budapest, but as to what steps should be taken thereafter.

MR. WHITE stated that he would prefer to have the military operations carried out by the Hungarians themselves.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he would prefer to see a written proposition before taking a definite decision on the matter, and asked whether Mr. Hoover could not submit a report to the Council on the following morning.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he would request Marshal Foch to be present at the meeting which could be fixed for 10.30 the following morning, and that the proposals of Mr. Hoover could then be examined.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he would like to know what was the decision from the point of view of international law in which Hungary now stood in regard to the armistice. She had accepted the Allies' conditions, and yet at

¹ Prof. A. C. Coolidge was Director of the Special Commission of Study in Austria, American Commission to Negotiate Peace. He had evidently entered the room for the item under discussion.

the present moment was attacking one of the Allied Powers, and he felt that in acting thus she had re-opened hostilities against all the Allies.

(It was decided that the question of further action on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments in Hungarian affairs, in view of the latest information received with regard to General Boehm's proposals, should be discussed by the Council on the following day, and that Marshal Foch and Mr. Hoover should attend.)

2. (M. Cambon entered the room.)

M. CAMBON said that the Supreme Council had granted the governments of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia a period of ten days in which to attempt to settle between themselves the question of Teschen,² and that this period expired to-day. The representatives of these governments had not yet reached a satisfactory solution. A dispatch received from Warsaw indicated that the Polish Government wished to obtain an extension of time. He had brought this matter to the attention of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Sub-Committees, and these bodies were disposed to grant the extension. He had also taken the matter up with M. Benes and M. Moski [Dmowski], and these latter were also disposed to grant the extension but believed that the same should be short. He stated that it was therefore proposed to grant an extension of ten days. If, on the expiration of this, no agreement had been reached the matter should be decided by the Supreme Council. He believed that the Governments at Prague and Warsaw were doing everything in their power to reach an agreement, as they had already constituted two small committees for the matter, and these were at present studying the question.

MR. WHITE stated that he thought that the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees ought to take advantage of the extension of time by themselves examining the question and preparing a solution for the Supreme Council, in the event of the two governments concerned not being able to come to an agreement.

(It was decided that a further period of ten days should be granted to the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the Teschen question.)

It was further agreed that the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees should in the meantime examine the question, in order that the Council should be in a position to decide, if no agreement should be reached by the aforesaid Governments.)

3. (At this point the military representatives of the Supreme War Council and General Thwaites entered the room.)

Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty (Mr. Hoover and Mr. Coolidge left the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Council had received the proposed Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty, which had been prepared by the Supreme War Council

² See No. 10, minute 1.

at Versailles. (Appendix A.³) He requested General Belin to inform the Council regarding the matters upon which the experts had differed.

GENERAL BELIN stated that no differences of opinion between the military experts existed with one exception, that the Italian military representative had made one reservation, which was indicated on the draft, regarding the method of recruiting. Briefly the Italian military representative insisted upon the reservation which he had already made for the Austrian and Hungarian States, namely:—that the Bulgarian army should be organised on a basis of one year compulsory service.

M. TITTONI said that this was a question of detail which he did not wish to press.

(It was decided that the report of the Military Representatives with regard to the Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be accepted.)

³ Not printed. This appendix comprised 49 draft articles and 5 tables which, with for the most part only minor drafting amendment, subsequently constituted Parts IV and X (Articles 64–104 and 204–11) of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly: Treaty Series, 1920, No. 5, Cmd. 522). The only considerable variations (printed in italics) between the draft articles in the appendix and the corresponding articles in the Treaty of Neuilly were:

(i) *Article 69* of the Treaty of Neuilly. The text of the draft (Article 6 in Appendix A) of the first paragraph of this article was as follows:

'The number of gendarmes, customs officials, forest guards, local or municipal police, etc., shall be fixed by a *Commission of Inter-Allied Officers* and shall not as a rule exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1911 within the territorial limits fixed for Bulgaria by the present Treaty.

'In no case shall the number of these officials who are armed with rifles exceed 10,000, so that the total number of rifles in use in Bulgaria shall not exceed 30,000.'

The last paragraph of article 69 was not included in the draft.

(ii) *Article 77*. The following footnote was appended to the end of the second paragraph of the draft (Article 14 in Appendix A):

'The Acting American Military, Naval and Air Representatives make the following reservation:—"The use of the term 'Allied and Associated Powers' in the text of the Military, Naval and Aerial terms shall not be construed to infer that the United States of America will be represented on the Commissions of Control, or otherwise participate in the enforcement of any of those articles."'

(iii) *Article 80*. The second paragraph of the draft (Article 17 in Appendix A) was subsequently omitted so that the third paragraph of the draft became the second paragraph of the treaty. The text of the second paragraph of the draft was as follows: '*This will also apply to special plant designed for the manufacture of military material with the exception of that which shall be considered necessary for authorised manufactures.*'

(iv) *Article 83*. Only the first paragraph was included in the draft (Article 20 in Appendix A).

(v) *Article 102*. The text of the draft (Article 47 in Appendix A) was as follows:

'The following portions of the Armistice of the 29th September 1918:—Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 6. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 4 (*Military Conventions—Secret Articles*) remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.'

The reference to the secret articles was omitted in the final treaty. A text of the secret articles is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. ii, p. 242.

4. (At this point the Military Representatives left the room, and M. Larnaude entered.)

Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty relating to Responsibilities M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Larnaude to explain the question.

M. LARNAUDE stated that he merely wished to outline the manner in which the Committee¹ had discussed the question. They had found themselves faced by Articles 227, 228 and 229 of the German Peace Treaty, and the question had come up whether these Articles should be adopted as they stood in the Bulgarian Treaty. The Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments had opposed this, as indicated in the Report presented by the Committee. (Appendix B.⁵) They feared that their good

⁴ The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.

⁵ Not printed. The main points made in the report, dated July 22, 1919, were summarized in the ensuing discussion in the Supreme Council. The report stated that 'while taking note of the reservations and observations of the Delegates of the United States and of France respectively [see notes 6 and 7 below], the Commission proceeded to discuss the proposal made by the Delegates of Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and as a result agreed upon a draft of eight Articles to be substituted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria for Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The text of this draft is annexed hereto (Annex I). In framing this draft, the Commission took into account the opinion expressed by the representatives of the Balkan States to the effect that there was no occasion to give special treatment to the case of the ex-Tsar of Bulgaria, as his responsibility should be judged according to the general rules laid down in the draft'. The text of this 'Preliminary Draft' in Annex I was as follows:

Article 1. The Bulgarian Government recognises the right of the Allied Powers to bring to justice in the manner hereinafter provided all persons accused of having committed or ordered acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, or who though having authority to intervene did not oppose these acts.

Article 2. These persons will be brought before the military tribunals of the Allied Powers, except in the cases referred to in Article 3 below.

'Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.

'Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned.

'In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.

'Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law.

'These provisions will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her Allies.

Article 3. The persons referred to in Article 1, who are to be handed over by the Bulgarian Government, shall be brought before a tribunal composed of seven judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers, namely: Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

Article 4. The tribunal shall determine its own procedure, including the arrangements for prosecution and for the guarantees essential to the defence.

'It will sit, according to circumstances, in Greece, in Roumania, or in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

'It shall have power to refer any case for examination in the first instance, for enquiry, or for report to any judicial authority of these three Powers.

Article 5. The law to be applied by the tribunal shall be the principles of the law of nations as these result from treaties and usages established among civilised peoples, and the

faith would be questioned adversely and therefore preferred that persons guilty of crimes against their citizens should be brought to judgment before international tribunals and not before national military tribunals of each of the Powers whose citizens had been injured, as was the case in the German Treaty. The American Delegates had made certain reservations⁶ and the French Delegates, whom he represented, had merely requested that note be taken of the position which they held with regard to this proposal.⁷ The French Delegates believed that it would be difficult and dangerous to adopt a different method of punishing the same criminal acts, should they agree to the proposal to grant to Bulgaria international guarantees of impartiality, which they had refused to grant to Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it would be well to know whether the same differences of opinion existed in the Council.

M. LARNAUDE stated that the United States and France had made certain tribunal shall impose on the persons found guilty such punishments as may be imposed by any Court in one of the countries represented on the tribunal or in Bulgaria itself.

'This provision will apply notwithstanding any order for amnesty or any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her allies.

'Article 6. The duty of deciding what cases are to be brought before the tribunal for trial shall be undertaken by a Commission on prosecutions appointed by the Governments of the States represented on the tribunal.

'The Commission on prosecutions shall, within three months from the date of its appointment, draw up the lists of persons to be brought before the tribunal and shall notify the Bulgarian Government thereof.

'The Bulgarian Government shall hold the persons thus designated at the disposal of the tribunal so that they may be handed over to the latter as and when the procedure may so require through the agency of the Government in whose territory these persons are to be tried.

'Article 7. The execution of the judgments of the tribunal shall be entrusted to the Government of the country where the tribunal shall have delivered its sentence.

'The costs of the proceedings which result in convictions shall, after examination and approval by the tribunal, be borne by the Bulgarian Government and settled by the Reparation Commission.

'Article 8. Whatever may be the tribunal called upon to deal with each case, the Bulgarian Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility.'

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council these draft articles were not adopted but were replaced by what became articles 118-20 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

⁶ Annex II to Appendix B, contained a 'Declaration by the Delegation of the United States of America' in which the American Delegates, Mr. J. B. Scott and Mr. H. G. Crocker, declared that they 'feel themselves constrained to recall and to confirm the statement entered in the proceedings of the Commission on the 17th July, 1919, that—"The United States accepts so much of the proposals as are in accord with Articles 228, 229 and 230 of the Treaty with Germany, and reserves as to those parts of the proposals contrary to or inconsistent with those Articles."'

⁷ The position of the French Delegation was given thus in the report of the Commission: 'The French Delegates on the Commission, for their part, while noting that the system proposed simply reproduces that previously adopted by the Commission, to which they had adhered, but which was not adopted in the Treaty with Germany, observed that it was a matter for regret that the Commission should be led to depart from uniformity in this respect between the various Treaties of Peace.'

reservations, but that the British Government supported the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian proposals.

BARON MAKINO observed that the Japanese Delegates had also made reservations, having reiterated those which they had already made regarding the Treaty with Germany, and that he wished to take the same position as his experts on the Committee.

M. LARNAUDE stated that the Japanese Delegates had merely renewed the reservations which they had previously made in regard to the prosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of enemy Heads of States, before a tribunal constituted by the opposite party.

M. TITTONI said that, if the question arose theoretically as to a choice between two tribunals, the Council might hesitate, but, as the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments themselves believed that they might be suspected of bad faith, and therefore requested the support from an international government, it seemed to him difficult for the Council to refuse them its support.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that another question was involved, namely, that of the precedent established in the German Treaty.

M. TITTONI answered that, in the case of Germany, the good faith of the Allies' judgment was not questioned and no one of the Allies thought of it. In the case of Bulgaria, the very Powers themselves who were interested in the matter had brought the question up.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had had the courage to undertake their responsibilities, and that the Council should reply that the Governments now in question should take theirs.

M. TITTONI stated that he did not wish to carry his point of view as the solution of the matter. It did not vitally concern him.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council must not lose sight of the fact that the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments considered themselves competent to try the Bulgarian prisoners actually in their hands before military courts, but that they did not believe themselves competent to try persons who might be turned over to them under the terms of the Treaty.

M. LARNAUDE said that the point in question had not been missed and that he had drawn the attention of the representatives of these various Governments to the fact that they were open to the charge of inconsistency. One of these latter, however, M. Politis,⁸ had stated that the number of persons to be brought before military courts was not great.

MR. WHITE stated that it was for this reason that they wished to place the responsibility of trying the numerous persons who were to be handed over to them by the Treaty upon the Great Powers. It had been stated that the Serbians had a list comprising from 15,000 to 20,000 persons.

M. LARNAUDE stated that he did not wish to enter into a discussion, but only to explain the point at issue. He did not see why there should be any

⁸ Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs and Delegate on the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.

difference between the two countries, and that justice should be applied everywhere in the same manner.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the proposal originally submitted to the Council of Four with regard to Germany was that an international tribunal, such as was now demanded by the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments, should be set up. In spite of the favourable view taken by the Committee, the Council had actually decided otherwise. He did not know why the modification had been adopted, but it must certainly have been based upon strong arguments. For this reason, he was not inclined to adopt a contrary principle.

M. TITTONI said that the decision would be a matter of indifference to him.

M. CLEMENCEAU then stated that he proposed to adopt the same formula as had governed the German Treaty.

(It was decided that the Clauses relative to Responsibilities in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be drafted on the same principle as that governing the corresponding clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany (National Military Tribunals competent to judge the crimes committed by the Bulgarians). See Articles 228-230 of the German Peace Treaty.)

5. (At this point M. Larnaude left the room and M. Tardieu entered.)

The Report of the Committee Supervising the Execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany on the subject of Belgium

M. TARDIEU stated that the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany did not foresee any difficulty in the nomination of five members by the Allied and Associated Powers to the Committee of seven Members, who, by virtue of Article 35 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, should lay down locally the new frontier between Belgium and Germany. There was, therefore, no special recommendation to be made. It would be sufficient if the Allied and Associated Powers would nominate their representatives, in order that the Committee might start work as soon as possible.

(It was decided that, at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, each Delegation should nominate its representative on the Committee provided for under Article 36⁹ of the Peace Treaty with Germany, for the purpose of determining locally the new boundary line between Germany and Belgium.)

6. M. TARDIEU stated that Article 48 of the Peace Treaty provided for the nomination of three members by the League of Nations, who could act in a Commission of five members, which should be charged with the duty of delimiting locally the boundary line of the Saar Territory as laid down in the Treaty. He admitted that it was not impossible, theoretically, for the League of Nations to make the necessary nominations within the fifteen days following the signature [*sic*] of the Treaty. The Convention in question was part of the Treaty, and the Powers represented on the

Report of the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany on the delimitation of the Saar Basin

⁹ In error for 35.

Council of the League of Nations were named; the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty thought, however, that it would be difficult in practice for nations whose members were on the Council of the League of Nations, and who should not have ratified the Treaty, to be able to nominate representatives to the Committee. If such a participation were impossible, the Delimitation Committee might be nominated in the manner foreseen in the Peace Treaty, but the Supervising Committee thought that the necessary nominations might be made temporarily by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Such a procedure would make an agreement with Germany necessary, since nominations made in this manner were not foreseen in the text in the Treaty. The ratification of the Pact of the League of Nations would take place as soon as possible. The Committee therefore recommended that the Supreme Council should come to a decision on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the League of Nations had certain defined duties with regard to the Basin of the Saar, but the League could only act after ratification. It followed that the American Government, which did not appear to be able to give the necessary ratification in a short time, would be prevented from taking its place on the Commission for some while. It was therefore proposed that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make a temporary nomination; it was open to question, however, if they had the right to do so.

M. TARDIEU stated that they had not such a right without arriving at an agreement with Germany.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he did not favour any request being made of Germany, but, that in the case in question, he thought no difficulty would arise.

M. TARDIEU stated that at the present moment there was no use in approaching the German Government, but that the Council could agree to the principle which should be applied when the time came.

MR. WHITE stated that he could not take any decision with regard to the ratification without referring to President Wilson.

M. PICHON stated that the point was important, since the American Government had the duty of convening the Council of the League of Nations.

M. TARDIEU stated that the text of the telegram to be sent to President Wilson could be made out.

(It was decided that:—M. Tardieu, at the next Meeting of the Supreme Council, should present a draft telegram for transmission to President Wilson, on the subject of the Commission for the delimitation of the Saar Basin.)

7. M. TARDIEU stated that the Committee had submitted a Note (see *Note from the Drafting Committee on the subject of the sale of State Property in Slesvig* Appendix C¹⁰), which had been sent to the various Delegations. The Committee proposed a slight modification to the text submitted

¹⁰ Not printed. The note was dated July 23, 1919.

to the Supreme Council.¹¹ A formal assent was all that was necessary.

(It was decided:—

That the Drafting Committee's proposed modification in the text of the notification to be sent to the German and Danish Governments on the subject of the sale of State property in Slesvig should be adopted.)

8. M. TARDIEU suggested [*sic*] that a Note dated 8th July had been received from the German Delegation on the subject of the preparatory measures which should immediately follow the ratification of the Peace Treaty, in order that the clauses of the Treaty with regard to the Eastern Provinces of Germany should be carried out (see Annex [Appendix] D).

The Committee supervising the execution of the Treaty submitted a draft reply (see Annex [Appendix] E).

(It was decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to the opening of negotiations between the Allied and German Governments, on the subject of the preparatory measures to be taken for enforcing the provisions of the Treaty dealing with the cession of the Eastern Provinces of the German Empire, should be accepted.)

9. M. TARDIEU stated that the German Delegation had sent a Note dated 16th July 1919 (see Annex [Appendix] F) asking that the names and powers of the Allied Commissioners for Eastern Prussia, should be communicated to the German Government. The Committee had drafted a reply (Annex [Appendix] G).

(It was decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to furnishing the German Government with the names and powers of the Allied and Associated Commissioners in East Prussia, be accepted.)

10.

*Clauses in the Peace
Treaty with Bulgaria
with regard to Prisoners
of war*

[Not printed]

¹¹ See No. 12, minute 3 (b) and appendix B. The Drafting Committee considered that the terms of paragraph 6 of No. 12, appendix B, invoked a principle which had not been established by either the armistice or the treaty of peace with Germany, and which might justifiably be rejected by the German authorities. The Drafting Committee accordingly proposed that the notification be made to the German and Danish Governments in the following terms: 'Conformément au principe consacré par l'article XIX de l'Armistice du 11 novembre 1918, aux termes duquel "pendant la durée de l'Armistice, il ne sera rien distrait par l'ennemi des valeurs publiques pouvant servir aux Alliés de gage pour le recouvrement de réparations", toute vente de propriétés publiques intervenue depuis le 11 novembre 1918 dans la partie du Sleswig soumise au plébiscite sera, pour l'application du Traité de Paix, considérée comme nulle et non avenue.'

11. M. CLEMENCEAU read the Austrian Note dated 21st July (see Annex I¹²).

He drew attention to the statement in the Note:—

Austrian reply on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to the Czecho-Slovaks

‘That all arms and munitions demanded hitherto are being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. The Mission in question has undertaken to transmit the materials to the Czecho-Slovakia[n] Government, which procedure has been decided upon with the full consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna.’

He drew attention to the fact that he had no knowledge of this.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he also had no information and would like to have certain points cleared up. He asked whether the arms and munitions had been handed over to the Head of the Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly?

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the arms and munitions belonged to all the Allies.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to know how long it was since the delivery of arms and munitions had been taking place, what quantity had been handed over, and how much was still to be delivered.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it was also necessary to know who had consented to the procedure.

It was decided:—

to send the following telegram to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna with regard to the delivery of arms and munitions to the Czecho-Slovaks:—

‘The Austrian Delegation has replied to a communication from the Peace Conference, wherein the aforesaid Government was directed to deliver up its war material¹³ in the following terms:—

“All the arms and munitions demanded up to date are at present being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. This Mission has undertaken to transmit the materials in question to the Czecho-Slovak Government with the knowledge and consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna.”

‘The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers therefore request that it may be informed:—

- ‘1. Who gave the consent referred to in the Austrian reply and in what form?
- ‘2. Whether the arms and munitions delivered by the Austrian Government have been handed over to the Royal Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly.
- ‘3. Since what date has this delivery taken place.

¹² Not printed. The salient passage in this note was that to which M. Clemenceau drew attention. This passage was immediately followed by a concluding sentence in these terms: ‘En ajoutant que de graves raisons de politique intérieure rendraient impossible de livrer directement à l’Etat tchéco-slovaque les matériaux mentionnés, la Délégation soussignée tient à insister sur le caractère confidentiel de cette communication.’

¹³ See No. 13, minute 2.

‘4. What are the total amounts of the different classes of war material, and what proportion of them have been delivered.’

12. After a short discussion it was decided that the texts of the following draft instructions for the Interallied Commission of Enquiry into the events in Asia Minor should be accepted. The enquiry of the Committee should take as its subject matter the acts which had taken place during and after the occupation of Smyrna, Aidin, Aivali and the adjacent regions by the Greek troops. These acts had been reported in the form of a complaint by the Sheikh-ul-Islam.¹⁴ The enquiry was to be extended to all events relative to the above from the date of occupation to the present moment. The Committee was to determine the responsibilities and to submit its report to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, together with such conclusions as it might consider relevant, as soon as possible.

13. (At this moment M. Seydoux entered the room.)

Instructions to be given to Committee on Enquiry into the events in Asia Minor
Blockade of Russia M. SEYDOUX stated that the question had to be resumed from where it had been left off at the last discussion.¹⁵ The American reply had not been received.

MR. WHITE stated that the American Government thought that it could not collaborate with the Allies in the Blockade of Russia since it was not in a state of war with Bolshevik Russia. The President had sent him a reply (see Annex [Appendix] J) in the above sense. The President thought that the practical difficulties of commerce would prevent any suitable assistance being given to Soviet Russia.

M. SEYDOUX said that the President's reply put the Supreme Council into a difficult position for it had been desired to block the Gulf of Finland. The Scandinavian Governments had made requests to be authorised to renew commercial relations with Petrograd. No reply had been given, since it was thought that Petrograd would soon fall. This, however, had not taken place; since that date Koltchak had been informed that the Allied and Associated Powers were ready to support him; this had, in fact, been done. He asked whether it was now possible to authorise certain nations to assist Koltchak's enemy by their commerce. The Swedish Government had demanded quite openly that it might be allowed to re-open commercial relations with the Government of Lenin. By acceding to this, Lenin would be assisted, and by taking the measures necessary, might distribute what he received in whatever manner he chose. The excuse of assisting unfortunate peasant populations could not be brought forward. A new note had been received moreover to the following effect: The French Minister at Copenhagen, who has been informed of the questions laid before the Supreme Council by the Blockade Committees in Paris and in London, on the subject of commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia, reports that the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, in an official letter addressed to the English Minister, that the Danish Government would not assist the exportation of any merchandise from Den-

¹⁴ See No. 14, appendix A.

¹⁵ See No. 11, minute 3.

mark to Soviet Russia, before the deliberations on the subject, now going forward in Paris, had been concluded.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he knew nothing of this communication.

M. SEYDOUX said that information had been received from Stockholm to the effect that the Swedes had not renewed their request and had not despatched vessels since they knew that they would be stopped. They had not been undecieved. The questions might be raised again at any time however, and it would be difficult to know how to deal with them.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the discussion with President Wilson should be taken up again since new arguments could now be brought forward. Everyone had to undertake a certain amount of responsibility. Should they not, therefore, submit the questions afresh and wait for his reply?

M. TITTONI stated that it was known from an authoritative source that the Soviet Government was making a large number of Allied bank notes. If commercial relations were renewed it would facilitate the circulation of these false notes.

MR. BALFOUR stated that Mr. White's remarks submitted to President Wilson were very complete. On the other hand one or two important points had been omitted. Mr. White had spoken of Koltchak and of the assistance that should be given to him. In his opinion the question was much more serious for at that moment British forces were fighting at Archangel. In addition to this the populations of the Baltic States were being organised and armed in order that they might fight against Bolshevism. So at the moment we were asked to assist our enemies by allowing them to receive arms, munitions and material of every kind, which, although they were not sent to men with whom we were legally at war, were none the less being despatched to persons who were fighting against us. What would be the position of the League of Nations if it were in existence? Supposing that it had existed and decided, as the Supreme Council had decided, to assist Koltchak, Denekin and the Baltic States to fight against the disorder of Soviet Russia. How would it operate? Undoubtedly it would declare a blockade for no other means would be at its disposal. Englishmen, and soldiers in Koltchak's and Denekin's armies were being killed daily in the fighting against the Bolsheviks. If a state of war did not exist legally, it existed none the less in point of fact. The position of the Allied and Associated Powers was, however, difficult. If the question were examined from the political point of view, was it possible to ask peoples already pressed by heavy taxes to make new sacrifices in order that arms should be sent to our friends, whilst at the same time arms were being allowed to pass into the hands of those against whom we were fighting?

MR. WHITE stated that he would have to consult an expert in international law. He desired, however, to draw attention to President Wilson's reply. What the President had said was not an article of a Treaty binding upon all, and the other Powers were free to set up a blockade without American help.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that before arriving at any solution, he thought President Wilson should again be approached and he proposed that Mr. Balfour should draw up a telegram in the sense of his remarks.

MR. BALFOUR stated that, in reply to Mr. White, he recognised that President Wilson in his reply did not bind us, but he asked what position should we be in if an American vessel were to carry munitions.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that, if it became necessary to act without American assistance, President Wilson would have to be asked to give an undertaking to send no ships.

M. SEYDOUX stated that, in his opinion, there was a point which should be insisted upon. Assistance to the Bolshevik Government could not be justified by the argument that relief was being given to an unfortunate populace. The Government of Lenin was such that his agents centralised all foodstuffs and distributed them as they wished. Little or no food would be sent to the populace. The only result would be that Lenin's Government would be strengthened.

(It was decided that Mr. Balfour should prepare, for the next meeting of the Supreme Council, a new dispatch to be sent to President Wilson on the subject of the Blockade of Russia.)

(At this point M. Seydoux left the room.)

14. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that a declaration which was to be signed by the Austrian Plenipotentiaries had been submitted to the Conference. (Appendix K.¹⁶)
Agreement by the Austrian Government with regard to vessels sunk by their Naval Forces (After a short discussion, the draft declaration was accepted.)

15. M. TITTONI stated that, as the Agenda had been worked off, he wished to draw attention to the grave situation in Italy with regard to coal. The stocks of that material would be practically exhausted in a fortnight. During the war an Inter-Allied body had decided on the manner in which coal should be distributed amongst the Allies. This body no longer existed. He asked whether it would be possible to re-constitute it and asked, further, that this should be done, because the situation in Italy was of the utmost gravity.
Coal question in Italy

MR. BALFOUR stated that it was one of the most urgent questions of the immediate future.

MR. WHITE said that Mr. Hoover was in agreement with Mr. Balfour.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed that M. Tittoni in collaboration with Mr. Hoover should make a proposal in writing.

MR. BALFOUR stated that Mr. Hoover had reported on the coal situation in Europe in an extremely pessimistic sense. He thought that the cause of the evil was that workmen were no longer working. This was more particularly the case in Central Europe and Upper Silesia. The reduction of the number of hours had made the situation even worse. It had been improved by the fact that the German authorities had threatened to cut off the provisions

¹⁶ Not printed. This appendix contained the first paragraph of the Declaration annexed to the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 11. Cmd. 400.)

from mining districts were production diminished. This measure had increased the quantity of mineral taken from the mines, but the progress had been short. It was, therefore, not a question of war but a social crisis.

(It was decided that M. Tittoni should submit to the next meeting of the Supreme Council his proposals with regard to the re-constitution of the Inter-Allied Committee for the distribution of coal.)

16. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Drafting Committee had brought the *Languages of* following note before them:—

the Treaties

The Drafting Committee would be obliged if the Supreme Council would give information as to whether Treaties with the Serbian (Croat-Slovene) State, and with Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, all of which are to be signed at the same time as the Treaty with Austria, should, like this latter, be drawn up in English, French and Italian, the French text being authoritative in case of divergence.

(After a short discussion, it was decided that the proposal of the Drafting Committee to the effect that the Peace Treaties with the Serbian (Croat-Slovene) State, with Czecho-Slovakia, with Roumania and with Bulgaria, should be drawn up in three languages, the French text being authoritative in cases of divergence [*sic*].)

17. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Delegation had submitted a note *Credentials of the* with regard to the credentials of the German Diplomatic *German Diplo-* Agents. (Appendix L.¹⁷) It had drafted a letter to the Presi-
matic Agents dent of the German Delegation. (Appendix M.)

(This draft was accepted.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris.

July 25, 1919.

APPENDIX D TO No. 17

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION, VERSAILLES.

July 8th, 1919.

Sir,

The execution of the Treaty of Peace in the Eastern Provinces of Germany requires that immediately after ratification important preparatory measures should be taken. The sudden withdrawal of all German Authorities in the provinces to be returned would undoubtedly cause great confusion, and the internal administration and the working of justice and of the transport system would

¹⁷ Not printed. The French note, dated July 16, 1919, drew attention to the difficulties likely to arise from the apparent failure of the German Government to furnish its diplomatic representatives abroad with new letters of credence. The note instanced the position at Stockholm where the German Minister was of senior standing to most of the Allied Ministers; it was held that, unless he were furnished with new letters of credence, diplomatic usage would require the Allied Ministers to initiate any exchange of courtesies with him. (But cf. a subsequent decision by the Supreme Council in this matter: Vol. II, No. 47, minute 7.)

especially suffer therefrom. Security and order seem all the more gravely threatened owing to the fact that in the territories in question national antagonism has already caused great excitement amongst the entire population. For these reasons the German Government considers it indispensable that direct negotiations should at an early date be entered upon with the Polish Government. The object of these negotiations would be, by appealing in the first instance to the different Prussian ministerial departments concerned, to ensure that these various administrations should be handed over to Poland in good order: they would moreover settle the details of the methodical withdrawal of Prussian officials. In view of the important part which the Prussian Bureaux will play and of the necessity of consulting original documents, the best solution would be to select Berlin as the seat of these negotiations. The Polish delegates would in such case receive all the necessary facilities.

It is requested that an early reply may be given as to whether the Polish Government agrees to this proposal and whether it be ready to appoint its representatives with the least possible delay, and that I may be informed of the date of their arrival at Berlin.

I have the honour, etc.,
FREIHERR VON LERSNER.

APPENDIX E TO NO. 17

Proposed reply to German Note of July 8th regarding the opening of negotiations at Berlin between the Polish and German Governments

Translation.

Peace Conference.

July 23, 1919.

From: President Clemenceau.

To: President von Lersner.

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has made note of the communication of the German Delegation, under date of July 8, 1919, relative to the preparatory measures which should immediately follow the ratification, for the execution of the Treaty referring to the Eastern provinces of Germany.

The Supreme Council is favourable, in principle, to the opening of negotiations with the Polish Government in Berlin, but considers that the Allied and Associated Powers, as guarantors of the Peace Treaty, should participate in these negotiations and be represented.

It is only under these conditions that the request of the German Delegation could be considered.

APPENDIX F TO NO. 17

DÉLÉGATION ALLEMANDE DE LA PAIX.

VERSAILLES, le 16 juillet, 1919.

Monsieur le Président, .

D'après des informations reçues de Prusse Orientale, un commissaire des Puissances alliées et associées est arrivé à Memel pour y prendre en main l'administration du territoire au Nord de la Memel. Jusqu'à présent le Gouvernement allemand n'a reçu aucun avis officiel de l'arrivée de ce commissaire; il n'est pas non plus en possession de ses pleins pouvoirs. Le Gouvernement allemand s'en tient au point

de vue qu'il a exprimé dans la note du 8 de ce mois — à savoir qu'il est souhaitable de commencer le plus tôt possible des négociations au sujet des territoires qui doivent être cédés à la Pologne. Il tiendrait également pour souhaitable l'ouverture prochaine de semblables négociations pour le territoire de la ville libre de Dantzig ainsi que pour le territoire situé au Nord de la Memel; mais il considère comme nécessaire que lui soient communiqués les noms et pouvoirs des commissaires, avant que ceux-ci n'arrivent sur place; à cette seule condition les négociations pourront aussitôt commencer de façon régulière.

Le Gouvernement allemand se permet, en conséquence, de demander si des commissaires munis de pleins pouvoirs sont déjà nommés pour le territoire au Nord de la Memel et pour la ville de Dantzig; il prie qu'on lui communique les noms et pouvoirs de ces commissaires, et s'il n'y a pas de nomination, que des commissaires soient désignés à bref délai. En raison de la grande quantité des documents auxquels il conviendra de se référer, et du nombre de bureaux qui sont intéressés à ces négociations, ce serait encore Berlin qui paraîtrait la ville la plus qualifiée.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

VON LERSNER.

Son Excellence

le Président de la Conférence de la Paix,
Monsieur Georges Clemenceau.

APPENDIX G TO No. 17

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX.

Le Président.

23 juillet 1919.

Monsieur le Président,

Le Conseil Suprême des Puissances Alliées et Associées a pris connaissance de la note reçue de la Délégation Allemande à la date du 16 juillet 1919, demandant que les noms et pouvoirs des Commissaires des Puissances Alliées et Associées pour la Prusse Orientale soient communiqués au Gouvernement Allemand avant l'arrivée de ces Commissaires.

Le Conseil Suprême estime que ces nominations ne peuvent pas être faites avant la ratification et l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix. Lorsque le moment sera venu, le Gouvernement Allemand sera, par l'entremise de la Délégation Allemande, informé des noms et pouvoirs des dits Commissaires.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

Monsieur le Baron von Lersner,
Président de la Délégation Allemande,
Versailles.

APPENDIX J TO No. 17

Trade with Bolshevik Russia

Immediately following the meeting of the Supreme Council at which this was last discussed,¹⁵ Mr. White cabled the President, describing in considerable detail the proposed notification to be given to neutrals with the object of preventing

such trade and stating as reasons for reconsideration of the attitude formerly taken:

(1) That the action of June 17th was taken in expectation of an early fall of Petrograd, which expectation had not been realised;

(2) That military and naval operations were active in and about the Gulf of Finland and that it would be difficult for the Allies to permit neutral shipping to proceed freely in the Gulf of Finland without thereby disclosing to the Bolsheviks the naval disposition of the Allies, thereby permitting the Bolsheviks to take the Anti-Bolsheviks in the rear;

(3) That the prior action of the Supreme Council related both to Bolshevik Russia and Hungary and that the Supreme Council had itself modified the decision in respect to Hungary, thereby indicating that the decision as a whole should be regarded as having been provisional only;

(4) That the Allies, by virtue of their promise of aid and assistance to Koltchak, were under a moral obligation to prevent the Bolsheviks from receiving aid.

The view was further expressed that it would be desirable for the United States to go as far as possible with our associates in assisting Koltchak and preventing aid from reaching the Bolsheviks and that the only apparent objection to the proposed course of action was the precedent involved in a group of nations exercising a control over a portion of the high seas other than by virtue of recognised belligerent rights.

In reply to this telegram from Mr. White to the President, the President stated his view to be that the United States could not join in the proposed notification in view of the fact that the status of belligerency did not exist with respect to Bolshevik Russia. It was added that it was felt that the practical difficulties in the way of trade with Bolshevik Russia would prevent any substantial relief being received by the Bolsheviks in this way.

APPENDIX M TO No. 17

Projet de lettre au Président de la Délégation Allemande

Lettres de créance des agents diplomatiques allemands.

Monsieur le Président,

Les Gouvernements alliés et associés seraient désireux de savoir si le Gouvernement allemand a pris soin de munir de nouvelles lettres de créance tous ceux de ses agents diplomatiques, actuellement en fonctions, qui avaient été accrédités à l'étranger par l'ancien Gouvernement impérial.

Je crois, en effet, devoir vous signaler qu'il serait difficile aux représentants diplomatiques des Puissances Alliées et Associées d'entretenir des relations officielles avec leurs collègues allemands après la reprise des relations diplomatiques entre l'Allemagne et les Puissances Alliées et Associées, s'ils se trouvaient en présence de représentants qui tiendraient leurs titres du Gouvernement déchu.

Les Puissances Alliées et Associées verraient un grand intérêt à recevoir, dans le plus bref délai possible, des renseignements précis à cet égard, en vue des instructions qu'elles auront à donner à leurs représentants dans les différents pays, en ce qui concerne l'attitude qu'ils devront adopter vis-à-vis des diplomates allemands accrédités dans les mêmes pays qu'eux.

H. D. 14.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 26, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm, K.C.M.G.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Lieut.-Commr. Bell. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (At this point Marshal Foch, General Weygand, and the Military Representatives from Versailles entered the room.)

*Polish and Lithuanian
Dispute with regard to
Demarcation Line*

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that, before passing to the subjects on the Agenda, he would ask Marshal Foch to explain the dispute that had now arisen between the Poles and the

Lithuanians with regard to the line of demarcation that had been laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MARSHAL FOCH shewed the demarcation line upon a map¹ which he presented to the Council, and drew attention to the point at which the line in question had been violated. He pointed out that the question of the German evacuation of the territories under discussion was involved, and that, according to latest reports, General von der Goltz had begun a general withdrawal.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that, as certain aspects of the problem were new to the Council, he would propose that the question should be adjourned until the afternoon's meeting, and that M. Cambon should attend.

(It was therefore decided that the question should be re-discussed at the afternoon's meeting and that M. Cambon should be present.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU read two telegrams, dated July 7th and 24th respectively, relative to a rupture of communications through Warsaw between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and other countries, and asked Marshal Foch whether he was familiar with the details of this matter.

*Rupture of the
Communications
at Warsaw*

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the question had not been brought to his attention.

(It was therefore decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until the afternoon's meeting, at which time Marshal Foch would have investigated the matter.)

¹ See No. 19, appendix A.

3. (At this point Mr. Hoover and Mr. Coolidge entered the room.)

Hungarian Affairs MARSHAL FOCH referred the Council to his military report of July 17th.² He reminded them, however, that the political side of the question still asserted itself, and that this could not be dealt with by him.

M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to the fact that the question of General Boehm's action had now arisen.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that General Boehm's proposals were of a purely political nature, and that the military situation had altered to a certain extent by reason of the Hungarian attack upon the Roumanian forces. These latter had been prepared, however, and were in a position to resist. The situation, therefore, was in the same posture as it had been when he reported on July 17th.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Marshal Foch knew anything about General Boehm.

M. TITTONI remarked that General Boehm was the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Bolshevik forces.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, according to his latest information, General Boehm had held a Lieutenant's rank.

M. PICHON remarked that he was actually the Hungarian Minister at Vienna.

MR. BALFOUR stated that, whilst the problem was both military and political, one side of it was half way between the two. Boehm stated that he had sufficient influence with the Hungarian Armies to crush Bela Kun and set up a Constituent Assembly without the Allies being called upon to strike a blow. This presented the question partly political and partly military. He would therefore like to know whether, in Marshal Foch's opinion, Boehm had the degree of military influence that he claimed and what were the probabilities of his being successful.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he knew nothing about Boehm, nor of his military qualities. At the same time, the small countries surrounding Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia and Roumania, would not keep a passive attitude for very long in the face of Hungarian aggression and would shortly take an initiative of some kind, since it was obvious that they could not keep their armies mobilised indefinitely.

M. TITTONI said he thought that the information received from Hungary during the past month gave a tolerable picture of the state of affairs in that country. It was clear that Bela Kun represented no more than a minority and that he had raised against himself internal and external enemies. It was even stated that 80 per cent. of the Bolshevik Armies in Hungary were hostile to him; if this were so, the offer of Boehm was only a manifestation of this discontent. Whatever was going to happen, it was evident that the Great Powers must lend some kind of assistance, either military or moral, since the reconstruction of Hungary from within was going to be a lengthy process.

² See No. 13, appendix B.

Two courses were now open. The first was to send out the Committee, as had been contemplated,³ and to support it with the promise of ultimate military force. The second course was to adopt immediately, and to put into effect, the military action proposed by Marshal Foch. All reports agreed in thinking that Austria would soon be affected by Bolshevism.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with M. Tittoni, but thought that the functions of the Committee must be kept distinct from the negotiations arising out of Boehm's proposals.

M. TITTONI remarked that, when the Committee had been decided upon, it had been agreed, at the same time, that it should not enter into relations with Bela Kun.

M. PICHON stated that the telegrams from the Allied Ministers proved that Boehm's proposals were being taken seriously. It was therefore for consideration whether the Committee should not, after all, be authorised to deal with him.

M. TITTONI stated that, if Boehm were actually in a position to overthrow Bela Kun, it was none the less certain that he required something from the Allied and Associated Governments. What was it, therefore, that he really wanted?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Boehm had asked for nothing except moral support.

MR. WHITE stated that, by sending out the Committee, it might appear that the Allied and Associated Governments wished to enter into negotiations either with Boehm or with Bela Kun: it was not desirable to give this impression. Mr. Hoover had a proposal to make which avoided this difficulty.

M. MANTOUX then read aloud Mr. Hoover's proposal.

MR. BALFOUR then read a draft proposal of his own, stating that it had the fault of coming to no definite conclusion.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, as M. Tittoni had observed, the Council was not entirely clear as to the requests and proposals which Boehm had made to the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that both the military plans and the proposals of Boehm had for their object the expulsion of Bela Kun.

M. TITTONI then said that the following distinct questions should be put to the Allied representatives at Vienna:

1. Was Boehm in good faith, or was he merely acting as an agent of Bela Kun?
2. Was Boehm able to carry out his promises, or did he want assistance?
3. What did he require?

MR. HOOVER said he thought Boehm had definitely asked that the blockade should be raised, foodstuffs sent into the country and navigation on the Danube re-opened, if he, on his part, established himself as a temporary dictator.

³ See No. 14, minute 5.

MR. WHITE confirmed Mr. Hoover's point of view by reading a portion of Appendix A.

M. PICHON said that Boehm had made no demand, but had submitted proposals.

MR. WHITE stated that the Allied Representatives at Vienna evidently thought that Boehm was to be taken seriously.

MR. BALFOUR summarised M. TITTONI's questions, and stated that he thought they had been answered by the fact that our representatives at Vienna believed that Boehm was to be trusted, and was doing no more than asking for certain specific things.

M. TITTONI said that he was not of opinion that explicit answers had been given, and that more detailed replies should be obtained.

MR. BALFOUR then asked Mr. Hoover if he were not justified in saying that the questions had really been answered.

MR. HOOVER replied that, in his opinion, it was dangerous for the Allied and Associated Governments to open negotiations with secret agents. Would it not be possible to make a public declaration of policy and to allow Boehm to make his own deductions from it? Such a declaration might take the form of a statement to the effect that economic assistance would be given to a properly constituted government, and that such a statement would not bind the Conference to subsequent military action.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the fact that Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice and had made war against our Allies stood out. He remarked that he would conclude his proposals by saying that, if any responsible government should be set up in Hungary, economic aid would be furnished it by the Allied and Associated Powers. He asked, however, whether the conclusion of the Council was that whether military action should be taken or the situation allowed to remain in its present state. He asked, in conclusion, how the declaration could be made public.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it could be published in the press.

MR. WHITE read from a telegram to the effect that Colonel Cunningham had, on that day, interviewed Boehm, who would be ready to act in a month's time and undertook to overthrow Bela Kun in 48 hours, but that Boehm could not act until he knew whether the Allies would approve of his plans.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the capture of Buda-Pest seemed to be an easy matter, but that the questions which would follow it were most difficult. For instance, if the Roumanians entered Buda-Pest, a very strong feeling would be excited amongst the Hungarians. He then asked Marshal Foch for his opinion on the actual situation of the Hungarian Army.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that Hungary had actually not disarmed. The Army was still in the field and it mattered little whether its leader was Bela Kun or Boehm. Even though a political formula were adopted, as the basis of subsequent action, any person who received support from the Allies might subsequently adopt a new attitude with every prospect of success.

M. CLEMENCEAU then asked how Hungary could be disarmed.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that it could be done by laying down terms so

severe that disarmament would be certain. The fact remained that, instead of the 6 divisions which had been allowed to the Hungarian Army, 12 were actually in the field.

MR. BALFOUR then asked whether Marshal Foch believed that an effective disarmament of the Hungarian Army could take place without an occupation of a portion of their territory.

MARSHAL FOCH answered that an ultimatum, backed by military force, could effect what was desired. The threat to attack must remain. He had already stated that the Allied Armies acting in Hungary must be commanded by a single General, who would possibly be a foreigner. Could not a civil government be instituted in the same way by the assistance of a Czecho-Slovak or Roumanian or other nominee? Some decision was none the less necessary.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that there was no inconsistency between the points of view of Mr. Hoover and Marshal Foch. In a public notification it could be stated why the Allies could not deal with Bela Kun, and what kind of person they would consent to deal with.

(It was therefore decided that Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hoover should confer in the preparation of a public notification to be sent to Hungary, and that it should be presented to the Council at the afternoon meeting.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to explain his report to the Conference.

*Army of Occupation
on the left Bank of
the Rhine*

MARSHAL FOCH then read the conclusions of his report (see Appendix B⁴) in which he had stated that the total strength of the Army of Occupation should be 6,500 Officers, 151,000 men and 35,000 horses. He stated that these figures had been reached in consultation with the Allied Military Representatives at Versailles. He had since received a letter from General Pershing in which the latter stated that the strength of the American Forces of Occupation would be approximately 6,800 men comprised of one regiment of infantry, one group of cavalry and certain auxiliary troops. He asked whether the proposals in his report were acceptable to the Council.

MR. BALFOUR then asked whether the proportion and numbers of troops to be supplied by each of the Allies in the Army of Occupation had been definitely fixed; because he himself was not aware of this having been done.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that the only question which had been discussed at Versailles was the total effective strength and not the proportion of the strength to be furnished by each Country.

⁴ Not printed. The conclusions of this brief report, dated July 15, 1919, were as summarized by Marshal Foch. The figures given by him for the total strength of the Army of Occupation represented ten divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, constituted as follows: one Belgian infantry division, i.e. 13,000 men; one American infantry division, i.e. 13,000 men (with a possible reduction to one regiment, i.e. 3,000 men); two to three British infantry divisions, i.e. 26-39,000 men; five to six French infantry divisions, i.e. 65-78,000 men; one to two French cavalry divisions, i.e. 5,500-11,000 men.

GENERAL THWAITES remarked that the proportion to be furnished by Great Britain had not yet been considered by the War Office.

(After some discussion it was agreed that the proposals of Marshal Foch's report on the subject of the total eventual effective strength of the Armies of Occupation upon the Rhine should be accepted. It was further decided that the question of the proportions in which this total strength was to be furnished by each of the Allies should not be discussed until the War Offices of the Countries concerned had been able to examine the question.)

5. MARSHAL FOCH submitted his reply (see Appendix C⁵) to the question laid before him by the Council, with regard to the Allied Forces necessary in the plebiscite zone in Upper Silesia (see H. D. 12 para. 3⁶). In commenting upon his reply, he drew attention to the fact that the Division required must be an Allied Division, and that each Ally must furnish an equal quota. He further drew attention to the fact that there was a clause in the Peace Treaty⁷ providing for the armed Forces under consideration.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question of employing British troops was most difficult and that the War Cabinet must be consulted.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the question had been decided by the Council of the Heads of Delegations in the sense that an Inter-Allied Division would be necessary. He read the previous decision on the subject (see H. D. 12 para. 3⁶).

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it had been decided that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should supply the troops.

MARSHAL FOCH said that such a decision had been arrived at but insisted that the force must be made up by equal numbers of Allied troops.

MR. WHITE remarked that in his opinion the former resolution of the Council had been inconsistent in that it contemplated the use of the troops taken from the Army of Occupation alone, whereas the clause of the Treaty referred to by Marshal Foch,⁷ stated that troops of all the Allies should be used. Italy, one of the Allied Powers, had no troops in the Army of Occupation.

The question of the length of time during which the Army of Occupation of the plebiscite zone would be necessary was then raised, and it was stated that whilst it might be six to eight months, the longest period contemplated was eighteen months.

MR. WHITE, further commenting upon the resolution of the Council, asked Marshal Foch whether the Division could be raised from the Armies

⁵ Not printed. In this note to M. Clemenceau, dated July 25, 1919, Marshal Foch stated that it was difficult for him to answer the question pending a decision by the Allied Governments as to the size and distribution as between the Allied armies of the forces for the occupation of the Rhineland. Referring to his report of July 15 (see note 4 above), Marshal Foch asked M. Clemenceau to represent to the Allied Governments the urgency of a decision in the matter, and concluded: 'En vous renouvelant cette demande, je fais étudier l'envoi éventuel en Haute Silésie d'une division à former d'éléments alliés et à prélever sur les troupes d'occupation des pays rhénans.'

⁶ No. 16, minute 3.

⁷ Paragraph 2 of the Annex to Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles.

of Occupation when they had been reduced to their ultimate strength of 150,000 men.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Division could be raised under those circumstances from the Army of Occupation, but that at the same time it was necessary to get it ready at once.

(Mr. Balfour again drew attention to the fact that it was necessary for him to refer the matter to Sir Henry Wilson and after a short discussion it was agreed that the question should be adjourned until Mr. Balfour should have consulted with the British War Office.)

6. MR. BALFOUR read aloud a draft of the telegram that he had prepared for President Wilson. (See Appendix D.)

Blockade of Russia (It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should communicate the despatch to the President of the United States.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 26, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO NO. 18

Received July 25.

25th July, 1919.

Hoover, Paris

For Logan.⁸ Boehm one-time Commander-in-Chief Hungarian Armies, Socialist and most forceful figure in Hungarian Army, at present serving as Hungarian Minister in Vienna called on British Military representative to discover if Entente would be willing to resume relations with Hungarian people. On the 23rd a conference of Entente representatives in Vienna took place and resulted in submitting to Boehm a plan of action for the overthrow of the present Bolshevik Government in Hungary and as a method which could set up a temporary Government that the Entente would be willing to support. The proposal was as follows:

First. That a dictatorship assuming complete powers of government should be composed of Haubrich, Agoston and Garamy,⁹ these names to be discussed.

Second. The present Communist Government of Bela Kun to be disbanded. Communism to be repudiated and Communist propaganda discontinued.

Third. Pending formation of Government representative of all classes this dictatorship to continue.

Fourth. Immediate discontinuance of all terroristic confiscation and seizure.

Fifth. That an Entente Advisory body be immediately requested.

Sixth. That the Blockade be discontinued and that steps be undertaken at once by the Entente to furnish coal and food and to assist in freeing navigation of the Danube.

Seventh. No political prosecutions.

Eighth. Final decision of socialization to be left for the permanent Government.

Boehm considered this formula and accepted it provisionally pending discussion with his colleagues. Now that things have gone this far think it imperative that

⁸ Colonel J. A. Logan. (Cf. No. 3, appendix A.)

⁹ M.M. Haubrich, Agoston and Garami were Hungarian social-democratic politicians. M. Haubrich was military commandant of Budapest and subsequently became Minister of War in the government of M. Peidl which succeeded that of M. Béla Kun on August 1, 1919.

Entente representatives be instructed as to whether Entente approves principles in general to an end that in the case of its approval by Hungarian representatives also we may go ahead. It is (?) reported that there is about to be sent into Hungary a Military Mission composed of four Generals who will investigate the possibility of a solution for existing conditions. It is urged that if the Entente desires to approve the carrying out of the project above set forth that the departure of this Mission be deferred pending receipt of final conclusions from Boehm for if this is not done the status of the present Hungarian Government will again be fortified by the construction that the Entente intends recognition and the possibilities of success for Boehm would badly suffer.

GREGORY¹⁰

APPENDIX D TO NO. 18

*Proposed telegram to President Wilson on the subject of the Blockade of Russia*¹¹

The British, French, Italian and Japanese Members of the Council of Five respectfully offer the following observations on the President's telegram relating to neutral trade in the Gulf of Finland. They do not desire to express any opinion upon the statement of International Law laid down in the telegram. It may well be true that where there is no state of belligerency there can be no legal blockade; but they would point out that the situation in Russia and in the Gulf of Finland is at the present moment such as hardly to permit the rigid application of rules which in ordinary cases are quite uncontested. The language in which International Law is expressed is fitted to describe the relations between organised States, but is not so well fitted to deal with relations between organised States on the one hand, and unorganised chaos on the other. Russia, during this period of transition, is not a State, but a collection of 'de facto' Governments at war with each other; and though it is quite true to say that the Allied and Associated Powers are not in a state of belligerency with Russia, it is also true that they are involved in Military operations with one of these 'de facto' Governments, and that they are supplying arms and ammunition to the others.

It may not be proper to describe this condition of things as war, but it cannot be right to treat it as peace; nor can the international rules applicable to a state of peace be applied to it without qualification. The case is a special one, and must be specially treated.

We would venture to point out some of the ill consequences which in the present case would follow from neglecting this consideration.

Allied and Associated troops are defending themselves in circumstances of very great difficulty against Bolshevik attacks in Archangel. Yet we permit the Bolshevik troops who are making these attacks, to receive supplies which we could easily cut off. We are furnishing the Siberian Army of Koltchak with Military equipment; and at the same time we are permitting Military equipment to go to his enemies. We have gone far in the direction of recognising the Estonians, and other non-Russian peoples, who are struggling to resist Bolshevik attacks: yet we leave neutral traders free to strengthen the Bolshevik Armies, and to convey

¹⁰ Capt. T. T. C. Gregory was Chief of the Central European Division of the American Relief Administration and was at that time in Vienna.

¹¹ This telegram is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, pp. 154-5.

unhindered information to a hostile Navy as to the number and disposition of our own ships of war.

It may be urged, indeed, that to interfere with neutral commerce will not so much have the effect of hampering the Military operations of those who are engaged in attacking us and our friends, as in aggravating the miseries under which the innocent civil population is already suffering. So far as our information goes, however, this will not be the result. Every cargo successfully brought through the Gulf of Finland to Petrograd supplies a new instrument to the Bolsheviks for adding recruits to their Army. None of it will reach anyone but soldiers and officials. Its distribution will be determined by considerations which are military and not philanthropic. It will not diminish the sufferings of humanity; it will add to them.

It has been suggested that it might be possible for the Four other Great Powers to maintain the control of imports into the Gulf of Finland without the participation of the United States. We feel, however, the strongest objection to adopting any policy not accepted by all the principal Allied and Associated Powers; and, even apart from this overwhelming consideration, we cannot ignore the fact that if in such circumstances an American ship were to enter the Gulf, an incident might easily occur whose consequences would be well-nigh intolerable.

It is for these reasons that we would most earnestly request the Government of the United States to reconsider their decision; and to concur in a policy which, as it seems to us, is of so special and exceptional a character as to be quite outside the ordinary rules laid down by International Law for the conduct of maritime blockade.

A. J. B[ALFOUR].

25.7.19.

No. 19

H. D. 15.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 26, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm, K.C.M.G.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Col. U. S. Grant. *British Empire:* Capt. E. Abraham. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

I. Marshal Foch, the Military Advisers, Mr. Hoover and the experts on Polish Affairs entered the room.

Line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces

M. CAMBON said that the line proposed by Marshal Foch¹ included in the Polish area the districts of Suwalki and Seiny. The population of this area was Polish. It was therefore preferable so to fix the line as to attribute those territories to Poland.

¹ See map at appendix A.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether these areas were still occupied by the Germans.

M. CAMBON said the Germans were evacuating the territories slowly.

MR. BALFOUR said he would like to know how the various lines which had been drawn¹ had come about. He understood that the territory was Polish but that it had been deliberately excluded from Polish occupation by the Council of Five. If it were true that the Council had laid down a policy to which the Poles had refused to submit, it would not be very satisfactory to reverse the Council's policy in favour of the Poles merely because they had been insubordinate.

GENERAL LE ROND explained that when it had been a question of establishing a line of demarcation between Poles and Germans a line had been drawn north and east of the districts of Suwalki and Seiny, giving these to the Poles. This line had been notified but had never been acted on. It had been drawn in accordance with a recommendation of the Committee dealing with the eastern frontiers of Poland. The recommendations of the Committee had come up before the Council but had not been accepted. All the experts had agreed that the territory in question was Polish.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had been told that the territory was mostly Lithuanian. He would like to know what the opinion of the experts really was.

(The American, British, French and Italian experts agreed that the population in these districts was mainly Polish.)

GENERAL LE ROND continuing, said that at a later date, according to the demands of the Lithuanian Military Mission, the question was brought before the Council and a line passing just north of Augustovo had been fixed as the line of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces. This was the green line on the annexed map (see Appendix A). The Poles had complained that there were distinctively Polish areas north of this line and on the 20th June they had proposed that the line of demarcation should be that shown in blue on the map. This line not only enclosed Polish areas, but also a wide defensive zone in addition. The line since proposed by Marshal Foch enclosed what were really Polish areas and only a shallow defensive zone in addition. This was the red line on the map. (Note:—Map will be issued later.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the change from the green to the red line had been accompanied by or was the result of an offensive action taken by the Poles.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that this was not so. General Henrys² had been told to allow the Poles to occupy Polish territory evacuated by the Germans.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been given the impression that the Poles had defied the orders of the Conference, but he was prepared to accept the explanation given and to agree to the line proposed by Marshal Foch, in view of the unanimous opinion that the territory which would be assigned to the Poles was Polish in character.

(Marshal Foch was then instructed to communicate through General Henrys, the line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces in

² French General acting as Military Adviser to the Polish Army Command.

the region of Suvalki, Grodno and Vilna, in accordance with the red line on the annexed map.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that he had had a talk with Mr. Hoover and as a result of his conversation, had prepared a draft which he then read:—

*Hungarian
Affairs*

‘The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the Hungarian people, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun; which has not only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. But if Peace is to be settled, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if the blockade is to be removed, if supplies are to be made available, the co-operation of the Hungarian people is required. It is only with a Government which really represents them that such a settlement can be arranged.

‘The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.’

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that the last paragraph meant that the Roumanians would have to evacuate territory occupied in what was to be Hungary according to the Treaty, as soon as the Armistice had been carried out on the Hungarian side. The draft dealt with one half of the Allied policy. It would explain to the world and to the Hungarians the intentions of the Powers. What instructions should be given to Marshal Foch to carry out this policy remained to be decided. He was strongly of opinion that the Council could not allow the Armistice to be violated with impunity. Having ordered the Hungarians to reduce their troops to six divisions and by implication to remain at peace with the Allies of the Powers, the latter could not sit and watch the Hungarians double their forces and attack their Allies. If Marshal Foch could put an end to this with the forces available, it appeared clear that he ought to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when Mr. Balfour said that the Powers could not tolerate violation of the Armistice, he presumably meant all the Powers. It was noticeable, however, that there were no Italian, no British and no American troops available, but only the remnants of two French divisions, together with Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs. According to Marshal Foch, the initial effort required would not be great, and the troops at hand might suffice, but the sequel must be considered.

M. TITTONI said that regarding Italian co-operation, he saw no difficulty

in the region of foreign policy, but in respect to internal politics, the outlook was not so clear. Any campaign against Hungary would produce a general strike in Italy. The cost of living had reached heights unequalled in any other country. As to coal, there was only a fortnight's margin. He must therefore state, with great regret, that the economic situation in Italy and its political consequences would not allow Italy to contribute any force for action against Hungary, although action in this direction would suit his foreign policy admirably.

MR. BALFOUR said that two questions were raised by M. Clemenceau's remarks. One was a general question, and the other was a military one. As to the latter, he need say little, as Marshal Foch considered he had enough troops on the spot to undertake action. As to the general question, he would like to ask whether in M. Clemenceau's opinion, it was necessary, whenever Inter-Allied military action was required, that the troops be furnished by an equal contribution of all the Powers interested.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not meant his remarks to be stretched to that extent. He would like to say, however, that his situation, though not as serious as M. Tittoni's, had some analogies with it. There were two French divisions in Bulgaria who were expected to assist the Greeks, and there were two in Hungary, which were expected to act without any Allied assistance whatever.

MR. BALFOUR said the only question remaining then was whether Marshal Foch was right in saying that he had enough troops to proceed with.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had reported on July 17th. Nothing had happened in the intervening week to make him alter his views, provided a definite policy were adopted and an agreement were reached between small States who would be called upon to furnish the main contingent.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Clemenceau what alternative he had to the policy suggested.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his alternative would be to allow Hungary to settle her own fate without military intervention. The war was over, the American Army had been withdrawn very rapidly, the British Army nearly as rapidly, and the French Army was being demobilised. He was forced to demobilise very quickly; it could not be helped. He could not, therefore, contemplate the sending of two French divisions into Hungary unsupported by their Allies. There would shortly be only two classes under the colours in the French Army. Marshal Foch quite reasonably asked for a definition of the exact intentions of the Conference. This was a political question, and to tell the truth, it was hard to give him an answer. In any case, he was not ready to begin fighting again. He felt inclined to adopt the proposals made by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hoover. He would encompass Hungary with a ring of hostile States, and rely on her to rid herself of the tyranny of a minority in her own way. Hence, it would be well, as Marshal Foch suggested, to consult the small Powers, who were, in any event, principally concerned. Their position was not clear. The Serbians would only act on certain conditions, the Roumanians also made reservations, and so did the Czechs. What was the net result?

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was for this reason that he recommended that the small Powers should be consulted, in order that the Conference might determine whether their terms could be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he quite understood M. Clemenceau's position. It meant, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers confessed their impotence to enforce their will on a small nation. If what had been said in the Council were known outside, namely, that all the Powers had demobilised so fast under the stress of domestic necessity, it would certainly be regarded as absurd that the Powers, which, eight months ago, were the conquerors of the world, could not, at the present moment, impose their will on an army of 120,000 men. This inglorious situation he did not particularly mind, but he wondered how the Conference would be able to terminate its work successfully.³ An unpleasant Treaty would have to be imposed on the Bulgarians, and a still more unpleasant one on the Turks. Further, the new small States lately created, must be controlled, and prevented from attacking one another. If the Conference could not enforce its will on Hungary, could it do all these things? If the picture drawn by M. Clemenceau was accurate, the Conference would have to leave its work unfinished.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not take such a gloomy view. All that he wished to do was to adapt the means at the command of the Conference to the ends it had in view. He believed Mr. Hoover held the key of the situation. The offer of food in return for good behaviour would be a very effective weapon. The case was similar to that of Russia, but in the case of Russia, there were no means of coercion; against the Hungarians there were. They could be surrounded, and in time would have to come to terms. This might be inglorious, but there was little glory in fighting without men, or in making threats that could not be carried out.

MR. BALFOUR said that there was not a very great difference between his policy and M. Clemenceau's. Marshal Foch might be requested to demand that the Hungarians at least observed the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a reiteration of this demand would not be of much avail, as it had already been made and neglected. He would prefer to accept the proposal Mr. Balfour had read, to avoid issuing any ultimatum, to refrain from engaging Marshal Foch or any troops and to give General Boehm the month for which he had asked. At the end of this time, the situation would not be much worse than the present. One-third of the French troops would have been demobilised, but there would still be means of action, if absolutely necessary.

MARSHAL FOCH said that as long as there was no understanding between the great and the small Powers the situation would not be clear. It would not improve after the lapse of a month or even two or three months. It was even possible that the smaller Powers would get out of hand and destroy the edifice so laboriously set up by the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR said that if assured that the situation would not grow worse

³ The two preceding sentences are printed with verbal variation by Mrs. B. E. C. Dugdale in *Arthur James Balfour, 1906-1930* (London, 1936), p. 268.

he would raise no objection. He presumed that if the Military Authorities said that they could settle the matter at once, failing which the situation would grow worse, M. Clemenceau would agree to act. If Bela Kun was going to fall there need be no anxiety, but on the other hand if he were going to have a military success the result might be grievous.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not prepared to prophesy what would happen. The world had just gone through a fearful war and had only secured fragments of peace. The peoples were looking out for means of starting their economic life again. He wished to do nothing to jeopardise this reasonable ambition. He could not ask his people to go to war again. They would not do it with the same readiness as they did in 1914. The situation appeared to him to require prudence. No doubt prudence involved some elements of risk but there was a greater risk in giving an ultimatum which, if rejected, would lead to war. Marshal Foch did not offer a clear solution. He made his action conditional on the definition of a certain policy and on the agreement of the lesser powers concerned. Any check would have very serious results in Italy, as M. Tittoni said, in France and also probably in Great Britain. He did not wish to run this risk. The plans of General Boehm offered for the moment a better outlook than existed a week ago. If the Hungarians were really in the majority opposed to Bela Kun they might under the stress of Mr. Hoover's blandishments overthrow the Bela Kun Government. There might then occur a favourable opportunity of which Marshal Foch could avail himself.

MR. BALFOUR said that he sympathised with M. Clemenceau as he also had no wish to plunge the world into war again. He would add that without a French Commander-in-Chief and without the co-operation of the two French divisions he thought there was little prospect of success. As M. Clemenceau said that neither of these conditions could be fulfilled the case was judged; but he would like to say in justification of the advice he had given that he was not animated by any spirit of adventure. He wished to get his own and other countries out of an adventure. He wished to avoid further misfortunes in the future. He wished the Conference to have the authority which power alone could give. He agreed that the economic weapon was still available. Nevertheless rapid demobilisation had put the Conference into a difficulty which was almost comic. Eight months ago the Allies had fifteen million men in the field; now it was difficult to lay hands on a single battalion. His fear had been that if Bela Kun were allowed to know that the Conference was militarily powerless he might use this knowledge to great effect and the evil might spread all over the world. If the French Government who had two divisions available declined to use them, it was not for him to press for the campaign. Possibly the prestige of past victories and economic power might enable the Allies to overcome this difficulty. He would therefore content himself with half of the policy he had proposed.

MR. WHITE said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. According to his information Bela Kun was backed by a strong Nationalist movement. Military interference would only reinforce this sentiment which it was not

desirable to inflame. The less national support Bela Kun had, the better. The action exercised by Mr. Hoover would therefore have, he thought, greater chances of success than military intervention.

After some further discussion it was decided to issue in the Press and by wireless the following declaration:—

'The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a Peace with the Hungarian People and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to be removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a Government which represents the Hungarian people and not with one that rests its authority upon terrorism.

'The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.'⁴

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in the meantime conversations might be undertaken with the smaller powers.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if it was intended to do nothing this was hardly desirable.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not meant to convey that he would never act: on some favourable occasion he might. Meanwhile if possible he would like to see the success of General Boehm.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the smaller Powers were called in consultation, the state of demobilisation would have to be revealed to them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they could be dealt with individually and asked to state under what conditions they would act should action be decided on. The Serbians, for instance, had certain desiderata.

M. TITTONI said that they desired that the Conference should intercede between them and the Italians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the Conference would do so.

MR. BALFOUR asked what news Marshal Foch had received of the Roumanian Forces.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the news was not bad and that the Roumanians were not alarmed by the Hungarian attack.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would make a great difference if the Hungarian

⁴ This declaration was issued that day and was published in the British press on July 28, 1919. Cf. also W. Böhm (i.e. General Boehm): *Im Kreuzfeuer zweier Revolutionen* (Munich, 1924. Hungarian ed.: *Két Forradalom Tűzében*), pp. 504-5.

attack failed. Should Bela Kun fall of his own weight it would certainly be better than if he were overthrown by the Allies.

(It was then decided that Marshal Foch should continue negotiations with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak Delegations in order to obtain from them their exact views regarding the guarantees they required for military intervention in Hungary.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU read the telegram from General Henry[s] asking, in agreement with the Entente Military representatives, that energetic action should be taken to force the Germans to cease hostilities in Silesia and in Posnania. The village of [?]Wirruszon had been daily bombarded and partially destroyed. Women and children had been killed and the population was abandoning the village and the cultivation of the fields.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on the 24th, instructions had been sent to General Nudant⁵ asking him to order the Germans to put a stop to this at once.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that it would be desirable to send a Mission immediately.

MR. HOOVER said the situation in Silesia was producing a very serious diminution of the output of coal. Most of central Europe depended on Silesia for coal. For instance, the parlous condition of Vienna resulted from this situation. The best hope resided in an early appointment of a Commission which might restore order. In view of the plebiscite, both Poles and Germans were conducting active propaganda which was having a demoralising effect on production.

M. TITTONI said he had already nominated the Italian member of the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch, in consultation with the French War Office, to arrange for a designation of the French member.

(It was decided that each power should nominate one member for a Commission to undertake the administration of the plebiscite area of Silesia during the period of plebiscite.)

(It was further decided that the Commission for the delimitation of the Eastern frontiers of Germany be appointed as speedily as possible.

It should be composed of four officers for each power (one Commissioner, Head of the Commission, one Assistant Commissioner, two Technical officers.) The nominations were to be made on the following Monday⁶ (see Appendix C to H. D. 8. para 2).⁷)

MR. WHITE said that he could not make a nomination without reference to Washington; in fact, no American nomination would be possible before ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the other members could be nominated in the meantime.

(Marshal Foch and the Military Experts withdrew, and M. Clementel⁸ and the Financial & Economic Experts entered the room.)

⁵ President of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission at Spa. ⁶ July 28, 1919.

⁷ Paragraph 2 of appendix C to No. 12. ⁸ Chairman of the Economic Commission.

4. (After a statement by M. Clementel (see Appendix B⁹), it was decided that the examination of the question should be resumed on the following Monday.⁶)

Economic Clauses for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria BARON MAKINO gave notice of an amendment to Article 29, which he would propose at the next meeting. (See Appendix C.⁹)

5. COLONEL PEEL¹⁰ said that there was unanimous agreement about these clauses (see Appendix D¹¹). The gist of the proposals was that Bulgaria should undertake to pay two milliards and a quarter of francs in gold. This sum might be reduced by the Reparation Commission should it consider it excessive. An international body, distinct from the Reparation Commission, on which

⁹ Not printed. See No. 22, minute 6.

¹⁰ British representative on the Reparation Commission of the Peace Conference.

¹¹ Not printed. This appendix, dated July 25, 1919, comprised ten draft articles, as follows:

Article 1. Draft for article 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly. The draft for the sixth paragraph did not include the words: 'as constituted by the Treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919, Part VIII, Annex II, paragraph 2' (cf. No. 59, note 10). The seventh paragraph of article 121 was not present in this draft, which was otherwise the same as the final version apart from minor variations in drafting.

Article 2. Draft for article 122. (In this and subsequent articles minor variations in drafting are ignored.)

Article 3. Draft for article 123.

Article 4. Draft for article 124. This draft read as follows: 'Bulgaria recognises the transfer to the Allied and Associated Powers of any claims by the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey against the Bulgarian Government. The Allied and Associated Powers, on the other hand, agree not to require from Bulgaria any payment in respect of claims so transferred arising out of the supply by Austria-Hungary and Germany of war material since the 1st August, 1914, as they have taken these claims into account in fixing the amount to be paid by Bulgaria under Article 1.'

Article 5. Draft for article 126.

Article 6. Draft for article 127. This draft read as follows: 'Bulgaria further binds herself to deliver to the Governments of Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, within six months from the coming into force of this Treaty, livestock of the descriptions and in the numbers set out in the Annex of this Article.

'These animals shall be delivered at such places as may be appointed by the respective Governments. They shall be inspected before delivery by agents appointed by the Inter-Allied Commission, who shall satisfy themselves that the animals so delivered are of average health and condition.

'No credit shall be made to Bulgaria in respect of their value, but the animals handed over shall be regarded as having been delivered in restitution for animals taken away by Bulgaria during the war from the territories of the countries named.

'Annex to Article 6.

	Greece	Serbia	Roumania
'Bulls (18 months to 3 years)	15	50	60
'Milch Cows (2 to 6 years)	1,000	3,000	4,000
'Horses and Mares (3 to 7 years)	1,500	2,500	3,500
'Mules	300	500	700
'Draught Oxen	1,200	2,000	2,800
'Sheep	4,000	6,000	10,000'

Article 7. Draft for article 128.

Article 8. Draft for article 129.

France, Great Britain and Italy would be represented, would be established in Sofia to work out the details. It would have considerable powers, both of raising and controlling taxation in order that the Reparation clauses should be duly executed.

(The Reparation clauses submitted were then accepted.)

6. M. SERGENT¹² said that there was complete agreement regarding the Financial Clauses. (See Appendix E.¹³)

Financial Clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria MR. WHITE said that the American expert had a word to say.

MR. DULLES said that he thought the text of the reparation and financial clauses should be communicated to the Serbians, Roumanians and Greeks, as they were concerned.

MR. BALFOUR asked what had been done regarding similar clauses in the Treaty with Austria.

MR. DULLES said that there had been a plenary meeting at which the smaller Powers had complained of the short time they had for considering the proposals.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether they were likely to wish to discuss the proposals or merely to hear them.

COLONEL PEEL said that he felt sure that they would be anxious to discuss them and that the discussion would be interminable. He agreed however that the clauses should be communicated to them.

(It was agreed that the Serbian, Roumanian and Greek Delegations should be informed by the President of the Committees which had drafted the financial and reparation clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria, of the provisions of these clauses. Should no modification of the present draft result, the text should be communicated forthwith to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.)

(The Experts then withdrew.)

Article 9. Draft for article 130. Appended to this draft article was the annex which was subsequently inserted after article 131.

Article 10. Draft for article 131.

This appendix thus contained no draft for article 125 of the Treaty of Neuilly. (Cf. No. 25, note 9.)

¹² A French representative on the Financial Commission.

¹³ Not printed. This appendix, dated July 25, 1919, comprised sixteen draft articles, as follows: articles 1-15, which were drafts for articles 132-46 respectively of the Treaty of Neuilly, and article 16, which was a draft for article 115 of the treaty. Apart from minor variations in drafting these draft articles did not differ from the final texts except that article 10 (the draft for article 141 of the treaty) read as follows: 'Any power to which Bulgarian territory was ceded under the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913, or under the Treaty of Constantinople, 1913, or is ceded under this Treaty, undertakes to pay in such manner as may be prescribed such contribution towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on the 1st August, 1914, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, may determine to be equitable, having regard to the ratio between the revenues of the ceded territory and the total revenues of Bulgaria for the average of the three complete financial years next before the Balkan War (1912).'

7.

A Commission for the delimitation of frontier between Belgium and Germany

It was agreed that the nominations of this Commission should be sent to the Secretary-General as speedily as possible.

8. Members of the Commission on Baltic Affairs entered the room.

Declaration proposed by Commission on Baltic Affairs to be addressed to the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania

The following document was read:—

‘Considering the importance of maintaining ordered and stable Governments in the Baltic territories as a barrier against Bolshevism on the one hand and against German aggression on the other, and the necessity of close co-operation between these Governments and the

Allied and Associated Governments which can only be secured if the Baltic peoples have complete confidence in the intentions of the Allies to protect their liberties in case of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia, the Baltic Commission are of opinion that the time has come when the Allied and Associated Powers should clearly define their policy towards these Governments and recommend that a joint declaration be made to them in the following sense:—

‘In response to the representation addressed to the Peace Conference by the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Delegations, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the fifth condition of their Note to Admiral Kolchak,¹⁴ which runs as follows:—

“If a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between their *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.”

‘The Allied and Associated Governments are anxious and willing to do all in their power to assist the Baltic Governments to organise their local

¹⁴ The reference was to the note which the Supreme Council addressed to Admiral Kolchak on May 26, 1919. This note stated that the Allied and Associated Governments were ‘disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Kolchak and his associates with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the Government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same objects in view as that of the Allied and Associated Powers’. These guarantees were embodied in eight conditions for acceptance by Admiral Kolchak. (These conditions were printed in the British press on June 7, 1919.) On June 4 a reply from Admiral Kolchak was communicated from Omsk. In this note he stated: ‘the Government over which I preside has been happy to learn that the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Russia is in perfect accord with the task which the Russian Government itself has undertaken.’ (See Vol. III of this series.)

defences and to re-establish in the interests of general peace an orderly and stable government in these countries.

'They further declare their intention to protect their liberties in the event of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia.

'At the same time it seems to them impossible to reach any definite solution which will guarantee a durable peace without a previous arrangement with a recognised Russian Government, and while reserving to themselves the right of collaboration either directly or through the League of Nations to obtain a settlement satisfactory to both parties, they cannot at the present moment take any steps which would bind them as regards a definite settlement pending the restoration of a recognised Russian Government.

'The Allied and Associated Powers would add that they feel confident that if they assist the Governments of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia, they may rely on these Governments to accept such provisions as the Allied and Associated Powers may consider necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities in those territories.'

MR. BALFOUR said that the objections to these proposals were clear to him. Their advantages were not manifest.

M. DELLA TORRETTA said that no precise instructions had been given to the Commission on Baltic Affairs. It had therefore studied questions connected with the New States set up on the north-west frontier of Russia. There were in these countries *de facto* Governments which had been encouraged by the Allied and Associated Powers to resist both the Germans and the Bolsheviks, who were either intriguing against them or fighting them. The Commission had thought that these Governments required some moral support from the Entente. A dispatch had been sent to Admiral Koltchak from the Conference in which reference had been made to these New States. A satisfactory answer had come from Admiral Koltchak.¹⁴ The Commission thought that it was opportune to do something to encourage these New States. They could not be offered independence, but they might be offered some guarantee for the preservation of their liberties without interfering with Russian sovereignty. In some way or other these *de facto* Governments must be recognised.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had some doubt concerning the policy proposed. He did not see whom it would please but it would certainly displease the Russians who desired Russia to be restored to its old frontiers. It was unlikely even to please the new states. In one paragraph the telegram to Koltchak was quoted. This telegram was known to the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians. Nothing was therefore gained by restating it. The first paragraph added to this extract from the telegram no doubt expressed a truth; but unfortunately the Allied and Associated Powers could not do all they desired to do. There was not much money to give. As to arms and munitions, they were being given. If this declaration were made, the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians might be led to suppose that they were about to receive more; but this was impossible. The declaration therefore

would either merely restate what was being done or raise false hopes. The next paragraph was either not new or represented a somewhat formidable undertaking on the part of the Entente Powers to enter into antagonism with a strong centralised Government in Russia. Such a declaration would not help the Baltic States and might greatly embarrass the Allied Powers. The first sentence of the next paragraph appeared to him to go too far. He hoped that Russia would reconstitute itself, but for the time being he saw no elements tending in that direction. Was it desirable to tell the Baltic States that they must wait for the settlement of their fate until a very remote contingency had taken place? Such a statement could only discourage them. As to the last paragraph, desirable as the proposals suggested might be, it was not an opportune moment to ask for the acceptance of these provisions at a time when the Allied Powers could only offer a very slight assistance to the Baltic States. He could not help thinking that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it failed to convey the encouragement it wished to convey. He would not advise the Council to accept it.

M. DELLA TORRETTA said that the Commission had been unanimous and had considered that its proposals followed directly from the Allied Policy outlined in the telegram to Koltchak. There seemed to be no other way of reconciling the unity of Russia with an offer of autonomy to the Baltic peoples. Certain things had been done which had led those peoples to believe that their fate would be settled by the Conference. They were being supplied with money, arms and munitions. The declaration suggested made no essential alteration in the Allied attitude. All that was aimed at was a transitory regularisation of the situation and a confirmation of the declarations previously made. The Commission was informed that the Baltic Governments required some encouragement of this kind to continue action against the Bolsheviks on one hand and the Germans on the other.

M. PICHON said that the Lithuanians, Esthonians and Letts had repeatedly asked the Governments of the Powers to recognise them. They had always been told that their efforts were sympathetically regarded and help had been given them as *de facto* Governments in their struggles against the Bolsheviks. They had always been told, however, that the Powers could go no further. The ultimate solution must depend on the outcome of the Russian situation. The Council of Five had always kept these two considerations closely connected. The Baltic Delegates had asked whether the Conference would end without settling the question of Russia. He had replied that he hoped it would not but he could not undertake to make a definite statement. The declaration suggested by the Commission would not, he thought, give them any particular satisfaction nor would it please the Russians. What the Baltic States really wanted was separation. This the Conference could not for the time being offer them. Promises of autonomy would not satisfy them. No other declaration, however, could be made without producing a very difficult situation in regard to Russia.

M. DELLA TORRETTA said that the Commission recognised that the declaration would not entirely satisfy the Baltic States. It would, however,

be a beginning. On the other hand it would not displease the Russians as it did not threaten the separation of the Baltic Provinces which they feared. (After some further discussion the question was adjourned.)

9. M. CLEMENCEAU read a telegram suggesting that three Karelian Delegates elected by an assembly held at Olonitz be heard by the Peace Conference in order to express the wishes of the population of that region. The Finnish Government was greatly interested in the question and would like the affairs of Karelia to be explained to the Conference.

(After some discussion it was decided to refer the question to the Commission on Baltic affairs.)

10.

Despatch of a Delegation of Swabians from the Banat

[Not printed]¹⁵

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris.

July 26, 1919.

¹⁵ This matter was referred to the Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs.

No. 20

H. D. 16.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 28, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm, M.P.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel U. S. Grant. *British Empire:* Capt. E. Abraham. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Lt.-Colonel A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that as his colleagues knew, he had informed the Chamber of Deputies that he could not communicate to them the records of the proceedings of the Council of Four. This had been in accordance with the wishes of his colleagues.¹ The Minutes of the Council of Four had been given to the members of the Council only. The present Council, it had been agreed, should proceed in the same manner. He now heard that the British Delegation

Distribution of Minutes of the Meetings of the Council

¹ See No. 8, minute 1.

tion wished to distribute the Minutes to as many as twelve experts or departments, while the French and other Secretariats were interpreting the order more strictly. He thought that the Minutes should only be sent to persons present in the Council.

MR. BALFOUR asked how many copies of the Minutes were sent to French experts or departments.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that none were sent.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that the distribution should be very carefully restricted, and that only extracts be sent to the experts or departments concerned.

MR. BALFOUR explained that a request had been made from London that various Departments should receive copies of the Minutes, as they concerned the work in which they were engaged. As his colleagues desired that the circulation should be restricted, he would reply that this could not be done.

(It was agreed that a strict interpretation of the Resolution adopted on the 5th [7th] July—see H. D. 1,² Minute 11—should be adhered to.)

2. (At this point, M. Loucheur and Mr. Waterlow entered the room.)

M. TITTONI put forward the following proposal:—

*Italian Proposal
for the Creation
of an Inter-Allied
Organisation for
the Distribution
of Raw Materials*

'In consideration of the fact that the persistent difficulties of provisioning Allied countries necessitate the continuation of a united and co-ordinated course of action in order to avoid the danger of famine,
It is resolved

that the Allied and Associated Powers shall form an organisation whose duty it will be to control and determine the respective requirements so far as concerns the most essential products (grain, coal, etc.) and to co-ordinate action so far as concerns purchases in the various producing countries and transport; and

'It is also resolved

to refer the question to the Supreme Economic Council with a recommendation to the said Council to name a Commission which shall determine as speedily as possible the working details of the above-mentioned organisation and which shall render the said organisation effective.'

M. LOUCHEUR said that the French Delegation had always supported the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council, in spite of British and American opposition. The British opposition had since been modified, as Mr. Lloyd George had come to see the importance of a common purchasing policy. The American Delegation, however, seemed still firmly opposed to the proposal.

MR. WHITE said that the United States were, in fact, quite unwilling to sanction the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council.

M. TITTONI said that the question he had raised was one of extreme importance for Italy. Italy was in distress. This distress was a consequence of the war and should be treated in the same manner as it would have been

treated had it come about during the war. As long as the Government could keep the people fed and supplied with work, it could maintain order. Without these conditions, it could not. He felt it necessary to make this statement. If Italy were left without succour, he would decline all responsibility as regards the future.

MR. WHITE said that he expected Mr. Hoover back from Brest on the following day. In the meantime, he did not object to the reference of the question to the Supreme Economic Council, as it still existed.

M. LOUCHEUR said that, quite apart from any questions of the official constitution of the Council, he and his colleagues had agreed to meet to see what measures could be taken to assist an Ally in distress. There was still a small sub-committee dealing with coal. He was himself Chairman of this Committee, and he was ready, should the Council desire it, to call the Committee together to study the question raised by M. Tittoni.

MR. BALFOUR asked who the British Representative was.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he would be able to inform Mr. Balfour later.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question was not merely one of help from one country to another. It went deeper than that. The war was now over and new problems, but equally difficult problems, had arisen. The situation resulting from the war had to be liquidated. The various Allied States were mutually indebted. Their only means of discharging their debts was by exports. Great Britain could only pay off her indebtedness by the production and exportation of coal. For coal was not only one of the principal British exports, but it was also the means necessary for every form of manufacture. The situation could not be solved, as during the war, by suppressing train services and doing away with superfluities. It went to the roots of the whole economic relations of all countries, not merely of the Allied countries between themselves. It was not simply a question of the rich helping the poor in any one particular commodity. It was for this reason that he had enquired who the British Representative on M. Loucheur's Committee was. It was necessary that a matter of this sort should be dealt with by a first-class Minister, intimately acquainted with the whole economic and financial situation. He understood that the future Economic Council, if created, would include first-class Finance Ministers from each of the countries concerned.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question, nevertheless, was one of life or death. Whether it be a peace question or a war question, it made little difference whether a man died by bullet wounds or by starvation. He, therefore, suggested that the matter be discussed on the following day, together with Mr. Hoover and M. Loucheur.

(This was agreed to.)

M. LOUCHEUR asked if he was authorised to examine the situation in the meantime with the Italian experts.

M. TITTONI said that he would be able to furnish him with all the figures showing the stocks at present existing in Italy.

(M. Loucheur's suggestion was approved.)

3.

*Distribution of Rolling
Stock in Germany,
Austria-Hungary and
Bulgaria*

[Not printed]³

4.

*Re-establishment of
Postal Communication
with Germany*

[Not printed]

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that in this connection he wished to inform his colleagues that the process of demobilisation forced him to withdraw 45,000 men from the French Armée d'Orient. He was not able therefore to undertake the conquest of Hungary, as only three *brigades mixtes* would be left.

M. TITTONI observed that the Anti-Bolshevik Government at Szeged expected to conquer Hungary if supplied with arms and munitions.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Anti-Bolshevik Governments had made similar statements before, but had never been successful.

M. SEYDOUX⁴ said that the Blockade of Hungary was a special case. Allied posts had been situated all round the circumference of Austria. Since peace had been made with Germany, the blockade along the Bavarian frontier had been raised, but it was maintained on the other frontiers. The blockade had been exercised by Inter-Allied agency. He had lately heard, however, that the American Government wished to recall its personnel. He also pointed out that the British Government had never sent any personnel with the exception of a single representative at Vienna. The work was disagreeable and unpopular, and it would be shared by France and Italy. It was evidently desirable that all the Allied and Associated Powers should play their part in this. Before addressing an urgent request to the British and American Delegations, the Blockade Committee had taken into consideration the stipulations which were to be required from the Austrian Delegates to the effect that Austria should undertake to maintain the blockade against Hungary (see Appendix A).⁵

The Committee had therefore prepared the following Note:—

21 juillet 1919.

‘Question du blocus de la Hongrie.

‘Le Comité de l'Orient estime nécessaire de porter devant le Conseil Suprême des Chefs de Gouvernements la question du blocus de la Hongrie, dont le maintien a été décidé par celui-ci le 26 juin dernier.

³ See No. 22, note 6.

⁴ M. Seydoux had entered the meeting for the discussion of the previous item.

⁵ Not printed. This appendix was a note dated June 7, 1919, from the Superior Blockade Council to the Council of Heads of States. This note proposed the declaration to be signed by the Austrian Delegation which was incorporated in the note of July 21 read by M. Seydoux.

'En même temps qu'ils signeront le traité de paix, les délégués autrichiens devront signer une déclaration portant que:

"sauf en cas d'une demande contraire présentée par les Gouvernements associés des Etats-Unis, de Grande Bretagne, de France et d'Italie, le Gouvernement d'Autriche continuera à interdire efficacement l'importation, l'exportation et le transit de toutes marchandises entre l'Autriche et la Hongrie, et à maintenir ces interdictions jusqu'au moment de l'acceptation formelle par le Gouvernement hongrois des conditions de paix qui lui seront proposées par les Gouvernement[s] associés."

'Il semble résulter de cette déclaration qu'après la signature du traité de paix, le Gouvernement autrichien aura seul la responsabilité des mesures à prendre pour le maintien du blocus de la Hongrie sur sa frontière.

'Or, si les mesures prises ne sont pas efficaces, les armes et munitions et autre matériel de guerre se trouvant encore en grandes quantités en Autriche pourront passer en Hongrie pendant le délai laissé par le traité de paix pour la livraison de ce matériel aux Alliés.

'Dans ces conditions, le Comité de Blocus de l'Orient désire savoir:

'1. Si le Gouvernement Autrichien doit être dès la signature par ses délégués de la déclaration susvisée, seul chargé de maintenir la fermeture de la frontière hongroise, dans ce cas les postes alliés entretenus à cette frontière devront être retirés dès la date de la signature;

'2. Si au contraire, une co-opération inter-alliée doit assister le Gouvernement autrichien dans sa tâche, il importe de savoir si les postes alliés de la frontière devront être maintenus:

- a) soit jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du traité,
- b) soit jusqu'à l'expiration du délai prévu pour la remise des armes et des munitions,
- c) soit jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix avec la Hongrie.

'Une décision immédiate est nécessaire, le délégué américain à Vienne ayant annoncé l'intention de son Gouvernement de rappeler ses agents du service de la frontière hongroise à la fin du présent mois, et le Gouvernement britannique n'ayant pas encore envoyé les siens; actuellement les postes de la frontière hongroise sont en majeure partie occupés par le personnel américain.'

In his opinion the best proposal was that Inter-Allied assistance be given to Austria. This would be welcomed by the Austrian Government, and the French Minister at Vienna had strongly supported the plan. The Austrian Government was weak, and if it was desired that the blockade should be maintained effectually against Hungary, it was desirable to reinforce the Austrian Government by Allied assistance.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how many men would be required to fulfil this plan.

M. SEYDOUX said that two officers and five or six men from each Nation would be enough. There remained the question of the time for which this blockade should be maintained. Probably, he thought, it would have to be maintained until the conclusion of peace with Hungary.

M. PICHON said that the period might be shortened if General Boehm succeeded.

MR. WHITE said that he understood that the American Government maintained three posts, but had since ordered their withdrawal.

M. SEYDOUX replied that this was so.

MR. BALFOUR said that Austria had been required to undertake the maintenance of the blockade against Hungary. He quite agreed that Austria must be assisted in doing so. If the Allies desired the blockade to be effective, it was manifest that they must assist in maintaining it. He thought that all the Allies should participate, and he undertook to try and induce the British Government to take their part.

MR. WHITE said that he would do likewise.

MR. BALFOUR said that as to the time at which the blockade could cease, it might be decided to raise it as soon as Hungary showed signs of good conduct, and sent Delegates to negotiate Peace. This point, however, need not be settled at present, and might be allowed to depend on events.

(It was then decided that the Blockade of Hungary should be maintained until the Council should decide otherwise, and that the participation of the Four Powers should be arranged for to assist the Austrian Government in maintaining it.)

6. M. SEYDOUX read a note of the Supreme Economic Council (see Appendix B).

Question of Imports into Serbia

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that in theory at least there was no blockade at Fiume. In practice, however, there was. The Italian Government, without justification, continually stopped trains.

M. TITTONI said that the question of transit was quite distinct. He had already sent a full explanation to M. Clemenceau, but no decision had yet been taken.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French base at Fiume had been hampered many times in its operations.

M. TITTONI said that pending a final solution, orders had been given by him that all trains should proceed without interference.

M. BERTHELOT said that a telegram had been received to the effect that the food situation in Serbia was very serious in consequence of the stoppage of goods from Fiume. Men, women and children had been dying of hunger whilst stores were accumulating in the port.

M. TITTONI said that he had sent telegraphic orders two days previously for the free passage of trains.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Tittoni whether he guaranteed that his orders would be carried out.

M. TITTONI replied that he did. He requested, however, that the situation be regulated speedily. As far as he knew, the goods in question were not landed on the quays in Fiume at all. They went by train and the railroad was open.

M. BERTHELOT said that, according to information he had received, the

railroads were blocked with traffic. In consequence, disembarkation of goods at Fiume was asked for.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether M. Tittoni recognised that the Serbians had a right to expedite goods through Fiume.

M. TITTONI said that it was not a question of transit through Fiume, but a question of establishing Serbian bases there. This would prejudice the question of Fiume and he was not prepared to accede to this.

M. BERTHELOT said that they would be satisfied if they obtained free passage either through the French base at Fiume, or through the Italian commissariat.

MR. BALFOUR asked when the Council might have information that this was being carried out.

M. TITTONI said that he would give telegraphic orders that goods destined for Serbia through the port of Fiume should proceed immediately, and that the revictualling of Jugo-Slavia in food, clothes, petroleum and other goods at present waiting at Fiume, should not be hampered by the interruption of communication, as the forwarding of these goods was of vital importance for the army and population of Jugo-Slavia.

M. Tittoni agreed to the use by the Serbians of Fiume as a port of transit, provided the French base or the Italian commissariat be used exclusively. The choice of either should be left with the Serbians.

Note was taken of M. Tittoni's declaration regarding the orders given by him two days previously for the resumption of transit by land.

M. TITTONI urged that a solution of this question be reached as early as possible.

7. (General Mance⁶ and Mr. Hudson entered the room.)

M. BERTHELOT read and explained the note attached in Appendix C.

Clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria on Ports, Waterways and Railways (It was agreed that there was no objection to the nomination of a French Member to the Commission.)

M. TITTONI said that he would express his view later.

MR. HUDSON said that final action on paragraph 24⁷ should, he thought, be postponed until the settlement of the territorial question. He therefore asked that the question of the insertion of clauses regarding Ports, Waterways and Railways be deferred until the territorial solution had been arrived at.

MR. BALFOUR said there was force in this proposal, but he would like to know when a decision on the territorial question could be expected. The Bulgarians had already arrived.

MR. WHITE said he had received a communication from President Wilson and therefore was able to discuss the question of Western Thrace. He would

⁶ British representative on the Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

⁷ The clause summarized in appendix C below. (Cf. No. 23, minute 2 and note 1.)

be ready to do so on the following day. In this connection, he wished to communicate the following document:—

‘Regarding the events mentioned in the report of the British, French and Japanese members of the Central Bulgarian [Territorial] Committee with respect to the alleged desire of the Mussulmans of Western Thrace that this territory be ceded by Bulgaria to Greece,⁸ the United States Chargé d’Affaires at Sofia, under date of the 24th instant, reports that the petition was prepared by one Mussulman deputy, who drew it up without the authority or knowledge of the other persons whose names were signed thereto. The Deputy in question has fled from Bulgaria and is believed to be in Italy or in Turkey. All the other Mussulman Deputies made an official denial before Parliament and also stated in a letter to the Prime Minister that they had not signed the petition and added that their views were entirely opposed to the sentiments expressed therein. In the opinion of the Chargé d’Affaires, the Mussulman population of Western Thrace, if forced to choose between Greek and Bulgarian rule, would greatly prefer here, as well as elsewhere, the latter, in spite of the fact that the Greeks have spent large sums in this district for purposes of propaganda. The Chargé d’Affaires concludes by saying that, in his opinion, an impartial investigation or a plebiscite would prove the foregoing beyond any question of doubt.’

Mr. White, continuing, said that the belief that the Mohammedan population of Western Thrace desired union with Greece had had considerable weight with the American Members of the Commission dealing with Greek Affairs. If this belief was as ill-founded as his later news implied, the situation was considerably modified.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. White whether he was able to obtain the official denial of the Mohammedan Deputies referred to in the Note.

MR. WHITE said he would try to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Venizelos must be heard on this subject, and he proposed, with Mr. White’s consent, to send him a copy of this Note.

(It was then agreed that M. Venizelos be invited to attend the Council at 5 p.m. on the following day, when the question of Western Thrace would be discussed.

It was further decided to postpone until the following meeting the discussion of the Clauses relating to Ports, Waterways, and Railways, for settlement in conjunction with the territorial questions affecting Bulgaria.)

The Meeting then adjourned.

Villa Majestic, Paris.

July 28, 1919.

⁸ See No. 16, appendix A, section IV.

*Note**Exportation en Serbie.*

Par une lettre du 1^{er} juillet, M. Nic. Pachitch, au nom de la délégation du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, a appelé l'attention du Président de la Conférence de la Paix sur l'encombrement du port de Gravosa, qui seul actuellement servirait à l'importation pour l'Etat serbo-croate-slovène, cet encombrement rendant très difficile le ravitaillement du Royaume. La délégation du dit Royaume demandait donc à la Conférence de bien vouloir ordonner que les importations fussent également autorisées par le port de Fiume.

La question a été portée devant le Conseil Suprême Economique qui l'a examinée dans sa séance du 10 juillet.

M. Volpi, délégué du Gouvernement italien, a fait connaître que les importations[s] pour le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes pourraient s'effectuer non seulement par Gravosa, mais aussi par Salonique, Cattaro et les ports dalmates, que d'ailleurs il n'existait aucun blocus du port de Fiume, et que le ravitaillement du royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes pourrait s'effectuer par ce port, soit par l'entremise de la base navale française, soit par celle de l'Intendance italienne.

M. Volpi a ajouté que son Gouvernement tout en étant désireux de donner toutes facilités au Royaume des Serbes Croates et Slovènes pour ce transit n'accepterait pas l'organisation à Fiume d'une base spéciale navale ou commerciale par ledit Royaume.

Le Conseil Suprême Economique ne peut que porter ce renseignement à la connaissance de la Conférence de la Paix pour réponse à M. Pachitch ou toute autre action qu'elle décidera.

Pour le Ministre et par autorisation

Le Conseiller d'Ambassade

Sous-Directeur des Relations Commerciales.

APPENDIX C TO No. 20

PARIS, le 24 juillet 1919.

*Note**Accès de la Bulgarie à Cavalla ou Dédéagatch.*

En prévision de l'attribution à la Grèce de la Thrace Bulgare, ce qui séparerait la Bulgarie de la mer Egée, la Commission du Régime international des Ports, voies d'eau et voies ferrées a proposé l'insertion dans le Traité avec la Bulgarie, d'une clause dont les dispositions essentielles sont les suivantes :

1^o — La Grèce donnera à bail à la Bulgarie pendant 50 ans une zone franche prise soit dans le port de Cavalla, soit dans celui de Dédéagatch, au choix de la Bulgarie.

2^o — Celle-ci y jouira de facilités particulières pour son transit.

3^o — Une convention, révisable tous les dix ans, fixera les conditions de cette cession et les modalités de son utilisation.

4^o — Si le port choisi est Cavalla, un chemin de fer sera construit et exploité par la Grèce pour relier ce port à la frontière bulgare.

Les questions visées aux paragraphes 3^e et 4^e seraient, en cas de désaccord entre la Grèce et la Bulgarie, soumises aux décisions d'une Commission composée d'un délégué bulgare, d'un délégué grec et d'un délégué britannique.

La Commission des Ports, en faisant cette proposition, ne s'est placée qu'au point de vue technique, et n'a pas envisagé certaines considérations d'ordre politique fort importantes pour le bon fonctionnement de l'organe ainsi créé. Cet organe a un rôle essentiellement pondérateur et arbitral. En n'y faisant participer qu'une seule grande Puissance, on risque de s'exposer aux protestations soit des Grecs, soit des Bulgares qui, suivant les décisions prises, les imputeront à l'attitude et aux intérêts politiques de cette grande Puissance.

La Délégation Française estime donc que pour donner à la Commission, qui doit fonctionner à Cavalla ou Dédéagatch, l'autorité voulue, il conviendrait d'y faire participer plusieurs grandes Puissances.

Elle considère que la Grande-Bretagne et la France, étant toutes deux Puissances garantes de la Grèce, sont naturellement désignées pour cette mission et que leur intervention sera d'ailleurs accueill[i]e par les Bulgares eux-mêmes comme une garantie d'impartialité.

No. 21

H. D. 17.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 28, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm, K.C.M.G.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Vannutelli.

Japan: Baron Makino; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Lt. Commander Bell. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Capt. Majnoni.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

I. At this moment M. Tardieu entered the room.

M. TARDIEU stated that the question of setting up the Committee for co-ordinating the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany had been submitted to the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty, by the American representative. After three meetings, the Committee had adopted a plan which was set out in Annex [Appendix] A.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the proposal was to the effect that a Committee should be set up in Paris to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty, and to co-ordinate its provisions. Would not there then be some confusion between this new Committee and the League of Nations? There would be a Permanent Committee at Geneva and another Permanent Committee at Paris. This might lead to disputes.

M. TARDIEU replied that Mr. Balfour's question had been answered in Paragraph 1 of the Report. The manner in which the functions of the Committee had been limited was clearly expressed, and there was therefore

no risk of overlapping. In addition to this, paragraph 5 of the Report stated that the Allied and Associated Governments would determine what the relations between the two bodies in question should be.

MR. BALFOUR replied that he was entirely satisfied; but that he would like to raise another, not very important question. Did the Council see any objection to the members of the Paris Committee being ambassadors?

M. TARDIEU replied that paragraph 2 of the Report answered the question. It had been thought that there was nothing to prevent ambassadors being appointed as representatives to the Committee, but, on the other hand, there was no need specially to recommend that ambassadors should be appointed.

(It was agreed that the Report of the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty with regard to setting up a Co-ordinating Committee to deal with questions of interpretation and execution should be adopted.)

2. M. Leygues¹ and the Naval experts entered the room.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Naval experts had met to discuss the question without being able to come to an agreement except on one point, which was, that, before they could deal with their side of the matter, a decision with regard to their general policy in the matter must be taken by the Governments concerned.

ADMIRAL RONARC'H stated that the Admirals had met several times without coming to an agreement and that their remarks on the differences of opinion between the Admiralties of the countries concerned could be seen in the Report submitted to the Conference (see Annex [Appendix] B).

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he did not see how the question of whether the vessels should be destroyed, sunk, or distributed, could again be raised. It had already been discussed by the Council of Four, and, finally, in reply to the French request, it had been decided that the vessels should be distributed; and that each recipient country should put the vessels allotted to it to what use it chose. There could be no doubt on the question, because, when the Scapa Flow incident occurred,² Mr. Lloyd George had expressed his regret for what had happened, in view of the fact that France was to receive a certain number of the vessels sunk. He had again renewed his promise, and had given a list of vessels that might finally be given to France by way of compensation. The Scapa Flow incident had added itself to the question of disposal. The German vessels had been placed under the guard of the British Admiralty. He did not wish to be critical; but simply to draw attention to the fact that a report on the whole question had been promised to the Supreme Council, and that the report in question had not yet been tendered. He had intended, at the time, to send a French Admiral over, but, since Mr. Lloyd George had not received the suggestion favourably, he had not insisted. The responsibility rested with the British Admiralty, and it was therefore necessary that a report should be submitted to the Council, in order

¹ French Minister of Marine.

² On June 21, 1919.

that responsibility for the affair might be determined. The German Admiral was going to be tried by a British court martial; but it should not be forgotten that the Admiral in question³ was at the time Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet; and that he had admitted to having given orders to sink it. The German Government was therefore clearly responsible, and the Allies had a right to demand reparation. Mr. Lloyd George had stated that reparation would be given, but, after enquiring, he had not appeared to think this possible. An argument had been brought forward to the effect that the provisions of the Armistice did not establish sufficient control over the German vessels; Mr. Lloyd George had further recalled Marshal Foch's opinion against surrendering these vessels. Before discussing the question of distributing the German fleet, it was necessary to know where the fleet in question actually was: one portion was at the bottom of the sea in Scapa Flow, another, smaller, portion was possibly afloat in the same locality; finally, there were vessels in German ports. How could the Admirals have given any other reply? They could only do what they had done, and draw attention to the fact that no political decision had been taken. This was the essence of the question, and before pursuing the discussion further, he wished to know the opinion of his colleagues.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the remarks of the President of the Council raised three points. Firstly, he had alluded to a declaration of Mr. Lloyd George in favour of distributing the Fleet.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the question had been twice discussed, and that finally President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had acceded to French wishes by accepting the principle that the Fleet should be distributed.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council of Four had agreed that the distribution should be made between the Allied Powers, but that he was not aware of the exact basis of this distribution. He asked whether it had been decided, for example, to make an equal division of all surface vessels of the same class; or whether compensations in another form were to accompany the distribution.

M. TITTONI stated, that, inasmuch as the principle of distribution had been determined upon, it was necessary to know the manner in which it was to be carried out.

M. CLEMENCEAU answered that the principle of distribution had alone been discussed, and not the details of this distribution.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the matters included in the minutes of April 25th represented a definite decision taken by France.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he was quite ready to re-discuss the question for the fourth or fifth time. He wished to draw attention, however, to the fact, that, as Mr. Lloyd George had proposed to hand over to the French a certain number of vessels whose names were given, this in itself proved his admission of the principle of distribution.

BARON MAKINO stated that he could remember this statement.

MR. BALFOUR stated that it was very important to know what had been

³ Rear-Admiral von Reuter.

decided upon by the Council of Four, in order that the question should not continually recur. He did not think, that, as a matter of principle, it was advisable to re-open matters already discussed and decided upon by that body.

M. CLEMENCEAU answered that he could not entirely accept Mr. Balfour's statement of principle. It was contradicted by the fact that a decision had been made to occupy the Rhine territory for fifteen years. Notwithstanding this, six days before the Treaty had been signed, Mr. Lloyd George had re-opened the question and it had been re-discussed. He was nevertheless in agreement with Mr. Balfour. It was necessary to see exactly what had been said and to consult the minutes drawn up by the Secretariat. In addition to this, the report promised on the Scapa Flow incident should be forthcoming.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he saw no objection to a report being made.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the British Admiralty was not of that opinion.

MR. WHITE stated that the question was new to him, and that it was necessary for him to examine carefully the minutes of proceedings in order that he might know what President Wilson had thought.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that they were therefore in agreement on the two points previously raised by him.

M. TITTONI stated that the principle of distribution was agreed upon; but the manner in which it was to be carried out had yet to be decided.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the last point had never been discussed; and that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had only agreed to the principle. He further drew attention to the fact that he had raised the question of German responsibility.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he did not doubt that such a responsibility existed, but even if established, what advantages would accrue?

(It was agreed that the Secretariat should examine the minutes of proceedings in order to report on all that had been said in the Council of Four with regard to the distribution of the German Fleet. It was further decided that Mr. Balfour should ask the British Government for the report on the Scapa Flow incident.)

(M. Leygues and the Naval Advisers then left the room.)

3.

*Nomination of a Director
for the Port of Kehl*

[Not printed]⁴

4. M. TARDIEU stated that the Jugo-Slav Delegation had addressed several *Report of the Commission on Roumanian and territories.* Notes to the Council on the subject of their claims to certain

*Jugo-Slav affairs
regarding the demands
of the Jugo-Slavs in the
Banat*

MR. BALFOUR stated, that before pursuing this discussion, he wished to remark that he preferred not to take up the Jugo-Slav claims during such time as the Serbians

⁴ This nomination arose out of article 65 of the Treaty of Versailles. After a brief discussion it was decided that the nomination of M. Detousse, Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées,

refused to respect the decisions taken by the Council with regard to Klagenfurt.⁵

M. TARDIEU remarked, that as the claims were rejected in the proposed replies, these latter were in line with Mr. Balfour's remarks.

M. TITTONI said that he considered it useless to discuss the question, as the Council's decisions were not being respected.

M. TARDIEU answered that the proposals themselves might be considered because they did not grant the Serbians' claims.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the entire discussion was put aside by Mr. Balfour's remarks, with whom [*sic*] the Council agreed.

M. TARDIEU stated that since the questions could not be further discussed, despite the fact that the claims put forward had been rejected, the Council would presumably be less inclined to discuss points upon which concessions had been made. There remained a question of Ada-Kalessi Island which did not concern Jugo-Slavia. In a telegram dated 11th July General Franchet d'Esperey had reported that the Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs both laid claim to Ada-Kalessi Island, which lay in the Danube opposite Orsova, and which, after being left to Turkey by virtue of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1908. In view of the fact that the Ada-Kalessi Island had been occupied by Austria-Hungary the Committee proposed that it should be given to Roumania, which country had received the Austro-Hungarian territories of Transylvania adjacent to the Danube. The Committee required that the stipulations of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, with regard to the prohibition of Military works on the island should be upheld.

(It was agreed that the Ada-Kalessi Island should be granted to Roumania, and that the clauses of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, as detailed above, should be upheld.)

It was further decided that M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, should inform the Jugo-Slav Delegation that, in view of the Serbian refusal to recognise decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to Klagenfurt, it was impossible to proceed further with the latest claims presented by their Delegation.)

5. M. TARDIEU stated that the Secretary-General had informed Marshal Foch of the decision taken by the Council on the 16th July, to the effect that French troops should not be sent to Schleswig,⁶ since the means of their transport were not yet ready. Marshal Foch had now reported that the decision in question arose out of a misunderstanding. The French battalion for Schleswig had been formed, and was now ready to start at four days' notice. Marshal Foch further reported that he had informed the British Admiralty to the above effect.

'as Temporary Director of the port of Kehl and of the port of Strassburg should be submitted by each respective delegation to their Governments for approval.'

⁵ See No. 16, minute 9.

⁶ See No. 12, minute 3 (b).

MR. BALFOUR said that the decision that French troops should not participate had been taken, simply because it had been wrongly supposed that they were not ready. Since this was not the case it would be advantageous if the French flag were represented.

(It was decided that the French battalion now ready should participate in the Military occupation of Schleswig; and that the British Admiralty should give Marshal Foch the four days' notice in advance which was to precede the despatch of the battalion.)

6. MR. WHITE stated that an Austrian Note with regard to the minority clauses of the Peace Treaty had been presented.⁷ He suggested that the [?] it] should be transmitted to the Committee on New States for report.

*Austrian proposals
with regard to the
clauses in the Peace
Treaty on the sub-
ject of minorities*

MR. BALFOUR said he believed that certain clauses on the subject of minorities had already been sent to another Committee. Would it not be preferable to submit the Austrian proposals to this latter Committee in order to avoid confusion?

M. BERTHELOT stated that the question of minorities should have been the exclusive object of study of the Minorities Committee. Other questions, involving problems of finance and transportation, had however been submitted to it.

M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to the fact that the note accompanying the presentation of the Austrian Peace Treaty⁸ stated clearly, that, as the text of the Treaty represented decisions finally arrived at, it would not be possible to reply to notes that had been received in the past, or would be received in the future, from the Austrian Delegation. It therefore seemed impossible to discuss the question raised by Mr. White.

(It was decided that the Austrian proposals with regard to minorities should not be examined by the Council, in view of the letter accompanying the presentation of the Peace Treaty, wherein it was stated that no further replies would be given to Austrian notes.)

Villa Majestic, Paris.

July 28, 1919.

⁷ An Austrian note dated July 10, 1919, had enclosed the texts of Austrian counter-proposals on various sections of the draft Treaty of Peace including those on the protection of minorities. English texts of the Austrian covering note and counter-proposals on minorities are printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-10 and 577-82.

⁸ On July 20, 1919, M. Dutasta had presented to Dr. Renner the full draft of the treaty of peace with Austria and an accompanying memorandum under cover of a note from M. Clemenceau of that date. French texts of these three documents are printed in *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye*, vol. ii, pp. 9-53.

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX.

Comité d'exécution des clauses du traité.

PARIS, le 23 juillet 1919.

Note pour le Conseil Suprême

Le Comité d'exécution des clauses du Traité a été saisi par le Représentant Américain à ce Comité, d'un projet de création d'un Comité, chargé, après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité avec l'Allemagne, de la coordination des questions concernant l'interprétation et l'exécution des clauses de ce Traité.

Le Comité a consacré trois séances à l'examen de ce projet et le texte ci-dessous a été finalement adopté à l'unanimité.

Projet de Recommandation

10—Les questions concernant l'interprétation et l'exécution du Traité avec l'Allemagne, — à l'exception de celles confiées par lui soit à la Société des Nations, soit aux Commissions des Réparations, du Contrôle Militaire, Naval et Aérien et de la rive gauche du Rhin, ou à d'autres organes permanents de même nature, — devront être étudiées et suivies par un Comité spécial, dont le siège sera à Paris, mais qui pourra, s'il le juge opportun en raison de la nature de certaines questions, se transporter en d'autres capitales.

2° — Chacune des Principales Puissances Alliées et Associées fera connaître aussitôt que possible le nom du délégué, diplomatique ou autre, chargé de la représenter dans ce Comité. Les délégués pourront être assistés de conseillers techniques choisis d'après la nature des questions à traiter.

3° — Le Comité aura pour mission de fournir aux gouvernements, à qui appartiendra la décision, des bases communes et coordonnées d'information et d'appréciation, comme aussi de leur faire en cas de besoin, toutes propositions répondant à l'objet défini par le paragraphe 1.

4° — Les relations du Comité avec les gouvernements et les commissions envoyées sur place en exécution du traité seront réglées comme suit:

a) — Les Commissions envoyées sur place adresseront directement au Comité un compte-rendu régulier de toutes les questions d'exécution courante résolues par elles et par les autorités locales allemandes ou autres avec qui elles seront en relations:

b) — Quand les dites affaires d'exécution courante, sans poser de questions de principe, provoqueront sur place un désaccord, les membres du Comité seront autorisés, par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, à envoyer directement des instructions aux Commissions et pour adresser directement copie de ces instructions, en même temps qu'aux gouvernements alliés et associés, aux représentants à Berlin des dits gouvernements;

c) — Quand se poseront des questions de principe, le Comité, après examen commun, proposera les solutions aux gouvernements qui notifieront les décisions et mesures d'exécution tant aux Commissions sur place qu'à leurs représentants diplomatiques des gouvernements alliés et associés à Berlin. Copie de ces décisions sera envoyée au Comité pour son information.

5° — Les gouvernements alliés et associés régleront, en temps utile, les relations qui devront exister entre le Comité et le Secrétariat Général de la Société des Nations, afin que toutes les mesures d'exécution du Traité soient conformes aux principes et à l'idéal qui sont à la base de la Société.

6° — Au fur et à mesure de la signature des autres Traités, une organisation, composée éventuellement des mêmes personnes, pourra être chargée, dans les mêmes conditions, d'en suivre l'exécution.

APPENDIX B TO NO. 21

Document 1

Joint Note by the Admirals for the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

The Admirals met this morning to consider the three questions on which the Council desire their advice, viz:—

The disposal of—

- (1) the German surface warships, both those remaining at Scapa and the additional ships to be surrendered under Article 185 of the Peace Treaty;
- (2) the warships of the late Austro-Hungarian navy, including submarines;
- (3) the surrendered German submarines.

2. After reviewing the discussions which have taken place and the reports which they have made from time to time on the above points in connection with the preparation of the Naval Clauses for the Treaties of Peace, the Admirals were unanimously of opinion that they could offer no further advice or formulate any recommendations until they were in possession of the decision of the Council on the point of principle involved, which is a political one, viz:—

(a) Are these vessels to be—

- (1) sunk, or
- (2) broken up, or
- (3) distributed without restriction as to their ultimate disposal?

(b) If they are to be distributed—

- (1) is the distribution to be confined to the Allied and Associated Powers whose navies have taken a prominent part in the war; or
- (2) are the smaller of the Allied Powers who possess navies and new States with maritime frontiers to participate? Claims have been made by Belgium, Brazil, China and Portugal, and also by Finland, Poland, and Yugo-Slavia.

On receipt of the Council's decision, plans to give effect to it can be formulated.

3. Briefly stated, the *naval* recommendations are as follows:—

Surface Ships

United States	To be sunk or broken up, with a preference for sinking.
British Empire	To be broken up.
Italy	To be broken up; but if an exception is made and vessels are allotted to any of the Allied Powers, as part of its fleet, the Italian navy should receive its due proportion.
Japan	To be sunk or broken up; with the same reservation as made in the case of Italy.
France	Opposed to both sinking and breaking up; considers the vessels should be distributed among the Allied and Associated Powers.

Submarines

United States British Empire Italy Japan France	Unanimous in recommending that all the submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks be broken up.
	Opposed to breaking up; considers the submarines should be distributed among the Allied and Associated Powers.

The situation as regards the German submarines was fully explained in the Admirals' report of 7 May, a copy of which is attached for convenience of reference.

Paris, 27th June, 1919.

Document 2

Disposal of German Submarines

(I.C. 176 E.)

The Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers in Paris have read the Notes of the meeting of the First Delegates of the Peace Conference held at President Wilson's residence on 25 April and have given further consideration to the question of the disposal of the German submarines.

2. The Admirals representing the United States of America, the British Empire, Italy and Japan are unanimous in recommending that all the submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks surrendered by Germany, be broken up.

[A] draft formula for an agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers themselves, to give effect to this recommendation, is attached (Annex A⁹). It differs but little from the paragraph on the subject embodied in the first draft of the Naval Clauses submitted to the Supreme Council on 7 February and nothing has occurred in the meantime to cause the four Admirals to modify their views.

Whatever be the future as regards submarine warfare, they see no necessity for increasing submarine armaments by distributing the German submarines at a moment when the menace of the German fleet has been removed and a general reduction of armaments is desired.

They are further of opinion that the destruction of all German submarines is called for on moral grounds, as a mark of the repugnance felt by the rest of the world to the manner in which Germany used her submarines in the war.

3. Admiral de Bon does not agree with the views expressed above and has prepared an alternative formula (Annex B). In his opinion, the two questions, viz., the destruction of the submarines and the future of submarine warfare, cannot be separated.

4. A statement showing numerically the present position as regards the German submarines is also attached (Annex C¹⁰).

(Signed by)

ADMIRAL BENSON
REAR-ADMIRAL HOPE
VICE-ADMIRAL DE BON
REAR-ADMIRAL GRASSI
REAR-ADMIRAL TAKESHITA

For

United States of America
British Empire
France
Italy
Japan

Paris, 7 May, 1919.

⁹ Document 3.

¹⁰ Document 4.

27 June, 1919.

NOTE. Annex B is not attached as the formula embodied in it is not in agreement with the present Naval view of France, viz., that *all* the submarines should be distributed amongst the Allied and Associated Powers.

Document 3

Annex A. Disposal of German Submarines

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FIVE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS

(Draft proposed by the Admirals representing the United States of America, British Empire, Italy and Japan)

All the German submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks for submarines, surrendered to the Allies shall be broken up.

The breaking-up of the German submarines appropriated for propaganda purposes in the countries of the Allied and Associated Powers shall be commenced not later than 31st October, 1919, which date shall be extended to 31st December, 1919, in the case of those allotted to Japan.

The breaking-up of the remainder now in the ports of Great Britain and France, or *en route* thereto, shall be commenced forthwith.

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of these vessels may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes. They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

The proceeds of the breaking-up of these vessels shall be divided among the Allied and Associated Powers on a scale to be subsequently settled.

Document 4

Annex C. Surrendered German Submarines

(Omitting those in the Black Sea)

6 May, 1919

(Subject to verification as to the numbers in the various categories)

	<i>In or on passage to Allied ports of</i>	<i>Incomplete thro' lack of engines, &c., or sunk on passage</i>	<i>Serviceable Operated at sea during the war</i>	<i>Took no part in the war</i>	<i>Total</i>
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Great Britain .		19	16	14	49
France . .		17	21	8	46
United States .		..	4	2	6
Italy	4	6	10
Japan	3	4	7
Total . .		36	48	34	118
Sold and being broken up in England				.	54
					172

Allied Submarine Losses During the War

Country	Number lost	Percentage of total Allied losses
Great Britain .	55	71.5
France . .	14	18
Italy . .	8	10.5
United States
Japan
Other Allies
Total . .	77	100.0

No. 22

H. D. 18.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 29, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White, (later) Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm.

France: M. Pichon, (later) M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. BERTHELOT referring to the decision taken on the previous day (H.D. 17. Para. 6¹), said that he understood the decision to refer to Austrian notes despatched before the final Treaty had been handed to the Austrian Delegation. It would clearly be necessary to reply to any Austrian notes despatched since then. He proposed, therefore, that the note regarding minorities be examined by the Committee on New States.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the same principle might be adopted in dealing with the Austrian notes as had been adopted regarding the notes sent by the German Delegation. In the latter case there had been a Committee to survey the whole of the replies. He would, therefore, propose that M. Dutasta be asked to arrange for a similar machinery in order that the whole of the replies be co-ordinated.

(This proposal was accepted.)

Note:—The Resolution referred to was as follows:—

(It was agreed that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of editing the reply to the German Note. The Secretary-General was requested to arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and to communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were approved.)

2. M. PICHON said that the Austrians had asked for an extension of one week beyond the period of 10 days allowed them to present their observations regarding the Treaty. They justified their request by reference to the change of Foreign Minister which had lately occurred.² He thought the demand could not be resisted, and asked his colleagues if they agreed with him.

*Note from Austrian
Delegation asking
for extension of time
allowed for reply*

(It was agreed that the period of ten days allowed to the Austrian Delegation to present observations on the Treaty handed to them should be extended by one week, and that this should be communicated to them by the Secretariat-General.)

3.

[Not printed]

*Re-establishment of
postal communica-
tions with Germany*

4. The Council had before it the proposal made by M. Tittoni on the previous day (H.D. 16, Para. 2³).

*Creation of Inter-
Allied organisation
for the distribution
of raw material*

M. LOUCHEUR said that M. Tittoni's proposal really amounted to the perpetuation of the Supreme Economic Council. The very functions he wished exercised were those hitherto exercised by the Council with the help of the Wheat Executive, the Interallied Maritime Transport Council, and similar organisations. The problem before the Government[s] was therefore merely restated in other terms. As the Council knew, the French and Italian Delegations favoured the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council. Great Britain latterly had taken the same view. Only the American Delegation disagreed, and had wired to Washington for instructions. On the following Friday and Saturday⁴ there was to be a meeting of the Council in London. Everything depended on the instructions that might be received from the Governments. Without them the members could take no action.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had prepared a draft resolution to the following effect:—

'That the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.'

² Herr Bauer resigned the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 25, 1919 (cf. No. 42, minute 9). The conduct of the Ministry was assumed by Dr. Renner, the Austrian Chancellor.

³ No. 20, minute 2.

⁴ August 1 and 2, 1919.

He had expressed his resolution in these terms in order not to bind the Supreme Economic Council in any way. M. Tittoni's proposal appeared to dictate the conclusion in some manner.

M. LOUCHEUR observed that neither resolution offered a solution of the question. All that could be done was to postpone it unless instructions were received for the Supreme Economic Council to continue its functions. In regard to the primary necessity of finding coal for Italy, he wished to inform the Council that he had had a conversation with M. Tittoni. There was information that between the dates of August 5th and September 5th, Germany would furnish one million three hundred and fifty thousand tons of coal. This coal was intended for French uses according to agreement. France, however, had agreed, in order to assist Italy, to despatch out of this one hundred and seventy-five thousand tons to the latter country. This would save the situation. In addition to this, in spite of considerable shortage in France, he had given an order for the despatch from the Saar Basin to Italy of one thousand two hundred tons daily. He hoped that Great Britain would also help to ease the situation and he expected to have a conversation with Sir Auckland Geddes⁵ at the end of the week.

(It was then resolved that the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.)

5.

Appointment of commission of experts for the distribution of rolling stock in enemy countries

[Not printed]⁶

⁵ President of the Board of Trade.

⁶ This question concerned a difference of opinion between Mr. Hudson, who considered 'that the Commission of Experts which was to deal with the distribution of rolling stock was, according to the Treaty, entirely independent', and M. Loucheur, who 'said that the experts might be allowed to make provisional allotments of the railway stock, subject to sanction by the Reparations Commission. He disputed that the experts under the Treaty had any right to dispose finally of such material.' Mr. Balfour said 'that two quite different considerations had to be reconciled. It was obvious that the rolling stock of Europe, as being a financial asset, could not escape the grasp of the Reparation Commission, but it was clearly important that for the economic reconstruction of Europe so essential an instrument of reconstruction should be employed to the best purpose. Without this, work on mines, farms, factories, &c., would be wasted. From this point of view there was no more important resource than rolling stock for the economic revival of Europe. This resource must be husbanded by the experts. It was therefore necessary to reconcile these two important objects.' After further discussion it was decided to accept provisionally, subject to further examination by the experts present of the Reparations Commission and of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, the following proposal made by Mr. Balfour: 'The immediate distribution of rolling stock shall be made on the authority of the Expert Committee; but no such distribution shall be final until the financial aspects of the question have been considered and approved by the Committee of Reparation.'

6. M. CLEMENTEL⁷ said that the draft Clauses now before the Council had been unanimously agreed to. (Appendix D.⁸) He explained the various clauses in which alterations had been made since the last edition. Some discussion arose concerning Article 29.

MR. WHITE asked whether the smaller Powers might not claim equal rights with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in respect to the 'most favoured nation' treatment.

M. CLEMENTEL explained that this provision had been inserted at the request of the Japanese Delegates.⁹

MR. BALFOUR asked why it was proposed to re-impose Consular Courts on Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENTEL said that it was merely a case of re-stating pre-existing rights.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had not been aware of any right of Consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria, but, in any case, he would have thought it more in keeping with the times to abolish or curtail such a right rather than to re-assert or extend it.

MR. WHITE said that the United States did not wish to claim extra-territorial rights in Bulgaria.

M. PICHON said that the French Government were negotiating just before the outbreak of war for the abolition of the capitulations in Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENTEL pointed out that the formula employed was permissive. Special conventions might be entered into by each of the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria. There was nothing to compel them to do so.

⁷ At the close of the discussion on the previous item M. Clémentel had entered the meeting together with the Experts, M. Alphand, M. Nogara and Mr. Hutchinson. Their entry had been immediately preceded by that of Mr. Polk, Under Secretary of State in the State Department of the United States, who had on July 19, 1919, been appointed a Commissioner Plenipotentiary to act as Chairman of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Mr. Polk arrived in Paris from the United States on the morning of July 29.

⁸ Not printed. This appendix was a report from the Economic Commission, dated July 7, 1919, and revised as to July 28, stating that 'the clauses proposed by the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria are based to a very large extent on the Treaties with Germany and Austria'. There followed a summary indicating 'which article can be derived from the corresponding articles in those Treaties by substituting the words "Bulgaria" or "Bulgarian" for the corresponding terms, and by making the necessary changes in the dates mentioned, e.g. the date of entry into the war (20th September 1915), date of the Armistice (30th September, 1918), &c.' This summary listed 59 draft articles numbered 1-56 and A-C. Nos. 1-18 were respectively the drafts for articles 147-64 of the Treaty of Neuilly. No. 19 differed from article 165 of that treaty in that it read: 'The convention of the 29th November, 1901, between Roumania and Bulgaria, concerning fishing in the waters of the Danube, is again brought into force from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace, and cannot be denounced for a period of five years unless it is previously revised by the mutual consent of the contracting States.' Draft articles 20-36 were respectively drafts for articles 166-182 of the Treaty of Neuilly; No. 37 was a draft for article 186 of that treaty; Nos. 38-40 were respectively drafts for articles 183-5, Nos. 41-8 for articles 187-94, and Nos. 49-56 for articles 196-203. Nos. A-C were respectively adaptations of articles 323, 327 and 366 (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the Treaty of Versailles. ⁹ See No. 19, minute 4.

The sentence regarding 'most favoured nation' treatment had been added at the request of Japan.

MR. BALFOUR observed that things were not left just as they had been before the war, as the United States and Japan were added to the list of Powers entitled to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding special rights which they had not possessed before the war.

M. PICHON observed that they need not avail themselves of this right. France had rights which had not been put into practice. Just before the outbreak of the war, negotiations were going on for the abolition of these theoretical rights. The object of the Article was therefore quite a restricted one, namely, to enable France to resume these negotiations.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that it was odd that an Article with so restricted an object contrived to add two Powers to the list.

M. MATSUI said that he understood that there was in practice, no consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria. Japan, however, had been for a long time urging her right to exercise such jurisdiction in Turkey. Japan would therefore seem to be weakening her position unless this sentence were inserted in the Article. If none of the Powers chose to exercise their rights under the capitulations, Japan would do nothing; should the Powers wish to do so, Japan desired to be in the same position as the rest. Nothing very substantial was being asked for, and he thought that any exercise of the right was improbable. In view of the negotiations with Turkey, however, the Japanese Delegation had thought it desirable to have this sentence inserted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it was strange to insist in a Treaty on a right which no one wished to exercise, and which no one approved. With this comment, however, he would be content, and would not oppose the acceptance of the Article.

(The Economic Clauses as drafted (see Appendix D.⁸) were then adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

It was further decided to communicate these Clauses in the same manner as the other Clauses, through the President of the Committee, to the smaller Powers concerned.)

(M. Clemenceau and M. Tardieu entered the room.)

7. MR. BALFOUR read the following telegram. He thought this amounted to a refusal on the part of General Pilsudski to obey the orders of the Council:—

*Line of demarcation
between Polish and
Lithuanian Forces*

(M. Clementel, M. Alphant and M. Nogara withdrew.)

Telegram from Sir P. Wyndham,¹⁰ Warsaw to Mr. Balfour

July 25th, 1919.

'On July 24th I saw General Pilsudski as instructed by you in your telegram of July 23rd.

'Upon my raising the question of the Polish troops being withdrawn to the line of demarcation General Pilsudski said that this was a responsibility

¹⁰ H.M. Commissioner at Warsaw.

which he would not take as the immediate result would be the outbreak of disturbances, possibly leading to regular warfare. He declared that he would resign Office and leave Poland for Lithuania if we insisted on the Polish troops being withdrawn, and showed absolute determination on this point.

'The internal situation is now so difficult that, as it seems to me, General Pilsudski would gladly avail himself of any opportunity to resign which might be afforded to him by foreign pressure in opposition to a cause which is popular in Poland. The political consequences will be serious if he carries out his threat.'

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the telegram was dated July 25th and that the decision of the Council had been taken on the 26th.¹¹

8. It was decided that no answer need be made to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's letter regarding his personal responsibility for the outbreak of war.¹²

¹¹ See No. 19, minute 1.

¹² The letter in question was not appended to the original minute but the reference was evidently to the following letter, dated from Hohenfinow on June 25, 1919, from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to M. Clemenceau:

(Translation) 'Sir,

'I have the honour to request that your Excellency will be so good as to bring the annexed letter to the notice of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers.

I have the honour, etc.,

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.'

Enclosure in above.

'According to Article 227 of the Conditions of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign His Majesty William II of Hohenzollern, ex-Emperor of Germany, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of Treaties. At the same time they declare that they will address to the Royal Government of the Netherlands a request to deliver the former Emperor into their hands in order that he may be put on trial.

'With reference to these stipulations, I beg leave to request the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to direct against my person the procedure which they propose to initiate against His Majesty the Emperor. With this object I declare that I place myself at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers.

'In accordance with the constitutional laws of Germany, it is I who, in my capacity of former Chancellor of the Empire, bear the exclusive responsibility for political acts of the Emperor during my tenure of office. I feel justified in considering that the Allied and Associated Powers who wish to submit these acts to their judgment should call me only to account therefor.

'I feel convinced that the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers will not refuse to admit that the rule established by the public law of a State deserves to be recognised in international relations, and I express the hope that they will be so good as to grant the urgent request which I submit to them.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.'

On June 28, 1919, this letter had been considered by the Supreme Council (Council of Four) and referred by it to the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties for reply along general lines suggested by the Council of Four. In accordance with this decision the Commission, at a meeting on July 15, 1919, prepared a draft reply to the letter stating that the Principle Allied and Associated Powers were pleased to acknowledge the spirit of sacrifice evidenced by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's letter, that there was, however, no occasion to enter into any interpretation of the constitution of the German Empire of April 16, 1871, and that 'there can be no question of modifying

9. (At this point M. Venizelos and the Members of the Commission on Greek Affairs, entered the Room.)

Hearing of M.

*Venizelos regarding
frontiers of Bulgaria*

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing M. Venizelos said that the Council thought that he would probably have something to say regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

M. VENIZELOS said that he would have something to say on the subject, but before dealing with that, he would like to give an explanation regarding the document produced by Mr. White at a previous meeting (see H.D. 16. para. 7).¹³ This document had been communicated to him by the Chairman and the Council would understand that he was considerably upset by it. It was implied that he had made use of a forged document to influence the Conference. He had never stated that the Mussulmans of Western Thrace desired to join Greece. Should they be given the choice, it was obvious that they would be inclined to choose the Allies of Turkey rather than the enemies of Turkey. What he had suggested was that Allied Officers should consult the Mahommedan Deputies without the knowledge either of Bulgaria or Turkey. He then read a letter addressed to him by 8 Mussulman Deputies of Western Thrace (Appendix E). This petition he had sent to M. Cambon, but he had never attempted to represent the Mussulmans of Thrace as desiring a union with Greece.

M. VENIZELOS then read a series of observations he had prepared on this subject (see Appendix F). He added that he had made complaint to the Government at Washington regarding the imputation made against him by the American Delegation.

MR. WHITE said that the document had been communicated to M. Venizelos confidentially. M. Venizelos had therefore no right to make any communication to Washington on the subject.

M. VENIZELOS said that the document had been communicated to him by the Chairman of the Council, and he thought he had a right to defend himself vis-a-vis the American Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought M. Venizelos would have done better to reserve his justification for the Council.

M. VENIZELOS said that he would withdraw his complaint at Washington.

M. Venizelos said that in Thrace as claimed by him for Greece there were more than five times as many Greeks as Bulgarians. There were, in addition, a large number of Greeks in Constantinople and in the districts surrounding it. To these he made no claim and he argued that this reinforced his claim to the other parts of Thrace. Against the ethnographical argument which entirely favoured Greece an economic argument was alleged in favour of Bulgaria. He recognised that free access to the sea was one of the principles of the Conference. Whenever interests were opposed which could not be reconciled, it was necessary to decide which deserved the greater respect. The principle of nationality should take precedence over economic considerations. Bulgaria had excellent ports on the Black Sea. An outlet on the Aegean

Articles 227-30 of the Treaty of Peace as accepted by the German Delegation which signed the Treaty and by the Assembly at Weimar which has ratified it.¹³ No. 20, minute 7.

Sea was not a matter of primary necessity since the opening of the Straits would convert the Black Sea into an open sea. The inclusion of Greek populations in Greece was however a vital interest. Bulgaria could have commercial access to the Aegean either at Dedeağatch or, if this port were regarded unsuitable, at Cavalla. Similar rights might be guaranteed to Bulgaria as had been guaranteed to other land-locked states. Four states, each of them larger than Bulgaria, namely Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and Poland had been left by the Conference without direct access to the sea. Why should a similar arrangement not be enough for Bulgaria? Poland had not been given Dantzig, in order that the nationality of the intervening populations should be respected. It had been alleged that the arrangement he proposed served Bulgarian purposes well enough in peace, but would not suit them in war. He thought this argument operated in his favour. There would be no chance for Bulgaria to establish a submarine base on the Aegean. Bulgaria was a continental power. Greece was very largely an island power. Should Bulgaria have complete control over a port in the Aegean, she could intercept the movements of Greek troops by means of submarines. He knew that strategic arguments were not in favour at the Conference but he only used this as a secondary argument and in reply to an objection. It was needless to attempt to satisfy Bulgaria. Nothing but hegemony in the Balkans would satisfy her. She would undoubtedly attempt to upset the settlement made by the Conference. The only hope for peace in the Balkans was to set up her neighbours as ethnic units each individually too big to be attacked. It had also been said that the Greeks had left Western Thrace. This was true. They had been driven out by the Bulgarians and had for five years been refugees in Macedonia and Greece. M. Venizelos then read copious extracts from a work entitled 'Rapports et Enquêtes de la Commission Inter-alliée sur les violations du droit des gens commises en Macédoine orientale par les armées bulgares'. He added that the American Red Cross Society which had worked in Eastern Macedonia thoroughly corroborated the report of the Interallied Commission. He argued that it was undesirable to entrust to the rule of a nation which could behave in the manner illustrated by these extracts, any foreign population whatsoever.

(M. Venizelos then withdrew.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
29th July, 1919.*

APPENDIX E TO NO. 22

SOFIA, le 31 décembre 1918.

A Son Excellence Monsieur Elephterios Venizelos.

Président du Conseil des Ministres de Grèce, etc. etc.

Excellence,

Les soussignés, Turcs-Musulmans, députés de la Thrace occidentale au Parlement Bulgare, quoique ayant des vues probablement différentes des vôtres au

sujet de l'avenir politique de la Thrace Occidentale, fermement convaincus de votre libéralisme, avons recours à vous pour porter à votre connaissance les faits suivants et vous prier de vouloir bien, rien que pour des raisons humanitaires, intervenir en notre faveur dans le sens que nous vous indiquons.

Au Chef de la Mission Hellénique à Sophia, le Colonel Mazarakis, nous avons déjà remis une lettre à ce sujet. Maintenant nous nous permettons de vous faire part que nous venons d'adresser une lettre au Général d'Esperrey, Commandant en chef les Armées Alliées, ainsi conçue :

SOFIA, le 31 décembre 1918.

Mon Général,

Les soussignés Turcs Musulmans, députés de la Thrace Occidentale au Parlement Bulgare, qualifiés par conséquent, pour représenter cette région, après nous être fermement persuadés qu'il est tout à fait impossible à nos compatriotes demeurant là-bas de vivre sous le Gouvernement Bulgare, vu le manque total de tolérance que les Bulgares montraient et qu'ils montrent encore envers nous, comme envers ceux de leurs sujets qui ne sont pas Bulgares de race et à cause des vexations et des abus fréquents et indignes d'une nation civilisée, qu'ils commettent, d'accord avec tous ces [? nos] compatriotes de la Thrace Occidentale, avons l'honneur de demander une audience au Général Chrétien Commandant les Troupes Alliées d'occupation en Bulgarie.

Notre but était de lui exposer que toute la région comprise entre la Mesta, la Maritza, la Mer et à peu près l'ancienne frontière Turco-Bulgare de 1912, divisée en deux préfectures : celle de Gumuldjina (District de Gumuldjina, Isketche, Egri-Dere, Dari-Dere, Pachmakli, Ahi-Chelebi, Kirdja-Ali, Kochikavac, Ortakeui, Sofoulou, Fere, Dedeagatch) et celle de Kara-Agatch-Odrin (District de Kara-Agatch, Moustaphapacha, Svilengrad, et Dimotika) est habité[e] par une masse compacte de Turcs-Musulmans, d'une minorité de Grecs et de quelques Bulgares.

Nous voulions en outre, au nom de cette majorité écrasante le prier de vouloir bien nous protéger afin que ceux de nos compatriotes de la Thrace Occidentale émigrés en Turquie puissent librement regagner leurs foyers, et les vexations et abus bulgares en Thrace contre nos malheureux compatriotes prissent fin et qu'une mesure fût prise au Congrès de la Paix en notre faveur, vu que sans garanties notre vie ne serait pas possible sous la domination bulgare.

N'ayant pas encore été reçus par le Général Chrétien, nous nous sommes permis, dans un rapport dont copie ci-jointe,¹⁴ d'exposer la situation de la Thrace Occidentale avec statistiques exactes à l'appui que nous lui avons remis et nous nous réservions de lui demander son intervention pour la protection actuelle de nos compatriotes en Thrace.

Malheureusement les vexations et les abus bulgares vont s'aggravant et se multipliant chaque jour contre nos compatriotes, une irritation sourde contre les Bulgares se fait sentir en Thrace et il ne serait pas improbable qu'elle éclatât un jour ou l'autre contre ces oppresseurs. Nous avons plus d'une fois interpellé à la Sobranié les Ministres bulgares au sujet de leur administration impossible en Thrace Occidentale, mais le Gouvernement n'entend donner aucune satisfaction. Il est même arrivé à vouloir démolir la seule Mosquée turque qui se trouve à Sofia, ce qui prouve sa tolérance.

Mon Général, au moment où la guerre mondiale menée pour les principes immortels de l'égalité et de la justice vient de finir, au moment où le Congrès de la

¹⁴ Not attached to original of this appendix.

Paix va établir sous une forme durable ces principes éternels, il ne serait pas juste de nous laisser souffrir sous le joug le plus dur et le plus impitoyable qu'on puisse imaginer, sous le joug bulgare.

En attendant les mesures qui seront prises au Congrès de la Paix à ce sujet et qui, nous l'espérons, seront de nature à nous libérer par n'importe quel moyen des Bulgares; pendant toute la durée de l'armistice nous vous prions instamment, mon Général, de prendre une mesure militaire, même provisoire, pour améliorer notre situation qui est intolérable.

Une occupation de la Thrace Occidentale par les Troupes Alliées mettrait fin à nos maux et préviendrait toute agitation qui, comme nous venons de l'exposer, est à craindre. Il serait désirable que des Troupes Helléniques prissent part à cette occupation, vu que les Grecs se trouvant en Thrace subissent les mêmes vexations que nous, que les Hellènes se sont toujours montrés libéraux envers nous, que c'est une nation avec laquelle nous pouvons très bien nous entendre et qu'ils pourraient en même temps que leurs compatriotes, nous protéger, nous qui nous trouvons dans les mêmes conditions, contre les vexations et les abus des Bulgares.

Excellence,

comme nous l'indiquons dans cette lettre il nous serait désirable que, dans l'avenir, la Thrace Occidentale soit libérée de toute façon du joug bulgare qui est insupportable.

Mais en attendant la solution qui sera donnée à ce sujet par le Congrès de la Paix, nous vous prions instamment, Excellence, au nom de tous nos connationaux opprimés de faire tout votre possible en faveur de l'occupation que nous demandons dans la lettre adressée au Général d'Esperey.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

MEHMET DJELAL
ISMAIL HAKKI
CALIM NOURI
TEVFIK

EDHEM ROUHI
H. CAFET
HACHIM
KEMAL

APPENDIX F TO NO. 22

Observation sur la Note en date du 24 juillet du Chargé d'Affaires des États-Unis à Sofia

1.—Une pétition, portant la signature des députés musulmans de la Thrace occidentale au Sobranié Bulgare, aurait été présentée à la Conférence demandant la cession de cette province par la Bulgarie à la Grèce. La plupart de ces députés auraient opposé un démenti officiel à cette pétition qu'ils n'ont ni signée ni connue.

Ce démenti n'a aucune raison d'être, car la pétition qu'il vise n'a jamais existé.

Il ne saurait de quelque manière que ce soit valoir contre la lettre datée du 31 décembre 1918 que ces mêmes députés adressèrent au Général Franchet d'Esperey et à Monsieur Véniselos pour affirmer que les Musulmans de la Thrace occidentale ne pouvaient plus vivre sous 'le dur et impitoyable joug bulgare et solliciter, en attendant d'en être délivrés' par 'n'importe quels moyens', l'occupation de leur pays par des troupes alliées et helléniques. Cette lettre, revêtue de la signature des huit députés musulmans de la Thrace occidentale, parvint à Monsieur Véniselos le 19 février 1919 et fut communiquée par lui, le lendemain 20 février, à S.E. Monsieur Jules Cambon, Président de la Commission de la Conférence, chargée de l'examen des questions grecques. De son côté le Général

Franchet d'Esperey fit parvenir au Gouvernement Français la même lettre à lui adressée.

2.—Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires des États-Unis à Sofia estime que si la population musulmane de la Thrace occidentale avait à choisir entre le régime grec et le régime bulgare elle préférerait de beaucoup ce dernier.

Cet avis est en flagrante contradiction avec celui des députés signataires de la lettre du 31 décembre, qui paraissent être meilleurs juges en la matière. Dans cette lettre, où ils ont affirmé leur désir de voir la Thrace occidentale 'libérée de toute façon du joug bulgare qui est insupportable', ils ont en même temps déclaré que 'les Hellènes se sont toujours montrés libéraux' envers eux et qu'ils constituent une nation avec laquelle ils peuvent très bien s'entendre.

Ce double sentiment est très ancien chez les musulmans. Ceux qui vivent sous la souveraineté grecque se sont toujours déclarés satisfaits de leur sort. Dans une étude de M. Franchet d'Esperey, dans la *Revue du monde musulman*, 1911, p. 87 et suivantes, on en trouve la preuve certaine et irréfutable. Il en est tout autrement des musulmans de Bulgarie et plus spécialement de ceux de la Thrace occidentale. Leurs députés au Sobranié ont à plusieurs reprises protesté contre le régime bulgare et formulé de la tribune du Parlement les plus graves accusations contre les autorités civiles et militaires bulgares. Il en fut notamment ainsi dans des interpellations retentissantes développées au Sobranié les 11 novembre et 12 décembre 1917. Il en fut de même en décembre dernier. Les députés musulmans se plaignirent de la démolition de la mosquée de Sofia et du caractère oppressif de l'administration bulgare. Menacés, terrorisés, ils ne purent achever le développement de leur interpellation. N'obtenant d'autre part, du Gouvernement bulgare, la moindre promesse de satisfaction, ils résolurent de saisir de leurs doléances les alliés. Le 18 décembre 1918, ils adressèrent un rapport au Général Chrétien, commandant les troupes alliées à Sofia. Ils décriaient l'oppression bulgare en France [? Thrace], sollicitaient le retour dans leurs foyers des milliers de musulmans arbitrairement déplacés par les autorités bulgares et réclamaient pour les musulmans la faculté de disposer de leur sort.

N'ayant réussi à obtenir du Général Chrétien ni réponse ni audience, ils décidèrent de saisir de leur affaire le Général Franchet d'Esperey. Il lui envoya la lettre du 31 décembre qu'ils adressèrent en même temps à M. Véniselos, en lui disant que, quoiqu'ayant probablement des vues différentes des leurs au sujet de l'avenir politique de la Thrace occidentale, leur conviction dans son libéralisme les incitait à le prier de vouloir bien, rien que pour des raisons humanitaires, intervenir en leur faveur et appuyer la demande d'occupation de leur pays adressée au Général Franchet d'Esperey.

3.—Toutes ces démarches se produisant à Sofia même parvinrent nécessairement à la connaissance du Gouvernement bulgare qui en fut naturellement ému. Il n'hésita pas à employer de suite la manière forte pour arrêter le scandale et ses désastreux effets: les députés musulmans furent étroitement surveillés, traqués, menacés, terrorisés. Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, les invita à fournir des explications sur le mémoire adressé au Général Franchet d'Esperey. On comprend que les députés appelés ainsi à se disculper durent répondre de manière évasive, se bornant à dire qu'ils avaient surtout voulu marquer leurs préférences pour la Turquie. L'intervention du Gouvernement leur fut un suffisant avertissement que le séjour à Sofia n'était pas exempt d'inconvénients et la plupart des députés s'empressaient de s'en éloigner. Quelques-uns d'entre eux se réfugièrent à Constantinople.

Cependant la nouvelle de la lettre du 31 décembre se répandit hors des milieux de la Conférence, et ne tarda pas à être défigurée au point de prêter aux députés musulmans de la Thrace occidentale, au lieu du désir de délivrer leur pays du joug bulgare, celui de le voir se réunir à la Grèce. La nouvelle ainsi altérée méritait un démenti. Les députés réfugiés à Constantinople, obligés sans doute de tenir compte du point de vue du Gouvernement Ottoman, ne manquèrent pas de le donner. Le 20 juin dernier, le journal turc paraissant à Constantinople *İkdam* publiait le texte d'un télégramme adressé au Président de la Conférence et aux Plénipotentiaires des principales Puissances Alliées et Associées par quatre députés musulmans au Sobranié, Kemal, Hachim, Housni et Hadji-Chafep, dont les deux premiers figurent parmi les signataires de la lettre du 31 décembre. D'après l'*İkdam* ce télégramme était ainsi conçu :

'Nous, soussignés, députés de Thrace au Sobranié bulgare, opposons un démenti à la nouvelle publiée dans la presse grecque, que nous aurions soumis un mémoire demandant l'annexion de la Thrace à la Grèce, et déclarons que si, comme le prétend cette presse, pareil mémoire a été présenté par Monsieur Véniselos au Conseil des Cinq, il est absolument apocryphe, car non seulement nous n'avons pas soumis pareil mémoire, mais nous n'avions ni mandat ni qualité pour le faire. Nous vous prions de faire établir la vérité par vos Hauts Commissaires à Constantinople, au moyen d'une enquête ou de notre interrogatoire, puisque nous nous trouvons actuellement à Constantinople, et vous supplions, au nom de la paix et de la tranquillité des hommes de prendre notre demande en considération.'

Il est fort possible que ce démenti, qui a dû réjouir le Gouvernement Bulgare, ait été reproduit ou renouvelé à Sofia.

C'est évidemment à ce même démenti, ainsi divulgué à Sofia, que doit faire allusion la note de M. le Chargé d'Affaires des États-Unis.

Mais il est manifeste qu'il ne saurait s'appliquer à la lettre du 31 décembre, qui conserve dès lors toute sa valeur tant contre la Bulgarie qu'en faveur de la Grèce.

4.—Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires des États-Unis ne s'est pas borné à donner une interprétation toute personnelle des sentiments des Musulmans de Thrace. Il a affirmé comme un fait 'que les Grecs ont dépensé dans cette région de grosses sommes d'argent pour la propagande'. Il y a là une accusation gratuite contre laquelle le Gouvernement Hellénique s'est empressé de formuler les protestations les plus énergiques auprès du Secrétaire d'État à Washington.

5.—Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires des États-Unis estime que l'interprétation par lui donnée des sentiments des Musulmans de Thrace serait sans aucun doute confirmée par une enquête impartiale ou un plébiscite.

Pareille consultation eût été désirable et possible il y a quelques mois. Monsieur Véniselos en avait fait lui-même la suggestion devant le Conseil Suprême de la Conférence, dans sa séance du 3 février, pour connaître les préférences de la population musulmane entre l'actuel régime bulgare et l'administration hellénique qui lui serait substituée. Répondant à une question de Monsieur Lloyd George sur les modalités de pareille consultation, M. Véniselos avait proposé qu'un officier général allié fût chargé de voir les députés de Thrace au Sobranié pour leur demander leur opinion à ce sujet. Mais il avait eu soin de recommander d'y procéder avec la plus grande discrétion, car il était évident que si le projet de cette consultation parvenait à temps à leur connaissance, les Gouvernements Bulgare et Turc ne manqueraient pas de mettre tout en mouvement pour influencer ou

intimider les intéressés dont l'opinion, cessant d'être libre, serait dès lors privée de toute valeur.

Le danger signalé alors s'est réalisé: les deux gouvernements ont eu le temps d'agir et de prendre leurs précautions. Une consultation impartiale est désormais pratiquement impossible.

Mais elle est, en même temps, parfaitement inutile, car les préférences qu'il s'agirait de rechercher entre le régime bulgare et le régime grec, les représentants légitimes et autorisés des Musulmans de Thrace les ont librement et clairement manifestées dans leur lettre du 31 décembre.

Le Gouvernement Bulgare ne saurait, par aucune manœuvre, infirmer la valeur de ce document qui formule en termes accablants l'irrévocable condamnation de sa domination en Thrace.

No. 23

H. D. 19.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 30, 1919 at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White, Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.
British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Comdr. Bell.

France: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he wished the question to be adjourned until the following day. The Greeks were engaged in discussions with the Italian Delegation and, in addition to this, M. Tardieu was required in the Chamber of Deputies. The question was therefore adjourned.

*Bulgarian
Frontiers*

2. MR. BALFOUR asked whether this question could be discussed without a settlement of the frontier question.

*Clauses for insertion
in the Treaty of
Peace with Bulgaria
on Ports, Water-
ways and Railways*

M. BERTHELOT admitted that the clauses dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways were dependent on the settlement of the Cavalla frontier line.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would not be possible to accept all the Articles with the exception of Article 24 which was dependent on the frontier settlement.

(It was agreed that the draft clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (Appendix A¹) dealing with the question of Ports, Waterways and Railways should be accepted with the exception of Article 24.)

¹ Not printed. This appendix contained a report from the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, dated June 21, 1919, submitting 36

3. M. FROMAGEOT stated that the Commission on New States had submitted draft clauses on the subject of the rights of minorities for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (see Appendix B²). The Articles had been drawn up on the basis of those which were to be inserted in the Austrian Treaty, with the exception of those dealing with the guarantees of the League of Nations. These latter were based upon similar provisions in the Polish and other treaties. In addition, the Committee had added Articles Nos. 3 and 4 which were not in the Austrian Treaty. These laid down obligations on Bulgaria to grant rights of Bulgarian citizenship to persons living continuously in Bulgaria, despite the fact that they came of foreign parents. The Drafting Committee thought that, though Articles 3 and 4 ought to be inserted in Peace Treaties with New States whose legislation was as yet unknown, or in the Peace Treaties with old States which did not give sufficient guarantees on the subject, they were none the less superfluous in the case of Bulgaria, since the legislation of that country on the point in question was in conformity with that of the most advanced European States. It had therefore been thought, that the two articles should be omitted from the text, which was otherwise analogous to that prepared by the Committee on New States. In addition to this, the latter Committee had left out a clause, by virtue of which the Bulgarians would be obliged to raise no obstacle against Bulgarian subjects, at present living in territories granted to other countries, opting as to their citizenship. The text prepared by the Drafting Committee differed from the one drawn up by the Committee on New States, in that articles 3 and 4 had been omitted, and an article dealing with the right of option inserted.

MR. BALFOUR stated, that as Bulgaria was an old State, and as its legislation was satisfactory on the point in question, there was no use in compelling it to modify its statute book.

M. SCIALOJA stated that it had been reported to him, that the Committee had not taken up its work, owing to the fact that it was not sure that it was competent to deal with the question. It should also be noted, that the disposal of Thrace affected a portion of the work of this Committee.

MR. HUDSON stated that the Committee had been of opinion that articles 3 and 4 were necessary in Roumania's case, in order that the Jews might be protected. In the 1878 Treaty the same rights had not [*sic*] been granted to the Jewish population as had been given to other citizens. The question was, whether the article should be enforced in Bulgaria's case.

MR. BALFOUR remarked, that since the clauses had been adopted for such clauses which constituted the draft for Part XI of the Treaty of Neuilly (articles 212-48). The appendix also contained a supplementary report from the Commission, dated July 28, 1919. Both reports are printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xi, pp. 100-19 & 131-5. Article 24 of the draft clauses was as summarized in No. 20, appendix C.

² Not printed. This appendix comprised eight draft clauses which were subsequently incorporated, with only drafting amendment, in the Treaty of Neuilly as articles 49-55 and 57. (Article 56 represented the additional clause which the Drafting Committee was directed by the Supreme Council to draw up: see the resolution adopted below.) These draft clauses are printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 317-20.

countries as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, he saw no reason against their being put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

M. FROMAGEOT said that in the Peace Treaty with Austria, although clauses had been inserted to protect minorities, no provision had been made for special nationalities, since the legislation of the country seemed a sufficient guarantee. The clauses were therefore only applicable to countries whose legislation was unsatisfactory and to others whose future legislation could not be foreseen. Bulgaria had dealt with the question of nationality in a satisfactory manner in the past. Was it necessary, therefore, to insert the clause? The Council had to decide whether, in spite of her previous legislation, Bulgaria was to be classified definitely in one of the two categories.

MR. BALFOUR said that the discussion might be indefinitely prolonged. Roumania was an old State, and had the obligations contained in the disputed articles imposed on her. He did not mind whether they were put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria; but, if a vote were called for, he would prefer that Bulgaria should be treated like Roumania and not like Austria.

(It was therefore decided that the political clauses dealing with the protection of minorities, as drafted by the Committee on New States, should be accepted.)

It was further decided, that a clause granting the right of option to Bulgarian citizens living in territories that had changed their sovereignties, should be inserted in the Peace Treaty.)

(The Drafting Committee was directed to draw up the clause, and to insert it in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.)

4. M. BERTHELOT stated that Marshal Foch had submitted a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the attitude of General von der Goltz, in particular, and of the Germans in general in the Baltic Provinces. (See Appendix C.) The Marshal had enclosed in his letter a copy of the correspondence exchanged on the subject with the German Government, together with a letter from the British Delegation covering a report from General Gough. (See Appendix C.) In submitting his report Marshal Foch was asking for precise instructions from the Council whether the proposals of the British General, which were supported by Marshal Foch, were acceptable.

*German attitude in
the Baltic Provinces*

It was decided to inform Marshal Foch that General Gough's conclusions as submitted in Marshal Foch's letter of the 28th July were acceptable.

Marshal Foch was directed to take all measures necessary for putting the proposals in question into effect.

5. At this point the naval experts entered the room.

M. BERTHELOT, at the request of the President and on behalf of the Secretariat, read out extracts from the texts of I.C. 'A' 176-E. and C.F. 90[? 91]. He drew attention to the fact that the texts of Sir Maurice Hankey and M. Mantoux were virtually in agreement.

MR. BALFOUR said that from quotations made in previous Minutes it was evident that M. Clemenceau had accurately remembered the discussion of

*Disposal of
Enemy warships*

25th June.³ It nevertheless seemed that, previous to the Scapa Flow incident, the Council of Four had been uncertain as to the ultimate action to be taken with German vessels. The French evidently had desired that they should be distributed. The Italians and Japanese did not appear to have been of the same opinion. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred. He did not think that it was anybody's fault, but the incident was none the less regrettable. Without attaching blame to the Admiralty it was none the less a fact that the German fleet had been sunk in British waters by its own crews. Mr. Lloyd George had evidently spoken with great feeling, and had renounced in favour of France the British share in any compensation obtainable, at the discussions that had followed the incident. On the extracts now before the Council M. Clemenceau based his views, which were (1) that no destruction of enemy vessels should take place, (2) that England renounced all claims to vessels which would have fallen to her share but for the Scapa Flow incident. He was entirely in agreement with the second point and thought that England's renunciation must be admitted. Two important points, however, remained undecided:—

- (1) How are enemy ships to be disposed of?
- (2) If division amongst the Allies be decided upon in what proportion shall it be made?

He did not think that Mr. Lloyd George's remarks could be regarded as a statement of a considered policy for the reason that when he made it he defined only the French position and made no mention of Italy, Japan or America. Even admitting Britain's claim to be lost, the questions he had put forward remained for decision.

M. SCIALOJA stated that Italy had not been represented at the Conference on the 24th June. It was probably for that reason that Mr. Lloyd George's remarks had not mentioned Italy. On the 28th June, the matter had been discussed and referred to the Council of Admirals. Italy's position to-day was the same as that of France.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked in what sense the Admirals had reported.

M. BERTHELOT replied that all the Admirals had differed, since each one upheld the standpoint which he believed to be that of his own country. He added that the statements attributed to President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were capable of being interpreted in the sense that the principle of distribution had then been admitted. In support of this, he quoted the phrase in which compensation to small Navies had been allowed for, and he also drew attention to the fact that President Wilson spoke in several places of the division of the enemy fleet.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that as the entire matter appeared not to be understood fully by his colleagues, he wished to make a statement as to the exact discussions which had taken place in the Council of Four, and in informal conversations preceding the meetings. Mr. Lloyd George had said to him, on one occasion, that if all countries could be of one opinion, the sinking of

³ See No. 21, minute 2.

the German fleet in the open sea, in the presence of the Allied Navies, would be a magnificent spectacle. He had dissented from this, knowing that the French people would desire to have a certain portion of the enemy fleet. A similar question had arisen as to the disposal of the enemy submarines, Mr. Lloyd George advocating that they should be sunk as their use had been illegal. President Wilson had in a way assented to this view. He, M. Clemenceau, had refused to agree and maintained that the submarines as well as the surface vessels should be divided, unless all existing submarines were destroyed. It was his conclusion from the discussions that a tacit understanding had been reached between Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson and himself to the effect that the enemy vessels should be divided, and not destroyed. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred and Mr. Lloyd George had been particularly upset over it owing to the fact that he had advocated the sinking of the fleet, and its destruction by the Germans had occurred in a British port. The incident would never have aroused such feeling had any form of destruction been previously decided upon. The very fact that this distribution had been admitted had made the act of voluntary destruction by the Germans more keenly felt. In conclusion, he could only repeat that it had been decided, that the enemy vessels should be divided, and that each ally should take what action it liked with the share allotted to it. He was surprised to hear the Italian claim put forward for the first time. He admitted it, however, but insisted that, if it were maintained, a pool of all enemy vessels should be made and a distribution effected amongst the Allies. He still required a report on the Scapa Flow incident.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he had asked for a report from the Admiralty, which had replied that it had not received any previous request to forward it.

CAPTAIN FULLER read a telegram confirming Mr. Balfour's statement.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the discussion could be proceeded with after the report had been placed before the Council. He pointed out, however, that the question of the disposal of the remainder of the enemy fleet must be settled.

MR. BALFOUR asked what was the American point of view on this subject.

MR. WHITE answered that he had not been acquainted by President Wilson with the discussions which had been referred to, but he always believed that the United States advocated the sinking or destruction of the warships. He added that it was impossible for him to agree to any decision until he had consulted President Wilson by telegram.

M. BERTHELOT then pointed out that the minutes of April 25th (i.e. 'A' [I]76-E.) indicated that President Wilson's views on the disposal of the submarines, and the surface vessels, differed.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he would agree to submit to President Wilson any proposal which might be put forward, but that he would never agree to the sinking or destruction of the warships.

MR. BALFOUR then stated that the quotations from previous minutes of the Council were not sufficient authority for him to act upon; and that he proposed to send a telegram to Mr. Lloyd George asking for further instructions.

MR. WHITE and MR. POLK said that they would send a telegram in the same terms to President Wilson.

M. MATSUI said that he would ask Baron Makino to give him a statement of his impressions of the conversations that had been quoted.

(It was agreed that the discussion should be adjourned until the British and American Representatives should have communicated with their Governments.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that Mr. White had proposed the following Resolution:—

*Conditions of Peace
with Hungary*

‘In view of the fact that the Supreme Council has granted an additional delay of one week to the Austrians for submitting their answer to the Conditions of Peace handed to them on July 20th, it is suggested that the Secretary-General be requested to instruct the various committees dealing with Hungarian matters to take up and finish their reports for the Hungarian Treaty.

(The draft Resolution was agreed to.)

7. MR. BERTHELOT stated that the Delegation of the Yugo-Slav State had sent a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference asking to be heard on the subject of the Financial and Reparation clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (see Appendix D⁴).
*Request of Serbian
Delegation to be heard by
the Supreme Council on
the Financial and Repara-
tion Clauses of the Treaty
with Bulgaria*

M. CLEMENCEAU said it seemed difficult to refuse the request.

M. SCIALOJA drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the situation had changed since the letter had been sent. The Serbians had been given audience by the Committee, and had submitted a memorandum. This latter had been examined, and two requests out of the three had been acceded. The requests had been (1) that they should be given cattle to compensate their losses in livestock; (2) that they should have the right to recover movable property carried into Bulgaria; (3) that they should take part in the deliberations of the Inter-Allied Reparation and Finance Committees in Bulgaria. The first two proposals had been granted but the third had been disallowed, since it would have created a precedent. Had it been granted, it would have been difficult to refuse similar requests made by other States, and endless disputes would have arisen.

It was decided to accede the requests of the Yugo-Slav Delegation with regard to livestock and movable property.

The Drafting Committee was directed to insert clauses to that effect in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

It was further decided to disallow the request with regard to Yugo-Slav participation in the deliberations of the Inter-Allied Committees on Reparation and Finance.

⁴ Not printed. In this letter M. Pašić stated: ‘These drafts do not take into account our most justified claims, which has caused a painful surprise to our Delegation.’

It was decided finally to refuse the request for audience of the Yugoslav Delegation, and the Secretary-General was instructed to notify them to that effect.⁵

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 30, 1919.*

APPENDIX C TO No. 23

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,
Headquarters Staff,
3rd Section, No. 3581,
General Headquarters.

28th July, 1918 [sic].

From Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.
To the President of the Council and of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to enclose copies, (1) of my correspondence with the German Government, through the Armistice Commission, on the subject of the withdrawal of the German troops from the Baltic Provinces, (2) of the letter from the British Delegation forwarding a report from General Gough.

The replies of the German Government, and the British report, referred, doubtless, to the interview which General Gough stated that he had had, on the 19th, with General von der Goltz. On the other hand, whilst the German representative considers that the result of the interview must be considered satisfactory to the Entente, General Gough remarks that the claims of General von der Goltz cannot be admitted, and that the German General, obviously supported by his own Government, is pursuing a policy of subterfuge and intrigue in the Baltic Provinces. General Gough's report therefore concludes:—

that Von der Goltz should be immediately recalled:

that the withdrawal of the German troops should begin without delay, and should be started by sea (the British Admiralty will furnish transport):

that the German authorities should be forced to submit their plan of withdrawal before the 5th August, and to carry it out before the 20th August:

that the Germans should be prevented from establishing depots of war material in Latvia or Lithuania, and that they should be called upon to give all information necessary on the positions of supply depots and munitions stocks hitherto moved by them:

that all fresh German troops should be refused entrance into Latvia.

⁵ On July 31, 1919, the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference circulated a notification to delegations that the above decision had been annulled and an alternative resolution adopted. This new resolution is inserted in the filed original in the following terms:

'It was decided that a report of the Economic Commission be awaited regarding the requests of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of livestock, moveable property, and representation on the Inter-Allied Committees on Reparation and Finance.

'The decision to refuse the request for audience of the above-mentioned Delegation was maintained, and the Secretary-General was instructed to notify them to that effect.'

I support these proposals, and think, especially, that a time limit should be given to German intrigues, by giving them a definite day within which they must withdraw from the Baltic Provinces. I should be much obliged if you will inform me of the decisions taken on this subject, in order that I may give all the necessary instructions to the Armistice Commission, as requested by the British Delegation.

FOCH.

Enclosure 1

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,
3rd Section,
General Headquarters,

13th July, 1919.

Copy of Telegram.

From the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To General Nudant, President of the C.I.P.A. at Cologne.

No. 3341.

Firstly, in conformity with instructions received from the Allied and Associated Governments, General Gough has entered into communication with the German Commander in the Baltic Provinces in order that all questions arising out of the withdrawal of the German troops from these regions may be settled.

I am informed:—

- (a) That the Germans refuse to evacuate Latvia, until such time as German interests shall have been guaranteed.
- (b) That they refuse to recognise the Ulmanis Cabinet.
- (c) That they refuse to withdraw by sea.

Secondly, this information shows that the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces is deliberately retarded, and that the situation in Latvia is thereby rendered most difficult.

Thirdly, under the above conditions, I beg that you will inform the German Government:—

- (a) That the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces must not be delayed longer than may be necessary to obtain the necessary transport.
- (b) That the constitution of the Government of Latvia has nothing to do with the question of German withdrawal.
- (c) That this withdrawal must be effected as rapidly as possible by sea and by land, since the Naval Armistice Committee has given the necessary authorisation.
- (d) That in their withdrawal the German troops must commit no action of destruction, more particularly with regard to telegraph wires.

Fourthly, you must insist that the German Commander shall enter into direct communication with General Gough, with a view to settling all questions arising out of the withdrawal of the German troops.

WEYGAND.

Enclosure 2

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,
3rd Section,
G.H.Q.

20th July, 1919.

Copy of Telegram.

From the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.
To General Nudant, President of C.I.P.A., Cologne.

No. 3454.

Firstly: The Head of the British Delegation at the Peace Conference informs me, that General von der Goltz has no knowledge of the powers given to General Gough by the Entente.

Secondly: Repeat the instructions contained in my former telegrams to the German Armistice Committee, and order them to give the necessary orders to the German Commander in the Baltic Regions without delay.

FOCH.

Enclosure 3

DÜSSELDORF, 24th July, 1919.

A.A.I. No. 4348.

From the Representative of the German Government.
To the President of the C.I.P.A.

In the name of the German Government I have the honour to reply to your letter of the 21st July, No. 1445/G, that the letter of Marshal Foch, dated 20th July, has been virtually replied to by the verbal negotiations entered into by the German chargé d'affaires and General von der Goltz and General Gough. My Government refers to the reply sent to your letter of the 14th July, No. 1414/8. (See my note under to-day's date, A.A.I. No. 4349.) I have learnt from Berlin that my telegram of 10th July, transmitting your note No. 1389/8 has not yet reached the Foreign Office. This explains the fact that no instructions have been given to Count von der Goltz.

WACHENDORF.

Enclosure 4

DÜSSELDORF, 24th July, 1919.

A.A.I. No. 4349.

From the German Government Representative.
To the President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Committee.

Subject: Evacuation of Latvia.

In the name of the German Government I have the honour to reply to your letter of the 14th July No. 1414/G(1), as follows:

The letter of the Marshal on the subject of the evacuation of Latvia, has virtually been answered by the result of the verbal negotiations entered into, at Mitau, between the German chargé d'affaires and Count Goltz on the one part, and General Gough and the other representatives of the Entente on the other part.

With regard to the details of Marshal Foch's letter, I beg to refer to the afore-said discussions. With regard to the general subject of the letter, I offer the following remarks:

With regard to Paragraph 1. After the danger which at present threatens German subjects and German property in Latvia has been withdrawn as a result of General Gough's promises, the evacuation of Latvia will be carried out without delay.

With regard to Paragraph 2. The nature of the Government of Latvia has always been considered by Germany as a matter of internal Latvian politics, in which the German Government cannot interfere. The formation of a new Cabinet in Latvia has therefore no connection with the question of German withdrawal from Latvia.

With regard to Paragraph 3. The evacuation of Latvia will be carried out as fast as possible. It will probably not be possible to use sea transport for troops in view of the situation at Libau.

With regard to Paragraph 4. Your [*sic*] military authorities have been instructed that no damage to Latvian property must be effected during the evacuation.

WACHENDORF.

Enclosure 5

British Delegation.

PARIS, 25th July, 1919.

To General Weygand.

My dear General,

I enclose herewith, for Marshal Foch's information, a copy of a cipher telegram dated 21st July from General Gough.

I refer it to Marshal Foch, asking him to be so good as to communicate on the subject with the German Armistice Committee; whilst I obtain an undertaking from the British Admiralty that transports for the withdrawal of German troops, as proposed by General Gough, shall be obtained.

Yours sincerely,

W. THWAITES.

Enclosure 6

Telegram from General Gough, Reval, to Mr. Balfour.

D. 01.18 July 21st, 1919.

R. 16.00 July 21st, 1919.

H.G. 53 July 20th.

Part I.

Von der Goltz made following statements and admissions at a meeting on July 19th:—

A. That he had not received instructions to deal with me and that any information given was unofficial.

B. That (?) even if all passenger traffic was stopped on railway lines the evacuation of Latvia would take 74 days.

C. That he had brought fresh troops from Germany recently to guard railway.

D. That Libau was evacuated for military reasons.

E. That he would not evacuate by sea except 600 men from Windau if we arranged tonnage.

F. That as his evacuation depended on how soon rolling stock could be brought from Germany no date would be given for commencement.

G. That as Mitau was an important railway junction and must be held until all of his troops had gone he could not evacuate it at once.

H. That practically all munitions and stores had been evacuated.

J. That his men had been promised to [*sic*] land in Latvia and they considered themselves citizens of Latvia and he could not answer for consequences if those who wished to remain in Latvia were not allowed to do so.

My observations on above are as follows:—

A. That Von der Goltz had been notified to deal direct with me and as further prevarication was useless Von der Goltz wished to satisfy himself as to my attitude on various questions especially with regard to allowing German troops to remain in Latvia.

B. That an evacuation which when it commences will take 74 days is preposterous and is solely intended to keep troops in Latvia until the harvest gathered and in hopes that one of his numerous intrigues will afford him the required loophole to interfere.

C. That Von der Goltz has carried out *coup d'états* before and unless quickly removed is in a position to carry out another in Baltic States. That we are dealing with reckless men promised much in Latvia who as recently as June 16th attempted a *coup d'état* against the Estonians after Von der Goltz had pledged his word that he had no intention of any further advance northwards. See (?) my telegram H.G. 49⁶ of July 10th.

D. That military situation on no front justifies arrival of fresh German troops and therefore there is no valid excuse for such action.

Part II.

E. That Libau was evacuated because there would have been no possible excuse for not evacuating by sea if Germans had remained. Von der Goltz quitted Libau when ships were promised. (See my telegram H.G. 49⁶ July 10th.)

F. That after many evasions we forced Von der Goltz by reference to War Office cable 79069 June 19th to admit that Windau should have been evacuated already and rather than force a final issue now to promise to allow 600 to go.

G. That Von der Goltz has no intention of surrendering Mitau and giving up control of railways Mitau-Windau, Mitau-Libau, Mitau-Riga, Mitau-Jacobstadt. That he is in a position to take advantage of any political crisis which his continued presence in the country is certain to foment and overrun Latvia at any moment. That as long as he remains at Mitau he controls all railways thus paralysing peaceful circulation and restoration of order and if such a state of affairs continues for 3 months grave trouble is to be expected in present excited state of the lately liberated Letts by hatred of their late oppressors.

H. That stores and munitions ready to be used at any moment have been parked in rear, hasty evacuation being necessary because under Article 109⁷ these would have become forfeit.

J. That Von der Goltz is now in position supported by certain Russian troops equipped and paid by Germans to offer, in return for rights of colonization, Latvia

⁶ See Vol. III of this series.

⁷ Apparently in error for article 169, the reference being to the Treaty of Versailles.

and Esthonia to restored Russia. To deal with situation I request you to cable German Government in substance as follows:—

1. All German forces in Latvia are to evacuate Latvia by sea. Evacuation to be assisted and expedited in every possible way by Allied naval and military mission under General Gough.
2. Evacuation of German force will be by barge from Mitau to Dünamunde at mouth of river Dwina north of Riga.
3. Evacuation to be completed by August 20th.
4. Further entrance into Latvia is forbidden to German troops.
5. That unless permission is obtained from Allied Mission removal of any war material from its present position in Latvia or Lithuania is forbidden and that mission should be furnished at once with list of location of all stores and munitions already moved.
6. That in order that I may arrange transport German plan of evacuation as in paragraph 2 is to be submitted to me as Chief of Allied Missions before August 5th.

In conclusion I point out—

A. That to allow Von der Goltz to carry out his present proposals for evacuation will render any peaceful solution in Baltic States impossible for 3 months and before the winter commences to close the ports to our navy.

B. As proposed by me there is no reason why the evacuation should not be completed in 3 weeks and under the eye of the British Navy if necessary. The feared pillage and arson of the undisciplined Germans evacuated by land will be avoided and looting will be impossible.

No. 24

H. D. 20.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, July 31, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White, Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Hartison.
British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Captain Abraham. *France*: Captain A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. TARDIEU explained the report of the Central Committee on territorial questions regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria in the south. He explained the divergent points of view of the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand and of the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other (see App. A to H. D. 12¹). If he were asked to argue his own point of view, he would argue it on three grounds—

*Frontiers of
Bulgaria*

¹ No. 16.

ethnological, political and moral. If Western Thrace were not given to Greece, 92,000 Greeks would be excluded from the Hellenic Kingdom. As the exclusion of Western Thrace from Greece would be followed by the exclusion of Eastern Thrace another 145,000 Greeks would be denied Greek citizenship. In the whole of Thrace, north and west of the Enos-Midia line there were 237,000 Greeks. In any case 1,835,000 Greeks would remain outside Greek Sovereignty. Unless Thrace were made Greek the Treaty which claimed an ethnological basis would leave more than 2 million persons of Greek race subject to non-Greek States. The whole Greek race only numbered 7 millions. This was a paradoxical result of a policy which claimed to be based on nationalities. It also appeared to him to be quite unjust. Greece no doubt would receive a good many things but if Bulgaria obtained free access to the Aegean, obvious difficulties would ensue for the Greeks. Their communications with the Islands and with Asia Minor could very easily be intercepted, especially in time of war. Greece had taken the side of the Allies in the war of her own free will. She had incurred a war debt of 2½ billion francs, borrowed no doubt from the Allies, but most States after all were in a similar condition. She deserved some consideration for the part she had played in the war. It was sometimes said that Western Thrace belonged to Bulgaria in law and in right. When the Treaty of San Stephano was signed in 1878, it was made according to the wishes of Russia which at that time was entirely pro-Bulgarian. The frontier laid down by that Treaty was almost the same as that proposed by the French, British and Japanese Delegations. Bulgaria had obtained Western Thrace by the Treaty of Bucharest. It was argued that if M. Venizelos raised no claim to it then, he had forfeited any claim to it now. This was not so, for at that time M. Venizelos was ready to do anything to establish the Balkan League. He had failed in this and after him the Allied Powers had also failed. It was clear that the Bulgarians would not be pleased, but nothing would please them save the establishment of Bulgarian authority over 9 million people, only 4 million of whom would be Bulgarian. It was not right to say that Bulgaria would be very harshly treated in this Treaty. Germany, by the terms imposed on her, lost one fifth of her population. Bulgaria, according to the terms proposed would only lose one eighteenth. The other clauses were not very severe. She was asked to pay 2½ billion francs, but on easy terms which could be made even more easy by the Reparations Commission. Moreover her debt to Germany was abolished, a provision which had not been made in favour of any other enemy State. Though she lost access to the Aegean Sea, she still preserved access to the Black Sea and to the Danube and the opening of the Straits would be to her advantage. The restitution clauses were also light. For instance, she was to restore to Greece only 1,500 milch cows out of 4,500 taken, 2,200 horses out of 9,000, 1,800 oxen out of 19,000 and 6,000 sheep and goats out of 260,000. He saw no particular advantage in offering Bulgaria a premium on aggression, violence and crime. The Bulgarians had no right to keep the fruits of the robbery committed by them in 1913 and again in 1915 with the help of Turkey, especially if to do this, 300,000 Greeks were to be kept out of Greece

and as a final result 34% of the Greek race were to be kept under alien domination.

MR. WHITE said that M. Tardieu had made constant allusion to Eastern Thrace. He understood, however, that Western Thrace was the subject under discussion. The main point was whether or not Bulgaria should have access to the Aegean Sea. Mr. White then made the following statement:—

‘In regard to the statement by M. Venizelos before the Supreme Council on July 29th,² it need only be said that the statement contained no arguments which the American delegation has not heard repeatedly and weighed carefully, unless exception be made of his references to the telegram of the American Chargé d’Affaires at Sofia and his quotations from the American Red Cross report on Bulgarian atrocities. As for the telegram (which I may remark parenthetically contained no charges of any nature against M. Venizelos or his Government, but merely referred to an active Greek propaganda, and large expenditures of funds in the district, without implication as to the source of either), it must be admitted that M. Venizelos’ suggestion that the eight Mussulman Deputies merely denied that they had asked for Greek sovereignty, but did not repudiate the document upon which he places so much weight, does not carry conviction. Our information is explicit and unequivocal to the effect that they denied foreknowledge of any such document and declared their signatures thereto to be forgeries. However, we do not care to stress this point, as even were it valid the American Delegation would not give it much weight as a reliable indication of the real sentiments of the mass of the Mohammedan population in Western Thrace. We merely point out that one of the chief arguments presented by the Greek Committee in support of their finding rests on evidence which, to express it mildly, needs verification.

‘As regards the long reading of citations of Bulgarian atrocities, we fail to see the relation between Bulgarian atrocities committed in one place and the drawing of frontiers in another. If I thought such arguments valid, I might read at length the descriptions of Greek atrocities contained in the well known Carnegie Report³, and cite them in support of the American opinion that Western Thrace should not be given to the Greeks. The American opinion, however, rests on no such feeble basis. It is founded on certain facts which are not subject to dispute on certain principles which have guided this Conference in its labours hitherto, and on one and only one ambition: namely, to contribute loyally and unselfishly to the great end we all have in view:—a just and enduring peace in Europe.

‘There is here no question of giving territory to Bulgaria. The only question before the Council is: shall we take territory away from Bulgaria and give it to Greece?

‘It is not denied that Bulgaria had a good and valid title to this territory when she entered the present war. She acquired it not by conquest, but

² See No. 22, minute 9.

³ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, 1914).

through a peace imposed upon her when she was beaten and helpless. Greece and her Allies, although conquerors, saw the wisdom of according to vanquished Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea. What was wise in 1913 is doubly wise in 1919, when we are endeavouring, more earnestly than ever before, to prepare a peace which will endure.

'If Bulgaria's legal title to Bulgarian Thrace does not admit of discussion, what are the grounds upon which we are asked to deprive her of this territory and hand it over to Greece? Certainly no serious argument for such procedure can be based on ethnic grounds. It is scarcely open to doubt that following the cession of this territory to Bulgaria, and before Bulgaria entered the war, the Bulgarian population outnumbered the Greek population, while Turks constituted, as always, the overwhelming majority. It does not invalidate this fact to argue that many Greeks were atrociously expelled from the region. When we remember that according to M. Venizelos' own figures there were, before the Balkan wars, only 70,000 Greeks in the area as against 60,000 Bulgars, we must admit that, expulsions or no expulsions, the feeble Greek superiority in numbers must inevitably give place to a Bulgar superiority as soon as the territory was ceded to Bulgaria. Greece knew, when she agreed to give Western Thrace to Bulgaria, that with the incoming Bulgarian administration, the development of Bulgarian commercial interests at the ports and elsewhere, and the migration of Bulgarians from new Greek territory into this new Bulgarian territory, the Greek population would most certainly and altogether naturally drop to third place in the proportion of races. In such a case, evidence as to atrocities and expulsions becomes wholly irrelevant. The vital fact remains that in any case the valid occupation of the region by Bulgaria must inevitably have brought about the ethnic preponderance in Bulgaria's favour which actually intervened.

'Nor do we believe that there is reliable evidence to show that the Turkish majority of Western Thrace prefers Greek to Bulgar rule. Many of these Turks speak Bulgarian as their native tongue, while comparatively few of them speak Greek. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it is natural to assume that this population would be better off under the government of those who speak their own language. The evidence to the contrary thus far presented is at least open to suspicion, and is offset by the declarations of the Chief of the Mohammedan Church in Bulgaria to the effect that his people preferred to be left under Bulgar rule. Assuredly we cannot find in the principle of self-determination any sound argument in favour of annexing Bulgarian Thrace to Greece.

'Is it sought to take this territory from Bulgaria and give it to Greece as a punishment for Bulgaria's action in joining our enemies? If this be the pretext for the proposed annexation, we must observe that while the wisdom and the method of administering punishment may be matters for discussion, there can be no doubt of the fact that punitive annexations of territory are in flagrant contradiction with the principles upon which we agreed to make peace in Europe, and with the principles which have

hitherto guided the deliberations of this Conference. The honour of the Entente will be gravely compromised if in order to punish an enemy and to pay a friend we take from the one and give to the other territory to which only the present possessor has a valid legal, ethnic and economic title. Never has the American Government approved territorial changes for punitive reasons; and it cannot now adopt a principle of procedure so fraught with danger to the future peace of the world.

'The fact that Germany, Austria, and Hungary are being deprived of large tracts of territory does not constitute a reason for taking territory from Bulgaria. In the first place the cases are not analogous, for Germany and Austria-Hungary had long been wrongfully annexing territory from their neighbours, whereas Bulgaria has recently been defeated and had stripped from her such territories as her neighbours saw fit to appropriate. In the very nature of events less remained to Bulgaria which can rightfully be taken from her; and the American Delegation has, in fact, agreed to deprive her of small areas at four different places along her frontiers. But far more important is the fact that all territories taken from Germany, Austria and Hungary were taken for valid reasons, and in the interests of justice and future peace. Such reasons do not exist in the case of Western Thrace, and we do not believe that to take this territory from Bulgaria would be in accord with justice or in the interest of a future peace.

'On the contrary, we believe that to deprive Bulgaria of Western Thrace is to cut her off from her only direct and convenient territorial access to the Aegean Sea, to inflict upon her a loss of territory which cannot be justified by the principles according to which we stand pledged to execute this peace, will be to render impossible the conciliation of the Balkan peoples, to sow the seeds of future trouble in South-Eastern Europe, and seriously to endanger the edifice of peace we have laboured so long and painfully to construct. It is for this reason that the American Delegation is unable to accept the proposal of the Greek Committee, and for this reason that its representatives on the Central Territorial Commission have recommended the formula contained in the Report of that Commission as submitted to the Supreme Council.'

MR. BALFOUR said that as he took a different view to that expressed by Mr. White, he thought he had better make a statement. He felt that he need not add much to the very clear explanation given by M. Tardieu. He accepted the general proposition that a punitive adjustment of frontiers was wrong. Nevertheless, when other circumstances balanced one another evenly it had been the practice of the Conference to give the benefit of the doubt to friends rather than to foes. If he were forced to appeal to this practice he would do so, but in this case he thought that the theoretical merits lay entirely on the side advocated by M. Tardieu. It was clearly both wrong and inexpedient to allow nations which embarked on aggressive and acquisitive wars to find this practice pay. In the whole war there had been no action more cynical and more disastrous than that undertaken by the Bulgarians.

Had the Bulgarians not behaved as they had, Turkey would not have entered the war; the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign would not have taken place; the war would have ended years sooner, and needless suffering would have been saved. The most plausible objection raised was that if Western Thrace were taken from Bulgaria a lasting peace in the Balkans would be jeopardised. Bulgaria, if she obtained Southern Dobrudja, which he hoped she would, would actually be larger than before the war. Mr. White had avoided any mention of the Greeks in Eastern Thrace. This question, however, was intimately connected with that of Western Thrace. If it was desirable that the Greeks in Eastern Thrace should be included within the limits of Greece, the attribution of Western Thrace to Greece was a means to that end. He had been rather shocked at Mr. White's theory about massacre. Mr. White appeared ready to accept the results of massacres with great equanimity. The American Delegation had been greatly influenced by the theory that every country should have direct access to the sea. He could not believe, however, that it was good policy to allow Bulgaria to retain territory obtained from Turkey as a bribe for declaring war on us. In any case, Dedeagatch was not the only port which could serve Bulgarian ends. The opening of the Straits added greatly to the value of Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea. The value of the opening of the Straits could be inferred from the outcry there would have been in Bulgaria had the Straits been open before the war and had the result of war closed them for Bulgarian traffic. In any case the port of Dedeagatch had never been and would never be a good port. He hoped that the arrangements that were to be made at Salonika or Cavalla would suit Bulgarian purposes far better. For these reasons he supported M. Tardieu. He might also quote the earlier views of the American Delegation. These views had changed while the views of the other Delegations had not.

M. TARDIEU said that he would like to make a brief reply to some of Mr. White's remarks. It was probable that the real value of the letter written by the Mohommedan Deputies of Western Thrace could never be estimated. At a time when Thrace was not occupied by the Bulgarians these Deputies had written to General Franchet d'Esperey. Since the Bulgars had occupied the country the signatories had felt impelled to recant. It was reasonable to believe that their first mood was more sincere than the second.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that perhaps neither was sincere.

M. TARDIEU said that the argument that because the Turks in Western Thrace spoke Bulgarian, they would prefer a Bulgarian to a Greek Government, was not to be relied on. Experience had disproved this many times. As to the diminution of population as a result of massacres, it could hardly be maintained that this should redound to the advantage of the authors of the massacres. He did not suggest that a punitive territorial arrangement should be made, but he did not think that it was good morality to recompense the Bulgarians for wrong doing. As to the legality of Bulgaria's title to Western Thrace, he would point out that Roumania's title to Southern Dobrudja was equally good, yet the American Delegation wished to restore

South Dobrudja to Bulgaria. The same legal argument could not justify the retention of Western Thrace by Bulgaria and the cession to her of Southern Dobrudja. If Bulgaria were given Southern Dobrudja, Eastern and Western Thrace and were only asked to contribute two and a half billion francs, this would amount to an invitation to begin again. As to a lasting peace, when Bulgaria possessed Western Thrace she was not prevented from embarking on an aggressive war. She was not more or less likely to do so after being deprived of it.

M. TITTONI said that the population in Western Thrace was mainly Turkish and Greek. In Eastern Thrace to the south it was Greek and to the north Bulgarian. Assuming, therefore, the Enos-Midia line to be a line beyond which neither Bulgaria nor Greece could extend, he thought that a line dividing Eastern Thrace according to the national distribution of the population would be the most satisfactory.

M. TARDIEU said that in 1913 when the Bulgars possessed Dedeagatch they had wearied all the chancellories of Europe to obtain Cavalla, as they considered Dedeagatch an inadequate harbour. It was unlikely that if left with this port only they would be satisfied.

M. LAROCHE observed that they had gone to war to obtain Cavalla.

M. TITTONI said that if they had had Cavalla they would have made war to obtain Salonika.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that according to M. Tittoni's plan Adrianople would be Bulgarian instead of being either Greek or part of the territory of Constantinople.

M. TITTONI said that Adrianople was on the line of demarcation between the Bulgarian and Greek populations. It might be assigned to either. This was a question for the experts to decide.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Italian Delegation had ever made this proposal in the Commissions.

M. TITTONI said that the Italians had always supported the American view.

MR. COOLIDGE observed that the railway to Dedeagatch had been snatched from Bulgaria by Turkey after her defeat by the Greeks and Serbs. At that time the Great Powers had protested very strongly, and among them Great Britain.

M. TITTONI corroborated this statement.

MR. WHITE explained that he was not so hard-hearted as Mr. Balfour had made him appear. He thought that the Greeks had withdrawn from Western Thrace rather because they feared massacre, than because they had suffered it. Doubtless the Bulgarians would withdraw from any territory invaded by Greeks as a consequence of similar apprehensions. In the East fluctuations of population commonly had this cause. As to Dedeagatch, he thought it could be converted into a good port. Access to the Mediterranean from a port in the Black Sea was obviously more circuitous and less desirable. He wished to state that at the instance of his colleagues he had communicated with President Wilson and explained the difficulty in which the Council

found itself. President Wilson, as a possible way out of the difficulty, had suggested the following:—

'Bulgaria recognises the right of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to transfer to the proposed International State of Constantinople the territory of Bulgarian Thrace as herein defined, and agrees to accept and co-operate in the effectuation of such transfer whenever it is made.'

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the territory of the future State of Constantinople were increased to this extent, its attribution to any mandatory power would become impossible. There might be agreement if only Constantinople and the Straits were in question, but he saw no chance if large territories were added.

M. TARDIEU said that internationalised states had been invented for a definite general advantage. The State of Constantinople was considered desirable in order to safeguard the freedom of the Straits. If a large hinterland, including Thrace, were added to it, the result would be that it would include 760,000 Turks, 650,000 Greeks, and 75,000 Bulgars. On what pretext could a mass of 650,000 Greeks at the very frontier of Greece be made subject to another State? This would clearly be contrary to the principle of nationality adopted by the Conference. He thought perhaps the experts might attempt to work out M. Tittoni's idea.

M. TITTONI said that his proposal was based entirely on ethnographical considerations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in his opinion it was impossible to dissociate Eastern and Western Thrace.

MR. WHITE said that he could not decide without further reference to President Wilson.

M. TARDIEU said that the future State of Constantinople could be easily imagined if it were restricted to the Straits, the Sea of Marmora and the populations who made their living by the sea, but if large territories were added to it, and Adrianople and Xanthi had to be administered as well, the task would be impossible.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a very clear and restricted programme must be made for Constantinople, otherwise no mandatory would be found.

M. TARDIEU said that the proposal made by President Wilson showed one concession at least to the opinion of the other Delegations. It denied Bulgaria direct access to the Aegean. He took note of this concession. M. Tittoni's proposal gave Western Thrace to Greece, some of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria, and the rest to Greece, making both Greece and Bulgaria coterminous with the new State of Constantinople. He thought that it might be possible to work on this thesis, and to obtain some agreement.

MR. POLK asked how many Greeks inhabited the part of Thrace south of the Enos-Midia line.

M. TARDIEU said that there were 420,000 Turks and 408,000 Greeks, and 5,000 Bulgarians.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Enos-Midia line had been introduced into the discussion not as the final boundary of the State of Constantinople, but as the limit beyond which the recommendations of the Commission on Greek and Bulgarian Affairs should not extend.

M. TITTONI said that the Enos-Midia line had been invented at the London Conference of 1913. Had not the Bulgarians attacked the Greeks and Serbians, this line would have become a final frontier line.

MR. POLK suggested that the discussion be adjourned.

(It was decided to adjourn the discussion on Bulgarian frontier[s] to Saturday, August 2nd, at 3.30. The Experts were requested to consider the suggestion made by M. Tittoni, for an ethnographical partition of Eastern Thrace, and to submit a report in time for the Meeting on Saturday.)

2. GENERAL BELIN read the report of the Military and Naval Representatives (see Appendix A).

Military and Naval Measures to be taken for the occupation of Dantzic and Memel (After some discussion of the implications of Article[s] 101 and 103 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the following resolution was adopted:—

‘Respecting the report of the Military Representatives on the Military and Naval measures to be taken for the occupation of the territories of Dantzic and Memel, it was decided:—

1. To forbid Polish forces from entering the territory of the free city of Dantzic.
2. To compel the evacuation of German forces from this territory.
3. To postpone the question of military forces to occupy the territory.
4. To ask the Commission on Baltic Affairs to examine the question of the occupation of Memel.

It was further decided that during the intermediate period pending the nomination of a High Commissioner by the League of Nations, the Commission provided for in Article 101 of the Treaty, should receive instructions to report to the Council of [? on] any measures necessary for the maintenance and [? of] order in the territory of the free City of Dantzic.’)

3.

Demand of the Swedish Legation to be heard on the subject of the Aland Islands

[Not printed]⁴

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
July 31, 1919.*

⁴ After a short discussion it was decided to give a favourable answer to the request of the Swedish Legation.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 24

Document 1

s. w. c. 430/1] *Report on military and naval measures to be taken for the occupation of the territories of Dantzig and Memel*⁵

(In reply to Resolution passed at a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday 18th June, 1919 at 3 p.m.)

On the 18th June the Council of Foreign Ministers examined a memorandum from the British Delegation to the Peace Conference referring to the military and naval measures to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, after the evacuation by the Germans of the territories of Dantzig and Memel, in order to assure the occupation of these territories and the regular working of the system of Government set up under the control of the League of Nations.

The Council of Foreign Ministers decided to submit the military and naval questions raised by this memorandum to a specially constituted Committee composed of:—

- 4 Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council.
- 1 Military Representative of Japan.
- 1 Naval Representative of each of the 5 Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The questions on which the Military and Naval Representatives are to give their opinion to the Council of Foreign Ministers are summed up as follows by the British Memorandum:—

- (1) Should the Polish forces be forbidden to enter the territory of the free city of Dantzig?
- (2) Should the German forces be compelled to evacuate this territory?
- (3) If (1) and (2) are accepted, what military forces shall occupy the territory?
- (4) Conditions for the occupation of Memel.

As far as the first two questions are concerned the Military and Naval Representatives have unanimously agreed that the answer should be in the affirmative.

As regards question 3 the Military and Naval Representatives were in disagreement on the question of principle involved by the despatch of an Inter-Allied Military force to Dantzig.

The American and British Military and Naval Representatives were opposed to the sending of Allied forces for the reasons set forth in Appendix 'A'.

The French and Italian Representatives, on the contrary, considered that the High Commissioner required an Allied force to assist him to carry out his functions. The reasons for this suggestion, and details in regard to the force proposed, are set forth in Appendix 'B'.

The Japanese Military and Naval Representatives expressed no opinion in regard to the necessity for a military occupation of Dantzig, and considered that the question should be referred to the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Note in original: 'The Peace Treaty with Germany stipulates in Articles 99 and 100 that Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and claims to the territories of Dantzig and Memel.'

They were, however, of opinion that the High Commissioner should have at his disposal an armed force of some description to maintain order and to support his authority.

C. SACKVILLE-WEST,
Major-General,
Chairman of Committee.

Versailles, 24th of June 1919.

Document 2

APPENDIX A TO S.W.C. 430

Memorandum by the American and British Representatives

In regard to question 3, the American and British Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that the presence of organised support at Dantzig is essential for the authority of the High Commissioner.

They are, however, of opinion that the despatch of an Inter-Allied Military Force to Dantzig is, for the present, inadvisable.

The reasons for this attitude may be briefly summarized as follows:—

- (a) The acceptance by the German and Polish Governments of the conditions laid down in the answers to questions 1 and 2 would give reason to presume that these Governments intended to act in good faith in regard to the future status of the District of Dantzig.
- (b) The population of Dantzig is mainly German in character and, if the terms of the Treaty of Peace are loyally accepted by the German Government, it will be in the interest of the German inhabitants of Dantzig to maintain order in their own town and to support the authority of the High Commissioner.
- (c) Under the circumstances referred to in (a) and (b), it is considered that the presence of an Inter-Allied Military force in Dantzig would inevitably have an irritating effect on the population, the results of which might be serious internal disorders.
- (d) They consider that the authority of the High Commissioner in Dantzig could, for the reasons given above, be efficiently maintained by the employment of locally raised gendarmerie or police forces which may require expansion to meet the new situation.
- (e) In the event of the High Commissioner being unable to maintain his authority by moral influence backed by local forces, it will no doubt be within the powers of the Allied and Associated States to send sufficient forces to enforce the conditions of the Peace Treaty.

Apart from the question of principle the American and British Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that the cost of the maintenance of an Inter-Allied force, as also the difficulty of keeping open communications for supplying that force, are factors which should be taken into account, more especially in view of the present lack of shipping for commercial purposes.

Further, even should Inter-Allied military forces be made available for the occupation of the District of Dantzig and be despatched forthwith, an interregnum would be inevitable before their arrival; this would, in all probability, be the most critical period.

In regard to the occupation of Memel, the American and British Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that, for the reasons already given in regard to Dantzig, there should be at present no Allied military forces of occupation.

Document 3

APPENDIX B TO S.W.C. 430

Advisability of raising an Inter-Allied Force of occupation for the territories of Dantzig and Memel

(Opinion of the French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives)

The French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives are agreed that it is indispensable that the High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Dantzig should have at his disposal, failing Polish or German troops, an armed force sufficient to ensure the maintenance of order and the exercise of his authority.

As the territories of Dantzig and Memel have been ceded by Germany to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, it is the duty of the latter to assume the responsibility of establishing the new Political Regime on an orderly foundation. The military and naval forces of occupation at the disposal of the High Commissioner must, therefore, be Inter-Allied.

It is possible in the more or less distant future that circumstances will allow a gradual diminution of the Inter-Allied force which may be thought necessary, and even their replacement by a force raised solely by the new Government from the free City and recruited on the spot with a certain proportion of foreign cadres if necessary.

It will be the duty of the League of Nations to make a decision on this point when the proper moment arrives, taking into consideration the general internal condition of the country.

At the present moment, however, the existing local police is wholly German; it cannot therefore provide the necessary guarantee of impartiality; it must be remembered, also, that it will be necessarily partially disorganised, if some of its personnel retain their German nationality, in accordance with the option recognised by Article 106 of the Treaty of Peace.⁶

Therefore it seems that the necessity of raising an Inter-Allied force, at any rate for the time being, cannot be avoided.

Lastly, it would be necessary for this force to be sent as soon as possible to the territory in question. Germany must, in fact, give up to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over this territory; it therefore follows that German troops must proceed to evacuate immediately and must have finished their evacuation within the 15 days laid down by the Committee for the determination of frontiers.

Effectives and Composition of the Inter-Allied Force of Occupation

The French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives are in entire agreement that the presence of both a military and a naval force is necessary.

Ships are indispensable to guarantee the supply of land forces and could give them very useful help in case of trouble.

The presence of a naval force alone would, on the other hand, be ineffective; furthermore, this force would be exposed to real dangers since it would not be able

⁶ Note in original: 'This option carries with it the obligation that those who avail themselves of it shall remove to Germany within a maximum period of 12 months.'

to ensure its own safety, as in the absence of land forces in occupation of the forts, batteries and other harbour defences, it would be exposed to hostile operations.

In determining the strength of the military and naval forces of occupation, the French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives have taken into consideration the following facts:—

- (1) The population of the entire territories in question (Dantzic and Memel) may be reckoned at about 600,000, of whom 183,000 are in the city of Dantzic alone.
- (2) The territory of Dantzic includes a large harbour and many sea and river establishments which must be protected against any possible attack in case of disorder.
- (3) The varied aspirations of the German and Polish populations, who are unlikely at first, at least, to accept the new order gladly, will make the political situation very difficult and unstable. It will therefore be necessary to have a considerable force on the spot for the prevention of any kind of disorder or conflict.
- (4) The geographical position of the territories in question which are situated at a distance from the Powers who are called upon to protect them will not lend itself to any rapid reinforcement of the military forces of occupation.

Under these circumstances the Military and Naval Representatives consider that the military force necessary for the occupation of the entire territories of Dantzic and Memel should be about 10,000 men, that is to say, about 1 division.

This division should be placed under the command of a General Officer appointed by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers with a Staff, including officers of the various armies composing the military force of occupation. This force might be detached from the allied forces of occupation in the territory on the left bank of the Rhine.

Force of Occupation for the Territory of Memel

The French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that the occupation of the territory of Memel could be assured by a *Military Force* of:—

1 regiment of infantry
and 1 squadron of cavalry

to be detailed from the forces above-mentioned. The Memel detachment should include Representatives from all the Allied contingents. Its Commanding Officer should be appointed by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.

General Remarks

Lastly the French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives consider it their duty to call the attention of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the fact that they hold it important that the force of occupation should in any case be Inter-Allied.

They therefore consider that if certain of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers cannot be represented in the force of occupation, it would be preferable to have no such force, both for moral reasons as the solidarity of the Allies must be upheld in all acts of a local Government set up by them, and for material reasons because one or two Powers cannot alone assume the responsibility which they all collectively incur, and later the dangers which may arise therefrom.

H. D. 21.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, August 1, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. H. White, Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.
British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman,
 Sir Ian Malcolm.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Lt.-Commander Bell. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives entered the room.

I. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he had received a communication from Berlin through General Nudant (see Appendix A). It was to the effect that the German Government, as a result of the revelations made by Herr Erzberger,¹ had been violently attacked from the Conservative and Independent Socialist Sections. The question most at issue was the surrender of the military officers demanded by the Treaty. Herr Erzberger asked that the provisions to that effect might not immediately be put into force.

M. TITTONI said that as the Allies had representatives in Germany, it would be best to ask their advice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at the present moment the situation was not quite clear. The list of German Officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war

¹ On July 25, 1919, Herr Erzberger, German Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Finance, made a speech in the National Assembly at Weimar in which he criticized German right-wing and military elements for having neglected to take advantage during the First World War of opportunities which he considered might have rendered possible an earlier termination of hostilities. In this speech Herr Erzberger disclosed, in particular, the contents of a letter sent by Mgr. Pacelli, Papal Nuncio in Munich, in August 1917 to Dr. Michaelis, the Imperial Chancellor, transmitting a copy of a communication made by the British Minister at the Vatican to the Cardinal Secretary of State in connexion with the proposals for peace made by Pope Benedict XV on August 1, 1917. (For these proposals see Cmd. 261 of 1919: *The Peace Proposals made by His Holiness the Pope to the Belligerent Powers on August 1, 1917, and Correspondence relative thereto*. German texts of the letter and enclosure referred to by Herr Erzberger are printed by General E. Ludendorff in *Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit 1916-18*, Berlin, 1920, pp. 425-6.) Herr Erzberger's speech provoked a heated debate and public controversy in the course of which further disclosures were made and the names of prominent personalities, including Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff, were introduced. (An English translation of the relevant passages of Herr Erzberger's speech is printed by R. H. Lutz in *Fall of the German Empire 1914-1918*, California and London, 1932, vol. i, pp. 440-9. See also loc. cit., passim, for related documents.) At the conclusion of the parliamentary debate on July 29, 1919, the National Assembly rejected a motion of no confidence in the government by 243 votes to 53.

comprised over 1,000 persons, of whom some were Princes of the Blood. He believed that the list of Naval Officers who were to be surrendered was not yet ready.

MR. BALFOUR replied that the list made out in Great Britain was ready.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the Council must be clear as to the demands that it was going to make. It was dangerous to postpone executing the provisions relating to the surrender of German Officers, if, at the same time, German prisoners were to be repatriated. M. Larnaude had made a report on the question of German Prisoners, and had pointed out that the problem of their repatriation was intimately connected with the surrender of enemy officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had themselves recognised that the two questions emphasised in M. Larnaude's report should be considered together. He thought that it would be improper to return German prisoners if the Germans did not themselves surrender the guilty officers. He proposed that no reply should be given at once. Herr Erzberger's telegram might certainly be based on fact, but, on the other hand, it might be intended to promote a hasty decision on the part of the Council. He asked whether the matter might not be referred to a Committee of experts.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was evidently the President's opinion that an answer should not at once be given. At the same time, the Treaty did not, in itself, permit the return of German prisoners to be much postponed, and, by its very provisions, prevented the Allies from making a delay in their repatriation a political weapon. If the detention of the prisoners was decided upon, it must be put into force before the Treaty received general ratification.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated, in reply to Mr. Balfour's question, that the French ratification of the Treaty would probably take place in the first week in September. He suggested that Marshal Foch, who had agents in Germany, should make a report on the subject, and that he should be given the assistance of jurisconsults.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the British agents in Germany would be asked for information, and he supposed that the question to be put to the jurists would be, whether we should be justified in adopting a measure for the detention of German prisoners if the Germans refused to surrender the culpable officers.

M. CLEMENCEAU then said that that was not quite his meaning. He wished to point out that the Germans in their note were asking for a definite favour—the waiving of the stipulations with regard to the surrender of guilty officers. The Allies, if they granted this, might ask for certain military measures to be carried out on the part of Germany, to compensate them for granting the German demand.

M. TITTONI pointed out that the Germans did not quite put forward their request as a favour, but were suggesting certain measures to us, on account of the social and political situation in Germany, which menaced the Allies' interests as well as theirs. In these circumstances, would it not be advantageous to obtain further information, and come to a decision when it had been tendered?

M. CLEMENCEAU returned to his original proposal of referring the question to a Committee of juriconsults and military men.

MR. BALFOUR then remarked that such a Committee might say 'You have a right to take what measures of security you please'. He asked what Marshal Foch thought.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the surrender of guilty officers was not a military question, but a political one.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Marshal Foch, and said that he would like his opinion as to a suitable military compensation for the favour which would be granted to the Germans by acceding to their request.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether we should not be asking the military men to verify political facts.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think so, since military men would only be advising on the subject of military compensation.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be necessary, therefore, to ask our diplomatic representatives for information. In the meantime, the Military Representatives at Versailles should endeavour to find out whether the statements in the German communication were correct, and should further advise the Council as to what military measures on the part of Germany would be adequate compensation to the Allies, for acceding to their demand. Whatever questions were put to Versailles, the British War Office must refer the matter to its own military representatives.

M. TITTONI said that the situation would be that each country would refer the matter to whatever agents or bodies it thought capable of making a suitable examination.

MR. POLK agreed with Mr. Balfour and M. Tittoni.

(It was decided:—

- (1) That no immediate reply to the German Government's request should be given.
- (2) That the Military Representatives at Versailles, in collaboration with Marshal Foch, should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilise all available sources of information at their command.
- (3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on such military compensations as might be demanded from Germany in return for a compliance with their present request.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU circulated two telegrams from Germany (see Appendices B and C) stating (1) that Germany had at present 800,000 men under arms, and (2) that the students in Munich were being armed in violation of the Peace Treaty.

Information from Germany with regard to the number of men under arms in that country and the arming of students in Munich

MR. BALFOUR stated, that before proceeding further with the question, he would like to have comprehensive figures comparing the total number of enemy and Allied troops at present in the field. He feared that such figures might be alarming.

M. TITTONI said that as Marshal Foch was going to study the questions put to him under decision No. 1, he would like him to state what force was now required in Germany for the maintenance of order.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the question was answered by the military provisions of the Armistice and of the Peace Treaty. He considered that the significance of the events at Munich lay in the fact, that the Germans wished to show, by what they were doing, that they knew that Allied control over their actions would soon cease.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the communication circulated drew attention to the point.

(It was therefore decided that the two documents circulated should be submitted to Marshal Foch for examination and report.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU read a telegram from General Franchet d'Esperey with regard to the Allied occupation of Thrace (see Appendix D).² He remarked that it was obviously necessary to reinforce the Allied troops in Bulgaria although the measure presented practical difficulties.

*Communication from
General Franchet
d'Esperey, Commander-
in-Chief of the Allied
Armies in the East*

MR. BALFOUR said that as he understood it the situation was serious and a comparison between the available Allied and Bulgarian forces would be disadvantageous to ourselves. He had received a report that the disarmament of Bulgaria was incomplete, on account of the different way in which demobilisation was carried out in such countries as England and France, and in Bulgaria. In the former case, demobilisation meant that soldiers returned absolutely to their civil occupations, and ceased to appear on the list of any military unit. This was not the case in Bulgaria, where demobilisation meant no more than the reduction of a military unit, from war to peace strength. The Bulgarian Army had comprised ten divisions. Under the Armistice it had been allowed to keep three and had been ordered to demobilise seven. This meant no more than that Bulgaria now had a powerful military force of three divisions on full war strength, and seven others on a reduced footing.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he thought Mr. Balfour's remarks as a whole were correct, but he could not guarantee the accuracy of the details.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Franchet d'Esperey had been asked to give a detailed report, but that no very clear statement had yet been received from him.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Bulgarian Army had never even obeyed orders it had received from the Allies. It was quite possible that they would

² Not printed. In this telegram to the French Minister of War (dated in Paris July 30), General Franchet d'Esperey referred to 'la décision du Conseil Supérieur interallié que vous m'avez communiquée le 10 juin', envisaging the participation of British and Italian troops in the occupation of Bulgaria (cf. No. 7, minute 12). The general reported delay on the part of the British and Italian military authorities in making the necessary arrangements with him. General Franchet d'Esperey concluded: 'Dans ces conditions les troupes françaises vont être seules à supporter la charge et la responsabilité de l'occupation de la Bulgarie au moment du traité de paix.'

have a superior force to that of the Allies, at the time that the Peace Treaty was presented.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed that Marshal Foch should report on the situation, and asked the approximate time necessary for the preparation of such a report.

MARSHAL FOCH said it would require several days, as he would be obliged to refer the matter to General Franchet d'Esperey.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that a certain amount of information was already at hand and that a report on the basis of the information available could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should submit on August 2nd a report on the present status of the Bulgarian forces, based upon information at present in his possession.)

(It was further decided that Marshal Foch should make investigations through General Franchet d'Esperey, and submit a full report when these latter had been received.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU circulated a telegram from the Military Representatives at Klagenfurt (see Appendix E).

Telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Klagenfurt relative to the execution of the decision of the Conference

M. BERTHELOT further explained the telegram stating that by the withdrawal of the Austrians and Jugo-Slavs from Klagenfurt a certain quantity of war material had been left behind, under the custody of a few Italian *carabinieri*. In view of the fact that the Supreme Council had asked that an Inter-Allied guard should be placed in charge of the material in question,³ it was now requested that it should be constituted, and, until it could be so constituted, two companies of Italian *carabinieri* should be authorised by the Council to form the guard. He pointed out that the value of the property in question was inconsiderable, and suggested that two platoons of Italian *carabinieri* would be quite sufficient to ensure the custody of the material.

(It was agreed that the Italian Command should be authorised to furnish two platoons of *carabinieri*, for the purpose of guarding the war material at Klagenfurt.)

5. The Council had before it a communication from Marshal Foch to the following effect:—

Organisation of the High Command of the Army of Occupation in Western Germany after the Treaty comes into force

‘When the Army of Occupation shall have been organised, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front, who was in command during the war, will no longer exercise this command.

‘However, it is necessary to maintain a superior Command for the group of Allied forces of occupation, were it only to establish a liaison with the High Commission, who should communicate directly with the High Military Command (Art. IV of Memorandum of June 9th),

³ See No. 16, minute 9.

also for regulating all military questions dealing with railway, river, telegraphic, telephonic and postal communications.

'France, on account of the number of troops in her army of occupation, should place a General at the head of the Rhine Army. The other Nations will probably not do this.

'It is proposed that this General be designated to command the group of Allied occupation forces, as soon as the command of Marshal Foch on the Western front shall have ceased, in other words, at the moment that the Peace Treaty goes into force.'

(The proposals which Marshal Foch's communication contained were agreed to without discussion.)

6. (a) *Frontier of Prekomurje.*

M. TARDIEU stated that the Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Committee had submitted on July 22nd a memorandum with regard to two new claims which had been presented by the Delegation of the Yugo-Slav kingdom regarding the northern frontier of that State (see Appendix F).

(It was decided to adhere to the boundary line in Prekomurje formerly adopted by the Supreme Council, which line in general follows the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.)

(b) *Baranya.*

M. TARDIEU read the memorandum regarding Baranya (see Appendix F).

(It was decided to accept the proposal of the Committee with regard to Baranya, and the frontier which had been proposed by it.)

7. (a) *Bacska.*

M. TARDIEU reported on the notes submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs dated 25th July 1919 (see Appendix G).

(It was decided to accept the draft proposals of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Bacska region; and to uphold the frontier line previously laid down, in view of the fact that the ethnographic conditions in the locality would not allow of the aforesaid frontier line being extended to the north.

It was further decided to refer the question of laying down regulations of an international kind, with regard to the working of the Deak Canal, at present in Jugo-Slavia, by means of hydraulic installations now in Hungarian territory, to the Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways.)

(b) *Banat.*

M. TARDIEU drew the attention of the Conference to the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs on the subject of the Banat.

(It was decided to adopt the proposals contained in the report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Banat, as follows:—

(1) *Central Banat*: The previously adopted frontier is to be upheld, and a notification to that effect sent to persons concerned. The Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways will take the necessary measures to maintain and to develop the irrigation canals in the Banat to the equal advantage of the States to which the Banat is allotted.

(2) *Northern Banat*: The question is to be adjourned for further study.)

8. M. TARDIEU said that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had received a note dated July 10th from the Jugo-Slav Delegation, asking that their troops be allowed to occupy the territories granted to Serbia by the Conference in the region in question. The Committee had submitted a reply dated 26th July (see Appendix H).⁴ Since the Council had settled the territorial question in Prekomurye, he proposed that the suggested military occupation should be granted.

(It was decided that the Jugo-Slav State should be authorised to occupy the territory in Prekomurye bounded by the frontier laid down and notified: see para 6 subsection (a).)

9. M. TARDIEU stated that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had given him a report dated 30th July, to which he had nothing to add. (See Annex [Appendix] I).

Roumanian frontiers in Bukovina

MR. BALFOUR said that the Commission, after its first examination of the question, had decided, that, for ethnographical reasons, the small territorial area under discussion could not be given to the Bukovina. The reasons in question still held good, because the population of the district was more Ruthene than Roumanian in character. In addition to this, Poland had received Eastern Galicia, and laid no claims to the area now being considered. The desires of the population affected were the real matter for study. He asked what was the reason given by the committee in support of these proposals. The answer probably was, that it would be advantageous, from a political point of view, to maintain the historical frontiers of Bukovina since that would be a measure which would please the Roumanian Government and Roumanian public opinion. The Bukovina had never belonged properly to Roumania, and he was not in favour of granting it to that country until such time as its real attitude towards the Allies had been cleared up. Up to the present time, the wishes and instructions of the Conference had been grossly disregarded by Roumania. That country had never acceded to our demands, and now that a territorial change, violating the principles of nationalities, was proposed in the interests of Roumanian public opinion, he preferred to adjourn the question.

MR. POLK said that he had been told in the morning that the line shown in red on the chart,⁵ ran along the bottom of a valley; and that he did not care for such a solution.

⁴ Not printed. The reply proposed by the committee was in the sense of the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council.

⁵ Not attached to original.

M. TITTONI said that he would like to draw attention to the following point, which was, that the frontier now proposed had been promised to Roumania when she entered the war. For this reason he would uphold it willingly. On the other hand, he recognised the strength of Mr. Balfour's argument, and thought that Roumania should be informed that it would only receive the territory in question if it were willing to carry out the wishes of the Allies, and to sign the Treaty. Roumania was now in a state of discontent. The demands of that country in the Banat had been curtailed, and it would be unwise, therefore, to displease it with regard to Bukovina unless there were important reasons for so doing. That is to say, the proposals of the committee might be accepted under certain conditions.

M. TARDIEU said that the Bessarabian question had not been settled either. Since the Council could exert pressure, it could be announced that the report of the committee would be accepted if Roumania satisfied the Council in other ways.

MR. BALFOUR said that there were also numerous negotiations proceeding between Roumania and Hungary of a kind that did not arise out of the Treaty. It was nevertheless important that these negotiations should be concluded in a manner satisfactory to all. Roumania was not only concerned in signing the Treaty, it was also called upon to manifest its general goodwill.

MR. POLK said that he accepted the proposal in principle; but that he would prefer that the question should again be referred to experts, since a frontier running through the bottom of a valley seemed to him unsatisfactory.

M. TARDIEU said that the question had been carefully examined by the committee. The difficulty was that a part of the Bukovina had already been given to Roumania, and had been occupied by that country. The alternative would be to give it to Poland, who did not demand it.

MR. POLK said that he raised no objection and that he was only insisting on a point of detail.

(It was decided to accept the report of the committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, and to grant Bukovina to Roumania, with the exception of the area traversed by the railway line Zaleszczyki-Kolomea (see annex 1 to appendix I); on the condition that Roumania should show goodwill towards the allies, with regard to the signature of the Treaty, and to the other questions in which she was concerned.)

10. M. TARDIEU said he wished to draw attention to a question not on the order of the day, but one demanding an early solution; the *Bessarabian Question* problem was that of Bessarabia, on which the Council had taken no decision.

M. Maklakoff and M. Bratiano had expressed the Russian and Roumanian points of view.⁶ After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision. It remained to be known what

⁶ See No. 2, minute 1.

solution the Council would adopt, for it was difficult to settle the Roumanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if, at the same time, its frontiers had not been notified to it.

M. PICHON said that the question was particularly important in that the minorities question would arise in Bessarabia.

M. TARDIEU said that the Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Roumania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Koltchak, which appeared inconsistent with that decision.⁷ In the telegram in question the Council had only stated that the Roumanian rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favour of that country.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was evidently important to be able to inform Roumania what its frontiers exactly were.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Tardieu thought that the committee would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for a further report.

M. TARDIEU said that the committee had been unanimous when it had studied the problem. But they knew that certain delegations had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the telegram sent to Admiral Koltchak.

M. PICHON said that he did not think that the Council had been inconsistent, since it had not stated to Admiral Koltchak that Bessarabia as a whole would be granted to Roumania.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Pichon thought the telegram to Admiral Koltchak was not binding on the Council.

M. PICHON said that Admiral Koltchak's attention had only been drawn to the fact that the Council upheld Roumanian rights in Bessarabia.

M. TITTONI said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an important point, which was that the committee had justified its proposals by saying that it wished to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia, and that it would give to Roumania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Dobrudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Roumania would be compensated for the northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia.

MR. BALFOUR said he did not think he could admit compensations, which consisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings by the cession of others to foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle.

M. TITTONI remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he proposed to put it on the agenda for the following day.

MR. BALFOUR said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Roumania was actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be sufficient to tell that country that it would not receive the territory now being considered unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to this, Roumanian statesmen did not really deny that

⁷ Cf. No. 19, note 14.

the southern part of the Dobrudja should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Roumania been our enemy during the war she would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our ally, she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. Was it therefore possible to say to that country that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Dobrudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a ceaseless cause of friction? The Roumanians were difficult people to deal with, and M. Bratiano was no exception.

M. TITTONI said that he had heard that a new ministry had been set up in Roumania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had also heard that, but the cabinet had not been formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one of his colleagues would give it his consideration.

MR. POLK said that the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of Russia. Admiral Koltchak, in his reply, had protested against his country being divided. He thought that the effect of dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia.

M. TITTONI remarked that Russia's point of view had been presented to the Council.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia.

M. TITTONI said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be the establishment of Bolshevism.

MR. BALFOUR said he did not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days' time, if it were possible to settle it then. He did not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He was willing to wait for the formation of the new Roumanian cabinet in the hope that it would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems.

M. TARDIEU said that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation of the new Government, but even if it were favourable to our point of view, we should have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja problems. It was not possible to do this at present.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the new Roumanian Government proved satisfactory, it would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could negotiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was favourably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Roumania, on the condition that the Roumanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the discussion of problems not yet solved.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian delegation was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed and settled whilst the present question remained open.

(It was decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Dobrudja until the formation of the new Roumanian Government.

It was further decided that the above questions should be put on the agenda as soon as the new Government had been formed.)

M. Sergent and M. Cheysson⁸ entered the room.

11. M. Clemenceau left the room and M. Pichon took the Chair.

Financial clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria M. PICHON said that the Council had to examine the amendments brought forward by the Reparations and Finance Committees after hearing the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak [Greek] and Jugo-Slav Delegations.

M. SERGENT read the report prepared by the two Committees. (See Appendix J.⁹) He added that the Reparations Commission had been presented with a note from the Serbian Delegation. The note in question had been examined and its suggestions adopted partially. On the day in question, however, at two o'clock, a new note, couched in the most violent terms, had been received, stating that Jugo-Slavia refused point-blank to accept article 4 in the reparation clauses.¹⁰ In the Peace Treaty with Germany the article in question had laid down that Bulgaria should transfer her debt with Germany to the Allies. In article 4 of the reparation clauses with Bulgaria that country was called upon to recognise the validity of the transfer of all credits due to the Governments of Germany, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, to the Allied and Associated Governments, conformably with article 261 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, and to the

⁸ Financial expert on the French Delegation.

⁹ Not printed. This undated report stated that the two committees had attentively examined the observations of the Serbian, Roumanian, and Greek delegations upon the draft reparation and financial clauses in the treaty of peace with Bulgaria (cf. No. 19, minute 6). The observations related to three main points: (i) The recovery of objects stolen or removed in territory formerly under Bulgarian occupation (cf. No. 23, minute 7). The Reparations Committee considered this representation to be justified and proposed to add a new clause accordingly (cf. No. 19, note 11, and article 125 of the Treaty of Neuilly). (ii) Deliveries of cattle to be made by Bulgaria. The demands of the three delegations amounted to nearly 1,000,000 head of cattle. The Reparations Committee considered that these demands could not be satisfied without ruining the economic life of Bulgaria, which should not, in its opinion, be required to deliver more than 80,000 head of cattle. The Committee proposed to modify the figures for delivery in the original draft (see No. 19, note 11) so as to increase them, with the exception of bulls, by 50 per cent. in the case of Greece and Roumania and by 100 per cent. in that of Serbia. (iii) Article 10 of the draft financial clauses (see No. 19, note 13) concerning the treatment of the Bulgarian public debt. The Financial Commission considered that the original draft of this article might lead to confusion and accordingly proposed a new text (cf. article 141 of the Treaty of Neuilly).

¹⁰ The draft for article 124 of the Treaty of Neuilly. See No. 19, note 11.

corresponding articles in the Peace Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. At the same time, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken these debts into account, when they had considered the sums payable by Bulgaria, and had undertaken not to put forward any further claims under this head. Serbia stated in her note, that, whilst the Allied and Associated Governments might be in a position to forgo later claims, they had no right to impose a corresponding renunciation upon Serbia. The note ended in what amounted to a threat to refuse to sign the Peace Treaty. The Reparation Committee had fixed the indemnity payable by Bulgaria at 2 billion francs. 250 million francs due from Bulgaria to Germany had been added to this sum. Since the committee had taken the debt into account it thought that nothing further could be done.

MR. BALFOUR said that the principle guiding the Council and the Reparations Committee had been that Bulgaria should pay the maximum amount that her resources allowed. It was of little importance from the Bulgarian point of view that the sum should be paid to any particular ally, since Serbia would have her share.

M. SERGENT said that the Reparations Committee had first intended to divide the indemnity into two heads. Under the first head would have been reparations amounting to 2 billion francs, and, under the second, 250 million francs owed by Bulgaria to Germany. This would have avoided giving the impression of renouncing the debt due to the Allies by Germany. It seemed that Serbia had not taken this simple calculation into account.

M. PICHON said that the Reparations Committee, being now informed of the issue, could submit a report which should be waited for.

MR. POLK said that Serbia was dissatisfied on another point, which was the amount of livestock to be delivered to her by Bulgaria. Was it possible to know what extra amount, under this head, had been granted to the Serbians?

M. SERGENT said that the original figures had been doubled, except in the case of the oxen. Serbia was actually going to receive 6,000 milch cows, 5,000 horses and mares, 1,000 mules, 4,000 yoke oxen and 12,000 sheep. Notwithstanding this, the Serbian demand amounted to ten times that figure.

M. BERTHELOT said that in spite of the figures having been doubled, Serbia was only going to receive one tenth part of that which had been taken from her by the Bulgarians.

(It was decided to accept the Reparation Clauses, with the exception of article 4, dealing with the transfer of credits, and of article 6,¹¹ dealing with the delivery of live-stock.)

M. Sergent and M. Cheysson then left the room and Generals Duval, Groves and Orsini¹² entered.

¹¹ The draft for article 127 of the Treaty of Neuilly. See No. 19, note 11, and note 9 above.

¹² The reference was evidently to Rear-Admiral P. Orsini, an Italian colleague of Generals Duval and Groves on the Aeronautical Commission of the Peace Conference.

12. GENERAL DUVAL said that he had to submit a report, dated 30th July, on the subject of the distribution of aeronautic material delivered by the enemy Governments (see Appendix K¹³).

*Distribution of Aero-
nautic Material*

MR. BALFOUR said that the note brought forward two questions:—

- (1) What principle was to govern the distribution of war material—a difficult question which had already raised considerable controversy.
- (2) How was this material to be dealt with when distributed between the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Committee proposed that the material in question should become the property of whatever Government it was given to, so long as this latter should undertake not to alienate it. He proposed to adjourn the first question and to accept the second principle enunciated.

M. TITTONI said that he accepted Mr. Balfour's proposal, but asked that the first question should be referred to Versailles, in order that the settlement should be made conformable to the general principles guiding the general distribution of war material in general.

(This proposal was adopted.)

(It was therefore decided:—

To request the Military Representatives at Versailles to submit a proposal regarding the principles to govern the distribution of all aeronautical war material turned over by the Central Powers in accordance with the Peace Treaty.

It was further decided that the Interallied Commission of Control should be charged with the details of the distribution to be made in accordance with the principles established above.

It was further decided that once this material had been allotted to and accepted by one of the Allied and Associated Powers, it should become the property of such Government, which latter should agree not to alienate the material in question by any form of transfer.)

13. M. TITTONI presented the President with a report from the Italian Delegation on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to Czecho-Slovakia by Austria. (See H. D. 13, paragraph 11.¹⁴) The report is contained in Annex [Appendix] L.

*The Delivery of
arms and munitions
to Czecho-Slovakia*

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 1, 1919.

¹³ Not printed. The report was made by the Committee on Aerial Clauses, consisting of representatives of the British Empire, the United States, France, Italy, Japan, and Belgium. It asked the Supreme Council for guidance upon the two questions referred to by Mr. Balfour.

¹⁴ No. 17, minute 11.

Télégramme. 1^{er} août 1919.

Général Nudant à Maréchal Foch.

Je vous informe que je viens de recevoir du Général Dupont un rapport que Erzberger a prié von Hockhammern, Président de la Wako¹⁵ de Berlin, de me transmettre.

Voici le texte de cette information :

'Le Gouvernement allemand est à l'heure actuelle très vivement attaqué: il se heurte aussi bien à l'hostilité des partis de droite, que les récentes révélations ont vivement mécontents qu'à celle des fractions socialistes indépendantes.

Le Gouvernement ne peut se maintenir qu'en s'appuyant sur l'élément militaire et l'ancien corps d'Officiers.

L'Entente exigeant la livraison de nombreux généraux et officiers affaiblira notre situation et nous enlèvera notre appui. Le Gouvernement sera renversé et le pays livré au communisme.

Pour parer à ce danger, aussi sérieux pour Entente que pour nous, nous vous demandons d'ajourner l'exécution de la clause de livraison.'

APPENDIX B TO NO. 25

ÉTAT MAJOR DE L'ARMÉE,
2^e BUREAU A.

PARIS, le 31 juillet 1919.

*Note sur l'Armée Allemande*¹⁶

De très nombreux renseignements, provenant en général de bonne source, indiquent que les effectifs de l'armée allemande s'élèvent actuellement à :

800.000 hommes (*chiffre minimum*).

Ces 800.000 hommes se répartissent entre les formations appartenant :

- à la Reichswehr,
- aux Corps de volontaires existant en dehors de la Reichswehr,
- aux unités restant de l'ancienne armée,
- auxquelles il faut ajouter en réalité, les Einwohnerwehren, Bürgerwehren et Sicherheitswehren, — troupes de police théoriquement et, pratiquement, réserves déguisées.

La Reichswehr devait comprendre, d'après la loi d'Empire du 6 mars 1919, 18 Brigades, dont 6 lourdes à 12.000 h., 12 légères à 7.200 h.

Or, dès la fin avril, le Ministère de la Guerre avait décidé la création de 28 brigades (18 lourdes, 10 légères).

A la date du 16 mai, un document officiel indiquait 31 brigades, un deuxième donnait, le 21 mai, le chiffre de 38 (22 brigades lourdes, 16 légères); enfin un troisième signalait le 15 juin, 40 brigades (23 lourdes, 17 légères). En outre, on

¹⁵ Abbreviation for *Waffenstillstandskommission*, the German Armistice Commission.

¹⁶ In this document original footnotes citing confidential sources of information are omitted.

vient récemment d'identifier une 42^e brigade, ce qui fait que le nombre des unités de la Reichswehr correspond à 2 unités près au nombre des anciennes divisions du temps de paix (42 au lieu de 44, déduction faite des 3 corps d'armée d'Alsace-Lorraine).

A elle seule, la Reichswehr compterait donc plus de 400.000 h.

Il faut ajouter à cet effectif un autre effectif de 400.000 h. appartenant à certains corps de volontaires, aux *Einwohnerwehren* et aux formations de l'ancienne armée non encore dissoutes. Il est assez difficile de donner des chiffres pour chacune de ces catégories, mais on est fixé sur le total des forces qu'elles représentent actuellement, et, ce dont on est certain, c'est que :

1^o) — les corps de volontaires devaient être versés dans R.W. ou être dissous. Or, il en existe qui vivent d'une vie propre à côté de la R.W. Un certain nombre de ces corps sont entretenus par des subsides particuliers (Ligue pangermaniste et Grande Industrie) ;

2^o) — Les *Einwohnerwehren* ne sont qu'une réserve déguisée. Pour donner le change, elles dépendent bien du Ministre de l'Intérieur, mais elles sont armées, font des exercices et constituent une vaste organisation centralisée.

3^o) — Les unités de l'ancienne armée devaient être dissoutes le 5 juin dernier délai. Or, si cette dissolution est assez avancée, elle n'est pas terminée, et on identifie encore de nombreuses unités de l'ancienne armée dont l'effectif est, à coup sûr, réduit, mais qui constituent des noyaux susceptibles d'être renforcés, le cas échéant.

Les Allemands conservent donc des effectifs très importants. La *question cadres* et la question du *matériel* les préoccupent également.

Nous savons, en effet, que :

1^o) — S'ils envoient en disponibilité, sous la pression du traité de paix, un grand nombre d'officiers (on parle de 16.000), au moyen d'un projet de loi déposé sur le bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale et par conséquent *public*, ils recrutent d'autre part, des officiers parmi les étudiants au moyen d'une instruction *secrète* du Ministre de la Guerre.¹⁷

Dans les deux derniers mois, ils ont renforcé la Gendarmerie, puis décrété qu'elle constituait 'une force non militaire' ;¹⁸ il est question également d'augmenter le nombre des pompiers.

2^o) — Au point de vue du matériel, des mesures sont prises pour que l'armement en artillerie des brigades de R.W. soit au complet, en bon état et 'absolument apte à être utilisé en campagne'.¹⁹

L'aviation postale est développée, ce qui permettra d'avoir des avions à double fin.

L'armée allemande tend donc à reprendre *sa force* d'autrefois. Elle subit un entraînement méthodique qui tend à la remettre entièrement dans la main de ses chefs.

Chose peut-être plus grave, le vieil esprit, un instant disparu, tend à renaître. Le Gouvernement l'encourage, car Noske, qui tolérât la 'Ligue Nationale des Officiers Allemands' à tendances réactionnaires, vient seulement, du jour où s'est dressée en face la 'Ligue Républicaine des Officiers', de déclarer inadmissible que des 'associations à tendances politiques s'installent dans l'armée'.

¹⁷ Note in original: 'Instruction du 14 juillet.'

¹⁸ Note in original: 'Décret du 2 juillet... L'effectif de la gendarmerie est passé en 1919 de 240 off., 9.395 h. à 318 off., 14.537 hommes.'

¹⁹ Note in original: 'Note Ministère de la Guerre, 18 juin.'

On peut conclure, de ce qui précède, que l'Allemagne ne semble pas avoir la volonté de se soumettre aux conditions de paix en ce qui concerne les clauses militaires relatives aux effectifs. Sournoisement, elle se donnera peut-être l'apparence d'une soumission. Elle sélectionne d'ailleurs avec soin ses effectifs de façon à ne garder, le cas échéant, qu'une élite autour de laquelle se grouperaient les réserves de toutes sortes. En sous main, elle forgera l'instrument d'une revanche dont les officiers parlent déjà.

'Les autorités militaires trompent systématiquement l'Entente sur les effectifs', dit le Professeur Foerster. 'Les renseignements fournis aux diverses Missions Militaires Alliées sont erronés à dessein.'

'Il y a encore des militaires qui semblent ignorer les conditions du Traité de Paix', dit la 'Freiheit' après enquête dans les bureaux de recrutement, 'et qui pensent encore moins à les remplir.'

Bref, 'camouflage' et mauvaise foi, tel est en deux mots le résumé de la situation. Déjà, après 1806, Scharnhorst recommandait la création de milices 'susceptibles d'être augmentées sans bruit' et, en 1811, Hardenberg écrivait: 'l'essentiel est aujourd'hui de conserver l'existence. Dans le jeu changeant des circonstances, il peut se trouver des remèdes que nous ne soupçonnons pas.'

Mais l'exemple de 1806 est là pour nous avertir, 'l'Histoire est un perpétuel recommencement'.

APPENDIX C TO No. 25

DÉFENSE NATIONALE. RECRUTEMENT DE L'UNIVERSITÉ ACADÉMIQUE DE MUNICH

*Traduction d'un document de la 'Reichswehr Akademische Werbestelle
München Universität'*²⁰

MUNICH, le 14 juillet 1919.

A Messieurs les Professeurs, Fonctionnaires et Assistants.

Les enrôlements clandestins en Bavière.

Le Bureau de recrutement académique ('Akademische Werbestelle') s'efforce de faire participer, dans la mesure du possible, toutes les personnes appartenant aux hautes écoles à la défense nationale; il contribuera ainsi grandement à assurer l'ordre à Munich.

Il n'a pas été possible de créer une formation militaire se recrutant seulement parmi le corps universitaire, car si d'un côté ce projet est rendu irréalisable par les clauses du traité de paix, et [*sic*] on ne veut pas d'un autre nourrir l'idée injuste mais cependant très répandue d'après laquelle l'esprit de caste règne dans les hautes écoles.

Il y a deux possibilités pour MM. les Professeurs, fonctionnaires et assistants de participer à la défense nationale:

1.— Les hommes qui ont achevé leurs classes militaires peuvent se faire inscrire sans qu'il soit nécessaire de les astreindre à une période de service.

Quand ils seront appelés sous les drapeaux, ils serviront dans l'infanterie ou l'artillerie. Mais afin de les mettre auparavant en rapport direct avec le Corps de

²⁰ An indication of the source of this document is omitted.

troupe auquel ils seront affectés, ils seront versés dans une Cie. ou une Batterie, qui leur sera indiquée verbalement; ils auront alors toutes facilités pour s'entendre avec ces unités et fixer les dates auxquelles ils pourront s'exercer une fois par semaine (tout particulièrement pour le tir).

2.— On a déjà organisé des cours spéciaux bi-hebdomadaires pour les hommes qui n'ont pas fait de service militaire et pour ceux qui n'ont pas achevé leurs classes ou qui ont besoin de compléter leur éducation militaire.

Les hommes qui suivent ces cours, reçoivent une instruction militaire très élémentaire; on leur apprend à tirer au fusil, à la carabine, au revolver et se servir des grenades à main.

Ces cours, qui n'ont lieu que le matin, sont fixés, en tenant compte des cours de l'Université; c'est ainsi qu'ils n'ont lieu actuellement que pendant les deux jours sans classe de la semaine.

Il est probable que l'on organisera un troisième cours, qui commencera à une date qui sera fixé d'accord avec les personnes qui se feront inscrire.

La participation assez nombreuse de Messieurs les Professeurs a déjà eu jusqu'à présent le meilleur effet sur les étudiants, qui devant un si bel exemple, ne veulent naturellement pas rester en arrière.

Quiconque, par conséquent, se fait inscrire, apporte non seulement le concours de sa propre personne au service de la cause, mais il nous aide à recruter d'autres forces nombreuses et d'une valeur particulièrement appréciable.

C'est pour cela qu'il serait ardemment à souhaiter qu'aucun de ceux, qui par leur situation personnelle peuvent servir la cause nationale d'une manière quelconque, ne s'abstiennent.

Il est nécessaire d'autre part, pour le bureau de recrutement académique de se rendre compte de la participation que prennent Messieurs les Professeurs, fonctionnaires et assistants aux autres organisations similaires (telles Einwohnerwehren, Ostwehren etc.).

C'est pour ces motifs que nous vous prions instamment de vouloir bien faire savoir au plus vite au bureau de recrutement académique (bureau 116 de l'Université), si vous faites déjà partie de la défense nationale ou d'une organisation similaire ou si vous avez l'intention de profiter d'une des possibilités ci-dessus indiquées pour y participer.

Dans ce cas nous vous prions de bien vouloir vous faire inscrire sur les listes qui se trouvent au bureau 114 de l'Université.

Etant donné l'intérêt de la question, une prompte réponse est désirée.

Les clauses du traité de paix s'efforcent, ainsi que vous le savez, de rompre autant que possible tous les liens entre les hautes écoles et l'armée.

Mais il se passera encore quelque temps avant que les organes de l'Entente, qui sont chargés du contrôle, ne portent leur attention sur l'exécution de la clause en question du Traité de Paix.

(Note du S.R.A.— Le document original est envoyé au G.Q.G.: il est à remarquer que les exemplaires en sont numérotés.)

Il semble ressortir de l'examen de cette circulaire que l'Université bavaroise fait actuellement pression sur les Professeurs et les étudiants pour augmenter la force militaire allemande, sous une forme dissimulée et en profitant de l'absence momentanée d'organes de contrôle de l'Entente.)

Translation.

Point I.

*Telegram from the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at
Klagenfurt*²¹

July 29, 1919

The Serbo-Croat-Slovene and Austrian Delegates signed, on July 28 at 16 o'clock, the convention regulating the evacuation of zone B of the Klagenfurt basin²² by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene troops.

The line of demarcation fixed by the Supreme Council on June 23²² will be occupied on July 31 at 17 o'clock by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene posts on one side and the Austrian posts on the other, a neutral zone of 600 meters being maintained between the two parties.

The military representatives are of the opinion that the guarding of the war material left at Klagenfurt cannot be safely entrusted to the Austrian gendarmerie. They propose therefore that, until the Inter-allied detachment requested by the telegram of July 25 arrives, this guard be insured by Italian carabinieri.

As the Italian detachment now at Klagenfurt to insure the guarding of the city is only half a platoon, it should be reinforced by two platoons.

The Italian Supreme Command, from whom the military representatives have requested this reinforcement, has refused to send it without authorisation from the Supreme Council of the Allies.

The military representatives have the honour to request instructions from the Supreme Council.

APPENDIX F TO NO. 25

*Note adressée au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission des Affaires Roumaines
[et] Yougo-Slaves*

PARIS, le 22 juillet 1919.

La Commission des Affaires roumaines et yougo-slaves a examiné, dans sa séance du 19 juillet, deux revendications nouvelles présentées par la Délégation du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, en ce qui concerne la frontière nord de cet État.

1^o) en Prékomourié;

2^o) dans la Baranya.

²¹ This telegram is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 520.

²² Zone B was the more northerly of the two zones in the Klagenfurt basin delimited by 'the purple line drawn on the map known as President Wilson's Map'. (Record of a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 19, 1919: printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iv, p. 845. Cf. article 50 of the Treaty of St. Germain.) Summary annotations on the discussions of the Supreme Council (Council of Four) during June 1919 concerning arrangements in the Klagenfurt area are printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 508-10. See also Count L. Aldrovandi Marescotti: *Guerra diplomatica* (Milan, 1936), chap. vii, and *Nuovi ricordi e frammenti di diario*, chap. i.

1^o) *Prékormourié*

En présence des accroissements de territoires accordés à l'Autriche aux dépens de la Hongrie, notamment dans la région de St. Gothard, la
Demande de la
Délégation Serbo-
Croate-Slovène Délégation S.C.S. revendique l'attribution du territoire compris entre la frontière nord précédemment assigné au royaume dans cette région et la rivière Raab.

La Commission considère que la modification proposée aurait pour conséquence de rattacher à l'État Serbo-Croate et Slovène une région qui est, en
Décision de la
Commission partie, peuplée de Slovènes, mais que ses intérêts économiques orientent vers le nord.

Elle propose donc le maintien du tracé précédemment adopté par le Conseil Suprême, et qui suit d'une manière générale la ligne de partage des eaux entre la Mur et la Raab.

2^o) *Baranya*

Dans l'exposé définitif de ses revendications, présenté à la Commission le 22 [20] mai, la Délégation S.C.S. renonçait à ses prétentions primitives sur
Demande de la
Délégation Serbo-
Croate-Slovène le Somogy et se bornait à réclamer en Baranya le triangle compris entre la Drave, le Danube, et une ligne prolongeant vers le sud-ouest la frontière accordé au Royaume dans la Bacska.

Tout récemment, la délégation S.C.S. a recommandé une pétition présentée par une délégation de notables serbes, magyars et allemands de la Baranya. Ceux-ci demandent que la base nord-ouest du triangle soit reculée de manière à comprendre dans le territoire S.C.S. le centre serbe de Mohacs et la voie ferrée Mohacs-Siklos.

A. La Commission reconnaît que le Danube et la Drave, dont les thalwegs se déplacent continuellement et suscitent ainsi des contestations tous
Décision de la
Commission jours renaissantes entre les riverains, constituent des frontières politiques très défectueuses. Elle admet que cette raison justifie en principe la revendication yougo-slave sur la partie sud-est de la Baranya.

B. Elle estime qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'accueillir la pétition des notables de Baranya qui paraît inspirée par les circonstances plutôt que par les affinités naturelles d'une population très mélangée et qui tend à priver la Hongrie d'une partie des mines de charbon de Pecs nécessaires au développement de cet État.

C. Les Délégations américaine, britannique et française proposent un tracé quittant le Danube à l'ouest de Bereg et rejoignant la Drave au sud-ouest de Torjancs, de manière à comprendre en territoire S.C.S. les voies ferrées reliant Monostor à Kisköszeg et Osjek ainsi que les villages de Dalyok et Baranyavar.²³ Ce tracé, à leur avis,

- a) — supprimerait pour le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes les inconvénients de la frontière fluviale sans accorder à cet État d'avantage stratégique menaçant pour la Hongrie;
- b) — assurerait dans des conditions satisfaisantes la vie économique des populations;
- c) — satisferait les aspirations nationales des villages slaves qui s'adossent aux collines situées entre Kisköszeg et Monostor.

D. La Délégation italienne estime que la frontière la plus juste au point de vue militaire entre la Hongrie et la Yougo-Slavie dans la Baranya orientale serait

²³ The original had here a footnote referring to annex 1 to this appendix. This annex, not printed, contained a detailed trace by numbered geographical points of the proposed frontier between Yugoslavia and Hungary in the Baranya.

onstituée par la crête des collines situées entre Kisköszeg et Monostor. Cependant, en considération des intérêts locaux invoqués par les Yougo-Slaves, elle se rallie à la solution proposée par les autres Délégations.

APPENDIX G TO No. 25

Note adressée au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission des Affaires Roumaines et Yougo-Slaves

PARIS, le 25 juillet 1919.

La Commission des Affaires Roumaines et Yougo-Slaves a examiné:

1^o) — Les protestations élevées par la Délégation du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, dans ses lettres en date des 10 et 16 juillet, contre la frontière précédemment attribuée à cet État;

2^o) — Les nouvelles revendications présentées par la même Délégation en ce qui concerne la Bacska;

3^o) — La question de l'île d'Ada-Kalissi.

Elle a l'honneur de soumettre ci-après au Conseil Suprême ses conclusions sur ces divers points.

BANAT

I. *Banat méridional.*

A. *Revendication de la Délégation Serbe-Croate-Slovène:* La Délégation S.C.S. revendique la région de Bazias en faisant valoir principalement:

a) — la prédominance de l'élément slave sur l'élément roumain dans cette région; b) — les droits domaniaux que les habitants des communes du Banat serbe, anciens soldats du 14^e régiment frontière, possèdent sur les forêts de la Klissoura.

B. *Avis de la commission:* La Commission est d'avis de maintenir, dans une région où deux États alliés sont seuls en cause, la frontière précédemment fixée par la Commission après une étude minutieuse et notifiée par le Conseil Suprême aux intéressés.

Elle estime qu'il peut y avoir lieu, après étude et vérification des droits domaniaux possédés par les communes du Banat Serbe sur les forêts de la Klissoura, de tenir compte de ces droits dans les règlements d'indemnité à intervenir entre l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène et la Roumanie.

II. *Banat central.*

A. *Revendication de la Délégation S.C.S.* La Délégation S.C.S. demande une rectification de la frontière dans la région de Zsombolya-Modos de manière:

a) — à assurer ces communications directes par voie ferrée entre Nagy-Kikinda et Versecz;

b) — à ne pas détruire au détriment de l'État S.C.S. l'unité du système hydro-technique des rivières Aranka, Bega et Temes qui alimentent les canaux d'irrigation de la plaine du Banat.

B. *Avis de la Commission.* La Commission est d'avis, pour les raisons exposées plus haut, de maintenir la frontière précédemment adoptée et notifiée aux intéressés.

Elle estime qu'il y a lieu de signaler à la Commission du régime international des ports, voies d'eau et voies ferrées la nécessité de prendre des dispositions internationales pour maintenir et développer, au bénéfice égal des divers États entre lesquels est partagé le Banat, le régime des canaux d'irrigation du Banat.

III. *Banat septentrional.*

La Commission a réservé cette question pour une étude plus approfondie qui demandera encore quelques jours.

BACSKA

A. *Revendication de la Délégation S.C.S.* La Délégation S.C.S. revendique la ville et la région de Baja en faisant valoir:

- a) — que cette ville compte 34.000 slaves sur 89.000 habitants;
- b) — que Baja est en relations économiques étroites avec Zombor, ville précédemment attribuée à l'État S.C.S.;
- c) — que Baja joue un rôle important dans le système hydrotechnique de la Bacska. Le canal François Deak qui dessert la partie nord de cette province est, en effet, alimenté par des installations hydrauliques établies à Baja.

B. *Avis de la Commission.* La Commission est d'avis de maintenir la frontière précédemment adoptée dont l'extension vers le nord ne serait pas justifiée par les conditions ethnographiques dans la région de Baja.

Elle estime qu'il y a lieu de signaler à la Commission du régime international des ports, voies d'eau et voies ferrées, la nécessité de prévoir des dispositions d'ordre international pour garantir le bon fonctionnement du canal François Deak, situé en territoire serbe-croate-slovène, au moyen des installations hydrauliques laissées en territoire hongrois.

ÎLE D'ADA-KALESSI

Par télégramme en date du 11 juillet,²⁴ le Général Franchet d'Esperey a fait connaître que Roumains et Serbes-Croates-Slovènes revendiquaient respectivement l'île d'Ada-Kalessi, située dans le Danube en face d'Orsava, laissée à la Turquie par le Traité de Berlin de 1878 et occupée par l'Autriche-Hongrie en 1908.

La Commission considérant que l'île d'Ada-Kalessi était occupée par l'Autriche-Hongrie, propose qu'elle soit attribuée à la Roumanie, héritière de l'Autriche-Hongrie pour la Transylvanie qui est riveraine du Danube en face de l'île.

Elle demande que les clauses de l'article 52 de l'acte final de Berlin qui stipulent la démilitarisation de l'île soient maintenues et, s'il est besoin, confirmées.

APPENDIX I TO No. 25

Note adressée au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission des Affaires Roumaines et Yougo-Slaves sur la Bukovine

PARIS, le 30 juillet 1919.

Dans son rapport N° 1 du 6 avril 1919, la Commission des Affaires roumaines et yougo-slaves prenant en considération les aspirations nationales des Roumains de Bukovine, les attaches économiques de cette région avec la Roumanie et enfin l'avantage que les Ruthènes de Bukovine trouveraient à s'associer avec les Roumains, avait admis en principe qu'il serait juste de rattacher la Bukovine toute entière à la Roumanie.

Elle avait toutefois rectifié les frontières historiques de la Bukovine au désavantage de la Roumanie sur deux points: au nord, pour éviter de couper la voie ferrée qui relie les deux villes galiciennes de Kolomea et Zaleszczyki, à l'ouest pour réserver le sort des populations ruthènes habitant, en masses compactes, le bassin de Czeremosz.

²⁴ This telegram, not printed, was appended to the original.

Le Conseil Suprême avait approuvé ces propositions.

Depuis cette date, les territoires ainsi détachés de la Bukovine et qui sont en fait occupés par les troupes roumaines n'ont été attribués à aucun État. D'autre part la Galicie Orientale, à laquelle ils confinent, a été confiée, sous des garanties d'autonomie, à l'administration de la République Polonaise.

En présence de cette situation nouvelle, la Commission des Affaires roumaines et yougo-slaves a soumis ses conclusions précédentes à un nouvel examen.

Considérant, d'une part, que la Délégation Polonaise, loin d'élever aucune prétention sur une partie quelconque de la Bukovine, s'est montrée plutôt disposée à consentir à la Roumanie une extension de territoire dans cette région;

Considérant d'autre part qu'il y aurait un intérêt politique à donner satisfaction au Gouvernement et à l'opinion roumaine en respectant autant que possible les frontières historiques de la Bukovine;

Considérant cependant la nécessité de laisser en dehors du territoire roumain la voie ferrée Kolomea-Zaleszczyki nécessaire aux communications de la Galicie;

La Commission des Affaires roumaines et yougo-slaves a l'honneur de recommander au Conseil Suprême de rattacher à la Roumanie la Bukovine toute entière, sauf le territoire que traverse la ligne de chemin de fer Zaleszczyki-Kolomea. Le tracé qu'elle propose à l'approbation du Conseil est décrit dans l'annexe 1 ci-jointe.

Annex 1 to Appendix I

Tracé de la frontière roumaine en Bukovine

Une ligne quittant le thalweg du Dniester jusqu'en un point à environ 2 kilomètres en aval de Zaleszczyki :

— de là vers le sud-ouest jusqu'au point de rencontre de la limite administrative entre la Galicie et la Bukovine avec la limite entre les districts de Horodenka et Sniatyn à environ 11 km. au S.-E. d'Horodenka,

une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain passant par les cotes 317-312 et 239.

— de là vers le sud-ouest l'ancienne limite administrative entre la Galicie et la Bukovine jusqu'à son point de rencontre avec l'ancienne frontière entre la Hongrie et la Galicie suivant ensuite cette frontière dans la direction du N.-O. jusqu'à la cote 1655 etc. . . .²⁵

APPENDIX L TO No. 25

DELEGAZIONE ITALIANA PER LA PACE.

Sezione Militare.

*Livraison à la Tchéco-Slovaquie d'Armes et Munitions de la part de l'Autriche
Allemande*

Le 27 juillet 1919.

Dans sa séance du 25 juillet, le Conseil des Cinq a rédigé le télégramme (déjà connu et dont la copie est ci-jointe)²⁶ par lequel sont demandés des éclaircissements au sujet de la livraison à l'Armée tchéco-slovaque de matériel de guerre existant en Autriche.

²⁵ Punctuation as in original.

²⁶ Not printed. For the text of this telegram see No. 17, minute 11.

A ce sujet il faut remarquer ce qui suit :

1^o — Le Gouvernement tchéco-slovaque depuis le mois de mai dernier demandait, par l'entremise de M. Allizé, représentant du Gouvernement français à Vienne, la cession d'armes et de munitions de l'Autriche allemande au Général Segré, représentant italien à Vienne, qui consentit pleinement à cette requête.

2^o — En même temps le Conseil Suprême de Guerre de Versailles, tout en indiquant les moyens pour mettre l'armée tchéco-slovaque en condition de résister à la contre-offensive hongroise des premiers jours de juin, proposait dans sa réunion du 7 juin que le ravitaillement de cette armée fût intensifié avec du matériel de guerre de l'Autriche allemande et que la cession de ce matériel fût faite toutefois par l'entremise de la commission italienne d'armistice à Vienne.

Le Conseil des Quatre, réuni le 9 juin approuva pleinement cette proposition du Comité de Versailles.

Peu après, dans le courant du mois de juin, le Maréchal Foch pria par lettre S.E. le Général Diaz de donner des instructions au Général Segré afin que la cession de matériel de guerre de la part de l'Autriche à la Tchéco-slovaquie fût facilitée et accélérée.

3^o — Ces instructions furent données, et, en effet, en date du 25 juin, le G.Q.G. italien communiquait que la mission italienne à Vienne avait obtenu du gouvernement austro-hongrois la cession à l'armée tchéco-slovaque de 20.000 fusils, 500 mitrailleuses, 50.000 coups d'artillerie, quelques millions de cartouches, cession qui résulte être en voie d'exécution.

En outre, à la date du 30 juin, il avait été déjà fourni à la Tchéco-slovaquie le matériel suivant :

Matériels italiens :

130	—	mitrailleuses Fiat;
1.800	—	mousquets modèle 91;
1.105	—	révolvers;
3.000	—	poignards;
21.728	—	fusils modèle 91;
3.210.000	—	cartouches pour mitrailleuses;
1.144.800	—	„ „ armes mod. 91;
200.000	—	„ „ armes mod. 91 réparées;
200.000	—	„ à balle explosive;
108.000	—	„ pour mousquets;
30.000	—	„ „ révolvers 7.65.

Matériel de l'ex-monarchie austro-hongroise :

3	—	batteries de 15 c/m de (quatre pièces chacune)
4	—	„ „ 10 „ id.
8	—	„ „ 8 „ „
132	—	mitrailleuses Schwarzlose;
15.800	—	fusils autrichiens;
31.000	—	séries complètes (fusil autrichien);
17.000	—	séries de buffleteries;
6.000	—	coups de 15 c/m;
16.000	—	„ „ 10 „
33.000	—	„ „ 8 „
10.080.000	—	cartouches pour fusils autrichiens.

H. D. 22.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, August 2, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

I. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the Council that he had received a wireless message from Lt.-Col. Romanelli, commanding the Italian Military Mission at Budapest. This message was addressed to M. Clemenceau.

M. MANTOUX then read the dispatch contained in Appendix A.

M. TITTONI said that he thought there was some misunderstanding as to the acceptance of proposals by the Allied Powers. He did not think the Allied Powers had made any proposals, as was suggested in the message. He thought that what was alluded to was the plan explained by General Boehm to the Allied Representatives in Vienna. He had himself received a telegram from Vienna, which did not quite agree with the message read out. According to his information, General Boehm and M. Beidl [? Piedl] had told the Prince Borghese and Colonel Cunningham that if the Roumanians were stopped, they would be able to form a Government more completely representative of public opinion.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it was General Boehm who had caused the Revolution.

M. TITTONI said that the proposals had been made by General Boehm as representative of the Socialists and of the Labour Party. It was necessary that the Allies should take precautions not to be deceived a second time.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that there was no motive for negotiating a second armistice. There was already one.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was in agreement. He thought the proposals referred to were those contained in the message discussed on the 26th of July. (See H. D. 14,¹ Appendix A.) He had no objection to these proposals, but what he did object to was that the responsibility for them should be laid upon the Allies. The Council was concerned with the armistice and its observance. It was not concerned with the internal Government of Hungary. No proposals had been made by the Council. That was the first point that should be made clear.

¹ No. 18.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the second point to make clear was that there was already an armistice, and no need of a new one.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was clear that hostilities must stop, but no new contract was required for this. The Roumanians could be told to stop by the Council, and they must obey. The Hungarians must also be told that they were not authorised by the armistice to advance.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that on this subject he wished to ask Marshal Foch a question. Was it not true that the present line of the Roumanians was quite different to the line they held under the armistice?

MARSHAL FOCH said that the line was in fact quite different. It was at the present time the line of the Theiss.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council about the 13th of June (see C. F. 65, minute 12 and appendices²), had ordered the Roumanians to go back from the line of the Theiss within their own frontiers. They had not done so. Their excuse had been that as the Hungarians had not disarmed as they were bound to do under the armistice, it was impossible for them to risk giving up a defensible line for one which was strategically far worse. Under the present circumstances, he thought that the Roumanians should be ordered to withdraw to the line originally laid down for them.

M. TITTONI thought that an order of this kind should be deferred. He thought for the time being that the Roumanians should be ordered to stop on the positions they now held. If the Hungarians gave evidence of good behaviour, the Roumanians could then be told to withdraw within their own frontiers. If, on the other hand, the Hungarians were again deceiving the Allies, any withdrawal of the Roumanians would be regretted. Should the Hungarians do all that was required of them, it would be easy to order the Roumanians to withdraw, and they would certainly comply.

M. PICHON said that there was another reason in favour of this. When the Roumanians had been assigned the armistice line, they had made it clear that it was indefensible. Nevertheless, they had conformed to it. Then they had been attacked, and, in order to repel attack, they had advanced to the Theiss. It would clearly be unfair to them to order them now to abandon that line. It was the Hungarians who had really violated the essential clauses of the armistice by maintaining a larger army than was allowed to them. The first necessity, therefore, was to force the Hungarians to reduce their forces.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought there was no great difference between his views and those of M. Tittoni and M. Pichon. Historically, however, he thought that M. Pichon was not quite accurate. He did not think that the Roumanian advance to the Theiss had been made as a consequence of attack by the Hungarians. The Roumanians had gone to the Theiss, and the Council had stopped them there.³ The Council had then ordered them to

² Printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xvi, p. 399 f.

³ The relevant sequence of events had been as follows: on February 26, 1919, the Supreme Council decided to establish in Hungary a neutral zone under Allied occupation between the Roumanian and Hungarian forces (see No. 13, minute 3) which were confronting each other as a result of the Roumanian advance north-westwards from the river Maros. The

go back, and they did not do so. They had given no official reason for this, but, privately, M. Bratiano had explained that he must keep a defendable line against the large Hungarian army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this explanation had also been given officially.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had not been aware of this. In any case, the Hungarians had attacked the Roumanians on the plea that the latter had not observed the armistice. The Hungarians had been defeated, and Bela Kun's Government had fallen. He quite agreed that the Council should avoid making the same mistake as before, but, personally, he would not make it a condition that they should have a humane and orderly Government or any specific kind of Government whatever. This was an interference in their domestic affairs. He would adhere strictly to the armistice, and call on the Hungarians to observe it. It might further be added that if the Government set up in Hungary were such as could be recognised, the Allies would make peace with it speedily.

course of this river to its junction with the Theiss had formed part of the line behind which the Hungarian forces were required to withdraw in accordance with article 1 of the military convention of Belgrade of November 13, 1918; the Roumanian advance beyond this line, which had the presumed object of occupying Transylvania up to the line established by the Treaty of Bucharest of August 17, 1916, might, however, be held to be compatible with the provision in article IV of section A of the armistice of Villa Giusti of November 3, 1918, that 'armies of Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.' (For a report to the Supreme Council on the Roumanian advance in February 1919, see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iv, p. 59.) The demarcation line assigned to the Roumanian forces on the eastern side of the neutral zone by the decision of February 26 was the line Arad-Nagy Szalonta-Grosswarden (Nagyvarad)—Szatmár Németi. This was evidently the 'armistice line' referred to by M. Pichon. See No. 13, note 6, for the fall of Count Károlyi's government on March 21, 1919, and the establishment of that of M. Béla Kun in consequence of the communication to the former of the Supreme Council's decision of February 26. On April 1-2 the Supreme Council charged General Smuts with a mission to Budapest in order to examine the general working of the agreements of November 3 and 13, 1918, and in particular the arrangement providing for the neutral zone. General Smuts proposed to the Hungarian Government that it should acknowledge its obligations under the conventions of November 3 and November 13, 1918; Hungarian forces should be withdrawn behind the western demarcation line of the proposed neutral zone, which was now delimited in a manner more favourable to Hungary than previously; the line of demarcation was to be without prejudice to territorial adjustments which might be embodied in the eventual terms of peace; Allied troops would occupy the neutral zone and the blockade against Hungary be lifted. On April 5, 1919, the Hungarian Government accepted these proposals, but on condition that the Roumanian forces should withdraw behind the river Maros. General Smuts rejected this condition and left Budapest forthwith. On April 16 the Roumanian forces, alleging Hungarian provocation, commenced an attack along the front and had by May 1 reached the river Theiss, where their advance was halted. On April 28 the Roumanian Government addressed to the British and other Allied diplomatic representatives in Bucharest a note justifying the Roumanian advance to the Theiss and representing, among other things, the alleged advantages of an occupation of Budapest by Allied forces. On May 30 General Franchet d'Esperey was informed that the Supreme Council was agreed 'that the Roumanian proposal that their Army should march on Buda-Pesth must not be carried out'; the Roumanian delegation in Paris was similarly informed. For subsequent action by the Supreme Council in this matter see No. 3, minute 2 and note 5.

M. TITTONI said that he thought there was really agreement. He pointed out that General Boehm at Vienna had not asked for a withdrawal of the Roumanian troops, but for their advance to stop.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had no cognisance of General Boehm.

MR. POLK asked whether the Council had not made a declaration in any manner tying its hands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that all that had been done was to make a general declaration to the world (H. D. 15, para. 2⁴).

MR. POLK asked whether the Council was not tied in any other way?

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was not. It appeared to him that the Council was agreed that the understanding alleged in the message, between General Boehm and Prince Borghese was not binding on the Council, and that it was unnecessary to negotiate any new armistice as the old one was still in existence.

M. TITTONI said that though there was no agreement between General Boehm and Prince Borghese, nevertheless, the Allied agents in Vienna had been instructed to conduct conversations with General Boehm, the result of which had been certain proposals agreed to by General Boehm.

(It was then decided to send a telegram (see Appendix B) in reply to the wireless message received from Lt. Col. Romanelli at Budapesth, dated August 1st.)

2.

Danish request regarding expenses of plebiscite in Slesvig

[Not printed]

3.

Danish request for warships at Flensburg

[Not printed]⁵

4.

Reference to a Commission of articles proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria

[Not printed]⁶

⁴ No. 19, minute 2.

⁵ It was decided to notify the Danish Government that in the opinion of the Supreme Council the British warship then in Danish waters, together with the French warship then proceeding thither, should be a sufficient naval contribution towards maintaining order in the plebiscite zone of Schleswig.

⁶ The articles proposed by the Greek Delegation (Appendix C in original), and referred by the Supreme Council to the Commission on Political Clauses, concerned arrangements in connexion with the cession of Bulgarian territory to Greece and corresponded *mutatis mutandis* with articles 32-7, 56, and 67 of the Treaty of Versailles. The most important of the proposed articles constituted drafts for what subsequently became articles 42-5 of the Treaty of Neuilly (see also No. 33, minute 5).

5. (Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives at Versailles entered the room.)

Strength of the Bulgarian Army MARSHAL FOCH read a statement regarding the Bulgarian forces (see appendix D).⁷

MR. BALFOUR said that his comment on the conclusion of the statement read by Marshal Foch, was that it would appear that the Allies must make a peace agreeable to Bulgaria because they were unable to enforce a disagreeable one. He was not very willing to acquiesce in such a conclusion unless it were inevitable.

MARSHAL FOCH said that Bulgaria had nine divisions. These divisions were easily convertible to war strength. Against them were very weak Allied forces. The British force consisted of 40 men, the Italian of one battalion, the French of two divisions, which would be reduced by demobilisation to 15,000 men. There were also two thin Roumanian divisions, one Serbian brigade and six Greek divisions. The last represented the bulk of the available forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch what he thought of the military value of the Greek divisions.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he was not prepared to express any opinion.

M. PICHON observed that General Guillaumat⁸ had thought well of them.

⁷ Not printed. In this statement, dated August 2, 1919, the Allied General Staff reported that the Bulgarian Government had duly complied with the terms of the armistice of September 29, 1918, and had agreed to effect supplementary military reductions required by General Franchet d'Esperey: these appeared, however, to be insufficient for ensuring continued security. Under the heading 'Conclusion' the report stated:

'La Bulgarie a la possibilité de mettre en ligne assez rapidement des effectifs importants et bien armés, susceptibles de constituer, non une *armée manœuvrière* mais de très solides *groupements de résistance*, capables de s'opposer, par la force, à l'exécution des conditions du traité de paix.

'Pour modifier, à son avantage, cette situation dangereuse, l'Entente devrait exiger la dissolution immédiate de la majeure partie des unités existantes, et le versement aux Alliés des armes et des munitions.

'Mais cette exigence pourrait entraîner un refus.

'Or:

— les Grandes Puissances ne disposent pas, sur place, des forces suffisantes pour imposer par la force l'acceptation de semblables conditions; elles ne paraissent pas disposées, d'autre part, à envoyer de nouvelles forces en Bulgarie;

— les disponibilités serbes et roumaines sont faibles ou inexistantes, celles des Grecs sont à demi absorbées par la campagne d'Asie-Mineure. L'ensemble de ces contingents hétérogènes et divisés par l'intérêt ne serait d'ailleurs pas suffisant pour rompre le bloc bulgare; son intervention ne ferait qu'exaspérer le sentiment national en Bulgarie et aggraver les conflits.

'C'est donc en définitive, par le traité de paix, que la question bulgare sera réglée.

'Mais il est bien évident que les dangers qui viennent d'être signalés pourront se reproduire pour les mêmes raisons, si l'Entente impose à la Bulgarie des conditions de paix rigoureuses qui portent atteinte au sentiment national.

'Il importe de se pénétrer de cette considération au moment où la démobilisation de ses armées enlève à l'Entente le moyen de faire respecter ses décisions.'

⁸ The predecessor of General Franchet d'Esperey in the command of the Allied Armies of the Orient on the Salonika front.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the troops that General Guillaumat had thought well of were National Defence troops. Since the check received at Smyrna by the Greek army, it was not unlikely that the morale of the Greek troops had suffered.

MR. BALFOUR said he would like to enquire whether the military stores, which, according to a clause of the armistice, had been deposited under allied guard within Bulgarian territory, could be seized by the Bulgarian army should it wish to resist the orders of the Conference?

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the Bulgarian army could probably seize them.

MR. BALFOUR said it was regrettable that such a provision had been made in the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH remarked that when the armistice was made, better terms could not be obtained.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether a portion of the military material had not been withdrawn outside Bulgarian territory.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the firing mechanism of one-twentieth of the rifles, one-tenth of the machine guns, and one-sixth of the guns had been removed to Salonika. The remainder was still on Bulgarian soil under allied guard.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the allied guard would be sufficient to protect these stores against the Bulgarian Army?

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that he thought not, but he suggested that General Baird, who had just come from Bulgaria, should be asked to make a statement on the present condition of affairs there.

MARSHAL FOCH said he thought it would be well to hear General Baird. He thought the Bulgarian Government was not inclined to resist the Conference, but it was possible that the population might rise and gain possession of these stores.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not very much alarmed by the Bulgarian situation. He agreed with Marshal Foch that the Government was unlikely to resist. As to popular risings, he thought they would not be very serious. Popular forces did not count much against regular troops. There were in all 15,000 French troops and 6 Greek Divisions, which should, and must, act. Greece was particularly interested, and her troops would doubtless behave well when acting in a national cause. Moreover, some of the Greek troops in Asia Minor could, if necessary, be recalled. If, however, it were required, Great Britain and Italy would doubtless come to the rescue. Moreover, he did not think that Bulgaria by herself would defy the whole victorious Alliance. Germany had been defeated, and the only quarter to which Bulgaria could look was the Entente. Germany had not dared to defy the Conference, and it was most unlikely that Bulgaria would. He quite agreed, however, that it would be useful to hear General Baird, and, if then thought necessary, to make a communication to the Bulgarian Delegation at Neuilly.

MR. BALFOUR said he was inclined to agree with M. Clemenceau's estimate of the situation. Unfortunately, Bulgaria was not the only quarter in which

the Allies were weak. The American Congress, the British House of Commons and the French Chamber were all anxious to demobilise.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that modern war differed from wars in the past, and the weakness indicated by Mr. Balfour, which came about at the cessation of hostilities, applied to the enemy as well as to ourselves. He himself had apprehended resistance by the Germans to the terms relating to Poland. Germany, however, had acquiesced. He felt sure that Bulgaria would do likewise.

(It was decided to request General Baird, through the British Delegation, to be present at a meeting of the Council on August 4th, and to make a statement on the present situation in Bulgaria.)

6.

[Not printed]

*Scale of pay for officers
attached to Missions of
Control in Germany*

7. GENERAL BELIN read the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles (see Appendix F).

*Repatriation of Russian
prisoners of war
interned in Germany*

M. TITTONI said that it was important that the prisoners should be repatriated in small groups. One of the reasons for the obstacles raised by Poland, Lithuania and other neighbouring States, was the fear that large batches of Russian prisoners should escape and take to looting.

GENERAL BELIN said that this was a point of detail which the Commission might deal with.

MR. POLK asked whether General Belin could make any estimate of the time that the whole operation would take.

GENERAL BELIN said that General Malcolm⁹ thought it should be completed before the end of the year.

MR. POLK said that from the American point of view there was a difficulty. There were about 800 American officers and men on duty with the American Mission in Germany. Owing to the American demobilisation, no money would be available for the upkeep of this mission, nor for the supplies of food for the Russian prisoners of war for the length of time indicated by General Belin. He pointed out that there were originally two million Russian prisoners in Germany, but that this total had now been reduced to 200,000. He suggested that it would be as well to charge the German Government with the care of the remainder.

GENERAL BLISS said that the substance of what he meant to say had already been explained by Mr. Polk. He would recall that it was a report by Mr. Hoover to the effect that the funds available for the upkeep of these Russian prisoners had been exhausted which had led to the examination of the subject at Versailles.¹⁰ He and Mr. White had recommended in Washington that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should be made

⁹ Chief of the British Military Mission in Berlin and President of the Interallied Commission for Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War.

¹⁰ See No. 15, minute 6 and appendix B.

esponsible for the care of these prisoners, but this view had not prevailed. It was now necessary to withdraw all American conscripted men from Europe. In support of this he read the following letter:—

*General Headquarters
American Expeditionary Forces
Office of the Chief of Staff*

August 2, 1919.

Dear General Bliss,

The Commander-in-Chief desires me to request you to use your best efforts with your colleagues to hasten the permission for him to withdraw our officers and troops in Berlin. At the time of the signing of the Peace orders had already been given for the withdrawal of the entire mission numbering approximately 700 persons. At the request of Marshal Foch on the 30th of June, General Pershing agreed to suspend the orders for a few days. On taking the matter up again on his return from London on the 24th of July, Marshal Foch informed him that the matter of the withdrawal of our representation there had been taken out of his hands and was vested in the Commission to Negotiate Peace. With the conference between you and me on the subject since that time you are familiar.

Without assuming to discuss the desirability of the United States maintaining troops in Berlin after Germany has ratified the Peace, in connection with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, we have imperative orders from the War Department to get all temporary personnel home by a certain time. It is necessary from that standpoint that the most expeditious action be had and a decision reached at the earliest date possible which will enable General Pershing to withdraw all officers and men now on that mission.

May I ask that you will help us in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. G. HARBORD.

Chief of Staff.

General Tasker H. Bliss,
American Commission to Negotiate Peace,
Hotel Crillon, Paris.

He suggested that the only solution was for the Allies to relieve the Americans of their share in this work, or for Germany to take over the whole thing.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think the scheme elaborated at Versailles very practical. What was proposed was a commission. A commission alone could do nothing. The American share alone at present required the services of 700 men. The British Red Cross had, he believed, a considerable personnel, and undertook a considerable share of the work. Their funds were exhausted, and their personnel was being recalled. It was clear that this system could not be continued. A commission without an army behind it could not act as substitute. The Americans could not provide men. Without consulting

experts, he was prepared to say that the British could not supply any. He doubted whether France or Italy could find them. The system would, therefore, break down. There was another objection. If the old arrangement were patched up, it would appear that the Allies still regarded themselves as responsible. If they undertook the responsibility and failed to carry out their undertakings, they would be discredited. He thought the responsibility should be repudiated. After peace it was quite unnecessary for the Allies to continue supporting Russian prisoners taken by the Germans. He noticed that it was suggested that 145,000 Russians should be repatriated by rail. It would be extremely difficult to prevail upon the Poles and Lithuanians to forward them overland. Meanwhile, he wished to ask who should feed them. Another 70,000 or 80,000 were to go by sea. He had the greatest doubt whether shipping could be found for them except at the expense of more vital services. He therefore recommended that the responsibility be thrown on the Germans. It was a responsibility they should always have borne. If the Germans then applied to the Allies for assistance, it would be time to consider what could be done. This policy was clear and freed the Allies from a task which they could not undertake without incurring discredit.

MR. POLK then suggested the following resolution:—

That the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers notify the [German] Government at once that all restrictions heretofore placed on the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany are removed, and that henceforth the responsibility of supporting them must rest with the German Government.

(This proposal was accepted.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said the question was whether or not the Baltic Commission should concern itself with the question of access to the Baltic.

*Proposed Treaty
regarding access
to the Baltic*

MR. BALFOUR said that access to the Baltic from the North Sea at present depended not on any treaty, but on immemorial custom. It was now suggested that this custom should be regularised by formal Inter-Allied sanction. This would establish a common régime for all the channels. In the Sound and the Great Belt traffic, he believed, had never been stopped by the neutrals on their shores. They interfered neither with trading vessels nor with warships. In the Little Belt, however, the Germans had stopped traffic and had laid mines. They could do so again, and this was not contrary either to the law of nations or to the practice thereof. If the proposals now before the Council (Appendix G) were accepted, all the channels would be made free for traffic. Whether it was worth while to engage in difficult negotiations to obtain this, he did not know.

M. DELLA TORRETTA explained that the Commission had not examined the merits of the question, as it did not know whether it was empowered to examine it at all.

MR. POLK questioned whether it would not be better to send the question to a Special Commission rather than to the Baltic Commission. He under-

stood that the Baltic Commission was not composed of naval men. This appeared to be a naval question.

M. TRITTON suggested that naval experts be attached to the Baltic Commission for the purpose of examining the question.

(It was decided that the report of the British Delegation relative to access to the Baltic Sea be referred to the Baltic Commission, assisted by the naval experts, for examination and report.

The Baltic Commission should be responsible for summoning a joint meeting.)

9. (It was decided to refer the letter of the Roumanian Delegation dated August 2nd—Appendix H¹¹—proposing an amendment to the Economic Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty to the Economic Commission, for examination and report.)

Amendment proposed by Roumanian Delegation for insertion in the economic clauses of the Treaty with Bulgaria

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 2, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 26

Radio sans N° de Budapest le 27 août 1919.¹²

A Son Excellence Georges Clemenceau, Président de la Conférence, Paris:—

Le Gouvernement hongrois de la République des Conseils a donné aujourd'hui ses démissions et a été remplacé par un Gouvernement qui a déclaré d'accepter les propositions des Puissances Alliées, telles qu'elles ont été arrêtées à Vienne le 25 juillet par M. le Prince Borghese, Ministre Plénipotentiaire de l'Italie, et Monsieur le Colonel Cunningham, Chef de la Mission Militaire Britannique à Vienne.

Le nouveau Gouvernement vient de charger le soussigné dans sa qualité de seul Représentant des susdites Puissances à Budapest, de remettre aux Commandants des armées opposées une *proposition d'armistice* qu'en attendant les décisions que Votre Excellence voudra bien prendre, je me suis permis de transmettre directement aux susdits Commandants, dans le but d'éviter toute ultérieure effusion de sang. Les propositions avancées sont les suivantes:

1° — En attendant les décisions du Conseil Suprême des Puissances Alliées et Associées, suspendre dans le délai le plus court possible toutes hostilités entre les armées alliées et l'armée hongroise.

2° — Arrêter en conséquence tout mouvement en avant des troupes alliées.

3° — Concorder un armistice avec le Commandant de l'armée hongroise en arrêtant les lignes provisoires d'occupation jusqu'à ce que Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix ait fait connaître ses décisions à ce sujet. Le Gouvernement hongrois demande vivement que la ligne d'armistice pour l'armée roumaine soit fixée à la Tisza.

Le Commandant de la Mission Militaire Italienne,

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROMANELLI

¹¹ Not printed. See No. 35, appendix D.

¹² This message was published in the British press on August 4, 1919. (English translation printed by F. Deák, op. cit., p. 477.)

*Le Président de la Conférence de la Paix au Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli, à Budapest*¹³

PARIS, le 2 août 1919.

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre radio du 1^{er} août annonçant la démission du Gouvernement de la République des Conseils, la formation d'un nouveau Gouvernement hongrois et les déclarations faites par ce dernier qui ont été portées à la connaissance du Conseil Suprême.

Le Conseil des Alliés estime qu'il n'[a] pas à intervenir dans la politique intérieure de la République hongroise et à ce titre n'a pas à faire état des propositions suggérées par deux membres des Missions Alliées à Vienne.

Les seules bases reconnues des relations des Puissances Alliées et Associées et de la Hongrie sont: 1^o — l'armistice du 13 novembre 1918, dont les conditions doivent être respectées par le nouveau Gouvernement hongrois, tout particulièrement en ce qui concerne la démobilisation de l'armée; 2^o — la notification de la Conférence de la Paix en date du 13 juin pour la fixation de la ligne sur laquelle doivent être maintenues les troupes hongroises du côté des frontières tchécoslovaques et roumaines.

Le Conseil des Alliés demandera seulement au Gouvernement roumain d'arrêter ses troupes sur les positions qu'elles occupent actuellement à la suite de l'agression dont elles viennent d'être l'objet du fait de l'armée hongroise et ne le priera pas de les retirer jusqu'à la ligne fixée le 1^{er} juin avant que le nouveau Gouvernement de Budapest ne se soit strictement soumis aux clauses de l'armistice.

Les Puissances Alliées et Associées attendent le nouveau Gouvernement hongrois à ses actes, elles espèrent que l'avènement d'un Gouvernement qui exécutera ses engagements et représentera le peuple hongrois hâtera le moment du rétablissement de la paix et de la reprise des relations économiques régulières.

CLEMENCEAU

APPENDIX F TO NO. 26

s. w. c. 448.] *Report on the means of Repatriation of Russian prisoners now in Germany and maintained at the cost of the Allies*

By a Resolution, dated July 18th, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers directed the Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council at Versailles:—

'To study, in conjunction with the Naval Experts the means of repatriating the Russian Prisoners of War, maintained at the cost of the Allies, in Germany.'

I. GENERAL SITUATION

(i) *Approximate number of prisoners of war to be repatriated.*

The number of Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany amounted at the end of April last to 250,000 men (statement of the General presiding over the Commission charged with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, 14th May, 1919). After eliminating some 50,000 prisoners who did not wish to return to their

¹³ English translation printed by F. Deák, op. cit., p. 478.

homes (principle accepted by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers) and some 8,000 Letts and Esthonians already in process of repatriation by German coasting vessels, the total number remaining to be repatriated amounts to about 190,000-200,000.

(ii) *Advantages of Repatriation.*

(a) The reduction to a minimum of the time during which the Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany will remain a source of expense to the Allied and Associated Powers.

(b) The dispatch, though only to a small extent, of reinforcements to the Anti-Bolshevist armies.

(c) The removal from Germany of Bolshevist propagandists, whom the Germans would certainly not hesitate to employ in neighbouring countries where they might wish to create trouble.

(iii) *The Disadvantages of Repatriation.*

(a) The repatriation of Russian prisoners of war would undoubtedly favour recruiting for the Red Armies.

(b) This repatriation could not take place without a large use of maritime transport, and in consequence would cause, for a considerable length of time, a diminution in the tonnage at present available for the revictualling of the Allied countries.

2. GENERAL CONDITIONS OF REPATRIATION

It seems essential to lay down, as a preliminary condition, the necessity for some form of selection, the object of which would be to segregate those prisoners of war that are not suspected of Bolshevist tendencies, in order, firstly, that they should not be exposed to harsh reprisals, and secondly, to allow of their being drafted into the Anti-Bolshevist forces on different fronts, either as reinforcements to existing units, or as new organisations.¹⁴

It would also be of importance to consider the transport of this class of prisoners of war into the zones, where, if they could not be employed in the reconquest of their own country, they could at any rate be screened from all such nationalist rivalries as might diminish their fighting value, or bring about local conflicts.

Lastly, the departure of these contingents ought to be studied and worked out in such a way as to ensure their eventual concentration as near as possible to that portion of the front where they would be called upon to serve.

In this connection it would seem useful to indicate the various directions that repatriation would follow, on the basis of an approximate number of 200,000 Russian prisoners of war still interned in Germany:—

Great Russians	100,000	By rail.
Lithuanians	15,400	"
Letts	5,300	"
Esthonians	500	By sea—Danzig to Reval.
North Russians	10,000	By sea—from Stettin to Archangel.
W. Siberians	17,000	

¹⁴ Note in original: 'In this connection consideration should be given to the complete revictualling of any such reinforcement, or new organisations, as might be formed, and the dispatch of missions to regulate their absorption. This would have to be provided by the Allied and Associated Powers.'

Ukrainians	40,000	By sea to Odessa.
Georgians	2,200	By sea—Hambourg to Batoum.
Cossacks	1,400	By sea to Novorossisk.
E. Siberians	5,000	By sea to Vladivostock.
Tartars	2,200	By sea to (?).
Armenians	1,000	„ „

3. CONCLUSIONS

It would seem that the different operations involved in the proposed repatriation cannot be prepared, nor carried out, except under the direction of an organization that is in close touch with the present situation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany, and having at its disposal, every means of studying on the spot the physical possibilities for concentration, embarkation, and transport, and every facility for dealing with these questions—

With the 'Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council' so far as tonnage is concerned.

With the Competent Authorities in so far as the use of railways is concerned.

The Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin, charged with the care of Russian prisoners of war, transformed into an International Commission of Control by the addition of German Representatives and eventually of Representatives of all the other interested countries, will be in a position to provide most of the essential conditions required. It should, however, first of all be accredited to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council and to the Governments interested, and be given the necessary powers to deal with every question regarding the proposed transport with the means placed at their disposal by the Allied and Associated Governments.

In view of these considerations the Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion:—

(1) That the Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin, charged with the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war should be made into an International Commission by the addition of German Delegates; and eventually of Polish, Lithuanian and other Delegates, as may be considered necessary.

(2) That this Commission should be directed to study, prepare and ensure, with the least possible delay, the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war at present maintained at the cost of the Allies in Germany with this reservation, that they conform their action to the guiding principles of the Allied and Associated Governments (principles set forth above in paragraphs 2 & 3).

(3) That on its constitution, this International Commission should be accredited by the Allied and Associated Powers to the interested Governments, as well as to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council at London.

Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council.
Naval Representative.	Naval Representative.	Naval Representative.	Naval Representative.

Given at Versailles on the 25th July, 1919.

The Entrances to the Baltic

1. (a) By a Treaty of 14th March 1857¹⁶, Denmark undertook to abstain from levying dues on vessels passing through the Belts and Sounds, but this extends to mercantile vessels alone, and the treaty has little, if any, bearing on the position of warships.

It appears that there is a traditional general right of transit through the Belts and Sounds for men-of-war. Denmark and Sweden recognise this as they have in practice abstained when neutral from closing the passage of the Sound to belligerent men-of-war. There is, however, no international written instrument embodying this right of passage.

(b) The geographical position of Germany enables her to control the passage of the Little Belt, and to a lesser extent the Great Belt.

Note. It is to avoid this that the Peace Terms to Germany include the dismantling of all German fortifications commanding the Little Belts and also those on the east coast of Schleswig-Holstein (Art. 195, Treaty of Peace with Germany—Naval Clauses).

(c) It is desirable that a Treaty should be arranged whereby the countries adjoining should undertake, when neutral, to keep open within their respective jurisdictions all the Belts and Channels connecting the North Sea and Baltic south of lat. 58° N. and west of long. 16° E. of Greenwich for passage of all merchant ships and warships, belligerent or otherwise, and further that a safe channel through these passages be guaranteed for all commercial traffic.

2. It is considered that the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia should be considered at the same time as the above, i.e.

(i) The fortifications of the Aland Islands should be dismantled and there should be a prohibition against their re-erection.

(ii) The Gulf of Bothnia should be declared an open sea, and the channels leading from the Baltic to the Gulf of Bothnia should be kept open, in time of peace or when the adjoining countries are neutral, for the passage of all merchant vessels and warships, whether belligerent or otherwise.

*British Delegation,
13th June, 1919.*

¹⁵ The original of this appendix also contained a covering letter dated June 20, 1919 (not printed), from Sir E. Howard, then Chairman of the Commission on Baltic Affairs, forwarding the memorandum to M. Dutasta, drawing his attention to the question outstanding, and inquiring on behalf of the Commission on Baltic Affairs whether the commission should consider the question in consultation with naval experts.

¹⁶ Text in *British and Foreign State Papers (1856-57)*, vol. xlvii, p. 24 f.

H. D. 23.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 4, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Ian Malcolm.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. P. Chapin. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (Marshal Foch, General Weygand, Mr. Hoover and Mr. Waterlow entered the room.)

Situation in Hungary

MR. HOOVER said that the situation had changed since he last attended the Council. The Roumanians were now entering Budapest. What he proposed was a relaxation of the blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of foodstuffs to Hungary from the Banat. He thought action should be taken without delay. The new Government, though very radical, represented the trade unions. He thought trade unionism was an instrument that should be used to upset Bolshevism. If this were a correct estimate the present Hungarian Government should be encouraged as a very important reaction, even on Russia, might result. A member of the Food Administration in Vienna held the opinion that the new Government might take in a certain number of peasants. This might lead to a really representative Government.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Mr. Hoover had read the telegram sent by the Council.¹ He thought the conclusion of that telegram contained a policy very similar to that Mr. Hoover recommended.

MR. HOOVER said he had read the telegram. The only thing that it did not mention was relaxation of the blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of food from the Banat. He thought these measures represented the practical application of the policy outlined in the telegram, and that instructions to that effect should be given at once. As long as the Council was able to threaten a reimposition of the blockade, it would be able to control the situation. A week or two of relaxation would not give the Hungarian Government such economic strength as to make it independent. If the Government by then had not shown itself satisfactory by fulfilling all the conditions of the armistice, by demobilising and by doing what the Council wished, the blockade could be reimposed. If, on the other hand, action were not taken at once the opportunity would be lost.

¹ See No. 26, appendix B.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought that the Council should both re-open the Danube and declare that it would close it again if it so wished.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had no objection to raise.

M. TITTONI agreed but he thought that it should be made clear that the Hungarians must conform to the armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Mr. Hoover should furnish a draft.

MR. HOOVER then suggested a draft, which after some amendments suggested by M. Tittoni, was adopted in the following form:—

‘It is agreed that instructions should be sent to the representatives of the various Allied Governments at Vienna and to the Blockade Commission in that area and to the Danube River Commission and to General Franchet d’Espercy that the Blockade on Hungary shall be lifted at once and that the Danube shall be opened and shall remain opened so long as the present Hungarian Government gives practical evidence of its intention to comply promptly with the conditions of the armistice.’

Mr. Hoover continuing said that there was a surplus of food in the Banat. The Council had tried to supply Vienna from this surplus. The Serbians, however, had stopped the exit of the supplies. The Banat was now the only source from which Budapest could be fed. One of the reasons for the obstacles raised was that German agents were offering bigger prices for the food than could be afforded by the Allies. The result of all this was that the relief of Vienna and Budapest was jeopardised. He asked whether the Council would be ready to address a request to the Government of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes not to hamper the export of foodstuffs from the Banat.

MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Hoover put the blame in one sentence on the Serbian Government for the stoppage of relief from the Banat, and in another said that the reason was that German agents outbid everyone else. If the latter were the case, he could not understand why the Serbian Government was to blame. No Government could make a merchant sell cheap if he could sell dear.

MR. HOOVER said that the explanation was a very long story. The Economic Council had negotiated the cession of an iron bridge to the Serbians in exchange for foodstuffs. The Serbian Government had put an embargo on all food exports from the Banat. By means of this, the Serbian Government entirely controlled the direction taken by food exports. The intervention of the Germans had only complicated the question. The main element, however, remained the control of the Serbian Government. There were in the Banat 500,000 or 600,000 tons of food, the only source of supply from which Vienna and Budapest could be fed. He had prepared a draft to be addressed to the Serbian Government which might perhaps be too strong, but which might form the basis of the re-draft. He then read the following draft:—

‘The Council is informed by the Supreme Economic Council and by its various Allied representatives that there is a very considerable surplus of foodstuffs now lying in the Banat and surrounding counties and that with

the impending favourable harvest in Greater Serbia there is now no reason for the reservation of these supplies from general distribution through Central Europe. The continuation of provisioning of Vienna is absolutely dependent upon the free shipment of these supplies to that city and the recent overturn of Government in Budapest makes it of prime interest to the Allies and to all hope of stability in Central Europe that the city of Budapest should be given every facility for the purchase and export of foodstuffs from these counties.

'Therefore, the Council wishes to urge upon the Serbian Government in the strongest terms that not only will the greatest contribution be made by Serbia towards the re-establishment of order and stability in the countries adjacent to her borders, but that the dictates of humanity demand that no obstruction of any character shall be placed in the way of food exports from the Banat to the surrounding counties and that, in fact, the Serbian Government is requested to join with the Allies and through their various agencies in promoting the export and distribution of these supplies. The Council hopes for an early and favourable reply to this representation, the importance of which it cannot over-emphasize, and it trusts that the Serbian Government will realise that unless the Allies can receive co-operation in the labours they have undertaken for the restoration of stability in Central Europe that [*sic*] it is impossible that the Allied Governments should continue the economic support which they have given and expect to continue giving to the Greater Serbian Government.'

M. CLEMENCEAU said that before pursuing this question any further, he wished to inform his colleagues of two communications he had received—the first from Lt. Col. Romanelli (Appendix A) and the second from the new Hungarian Government (Appendix B²). Under these conditions, M. Clemenceau said that he approved Mr. Hoover's policy.

M. PICHON said that he thought it was overstepping the mark to threaten Serbia. The measures taken by the Serbian Government had been in accordance with the views of the Council at the time. The Government had acted in good faith. The Serbs were now to be asked to adopt another policy. This was not a sufficient reason for addressing any threats to them.

MR. HOOVER said that he did not agree that the Serbian Government had

² Not printed. This message was the text of a proclamation issued by the new Hungarian Government under M. Peidl to the Hungarian people on August 1, 1919. This proclamation announced the fall of the Government of M. Béla Kun, attributed to an ultimatum from the Allied Powers in which, according to the proclamation: 'Elles exigent que le Gouvernement basé sur le principe des Soviets soit remplacé par un autre Gouvernement. C'est à cette condition qu'elles consentent à entamer les pourparlers de paix. Le Gouvernement de la République des Conseils Socialistes de la Hongrie a compris qu'à présent une résistance tenace contre les Puissances de l'Entente n'aboutirait qu'à une effusion de sang.' The new Government, 'formé des chefs des syndicats armés et disciplinés de la Hongrie,' called for calm and obedience in accordance with its object of maintaining order and entering into pourparlers with the Entente. An English text of this proclamation is printed by Baron A. Kaas and F. de Lazarovics: *Bolshevism in Hungary: the Béla Kun Period* (London, 1931), pp. 410-11.

acted in good faith. In respect of Vienna, the Serbian Government had refused to supply certain goods which had already been paid for. He agreed, however, that it might be as well not to threaten the Serbians.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a re-draft of Mr. Hoover's proposal should be made. He asked M. Berthelot to make a draft.

MR. POLK said that the latest news received was to the effect that the Roumanian advance guard had reached Budapest and that the Trade Union Government feared an occupation of the city by the Roumanians and a further invasion by the Czecho-Slovaks. These fears would doubtless rouse nationalist feelings. At two o'clock the news was that 600 Roumanian cavalrymen were to the west of Budapest, where they had cut all communications with Vienna. Looting was said to have begun in the suburbs. To avoid worse trouble the Hungarians suggested that an inter-allied police force should be sent immediately to Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR asked what the Council could do to enforce good behaviour on the Roumanians.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he did not know.

M. TITTONI said that the Roumanians had been invited to go to Budapest together with the Serbs and the Czecho-Slovaks. All they had done was to go there by themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as the Council could neither blame the Roumanians nor praise them, it was perhaps best to say nothing.

M. TITTONI said that he advocated sending an Allied Mission.

MR. POLK said that he agreed to this. He also thought it was essential that the Roumanians should withdraw from Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the Roumanians insisted on going forward and occupying Budapest the result would be the fall of the present Government in Hungary and an outbreak of nationalist feeling. He could not see what the Roumanians could gain either for themselves or for the common cause by persisting in their present course. Their only excuse previously for not withdrawing was that they feared an attack by the Hungarians; this they had no reason to fear now. The Hungarians had said that they would observe the Armistice; the Council was therefore bound to give them an opportunity of proving that they meant what they said. It was not giving them a fair chance to send Roumanians to plunder the suburbs of Budapest.

MARSHAL FOCH said that an inter-allied character could be given to the occupation of Budapest either by sending allied regiments as suggested by the Hungarian Government, or by sending missions of allied officers. The former, under the circumstances; it was not easy to realize. On the other hand, it was possible that the Roumanian Government might wish to settle the whole situation by itself.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Roumanian Government would then be solving the Council's problems; if so the Council would settle theirs without them.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians had not shown all the respect for the Conference that was desirable. They were not likely to treat the Hungarians

in accordance with the laws of war. If the Council allowed Budapest to be looted, the effect on Russia would be instantaneous. The whole effect of the overthrow of Bela Kun would be lost. Any occupation of the city was dangerous. He asked whether the Roumanians could not be required to remain outside.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Roumanian army was not under the command of General Franchet d'Esperey.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was not.

M. PICHON said that he had sent a telegram on the previous night to the French Minister at Bukarest, requesting him to ask the Roumanian Government to stop the advance of Roumanian troops immediately on the positions then occupied. He had further asked the French Minister to inform him of the result of his *démarche*.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the first thing that must be done was to disarm Hungary. The only guarantee of disarmament was the occupation of the country. This occupation must be effected with the available troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whose the available troops were.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that they were Roumanian or Czech troops.

M. TITTONI said that the worst possible results would be obtained by sending Czech troops into Hungary. The Hungarians detested the Czechs even more than the Roumanians. He thought an Allied Mission, if sent at once, could judge on the spot what measures should be taken and would be able to exercise sufficient moral influence to have them carried out.

MR. POLK said that the occupation of Budapest would make it impossible for the Hungarians to surrender their arms. National feeling would prohibit this unless the Hungarians could rely on allied protection. An allied officer (not American) had heard a Roumanian general say that he expected to plunder Budapest. If this were to happen the allies would be responsible should they take no steps to protest against the entry of the Roumanians.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he would agree to M. Tittoni's suggestion that a mission composed of allied generals with an escort of one company from each Power should be sent to Budapest. This mission could take charge of affairs and reduce the Roumanian occupation to the strict minimum necessary. The president of the mission could be chosen by the Great Powers.

MR. POLK agreed that this was desirable. He thought action should be taken at once. In addition to this the Roumanians should be warned that no abuses would be tolerated. He had already that morning sent word to the Roumanian delegation in Paris that if any incident occurred in Budapest likely to rouse American public opinion against them, the consequence must be that the Roumanian Government could not rely on any further help from America in the future. He asked whether the allied military mission would have control over the Roumanian army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would only have a moral influence over it.

M. TITTONI said that the mission should have the right to tell the Roumanians to withdraw if this appeared necessary.

M. PICHON said that the sending of the mission re-established the situation

existing before the establishment of the Bela Kun Government. There had then been a military mission in charge of the execution of the armistice.

MR. POLK said he thought it would be necessary to obtain from the Roumanian Government an agreement to accept the decisions of the mission. The mission would have no authority unless the Governments concerned were notified.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed to the despatch of a mission provided it were endowed with all the authority the Conference could confer. Further, he thought that the American member might be empowered to make the economic threat mentioned by Mr. Polk. He suggested sending for M. Misu and requesting him to telegraph to Bukarest that any excesses committed in Budapest during this needless occupation would have the most disastrous results. The Hungarian Government having promised to accept the armistice it was for the Conference to see that it did so. He would suggest, like Mr. Polk, that the Roumanians should occupy high ground outside Budapest, and stop there. He would like to ask Marshal Foch whether, if they did so, they would safely control the situation.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that there was a hill in Buda but that all the surrounding country was flat plain.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether an army in the vicinity could be itself safe and also able to control the situation.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it depended on the size of the army.

MR. POLK asked whether the Allies could not make the same sort of economic threat as he had made on behalf of the United States. He further observed that it would be difficult for the moment to promise an American company as escort. He would, however, endeavour to find the men.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that he could promise any British troops. Admiral Troubridge,³ however, had suggested going up the Danube with a monitor.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the mission must have written instructions. These instructions he hoped Mr. Balfour would draft as regards their political side. Marshal Foch might then add the military instructions. At the same time a telegram could be sent to Bukarest, stating that the Council considered the Roumanians responsible for any disturbances that might take place in Budapest and that unless they conformed to the wishes of the Conference the economic consequences to themselves would be to their detriment.

MR. PICHON said that he thought it was undesirable to threaten the Roumanians, even though they were not obeying orders, they were helping the allied cause. They did not deserve to be treated like enemies.

M. TITTONI agreed. It was possible he thought, that the withdrawal of the Roumanians might not be desired by the mission. He thought they should be informed that a mission was being sent under the authority of the Conference and that the Conference expected the Roumanian Government to order their Generals to obey the instructions given by this mission.

³ British Admiral Commanding on the Danube, and President of a provisional Allied Commission for the Danube: cf. No. 41, appendix H.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if Mr. Balfour would make a draft at once.

M. PICHON said that the same communication should be made to the Czecho-Slovak and Serbian Governments. They would be pleased at receiving it and re-assured that Roumania was not to be allowed undue expansion.

MR. POLK said he had no objection. The American Delegation would like to go further and say that the Conference would hold the Roumanians responsible for any untoward incidents that might take place. On this condition he was ready to waive the economic threat.

(After some further discussion a draft prepared by Mr. Balfour to be addressed to the Roumanian Government and one prepared by M. Berthelot to be addressed to the Serbian Government were accepted (see Annex [Appendices] C and D).)

(It was also agreed that the telegram addressed to the Roumanian Government should be communicated to the Serbian and Czecho-Slovak Governments.)

(It was decided to proceed at once to the nomination of a Mission of Allied Generals to be sent to Budapest accompanied by a small escort of Allied troops.)

(It was agreed that written instructions should be given them to be prepared by Mr. Balfour and Marshal Foch.)

2.

*Hearing of Swedish point
of view on the subject of
the Aaland Islands*

[Not printed]⁴

3. (The Military Representatives, General Baird, Colonel Mougin and Colonel Georges entered the room.)

*Hearing of General
Baird on situation
in Bulgaria*

GENERAL BAIRD said that it was doubtless the intention of the Great Powers to make a lasting peace in the Balkans. He assumed that was their first intention. The punishment of Bulgaria was their second purpose. It was therefore necessary so to punish Bulgaria so as not to jeopardise a lasting peace. The most contentious questions in the Balkans were territorial questions. As regards Bulgaria there were two such questions which might be said to be analogous to that [of] Alsace Lorraine. There was even possibly a third in Thrace. It was the question of Macedonia and the question of the Dobruja that had brought Bulgaria into the war against the Allies. Proof of this could be found in the fact that while the Bulgarian attitude was still undecided, the Allies had urged the Serbians and Roumanians to make concessions in these very areas in order that the Bulgarians should be inclined to take

⁴ Count Ehrensvärd read to the Supreme Council a Swedish declaration on this subject (Appendix E in original). After the withdrawal of the Swedish representatives it was resolved at Mr. Polk's suggestion that the question of the Swedish claims to the Aaland Islands as embodied in the declaration be referred to the Baltic Commission for examination and report.

the allied side. What held at that time probably held now. If the Powers took no heed in this they would have to face the consequences. The Roumanians had taken the Dobruja for strategic reasons, and also to penalise the Bulgarians. Their strategic reason need not prevail. The Bulgarian forces at the present time could be reduced to any extent desired, and it could also be laid down that no Bulgarian troops should be sent beyond a line from Varna to Rustchuk. The Roumanians freely admitted that the Southern Dobruja was Bulgarian in population; but no Roumanian statesman would offer to return it lest he be reproached for alienating his country's possessions. It was therefore necessary to exert pressure on the Roumanians if a lasting bone of contention was to be removed. It would be easier for the Roumanians to yield to Allied injunctions than to offer the country themselves. Macedonia had been taken by the Serbians in 1913 because they were in effective occupation; secondly on grounds of compensation, seeing that they had not obtained access to the Adriatic; thirdly to maintain a balance of power.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Serbia had not claimed the country on the ground that it was peopled by populations of Serbian blood.

GENERAL BAIRD replied that in 1912 Serbia had admitted the country was not Serbian. Only one portion of it known as the 'contested area' had been reserved for arbitration by the Czar of Russia. If the main purpose was to establish peace and not to punish Bulgaria, some other solution of the Macedonian problem must be found. No one could expect that Bulgaria after the war should be rewarded by an accession of territory. Macedonia was neither Greek nor Serbian, it was Bulgarian. Nevertheless it did not desire to be, and need not be placed under Bulgarian Government. The situation was now very different from that in 1912. Serbia had obtained her compensation towards the west, and there was no fear that Bulgaria would now become the most powerful military state in the Balkans. Very much the same might be said about the Greek claims to Thrace. In the opinion of all the allied officers in Sofia there would be a repetition of the Smyrna episodes if Bulgarian Thrace were given to Greece. The population was principally Pomak,⁵ and the next most important element in it was Bulgar. He heard from General Bridges⁶ that General Franchet d'Esperey was opposed to the cession of Thrace to Greece. General Milne was also opposed to it as well as all the Allied Generals. The Greeks would not be able to administer the country. In addition, some of the Pomaks had appealed to General Franchet d'Esperey not to be put under the Greeks. He thought that should the Dobrudja be returned to Bulgaria, the Roumanians would never go to war to get it back, because the Roumanian people would feel no enthusiasm on the subject. He thought the same applied to Macedonia and Thrace. Neither the Serbs nor the Greeks would willingly wage a war to regain those areas. On the other hand the Bulgarians would go to war whole-heartedly to regain them if they were taken from them. As to the present situation, he thought

⁵ i.e. Mohammedan Bulgarians.

⁶ Head of the British Mission with the Allied Armies of the Orient.

a wrong impression prevailed in Paris that Bulgaria had been turbulent since the armistice. Bulgaria complied with every demand made. Her army had been reduced below the figures required by the armistice. The armistice allowed an army of 4,000 officers and 80,000 other ranks. The Bulgarian army really numbered 3,500 officers and 55,000 other ranks. There were 8 infantry divisions instead of 10, and in each of them one class was serving instead of two. Bulgaria had attempted to do nothing against the interests of the Allies. Moreover, the Allies had no troops, and, if a national rising were provoked, it would be impossible to stop it. There would, moreover, be no Bulgarian Government to appeal to.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether the armistice enabled Bulgaria to maintain 10 divisions.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Bulgarians had not been asked to reduce the number of their divisions, but to keep only 3 of them mobilised.

GENERAL BAIRD said the Bulgarians had not even kept 3 mobilised. He observed that the Bulgarians could be very heavily fined in money, cattle and corn. Moreover, the Allies could administer and develop certain state resources such as railways and mines, and thus obtain what they required without touching territory and incurring the permanent hostility of the Bulgarians and a readiness on their part to take the side of any possible enemy of the Entente. He suggested that the same kind of peace as the British Government had made with the Boers should be made with the Bulgarians. It would be better to have the Bulgarians on our side next time than against us.

MR. BALFOUR said that it might comfort General Baird to know that inside the Conference there had never been any idea of subordinating everything to a desire to punish the Bulgarians.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked General Baird, who then withdrew.

M. Clemenceau then asked Colonel Mougin to give an account of the present military situation of Bulgaria.

COLONEL MOUGIN said that the clauses of the armistice had been carried out by the Bulgarians as regards the number of their troops. It might be possible, with tact, to induce the Bulgarians to disarm still further. This would be advantageous, seeing that if they disliked the treaty, they would only find weak Allied forces opposed to them. The bulk of the available allied force would be French. It might not be numerous enough to cope with the situation. It would certainly not be adequate should a popular rising occur. It must be remembered that in those parts every man had a rifle, and since the war a great many had machine guns. The question then was whether the Greeks could be depended on. He thought not. Of their 11 divisions, 5 were in Smyrna. Their policy in that region was such that they would require a large number of troops to enforce it. Of the remainder, the bulk must be kept in Macedonia, which was not Greek, but either Bulgarian or Mahommedan. Thrace also, if Greece should have it, could only be held by force. Unless the Allies supplied the force, Greece would have to do so. It followed that Greek troops could not be relied on to cope with the Bul-

garians should they rise. This would not lighten the task of the French troops, which would also have to cope with difficulties of transport. The troops at General Franchet d'Esperey's disposal might, if he were warned in time, be able to keep the railways, the stores of ammunition, and the arsenals, but it must also be borne in mind that the Turks would take sides in favour of the Bulgarians as a consequence of what had happened in Smyrna. They were now less anti-Bulgarian than anti-Greek. In a word, throughout Thrace the majority was Mussulman. The Turkish peasants might be armed by the Bulgarians, and all would make common cause against the Greeks. His personal opinion was that the Allies were in a fair way to making permanent enemies of the Turks, who lately had been friendly.

MR. BALFOUR asked what Colonel Mougin had meant by tactful methods of reducing Bulgarian armaments.

COLONEL MOUGIN said that he thought that the methods might be left to General Franchet d'Esperey. All the Council need do was to tell him what was desired.

(Colonel Mougin then withdrew.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not sure that the discussion could be pursued with advantage. In any case, it must be understood that French troops would not fight alone against the Bulgarians in the interests of Greece. The Greeks had gone to Smyrna, with the result known. They would also have trouble in Macedonia. They courted further trouble by claiming Thrace. He was quite prepared to give them Thrace, but not to meet the trouble for them.

M. TITTONI said that the Italian battalion was there for the purpose of bringing about peace, not for war.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the same applied to the 15,000 French troops.

MARSHAL FOCH said that whatever form the treaty took, it was unlikely to be entirely to the taste of the Bulgarians. The question then arose: what could the Allies do? There were a few French troops under General Franchet d'Esperey. In front of them was the Bulgarian army and its store of arms. General Franchet d'Esperey might perhaps prevail on the Bulgarians to yield some of these arms. That would be so much to the good, but it must be done at once, because the process of demobilisation would reduce his troops to a negligible quantity in a month. He therefore proposed to tell General Franchet d'Esperey to get possession of the Bulgarian guns. The Allies would be more able to cope with the situation when the treaty was signed. At that time only the small states—Greece and Serbia, and, possibly, Roumania, would be able to furnish the police force. They would only be able to secure the execution of the treaty if the Bulgarians had been disarmed beforehand. He therefore concluded that General Franchet d'Esperey should be ordered to disarm the Bulgarians as far as possible.

MR. POLK asked whether the Allies were entitled under the armistice to give him this order.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no such order could be given to the Bulgarians.

They might or might not comply with General Franchet d'Esperey's request. He was inclined to ask Marshal Foch to do as he suggested under the reservation that the use of the French divisions remained at the disposal of the French Government.

MARSHAL FOCH read a draft telegram he proposed to send to General Franchet d'Esperey.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it be made quite clear to General Franchet d'Esperey that he must obtain his results by diplomacy, and not by giving orders to the Bulgarians, who were entitled under the armistice to disregard them.

MR. BALFOUR thought it most unlikely that the Bulgarians would agree, but, if the military authorities thought there was some hope, he was quite ready to try.

(After some further discussion, the telegram annexed as appendix F was adopted, subject to final consideration at the next meeting.)

M. TITTONI suggested the holding of a plebiscite in Thrace.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that as the population was predominantly Mussulman, the result would be a foregone conclusion.

M. PICHON suggested the country should be given to the League of Nations.

4. The following nominations were made:—

<i>Appointment of Allied</i>	For France General Dupont.
<i>Commissioners for</i>	For Great Britain General Malcolm.
<i>negotiation between the</i>	For Italy General Bencivenga.
<i>German and Polish</i>	
<i>Governments.⁷</i>	(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 5, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 27

Radio de Buda-Pest N° I W 136, 3/8 6 H. 10 M.

A Son Excellence Clemenceau, Président de la Conférence de la Paix, à Paris.

En accusant réception de votre dépêche, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le nouveau Gouvernement hongrois est tout à fait disposé d'accomplir dans le plus court délai possible les conditions d'armistice. Dans ce but, étant en connaissance des difficultés intérieures résultantes de la crise récemment surmontée, le Gouvernement me charge officiellement de vous demander d'être aidé par les Puissances Alliées et Associées dans l'accomplissement des conditions d'armistice par une représentation des troupes de l'Entente dans la mesure d'un régiment pour chaque nation, sans que cela ait le semblant d'une intervention, mais seulement d'un pas qui permette la libre manifestation de la volonté du pays.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROMANELLI

⁷ See No. 17, appendix E.

APPENDIX C TO No. 27

Telegram to be sent to the Roumanian Government

The Conference have received assurances from the new Government of Hungary that they are prepared to disarm in accordance with the terms of the Armistice and are anxious to work in harmony with the Allied and Associated Powers. Under these circumstances the Conference have resolved to send a Mission of Allied Generals to Budapest to see that these promises are fulfilled. The Roumanian Government are requested to give orders to the General Commanding their troops in Hungary to conform to the policy laid by the mission, which represents the Conference and will act by its authority.

The Conference do not conceal from the Roumanian Government their great anxiety lest some untoward incident in Budapest or elsewhere in Hungary, should mar the success of the Roumanian Army. Any such incident might destroy the prospects of a speedy peace in Central Europe, cause infinite sufferings to its population, and indefinitely postpone the hopes of its economic reconstruction. Those whose unconsidered action was the occasion of so great a calamity would not easily be forgiven and could no longer count on the goodwill of the Peoples of the Entente, whose assistance and co-operation are so necessary, if the disasters which have overtaken European civilisation are to be speedily remedied.

APPENDIX D TO No. 27

4 août 1919.

Ministre France, Belgrade.

Je vous prie de faire au Gouvernement serbe, de la part du Président de la Conférence de la Paix, la communication suivante :

‘Le Conseil Suprême a été informé de la présence dans le Banat de quantités considérables de produits alimentaires dépassant les besoins de la Serbie, et de l’embargo mis par les autorités serbes sur la sortie de ce surplus alimentaire.

‘En raison des nécessités vitales que représentent l’alimentation de la ville de Vienne et de la formation à Buda-Pest, à la place du Gouvernement communiste, d’un Gouvernement socialiste, qui se déclare prêt à exécuter les clauses de l’armistice et à agir dans le sens des décisions des Alliés, le Conseil Suprême estime que c’est un devoir d’humanité pour le Gouvernement Serbe de lever l’embargo.

‘Il le prie formellement de donner les ordres voulus pour que les centaines de milliers de tonnes immobilisées dans le Banat soient distribuées, d’accord avec les agents techniques des Alliés, pour assurer la vie et le ravitaillement des populations de Vienne et de Buda-Pest.’

APPENDIX F TO No. 27

Projet

G.Q.G.A. le 4 août 1919.

Le Maréchal Foch, Commandant en Chef Armées Alliées, à Général Commandant en Chef Armée Alliée d’Orient, à Constantinople.

Primo. Des derniers renseignements que vous avez fournis il résulte que Bulgarie dispose, sous contrôle des Alliés, d’un matériel de guerre très important, notamment en canons, mitrailleuses, fusils, munitions d’artillerie et d’infanterie.

Elle aurait donc possibilité, en remobilisant, sinon de constituer armée manœuvrière, du moins de former de très solides groupements de résistance, capables de s’opposer, par la force, à l’exécution des conditions du Traité de Paix.

Secundo. Dans ces conditions, et pour écarter cette éventualité dangereuse, il importe absolument de profiter sans retard de l'état actuel de nos forces, pour obtenir de la Bulgarie conditions militaires la mettant hors d'état, le cas échéant, de reprendre les armes.

Il ne s'agit pas d'ordre à imposer à la Bulgarie, en invoquant les conditions de l'armistice qui a déjà été exécuté par elle, mais d'en obtenir des conditions motivées par l'état actuel des choses.

Tertio. Dans cet ordre d'idées, mesures à prendre doivent viser nettement:

- a) — Versement immédiat aux Alliés, et entreposition hors du territoire bulgare des culasses de canon, fusils et mitrailleuses existant dans les divers dépôts de matériel ou rendus disponibles par dissolution des unités visées au parag. (e) ci-dess[us];
- b) — Arrêt de toute fabrication de matériel de guerre, mainmise sur les arsenaux et contrôle de la production des usines ou établissements métallurgiques privés;
- c) — Réduction des forces mobilisées bulgares aux seules unités chargées du maintien de l'ordre;
- d) — Limitation de l'effectif maximum à maintenir sous les armes en conséquence de la réduction ci-dessus envisagée;
- e) — Dissolution, dans un délai à fixer, de toutes les autres unités, dépôt[s] ou noyau[x] mobilisateurs.

Ces mesures sont énumérées suivant l'ordre de leur importance.

Quarto. Prière faire connaître extrême urgence votre avis sur possibilités et délais d'exécution des mesures ci-dessus envisagées. Veuillez indiquer, en outre, propositions complémentaires que vous auriez à formuler au sujet de cette question.

No. 28

H. D. 24.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, August 5, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clarke [Clerk].

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire:* Captain E. Abraham. *France:* Captain A. Portier. *Italy:* Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. The draft telegram annexed as appendix F to the minutes of the preceding meeting, H. D. 23,¹ was finally adopted. Marshal Foch was requested to forward this telegram.

Instructions to General Franchet d'Esperey regarding disarmament of Bulgarians

2. (Mr. Hoover, M. Seydoux, Mr. J. F. Dulles and M. Loucheur entered the room.)

Situation in Hungary M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Polk if he had any news of Budapest. MR. POLK read the following telegram:—

‘Hoover, American Relief, Paris.

August 5th 1919.

‘Last night there were 15 or 20 people killed in Budapest which I have definitely verified. It absolutely necessary that the Roumanians be taken out of this situation as rapidly as possible and pending their departure General Gorton² should act for the rest of the Commission. I was sure that these conflicts would take place. They also demand hostages and threaten definitely to kill 5 persons for each one who is injured in Budapest; naturally after their starting the killing further difficulties are apt to occur. The railroads are all tied up with machine-guns on the bridges. The police force has been dispossessed and whole city in absolute military control. This condition cannot continue and the movement to re-organise Hungary succeed.

GREGORY.’

MR. HOOVER said that half an hour before the meeting he had received a message for M. Clemenceau, from Lt.-Colonel Romanelli:—

‘Budapest, August 4th, 1919.

‘I have the honour to inform you that I communicated your orders to the High Command of the Roumanian Army but the Roumanian troops have advanced in spite of this and continue to come. At the present time they have occupied the city of Budapest, have cut communications, taken hostages and made prisoner one member of the new Government. The Serbians also are advancing from the south and pillaging. The situation makes it impossible for the new Government to explain itself.’

M. CLEMENCEAU said that under the circumstances it might be desirable to send a more threatening message than the one sent on the previous day.

MR. POLK said that the orders referred to in Colonel Romanelli’s telegram were probably those sent on the previous Sunday.³

M. TITTONI said that the moral of this was that the military commission should reach Budapest as soon as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if all the members had been nominated.

MR. POLK said that the American member had not yet been nominated, but informed the Council that General Bandholtz was appointed.

The Commission was composed as follows:—

For the United States of America	General Bandholtz.
For Great Britain	General Gorton.
For France	General Graziani.
For Italy	General Mombelli.

(At this point, Marshal Foch and General Weygand entered the room.)

² See below.

³ Cf. No. 26, appendix B.

MR. BALFOUR read the following draft instructions for the Interallied Commission to Budapest:—
Instructions to Military Commission at Budapest 'The Mission are desired:—

- (1) To enter into communication with the Hungarian Government with a view of securing the observance of the armistice.
- (2) To report on the present position of this question, and its probable developments.
- (3) To enter into communication with the Roumanian generals in order to prevent any action by the successful army which, by rousing nationalist sentiment in Hungary, or otherwise, may perpetuate the unhappy condition of that country and delay the conclusion of peace.

'It may be of assistance to the Mission to remind them:—

- (a) That the frontiers of Hungary having been already determined by the Conference, and communicated to all the Governments immediately concerned, it is the policy of the Conference to remove without any unnecessary delay all foreign troops from the country. The Roumanians, it should be noted, have promised to withdraw their armies as soon as the disarmament of the Hungarians has been accomplished according to the terms of the armistice.
- (b) That orders have been given to terminate the blockade of Hungary and to further the immediate importation of necessities.
- (c) That the maintenance of this new condition of things must depend on the behaviour of the Hungarian Government to the Allied and Associated Powers, and
- (d) That while those Powers have not the slightest desire to interfere with the Hungarian people in their choice of a Government, they can only have dealings with one which can be trusted loyally to carry out its international obligation[s].'

MARSHAL FOCH said that he agreed to these instructions, but would like to add to them certain more definite instructions regarding the Armistice. The Hungarians must have no more than six divisions. They must be made to deliver war material, not only Hungarian war material, but the war material left by General Mackensen's army. He therefore suggested the following draft instructions:—

'The Mission of Allied Generals sent to Budapest in the name of the Supreme Council is to be entrusted with the duty:—

- (1) Of supervising the execution of the military armistice signed on 30th [13th] November, 1918, between the Allied Command and the Hungarian Government and in addition of the following measures:—
 - (a) The establishment of the maximum number of effectives under

arms, in each branch of the Hungarian Army, with the sole purpose of insuring the maintenance of internal order.

- (b) The disarmament of all demobilised units and the dispersal of depots or centres of mobilisation.
 - (c) Delivery to the Allies of arms, munitions and war material in excess of material necessary for the units maintained, including material having belonged to General Mackensen's army.
 - (d) In concert with the Allied Staffs, to regulate the distribution of this material among the Allied Powers concerned, in proportion to the military contribution made by each, and in consideration of the present war situation.
 - (e) Immediate stoppage of production in the arsenals or industrial establishments producing war material.
- (2) The Mission will further:—
- (a) Determine according to present circumstances the strength and distribution of Roumanian and Serbian troops which it may be necessary to maintain on Hungarian territory to ensure order and the execution of the Armistice.
 - (b) Arrange with the Roumanian and Serbian Commands for the withdrawal of any superfluous troops.'

MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to ask two questions regarding this proposal. Firstly, had the Allies any right to make the terms of the armistice more onerous? In the armistice there had been no question of demobilising six divisions. He thought, perhaps this might be justified on the ground that Hungary had, in the interval, made war. Secondly, he agreed that the evacuation of Hungarian territory should be gradual and under control. Unfortunately Marshal Foch was not Commander-in-Chief of the Roumanian Army. He was afraid that four generals escorted by two companies of inter-allied troops would not be able to control the Roumanian army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the violation of the armistice gave the Allies a right to enhance the terms.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he felt uneasy in that not only were the armistice terms made more onerous, but the increased severity of the terms was coupled with orders given to the Command of the Roumanian army. It was probable that the first part would be carried out by the Hungarians. Could he be assured that the second part would be carried out by the Roumanians? If not, the Conference would incur great discredit. It might be argued that because the Hungarians had made war, they deserved severer terms, but it must be admitted that they had made war against people who had invaded their territory in spite of the orders of the Conference.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he admitted his proposals exceeded the terms of the armistice. The armistice, however, had been made a year ago. At that time it had been necessary to leave the Hungarians a certain force on a war footing, in order that Hungary should be defended against the Germans, who

were then still in the field. The situation now was quite different. It was quite unnecessary for Hungary to maintain any forces on a war footing. The Hungarian army should be demobilised. As to the Roumanians, he thought that, if properly addressed, they would do as they were told.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Roumanian Military Adviser to the Peace Delegation, Colonel Dimitresco, had called on him to say that the Roumanian army considered itself in Hungary as the mandatory of the Conference. It wished to carry out Marshal Foch's orders. In other words, he asked for instructions from Marshal Foch, although he was not in command of the Roumanian army. He added that the Roumanian commander in the field had been instructed to send direct reports to Marshal Foch.

M. PICHON said that the Roumanians had not actually disobeyed the Conference. They had been given a certain frontier which they had declared they could not defend. While this was being discussed, the Hungarians had attacked them. In self-protection they had advanced beyond the line fixed for them.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no wish to make a case against the Roumanians, but he thought that M. Pichon's statement was too favourable to them. On the 14th June, the Roumanians had been ordered to retire by a certain date. They had not done so, and they had not given any explanation.

MR. POLK added that in February last they had flatly refused to obey the orders of the Conference.⁴

M. TITTONI said that he had the greatest confidence in the moral authority of the four generals who would go to Budapest. He believed that neither the Roumanians nor the Serbians would disobey them. To reinforce their action, he suggested that a diplomatic *démarche* be made at Belgrade and Bukarest.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the instructions drafted by Mr. Balfour and Marshal Foch should be welded in one, and that M. Tittoni should prepare a dispatch to be sent to the Roumanians and the Serbians.

MR. POLK said that he wished to enquire whether an alteration of the armistice terms would not put the Council in contradiction with itself, seeing that on August 2nd the Council had addressed the Hungarian Government,³ and taken its stand on the armistice as it originally stood.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was absolutely necessary to obtain demobilisation in Hungary at the present time. A year ago this had not been desired. The situation had entirely changed since then.

MR. POLK said that whatever the reasons might be, and however good they might be, the Council was committed by what it had said three days before.

MR. BALFOUR said that Marshal Foch wished to reduce the Hungarian forces below the figures stated in the armistice. He wished to draw attention to the fact that the armistice conferred on the allies a right to occupy such places as they wished in Hungarian territory, in order to establish peace. Would it not be possible to offer the Hungarians the choice either to reduce

⁴ See No. 26, note 3.

at once to the allotment which was to be made to them in the Peace Treaty, in which case no occupation by Allied troops would be required, or to submit to occupation by Roumanians?

MARSHAL FOCH said that if the Hungarians were offered two solutions, they would propose a third. This would lead to endless argument. He suggested that the military mission be instructed to obtain such reduction as they could.

MR. POLK said that he did not object to any attempt the mission might make by persuasive methods, but he thought the Council should not contradict itself and order the generals to violate the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the instructions he had drawn up were addressed not to the Hungarians, but to the allied generals.

MR. POLK observed that if the Roumanians were asked to occupy Hungary in the name of the Conference, they would be entitled to demand the cost of occupation, presumably out of the available resources of Hungary.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that for the time being the Roumanians were asking for nothing. Nor was it Marshal Foch's idea to employ Roumanians as agents of the Conference. He asked Marshal Foch if he required a company of French troops.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the affirmative.

M. TITTONI said that he would supply a company of Italian troops.

MR. BALFOUR said that Admiral Troubridge and a monitor would be available from the British side.

M. TITTONI then proposed a draft telegram to the Roumanian and Serbian Governments.

(After some discussion, this telegram was agreed to in the form given in Appendix A.

It was agreed that this telegram should be communicated in [to] to the Roumanian and Serbian Governments and the first part of it to the Hungarian Government by M. Pichon.

It was further decided that the instructions contained in Appendix B should be given to the Allied Military Mission to Budapest.

Marshal Foch was asked to transmit these instructions to each of the four generals nominated.)

3. MR. HOOVER made the following statement:—

The coal situation in Europe 'I desire to again raise to the Council the coal situation in Europe.

'Under the direction of the Supreme Council and the Supreme Economic Council, my Administration undertook the promotion of production and so far as possible to control the distribution of coal during the armistice in Central and Eastern Europe. A considerable staff has been employed upon this labour and numerous agreements and undertakings entered upon, involving the old states of Austria, the Balkans, Poland and to some extent Germany. While the result could not be ideal they have at least served to maintain sufficient supplies for the transporta-

tion of municipal and domestic services necessary to maintain life. With the ending of the armistice (and this authority) and with the superimposition of the Reparation Commission over a considerable part of this problem, the supervision which we have exerted must necessarily cease.

'Colonel A. C. Goodyear and Colonel W. G. Atwood of our staff have compiled a summary (see appendix C⁵) of the 1913 production and consumption of the principal countries in Europe (excluding Russia and the Balkan States) and have also conducted a careful inquiry into the probable production during the year 1919, based upon the experience of the first six months of the year. The net result shows that from a production of about 679,500,000 tons in the principal countries in Europe (except Russia) the production in these states had fallen to a rate of about 443,000,000 tons per annum. Of the 1913 production above mentioned about 614,000,000 tons were consumed in these States (i.e. outside the Balkan States and export markets foreign to Europe). In other words, the production has fallen approximately 236,500,000 tons, or down to 65 % of normal production. The consumption cannot be decreased in this ratio (35 %) upon certain vital consumers, such as transportation and municipal and other essential services, so that a shortage for manufacture and household use must be on a far greater ratio. Beyond this, the very natural tendency of productive countries to reserve a larger degree of their normal consumption will and does result in an undersupply to the non-producing countries far below a 35 % reduction. Furthermore, the summer accumulation against winter use has not been in progress and therefore the hardships of the coming winter are even further increased.

'It seems almost unnecessary to repeat the causes of this diminished production but they may be again summarised as due to certain specific causes which in fact are much in the same in [*sic*] all productive industries.

'To a minor degree, compared with the whole, there has been a loss of equipment and skill, due to the war; there has been a retardation of advance exploitation during the war; there has been a relaxation of effort as a reflex from the physical exhaustion of large sections of the population through privations and the mental and physical strain of the war; there is a shortage of railway rolling stock for prompt movement from the mines; there has been an unsettlement of political destiny of a number of coal-fields by the peace terms; and, above all, the proper and insistent demand of labour for higher standards of living in the general unbalance of economic conditions has been manifested in repeated strikes and other deterrents to production. Unfortunately European labour at many points has become infected with the theory that the limitation of effort below physical necessity and the obstruction of labour-saving devices will increase their own comfort and improve their conditions. In turn, the reactions from undue profits earned by proprietors during the war has brought a

⁵ Not printed. The conclusions of the summary were as stated by Mr. Hoover. The precise figures given in the summary for production and consumption in 1913 were 679,150,000 and 614,369,000 tons respectively.

shock to the theory of private ownership, which has discouraged further investment and consequently a renewed opening of new areas which the maintenance of production demands. All these causes are operating to varying degree in different localities but their summation is shortage of production below the living necessity of the population of Europe.

'With the arrival of a harvest and thus the solution of immediate food pressure, the problem of coal now comes to the front as the greatest menace to the stability and life in Europe. It is a problem domestic to Europe and incapable of solution from the United States. Disregarding all other questions, an additional load of 1,000,000 tons per month on American ports would indeed be a large tax in the face of the trebling of the United States food exports above pre-war normal. Furthermore, even such a tonnage would entail a tax on the world's shipping that cannot but affect freight rates generally. With a shortage in production of 20,000,000 tons per month a contribution of even double this amount from the United States would be but little help.

'The solution of the problem demands, *first*, increased production and *second*, organisation of distribution.

'It would perhaps contribute to the first problem if the coal miners and coal owners of all Europe could be brought to a realisation that the fate of European civilisation now rests in their hands to a degree equal to—if not greater than—in the hands of providers of food supplies during the next year.

'The solution of the second problem—distribution—is vital if the non-producing states are not to collapse and in its conduct it should be possible to force the maximum production in those states who are partially supplied.

'I urgently recommend that some form of coal control should be set up in Europe with view to the stimulation of production and to secure a distribution that will maintain the essential services upon which economic and political stability must rest. The problem cannot be solved for any one European country alone but the energies of all must be enlisted and the position of all must be considered. It is purely a domestic problem for Europe.'

He therefore proposed the following resolution:—

'That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and the different commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to co-operate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers.'

M. LOUCHEUR agreed with Mr. Hoover except in one particular. He considered that the United States should be represented upon the proposed commission.

MR. HOOVER stated that American representation had been omitted because it was felt that this matter was a domestic problem of Europe. Furthermore, the United States was faced with a crisis at home. At the best, the United States could only ship to Europe about 500,000 tons in a year, by reason of port troubles and lack of shipping. As production of coal in Europe had declined 25% this assistance was negligible. Under the authority of the Council he had been concerned with the coal production in Central and Eastern Europe, but the Reparation Commission set up under the Treaty was now taking charge of the mines, and his own work was therefore coming to an end.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was not quite sure that he understood what Mr. Hoover meant by saying that the coal crisis was a European domestic problem. As the British representative, he might in the same way say that the problems of continental Europe were domestic problems in which Great Britain was not concerned. In reality, all countries of the world were interdependent, and their mutual interests in one another's condition had never been better understood than by Mr. Hoover himself. Therefore, he did not quite follow Mr. Hoover's reasoning in excluding America from representation on the commission. He had no doubt, however, that the port and shipping difficulties mentioned by Mr. Hoover made it difficult for America to do all she would wish to do to help Europe. One portion of the resolution proposed by Mr. Hoover appeared to him a little obscure. He alluded to the passage in which it was said that the Commission should 'undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe.' Did this mean that the Commission would take charge, for instance, of the Belgium [*sic*] coalfields and the coalfields of Northern France? Would it attempt to regulate the conditions of production in England? As was well known to the Council, it was difficult to obtain coal from English coalfields even to keep British industries going. In what manner could the proposed commission intervene in the internal affairs of the various countries?

MR. HOOVER said that the question of the sovereignty of commissions of this kind had always proved an insuperable difficulty. In practice, it had always been agreed that such commissions had no authority. No Government could give a right, even to its representative, to dispose of its national resources. The commissions therefore, confined themselves to giving advice as to ways and means, and the best methods of co-ordination. For instance, Germany was in a position to produce more coal than was required of her for indemnity purposes and for home consumption. Italy had offered a supply of skilled workmen; by offering a bonus on production, a surplus could be obtained for the benefit of the world at large. In Silesia, on the other hand, the production of coal had diminished 50% by reason of the political situation in that area. The Relief Commission which had formerly

controlled the production of coal in Silesia had been superseded by the Plebiscite Commission; the resulting situation had had a detrimental effect on the output. In Teschen for similar reasons the production of coal had also diminished. The political situation there had reacted on the mines. Czecho-Slovakia produced an excess of brown coal. This coal was useless for transportation purposes but was employed in certain industries which by reason of the political situation could not obtain it, and were now using black coal. An exchange of this brown coal for black coal could be suggested as a means of obtaining a more profitable distribution. In fact, the commission could suggest many ways of co-ordination which the ordinary play of political affairs impeded.

M. LOUCHEUR suggested that if an American member could not be appointed to the commission, Mr. Hoover's agents should at least be allowed to continue their work in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. HOOVER said that he thought perhaps a solution could be found if he were allowed time for consultation with Mr. Polk.

M. TITTONI suggested that Mr. Hoover might at least continue his activities for the first six months of the operations of the commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was in entire agreement.

MR. POLK asked that the question should be left open for a decision between himself, Mr. Hoover and Mr. Loucheur.

It was then resolved:—

'That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and different Commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to co-operate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers.'

(It was further decided that Mr. Polk, Mr. Hoover, and M. Loucheur should confer regarding American representation on this commission.)

4. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to introduce a subject not on the agenda. He did so with all due apologies. He would remind the Council that at the same time as the Treaty with Austria, *Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia* the Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia⁶ must be signed. The latter had not yet been passed by the Conference. Seeing that the Austrian Delegation had been in St. Germain since May, he thought the Conference should be ready to deal with their final reply as soon as it came.

'It was agreed that the question of the Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia, together with that of the Treaty with Roumania should be placed on the agenda for the following day.'

⁶ The reference was to the treaty for the protection of minorities in Czechoslovakia. (For final text see Treaty Series, 1919, No. 20. Cmd. 479. Cf. No. 9, minute 4 and note 9.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that after hearing General Baird and Colonel Mougin, he had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to hear M. Venizelos regarding some of the problems raised. He had taken the liberty of asking M. Venizelos to address the Council, and he had also summoned M. Tardieu. He had done this without consulting his colleagues, and hoped they would forgive him.

(At this stage M. Venizelos, M. Tardieu, and a number of experts on Bulgarian Affairs entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he wished to have a conversation with M. Venizelos about Thrace and Asia Minor. The troops of the Great Powers were being demobilised very rapidly. It would therefore be impossible for any of the Great Powers to undertake a new campaign. The situation in Asia Minor, according to his information, was not good, and as M. Venizelos knew, a commission of enquiry had been sent.⁷ The Turks appeared to be greatly incensed against the Greeks. The situation in Bulgaria, on the other hand, caused anxiety also. The Bulgarians had demobilised in accordance with the terms of the armistice, but they still had a respectable force under arms. In Thrace, even should the Bulgarian Government not interfere, there might be popular risings against the Greeks, should the country be given to them. What had taken place in Asia Minor had produced the effect of making the Turk and Bulgarian in Thrace feel a common interest antagonistic to Greece. France had, in the Balkans, 15,000 men, but he must warn M. Venizelos that the French Government had no intention of embarking these troops in a campaign. They were needed at home, and he wished to recall them as soon as possible. All the Powers were in the same case. The evidence led to the conclusion that if the Peace terms offered to Bulgaria were not to her taste, the resulting situation might be very serious. Greece, at the present moment, had five divisions in Asia Minor.

M. VENIZELOS said that there were four Greek divisions in Asia Minor; owing to the improvement of the situation there, a fifth division, which had been forming, had been withdrawn to Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had not been made aware of any improvement in the situation in Asia Minor. On the contrary, he had heard that the situation there had re-acted unfavourably in Constantinople. The Allies had somewhat ingenuously undertaken to disarm the Bulgarians beyond the stipulations of the armistice. They would doubtless understand that this intention of disarming them was a prelude to something not to their advantage. They would probably decline to be disarmed. The question he personally wished to ask M. Venizelos was this:—Could the Greeks undertake to defend themselves on two fronts—in Thrace and in Asia Minor—without any assistance from the Allies?

M. VENIZELOS said that before replying to this question he would like to speak a few words regarding the Greek Army in Asia Minor. He begged the Council to reserve its opinion on this subject. The Turks had made a great

⁷ See No. 17, minute 12.

outcry, which had perhaps been too much attended to in certain quarters. No doubt excesses had taken place but there were extenuating circumstances. The troops had been attacked in the streets by people firing at them out of windows and from roofs. He did not attempt to exonerate the massacre of prisoners, but he would assure the Council that after investigation, it would be found that these were very rare and isolated instances. He need not remind the Council that the Greek troops which had fought in Macedonia and Russia side by side with the troops of the Great Powers had borne themselves well. Greek troops had been accused of excesses at Menemen. In all seventeen people had been killed and twenty wounded. Trouble had arisen there because a tired Greek battalion withdrawing from Bergama had been attacked as it entered the town with sloped arms. Regarding what had been alleged at Aidin, he begged leave to read a telegram received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek forces (see Appendix D). As to the effect of these events on the feelings of the Turkish population in Thrace, he thought it would be a mistake to attribute much importance to it. On July 29th he had received a telegram from Kavalla, conveying the appeal of a number of Thracian Mohammedans for liberation from Bulgaria (see Appendix E).

As to M. Clemenceau's question, whether Greece could undertake simultaneous action in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he was bound to answer in the negative, but he hoped that simultaneous action would not be required. The local situation in Asia Minor had improved, and he expected to reduce the Greek forces there by one division. Latterly, one Greek division from Bessarabia had been brought back to Greece, which it had been intended originally to send to Asia Minor. It might be possible therefore to leave only three divisions in Asia Minor, though doubtless it might be necessary to restrict the area occupied. This was all the easier as, in consequence of the agreement with Italy,⁸ there was nothing to fear on the side of Aidin, and only two roads of access to Smyrna needed guarding. This left eight divisions for use on the Greek front in Europe. He fully understood that the Great Powers could not undertake to enforce the Peace for him. He fully understood that Greece must help herself in this respect. Two things were possible. Bulgaria would sign the treaty, or would refuse to. If she signed it, he thought she would also execute it and withdraw her troops from Thrace. The occupation of Thrace under these conditions would be an easy operation. All measures would be taken to avoid resistance by the population, and damage to property. He would like to suggest that the best means of obtaining these results would be to send British and French officers to advance in front of the troops. If Bulgaria refused to sign the Peace, he thought that not Greece alone, but Greece and Serbia, and perhaps also Roumania would be together in forcing Bulgaria to comply. He had heard it said that the Southern Dobrudja was to be restored to Bulgaria. Should this not be the case, and should Bulgaria attempt to resist the treaty, he was confident that Roumania would help Greece and Serbia, though she was not definitely pledged to do

⁸ See No. 14, minute 4.

so. He thought it would be of advantage to let the Bulgarians understand that if they did not accept the treaty offered to them, they would have to be coerced by their neighbours, who would compensate themselves at her expense and eventually impose upon them much harder terms. For instance the Dobrudja would not be left to them. He thought this would make the Bulgarians think twice before resisting. There would be against the Bulgarians the overwhelming force of eight Greek divisions, two Serbian divisions (at least two Serbian divisions could reasonably be expected) and five or six Roumanian divisions. Should the last not act, the eight Greek and two Serbian divisions, by prompt intervention, could easily take Sofia and dictate Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos what he thought about the Turkish population in Thrace. The information he had received was that these Turks were in league with the Bulgarians against Greece.

M. VENIZELOS said that if it was only the Thracian population that gave trouble, eight divisions was an ample force to cope with the situation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not entirely reassured. M. Venizelos answered his question by saying that though he could not conduct a simultaneous campaign in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he hoped the Turks would be good enough not to attack him in both places at once.

M. VENIZELOS said he had understood M. Clemenceau to ask whether Greece could fight Bulgaria and Turkey at the same time. This, Greece could not do, but she was not afraid of local risings in the population. Before concluding his remarks, he would like to draw the attention of the Council to a curious historical fact. It had often been alleged that the shape of Greece towards the east was such as to render her eastern frontier untenable.

He showed by the help of an atlas the persistence throughout the centuries of a territorial distribution of the Hellenic world very similar to the territorial claims of the Greek Delegation.

(The work quoted was 'The Bulgarians and their historical, ethnographical and political frontiers, 679-1917'. Preface by Dr. Rizoff, published in Berlin, 1917.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a suggestion had been made by M. Venizelos which he would not accept. If he was unable to send French troops, he was equally unable to send French officers to risk their lives in Thrace.

M. PICHON said that M. Venizelos had only considered the hypothesis of resistance by Bulgaria to the Treaty. In that case the Serbians and Roumanians were expected to make common cause with Greece. But was it not possible that Bulgaria would acquiesce in all the clauses concerning Roumania and Serbia, in order to detach them from Greece and in order to be able to cope with Greece alone?

M. VENIZELOS said that as to Serbia, he felt certain of her co-operation. He had stood by Serbia at the risk of civil war in his own country, and he had no doubt of Serbia's loyalty. There was, moreover, a Treaty between Greece and Serbia. There was none with Roumania and he admitted that

Roumanian co-operation was less certain. He did not, however, think that Bulgaria would abandon the Dobrudja without contest.

(M. Venizelos then withdrew.)

M. TARDIEU then explained that the Commission had attempted to work on the lines suggested by M. Tittoni,⁹ but that no agreement had been reached up to the present.

(Certain alternative suggestions were made and the question was deferred for discussion at a later date.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 5, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 28

Télégramme à envoyer aux Gouvernements Hongrois, Serbe et Roumain

1° Le Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix a décidé d'envoyer à Budapest une mission de quatre généraux: américain, français, anglais et italien:

a) Pour entrer en communication avec le Gouvernement hongrois, assurer de sa part l'exécution de l'armistice avec les modifications que, d'un commun accord, ils reconnaîtront nécessaire.

b) Pour entrer en communication avec les chefs des armées (roumaines) (serbes) afin de garantir selon les instructions de la Conférence le pays occupé contre tous sévices, et leur donner les instructions qu'ils croiront utiles quant à l'occupation effective de ces armées et le retrait en arrière dans leurs frontières respectives des forces en excédent.

(Cette première partie seule sera envoyée au Gouvernement hongrois.)

2° La Conférence demande au Gouvernement (roumain) (serbe) de transmettre immédiatement aux chefs de leurs armées l'ordre de se conformer aux instructions de la mission des quatre généraux qui représentent la Conférence.

APPENDIX B TO No. 28

Directive pour la Mission Interalliée à Budapest

La mission a pour objet de:

1°) se mettre en communication avec le Gouvernement Hongrois dans le but d'assurer l'observation de l'armistice et de rendre le désarmement effectif.

A cet effet elle aura à:

a) Fixer l'importance maxima des effectifs de l'armée hongroise à maintenir sous les armes, dans le but unique d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre intérieur;

b) Procéder au désarmement de toutes les unités démobilisées et à la dissolution des dépôts ou noyaux mobilisateurs;

⁹ See No. 24, minute 1.

- c) Assurer aux Alliés, la *livraison* des armes, munitions et matériel de guerre en excédent du matériel nécessaire aux unités maintenues, y compris celui provenant de l'armée Mackensen.
 - d) Régler de concert avec les Commandements alliés, la répartition de ces divers matériels entre les Puissances alliées intéressées, en tenant compte de l'effort militaire fourni par elles, et de la situation de guerre actuelle;
 - e) Arrêter immédiatement la production des arsenaux ou établissements industriels de guerre.
- 2º) faire un rapport sur l'état actuel de cette question et son évolution probable.
- 3º) Se mettre en liaison avec les Commandants en Chef des Armées roumaine et serbe pour:

- a) éviter de la part des armées victorieuses toute mesure qui en surexcitant le sentiment national en Hongrie ou par toute autre conséquence perpétuerait la situation troublée de ce pays et retarderait la conclusion de la paix.
- b) déterminer d'après la situation du moment l'effectif et les emplacements des troupes roumaines et serbes qu'il est nécessaire de maintenir sur le territoire hongrois pour garantir l'ordre et l'exécution de l'armistice.
- c) régler avec les commandements roumain et serbe le retrait des troupes roumaines et serbes en excédent.

La Mission est informée pour éclairer ses décisions:

1º) que les frontières de la Hongrie ayant été définies déjà par la Conférence et communiquées immédiatement à tous les Gouvernements intéressés, la Conférence a comme politique de retirer toutes les troupes étrangères de ce pays en évitant tout délai qui ne serait pas indispensable. Il faut noter que les Roumains ont promis de retirer leurs armées aussitôt que le désarmement des Hongrois aura été accompli et en conformité avec les termes de l'armistice.

2º) que des ordres ont été donnés pour mettre fin au blocus de la Hongrie et pour poursuivre l'importation immédiate des denrées de première nécessité.

3º) que le maintien de ces conditions nouvelles dépendra de la conduite du Gouvernement hongrois vis-à-vis des Puissances Alliées et Associées.

4º) que ces Puissances n'ont pas le moindre désir de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures du peuple hongrois en ce qui concerne le choix de leur Gouvernement, mais que néanmoins elles ne peuvent traiter qu'avec un Gouvernement dans lequel elles puissent se fier pour exécuter loyalement ses obligations internationales.

APPENDIX D TO No. 28

Traduction.

Son Excellence Monsieur Venizelos.

SMYRNE le 2 août 1919.

Il résulte d'une enquête étendue sur les événements d'Aidin que les nouvelles qui avaient été communiquées sur des prétendus massacres sont dénuées de fondement.

Durant les combats qui ont duré deux jours dans la ville d'Aidin, deux hommes et une femme musulmans ont été tués par cas purement fortuit. Des milliers

de coups de fusil ayant été tirés, il est naturel que ces trois personnes aient été atteintes.

Aussitôt après le départ de notre armée de ce secteur, les Turcs se sont livrés à d'effroyables massacres de chrétiens. Des photos de centaines de victimes ont été prises par notre service, pour la plupart des femmes et des enfants dont les corps étaient mutilés. Jusqu'à présent six cents cadavres ont été découverts; le nombre total des victimes est évalué à plus de deux mille.

Après la réoccupation de la ville, grâce aux mesures qui ont été prises, aucun acte de représaille de la part des nôtres n'a été signalé. Il s'ensuit que la responsabilité des événements retombe exclusivement sur les Turcs.

J'ai eu l'occasion de constater à différentes reprises que des bruits non contrôlés sont répandus par des fonctionnaires subalternes après avoir été exagérés ou même créés de toutes pièces.

GÉNÉRAL PARASKÉVOPOULOS

APPENDIX E TO NO. 28

Copie de télégramme. SSS Cavalla 574—257—29—23 H.—VMLTE.

Nous Musulmans réfugiés de Thrace qui, fuyant atrocités Bulgares, avons trouvé en Grèce asile et notre salut avec joie débordant apprîmes que Conférence, rendant arrêt sublime de justice, décida la libération de Thrace du joug odieux bulgare, et que nous pourrions bientôt réintégrer notre pays pour vivre heureux avec nos coreligionnaires aux côtés Hellènes, avec lesquels musulmans Thrace furent toujours en excellentes relations, et prospérer sous le régime parfait de liberté et d'équité hellénique. Nos compatriotes attendent anxieusement [? la fin] définitive des maux qu'ils ont essuyés et continuent essuyer sous le Gouvernement bulgare et espèrent fermement que la Bulgarie, dont la barbarie dépasse toutes les bornes, sera limitée dans ses confins d'avant la guerre balkanique et qu'elle n'aura plus sous sa domination des territoires auxquels elle est complètement étrangère. Vous assurant, Excellence, que les troupes libératrices de Grèce seront saluées partout dans notre pays avec véritable enthousiasme, nous prions agréer notre dévouement intégral au nom Musulmans Thrace occidentale: Le Comité originaire Sandjak Gumuldjina Schérif Ismail Mehmet Youssouf Ralisin Moustafa Cadir Bekir Mehmet Ibrahim, Comité Caza Xanthie Youssouf Moula Hassan Moustafa Rassin Mestan Hassan Houssein Imbrahim [*sic*], Comité Caza Cabrider [?Egridere] Imam Halil Hadji Mesiam Imane [?Imam] Souleimann Ibrahim Ahmet, Comité Caza D[?]ridele [?Daridere] Hafouz Houssein Ali Ahtet [?Ahmet] Houssein Sali, Comité originaire Sandjak Dédégatch Eteoglou Osman D[?]istan Ahmet Bouroundjik Ahmet, Comité Caza Demotica Schalli Salin Bulbur Ibrahim Hassan Houssein, Comité Caza Ortacu [?Ortakioi] Djater [?Djafer] Salih Tatar Bekir, Comité Caza Kirbdjali [*sic*] Hodja Taik Moustafa Ramadan Ali Halil Fechat Schaban.

H. D. 25.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, August 6, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clarke [Clerk].

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire:* Major Caccia. *France:* Capt. A. Portier. *Italy:* Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. At the suggestion of Mr. Balfour (see Annex [Appendix] A) it was agreed to modify the text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919, (H. D. 21¹, item 1), and to request Marshal Foch to submit a report on the military measures necessary in order to oblige the German Government to surrender the persons guilty of breaches of the laws of war.

*Surrender of officers
guilty of breaches of
the laws of war*

(It was agreed that no compensations should be demanded from the German Government. The revised text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919, would therefore read as follows:—
It was decided—

- (1) That no immediate reply to the German Government's request should be given.
- (2) That the Military representatives at Versailles in collaboration with Marshal Foch should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilise all available sources of information at their command.
- (3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on the military measures that might be enforced in order to oblige the German Government to comply with the clauses of the treaty relating to the surrender to the Allies of officers guilty of breaches of Laws of War.)

2. MR. POLK said that before the questions on the agenda paper came under discussion, he wished to communicate to the Supreme Council the latest information received from Budapest.

*Situation in
Hungary*

(Mr. Polk then distributed copies of the documents included in Annex [Appendix] B.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that from the telegram sent on the 5th August by Mr. J. A. Logan,² it would appear that the Roumanians had proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government. He did not think that the

¹ No. 25.

² The telegram in question was sent by the Allied officers in Budapest and was transmitted by Colonel Logan. See appendix B.

Hungarians [*sic*] had been authorised by the Allied and Associated Powers to take such action.

M. TITTONI thought that the Roumanian Government had merely put forward certain proposals.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Roumanian Government regarded itself as absolutely independent, and had acted and put forward its conditions as if the Allied and Associated Governments did not exist. Technically, Roumania was quite independent since Marshal Foch had not been placed in command of the Roumanian troops. Roumania had quarrelled with the Allies: M. Bratiano had left Paris thoroughly discontented, and he was now acting as the head of one independent State dealing with another equally independent State.

MR. POLK informed the Conference that he had that morning had a long conversation with Mr. Misu, shortly after the receipt of the documents he had just distributed. He had communicated the contents of those documents to Mr. Misu and had explained to him that Roumania's action amounted to an attempt to conclude a separate peace. He (Mr. Polk) had pointed out that he did not consider it right that the Roumanians should obtain the delivery of the war material referred to in the document under consideration. Mr. Misu had replied that the measures taken were dictated by military necessity. He further stated that Roumania had not been treated with justice in regard to the matter of reparations. He maintained that the Belgians, whose territory had similarly been invaded, had been permitted to appoint a representative on the Commission of Reparations and had thereby been able to look after their interests. On the other hand, Roumania had not been permitted to appoint a representative on that Commission.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that Mr. Misu should be invited to attend in order to discuss the question under reference. Mr. Misu was a very sensible man with whom it might be possible to arrive at an agreement.

M. CLEMENCEAU saw no objection to Mr. Misu being heard by the Council.

MR. POLK thought it would be preferable for Mr. Balfour in the first place to have a private conversation with Mr. Misu. He thought that procedure would yield better results.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that talking alone gave opportunities for the excuse of a certain flexibility of conversation that could not be got in a formal conference. On the other hand he thought a greater impression would be produced by an interview with the Council as a whole. He proposed, therefore, that Mr. Misu should be received in that room. Otherwise, that M. Clemenceau be authorised to speak on behalf of the Conference.

M. TITTONI enquired whether it would be possible for the Generals forming part of the Allied Mission to Budapest to start at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that a telegram should at once be sent to the Roumanian Government stating that the Council did not recognise the right of Roumania to conclude an armistice. Should the Roumanians fail to accept those instructions, the situation would become exceedingly grave.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the armistice proposed by the Roumanians would in addition deprive the Commission on Reparations of material and property which belonged to the whole of the Allies.

MR. POLK added that Mr. Hoover had also drawn attention to the fact that by withdrawing 50% of the rolling stock from Hungary, the Roumanians would thereby render the distribution of supplies impossible.

(Marshal Foch, General Bliss, General Weygand, General Belin and Col. Georges entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Supreme Council had decided that the four generals should forthwith be sent to Budapest. He enquired what measures Marshal Foch had taken to give effect to that resolution.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the four Generals who were to form part of the Military Mission to Budapest were scattered, consequently the following measures had been taken—General Graziani, being under the orders of General Franchet d'Esperey, a telegram had been transmitted to him through General Franchet d'Esperey together with copies of instructions. General Franchet d'Esperey had also been asked to forward copies of these documents to General Mombelli who was said to be at Sofia.

M. TRITTONI, intervening, said that General Mombelli was now actually in Turin. He would therefore himself send him copies of the instructions. General Montpelli [Mombelli] had, as a matter of fact, already been warned and would be ready to start within six hours after receipt of orders to that effect.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had forwarded to General Bliss the instructions intended for General Bandholtz, the American Representative. In regard to the British General, he believed him to be at Pressbourg, and he had consequently asked General Sackville-West to forward the necessary instructions. He had, however, just learnt that General Gorton had already reached Budapest.³ It would therefore be necessary to forward his instructions to that town.

MR. POLK wished to call attention to a certain matter connected with the instructions to be issued to the four Generals. Yesterday M. Tittoni had proposed an amendment in order that the Generals might fully realise that the instructions given them should be carried out in agreement with the Hungarian Government: that is to say, the required results were to be obtained rather by persuasion than by the issue of orders. The text of the telegram which he had received that morning from General Weygand did not appear to contain that amendment. He proposed, therefore, that the words 'in agreement with the Hungarian Government' should be inserted in paras. (b) and (d).⁴

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that the first paragraph of the instruction fully met Mr. Polk's view, since it was therein clearly stated that the mission should place itself in communication with the Hungarian Government in order to obtain certain concessions which were detailed in paragraphs which

³ See document 2 in appendix B.

⁴ See No. 28, appendix B.

followed. He thought that sentence clearly indicated that an agreement should be reached between the mission and the Hungarian Government.

Mr. POLK agreed that his objection had been fully met.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Council should proceed to draft the text of a telegram to be sent to the Roumanian Government, stating that the Allied and Associated Governments would not admit her right to conclude an independent armistice with Hungary; that such an armistice would not receive recognition, particularly as it was intended to take away large quantities of material, the joint property of all the Allies and not of Roumania alone.

Mr. BALFOUR said he had prepared a draft telegram.

(After a short discussion, the following draft telegram was approved:—

‘Supreme Council have learnt that Roumanian military authorities at Buda-Pesth have imposed armistice on Hungarian Government, to be accepted at a few hours’ notice. Terms of this armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfil armistice concluded with Allied Powers on November 13th. Moreover, terms in themselves pay no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. Supreme Council desire formally to record their refusal to recognise right of Roumanian Commander-in-Chief to impose any armistice without authority of Allied and Associated Powers.’)

(At this stage M. Misu and M. Vaida-Voivode entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had invited M. Misu and M. Vaida-Voivode to attend in order to consider the situation in Hungary, which was very grave. The Roumanians had seized Budapest.

M. Misu, intervening, said that he had received no official communication on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that information which left no doubt on the matter had been received from various sources. Furthermore, the Supreme Council had learnt that the Roumanians had proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government.

M. MISU said he had received no information on that subject, with the exception of the telegram which Mr. Polk had shown him that morning.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that the Supreme Council had just decided to send a telegram to the Roumanian Government.

(M. Clemenceau then read the telegram above quoted).

M. MISU said he would forward a copy of the telegram to his Government, laying stress on the view expressed by the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Allied and Associated Powers had given many proofs of goodwill to Roumania. M. Bratiano had not always received these in the spirit in which they had been meant. The situation to-day, however, was very grave, and he was authorised to say that the Supreme Council were determined that the Armistice of Versailles should be respected and executed everywhere.

M. MISU drew attention to the fact that the situation had entirely altered in consequence of the last attack made by the Hungarians.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the relative position of the Entente and Roumania had in no way altered.

M. MISU, continuing, said that Mr. Polk had that morning communicated to him a list of the material which had been demanded by the terms of the alleged armistice. He wished to point out that the Roumanians demanded the delivery of this material solely in the general interest. This material was being taken over solely with the view of disarming Hungary, since it was essential to disarm her as rapidly as possible. The measures so taken would not, however, in any way prejudice the eventual distribution between the Allies of the material so obtained.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to read to the Roumanian Delegation a copy of the instructions which had been sent to the Allied Generals who were proceeding to Budapest.

M. MISU said he had received the text of the telegram that morning, and had already telegraphed the same to his Government. On the other hand, the Council should not lose sight of the fact that Roumania had been treated unjustly by the Commission on Reparations from which she had been excluded. Roumania had consequently not obtained the authority to seek out the material which had been looted from her territory by her various enemies.

M. VAIDA added that the Roumanians had merely claimed the return of their own property.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired how the Roumanians could pick out their own personal goods from the mass of material in question.

M. VAIDA pointed out that the Roumanian rolling stock had been taken by the Bolsheviks with the result that at the present moment Roumania only possessed some 50 locomotives. On the other hand, Roumania had been obliged to incur serious expense in order to maintain the army at a time when their allies had already begun to demobilise. Mackensen, during the course of his retreat, had carried off a large quantity of material, which had subsequently fallen into the hands of the Magyars. The Roumanian Delegation had on several occasions requested the Conference to return this material, but no answer had ever been vouchsafed. It was essential that the material in question should be returned with as little delay as possible; otherwise the marks and signs, which would enable the Roumanians to recognise their property, would disappear. Should this material at once pass into the possession of the Roumanians, he thought it would be quite as safe as if it remained with the Magyars, and should it subsequently be proved that the engines, which would be used to revictual his unhappy country, in reality belonged to any particular one of the Allies, the Roumanians would be ready to surrender them without a murmur. The Council would undoubtedly agree that the material in the hands of the Roumanians would be a safer guarantee than if left in the hands of the Magyars.

M. CLEMENCEAU feared he had explained himself badly. The exact question that he wished to place before the Delegates was the following. The Council would not permit Roumania to conclude an armistice which

would in any way hinder the Hungarian Government from executing the terms of the armistice which she had already concluded with the Allies. For some months past the Principal Allied and Associated Governments had endeavoured to enforce the execution of that armistice. It had been agreed to enforce that armistice, and even if possible to enlarge its scope by agreement, in order to obtain a more complete disarmament. The Roumanians had now seized Budapest. Nevertheless, the conditions of the armistice concluded with the Entente would have to be fulfilled. The Allied and Associated Governments intended shortly to make peace with Hungary, and they could not allow the action of Roumania to retard the conclusion of peace. With that object in view, the generals had been sent to Buda Pest.

M. MISU said that he would transmit the wishes of the Conference to his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that these were not the wishes, but the final decisions of the Conference. Furthermore, the Council wished to know as soon as possible what action Roumania intended to take in the matter. In regard to the material, he wished to point out that the Allied and Associated Governments had no desire to deprive Roumania of that portion of the material to which she was entitled: but the whole must enter into the common pool. That was the principle which Roumania was required to accept.

M. MISU pointed out that it was a matter of urgency that the Inter-Allied Commission should proceed to Buda Pest with as little delay as possible. The Commission would then be in a position to obtain particulars, and to give the necessary instructions.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that the situation at present in Hungary was so confused that it would be necessary, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, that all questions should be settled directly between the Conference and the Roumanian Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could add very little to what had been said by M. Clemenceau. It was quite clear that Roumania had been cruelly treated both by Germany and by Hungary. Without doubt, she would never recover all that she had lost, since an act of spoliation necessarily involved an act of destruction, and it would be impossible to get back material which had been destroyed. Roumania would doubtless find herself in the same situation as Serbia, Belgium and France. It was equally true to say that the Magyars had taken from the Roumanians the greater part of their rolling stock, but the fact that rolling stock constituted the material which Europe most urgently required in order to reconstitute her economic life should not be lost sight of. Consequently, in spite of her rights, Roumania should realise that in the general interest this material must be distributed in an equitable manner for the benefit of all parties.

In regard to the proposed armistice he wished to invite attention to the following paragraph which the Roumanian Government desired to impose on Hungary, namely:—

‘The factories existing in Hungary which may have served for the manufacture of arms and munitions of all kinds must be demolished to

the benefit of Roumania. This operation shall be carried out by Roumanian specialists with the help of Hungarian Officers.'

He need hardly point out that in Hungary, as in all Allied countries, every factory and every workshop had been utilised for the production of war material. Consequently, the whole of the Hungarian factories would have to be handed over to Roumania. Such a solution was impossible for Hungary, and he thought that it would be equally unacceptable to the Allied and Associated Governments, since it contravened the principles which had hitherto guided the Conference in their labours.

MR. VAIDA said that the opportunities of presenting their case to the Conference which had hitherto been offered to the Roumanian Delegation had been so few and far between that he could not allow the present opportunity of making a statement to escape. He wished to impress upon the Conference the fact that the Magyars had never complied with the conditions of the armistice of the 13th November, 1918. The Entente had for many months past struggled against the situation so created, and had on frequent occasions issued instructions which the Roumanian Government had always accepted whatever might have been the consequences entailed. On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers had never been able to compel the Hungarians to accede to their wishes. Finally, the Hungarians had attacked Roumania thereby annulling the armistice. In spite of the armistice, the Hungarians had treated the Roumanians as enemies and compelled the latter to take military measures to defend themselves.

He wished on this occasion to beg the Conference to make certain alterations in the terms of the existing armistice. He would ask the Conference to add to the instructions to be issued to the generals a clause to the effect that the armistice of the 13th November having been broken no longer existed, and that it must be replaced by a new armistice to be imposed in Budapest by the representatives of the Entente. Many of the clauses of the armistice of November, 1918, could no longer be carried out: others had no further value. Yesterday the Hungarians were the enemies of Roumania, to-day they were conquered, and Roumania in the future desired that they should become her friends. He begged the Conference, therefore, to reconsider the text of the telegram which it was proposed to send to the Roumanian Government and to modify it so as to add a sentence which would prove to his Government that it could still count on the same goodwill as the Conference had extended to himself personally. Every telegram issued by the Conference was invariably at once published in the newspapers of Vienna and Budapest. Consequently, it was essential that the message should not be open to the interpretation that the Conference desired to blame Roumania when a word of encouragement would cause hopes to arise, which would lead more easily to the desired goal.

M. CLEMENCEAU promised that this request would receive the favourable consideration of the Conference.

M. MISU added that the Roumanian Delegation merely asked for some sign of goodwill.

(M. Misu and M. Vaida Voivode then withdrew.)

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that the remarks made by the Roumanian representatives were just, and that a sentence should be added to the draft telegram to give effect to their wishes.

M. TRITONI pointed out that Mr. Vaida Voivode had also declared that the Hungarians had no further claim to the maintenance of the first armistice, and that the four Allied Generals should be charged with the duty of dictating new conditions.

(After a short discussion it was decided to insert in the telegram above quoted the following sentence:—

‘Fully recognising the just claims of Roumania and her devotion to the common cause.’)

(It was agreed:—

- (1) To transmit the following telegram with all due urgency to the Roumanian Government through the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bukarest:—

‘The Supreme Council has learnt that the Roumanian military authorities at Budapest have imposed armistice on Hungarian Government to be accepted at a few hours notice. The terms of this armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfil armistice concluded with Allied and Associated Powers on November 13th, 1919 [sic]. Moreover, the terms in themselves paid no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. The Supreme Council whilst fully recognising the just claims of Roumania and her devotion to the common cause, desired formally to record their refusal to recognise the right of Roumania’s Commander-in-Chief to impose any armistice without authority of the Allied and Associated Powers.’

- (2) To forward instructions to the four generals, members of the Military Mission to Budapest, to proceed thither without delay.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to communicate to the Conference, for information, the following telegram, dated Constantinople, 4th August, 1919:—

*Results of the decision
of the Conference in
regard to Smyrna*

‘The High Commissioners of Great Britain, France and Italy on the 3rd August, 1919, transmitted to the Turkish Government, the decisions of the Supreme Council in regard to the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones of occupation and in regard to the creation of a Commission of Enquiry into the events which have taken place in consequence of the occupation of Smyrna.

‘The Grand Vizier received this communication with great satisfaction and declared that the Conference had thereby increased by 50 per cent. the authority of the Government.

‘An official communiqué dated on the 4th August ends as follows:—
“Without doubt the humanitarian decision of the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude.”’

4. M. CLEMENCEAU read the following telegram, dated 5th August, 1919, which he had received from the French Ambassador in Washington, in reply to the request made by the Conference to the American Government on the subject of the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia:—

*Repatriation of
Czecho-Slovaks
in Siberia*

‘The American Government possesses no tonnage which could serve for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks, and does not believe that any other country is in a position to supply tonnage for that purpose. In view of the fact that the matter relates to the repatriation of people who would no longer fight, it enquires whether it would not be possible to send these people to the Black Sea, passing through the region occupied by General Denekin.

‘The American Government is considering at the same time the repatriation, which must soon take place, of the 200,000 German-Austro [*sic*] prisoners still in Siberia.’

M. Clemenceau, continuing, said that the Conference were faced with a cruel situation. The military experts at Versailles, to whom the question had been referred, had reached the conclusion that the Czecho-Slovaks could only be repatriated by the sea route. To the demand for tonnage made to the American Government, the reply was that no tonnage was available, and that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks could only be made by the land route. The Conference felt obliged, therefore, as a last resort, to turn to the Japanese Government to whom the question had already been submitted.

M. MATSUI said that during the course of the meeting at which this question of repatriation had first been discussed,⁵ the view had been expressed that the Czecho-Slovaks should be withdrawn from the Trans-Siberian railway and placed on the right of Koltchak’s army, in order to reinforce the latter. It had then been suggested that the Japanese Government should furnish military contingents in order to relieve the Czecho-Slovaks along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Later, the situation had altered, and it had been found that the Czecho-Slovaks could not be used to reinforce Koltchak’s army since they desired to be repatriated and refused to fight. The situation having thus altered,⁶ Baron Makino had telegraphed to the Japanese Government for fresh instructions. No reply had yet been received. He did not wish to prejudge the question, but he felt compelled to inform the Conference that he did not think the Japanese Government would be in a position to accept the proposal. He was led to that conclusion by the refusal of his Government to comply with a similar request made by the Roumanian Government, who had asked for tonnage to repatriate the Roumanians at present in Siberia, whose numbers fell far below those of the Czecho-Slovaks. Nevertheless, his Government had been unable to obtain the necessary tonnage.

M. CLEMENCEAU gathered that, under the circumstances, it would apparently be impossible to repatriate the Czecho-Slovaks either by the land

⁵ See No. 7, minute 10.

⁶ See No. 15, minute 8.

or by the sea route. On the other hand, all information went to show that they could not spend the winter in Siberia.

M. TITTONI enquired how the Czecho-Slovaks at present obtained their supplies.

MR. BALFOUR replied that they received their supplies from America via Vladivostock.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the ships which brought these supplies did not return empty, and, if so, whether they could not be used for repatriating the Czecho-Slovaks.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the steamers were not suitable for employment as troopships.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the men would prefer to be repatriated in discomfort rather than not to be repatriated at all.

MARSHAL FOCH expressed the view that the shortest route would be via Vladivostock and Vancouver and thence across the Atlantic to Europe. He enquired whether the ships which came to fetch the American troops could not be used for bringing the Czecho-Slovaks across the Atlantic.

M. CLEMENCEAU urged that some solution should be found.

MR. POLK said that if the Council would adjourn the question for a few days, he would again refer the matter to his Government.

(It was decided that Mr. Polk should telegraph again to the American Government to urge the necessity of supplying the tonnage required for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks, the American proposals to send the men across the territories occupied by General Denekin having been found to be unworkable.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the following telegram dated 3rd August, 1919, had been received from the French Military Attaché at Stockholm:—

Situation in the Baltic Provinces. Action of General von der Goltz

'From information supplied by our Military Mission at Libau, the Germans, far from evacuating Courland, as promised, continue to reinforce themselves by fresh drafts and additional material. They at present possess 35,000 men in that region.

'Von der Goltz is determined not to leave. He encourages the entry of Russian Bolsheviks, and German Spartacists who have considerable funds at their disposal. He counts on their action to provoke a revolutionary movement which would give him the excuse for intervention.

'The situation is extremely critical and will become more so after the 10th August, the date from which the American revictualling must cease except for the children at Riga. Unless the Ullmanis Government⁷ receives at once the arms, equipment material and money which the British Mission had caused it to expect, it cannot maintain itself beyond the 15th August, and will be replaced by extreme Socialists. This will bring about a Bolshevik revolution. The Germans will then intervene as saviours and definitely occupy the country.'

⁷ The Provisional Government of Latvia. See Vol. III of this series.

M. Clemenceau, continuing, called on Marshal Foch to express his views on this question.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Conference had decided on the 30th July to accept the proposals made by General Gough.⁸ The telegram giving effect to that decision had only been dispatched by Marshal Foch on the 1st August. The telegram to [? from] the French Military Attaché at Stockholm had been dispatched on the 3rd August, and he doubted whether Marshal Foch's telegram, which had to be forwarded through General Nudant in Berlin, could have reached General von der Goltz by the 3rd August.

On the other hand, that morning, Marshal Foch had received the following telegram from General Gough:—

'Please thank Marshal Foch for the firm attitude taken by him in regard to von der Goltz. Should the latter carry out the orders now sent him, many of the difficulties will have been overcome. I shall do all that is possible in regard to the Lithuanian Polish question.'⁹

He (General Weygand) thought it would be best to await the receipt of later information.

(It was decided to postpone the consideration of this question until the receipt of further information.)

6. M. MATSUI proposed that the Japanese Delegation should be authorised to appoint a Japanese Officer to form part of the Allied Commission appointed on August 4th, 1919 (H. D. 23¹⁰) to negotiate between the Polish and German Governments.
- Appointment of Allied Commissioners negotiating between the German and Polish Governments*

(It was agreed that a Japanese officer should be nominated to represent Japan on the Allied Commission for negotiation between the German and the Polish Governments.)

7. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY¹¹ invited attention to the draft of a Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Czecho-Slovakia on the other hand (annex C¹²).
- Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Czecho-Slovak State*

The Commission on New States were anxious that a copy of the treaty should be communicated to the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, and he had been deputed to obtain the sanction of the Council to this procedure being adopted. The treaty had been unanimously accepted by the Commission on New States, but it was considered politic that the Czecho-Slovak Delegation should at once have an opportunity of expressing their views.

⁸ See No. 23, minute 4.

⁹ Cf. No. 19, minute 1.

¹⁰ No. 27 (minute 4).

¹¹ British Representative on the Commission on New States.

¹² Not printed. This draft, dated July 5, 1919, was in the main the same as the text of the treaty as signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919 (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 20. Cmd. 479). The draft is printed with minor variation by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 245-57.

(It was decided¹³ to approve the draft of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czecho-Slovakia as submitted by the Committee on New States; the draft to be submitted to the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation by the Secretariat-General.)

8. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Commission on New States had proposed that the treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania (annex D¹⁴) should also forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation.

Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania

The treaty dealt with matters of very great complexity. The Commission had therefore refrained from entering into direct negotiations with the Roumanian Delegation. It was now considered expedient that the draft treaty in its final form should forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation, with the intimation that though the general principles had been accepted, the Roumanian Government would have the opportunity of making their observations on matters of detail. He pointed out that the same procedure had been followed with advantage in the case of Poland.

MR. POLK enquired whether any reservation had been made by any of the representatives on the Commission.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY replied that the American representative had made a reservation in regard to the clause dealing with navigation on the Dniester.¹⁵

MR. POLK said that he could only accept the treaty with the reservation on the question of the Dniester. President Wilson himself was greatly interested in this question.

MR. HUDSON suggested that the clause dealing with the Dniester should not be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation. The Dniester was situated in Russian territory.

MR. POLK stated that for that very reason the inclusion of this clause might convey the idea to the Roumanians that the Council accepted their claims in Bessarabia.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY maintained that if the Dniester were not mentioned, great difficulties might subsequently arise. He suggested that in communicating the treaty to the Roumanian Delegation, a forwarding letter should be sent explaining that certain questions could not be definitely decided until the frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia had been settled.

(It was decided¹³ to approve the draft of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania as submitted by the Com-

¹³ Owing to a fault of transposition the decision arising out of minute 7 stands in the original at the conclusion of minute 8 and vice versa.

¹⁴ Not printed. This document, headed '5^e. épreuve — 17 juillet 1919', was a draft for the treaty signed at Paris on December 9, 1919 (Treaty Series, 1920, No. 6. Cmd. 588). This draft is printed with certain variations by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 280-8. (Variation occurs, in particular, in article 17 of the draft: see note 15, below.)

¹⁵ Article 17 of the draft. This article read: 'Pending the conclusion of a general Convention on the international Régime of Waterways, Roumania undertakes to apply to such

mittee on New States; the clause concerning the Dniester River to be revised by the Committee to meet the objections of the American Delegation; the draft thus revised to be submitted to the Roumanian Delegation at once by the Secretariat-General.)

9.

*Reply to the Note of
the Austrian Delegation
on the protection
of Minorities*

[Not printed]¹⁶

10. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that M. Venizelos had submitted a report (Annex F¹⁷) dealing with certain difficulties in the Balkans by the encouragement of voluntary emigration. M. Venizelos' proposals had been discussed unofficially by the Committee on New States, who considered these to be so good as to justify their extension to all the Balkan States. It had been suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed by the League of Nations to control the proposed emigration. The Commission now sought permission from the Council to discuss the question in the first place with M. Venizelos and subsequently, should an agreement be reached, with the various Balkan States concerned. The Commission on New States had drawn up a report (Annex F¹⁷) which had already been submitted to the Council.

Proposal by M. Venizelos to deal with certain problems in the Balkans by voluntary emigration

M. TITTONI said he would accept the proposal provided a strict control were established so that the suggested emigration should not be used by the Governments concerned as measures of expulsion.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY pointed out that the proposal to create a strong commission of control under the League of Nations had been brought forward with the very object of preventing any such abuses.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that since the question had not been placed on the agenda paper, it should be adjourned for further consideration at a later date.

(It was agreed to adjourn to a later date the further consideration of the report submitted by the Commission on New States on the proposals

portions of the River Systems of the Pruth (and Reservation made by the America[n] Delegation of the Dniester) as may lie within, or form the boundary of, her territory, the régime set out in Articles 332-337 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.' The parentheses are as in the original.

¹⁶ Mr. Headlam-Morley read to the Supreme Council a report on this matter by the Commission on New States; this report is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 584-5. Mr. Headlam-Morley, continuing, said that the commission 'had prepared a draft reply to the Austrian counter-proposals giving effect to the conclusions in the report just read' (appendix E in original); this draft reply is printed with verbal variation, op. cit., pp. 590-3. (Also printed there, pp. 586-9, is a translation of the observations of the Austrian Delegation.) The Supreme Council accepted this draft reply in a resolution of which a text is printed, *ibid.*, p. 594.

¹⁷ Not printed. A translation of M. Venizelos' proposals and of the covering report of the Commission on New States is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 309-17.

submitted by M. Venizelos on the subject of encouragement of voluntary emigration in the Balkan States.)

(Mr. Headlam-Morley then withdrew. M. Laroche entered the room.)

II.

[Not printed]

Note from the Committee on Political Clauses on the eventual restitution to the Allies of rolling stock moved beyond the armistice frontier in violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti

12. M. LAROCHE read the note submitted by the Committee on Political Clauses respecting the desirability of reconciling the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria with those of the Treaties to be concluded with the Allied States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Appendix H¹⁸).

Desirability of reconciling the clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria with those of the treaties to be concluded with the Allied States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

(It was agreed to accept the proposals contained in the note above referred to (Appendix H¹⁸) and to authorise the Committee on Political Clauses to prepare as soon as possible

in conjunction with the Drafting Committee and the Commissions concerned, the new text of the Clauses of the Treaty with Austria therein referred to.)

(M. Laroche then withdrew.)

13. M. DUTASTA read the following Note, dated Paris, July 30th, 1919, addressed by M. Tittoni to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the dispatch of war material to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State.

Reference to the Supreme War Council at Versailles of the dispatch of war material to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State

‘Confirming declarations made yesterday to the Supreme Council,¹⁹ I have the honour to inform you that the Italian Delegation has telegraphed to the competent authorities

in order that necessary steps be taken to avoid every obstacle to the passage through Italy of French trains transporting merchandise including these the destination of which was Serbia, as well as the military trains agreed upon between France and Italy.

‘As for the war material destined to Serbia, as I had the honour to ask of you in my note of the 20th instant, as well as at yesterday’s session, I

¹⁸ Not printed. This note resulted from the proposal of Baron Sonnino of June 17, 1919, and the decision upon it taken by the Supreme Council on July 11 (see No. 9, note 9). A translation of the note is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, pp. 594-5. The decision taken by the Supreme Council in connexion with this note is also printed there, pp. 595-6.

¹⁹ Cf. No. 20, minute 6.

would be infinitely obliged to you if you would be good enough to submit the question as soon as possible to the Inter-Allied Council of Versailles.

'Please accept, etc. . .'

MR. POLK drew attention to the fact that Mr. Lansing had maintained the view that the Allied and Associated Governments had no right to prevent the material going to Serbia;²⁰ but he, personally, would raise no objection to the question being discussed by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

(It was agreed forthwith to submit the question above referred to, to the Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles.)

(At this stage General Groves entered the room.)

14. GENERAL GROVES said that under the Peace Treaty, Germany was forbidden to have any naval or military aviation, and was required to surrender all her service aircraft to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control appointed to supervise the carrying out of the air clauses would not be able to begin work until after the ratification of the treaty. Reports received from the British Military Commission at Berlin and from other sources (see Appendix I), showed that Germany was circumventing the air clauses by the following means:—

Note from the Air Commission asking that measures may be taken to prevent the Germans from disposing of their air material

- (1) She had sold and continued to sell her aircraft and aircraft material to various neutrals.
- (2) She was adapting her aircraft to commercial use.
- (3) She was also negotiating to sell to private companies for the sum of 400,000 marks some 500 aircraft engines captured from the Allies.

With regard to (1), namely, the sale of aircraft to neutrals, that entailed the securing of neutral markets at the expense of the Allies. Those markets would also support the German aircraft industry, which was the production of her air power, and also the basis of her commercial aeronautical development, which will be in competition with that of the Allied and Associated Powers. It was therefore suggested that this sale shall be forbidden through the Supreme Council, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she had already made out of such sales.

With regard to (2), that is, the conversion to commercial use of service types of aircraft, a service type of aircraft could be converted to commercial use by slight structural alterations within 48 hours. Such aircraft could equally well be re-converted to service use within the same period. It was suggested that the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.

With regard to (3), (i.e. the sale of aircraft material captured from the Allies), under the military clauses all war material captured from the Allies

²⁰ Sec No. 8, minute 8.

was to be returned. This material was required by the Allies, particularly the engines.

It was therefore suggested that the German Government should be informed that the 500 engines referred to shall be delivered to the Allies at once, at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the fact that the German Government had sold a certain number of captured aircraft engines to private firms reacted in any way to the detriment of the Allies from a commercial point of view.

GENERAL GROVES replied in the negative. He would point out, however, that the engines in question were in very good order; they had been well looked after; and they were urgently required by the Allies.

(It was agreed to accept the proposals made by General Groves, namely:—

1. That the sale of aircraft and aircraft material to neutral Powers shall be forbidden through the Supreme Command, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she had already made out of such sales;
2. That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise;
3. That the German Government be informed that the 500 engines sold to private companies shall be delivered to the Allies at once at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall forthwith be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.)

(General Groves withdrew, and Colonel Morgan entered the room.)

15.

*Liberation of prisoners of
war formerly belonging to
the Austro-Hungarian
Army, now nationals of
an Allied or Associated
State*

[Not printed]

16.

*Immediate liberation of
Turkish Prisoners of
War in Egypt*

[Not printed]

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 7, 1919.*

August 5th, 1919.

Dear Monsieur Dutasta,

I notice that, according to our 'Procès-Verbal', one of the conclusions arrived at on August 2nd [1st], was to the effect that Marshal Foch should be directed to consider what military equivalent could be exacted from the Germans should they fail to carry out that provision of the Treaty which requires them to surrender Officers guilty of crimes against humanity and the laws of war.

This is not in accordance with my own recollection of what passed; but I have spoken to the Secretariat on the subject, and they are so convinced of the accuracy of their report that I am forced to admit that I must have failed clearly to hear what was said by my colleagues.

I do not therefore ask that any alteration should be made in the minutes, but I should be grateful if you would place on record my dissent from this particular conclusion, which seems to suggest the possibility of comparing the punishment of criminals on the one hand, with some kind of military advantage on the other; an idea difficult clearly to grasp.

My own view was that we resolved to ask Marshal Foch to consider by what kind of military threat we could prevent the German Government evading its Treaty engagements with regard to the surrender of accused Officers—a quite different proposition.

Perhaps you would be kind enough to add this letter to our records.

A. J. BALFOUR

APPENDIX B TO NO. 29

Document 1

PARIS, 6 août 1919.

Au Colonel Wallace.

Aux bons soins du Général Tasker H. Bliss,

Hôtel de Crillon, Paris.

Mon Cher Colonel Wallace,

Je vous envoie ci-joint copie d'un télégramme qu'on vient de recevoir de Budapest, signé du Général britannique Gordon [*sic*], du Colonel italien Romanelli et du Colonel américain Causey, donnant le texte de l'ultimatum remis par le Haut Commandement roumain aux autorités hongroises hier soir à 6 heures. Ce texte est quelque peu tronqué, mais je vous l'envoie tel qu'il est et je vous ferai parvenir, par télégramme, aussitôt que je l'aurai, une copie corrigée.

M. Hoover vous serait reconnaissant de porter ce fait, aussitôt que possible, à l'attention du Général Bliss.

Veuillez croire, etc.

J. A. LOGAN [LOGAN]

BUDAPEST, Aug. 5th, 1919.

112. X. U.

Paris.

Lorsque [*sic*] le Commandement Suprême Roumain pose pour accepter la cessation des hostilités, demandée par l'état Hongrois. Contents [*sic*] Convention militaire qui fera cesser les hostilités entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie.

A. Le Commandement Suprême Roumain renonce à occuper toute la Hongrie si le Commandement suprême hongrois gage:

1. A livrer:

A. Tout le matériel de guerre de toutes les catégories qui est encore resté en possession des troupes et de l'Etat Hongrois.

Fait exception de cette règle le matériel qui sera jugé nécessaire aux forces armées que la Hongrie aura le droit d'avoir pour garder l'ordre à l'intérieur jusqu'à la ratification de la paix avec la Roumanie.

L'effectif de ces forces ne dépassera sous aucun motif le nombre de 15.000 (quinze mille) hommes, officiers inclus.

Leur organisation en unités ainsi que leur encadrement, armement (?) et leur groupement, sera décidée ultérieurement par le Commandement Suprême Roumain.

B. Les fabriques existantes en Hongrie qui ont servi à la fabrication de l'armement des munitions, de toutes les catégories; leur démontage au profit de la Roumanie sera effectué par les spécialistes roumains avec le concours des officiers hongrois.

C. L'équipement de toutes les catégories nécessaire à une armée forte de 300.000 soldats.

D. 50 pour cent du matériel roulant qui appartient encore d'après les registres à l'Etat hongrois, des machines et du matériel qui existent en Hongrie et servent à la construction, l'entretien et la réparation des voies ferrées et au matériel roulant.

E. 200 (deux cents) automobiles de tourisme et 400 (quatre cents) camions automobiles en bon état de fonctionnement et avec tous leurs accessoires.

F. 30 pour cent du bétail et animaux de toutes les catégories qui existent actuellement d'après les registres en Hongrie (1).²²

G. 30 pour cent de toutes les machines agricoles de toutes les catégories actuellement existantes en Hongrie (1).²²

H. 20.000 (vingt mille) wagons de blé, 10.000 (dix mille) wagons de maïs et 5.000 (cinq mille) wagons orge et avoine (1).²²

I. Tout le matériel flottant de toute catégorie qui appartenant à l'Etat Roumain, aux sociétés particulières et citoyens roumains, ont été enlevés par l'ennemi en Roumanie et qui se trouve dans les eaux hongroises.

J. 50 pour cent du matériel flottant de toutes les catégories qui appartient à l'Etat hongrois.

K. Tous les prisonniers et otages roumains.

L. Tous les déserteurs roumains, de toutes les nationalités, se trouvant réfugiés en Hongrie à la signature de la présente Convention.

²¹ A translation of this document was published with minor omissions in the British press on August 7, 1919.

²² See the note in the text after paragraph L.

(1) Destiné à être distribué aux soldats roumains qui n'ont pu cultiver leur terre à cause des deux motifs suivants:

A. Ils ont été tenus mobilisés pour garantir la sûreté de l'état contre ceux qui ont continuellement troublé la paix.

B. Ils ont manqué des moyens nécessaires parce que ces moyens leur ont été enlevés par l'ennemi.

2. A.²³ Entretenir au compte de l'Etat hongrois pendant tout le temps que les troupes roumaines occuperont les régions hongroises de l'ouest de Tissa toutes les forces royales roumaines qui se trouveront dans ces régions au moment de la signature de la présente convention.

3. A.²³ Procurer le charbon nécessaire à la circulation en rapport avec les nécessités militaires roumaines dans la région à l'ouest de Tissa.

4.²⁴ B. Les armées Royales roumaines ne se retireront à l'est de Tissa que lorsque le commandement suprême hongrois aura satisfait toutes les conditions imposées au paragraphe A.

C. La réception du matériel et des animaux de toutes les catégories prévue au paragraphe A, se fera par des commissions qui seront constituées. La composition et le siège des commissions ainsi que les conditions et les endroits de livraison du matériel et des animaux, seront décidés ultérieurement par le commandement suprême roumain. Le fonctionnement des commissions devra commencer au plus tard 48 heures après que le commandement suprême roumain aura notifié officiellement leur nomination au commandement hongrois. Notification pourrait être faite pour toutes les commissions et en même temps ou pour chacune à part. Le terme minime pendant lequel devra s'effectuer la livraison sera fixé ultérieurement par le commandement suprême roumain pour chaque catégorie à part, en rapport avec les possibilités techniques.

D. Pour le contrôle de l'exécution de cette Convention fonctionnera à Budapest une mission roumaine. La Mission fonctionnera jusqu'à la ratification du Traité de paix entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie par les autorités légales hongroises. La Mission jouira de tous les privilèges et immunités accordés par l'exterritori[ali]té dans les pays civilisés.

E. La ci-présente convention devra être acceptée ou refusée intégralement; par conséquent les contre-propositions ne seront pas admises. Le terme de réponse expire à 22 heures le 5/viii-1919.

F. En cas que les conditions ne sont pas acceptées, le Commandement Suprême Roumain enlèvera de la Hongrie, sans respecter de proportion, le matériel et les animaux qui seront nécessaires à la Roumanie pour remplir aux moyens [? au moins] en partie, les vides douloureux créés à la Roumanie par un ennemi qui pendant tout le temps de l'occupation et à l'occasion de la paix de Budapest, a méconnu le sentiment humanitaire.

GÉNÉRAL GORDON [GORTON], anglais.

LIEUT. COL. ROMANELLI, italien.

LIEUT. COL. CAUSEY, américain.

Les conditions ci-dessus ont été remises du [? au] Ministère Hongrois à 6 heures le 5 août et on ne lui a accordé que jusqu'au 5 août 10 heures pour les accepter.

L'acceptation de ces conditions amènerait sans aucun doute la chute du Gouvernement et la ruine du pays.

GREGORY

²³ The French preposition appears to have been mistaken for a paragraph heading.

²⁴ Apparently numbered in error.

APPENDIX I TO No. 29

Document 1

MINISTÈRE DE LA GUERRE.

PARIS, *July 31st, 1919.*

General Duval, President of the Commission on Aerial Clauses,
to The President of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to submit herewith the report addressed to General Groves by the British Military Mission at Berlin.

General Groves, British Delegate of the Commission on Aerial Clauses has asked me to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to this report so that instructions may be given to the Commander-in-Chief to oppose the sale of the motors in question.

This report clearly shows the importance of the facts mentioned and I think it is necessary that this question should be examined without delay.

DUVAL

Document 2

No. 6599.3.1.

'C' (D. 249—25.7.19)

General Haking,

Armistice Commission, Cologne.

I forward herewith a report by Captain T. Breen of this Mission, which is of importance and seems to demand prompt action. Capt. Breen is making further investigations, but looks upon this report as quite reliable. There is no doubt that the Germans will make use of the period before the treaty comes into force to dispose of as much property as possible.

N. MALCOLM, Major General,
Chief of British Military Mission
1 Moltkestrasse, Berlin.

Document 3

'C' (D. 249—25.7.19)

BERLIN, *24th July 1919.*

To General Malcolm.

In accordance with section 3 of part V of the Conditions of Peace (air clauses 198 to 202) Germany is restricted in the manufacture of aeroplanes and engines. Accordingly the Government have arranged to close down a series of factories including that at Adlershof, near Johannesthal, Berlin, immediately.

This factory employs 4,800 hands, who have been given notice of dismissal the first week in August. Shed 404 contained approximately 500 engines captured from allied machines, many of which were of the most modern type, Rolls-Royce, Hispano-Suiza, Renault, Liberty, etc. The workmen of the factory informed me some time ago that a Commission of British Officers had visited Johannesthal in December accompanied by a German Staff Officer, who did not show them the

booty hall at Adlershof. [A] deputation of two workmen informed me yesterday that the motors are now being removed in all haste to a small depot at Kurfürstendamm, Berlin. It would appear that a private firm has purchased the contents of the hall for 400,000 Marks. So far 120 Rolls-Royce engines and Hispano-Suiza engines have been removed and the remainder should be moved in the course of this week. The men at the present moment are being dismissed. They receive three weeks' pay in advance.

If the Allied Military Authorities wish to obtain delivery of this material according to article 202, the powers conferred by article 210 of section IV (Inter-allied Commissions of Control) might be temporarily transferred to an Allied Aviation Commission in order to obviate the secretion of the material in this way by the German authorities; otherwise it will be very difficult to recover material and engines disposed of to private buyers before the ratification of the treaty.

T. F. BREEN, Captain

No. 30

H. D. 26.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, August 7, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clarke [Clerk].

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (M. Tardieu, M. Laroche, M. Aubert,¹ Colonel Peel, Colonel Castoldi,² *Situation in* Mr. Coolidge, M. Adatci, M. Kato, and M. Shidemitsu [? Shigemitsu] entered the room.)
Hungary

MR. POLK handed to M. Clemenceau a telegram, which M. Clemenceau asked M. Mantoux to read.

(The following telegram was read:—

Vienna, Aug. 7, 1919, 12 noon.

1. '(Causay [*sic*] will stay Budapest until General Bandholtz arrives and you can phone him easily from Prague; situation in Pest more nasty than ever.) You have already been told of changes and situation

¹ French expert for ethnographic questions.

² Italian expert for political and diplomatic questions.

³ MM. Adatci and Kato were members of the section of the Japanese delegation concerned with political and legal questions; M. Shigemitsu was a secretary on the delegation.

becoming very acute on account of stoppage of boats on river which were preparing to move this morning in accordance with James' plans, also on account of cutting all lines of communication, including blowing up of railroad to Vienna, also manner of military occupation and treatment of inhabitants, their property and supplies. General Gordan [*sic*], Causey, Romanelli and James went to Roumanian General with written protest against these things, acting under their authority given in the several different ways by the Entente. Roumanian General declined to permit them to read statement, acted very discourteously, and was told so. He declined to receive communication, stating that it should be sent to Roumanian General Headquarters, which of course is out of reach of communication, even if they knew where it was. He also stated he was acting under orders when he destroyed all communications out of city, which of course cuts off supplies coming in from country, of which there were eighty carloads vegetables in one lot. I plan to go to Buch[s] tonight, meeting you there. I will arrive in time to have conference with General Bernhardt [?Bandholtz] there, who I understand leaves tonight. Will you tell him to be looking for me. There is nothing to be done with this situation except to settle whether Roumanians are going to loot this country under one guise or another and if France is going to back them; then to determine whether other members of Entente are going to have a voice in determining the future policy of Central Europe. It is just as difficult, perhaps even more so, to utilise Hungarian equipment of railways and Danube in this situation as it was under Bela Kuhn. There is no resistance their troops, no necessity for their occupying with the force they have, except for a misguided military policy or a selfish desire on their part which is not in accord with broad principles of reconstruction and future peace of this country and the world.')

MR. POLK said that, as he had already informed M. Clemenceau, all supplies to Hungary had been stopped by Mr. Hoover, who did not propose to supply the Roumanian Government with food that was meant for the Hungarians. He also asked that the following telegrams be heard:—

2. '2vn. rb 201

A.R.A. Received Aug 7, 1919.

Budapest Aug. 6, 1919.

Supreme Council, Paris.

'As indicated in telegram sent by me earlier tonight the Archduke Joseph with three members of the new cabinet called on myself and the representatives of the Italian and American Governments to announce the partial selection of his cabinet and to state that he was forming a coalition government in line with the suggestions made by the Supreme Council in Paris. The Archduke is known as the Governor of the State. He was accompanied by Frederick, the Minister President: General

Schnetzer, Minister of War: General Tanczos, Minister of Foreign Affairs: Bleyer, Minister of Nationalities: Caillery, Minister of Health. The other ministry appointments to be made tomorrow to complete the cabinet will consist of two agrarians, one or two of the Szegeci party and a social democrat. The Minister President is a bourgeois. The Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs are both late Generals in the Austro-Hungarian army. The Minister of Nationalities is a university professor, the Minister of Health a physician. Other details will be wired later. General Gorton, Causey and Gordon [*sic*] just reported from Budapest that Roumanians under the pretext of searching for arms are entering and pillaging a great many different houses in outlying districts as well as in town. The army is living on the country and taking for both animals and men.

GREGORY.'

3. 'Ix rb. 75.

A.R.A. Received August 7, 1919.

Budapest Aug. 6, 1919.

For Action.

Supreme Council, Paris.

'The Hungarian Gendarmerie arrested at six thirty p.m. today the social democratic Government while the latter were holding a sitting at the National Palace. The *coup d'état* was carried out without any disorder. The Archduke Joseph is head of the new Government. General Schnetzer was sent here at ten o'clock tonight to impart this information and to state that policy and other details of new Government will be handed later tonight.

GENERAL GORTON.'

4. 'ivn rb 180

A.R.A. Received Aug. 7, 1919.

Budapest Aug. 7, 1919.

Supreme War Council, Paris.

'The Roumanians have informed the Hungarian Government that as the latter have not accepted the terms of their armistice they intend to cross the Danube tomorrow, August seventh. I have ascertained that General Holben⁴ refused to appear in the press today the publication [*sic*] of M. Clemenceau's telegram of fifth instant to the Hungarian Government.⁵ The Roumanians continue to perpetrate acts which are most discreditable to a power associated with the Entente. Harmless individuals are assaulted, food, livestock, agricultural implements and rolling stock are requisitioned and sent to Roumania, and through the purposeless blockade and destruction of railways Budapest is on the verge of starvation. The latest act of wanton destruction is the demolition of the railway between Budapest and Vienna. Unless instant measures are taken to compel the Roumanians to evacuate Budapest and cease their predatory operations in Hungary,

⁴ General Holban was commander of Roumanian forces in occupation of Budapest.

⁵ See No. 28, appendix A.

the confidence of the Hungarians in the good will of the Entente will be destroyed.

GENERAL GORTON.⁷

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that the Roumanian action could not be tolerated.

MR. POLK said that in the opinion of the American Delegation, interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary would do more to encourage Bolshevism than any event in the last six months. Lenin would point to the example of what had taken place on the downfall of the Soviet Government in Hungary, in order to scare Russia and preserve his own régime. The setting up of a reactionary Government in Hungary in place of a moderate socialist Government was a very threatening feature in the situation.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Roumanian General committing these follies and wickednesses was the same that had put himself under Marshal Foch's orders.⁶

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as the General was not named, it was impossible to know.

MR. POLK said that one of the American Experts on the Economic Commission had prepared a memorandum showing in what way the armistice demanded by the Roumanians interfered with the Reparation terms of the Conference. (See Appendix A.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that an energetic telegram must be sent to the Roumanian Government.

MR. BALFOUR entirely agreed. He added that the Commission of Generals should be informed of the message sent to Bucharest, and asked to communicate it to the Roumanian Government. If the Roumanians still persisted in going forward, it would be necessary to break off relations, or to do something very serious. He asked whether there was any economic weapon that could be brought to bear on Roumania.

MR. POLK said that Roumania would soon be quite independent of the Allies in this respect for a short time. There was a good harvest about to be reaped, and abundant rolling stock was being stolen from Hungary, but, for the future, Roumania would not be able to count on any assistance from the United States.

M. TITTONI said that on the previous day he had heard a rumour that the King of Roumania was to enter Buda Pest.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the telegram to be sent to Roumania should begin by a brief recital of the various things which had been required of the Roumanian Government by the Conference, and of the omissions by the Roumanian Government to fulfil these requests. This part, he thought, would be easy, as it amounted to a list of requests by the Conference and of disobediencies by the Roumanians, but it was harder to discover exactly what threat should be added at the end. No opinion had as yet been expressed in the Council as to how far it was desirable or possible to go.

⁶ See No. 28, minute 2.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it be stated that Roumania had broken the Alliance and must suffer the consequences.

M. PICHON agreed that the Roumanians had proposed an armistice which was not in harmony with the armistice made by the Allies, and that they had set up a reactionary Government which was contrary to Allied policy.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Council would agree to a threat of blockade by sea.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer to threaten Roumania for the time in general terms. He thought that the mere breach of the alliance would frighten her sufficiently.

MR. BALFOUR said that the result of this action should be borne in mind. This would be the first public quarrel in the alliance. It was also taking place in a part of the world where the tension was very great. The fact must be faced that the consequences might be very serious.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the alternative was to submit to the insolent defiance of the Roumanians. He was not prepared to submit to it. He would rather leave his place in the Council. The Roumanians had always behaved like this, and deserved to be told that if they continued they would be regarded as having broken the alliance. They were in conflict with the Conference, and must suffer for it.

M. TARDIEU enquired whether there really existed any alliance with Roumania. It had been declared at the Peace of Bucharest that the Roumanians had ceased to be Allies.

MR. POLK said that even after this, when they desired to raise a loan in America, the Roumanians had declared themselves to be among the Allies. They could not be Allies only for financial purposes.

M. TARDIEU suggested that the Roumanians be told that they must leave the Conference and suffer all the consequences of ceasing to belong to it. The Conference was a definite thing. The alliance was a vague thing. The Roumanians would be able to estimate advantages and disadvantages more clearly.

MR. BALFOUR then undertook to draft a telegram. He said that what he was about to read should be prefaced by a recital of the various instances in which the Roumanian Government had refused to carry out the policy of the Conference. After some discussion the following draft was accepted as the conclusion of the telegram to be sent to the Roumanian Government:—

‘The Conference in the face of these facts is compelled to believe that the Roumanian Government intends to defy the Conference and to sever themselves from the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Conference is mistaken in these views it desires that the Roumanian Government will give it an immediate contradiction not only in words but by acts which will prove to all the world that Roumania accepts and is prepared to carry out in good faith the policy which the Conference has thus laid down.’

(It was also agreed that the telegram should be transmitted to General Gorton at Buda Pesth for communication to his colleagues and to the Roumanian Commander.

The final draft prepared by M. Berthelot is annexed in Appendix B.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Tardieu if he had anything new to say about Thrace.

*Bulgarian
Frontiers*

M. TARDIEU said he had nothing to add to what he had said the day before.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had had a talk with Mr. Polk. The original proposal of the Committee was strongly objected to by the American Delegation, which was supported by the Italian Delegation. He had himself on the previous day suggested a compromise which restored to Bulgaria a large population in Western Thrace, but gave the coast to Greece as a line of communication with Eastern Thrace. M. Venizelos had not liked this solution. As an alternative he had proposed that Thrace be made an autonomous State like Ruthenia under Greek sovereignty. This solution did not commend itself very much nor did it meet the American objection which he understood to be that Bulgaria could not now be deprived of access to the Aegean which had been given her before the war by a Treaty. The American Delegation believed that this was bound to lead to war very soon. They said they also thought it was useless to allege that Dedeagatch was an indifferent port not worth a quarrel. Whatever its merits the Bulgarians were attached to it, and it had a sentimental value about which there could be no argument. If peace in the Balkans were to be established, Dedeagatch must be left to Bulgaria. This he understood to be the American view. To meet this view a suggestion had been made that a corridor to the Aegean including Dedeagatch be given to Bulgaria under full sovereignty, the allotment of Thrace, both Eastern and Western, being left very much as the Committee had proposed. It had then been agreed between himself and Mr. Polk that the American and British experts should set to work on this suggestion to see if it could be geographically carried out. They were then to see M. Venizelos without committing either of their Principals or the Conference.

MR. POLK said that one argument had weighed considerably with him. All military authorities said that the cession of Thrace to Greece meant war in the Balkans. They added that of the Balkan States Bulgaria was the best able to wage war. It was therefore imperative to find some compromise which had a chance of lasting at least for a while.

M. TARDIEU said that he was not much in favour of the 'corridor' proposal. In another instance a 'corridor' had been proposed to link Czecho-Slovakia with Yugo-Slavia. This had been rejected by the Council as impracticable, though it would have been a matter of European interest and favourable to two of our Allies, as well as separating Austria from Hungary. As to the military opinion mentioned by Mr. Polk, he did not like to pit himself against the military authorities, but the Conference had been repeatedly told that all the enemy countries would go to war. Germany had not done so. He personally thought it most unlikely that Bulgaria would defy the Conference.

MR. POLK pointed out that in the case of Germany the Allies were in possession of a good argument namely, Marshal Foch and his armies on the Rhine. No similar argument existed in Bulgaria.

M. TARDIEU said that M. Venizelos had declared himself ready to cope with the situation. In any case he thought, as the corridor would include Dedeagatch, a Greek town, and other towns also Greek, that it should, like Dantzig, be made into the territory of a Free State.

M. TITTONI said that he had previously suggested an alteration of the line in Eastern Thrace; now Mr. Balfour suggested one in Western Thrace. He thought perhaps the two might be combined.

M. TARDIEU said that if Western Thrace were not to be Greek there was no special reason why it should be Bulgarian. The population was Turkish.

MR. POLK observed that the country was at the present time Bulgarian.

M. TARDIEU said that Western Thrace was held by the Bulgarians just as Southern Dobrudja was held by the Roumanians. The American Delegation wished to take Southern Dobrudja from Roumania because it was Bulgarian and to give Bulgaria Western Thrace because it was Turkish.

MR. POLK said that the question was whether Greece had a better claim to the country than Bulgaria. Secondly, if the transfer meant war was it advisable to make it?

M. TARDIEU said he would agree if necessary not to give the country to Greece but he would not agree to give it to Bulgaria.

MR. POLK observed that the American suggestion had been to attribute the country to an international state. This had been scoffed at.

M. TARDIEU said that possibly a working arrangement might be made giving Dedeagatch as a commercial outlet to Bulgaria, under international administration as a free city. An international administrative commission would also control the railway leading to it. Thrace, both Eastern and Western, might be granted autonomous rights, similar to those granted to Ruthenia, under the sovereignty of Greece. It might even be possible to re-enforce the arrangement made for Ruthenia by an international commission. This scheme would take into consideration all the observations made, except that it would not permit direct access of Bulgaria to the Aegean, but he thought Bulgaria could do without this and the Allies had no real interest in furthering this desire. In any case he thought it was more inexpedient to work for the party of Constantine in Greece than to annoy the Bulgarians who, after what they had done, must expect severe treatment.

MR. POLK agreed that it was desirable to uphold M. Venizelos. He had no desire to favour the Bulgarians but it was not always advantageous to give even a good boy all he wanted. In Western Thrace, the figures of the 1914 census showed 100,000 Bulgarians against 30,000 Greeks. It was true that this proportion had been different in 1910 but present figures showed a great preponderance of Bulgarians. The American Delegation was convinced that to give this country to Greece was dangerous and would do no good. In Eastern Thrace, by changing the Enos-Midia line, it might be possible to give Greece a larger Greek population. The Greeks were more numerous towards Constantinople and less numerous towards Adrianople where the Bulgarian population was denser. He urged that 100,000 Bulgarians should not be placed under Greek rule. What had happened in Smyrna would

happen again in Western Thrace. M. Venizelos had quoted a number of Bulgarian atrocities. Out of the Carnegie report an equal number of Greek atrocities could be cited. The Turks in Western Thrace spoke Bulgarian and preferred Bulgarian to Greek rule.

MR. TARDIEU said that his own experience had satisfied him that the inference from language to political preference was false.

MR. POLK said that this might be so. Nevertheless, there still remained 100,000 Bulgarians as against 30,000 Greeks.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what Mr. Polk thought of the proposal to make Dedeagatch and the corridor a free city.

MR. POLK said that this solution would still give the uplands of Thrace where the Bulgarian population was densest to Greeks. The corridor was on the Eastern rim of Western Thrace.

M. TARDIEU said that he saw no possibility of giving to Bulgaria Greek or Turkish territory. The figures of the 1914 census did not deserve any attention. The reduction of the Greek population had been obtained by wholesale massacre. He could not admit that massacre created title.

MR. POLK said that he had taken care to say that no title arose from massacre. What he had drawn attention to was the actual condition of the population.

M. TARDIEU said that under a Greek or International Government, the Greeks would flock back to the country.

MR. POLK said they would doubtless do so if the Bulgarians allowed them. That was the point. His instructions from President Wilson were very clear that a large Bulgarian population was not to be handed over to Greece.

M. TARDIEU asked whether a commercial outlet for Bulgaria to Dedeagatch through an internationalised territory was consistent with Mr. Polk's instructions.

MR. POLK said that this might be consistent with the instructions. He was not quite certain, as there had been some confusion in the cable. What was quite positive was that the transference of a large population in Western Thrace to Greece was not approved.

M. TARDIEU asked whether autonomy similar to that given to the Ruthenians or even reinforced by further guarantees would be accepted by the American Delegation.

MR. POLK said that only international control would be accepted.

M. TARDIEU asked if Mr. Polk would oppose the cession of any part of Western Thrace to Greece.

MR. POLK said his instructions did not amount to this. He would be prepared to accept the compromise suggested by Mr. Balfour. The whole matter might, as Mr. Lansing had suggested, be referred to an International Commission.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the present Council was, in itself, an International Commission. He thought that for the time being no further progress could be made in the discussion and suggested that the views of M. Venizelos on the various compromises should be obtained.

M. TARDIEU said that he knew what M. Venizelos' views were. He had seen him since his conversation with Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk. M. Venizelos was not willing to give up the numerous Greeks of Eastern Thrace merely on account of a few thousand Bulgarians in Western Thrace.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Mr. Polk accepted autonomy for Thrace under Greek sovereignty.

MR. POLK replied in the negative.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think that the granting or the withholding of Dedeagatch from Bulgaria would put an end to conflict in the Balkans. On one thing he was determined—that no territorial reward should be given to Bulgaria.

(It was decided to adjourn the discussion.)

3. M. TARDIEU said that a small piece of frontier remained unsettled. He alluded to the frontier between Roumania and the Ruthene territory attached to Czecho-Slovakia. The recommendations of the Committee on the Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Yugo-Slavia were to be found in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919. (W. C. P. 656, Page 4. II—Conclusions, A. Northern Frontier (a) and (b)).⁷

Frontier between Roumania and the Czecho-Slovak State

(It was then decided to accept the frontier between Roumania and the Czecho-Slovak State (Ruthene territory) as drawn by the Committee for the study of Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919, and to notify this line to the two Delegations concerned.)

4. M. CAMBON said that the Czechs and Poles had not been able to reach a solution on the question of Teschen. M. Paderewski had suggested that the negotiations should be resumed in Paris. M. Benes, who felt that he would not be able to yield, had asked to be heard by the Council. The Council had already had discussions on the question of Teschen, and was doubtless unwilling to hear lengthy statements on the subject again. He therefore suggested that M. Benes and M. Paderewski be heard before a joint meeting of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees. As neither side would yield, it was obviously to the advantage of both to have

Question of Teschen

⁷ The paragraphs in question read as follows:

'(a) The line proposed by the Committee for the northern frontier of Transylvania gives to the Ruthenes the valley of the river Tisza and the railway following it, with the exception of the Rumanian centre of Máramaros-Sziget. Moreover, it leaves the Ruthenes free to re-establish the continuity of their railway by making a detour round that town.

'(b) The Committee is of opinion that the railway from Tisza-Ujlak to Rahó, as well as its connections with the railways situated on each side of it, should be operated under the supervision of the Allied and Associated Governments so as to ensure their free use to the neighbouring States concerned during the time required for the completion of a continuous railway in Rumanian territory from Máramaros-Sziget to Szatmár-Németi and a continuous railway in Tchecho-Slovak territory on the northern bank of the river Tisza. The conditions and duration of the supervision by the Allied and Associated Governments will be fixed by the said Governments.'

a solution imposed by the Conference. The joint meeting would then make a short report to the Council.

(It was decided to accept M. Cambon's proposal regarding the reference of the Teschen question to a joint meeting of the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees for speedy examination and report.)

(M. Cambon withdrew and Mr. Strachey⁸ entered the room.)

5. MR. STRACHEY said that on May 7th the Supreme Council decided that the mandate for German East Africa should be given to Great Britain. This decision was published. M. Hymans⁹ thereupon addressed a protest to M. Clemenceau as he considered that the claims of Belgium to receive a mandate for the portion of the colony occupied by her troops should not have been overlooked. Lord Milner¹⁰ was asked by the Prime Minister to discuss the matter with M. Hymans. M. Hymans delegated M. Orts to represent him, and Lord Milner had meetings with M. Orts and also correspondence during the month of May. On the 1st June Lord Milner informed the Secretary of the British Empire Delegation that he had agreed with M. Orts to join with him in a proposal to the Supreme Council that Belgium should be allowed to retain, under mandate, a certain portion of the territory of German East Africa occupied by her troops. The limits of this territory so retained were marked on a map, a copy of which was submitted by Lord Milner. Lord Milner added: 'It is clearly understood that in recommending this solution, which I am personally prepared to support, I have not in any way committed the Supreme Council.' The decision to create a special Commission to consider, among other things, the claims of Belgium in German East Africa, was taken on June 26th [27th]. The Meeting of that Commission which heard the Belgian claims took place on July 17th, and the above-mentioned agreement between Lord Milner and M. Orts, was communicated by Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy.¹¹

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how much of German East Africa would thus pass under Belgian mandate.

MR. STRACHEY replied that it would be about one-twentieth of the Colony and the most thickly populated part of it containing about 2,500,000 people.

MR. BALFOUR said that he supported the views of Lord Milner. He understood that there were some objections as Belgian administration, owing to its past achievements, did not inspire universal conviction.

MR. STRACHEY said that this point had not been raised by the United States representative. A different point had been raised by him at a meeting of the Mandate Committee (See penultimate paragraph of Report of Committee on Belgian Claims in East Africa—Appendix C).¹²

⁸ Expert for African Colonies on the British Delegation.

⁹ Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

¹⁰ Secretary of State for the Colonies and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

¹¹ Belgian representative on the Commission on Colonial Mandates.

¹² Not printed. This report stated that the committee had on July 17, 1919, considered the agreement of May 30, 1919 (see appendix D), and had unanimously decided to transmit it to the Supreme Council, no member of the committee except the representative of the

M. TITTONI said that, in consideration of the great sacrifices made by Belgium during the war, this satisfaction could not be denied her. He was in favour of ratifying the agreements made between the British and Belgian Delegates.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK asked if he might for the time being reserve his vote, as he wished to consult an American Expert who was not present. He would notify the Secretariat later.

(With the reservation that Mr. Polk would inform the Secretariat-General at a later date whether he was able to accept or not, the agreement annexed as Appendix D was accepted by the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 7, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 30

Memorandum relative to the Armistice Terms presented by Roumania to Hungary

August 7th, 1919.

The armistice terms go far beyond what is normally included in an armistice and comprise a comprehensive programme for indemnifying Roumania for loss and damage which she has suffered in the war. The indemnification to be required of Hungary is far more drastic than anything which has ever been considered by the Peace Conference and is for the exclusive benefit of Roumania.

The demands of Roumania represent, in my opinion, an act of bad faith on the part of Roumania, which is destructive of the entire principle of reparation adopted by the Peace Conference and consecrated by the Treaty with Germany, which Roumania has signed.

(1) The Treaty with Germany establishes the principle of 'solidarity'. One global debt is created, made up of the damage done by Germany *and its allies*, and one common fund is created of payments by Germany *and its allies*. Out of this common fund each Allied State is to receive a share proportionate to damage suffered, irrespective of which [of] the enemy States caused the damage and irrespective of the Powers from which the reparation fund was made up. This principle was accepted by the greater Powers at the urgent request of the lesser Balkan Powers, particularly Roumania, which urged that it would be unjust that they be relegated to relief from Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, the financial capacity of which was small. Accordingly, the Treaty with Germany makes Germany liable for damage done by Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Roumania,

United States having any observation to make with regard to principle. As regards the American attitude, the penultimate paragraph of the report read as follows:

'Mr. Beer, on behalf of the U.S.A., made the following observations:

"The territory over which there is a question of giving Belgium a mandate had a population of about 3 million inhabitants out of the 7 millions who formed the population of the former German colony of East Africa. This zone is moreover inhabited by tribes whose position, from the ethnical, political and economic points of view, differs from that of the populations of the Belgian Congo, from which they are moreover geographically isolated. This may cause the Belgian administration difficulties which Mr. Beer, some weeks before the agreement of 30th May, had thought it his duty to point out to President Wilson."

among the other Allies, is entitled to share *pro rata* in payments made by Germany. Correspondingly, all the Allies are to share *pro rata* in reparation payments made by Hungary, etc.

The armistice demand made by Roumania on Hungary is destructive of this fundamental principle which was accepted by the principal Allied Powers at the request and for the benefit of Roumania and other lesser Powers.

(2) The principle is established by the Treaty with Germany (see Reparation Clauses, Annex II, Paragraph 12) that the Reparation Commission is constituted by the several Allied and Associated Governments as the 'exclusive agency' of the said Governments for receiving the reparation payments to be made by Germany. While the text of this Treaty applies only to the reparation payments made *by Germany*, it was always understood that the signatories of this Treaty accepted the general principle of the Allied Powers collecting reparation through a common and exclusive agency. Language similar to that of the German Treaty is contained in the Conditions of Peace presented to Austria, and is to be contained in the reparation clauses with Hungary. The principle is obviously the only sound and orderly one. If every nation is allowed to go about in its own way to collect the indemnity which it thinks is due it, nothing but dispute, recrimination and serious trouble can result. The action of Roumania in formulating and presenting the armistice terms to Hungary is destructive of this principle.

(3) In the Conditions of Peace prepared for Austria it was originally provided that liability for reparation should be imposed upon the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, including portions of that Empire transferred to Allied States. In deference to urgent protests it was agreed to permit the States acquiring Austro-Hungarian territory to make a modest contribution toward the cost of the war of liberation, which would be accepted in lieu of indemnity. An agreement to this effect has (subject to approval by his Government) been signed by Mr. Antonesco, one of the Roumanian plenipotentiaries. By this agreement Roumania undertakes to make payment, in accordance with a formula which is prescribed, on account of the cost of liberating Austro-Hungarian territory transferred to Roumania. It is further provided that this sum to be paid *by* Roumania shall be set off against the sums payable *to* Roumania by way of reparation and 'no further payments on account of reparation shall be made until the other States to whom reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation'. On the faith of this agreement the proposed Conditions of Peace with Austria were modified, so as to relieve transferred portions of Austria-Hungary from payment of indemnity.

The terms of the armistice presented by Roumania to Hungary are in direct violation of the agreement signed by Mr. Antonesco.

J. F. D[ULLES].

APPENDIX B TO No. 30

Document 1

Radio.

Monsieur le Général Gorton,

Mission Britannique, Budapest.

En réponse à vos télégrammes d'information, je vous communique le télégramme que la Conférence de la Paix a adressé aujourd'hui au Gouvernement Roumain à Bucarest.

7 août 1919.

Je vous prie d'en donner connaissance à vos Collègues des Missions Alliées et au Général en Chef Roumain.

(reproduire le Télégramme à Bucarest)

G. CLEMENCEAU

Document 2

Extrême urgence.

7 août 1919.

Ministre de France, Bucarest.

Je vous prie de communiquer sans le moindre retard au Gouvernement Roumain le télégramme suivant que lui adresse la Conférence de la Paix.

A la suite de la chute du Gouvernement de Bela Kun et de son remplacement par un Gouvernement socialiste, consécutifs à la défaite des troupes hongroises par les troupes roumaines, le Conseil Suprême a, le 5 août, envoyé à Budapest une Commission de quatre Généraux Alliés chargés d'entrer en communication d'une part avec le Gouvernement hongrois pour faire respecter l'armistice de novembre 1918, et d'autre part avec les Chefs des armées roumaines et serbes pour garantir le pays occupé contre tous sévices et régler les conditions de l'occupation.

Ces décisions ont été portées par télégramme à la connaissance du Gouvernement hongrois, des Généraux roumains, en même temps que des Gouvernements roumain et serbe.

Le Conseil Suprême ayant appris le 6 août que les autorités militaires roumaines à Budapest voulaient imposer au Gouvernement hongrois un armistice en contradiction avec l'armistice conclu en novembre avec la Hongrie au nom des Puissances alliées, et en violation des droits généraux des Alliés quant aux réparations, a avisé le jour même le Gouvernement roumain qu'il refusait de reconnaître aux Généraux roumains le droit de conclure un armistice sans l'autorisation des Puissances Alliées. En même temps, le Gouvernement roumain était mis en garde contre toute action contraire à l'humanité ou au droit qui pourrait être commise par les troupes roumaines, en le priant de donner au Général en Chef Roumain en Hongrie l'ordre de se conformer aux directions de la Commission des Généraux qui représente la Conférence et agit par délégation de son autorité.

La Conférence de la Paix n'a encore reçu aucune réponse directe du Gouvernement roumain et apprend que les Généraux roumains refusent de déférer aux indications des Généraux Alliés, s'opposent à la publication du télégramme adressé par le Président de la Conférence au Gouvernement Hongrois, laissent leurs soldats piller la propriété privée, réquisitionnent et envoient en Roumanie le bétail, et le matériel roulant, soumettent Budapest à un blocus inutile qui affame la ville, détruisent les lignes de chemins de fer, en particulier celle qui va de Budapest à Vienne, enfin commettent une série d'actes qui sont autant de violations des décisions de la Conférence, des droits des Puissances Alliées et Associées, et même de la plus élémentaire humanité.

Le Conseil Suprême apprend en même temps que le Gouvernement socialiste et hongrois a été renversé par un coup d'état, ses membres arrêtés et qu'il a été remplacé par un Gouvernement à la tête duquel est l'Archiduc Joseph.

En présence de ces faits, la Conférence est obligée de croire que le Gouvernement Roumain a l'intention de braver la Conférence et de se séparer des Puissances Alliées et Associées.

Si la Conférence se trompe à cet égard, elle demande au Gouvernement Roumain de démentir immédiatement cette opinion, non par des mots mais par des

actes, qui prouveront publiquement que la Roumanie accepte et est prête à exécuter de bonne foi la politique arrêtée par la Conférence.

G. CLEMENCEAU

APPENDIX D TO NO. 30

Document 1

Copie.

PARIS, le 30 mai 1919.

Annexe: une carte.¹³

Les soussignés ont l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil Suprême des Alliés la proposition suivante concernant l'attribution de mandats d'administration sur les territoires de l'Est africain allemand:

La Belgique exercera le mandat d'administration de la partie de l'Est africain allemand qui s'étend à l'ouest de la limite indiquée en rouge sur la carte ci-jointe.¹³

La Grande-Bretagne exercera le mandat sur les parties de la même colonie qui ne sont pas attribuées à la Belgique.

MILNER.

ORTS, Ministre Plénipotentiaire
de sa Majesté le Roi des Belges.

Document 2

Description of the Boundary indicated on the Accompanying Map¹³

From the point where the frontier between the Uganda Protectorate and German East Africa cuts the river Mavumba and in a south-easterly direction a straight line to point 1640, about 15 kilometers south-south-west of Mt. Gabiro.

Thence a straight line in a southerly direction to the north shore of Lake Mohazi, where it terminates at the confluence of a river situated about 2½ kilometers from the confluence of the river Msilala.

If the trace of the railway on the west of the river Kagera from Bugufi to Uganda approaches within 16 kilometers of the line defined above, the boundary will be carried to the west, following a minimum distance of 16 kilometers from this trace, without, however, passing to the west of the straight line joining the terminal point on Lake Mohazi and the top of Mt. Kivisa (2100) situated on the Uganda-German East African frontier about 5 kilometers south-west of the point where the river Mavumba cuts this frontier.

Thence a line south-eastwards to meet the southern shore of Lake Mohazi.

Thence the watershed between the Taruka and the Mkarange and continuing southwards to the north-eastern end of Lake Mugesera.

Thence the median line of this lake and continuing southwards across Lake Ssake to meet the Kagera. Thence the course of the Kagera downstream to meet the western boundary of Bugufi.

Thence this boundary to its junction with the eastern boundary of Urundi.

Thence the eastern and southern boundary of Urundi to Lake Tanganyika.

MILNER.

ORTS, Ministre Plénipotentiaire
de S.M. le Roi des Belges.

¹³ Map not annexed to original of this appendix.

H. D. 27.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, August 8, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir G. Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Commander Bell. *France*: Captain A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt-Colonel A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. (Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council were present.)

Situation in Fiume M. CLEMENCEAU communicated a letter from the Italian Delegation on this subject to the Council (See Appendix A).

M. TITTONI asked that the question should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.

(It was therefore agreed that the letter from the Italian Delegation with regard to the Financial Situation in Fiume should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the Americans had any news from Budapest.

Situation in Hungary MR. POLK communicated a telegram contained in Appendix B.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not see that the Council could do anything at present.

MR. BALFOUR, commenting upon the telegram, asked why the Allied and Associated representatives at Vienna had received some, and not all, of the instructions given to the Committee of General Officers.

MR. POLK said that he could only say that the instructions had been sent through Warsaw [? to] General Gorton.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that the instructions had been sent on the previous day, in writing, and by telegram. The former would go by courier, but the latter would have to be communicated by the best means that the Allied representatives in Vienna could devise.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the American organisation for telegraphic communication with Central Europe had been employed.

MR. NORMAN replied that an attempt had been made to send the communication by wireless telegraph from the Eiffel Tower.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think the question was of great importance, so long as every means had been employed for communicating with the Allied and Associated representatives concerned.

M. TITTONI then drew attention to the instructions to the four Generals, dealing with the distribution of war materials to the Allies (See Appendix B of H. D. 24¹).

He thought that the insertion of the phrase in the instructions in question was somewhat premature. He understood that the Council was to decide finally on the distribution of the total war material taken from the enemy, on the general principle that each Ally was to have a share proportionate to its effort. The question, therefore, still remained to be settled.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not quite understand how the phrase objected to by M. Tittoni had been inserted.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with the principle enunciated by M. Tittoni, and said that he thought a telegram should be sent to the Generals.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he would draft the necessary telegram to the Generals.

(It was decided that General Weygand should send a telegram to the four Generals on the Commission to Budapest, informing them that as the general principle governing the distribution of enemy war material to the Allies had not as yet been decided on by the Council, their functions in the matter should be limited to making such recommendations as they might think fit.)

3. MR. BALFOUR stated that the Austrian Delegation had just sent in a general reply on the subject of the peace terms.² The communications in question would be sent to the various Committees for examination, in accordance with the procedure established. Furthermore, each Committee would report separately on the points in the Note with which it was immediately concerned. The Council after receiving and considering the replies of these various Committees, would send them to the Co-ordinating Committee for the necessary action. He therefore proposed a modification of the procedure, which would consist in sending the replies of the various Committees to the Co-ordinating Committee first, which latter body, after considering them as a whole, should report to the Council.

CAPTAIN PORTIER informed Mr. Balfour that this procedure had already been adopted.

(The Finance Experts entered the Room.)

4. M. CHEYSSON drew the attention of the Council to the telegram contained in Appendix C. He said the Council was faced with the alternative of the eventual bankruptcy of the Turkish state, or of partially consenting to the measures which the Ottoman Government were taking. He thought it would be better to

¹ No. 28.

² On August 6, 1919, the Austrian Delegation, in conformity with the stipulated extension of the time-limit (see No. 22, minute 2), communicated its general reply and detailed observations upon the draft treaty presented to it on July 20. French and German texts of this Austrian reply are printed in *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye*, vol. ii, pp. 78-295.

have further information before taking definite measures. Such information would take the form of a general report on the financial position of the Turkish Government. He did not think that it would be proper to allow the Turks to proceed with the sale of State property without further enquiry. He suggested that they should be asked why the sale of their credits and property was so urgent, and what form of realisable property they proposed to sell.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Cheysson as to the need of a general report upon the financial position of Turkey. He thought, however, that a distinction should be made between

- (1) the private property of the Sultan
- (2) the properties of religious foundations, and
- (3) the State domains.

No. 3 constituted a fund of State property which was a most important guarantee of ultimate reparation. The private property of the Crown could be sold by the Turkish Govt. as it could not be regarded as confiscated property, subjected to the payment of war damages. The properties of religious foundations could not be seized in payment of war damages, and the Turkish Government might, in a similar manner, sell them.

M. CHEYSSON said that in the Peace Treaties with Austria and Germany, the Crown property had been regarded as belonging genuinely to the State, and as being, in consequence, liable to confiscation.

M. TITTONI said that he could not quite agree, as a distinction had been established between the private and public property of the Ruler, the latter falling under the jurisdiction of the National Executive.

M. PICHON said that he did not think that distinctions of the kind were applicable to Eastern countries, and that it would be better to adopt a simpler, general rule.

M. TITTONI said that he only desired that in communicating a general report upon the financial situation in Turkey, the Financial Commission should take into consideration the point that he had raised.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether, under the terms of the Armistice, we were empowered to ask for the exact information required. Could we, for instance, have made a similar request to Germany?

M. CHEYSSON remarked that he thought that until such time as the Peace Treaty should be signed, the Allied and Associated Governments were able to take whatever measures they thought necessary for the preservation of their interests.

MR. POLK said that as it would be a long time before the final peace could be arrived at with Turkey, and, as the existing Armistice was incomplete in certain points, due to its having been drawn up at an early period, would it not be advantageous to draft a more complete and conclusive Armistice, which would enable us to tide over the intervening time?

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Mr. Polk's suggestion, if put into effect, would be a trifle high-handed.

MR. POLK suggested that the necessary measures might be effected by mutual agreement.

MR. DULLES drew attention to the fact that in the successive Armistices imposed upon Germany, measures had been taken with a view to preserving securities and other properties for the purposes of ultimate reparations.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, but said that these additional terms had only been imposed in exchange for concessions on other points granted by the German Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the necessary measures could only be put into effect by Treaty provisions.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that it might be best—

1. To refuse to recognise the sales of property now being carried out by the Turkish Government until the final signature of the Peace Treaty. Such a measure would put prospective purchasers on their guard; and
2. After receiving a full report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, authorisation might be given to proceed with sales of a certain class, in order that the Turkish Empire might be saved from bankruptcy.

(It was therefore decided:—

1. That a communication should be sent to the Ottoman Government through the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, informing it that the Allied and Associated Governments refused, and would refuse to recognise the validity of any sales, effected by such Government, between the signature of the Armistice and the ratification of the Peace Treaty.
2. That the Allied and Associated Governments should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licences to the Ottoman Government for the sale of such property as the aforesaid Ottoman Government might desire to realise: the conditions of sale, and the property to be realised, being specified, in detail, beforehand, to the Allied and Associated Governments.
3. That the Financial Commission should enquire into, and present a general report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, and should examine the question of the sale by that Government of
 - (a) Private properties of the Crown.
 - (b) Properties belonging to religious foundations.
 - (c) State domains.)

5. (At this point Colonel Peel entered the Room and M. Cheysson withdrew.)

*Reparation and Financial
Clauses in the Peace
Treaty with Bulgaria*

COLONEL PEEL presented and remarked on the proposals put forward by the Reparations Commission (See Appendix D).³

³ Not printed. The proposals put forward by the Reparation Commission in this note dated August 7, 1919, were those accepted below by the Supreme Council under resolutions 1-4. In the first two of these proposals the Reparation Commission was reiterating its previous views against those of the Greek, Roumanian and Yugoslav Delegations, which considered that

He drew attention to the observations made by the Delegations of the Greek, Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Governments on the subject of the Reparation Clauses, and to the opinion of the Reparation Commission upon the criticism raised against the articles in the Peace Treaty dealing with reparations by Bulgaria.

In conclusion, he drew attention to the calculation made by the American Delegation on the subject of reparations in Balkan countries. The results of this calculation were that the reparations to be paid by Bulgaria were to be regarded as a national payment of Fcs. 600. for each citizen. The total load of debt and obligations upon Serbia, represented a payment of Fcs. 300. per citizen.

Finally, he wished that a modification should be inserted into Article 14, so as to enable the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.

(It was agreed:—

- (1) To accept the figure of 2½ milliards of Francs, which the Reparations Commission considered to be the maximum sum payable by Bulgaria.
- (2) To accept the findings of the Commission with regard to the debts due by Germany to Bulgaria, and by Bulgaria to Germany, and not to add such credits to the total sum payable by the Bulgarian Government.
- (3) To accept the findings of the Reparations Commission on the subject of the cattle and live stock to be delivered by the Bulgarians to the Serbs.
- (4) That neither Greece, nor Roumania, nor Jugo-Slavia should be represented on the Interallied Committee for Bulgaria.
- (5) That Article 14 of the Financial and Reparation Clauses should be modified in such a manner as to allow the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.)

6. MARSHAL FOCH explained his report (see Annexe [Appendix] E) on the subject of the German Forces in the 10 kilometre and 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch's proposals with regard to the German Military forces for maintaining order in the 10 kilometre and the 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine should be accepted.)

the provisions were unduly favourable to Bulgaria. (In connection with the second proposal it was stated that: 'La Commission estime qu'il serait tout à fait illogique, après avoir fixé le maximum de ce que la Bulgarie peut payer, d'y ajouter une somme indéterminée et dont le montant est, au reste, l'objet des contestations.') These delegations held the same view as regards the third item. Here the Reparation Commission stated that after consulting the Allied representatives in Bulgaria it had somewhat raised the proposed figures; it energetically maintained, however, its view as to the desirability of limiting restitutions of cattle from Bulgaria, which might otherwise degenerate into razzias. It appeared to the Commission that the delegations in question did not fully appreciate the fact that limited restitutions in kind were not to be regarded as being necessarily the only satisfaction which they might receive in respect of claims to reparation for losses in cattle, etc.; and in the course of the general discharge of her economic obligations, Bulgaria would doubtless be compelled to export cattle in large numbers.

7. MARSHAL FOCH said that the question to be discussed had been brought forward in his letter of the 6th of August to the President of the Council (see Annexe [Appendix] F). His conclusion had been, that the Council ought to take an immediate resolution with regard to the constitution of the Allied Forces, and to the total forces necessary.

*Army of Occupation
in Upper Silesia and
Dantzig area.
(a) Upper Silesia*

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Italy should be regarded as consenting to participate in the occupation.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he understood that Italy would participate, and that contributions to the forces would come from four sources.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question before the Council was whether each Country consented to send a quarter of the total effectives.

MR. BALFOUR said that Great Britain was quite willing to send her share; but that a practical difficulty with regard to the provisioning of the troops called for solution. It would be very difficult for Great Britain to send the necessary provisions to any of its forces stationed in Upper Silesia; on the other hand, such an operation would be relatively easy for France. He therefore proposed that the Headquarter Staffs should examine the question of distributing the troops. England might take a greater share in any operations affecting the coastal regions, such as Dantzig; whilst France might make a proportionately larger contribution towards operations in such regions as Upper Silesia. The total force would be the same; only the disposal of the troops would be modified.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that a decision had been arrived at, to the effect that the forces of occupation in Upper Silesia should be taken from the Armies in the Rhine territories. The question of transport had not therefore arisen, since troops taken from such sources would probably be sent by land. Since the provisioning of the troops on the left bank of the Rhine was carried out *en bloc*, the same thing would probably hold good for military forces in Upper Silesia. It was most important that all forces of occupation sent out by the Allies to various parts of Europe should, in every case, comprise a certain number of men from each one of the Allied and Associated Powers. This principle was particularly important in such areas as Dantzig. He did not make any concrete proposal, but considered that the spirit of the Treaty would be violated by failing to make all forces of occupation, composite, Inter-Allied Units.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he concluded from Mr. Balfour's remark that the British Army would be represented in Upper Silesia.

MR. BALFOUR said the British forces would certainly take part in that occupation.

GENERAL BLISS said that a decision had been arrived at, to the effect that every Army was to be represented on the Rhine. He was of the opinion that the command in any one locality should be homogeneous. The United States would contribute. With regard to the proportion of troops to be furnished by each nation, he reminded the Council that he had been a Member of each Committee that had examined the problem, when the ques-

tion of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine had been discussed. He had told President Wilson that the figure arrived at for the United States Forces was an absolute minimum. His observations had therefore been accepted and the necessary orders given. He had thought, however, that the American troops were to remain on the Rhine, and were not to be sent into Upper Silesia. It would therefore be necessary for him to ask President Wilson whether the United States contingent for the Rhine should be considered as indivisible, and, if sent elsewhere, whether it should be replaced.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when the question of the occupation of the Rhine had been discussed, President Wilson's plan of an Inter-Allied occupation had been accepted in spite of his (M. Clemenceau's) opposition. It therefore seemed difficult to admit that President Wilson was in a position to discuss the matter further.

MR. BALFOUR said that he believed General Belin had informed the Council that a Division in Upper Silesia could be of strategical use in the event of the recurrence of active operations on the Western Front.

GENERAL BLISS said that he was sure that President Wilson would make no objection. The only point to be considered was whether the United States force should be regarded as a Unit not capable of division, and whether if it were sent to Upper Silesia, it should be replaced on the Rhine by other troops.

MR. POLK said that the question was one of numbers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he realised, that, from a practical point of view, it would be better for certain Units in the Armies of Occupation not to be Inter-Allied Forces. From the political point of view, however, it was most important that Occupation Forces should be so constituted; this was more particularly desirable in view of the fact that the Allied soldiers had always worked well together, and that no friction had risen between them.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. It was most advantageous to show everywhere, that the Allies remained associated together in the achievement of certain objects. He did not foresee any difficulty with regard to the troops; but he did anticipate numerous practical difficulties with regard to provisioning. He proposed that Marshal Foch should examine the problem in collaboration with the Headquarter Staffs of the various Governments concerned.

M. TITTONI said that he did not think that the principle of equal contribution had ever been accepted, and that he could not undertake to furnish a quarter of the total effectives in the Division for Upper Silesia, more especially as Italy had no troops on the Rhine.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that although there were no Italian troops on the Rhine, Signor Orlando had none the less accepted the principle of the Forces of Occupation being divided amongst the Allies.

M. TITTONI said that he thought that the American and British Governments had made reservations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that these Governments had consented to furnish their contingents; the only reservations that they had made, dealt with the subject of the distribution of troops in certain specified sectors.

MARSHAL FOCH asked whether he was to understand that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, would participate equally in the occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. TITTONI said that he accepted the principle, but made a reservation with regard to the number of effectives to be supplied.

M. CLEMENCEAU answered that the principle of Inter-Allied occupation had been proposed by President Wilson, and accepted by all. It had been completely understood that an equal representation was intended; for, when no such understanding had been arrived at, the question had been raised and decided. This had been the principle arrived at for the Rhine. No statement had ever been made to the effect that unequal contributions would be given by the various Governments to the Army of Occupation in Silesia. Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk had accepted the general principle, and he asked M. Tittoni to give his consent to it.

M. TITTONI said that the theatre in which the operation was to take place was further away from Italy than it was from other countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that such a fact might be an excuse for Italian troops arriving late, but that he insisted on knowing whether M. Tittoni did, or did not, accept the principle that Italy should supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for the occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. TITTONI said that he accepted the principle.

(It was decided that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, should each supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for Upper Silesia.)

It was further decided that Marshal Foch, in collaboration with the Allied Headquarter Staff should consider what advantage would be derived from each of that [?the] Allied Governments being represented in the Forces of Occupation in Eastern Europe. Marshal Foch should further consider the disadvantages which might arise from the constitution of composite Inter-Allied Forces, owing to difficulties of provisioning each of these contingents, and from any friction that might occur between the soldiers of the Allied Nations. Finally, Marshal Foch was to submit a report on what he considered would be the most advantageous distribution of the Allied troops.)

MARSHAL FOCH said that the same question arose with regard to Danzig and Memel, which were occupied by Inter-Allied troops. He asked whether the principle of equal contingents had been accepted.

(b) *Danzig and Memel*

MR. BALFOUR said that the principle was not disputed. What ought to be decided was whether it would not be more practical for each Government to have its forces concentrated in certain sectors, so as to simplify the problem of provisioning. The total number of effectives in each locality would not be altered; he took as an example the occupations of Upper Silesia, and of Danzig, and of Memel. It might be decided that the British contingent in Upper Silesia ought to be replaced by a French contingent of equal strength. In compensation for such an arrangement, France would not have to send

any contingent to Danzig. On such a basis, France would only have to send provisions to Upper Silesia, and not to Danzig; whilst Great Britain would only send provisions to Danzig, and not to Upper Silesia. He wished the problem, as he had brought it forward, to be studied by Marshal Foch and the Allied Headquarters Staffs.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that the Upper Silesia question had been settled and ought not to be raised afresh. He asked for a decision with regard to Danzig and to Memel.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the articles in the Peace Treaty were different with regard to the two regions. The Inter-Allied occupation of Upper Silesia had been decided upon, but no such decision had been taken with regard to Danzig. The question had been laid before the Supreme Council at Versailles; but the military experts had not been able to agree to the necessity of sending troops of occupation. The French Delegation favoured such a measure; the British and American Delegations opposed it. A decision was very necessary.

M. TITTONI remarked that in a previous discussion⁴ it had been decided that German troops should evacuate Dantzic, which should not be occupied by Polish forces; and that the question of sending Inter-Allied troops into that region should be adjourned. Troops should only be sent into the Danzig region if thought necessary by the members of the Delimitation Committee on the spot.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his opinion only a very few troops would be necessary for Danzig. The Germans, whose propaganda might have been serious, now seemed to be resigned and the situation in this locality had much improved. He did not think that it was therefore very urgent to come to an immediate decision.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the difficulty arose from the fact that officers sent out to the regions in question might at any moment ask for troops. The High Command must keep this in mind in drawing up its general military programme. At the present moment all armies were demobilising. Soldiers were returning to their civil occupations and if the constitution of this contingent were not decided upon it might be impossible to form it when desired.

M. TITTONI said that the troops would only be sent if the officers on particular Commissions and Committee[s] asked for them. Such officers could not even take up their posts until the ratification of the Treaty and this fact gave us time to consider the question.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was therefore decided that Marshal Foch should only examine the question of Upper Silesia.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Danzig question was also important and read out a telegram received that day from General Henrys:

'Varsovie, 6 août, 1919.

'Le Gouvernement Polonais me demande d'intervenir auprès de vous afin d'obtenir l'envoi de deux bataillons alliés pour garder les approvi-

⁴ See No. 24, minute 2.

sionnements transportés de Dunkerque à Dantzig et éviter les vols à Dantzig.

‘Je vous serais obligé de me faire connaître les intentions des Alliés au sujet du fonctionnement de la base polonaise de Dantzig. Si une Commission interalliée doit être chargée de la direction du port et des transports à Dantzig, j’estime que j’aurais intérêt à y être représenté pour les questions de transports qui intéressent directement le ravitaillement de la Pologne.’

The question of sending Allied troops to Dantzig and Memel was adjourned.

8.

*Allied Armies and the
clearing up of Battlefields*

[Not printed]

9. (M. Georgi then left the room,⁵ and General Nollet entered.)

*Organisation of
Inter-Allied Com-
mittees of Control*

GENERAL NOLLET said that as he was the President of the Interallied Commission of Military Control, he could not speak for the Naval and Aerial Commissions of Control. The Military Commission was divided into three sub-committees:—

- (a) The Sub-Committee for Arms and Munitions.
- (b) The Sub-Committee for Effectives and Recruiting.
- (c) The Sub-Committee for Fortifications.

Sub-Committee (a) was at the present moment the most important. There were large numbers of trained men in Germany at the present time. If German arms and munitions were taken away, the value of these trained men would disappear, and security would result. This had been the reason for the provision in the Peace Treaty whereby the time for the reduction of the German forces to an ordinary standard had been limited to three months. The Sub-Committee in question would have to see to it, that all material, in excess of what had been laid down, should be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments. It would, moreover, actively supervise the production of the numerous factories in Germany, to prevent the country from taking up the production of war material in a disguised form. It was evident that this sub-committee ought to have a considerable personnel, and a large number of specialists, in order to be able to act with rapidity. The field of its operations extended over the whole German Army, and all the factories of Germany.

Sub-Committee (b) had a different character. Its immediate functions were obviously most important, but its work in the future would be of far greater consequence. The avowed, and actual, intentions of Germany could only be ascertained with certainty by studying closely the manner in which German mobilisation would be carried out, and by examining the new legislation of that country. The members of this Sub-Committee would have to study German organisation from this point of view, and would have to

⁵ M. Georgi had entered the meeting for the previous item.

see how all the questions enumerated affected the general situation. The Sub-Committee might be composed of a smaller, non-specialist, personnel.

Sub-Committee (c) on fortifications would have an easier task. Fortified works could not be disguised. Their position was actually known, and they were largely in the territory that had fallen to France. The remainder were mostly in the Rhine territories, now under French occupation.

The whole Military Commission of Control, as outlined, would be very important. It would have to be constituted by 350 officers, 150 interpreters, and 800 ordinary soldiers. He thought that the figures given ought to be regarded as the minimum of what was necessary, in view of the large number of problems that would have to be studied locally, and the rapidity with which examinations would have to be effected. After the ratification of the Treaty, it would be necessary to spread a whole network of investigating bodies over Germany. He called upon the Council to examine the figures put forward by him, and to remember that the whole Committee would be an Inter-Allied body, and not a French one.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was entirely in agreement with General Nollet's conclusion with regard to the numerous personnel necessary for carrying out the work of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. Practical difficulties would, however, arise in points of detail, such as the transporting, provisioning and quartering of the staffs. As British representative, he would like to propose that the three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should come under Marshal Foch's orders, or else, later on, under the orders of the French General commanding on the Rhine.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch's Headquarter Staff, or the Headquarter Staff of the French Commander on the Rhine, should settle all questions arising out of the transportation into Germany of the Inter-Allied Committees of Control, as well as the questions affecting their quartering and provisioning, when established in that country.)

It was further decided to accept General Nollet's proposals on the subject of the personnel out of which the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be constituted.)

10. (At this point General Nollet left the room.)

Agreement between the Military clauses in the Peace Treaty with Hungary and those in the Austrian Peace Treaty

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that a report had been presented to the Council on the subject of the Military forces, which might be maintained by the various States of Central Europe. The report on Austria had been sent back to be modified. Certain alterations had been put into it, and he asked the Council whether the articles affecting Hungary were to be remodelled, and brought into conformity with those in the Peace Treaty with Austria as finally modified.

GENERAL BELIN said that the Council had decided on the maximum number of effectives which were to constitute the new Hungarian Army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council could not reply; since the Hungarian Treaty was not yet complete.

GENERAL BELIN said that the Military Representatives had proposed a maximum figure of 40,000 men for Austria. The Supreme Council had lowered the figure to 15,000. The final decision was that an Army of 30,000 men should be allowed. In the case of Hungary the two extreme figures were 45,000 men and 18,000 men respectively. What figure between these two latter was the Council going to decide upon?

M. TITTONI said that if the Austrian Peace Treaty was to be taken as a basis, Hungary ought to be allowed an Army of 35,000 men.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in the present state of the Peace Treaty with Hungary it was difficult to arrive at an exact figure. He did not see that there was any particular need for deciding immediately.

M. TITTONI said that the figure had to go into the Peace Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed that the Military Representatives ought to make the two Treaties agree in such articles as had been definitely settled. It was quite impossible to settle the question in the case of articles not decided upon. Austria had been allowed a large number of effectives in order to conciliate her and to detach her from German influence. His own suggestion had been for an Austrian Army of 15,000 men. It was not possible to settle the Hungarian Army on the basis of the Austrian.

(It was decided that the Military Representatives should co-ordinate the articles in the Peace Treaty with Hungary now definitely decided upon, with the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

11. M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the question should be adjourned in order
German Prisoners in that he might discuss it with Mr. Polk.
the custody of the
American Armies (It was therefore decided to adjourn the question.)

12. MR. BALFOUR said that it had been the wish of the British Government
Blockade of not to declare a Blockade on Russia, but to concert measures for
Russia closing the ports of Baltic Russia to International traffic in which
all the Allies could act conjointly. President Wilson had just replied
(see Appendix H) to the effect that he could not participate in the Allied
policy. It was, therefore, not possible to come to a decision at once, for,
whilst regretting the necessity of abandoning the policy suggested, he would
not adopt another unacceptable to America. At the present moment commercial transit was not active in the region in question, and, in another
three months, ice conditions would make it impossible. All that was necessary
was to tide over this short period, and to be ready to re-examine the question
if any important change took place.

M. TITTONI remarked that the Blockade of Hungary had only been declared because Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice conditions. We were now refusing to blockade Russia despite the fact that Lenin, the head of the Bolshevik Government, had defied the elementary laws of human society. Would not the Allied and Associated Governments be fully justified, in view of this comparison, in declaring a blockade on Russia? He was willing, however, to submit to the opinion of his colleagues.

MR. POLK said that morally he agreed with M. Tittoni. But there was an important legal point, which should not be forgotten. No war had been declared against Russia. He proposed that President Wilson's suggestion should be accepted, and that the Experts should study a means of effecting what was desired by means of mutual co-operation.

MR. BALFOUR accepted Mr. Polk's proposal.

(It was decided that the Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should examine the problem of carrying out, conjointly, measures which should be equivalent to a Blockade of Russian Baltic ports. When the problem had been fully examined a report should be made to the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 8, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO NO. 31

Italian Delegation,
Hotel Edward VII,
Paris, 7th August, 1919.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que le Gouvernement Italien vient de recevoir des nouvelles toujours plus graves au sujet de la situation monétaire à Fiume.

Le public a soustrait à la circulation et caché presque la totalité des couronnes qui ont été estampillées par la ville le mois d'avril, dernier, en attendant l'échange en monnaie italienne; de nombreux billets austro-hongrois avec une fausse estampe de Fiume entrent en circulation et le public est forcé à les accepter pour les nécessités de l'existence. Les trafics avec l'étranger sont excessivement difficiles à cause de la pénurie monétaire, ce qui produit un renchérissement de toutes les marchandises et par suite une très vive agitation dans la population.

La situation est vraiment très grave, et pourrait entraîner des conséquences très fâcheuses si les mesures nécessaires n'étaient pas prises de toute urgence. Le Conseil National de Fiume a fait cette suggestion: que le Gouvernement Italien prête à la ville de Fiume ses billets d'Etat et de banque dans la mesure requise pour retirer toutes les couronnes estampillées par la ville même, qui adopterait provisoirement la monnaie italienne. Le Gouvernement Royal n'aurait pas de difficulté à adhérer à cette proposition, mais il désire que les Alliés en soient préalablement informés. C'est pour cela, que je me permets d'avoir recours à Votre obligeance en Vous priant de vouloir bien saisir la Conférence de cette affaire: et comme tout retard pourrait être très nuisible, je Vous saurai gré si Vous voulez bien faire inscrire la question à l'ordre du jour d'une des séances de cette semaine.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

TITTONI

Son Excellence,

Monsieur Georges Clemenceau,

Président de la Conférence de la Paix, Paris.

APPENDIX B TO No. 31

Signal Corps, United States Army. Telegram.

VIENNA, August 7, 1919.

Hoover, Paris.

Number HAM 1099 for Logan. Details continue to arrive from Budapest showing the effect of cutting of communications. Hospitals are without food. Children also in desperate circumstances. Arranging to send down immediate temporary supply from Vienna stocks under convoy of British and Italian and American soldiers. Roumanians continue to conduct their occupation in the most harassing manner and their attitude towards Entente representatives who are there is distinctly hostile and puts us in a humiliating position. The taking away of horses and cattle is going to still further complicate harvest and food situation and no doubt withdrawal of army when ordered will be accompanied by loss of cars, locomotives, horses, cattle and foodstuffs. The political problem and the independent government of Hungary is a comparatively simple proposition but must be based on two propositions, first the immediate withdrawal of Roumanian troops out of the city and back to their frontiers and second, close supervision by the four Generals who will soon be there of the conduct of that withdrawal with reference to exportations and pillaging. We have not yet received full text of instructions given to four generals and do not know extent of their jurisdiction. Please wire that at once. Borghesi and Cunningham in full accord and while Alysee [Allizé] has expressed his personal opinion on withdrawal does not care to officially show any interest on the ground that it is outside his sphere. From certain reliable reports it appears that communist agitators are already endeavouring to influence Roumanian troops in Budapest with success. This still further complicates the problem and accentuates necessity for immediate withdrawal. Only quick communication with Paris from Budapest of course by wireless which is now under Roumanian control. Would suggest hereafter that any messages intended for consideration of any of Entente representatives be sent over our lines as we have direct telephone and telegraph office at Budapest. Please repeat to Italian and British Mission.

GREGORY

APPENDIX C TO No. 31

Télégramme du Haut Commissaire Français à Constantinople

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 1^{er} août 1919.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman, dont la situation financière est très critique, a vendu des stocks de matériel appartenant notamment à l'administration des chemins de fer du Hedjaz.

Il se propose de mettre en vente les biens du Domaine et ceux de l'Evkak.

Ces aliénations posent la question de savoir si le Gouvernement Ottoman a, pendant l'armistice, le droit d'amoindrir son avoir et, par suite, le gage commun des Alliés.

On se trouve en présence du dilemme suivant: empêcher le Gouvernement Ottoman de se créer les ressources indispensables et l'acculer à la faillite, ou bien laisser amoindrir le gage sur lequel les Alliés peuvent compter pour les réparations qui leur sont dues.

Les Hauts Commissaires des Puissances à Constantinople sont d'accord pour soumettre cette situation au Conseil Suprême et lui demander s'ils doivent, ou non, signifier au Gouvernement ottoman défense d'aliéner ses biens.

APPENDIX E TO No. 31

*Le Maréchal Foch, Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées, à Monsieur le
Président du Conseil, Président de la Conférence de la Paix*

3714.]

G.Q.G.A., le 4 août 1919.

Par ma lettre N° 3401 du 17 juillet, je vous ai soumis des propositions au sujet des mesures à prendre pour assurer le maintien de l'ordre dans la zone de 50 kilomètres sur la rive droite du Rhin.

Ces propositions visent, notamment, à tolérer, pendant une période de 3 mois au plus, à partir de la mise en vigueur du Traité, le maintien dans la zone de 50 kil. sur la rive droite du Rhin, des forces militaires, comme garnison de sûreté, ces forces étant soumises à un régime analogue à celui actuellement en vigueur pour la zone neutre de 10 kilomètres.⁶

Au sujet de l'importance des forces dont le maintien dans la zone de 50 kil. pourrait être provisoirement toléré, je crois devoir vous donner les éclaircissements ci-après :

Après l'armistice, les Allemands ont été autorisés à maintenir dans la zone neutre des forces militaires comportant au total :

10 Bataillons
et 10 Escadrons.

Depuis, en raison des troubles, des renforcements partiels ont été accordés par le Haut-Commandement Allié; ces renforcements ont porté les forces allemandes de la zone neutre à :

15 Bataillons 1/2, d'un effectif moyen de 500 h.	
8 Escadrons " " "	150 h.
2 Bies de campagne " "	120 h.

Telles sont les forces allemandes actuellement en zone neutre.

Pour assurer le maintien de l'ordre dans la zone de 50 kil. il y a lieu d'autoriser le Gouvernement Allemand à maintenir provisoirement, dans cette zone, outre les forces ci-dessus, un certain supplément. Mais ce supplément doit être de peu d'importance.

Il ne s'agit, en effet, que de garder certains centres industriels, comme Essen, ou certaines grandes villes comme Francfort. Le nombre des garnisons supplémentaires qui s'impose est donc restreint.

Il faut tenir compte, en outre, de ce que la situation intérieure en Allemagne est moins troublée qu'elle ne l'a été.

Enfin, il serait illogique de permettre à l'Allemagne de conserver, dans la zone de 50 kil. des forces relativement importantes, pendant 3 mois, alors que, pendant ces 3 mois, ils devront réduire leurs forces totales à 200.000 hommes.

Pour ces raisons, je propose de fixer le supplément à accorder à 4 bataillons 1/2

⁶ Note in original: 'Toutefois, le contrôle des Régions Militaires de la zone de 50 kil. appartiendrait, non au Commandant des Troupes d'Occupation, comme c'est le cas actuellement pour la zone neutre, mais à la Commission de contrôle des clauses militaires.'

et 2 escadrons, c'est-à-dire, d'autoriser, pour l'ensemble de la zone de 50 kil. de la Hollande à la Suisse, le maintien provisoire de:

20 Bataillons,
10 Escadrons,
2 Batteries.

A titre de renseignement, les forces allemandes stationnées en temps de paix dans cette zone de 50 kilomètres comprenai[en]t:

39 Bataillons,
30 Escadrons,
60 Batteries.

Je vous demande de vouloir bien me faire connaître le plus tôt possible la décision des Gouvernements Alliés sur cette question, de manière que les mesures à prendre puissent être appliquées dès la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix.

Je crois devoir ajouter que le Général Michel, Commandant l'Armée Belge d'occupation, et le Général Fayolle, saisis, par le Commandement Allemand, de demandes tendant à assurer le maintien de l'ordre dans la zone de 50 kilomètres, ont émis tous deux un avis conforme aux propositions que je vous sou mets.

FOCH

APPENDIX F TO No. 31

Troops of Occupation in Upper Silesia and Dantzig

SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

General Allied Headquarters,

General Staff, G-1.

August 6th, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

The military representatives at Versailles have studied, on the invitation of the Allied Supreme Council, the composition of the Allied forces of occupation in the plebiscite zone of upper Silesia, and the effectives to be sent there. On July 10th they unanimously pronounced for one division at a strength of about 13,000 men.⁷

Since, in its session of July 26th, the Supreme Council decided that this force would be taken from the occupation troops of the Rhenish territories.⁸ But no decision has as yet been made to determine the *contribution of each of the Great Powers* toward the constitution of this force.

In the same way, the military representatives at Versailles, increased by a military representative of Japan and a naval representative from the Five Great Powers, have been invited by the Supreme Allied Council to determine the military and naval steps to be taken in the territories of Danzig and Memel. Without its having been possible to reach an agreement on this question, a certain number of them concluded, on June 24, the advisability of employing forces equivalent to one division for the whole of the two territories.

Since, in its session of July 31, the Supreme Council, examining the Danzig question, postponed the examination of the military force which is to occupy this territory.⁴

These two questions remain thus in suspense, and the command may expect to have requested of it to furnish important contingents for Silesia and the Danzig

⁷ See No. 11, appendix E.

⁸ See No. 18, minute 5.

zone. It may also have to furnish troops for the occupation of the Sarre territory, concerning which no decision has yet been made.

Now the resources at the disposal of the French command at the present moment are strictly limited. The demobilisation allows it indeed to draw, for the missions in question, only on the 9 divisions made up exclusively of the classes 18 and 19, which are consequently not affected by the demobilisation, and are maintained at a sufficient strength (2,000 men per regiment).

Out of these 9 divisions, 6 are designated to form the French army of occupation, 1 has just been dissolved in order to obtain regiments for the guard of German prisoners of war.

There thus remain only the equivalent of two divisions to furnish the French effectives which the Supreme Council may decide to assign either to the Sarre territory, or to Upper Silesia, or to Danzig and Memel.

Consequently, it is indispensable to solve *simultaneously* and in the shortest possible time these three questions, so that a *general plan* may be established for the employment of this force of two divisions, with which the chief of the General Staff of the Army has just requested, in addition, the taking of a considerable new contingent to strengthen the P.W. guard, which has become insufficient.

I have the honour, consequently, to request you to be good enough to have these three questions decided without any delay by the Supreme Allied Council: strength and composition of the forces designated for the occupation of Upper Silesia, as well as the territories of Danzig and Memel, and finally the Sarre territory.

APPENDIX H TO No. 31

Reply of President Wilson to inquiry of July 27, from the British, French, Italian and Japanese Representatives in the Council of Five on the question of a proposed blockade of Soviet Russia

The President is not unmindful of the serious situation which exists in relation to neutral trade in the Baltic with the Russian ports controlled by the Bolsheviks. He has given careful consideration to the arguments advanced in the message transmitted at the request of Monsieur Clemenceau⁹ and is not unmindful of their force in support of the proposed interruption of commerce with the ports mentioned. However, while he fully understands the reasons for employing war measures to prevent the importation of munitions and food supplies into the portion of Russia now in the hands of the Bolsheviks, he labours under the difficulty of being without constitutional right to prosecute an act of war such as a blockade affecting neutrals unless there has been a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States against the nation so blockaded.

The landing of troops at Archangel and Murmansk was done to protect the property and supplies of the American and Allied Governments until they could be removed. The sending of troops to Siberia was to keep open the railway for the protection of Americans engaged in its operation and to make safe from possible German and Austrian attack the retiring Czecho-Slovaks. The furnishing of supplies to the Russians in Siberia, while indicating a sympathy with the efforts to restore order and safety of life and property, cannot be construed as a belligerent act.

⁹ See No. 18, minute 6 and appendix D.

The President is convinced that if proper representations are made to the neutral countries during the war they can be induced to prohibit traffic in arms and munitions with the portions of Russia controlled by the Bolsheviks. The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviks to all Governments and the announced programme of international revolution make them as great a menace to the national safety of neutral countries as to Allied countries. For any Government to permit them to increase their power through commercial intercourse with its nationals would be to encourage a movement which is frankly directed against all Governments and would certainly invite the condemnation of all peoples desirous of restoring peace and social order.

The President cannot believe that any Government whose people might be in a position to carry on commerce with the Russian ports referred to would be so indifferent to the opinion of the civilised world as to permit it. The President therefore suggests that the so-called neutral Governments be approached by the Allied and Associated Governments in joint note setting forth the facts of the case and the menace to such countries and to the world of any increase of the Bolshevik power, and requesting the neutral Governments to take immediate steps to prevent trade and commerce with Bolshevik Russia and to give assurance that the policy will be rigorously enforced in conjunction with other Governments which are equally menaced.

No. 32

H. D. 28.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 11, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir G. Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel U. S. Grant. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

i. M. CLEMENCEAU asked if any of his colleagues had any news from Hungary.

Situation in Hungary MR. POLK distributed a number of telegrams annexed in Appendix A.

MR. BALFOUR asked if there were any indication that the Roumanians had received or meant to obey the orders of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was not the slightest sign.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought the silence on the part of the Roumanians was deliberate.

M. PICHON said that he did not think this could be inferred with certainty. The latest news was dated 7th or 8th and by that date the orders of the

Council could not have arrived. There was a rumour that the line to Buda Pesth had been cut. He added, that a telegram had been received from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest dated 10th which was to the effect that he had handed, on the previous day, the telegrams from the Council to the Roumanian Government. None of the news contained in the telegrams distributed by Mr. Polk was subsequent to the 9th.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that the Roumanian Generals at Buda Pesth must have been made aware of the desires of the Council.

MR. POLK said that according to information given to him by Mr. Buxton¹ the Allied Generals had great difficulty in their dealings with the Roumanian General in avoiding unpleasant incidents. The attitude of the Roumanian General was very insolent.

M. PICHON said he fully admitted that the Roumanians were not behaving well but he suggested that a judgment should not be based on the news received.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it would be best to wait until the following day.

MR. POLK observed that the way in which the Roumanians treated the Conference might become a pattern not only for other Small States but possibly even for Germany.

M. TITTONI asked what means of communication existed between the Conference and the Roumanian Generals at Buda Pesth.

MR. BALFOUR said he understood the telegraph was in American hands as far as Vienna; communication thence to Buda Pesth was by telephone. If the Roumanians had cut the telephone, communications were severed. He added that he hoped the Allied Ministers at Bucharest were being kept informed of the instructions sent to the Generals at Buda Pesth.

M. TITTONI asked whether communication by wireless could not be maintained.

M. PICHON said that he would enquire from Marshal Foch what other methods could be employed to establish communication.

2. The Council had before it a letter from M. Benes (see Appendix B²).

Letter from Czecho-Slovak Delegation relative to the Roumanian occupation of Hungary

MR. BALFOUR suggested that a suitable acknowledgment should be sent to M. Benes of his letter and that he should be told that it would receive full consideration.

(It was then decided that M. Benes' letter of August 8th, 1919, regarding Czecho-Slovak Interests in Hungary should be acknowledged and that M. Benes should be assured that due note would be taken of its contents.)

¹ Mr. Noel Buxton. (Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. xi, pp. 373-4.)

² Not printed. In this letter M. Benes stated that he had received a copy of the telegram sent by the Peace Conference to the Roumanian Government (see No. 30, appendix B), emphasized the respect shown by the Czechoslovak Government for the decisions of the Peace Conference, and in general terms advanced his Government's claims against Hungary in respect of reparation.

3. The Council had before it the following communication from Colonel Haskell.

*Situation in
Armenia*

'From: Colonel Haskell, High Commissioner for the Entente in Armenia.

'To: President Clemenceau, Peace Conference.

'Have received official notice from the British Command at Constantinople that all British troops at the present time in the Caucasus have orders to commence complete evacuation on August 15th; an order from London only can prevent this movement.

'The Italians officially declare that they will not send troops. This retreat will leave several million dollars worth of relief provisions deposited at Batoum, Tiflis, Erivan, etc. without protection and will stop all measures of assistance now operating, without which thousands of Armenian refugees in Russian Armenia are exposed to death from famine. The Armenians are surrounded by enemies and have not enough arms, munitions or energy to protect themselves. Two million of lives are in danger after the retreat of the British troops; anarchy will reign in the Caucasus where all the lives and properties are menaced. The French High Command in the East declares that British troops in the Caucasus are not under his jurisdiction.

'In the name of the future of these regions, I ask that the British Government be requested to revoke the evacuation order until the question of the method of occupation shall have been decided. This viewpoint receives the approbation of all the authorities here who understand the situation.

Signed: WILLIAM HASKELL,

Allied High Commissioner to Armenia.'

MR. BALFOUR said that the situation in Armenia was very serious and very disturbing. Historically what had led to the present position was, as far as he could remember, as follows. British troops had been sent into the country in 1918. In March and April of the current year it had been made clear to the Conference by Mr. Lloyd George that the British troops would be withdrawn. The date for withdrawal had first been the 15th July, but had since been postponed to the 15th August. It was probable that movements had already begun. It had therefore been known to the Conference for a long time that continuance of British occupation could not be expected. It had been understood that Italian troops would replace the British. Italy had accepted this exchange and the relief had been expected. From certain remarks made lately by M. Tittoni, he inferred that Italy regarded the enterprise as too great a burden. What resulted was that British troops were leaving the country, that Italian troops were not coming to replace them and that America was not sending any men.

M. TITTONI said that the question in as far as it concerned Italy, related to Turkish Armenia and not to Russian Armenia, of which Mr. Balfour had

spoken. Italy at one time had thought of sending troops to Georgia and Azerbaijan, not to Armenia proper. Georgia demanded complete independence and on this condition raised no objection to occupation by Italian troops. On the other hand, Admiral Koltchak was unwilling to grant the independence of Georgia, though he might be ready to grant autonomy. If Italy had accepted a mandate on the conditions demanded by the Georgians, Italy would have taken upon herself responsibility for safeguarding the independence of Georgia. This, she could not do. In any case the area to be guarded was a large one; the Railway line from Baku to Batum was of very considerable length; some 40,000 men would be required and, in addition, shipping and supplies would have to be found. The last were to have been lent by Great Britain, though it appeared at the present time that British shipping would not be available. The initial expense would be, he was told, 75 million lire and the annual cost would be as much as 1 billion lire. Italy could not undertake so heavy a burden and the idea had therefore been given up. Nevertheless, he wished again to point out that the question of Georgia was quite distinct from that of Armenia.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the United States could do anything.

MR. POLK said that the United States could do nothing until Congress acted. Troops could not be sent into a country with which the United States were not at war. The question of a mandate for Armenia would be put before Congress by the President.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether President Wilson was aware of the critical condition of Armenia.

MR. POLK replied that he had sent him two strong personal messages on the subject already within the last few days.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the conclusion was that France could do nothing: Italy could do nothing: Great Britain could do nothing and, for the present, America could do nothing. It remained to be seen whether, as the result of this, any Armenians would remain.

(As no Government was prepared to furnish troops for Armenia, the question raised by Colonel Haskell's telegram of August 5th, 1919, was left without solution.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU asked his colleagues whether they had read the letter sent by General Dupont to Marshal Foch (Appendix C).
Execution of Clauses 227-230 of the Treaty with Germany For his part he thought that what Erzberger had said³ was true. All French agents, both civil and military, were of one mind on the subject. He thought, therefore, that General Dupont's conclusion was sound. He had no intention of giving up the principle of demanding the surrender of culprits, but it might be advisable to confine the demand to a few symbolic persons, for instance, the Kaiser, the assassin of Miss Edith Cavell and the murderer of Captain Fryatt. A demand limited to a small number would probably not be resisted. The suggestion he would make was that each of the members should name one

³ See No. 25, appendix A.

representative to proceed to Berlin and to consult General Dupont as to what was practicable. For himself, he would nominate M. Haguénin,⁴ who knew everybody in Berlin and whom he could trust implicitly to form a correct estimate. Probably his colleagues could make equally satisfactory nominations.

MR. BALFOUR said that he considered M. Clemenceau's proposal very worthy of consideration, but before he could give complete assent to it, he would like to observe first that it represented an abandonment of the Treaty. Secondly, this abandonment was on a point, concerning which English public opinion had been greatly excited at the time of the Election. He thought that scarcely a member had been returned who had not addressed his constituents on this subject and promised them that the guilty should be punished. He would therefore ask to be allowed to consult Mr. Lloyd George before assenting to M. Clemenceau's proposal.

MR. POLK said that from his point of view, the proposal represented a change in the Treaty.

M. TITTONI said that he quite agreed with General Dupont's proposal. He also concurred in the opinion that it was not advisable to try the Kaiser.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not intend to abandon anything. What he had proposed to do was to execute the Treaty bit by bit. It was desirable to help the present German Government to live on for a few months. He believed that the presentation of the full demand would destroy it. He, himself, had a list of 1,000 names. Doubtless his colleagues had similar lists.

MR. BALFOUR said the M. Clemenceau's plan was doubtless excellent. It consisted not in giving up any of the culprits, but in deferring the demand for some of them. The proposal was therefore different from that made by General Dupont who only proposed to take a few. He did not think, however, that it would comfort the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Haguénin had a very long conversation with Erzberger who had assured him that this was not a thing to be trifled with. There was no intention on the part of France to abandon the execution of the Treaty. At first, it was suggested that a few prominent culprits should be asked for; the rest could await their fate for a few months.

MR. BALFOUR said there were three possible plans. One was to stick to the Treaty to the letter and ask for all the culprits at once. The second was M. Clemenceau's plan to ask for a few well selected victims at once and to put off the rest. The third, to abandon part of the Treaty entirely and only insist on the surrender of a very few. He thought these three possible plans should be submitted to the various Governments.

(It was decided to postpone discussion on the execution of Articles 227-230 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, pending consultation of their respective Governments by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk on General Dupont's proposals.)

(M. Seydoux entered the room.)

⁴ Head of a French political mission in Berlin after the conclusion of the armistice with Germany.

5. M. SEYDOUX gave the Council an explanation of the document annexed as Appendix D.⁵

Note from Supreme Economic Council on the Exchange of Goods between Countries of Central Europe

MR. BALFOUR asked why, since the Blockade had been raised, it had been necessary to bring this question before the Council at all.

M. SEYDOUX said he agreed with Mr. Balfour that there was no particular reason for the intervention of the Council.

(It was decided that the raising of the Blockade had rendered unnecessary any action by the Council regarding the regulation of exchanges of goods between the countries of Central Europe.)

M. SEYDOUX read and commented [on] the report of the Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council on Russia, dated 9th July, 1919:—

Note from Supreme Economic Council on the Economic Policy of the Allies in Russia

‘With reference to Minute 244 of the Supreme Economic Council,⁶ the Sub-Committee on Russia presents the following report:

- ‘1. The Committee considers that any discussion of the ultimate economic rehabilitation of Russia is at present purely academic.
- ‘2. The Committee considers that economic assistance should at once be given to those areas of Russia now under the jurisdiction of the so-called “Provisional Government of Russia” in conformity with the terms of the telegrams exchanged by the Council of Four and Admiral Koltchak.
- ‘3. This assistance should take the form of credits from the various Allied Governments to be expended in purchases and transportation of commodities from the countries furnishing such credits.
- ‘4. The nature of these credits and the commodities to be supplied and their distribution should be determined by a Commission organised for this purpose from the countries supplying the credits and the goods. The Commodities to be furnished should be of such a

⁵ Not printed. This appendix contained a brief extract from the record of a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council on July 17, 1919, which considered and decided to submit to the Supreme Council proposals contained in a telegram dated July 13, 1919, from the Allied Railway and Relief Missions in Warsaw relative to the exchange of goods such as potatoes and coal between Poland on the one hand and Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia on the other. The text of the telegram in question was not included in the appendix.

⁶ Minute 244 of the Supreme Economic Council under date of June 30, 1919, read as follows: ‘*Allied Economic Policy in Russia*. The Council had before them memoranda from all the sections regarding the extension of the operations of the Supreme Economic Council to include Russia, as follows:—(a) Food. (b) Communications. (c) Finance. (d) Shipping. (e) Raw Materials. It was agreed that a special Sub-Committee should be appointed to consider in detail the memoranda put forward by the Sections, and co-ordinate the proposals made therein, and that the Delegations should appoint their representatives on the Sub-Committee as soon as possible.’

character as are necessary to rehabilitate transportation and the production of manufactures. Their distribution should be organised in such a manner as to reconstitute commercial life.

- ‘5. It appears to the Committee that credits to the amount of £50,000,000 sterling would cover the amount of commodities (exclusive of arms and munitions) that could advantageously be supplied and used within a period of twelve months.’

MR. BALFOUR suggested that consideration of the question be deferred until the discussion of the general policy to be adopted regarding Russia.

(It was decided to defer consideration of the proposals of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the economic reconstitution of Russia until the settlement of the general policy of the Council regarding Russia.)

(At this point M. Seydoux withdrew and members of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council and other experts entered the room.)

7.

[Not printed]

*Participation of the
interested Powers in
the improvement of
the Railway from
Chambéry to Turin*

8. MR. POLK said that he had received a reply from Washington in which Mr. Lansing stated that it was possible that suitable tonnage might be available from the United States' Army by August 30th, but neither the State Department nor the War Department had any funds of its own which could be used for the purpose in question. It was roughly estimated that repatriation would cost 250 to 300 dollars per man.

*Repatriation of
Czecho-Slovaks
in Siberia*

Mr. Polk enquired whether any agreement had been reached as to financing the operation.

M. BERTHELOT said that France had hitherto advanced all the money for the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia and in Siberia. The advances amounted to one milliard a year. Great Britain had furnished arms, munitions, and supplies as an advance. These advances were ultimately to be shared by France, Great Britain and the United States in equal thirds. Application for ships had been made to Japan and the United States. The United States had not made a definite reply but thought it might be difficult to find the ships, while Japan had found enough for about one-third of the force. It was always understood that the cost would be equally divided between Great Britain, France and the United States.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it had never been thought that the Czecho-Slovak State should pay.

M. BERTHELOT replied that it was a matter of course that the Czecho-Slovak [?State] would re-pay the whole cost.

MR. POLK asked if a statement might be prepared for him regarding the agreements made.

(It was agreed that M. Berthelot should furnish Mr. Polk with a statement of the agreements reached regarding the payment of the expenses for maintenance, transportation and repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia and Siberia.)

9. MR. POLK drew attention to the decision of the Council taken on August 6th adopting three proposals by General Groves (see H. D. 25,⁷ Minute 14). He thought that the first and third of these proposals exceeded the terms of the Treaty and that the Germans might be justified in refusing to comply with them. He thought it was very necessary to examine the question at once as it was clearly undesirable to exceed the Treaty rights of the Council.

*Proposals to prevent
the Germans from
disposing of aero-
nautical material*

(It was decided to ask the Air Commission to re-examine at once the Resolution taken on August 6th regarding the sale of aeronautical material by Germany, with a view to establishing whether the action decided on goes beyond the terms of the Treaty of Peace.)

(It was further decided to suspend all action on this Resolution pending receipt of the report.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 11, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 32

(ii)⁸

Budapest. August 8th, 1919, 9.0 p.m. (Received Aug. 8th, 1919.)

Hoover and Atwood,

Paris.

This is the 5th day since the Roumanian forces entered Budapest and all transportation lines are still out of service including the Danube river, although the Roumanians promise that they will open the transportation lines.

⁷ No. 29.

⁸ Document (i) of this appendix (not printed) was a telegram dated August 7, 1919, from Colonel Causey in Budapest to Mr. Hoover in Paris for Colonel Atwood, United States member of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council. This telegram communicated the text of a letter from Colonel Causey to General Holban with regard to the severance by the Roumanian forces of railway communication with Budapest. In this letter Colonel Causey stated: 'I . . . in my capacity as President of the Allied Railway Mission under the direction of the Supreme War Council in Paris urge that the repairs to all the railroads be immediately effected and that traffic be immediately resumed on all the railroad lines entering the city of Budapest, at least that the transportation of food

The Roumanians continue their advance beyond Budapest; vast quantities of agricultural machinery of all kinds have been collected for shipment to Roumania. They also continue to confiscate great quantities of live stock. As stated in previous communications the Roumanian Army is practically living on the occupied territory. This will mean ultimate starvation for the Hungarians unless aid is given by the Allied Powers. Military occupation of Hungary by the Roumanians badly hampers their present re-organisation of new Hungarian Government and the functions of the civil are [*sic*] almost entirely interrupted. The Hungarian Government has no organised forces at its disposal to keep order. The only organised force consists of about six hundred of the old Gendarmier[*e*] in Budapest. Up to this time the Roumanians have allowed only six hundred of the Gendarme[s] to carry arms. It is absolutely essential if the Government is to function, armed forces must be organised in sufficient numbers to preserve order in the country outside of Budapest as well as in Budapest. At the present time the Roumanians have cut off all means of communication between the central government and outlying districts and even telephone communication has been impossible between the central government offices and other points in the city. There have been many reports of attacks on Jews and others by the so-called white guards with the tacit support of the Roumanian soldiers, but as a matter of fact there has been very little bloodshed.

In company with Captain Leath, who is to have charge of feeding of the children in Budapest, I called on General Holban, commanding officer of the Roumanians this afternoon and arranged to bring 240 tons of food in from Vienna. General Holban stated that if advised about what time the train would arrive he would restore the tracks for passage of same to Budapest. The food situation in Budapest is worse than it has been any time since the war commenced in 1914. It is worse here now than it was in Vienna in January. With their full knowledge of food situation in Budapest, it would seem that the Roumanians are trying to starve out the population by cutting the city off entirely from all supplies from the surrounding country. The carrying off of farm animals, farm machinery and food supplies of every character would seem evidence the Roumanians have the same intentions towards the country in general as towards Budapest. General Gorton, Col. Romanelli and myself have been holding sessions daily and nightly and have made vigorous protests to the Roumanian Commander about cutting the city off from supplies and about various other outrages that have been committed and have endeavoured to represent what we believe to be the attitude of at least three of the allied powers; there is no French representative here. It is my belief that if permitted to properly function, the new government would soon complete its organisation along the lines laid down from Paris and demonstrate a firm hold of the situation.

Unless the food blockade is raised at once [?] and] supplies brought into this city, hunger and privation may produce great excesses. I would urge in the name of humanity that the representative powers in Paris take such steps as will ensure an

supplies from the adjacent territory be allowed to move freely to the city. . . . The cooperation of the Roumanian military command is absolutely essential to the successful prosecution of my mission [as regards the movement of relief supplies] and I would be very much pleased if you would evidence your cooperation by immediately repairing the railroads and making them fit for normal traffic and by ordering the immediate resumption of Relief traffic of every description on the railroads in the territory you have entered with your forces. Will you kindly acknowledge receipt of this communication and advise if you will comply with my requests and indicate time when traffic will be resumed.'

immediate raising of the blockade placed by the Roumanians and that the blockade so far as the food is concerned be raised in every other direction.

W. B. CAUSEY,

Lt. Col. Engrs. USA

Pr. Inter-allied Ry. Miss.

(iii)

Budapest. Aug. 8, 19. 2.22 p.m. (Received August 8, 1919.)

To Col. Twiss, British Mission, Hotel Astoria, Paris.

Can you tell me whether it is the intention of Entente to cause withdrawal of Roumanian army from Budapest and if so how far. Impossible for new Government to function if they are allowed no troops or police to keep order and food supply is hampered by destruction or military control of railways and by removal of food and animals for army of occupation. Roumanian army is carrying off large quantities of agricultural machinery and other property not necessary for military purposes and referred to in Reparation and economic clauses of treaties. I have had no reply of any sort from Hotel Astoria to my telegrams.

GENERAL GORTON

(iv)

Télégramme transmis par le Service Télégraphique Américain.

BUDAPEST, 8 août 1919.

5.0 p.m.

M. Clemenceau,

Président de la Conférence de la Paix, Paris.

Conformément à l'opinion publique du pays, le Gouvernement provisoire, recruté en partie des membres du Gouvernement précédent de Kun, a été invité à démissionner; sur cela, ce Gouvernement a donné hier sa démission et un nouveau Gouvernement provisoire s'est constitué. En qualité de Gouverneur, invité par le nouveau Gouvernement provisoire, j'ai pris le pouvoir dans les mains, j'ai nommé et chargé le Gouvernement. C'est avec grand enthousiasme que la population de la capitale de Budapest a pris connaissance de la chute du régime de la terreur bolcheviste et ma conviction est que le peuple du pays entier en fera de même. Notre tâche la plus urgente est dans le moment la préparation et la convocation de l'Assemblée Nationale au plus tôt possible afin que sur une base constitutionnelle elle puisse ensuite prendre une décision définitive sur la forme de l'état. Jusqu'à ce terme notre programme est l'écrasement complet du bolchevisme transplanté dans le pays par les moyens de la terreur, l'exécution des clauses de l'armistice, le rétablissement de l'ordre dans les affaires alteres (*sic*) de l'état, l'assurance [*sic*] du travail productif, la préparation de la matière des discussions de la paix et pour tout cela nous chercherons un rapport plus étroit avec les Gouvernements alliés et associés.

Nous demandons votre appui bienveillant et dans l'intérêt du succès de nos efforts la reconnaissance de notre Gouvernement.

L'ARCHIDUC JOSEPH
Maréchal.

Budapest, Aug. 9th, 1919, 6 p.m. (Received August 10, 1919.)

[Rt.] Hon. A. J. Balfour,

Astoria, Paris.

G.7. Ninth dispositions [*sic*] of Roumanian Army of Transylvania on 8th August as follows. Army Hq. Török Sze[nt]miklos. General Holban's group, Hq. Budapest, includes 1st and 2nd Chasseur divisions with one regiment of Chasseur de Montagne and armoured cars at Budapest, 7th Division at Hatvan, and 2nd Cavalry Divisions at Gyöngyös with detachments along Czecho-Slovak frontier. General Mosious group, Hq. Czepléd, includes 1st and 6th divisions at Kecskemét and one brigade dismounted of 1st Cavalry at Nagy Körös. Other troops are 2nd division at Jászó Ladány, 16th Division at Niskoloz [?Miskolcz], 18th Division at Mezőtúr, 21st Division at Gyoma, 20th Division at Debreczen. According to General Holban all that is left of Red Hungarian Army are bands of disorganised troops in area Kisber, Mór, Plattenzee. I shall obtain further information from Hungarian War Minister. The relations between Roumanians and Hungarians are greatly improved in consequence of following measures taken by General Holban. Firstly establishment of bureau where representations of government and Roumanian army work together and are in close liaison, secondly, employment of Hungarian police working in pairs with Roumanian soldiers. Movement in Budapest is unrestricted except to leave city for west when pass is required. General Holban has given Commander Freeman full hand in working Danube Commission except for examination of persons wishing to cross from left to right bank of river.

GENERAL GORTON. Budapest.

APPENDIX C TO No. 32

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE À BERLIN.

BERLIN, le 4 août 1919.

Note pour Monsieur le Maréchal Foch à/s. de la livraison des coupables à l'Entente
(Articles 227 à 230 du Traité)

Mon avis est que l'argument Erzberger³ est fondé.

La livraison des coupables amènera la crise gouvernementale qu'il annonce. D'abord des troubles, puis un Gouvernement Haase avec les membres les plus communistes des indépendants. La révolte des troupes en grande majorité. Puis le communisme, sinon l'anarchie.

Si nous ne voulons pas de désordre, il faut transiger.

Le coupable, c'est la doctrine de guerre allemande: plus une guerre sera féroce, plus elle sera courte. D'où ce sophisme: le maximum d'humanité réside dans le maximum de cruauté.

La souffrance sera terrible, mais étant courte et localisée, la somme des épreuves sera moindre dans une telle guerre courte que dans une guerre menée plus doucement mais très longue.

L'expérience a fait justice à cette théorie barbare.

Les responsables, ce sont ses promoteurs. En fait, c'est tout le peuple allemand qui a accepté d'enthousiasme cette thèse répondant à sa mentalité.

Si l'on veut concrétiser cette responsabilité, c'est l'Empereur qu'il faut frapper. Etant donné le système allemand, autocratique au summum dans l'ordre des choses militaires, l'Empereur seul doit apparaître. Les Généraux ne sont que des exécutants. Moltke, Falkenheyn, Hindenburg et Ludendorf disparaissent en lui.

Plaçons-nous, autant que possible, dans la mentalité allemande pour juger, ou mieux, c'est cette mentalité que nous voulons châtier. Frappons-la dans sa tête.

Je dis l'Empereur seul. Si l'on y tient, ajoutons Tirpitz. Sans doute, il a simplement transposé dans la guerre maritime les principes militaires. Mais, c'était une innovation, introduite sur sa proposition. Il a, à la rigueur, une responsabilité personnelle et directe.

Ajoutons encore : les Commandants de sous-marins qui ont torpillé des navires hôpitaux ; les Commandants de camps de prisonniers signalés par une rigueur excessive ; les Commandants d'étapes personnellement coupables d'assassinats, de vols ; les juges de Miss Cavell et du Capitaine Fryatt.

Puisqu'ils n'ont pas trouvé de juges chez eux, exigeons leur livraison.

Donc l'Empereur, peut-être Tirpitz et des subalternes exécutants directs de décisions prises sous leur propre responsabilité.

C'est le maximum que nous puissions obtenir d'un Gouvernement. Encore, faut-il avoir grand soin que l'Empereur ne rentre pas en Allemagne. Nos titres à exiger sa livraison seraient les mêmes, mais les difficultés d'exécution se présenteraient comme pour les Généraux.

L'argument que le Gouvernement manque à sa parole en n'exécutant pas une livraison prévue au Traité qu'il a signé est inopérant.

Il ne dit pas en effet : 'Je refuse', il vous dit : 'Je ne peux pas'. — 'Je disparaîtrai, de bon gré, ou emporté par la révolution et vous ne trouverez pas un Gouvernement régulier qui pourra vous satisfaire'. Tout au plus, dira-t-il 'J'ai promis, j'essayerai de réaliser, mais sans espérance.'

Quoi qu'on décide, il serait urgent de préciser ce qu'on exigera.

Des bruits, répandus à Berlin par les Américains, ont parlé de 3.500 noms parmi lesquels tous les généraux en renom. Tout le monde se sent menacé. En raison de la lâcheté humaine, dès que des prévisions [précisions] seront données, le mouvement de résistance se localisera dans l'entourage des victimes désignées, d'autant moins étendues qu'elles sont moins haut placées.

L'Empereur est absent. Les protestations seront théoriques. Le Gouvernement se déclarera impuissant. La résistance ne pourra se concrétiser en un point donné.

Tirpitz est un marin. C'est de plus l'homme auquel le peuple en veut le plus de l'avoir trompé et surtout, de n'avoir pas réussi. On le verra livrer comme bouc émissaire, sans trop de résistance effective. Les autres c'est du fretin.

Qu'on publie cette liste. Peut-être pourrait-on ne pas fixer la date de livraison ou la situer un peu plus lointaine, si l'on veut juger de l'effet produit, voir la protestation éclater, atteindre son apogée et s'éteindre, en laissant la possibilité de tractations nouvelles.

Car il va de soi que notre condescendance demandera des compensations. Réparations complètes d'offenses qui nous ont été faites. Facilités pour nos commissions de contrôle, auxquelles la moindre résistance serait punie par l'ordre de livraison de tout ou partie des otages de la liste. Exécution de bonne grâce des clauses territoriales polonaises.

Cette liste sera l'épouvantail qui remplacera le sabre du Maréchal rentré dans son fourreau à la Paix.

DUPONT

H. D. 29.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, August 12, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Mr. P. Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. On Mr. Balfour's proposal it was agreed:—

Instructions to Committees preparing clauses for Treaty with Hungary That all the Committees engaged in the preparation of clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary except those which have already forwarded their recommendations to the Secretariat General for submission to the Supreme Council, should do so forthwith.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna stated that General Graziani would be in Budapest on the 12th August.

Situation in Hungary M. TITTONI said that he had no news.

MR. POLK said that General Bandholtz had arrived in Budapest on the previous day.

M. PICHON drew attention to a Note prepared by General Weygand regarding the means of communication with Budapest (see Appendix A¹).

(Note was taken of the statement of General Weygand regarding means of communication with Budapest.)

3. (M. Tardieu, M. Aubert, Mr. Nicolson, Col. Castoldi, Prof. Coolidge and M. Adatci were present during the following discussion.)

Frontiers of Bulgaria in Thrace M. TARDIEU said that he could not offer the Council any agreed solution of the problem; the margin of disagreement, however, had been reduced. He would briefly recall various phases which the question had passed through. The first phase was the blue line suggested by the Commission on Greek Affairs.² This line had been rejected in the

¹ Not printed.

² The reference was to a line traced upon a map appended to a report of the Commission on Greek Affairs, dated March 30, 1919 (see No. 16, appendix A and note 12). This blue line tracing a proposed Greco-Bulgarian frontier in Thrace resulted from agreement in principle by the British, French, and United States representatives on the Commission to accept the Greek claims with slight modifications. Having regard to the fact that the future status and attribution of Constantinople and adjacent territories remained at that time undetermined, the report stipulated that the proposed line was subject to revision and modification when the extent of the state of which Constantinople would be the capital

Committee on Bulgarian frontiers by the American Delegation. A compromise had been sought by means of mutual concession. The initial demand of the American Delegation had been to leave Western Thrace to Bulgaria with the 1915 frontier. The British, French and Japanese Delegations had disagreed.

After a variety of views had been proposed, the American Delegation suggested that Eastern and Western Thrace should be attached to the International State of Constantinople. This had not been accepted by the other Delegations. Then, M. Tittoni had proposed an ethnographical line intended to give more Greeks to Greece and more Bulgarians to Bulgaria. A solution had been sought in this direction giving both Bulgaria and Greece a frontier with the International State. No success had been achieved. The line suggested took Greece up to Lule Burgas leaving the northern part of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria. The American Delegation had objected that this left Bulgaria no exit on the Aegean. Then it had been suggested that the South Western part of Western Thrace should be given to Greece and that an

should have been agreed; the United States delegation further reserved the right to modify the proposed frontier, which it approved in the report, according to the manner in which Eastern Thrace should be disposed of. The frontier proposed by the blue line was described in the official French text of the report as follows:

'Partant, sur la frontière gréco-bulgare de 1913, du point où cette frontière traverse le sommet du mont Kushlar, cette ligne continuera le long de la ligne de partage des eaux entre le bassin d'écoulement de la rivière Arda d'un côté et ceux des rivières Yazı Euren et Kouru Tchaï de l'autre, en passant par Hassanagha Yailassi et Maragsu. Puis le long de la ligne de partage des eaux entre le bassin d'écoulement de l'Arda et celui du Seugudlu Su, en passant par Padaroicha, Kara Boghaz, Maaden Dagħ elle atteindra Balija Tepessi. De là, la ligne se dirigera d'abord vers le Nord puis vers l'Est de façon à laisser à la Grèce le village de Yatajik et celui de Fazebunar à la Bulgarie, continuera vers l'Est le long de la ligne de partage des eaux, en passant par les cotes 820 et 669 pour atteindre le Seugudlu Su à un kilomètre environ au Sud-Est du village de Sagirlar. Elle suivra alors le thalweg du Seugudlu Su jusqu'à sa jonction avec l'Arda, puis celui de l'Arda jusqu'à un point situé à un kilomètre et demi à l'Est de Kadirlar, gravira la crête de la chaîne entre Perperek Deré et l'Arda, suivra cette chaîne jusque dans le voisinage de Rustemlar d'où elle tournera vers l'Est le long de la ligne de partage des eaux entre les bassins d'écoulement de l'Arda et de la Maritza en passant par la ligne de faite du Besh Tepeh Dagħ jusqu'à Tazi Tepessi. De ce dernier point la frontière prendra la direction Est-Nord-Est, suivra le thalweg du Chermen Deré (rivière située au Nord-Ouest et Nord du village de Chermen et se jetant dans la Maritza à 3 kilomètres à l'Est de ce village) jusqu'à un point situé au Nord de la ligne ferrée et du village de Chermen. De là elle atteindra par la voie la plus courte le thalweg de la Maritza, le longera jusqu'à un point où la Maritza rencontre la petite rivière au sud de Viranteké. De ce point, la frontière se dirigera vers le Nord en suivant le thalweg de cette petite rivière jusqu'à la cote 250, se dirigera Nord-Nord-Est pour atteindre la rivière Tunja jusqu'à l'endroit où il [sic] rencontre la frontière du traité de Berlin. Elle suivra cette frontière jusqu'à un point situé, sur la ligne de partage des eaux entre l'Egée et la Mer Noire, à environ trois kilomètres Nord-Nord-Est du village de Topjilar.

'Elle descendra vers le Sud en suivant la ligne de crête jusqu'à un point deux kilomètres au Nord-Nord-Ouest de Kovchas. Elle se dirigera vers l'Est, puis vers le Sud, en se tenant à deux kilomètres de distance de cette même ville, regagnera ensuite la ligne de partage des eaux entre l'Egée et la Mer Noire, suivra cette ligne vers le Sud-Est pour atteindre la cote 1,125 à Boyouk Maghiada. De ce point, elle se dirigera approximativement en ligne droite jusqu'à la pointe Sandal, en passant au Sud de Samakov.'

International State with an outlet at Dedeagatch should be created with control over the railway from Dedeagatch to Adrianople. Eastern Thrace would then be attributed to Greece up to a line from the Gulf of Xeros to Midia. To this the American Delegation had objected that the Western part of Western Thrace was not economically connected with the rest. The International State would therefore be economically unsound. The American counter-proposal was that North Western Thrace should be given to Bulgaria whilst the International State should be limited by a line 10 kilometres east of the Maritza including Adrianople. Disagreement was therefore limited; for it was admitted by all that the best solution was some form of international control over Dedeagatch and the railway. The French, British and Japanese Delegations wished to extend this International State West and North, maintaining on the East the 1915 frontier. The Americans wished to extend it to the East 10 kilometres from the Maritza and including Adrianople while ceding North West Thrace to Bulgaria.

M. TITTONI said that a very slight concession would now produce agreement. A free State might be formed with a capital at Adrianople.

M. TARDIEU said that there were in Adrianople 26,000 Turks, 23,000 Greeks and a few Bulgarians.

MR. BALFOUR said that Adrianople was a Turkish Town in a Greek area. He saw considerable advantages in giving it to the free State as it was a Holy City for the Mohammedans.

M. TARDIEU said that his private opinion was that an International Commission at Dedeagatch with complete control over the railway would be quite enough to ensure all the guarantees required by Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in any case he would not agree to any territorial reward to Bulgaria. He thought that no International State would live long and that all the personal [*sic*] solutions suggested promised new wars.

After considerable further discussion it appeared that the principal alternatives before the Council were:—

1. The separation of Eastern and Western Thrace by an International State under the League of Nations, or
2. The mere control of Dedeagatch and the railway to it from Adrianople by an International Commission.

To the former scheme were attached the following proposals:—

- (a) In Western Thrace Greece to obtain at least the districts of Xanthi and Gumuljina, with a frontier sufficient to protect the coastal railway.
- (b) That the Port of Dedeagatch, the town of Adrianople and an area covering the railway connecting these two should be constituted into an autonomous State under the League of Nations.
- (c) That with the exclusion of Adrianople, the whole of Eastern Thrace, as comprised between the existing Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and a line drawn from the Gulf of Xeros to South of Midia, should be given to Greece.

MR. POLK stated that he was committed to the plan of an international state. But he was willing that M. Venizelos should try and persuade President Wilson to accept the second plan. If President Wilson accepted, Mr. Polk would be willing to be overruled.

(It was then agreed that Mr. Polk should confer with M. Venizelos, explain both solutions to him, and submit them to President Wilson. Mr. Polk would inform M. Venizelos that he was at liberty to send himself any message he desired to President Wilson.)

4. The Council had before it a communication from M. Jules Cambon.
(See Appendix B.)

*Recognition of the
'Republic of Austria',
under that title only* MR. BALFOUR said that the Allied and Associated Powers might insist on addressing the State of Austria as the Republic of Austria and in [*sic*] using that designation in the Treaty of Peace. More than this he thought could not be done. Should the people of Austria choose to call themselves citizens of German Austria it did not seem possible to compel them to do otherwise.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he entirely agreed.

(It was decided to maintain the expression 'Republic of Austria' in dealings with the Austrian Peace Delegation and in the Treaty of Peace.)

5. The note of the Commission on Political Clauses was read and accepted.
(See Appendix C.³)

*Clauses for insertion
in the Treaty of Peace
with Bulgaria pro-
posed by the Greek
Delegation* (It was decided in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Political Clauses—

- (1) to send for redraft to the Drafting Committee Articles 32, 33, 34, 35 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.
(2) to send Articles 36 and 37 to the Central Territorial Commission with a request that it should consult on this subject the Commission on New States.
(3) to send to the Financial Commission Articles 38⁴ and 67. The last should also be examined by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)

6. The Council had before it the following resolution:—

*Clauses on Responsi-
bilities in Treaty with
Hungary* 'The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, having been invited, in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council dated July 30, 1919,⁵ to hasten the conclusion of its report relating to the Treaty with Hungary, and taking into account the fact that its liberty of decision is restricted by the solutions already reached as regards penalties in the Treaty with Germany as well as the Conditions of Peace with Austria and with Bulgaria, is of the opinion that the Articles relating to penalties to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary

³ Not printed. This note, containing the recommendations which were adopted by the Supreme Council, was presented in accordance with its decision of August 2, 1919: see No. 26, note 6. For the numbering of the articles *v. ibid.*

⁴ In error for 56.

⁵ See No. 23, minute 6.

probably cannot differ from the solutions already adopted with regard to the other enemy Powers.

July 31–August 5, 1919.⁶

(The resolution proposed by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties in respect to the Treaty of Peace with Hungary was accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourned for an informal discussion on the situation in the Adriatic.⁶)

Villa Majestic, Paris.

August 12, 1919.

APPENDIX B TO No. 33

M. 452] *Note*

12 août 1919.

Le 29 mai 1919, M. Jules Cambon, Président du Comité de vérification des pouvoirs de la Conférence, adressait, sur instructions du Conseil Suprême, la lettre suivante⁷ au Chancelier Renner:

PARIS, *le 29 mai 1919.*

‘Monsieur le Président,

‘J’ai l’honneur de retourner ci-joint à Votre Excellence les pleins pouvoirs qu’Elle a bien voulu me remettre le 19 mai dernier et au sujet desquels j’ai reçu l’instruction de lui adresser la notification suivante:

‘Les Puissances Alliées et Associées ont décidé de reconnaître la nouvelle République sous la dénomination de “République d’Autriche”. Elles déclarent en conséquence qu’elles agréent les pleins pouvoirs remis le 19 mai comme habilitant les délégués qui en sont titulaires à traiter au nom de la République d’Autriche.

(Signé) J. CAMBON

A Son Excellence M. Renner,
Président de la Délégation
de la République d’Autriche.’

Or, la Délégation Autrichienne n’a tenu aucun compte de cet avertissement. Toutes les communications qu’elle a adressées depuis cette date au Président de la Conférence de la Paix ont été faites au nom de la ‘Délégation de l’Autriche Allemande’. Telle est en particulier la lettre N° 914 qui forme la note d’envoi des ‘observations présentées par la Délégation Autrichienne Allemande sur l’ensemble des conditions de paix avec l’Autriche Allemande’. Le contreprojet de traité qui figure en Annexe II à cette note d’envoi ne manque jamais, même lorsqu’il reproduit textuellement certains articles des conditions, de faire suivre ce dernier mot ‘Autriche’ du mot ‘Allemande’, ce dernier mot étant imprimé en italique pour souligner l’intention.

Il y a lieu, semble-t-il, d’examiner si les Puissances Alliées et Associées ne doivent pas confirmer à la Délégation Autrichienne leur volonté de reconnaître la ‘République d’Autriche’, sous ce titre à l’exclusion de tout autre.

⁶ Cf. Vol. IV of this series.

⁷ An English translation of this letter is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

H. D. 30.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, August 13, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir G. Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel U. S. Grant. *British Empire*:

Captain E. Abraham. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

THE FOLLOWING ALSO ATTENDED: General Weygand, General Sackville-West, M. Shigemitsui.

1. The following telegrams were before the Meeting:—

'Budapest Aug. 12, 1919

*Situation in
Hungary*

Supreme Council Peace Conference Paris.

'At the meeting today August 12th the Roumanian plenipotentiary several times stated that the Roumanian Government cannot accept orders from the Commission of Inter-Allied generals but can only enter into agreements with them for the solution of the difficulties which may come under discussion. The three generals, namely American, British and Italian, who compose the commission at present (General Graziani arrived this evening but has not yet been interviewed) are of unanimous opinion that the instructions received from the Supreme Council at Paris should be interpreted as orders which the commission should give to the Roumanian army in Hungary and which the latter is obliged to carry out in order that the required solution may be arrived at (for example paragraph one sub-paragraph[s] C and E and paragraph three sub-paragraph B).¹ The commission urgently requests a prompt reply whether its interpretation of the instructions is correct and if it can act accordingly that is to say that it can refuse to continue discussion with the Roumanian plenipotentiary if the latter insists in his refusal to accept the instructions as orders.

Inter-Allied Mission.'

'Budapest Aug. 12, 1919.

Supreme Council Peace Conference, Paris.

'The Interallied Military Mission had a full day's session this date during which a conference was had with M. Constantin Diamandy, the Roumanian plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. M. Diamandy

¹ The references are to paragraphs of appendix B to No. 28.

stated he was authorised to transact business with the Mission. He was furnished a part copy in French of the instructions to the Mission and asked whether or not his Government would abide by same. He replied he could not give an answer without first conferring with General Mardarescu, who is expected any moment to arrive and assume command of the Roumanian forces. He stated that the Roumanian Government was deeply hurt at press notices to the effect that the succession of the Archduke Joseph's Government was in any way due to Roumanian influence.

'It was represented to him that the food situation was serious and that famine and riots would result in case this situation was not alleviated. The Commission, while disassociating itself from all responsibility for the present deplorable condition in Budapest, suggested that he immediately arrange to prevent the requisitioning by Roumanians for supplies within a prescribed zone surrounding the city of Budapest and that the Roumanians remove no more rolling stock. He stated that he would give the matter his immediate attention and became very angry when it was intimated that the Roumanian Government might be considered as responsible for any famine or suffering in Budapest under present conditions.

'He was asked to state what portions of the Mission's instructions the Roumanian Government could immediately accept and became angry, stating that Roumania was not a conquered nation, that it was coordinate with the other Allies and that he would receive orders from nobody except from his Government. He finally subsided. The Mission then insisted [?on] the urgency of the case but he would not commit himself as to when he would give an answer but stated he would confer with General Mardarescu and they may see the Commission tomorrow August 13th. He was asked if the Roumanian Government had within the past day or so delivered another ultimatum to Hungary and replied in effect that he was sure it had not, because such paper would naturally and properly have been presented by him, and he is ignorant of existence of an ultimatum; the Archduke yesterday and today gave Commission details of a plot intended evidently to demoralise his Government. He stated that the three Hungarian liaison officers attached to Holband's headquarters had dictated to them a document by a Monsieur Ardeli, formerly Ambassador from Roumania during Tisza Government. The document contained the following terms amongst others. The Banat is claimed by the Roumanians, Bekesaka must belong to Roumania. Roumania has six hundred thousand men under arms. The military power of Entente is nil and they have labour difficulties. Various other inducements are offered if there is a Hungarian-Roumanian union against Slav danger. If terms not accepted Roumanians will sweep Hungary like Mackensen and leave it to its destiny. This document after being signed by one of the liaison officers but not by Ardeli, was presented to Prime Minister. Today the three officers again presented themselves to Government and informed it that if terms were not immediately accepted Roumanians would leave the country, taking with it the Government, sweep it bare and stir up labour troubles. The above is Archduke story;

he was much agitated on these occasions and appealed to Commission for advice. The first ultimatum, as he termed it, is in our possession signed by one of the liaison officers who, the Archduke states, has been with him throughout the war. The plot is obviously childish but it succeeded in frightening the Government. We have told the Archduke to take no notice.

Inter-Allied Military Mission.'

MR. BALFOUR observed that the first telegram asked for precise instructions on a definite point. The Inter-Allied Mission wished to know whether it was authorised to give orders to the Roumanian Army in Hungary. Technically he supposed that the Allied Generals in Budapest had no authority to give orders to the Roumanian Commander in the manner in which a superior officer gave orders to a junior officer, but that the Commission of Generals were entitled to deliver to the Roumanian Commander the views of the Allied and Associated Powers merely as a message from the Conference. The Generals could say that they conveyed these views to the Roumanian command, indicating that the Roumanian Government, should it mean to remain within the Alliance, would doubtless give the requisite orders to carry out the intentions of the Conference. Should the Roumanian Government decline to do so, it would shoulder the consequences of breaking the Alliance. It was obvious, in that case, that the Conference would have no further authority over Roumania once she had left the Alliance.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the Allied Generals were wrong in holding conversation with the Government of the Archduke Joseph. This Government was a reactionary Government and the public of the Entente countries would not allow any backing of such a Government. There were therefore two questions. One was the question to which Mr. Balfour had given, in his opinion, the right answer, namely, could the Allied Generals in Budapest give orders to the Roumanian Army? The second was whether they should have relations with the present reactionary Hungarian Government? He thought the answer in this case was in the negative.

MR. POLK said that there was no evidence that the Generals had, on their own initiative, sought out the Archduke's Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the telegrams indicated that the Generals were holding conversations with that Government.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that in the instructions sent to the Generals they were asked to get into touch with the Hungarian Government (see H. D. 27,² minute 2).

MR. POLK observed that there was a difference between obtaining information from a Government and having relations with it implying its recognition. The Generals must obviously take steps to obtain information. He agreed that the Generals should take no action likely to commit the Allied and Associated Powers; but to prohibit their communicating with the *de facto* Government in Budapest would be to tie their hands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the Conference must be careful to

² No. 31.

avoid the appearance of backing a reactionary Hungarian Government against the Roumanians.

MR. POLK observed that the Roumanians had established this government.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Clemenceau was aware of the report to this effect.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that according to the telegram M. Diamandy denied it.

MR. POLK said that a warning might be sent to the Generals that they must avoid committing the Conference, but the question arose, who was to carry out the terms of the Armistice? Was the Conference to wait for another government to be formed?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at all events the Conference should have the minimum of relations with the present Government.

M. TITTONI said that this minimum should be at least enough to ensure the execution of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the following dilemma then arose. The Conference would tell the present Government to carry out the original Armistice but the Roumanians had another Armistice competing with the former; thus the Conference would be standing behind the Hungarian Government as against the Roumanians.

M. TITTONI said that it was, of course, understood that the Roumanian Armistice gave way to the previous one.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the present Government in Hungary might not last; if so the Conference would be backing an ephemeral administration against the Roumanians. This would make things too easy for the Roumanians.

MR. BALFOUR then proposed a draft of instructions to be sent to the Allied Commission in Budapest.

After some discussion the draft was finally adopted in the following form :—

‘We quite recognise that you cannot avoid having relations with any *de facto* government holding power in Budapest. You will however bear in mind that according to our information the Government of the Archduke Joseph has as yet little authority and has not so far been accepted by the country. We are most desirous of dealing directly with any genuine Hungarian Government in order to settle terms of peace and resume normal economic relations. But we must not be committed to any administration which has not authority to speak for the Hungarian people. While it will therefore be your duty to listen to anything the Government has to say, you must remember that it has not yet been accepted by those for whom it professes to speak.’

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Berthelot had had an interview with M. Antonescu.³ The latter had received a personal telegram from M. Bratiano.

M. BERTHELOT said that the telegram alluded to was not the official answer of the Roumanian Government. This was to be sent to M. Misu who

³ Roumanian Minister at Paris and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

would communicate it to the Conference. What M. Antonescu had been told in the telegram was that the Roumanians had in no manner assisted in the establishment of the reactionary Government of Archduke Joseph. As to the requisitions imposed on Hungary, they were regarded as legitimate as they did not exceed what the Hungarians had taken in Roumania in cattle and railway material. In other words, the Roumanians were merely recouping themselves for their losses.

MR. BALFOUR said that as M. Clemenceau would not be present on the following day, he wished to ask him whether he would authorise his colleagues to reply to the Roumanian Government on this point should its official communication be of the same nature as that made to M. Antonescu.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Antonescu had told him that the Roumanian generals had made a mistake in requesting from the Hungarians a fixed percentage of their cattle, railway stock, etc., but he thought they were right in requiring from the Hungarians an equivalent for what the Hungarians had taken from the Roumanians.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be necessary to make the Roumanians understand that they were in the wrong in doing this.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had lost hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle. France had only recuperated from Germany 94,000. France had submitted to the decisions of the Conference. The victory of the Allies had found Roumania bound by the Peace of Bukarest, in other words at the feet of Germany. As a result of the victory of the Allies, Roumania was doubling her territory. She now wished to lay her hands on goods which belonged to the Alliance as a whole. If France and Italy had behaved like this, there could have been no peace. France and Italy had obtained far less than their demands and far less than they had lost.

MR. POLK said that this was the first open defiance of the authority of the Conference. The Council was on its trial. Should this defiance be tolerated, it would form a bad example for other small Powers and ultimately for Germany. He was authorised to say for President Wilson that if the Roumanians continued in their present course, he would not look favourably on any of their claims. He added that he had information that the Roumanians were taking steps to hold elections in Bessarabia although the disposal of the province had not yet been settled.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Clemenceau would authorise the Council, if the Roumanian official answer proved to be what was anticipated, to tell the Roumanian Government that its action could not be tolerated and that if the Roumanians wished to remain in the Alliance, they must alter their policy.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the expression 'tolerated' too stiff. He would prefer to say 'accepted'.

MR. BALFOUR asked in what manner pressure could be exercised over the Roumanians.

MR. POLK asked whether Roumania would not obtain Transylvania in virtue of the Treaty with Hungary. He also added that the partition of the Banat was not satisfactory to the Serbians.

M. TITTONI observed that the misconduct of the Roumanians was no adequate reason for rewarding the Serbs. He wished to make reservations on this matter.

(It was decided that on the receipt of the formal answer of the Roumanian Government, action should be taken in accordance with the above discussion, even in M. Clemenceau's absence.

After a short discussion, it was decided to send a further dispatch to the Allied generals at Budapest, and to communicate this dispatch to the Roumanian Government at Bukarest. The following is the text of the dispatch:—

"The Commission of Allied Generals is invested with the authority conferred on it by the Supreme Council. It is not qualified from a military point of view to give direct orders to the Roumanian generals but it is qualified to communicate to them the views of the Allied Powers.

"If the Roumanian Government means not to break away from the Allied Powers, it will give its generals necessary orders to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

"The Conference cannot believe that the Roumanian Government will by refusing to conform to the views of the Allied Powers, take a decision so serious in its consequences.")

The Meeting then adjourned.

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 13, 1919.*

No. 35

H. D. 31.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, August 14, 1919, at 5.0 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Lt.-Commander Bell. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

1. M. PICHON communicated a letter from the Roumanian Minister in Paris *Hungarian Affairs*. (see Annex [Appendix] A), and the Council took note of a Roumanian reply to the further communication from the same source intimating that the communication of the Mr. Diamandy had been appointed High Commissioner for Roumania at Budapest. He then asked if Mr. Balfour *Allied and Associated Powers* had any observations to make on the Roumanian reply to the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers. (Annex [Appendix] B.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the letter as a whole was satisfactory, since the Roumanian Government consented to abide by the decisions of the Entente Powers. With regard to the remainder of the letter, he asked whether it would be profitable to reply to all the controversial points raised. He did, however, think that the Roumanian Government had advanced several arguments, which called for discussion, and possibly a reply. The first of these arguments was that dealing with the supposition of the part of the Roumanian Government, that the Armistice of November, 1918, had lapsed, owing to subsequent acts of war initiated by the Hungarian government, and owing to the explicit invitation of the Conference, by virtue of which Roumania was called upon to take military action against Hungary.

M. TRITONI said that he regarded the first argument as a strong one, since the attack of the Hungarian army was a positive violation of the armistice. He regarded the second argument as weak, because, whilst admitting that the Roumanians had been invited to initiate military action against the Hungarians, a similar invitation had been sent to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs; and no action by any of the parties consulted had followed upon these negotiations.

M. PICHON said that the Roumanians were not in a position to claim that the armistice had lapsed on account of the invitation sent to them by the Allied and Associated Powers for the simple reason that they were invited to enforce it by the communication to which they referred. He agreed with Mr. Balfour, that there was a satisfactory side to the Roumanian reply. He thought, however, that the Roumanians were attempting to take up too isolated an attitude. They spoke of collaborating with the Conference; they were not called upon to do that; but to obey its decisions.

M. TRITONI said that M. Pichon's remark was a matter of nuance, since, if the Roumanians wished to conform with the decisions of the Conference, they would evidently have to collaborate with it.

MR. BALFOUR said that under the circumstances, it would probably be better to make no reference, in our answer, to the ambiguous phrases of the Roumanian note; but to lay emphasis on the satisfactory assurances that it contained. The next point, to which he wished to draw attention, was the protest of the Roumanian Government on the subject of the Conference decision with regard to war material. It was obviously necessary that they should be assured, in a most formal manner, that the war material captured by them belonged to the Allies as a whole. The statement in their note, to the effect that they had not compromised the economic activities of the countries they had invaded, was contradicted by the information submitted to the Conference. It seemed as though the Roumanians assumed, that, because they had been robbed by the Hungarians at an earlier period of the war; and because booty had been carried from their country into the territories that they had now invaded, they had a right to carry away with them, whatever they could seize in order to equalise matters. This argument should be replied to, by showing them that France, Belgium, Serbia and Italy had suffered in the same manner, and would never recover the booty that had

been taken from them by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies in the days of their successes.

M. PICHON said that according to the information at the disposal of the Conference, the Roumanians had requisitioned 50% of everything they could lay their hands on; railway rolling stock, live stock, and agricultural implements.

M. BERTHELOT said that when General Mackensen had invaded Roumanian territory, a large amount of the railway material (2000 locomotives) requisitioned by him had remained in Hungarian territory. These engines could not be restored under the armistice because they were of German make and were indistinguishable from the ordinary machines used normally on the Hungarian railways.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to know the opinion of the French Foreign Office and of his colleagues on the Roumanian protest to the effect that the Allies had allowed themselves to be swayed by the calumnious accusations of an unscrupulous enemy.

M. PICHON said that we had not received information from such a source, but from our accredited representatives. He further remarked that the Roumanians admitted implicitly the accusations, against which they protested, by trying to justify them on the plea of military necessity.

M. TITTONI suggested that there should be no recriminations; the main point being that the Roumanians should be made to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with M. Tittoni, but thought that the question of war material must be dealt with in our reply, which, he thought, M. Berthelot might possibly draft.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would draft a reply, and asked whether it should not deal also with the entire disarmament of the Hungarian army, and the withdrawal of the Roumanians behind the Theiss; since these points had been decided upon by the Conference, before sending out instructions to the Mission of Allied Generals to Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the Roumanians must be made to retire to their frontier and not only to the Theiss. They had already promised to do so after the disarmament of Hungary.

M. TITTONI remarked that the moment at which the withdrawal of the Roumanians should begin ought to be left to the Generals to decide. Further events in Hungary might make it most desirable to have a strong force of Roumanians present in Budapest, which had been, during the past few months, the scene of Bloodshed and massacre.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that, under the circumstances, it might be best to examine carefully the instructions given to the Generals, and to see whether they were complete in all points. If it should be found that they were not, they could be revised and added to them [*sic*] if necessary.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it had not been decided in those instructions what particular strategic points should be occupied by the Roumanian army.

MR. BALFOUR said that the letter as a whole was satisfactory, since the Roumanian Government consented to abide by the decisions of the Entente Powers. With regard to the remainder of the letter, he asked whether it would be profitable to reply to all the controversial points raised. He did, however, think that the Roumanian Government had advanced several arguments, which called for discussion, and possibly a reply. The first of these arguments was that dealing with the supposition of the part of the Roumanian Government, that the Armistice of November, 1918, had lapsed, owing to subsequent acts of war initiated by the Hungarian government, and owing to the explicit invitation of the Conference, by virtue of which Roumania was called upon to take military action against Hungary.

M. TRITTON said that he regarded the first argument as a strong one, since the attack of the Hungarian army was a positive violation of the armistice. He regarded the second argument as weak, because, whilst admitting that the Roumanians had been invited to initiate military action against the Hungarians, a similar invitation had been sent to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs; and no action by any of the parties consulted had followed upon these negotiations.

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been taken from them by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies in the days of their successes.

M. PICHON said that according to the information at the disposal of the Conference, the Roumanians had requisitioned 50% of everything they could lay their hands on; railway rolling stock, live stock, and agricultural implements.

M. BERTHELOT said that when General Mackensen had invaded Roumanian territory, a large amount of the railway material (2000 locomotives) requisitioned by him had remained in Hungarian territory. These engines could not be restored under the armistice because they were of German make and were indistinguishable from the ordinary machines used normally on the Hungarian railways.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to know the opinion of the French Foreign Office and of his colleagues on the Roumanian protest to the effect that the Allies had allowed themselves to be swayed by the calumnious accusations of an unscrupulous enemy.

M. PICHON said that we had not received information from such a source, but from our accredited representatives. He further remarked that the Roumanians admitted implicitly the accusations, against which they protested, by trying to justify them on the plea of military necessity.

M. TITTONI suggested that there should be no recriminations; the main point being that the Roumanians should be made to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with M. Tittoni, but thought that the question of war material must be dealt with in our reply, which, he thought, M. Berthelot might possibly draft.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would draft a reply, and asked whether it should not deal also with the entire disarmament of the Hungarian army, and the withdrawal of the Roumanians behind the Theiss; since these points had been decided upon by the Conference, before sending out instructions to the Mission of Allied Generals to Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the Roumanians must be made to retire to their frontier and not only to the Theiss. They had already promised to do so after the disarmament of Hungary.

M. TITTONI remarked that the moment at which the withdrawal of the Roumanians should begin ought to be left to the Generals to decide. Further events in Hungary might make it most desirable to have a strong force of Roumanians present in Budapest, which had been, during the past few months, the scene of Bloodshed and massacre.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that, under the circumstances, it might be best to examine carefully the instructions given to the Generals, and to see whether they were complete in all points. If it should be found that they were not, they could be revised and added to them [*sic*] if necessary.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it had not been decided in those instructions what particular strategic points should be occupied by the Roumanian army.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the Generals had been left free to decide on the points in Hungarian territory which ought to be occupied by the Roumanians, and what forces should be employed by these latter for this purpose.

M. BERTHELOT then read the draft of the telegram that he had prepared for communication to the Roumanian government (see Annex [Appendix] C).

MR. BALFOUR asked whether special mention should not be made of the rule laid down with regard to war booty and requisitions, since the rule in question had been accepted by the governments of other Allied countries which had been invaded. He further asked whether these countries should not be mentioned by name.

M. BERTHELOT [said] that it would, in his opinion, be unwise to mention Allied countries by name in this connection, on account of the Serbian actions in the Banat.

MR. POLK asked whether it was desired that the Roumanian statement with regard to the lapse of the armistice should be allowed to stand.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought it would be unwise to argue the question closely. There had been two armistices with Hungary. The first had not been very successful and it had been altered by subsequent decisions of the Conference, since, by its provisions, Hungary was allowed to remain in Slovakia. The second armistice had then been substituted. It was now superseded by a third one, imposed on the Hungarians by the Roumanians. The Conference could not very well re-open the whole discussion on armistices by replying in detail to the Roumanian argument on the subject.

MR. POLK said that the sentence of the Roumanian note stating that the armistice had lapsed owing to an invitation to take military action, communicated to Roumania by the Allied and Associated Governments, could hardly be allowed to stand.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that a general sentence might open the reply, saying that the Conference did not wish to discuss the controversial points in the Roumanian note.

(It was agreed to send a telegram drafted by M. Berthelot (see Annex [Appendix] C) to the Roumanian Government and to the Mission of Allied Generals at Budapest.)

(At this point Mr. Hutchinson¹ entered the room.)

2. MR. HUTCHINSON reported and commented on the Report of the Economic Commission with regard to the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (see Appendix D).

*Economic Clauses
in the Peace Treaty*

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the modification proposed to Article 25² would entail the acceptance on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments of the clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucarest of 1913 whereby Roumania obtained a certain portion of the Dobrudja.

¹ Expert in the section of the British Delegation concerned with commercial and industrial questions.

² For the numbering see No. 22, note 8.

MR. HUTCHINSON replied that he was unable to answer Mr. Balfour's question as the Economic Commission could not deal with territorial questions.

(It was decided:—

(1) That the proposed modification to Article 25 should be submitted to the Drafting Committee who should inform the Council whether by virtue of the aforesaid modification the Allied and Associated Governments would be bound to recognise as valid the territorial clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucarest of 1913, more particularly those whereby a certain portion of the Dobruja was ceded to Roumania.

(2) That the proposed modification to Article 36² should be accepted.)

3. The Council took note of a telegram from the High Commissioner at Constantinople (see Appendix E).

Commission of Enquiry into the events at Smyrna M. PICHON said that he believed that it was intended that the Greek Officer should be present at the meetings of the Commission. (See H. D. 12, paragraph 5.³)

M. TITTONI remarked that in his opinion the decision only implied that the Greek Officer was to be at the disposal of the Commission, without being present at every sitting.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with M. Tittoni.

M. TITTONI then accentuated his previous statement by saying, that in his opinion, the witnesses cited before the Commission would be intimidated by the presence of a Greek Officer.

M. PICHON said that a decision, in the same sense as the one previously taken, must be made with regard to the Turks.

M. TITTONI then remarked that he did not think that the resolution in H. D. 12, paragraph 5,³ had been accurately drafted, and pointed out that he had drawn attention to the inaccuracy in question on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR replied that the decision had been communicated to the Greeks and could not now be altered or modified.

M. PICHON then said that the previous decision could be interpreted as excluding the Greek Representative from the deliberations of the Commission. The words of the decision had been that he was to 'follow the labours of the Commission'. He was therefore in a position which could be compared with that of a foreign Military Attaché who followed the deliberations of the Headquarters Staff to which he was attached, without taking part in them.

(After some further discussion, it was decided that the previous decision of the Council (see H. D. 12, Article 5³) should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna. All necessary data should be communicated to him, however,

³ No. 16, minute 5.

and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 14, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 35

LÉGATION DE ROUMANIE EN FRANCE

Le Ministre de Roumanie en France a l'honneur d'informer Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que dans un télégramme daté de Bucarest le 12 août, Monsieur Bratiano le charge de démentir que le Gouvernement Roumain ait favorisé d'une manière quelconque l'installation de l'Archiduc Joseph au gouvernement de la Hongrie.

Le Gouvernement Roumain n'a aucune sympathie ni pour la personne de l'Archiduc Joseph, ni pour les idées réactionnaires qu'il représente, et d'une manière générale n'entend soutenir aucun gouvernement qui ne serait agréé par l'Entente.

Légation de Roumanie, Paris.

PARIS, le 14 août 1919.

A Son Excellence

Monsieur Pichon,

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Paris.

APPENDIX B TO No. 35

Document 1

Translation.

ROUMANIAN DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

PARIS, August 14, 1919.

The Roumanian Delegation has the honour to submit herewith the reply of the Roumanian Government to the communications of the Peace Conference, presented at Bucarest on August 9, 1919, concerning the situation in Hungary.

To His Excellency the President of the Peace Conference.

Document 2

*Reply of the Roumanian Government to the Communications of the Peace Conference
presented at Bucharest on August 9, 1919⁴*

The Roumanian Government has been very painfully surprised by the communication received from the Peace Conference.⁵ It has deserved neither the

⁴ The text of this note from the Roumanian Government was published with certain variations in the British press on August 16, 1919.

⁵ See No. 30, appendix B.

reproaches nor the accusations contained in this communication. Roumania could not defy a Conference in whose decisions she is to participate as a result of her co-operation with the Allies in the work of justice which the victory of the Allies assures to the world, as well as the national claims that the Roumanians formulated precisely when they formed the entente with the Allies. Roumania has not changed her territorial claims according to the success of her army, but she does consider that the new military efforts that she has been constrained to make in order to throw back the Hungarian offensive, and the services that she has rendered to civilization by her sacrifices, give her a new title to claim her rights.

The Roumanian Government, at Budapest as elsewhere, intends to work in collaboration with the representatives of the Allied Powers. The Roumanian military command has received orders to collaborate with the military missions at Budapest, in order to fix together the measures necessary to facilitate the possibility of a Hungarian Government, which will assure order in the country and guarantee the security of peace relations on the Roumanian frontier. With this very object in view the Royal Government has instructed its High Commissioner, Monsieur Diamandy, to go to Budapest, where, thanks to the order established by the victory of the Roumanian army, he will be able to meet the representatives of the Allied Powers. Roumania is decided in her intention of acting in accord with the policy that the Conference may henceforth fix in regard to Hungary, as a result of the new order of things established by the intervention of the Roumanian army.

Concerning the attitude of the Roumanian Government and of the Command towards the decisions of the Conference concerning the occupation of Budapest, it is well known that the Roumanian troops were already there when the communication was made to the Royal Government, and that the other four⁶ were presented to it simultaneously, and not earlier than the afternoon of the ninth of August. Moreover, this occupation, which does not imply the bloodshed that the Conference fears, is indispensable if it is desired to bring an end to the state of affairs that has troubled the centre of Europe too long already. Previous events have proved this.

The Roumanian Government could not foresee that the Peace Conference would consider the Armistice of November, 1918, as still existant, after having received from it the invitation to co-operate in a military action against the Hungarian army. Still less could it foresee this attitude after having been the object of a general offensive on the part of this army.

Roumania could not conceive that, after the severe fighting which resulted in the surrender of all the enemy's organized forces to the Roumanian army, she would not have the right to take possession of the war material that the former had used to attack her, without being prevented by the situation created by the previous armistice. As to the other requisitions, they were levied only in proportions that assured, in addition to the needs of the population, large quantities for exportation, and did not compromise economic activity of the country.

Roumania was obliged to take such action as a result of the state of complete exhaustion due to the Hungarian and German invasions and by the fact that it was in these regions,—now occupied by her—that the greater part of the spoils of war taken by the armies of the Central Powers were deposited. It would be difficult

⁶ The reference is uncertain; for earlier communications on this subject from the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government see No. 27, appendix C, No. 28, appendix A, and No. 29, minute 2.

to conceive that this right should be denied to Roumania when other Allied armies were able, without any obstacle on the part of the Conference, to completely drain and exhaust occupied territories, which should have been, according to the Peace, turned over not to a former enemy but to an Ally.

The Roumanian Government regrets that the Allies should have taken into consideration the slanderous accusations preferred by an unscrupulous enemy. Far from encouraging pillaging, the Roumanian troops, by their very presence, re-established order and checked anarchy and devastation. The presence of the Representatives of the Allied Powers at Budapest is a testimony to such a state of affairs. The Roumanian Command, from the very first days, adopted measures to insure the provisioning of the Hungarian Capital which he [*sic*] had found completely deprived of provisions. Railroad transportation was interrupted only temporarily in the strict interest of military security. Concerning the Governments which have succeeded Bela Kun, they have been neither established, nor replaced nor interfered with by Roumanian troops.

The Roumanian army has proved, in the midst of all the hardships which it has had to sustain, the high spirit with which it is animated and the discipline which reigns, and has never lost sight of the duties towards humanity and civilization which were incumbent upon it. The reception given to the army by the population in all the occupied territories is a brilliant proof of the equity of their actions. If the Roumanian military accomplishments, thanks to the direction of the operations and to the bravery of the troops, have developed and culminated so rapidly, Roumania has the clear conviction that she has rendered eminent service towards the work of peace which is the object of the Peace Conference.

APPENDIX C TO No. 35

Télégramme au Gouvernement Roumain⁷ (adressé par l'intermédiaire du Chargé d'Affaires de France à Bucarest), communiqué à la Mission Militaire Interalliée de Budapest

12 [*sic*] août 1919.

La Conférence de la Paix, sans revenir sur un certain nombre de points qui appelleraient de sa part des rectifications, enregistre avec satisfaction la déclaration du Gouvernement Roumain 'qu'il est décidé à agir d'accord avec la politique que la Conférence fixera à l'égard de la Hongrie'.

Elle interprète cette déclaration comme indiquant que la Roumanie, en sa qualité d'Etat participant à la Conférence de la Paix, a l'intention de se conformer à ses décisions communiquées par l'intermédiaire de la Mission Militaire déléguée à Budapest par le Conseil Suprême.

Les Directions envoyées à trois reprises par la Conférence à la Mission des Généraux Alliés et communiquées à Bucarest ont défini d'une manière détaillée et explicite la politique des Puissances Alliées à l'égard de la Hongrie dans la situation présente (désarmement des troupes hongroises, maintien de l'ordre avec le minimum de troupes étrangères, ravitaillement de la Hongrie, abstention de toute immixtion dans la politique intérieure sous réserve de la libre expression de la volonté nationale).

Le Conseil Suprême insiste sur le fait qu'aucune reprise définitive de matériel

⁷ A translation of this telegram was published in the British press on August 16, 1919.

de guerre, de chemins de fer, d'agriculture, ni de bétail, etc., ne peut avoir lieu actuellement.

Il appartient, conformément aux principes de la Conférence acceptés par tous les Etats Alliés et appliqués en particulier dans le Traité avec l'Allemagne, à la réunion des Puissances Alliées et Associées seule de déterminer des réparations à fournir par la Hongrie et la répartition entre les Etats intéressés. Ni l'armée Roumaine, ni le Gouvernement Roumain ne sont fondés à fixer eux-mêmes la part de la Roumanie, les avoirs hongrois de toute nature étant le gage commun des Puissances Alliées.

S. PICHON

APPENDIX D TO No. 35

Le Président de la Commission Economique de la Conférence de la Paix à Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême des Principales Puissances Alliées et Associées

PARIS, le 12 août 1919.

Le Conseil Suprême des Principales Puissances Alliées et Associées a renvoyé à l'examen de la Commission Economique deux propositions relatives à l'article 25² et à l'article 36² du Projet de Traité avec la Bulgarie, précédemment approuvé.

1) *Article 25.* Au sujet de cet article, la Délégation Roumaine a proposé³ une retouche tendant à ce que l'abrogation des Traités passés par la Bulgarie avec la Roumanie ne vise que les Traités conclus depuis la date du 15 août 1916 jusqu'à la mise en vig[ueu]r du présent Traité.

La Commission Economique faisant droit à la proposition roumaine propose à l'unanimité, pour l'article 25, la rédaction ci-après.

'La Bulgarie reconnaît comme étant et demeurant abrogés tous les Traités, Conventions ou Accords qu'elle a conclus avec la Russie ou avec tout Etat ou Gouvernement dont le territoire constituait antérieurement une partie de la Russie, avant le 1^{er} août 1914 ou depuis cette date, jusqu'à la mise en vig[ueu]r du présent Traité, ainsi qu'avec la Roumanie depuis la date du 15 août 1916 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.'

2) *Article 36.* Sur la proposition de la Délégation Britannique la Commission Economique a été unanime à retoucher la rédaction de l'article 36 sur un point de détail. Une précision a été insérée dans le texte pour marquer que les obligations résultant de cet article seront confinées au territoire bulgare tel qu'il résulte du présent Traité; la rédaction nouvelle proposée à l'unanimité est la suivante. . . .⁹

Le Secrétaire Général
de la Commission Economique
de la Conférence de la Paix

SERRUYS

⁸ See No. 26, minute 9. In his letter of August 2, 1919, proposing the amendment in question, M. Pangrati, Roumanian representative on the Economic Commission, stated: 'La Délégation Roumaine n'a jamais entendu et n'entend pas renoncer notamment au Traité de Paix de Bucarest conclu avec la Bulgarie en 1913.'

⁹ There followed in the original a draft for the French text of article 182 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

Translation.

Telegram from the French High Commission on behalf of the Interallied Investigation Commission

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 11, 1919.

Received on the 13th.

The Investigation Commission of Smyrna is composed as follows:—Admiral Bristol for the United States of America, General Bunoust for France, General Hare for England, General Dall'olio for Italy. The Greek Government has designated Colonel Mazurakis to follow the meetings.

It would be well to precise whether or not the Greek Officer can be present at all the sessions. That might have the disadvantage of preventing the Turkish witnesses from making their depositions freely before him. It is probable that the Turks will ask that a Turkish Officer be authorised to be present at the sessions under the same conditions as Colonel Mazurakis.

The first meeting of the Commission will take place to-morrow.

DEFRANCE.

No. 36

H. D. 32.] *Notes on a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 18, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire:* Captain E. Abraham. *France:* Captain A. Portier. *Italy:* Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Demolon.

1. M. PICHON asked whether his colleagues had received any news of Hungary. He assumed that all had seen the telegram from General Bandholtz.

Situation in Hungary

(This telegram was read. See Appendix A.)

M. Pichon also mentioned another telegram addressed to M. Clemenceau by the Archduke Joseph. (See Appendix B.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the latter telegram appeared to be satisfactory. The Government undertook to proceed to a general election in a short time, and to remit the negotiation of peace to the national assembly.

M. PICHON said that the phrase used, namely, 'on the basis of universal suffrage' was not very precise. It did not necessarily imply that the voting would be direct and secret.

M. TITTONI said that failing this condition there would be no legitimate government.

M. PICHON said that in addition the time limit 'as soon as possible' was very indefinite, and the resignation of the government 'when the National Assembly met' might be considerably postponed. He thought that instructions should be given to the representatives of the Allied Governments to arrange that the elections should take place very soon; that they should be based on direct and secret voting, and that the Constituent Assembly should be formed immediately.

MR. POLK asked whether the Allied Representatives had yet made any report on the present Government. He had himself received information from two sources: from Mr. Hoover, and from certain persons who had just returned from Hungary. Both agreed that it was scarcely possible for the Council to recognise the Archduke Joseph. He only remained in power because he controlled the police and the Hungarian army. No labour representative or socialist had joined his Government. The mere fact that he was a Hapsburg had greatly upset the neighbouring small States. Mr. Hoover's conclusion was that this Government should not be recognised, as there could be no proper election while the Archduke Joseph remained in power. Should the Conference refuse to recognise him he would fall, and he could then be replaced by a Coalition Government.

M. PICHON asked whether there was any proof that the Roumanians had supported this Government.

MR. POLK said they of course denied it. The information received was to the effect that they were present at its formation and could have prevented it. The Archduke Joseph had been put in power by the Hungarian military party.

M. TITTONI said that retrospective considerations were not of much import. The Roumanians denied any complicity in forming the present Government of Hungary, and their mere presence at its formation did not establish complicity. Their presence, however, inasmuch as it contributed to the maintenance of order, also contributed to maintaining any Government in power. The question for the Council was whether this Government should be recognised as a *de facto* government, or whether the Council should say that elections must be held by a government more representative of all parties in the country.

MR. POLK said that he understood no social democrat or labour representative would join a Coalition Government with the Archduke. Recognition of the Archduke's Government would amount to excluding from recognition the real representation of the country. He thought, therefore, that it would be a fatal error to recognise the Archduke's Government. He felt American opinion would be very strongly opposed to it.

M. TITTONI thought it would be better to consult the Allied Mission in Budapest before coming to a decision. The Mission might be asked whether, should the Archduke Joseph withdraw, power would be likely to pass without revolution to a Coalition Government. The Mission might also be asked whether, seeing that the Archduke Joseph did not furnish a rallying point for

all parties in Hungary, it would not be well to recommend him to resign and yield his place to a Government which might be really representative.

M. PICHON said that there were undoubtedly objections to any Government with a Hapsburg as chief. Such a Government was bound to be a reactionary government. The Conference, however, had said that it would not interfere in Hungarian internal affairs. Nevertheless the Allied Mission in Budapest had inevitably had relations with the Archduke. Hence a very delicate situation. If the question suggested by M. TITTONI were to be in the precise form he proposed, the Conference would be open to the charge of interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary. He thought that the representatives should be asked for information on Hungarian conditions. The previous instructions sent to them should be recalled. They should be told not to appear to interfere and above all to do nothing tending to convey any recognition of the present Government which in the eyes of the Conference, had no legal existence, which did not represent the chief parties in Hungary and especially excluded all democratic elements.

MR. POLK said that he agreed that information was what the Council desired. He drew attention to the fact that the Archduke's government had not been put in power by the Hungarian people, but by a *coup d'état*. It took the place of the Government in whose favour Bela Kun had resigned. If the Archduke knew that the Powers were unfavourable to him he would resign, and a Coalition Government might soon be possible. The representative of the French Government had had an interview with the Archduke, who had said that he would abdicate as soon as a Socialistic Government could be formed. If he had spoken the truth he might resign immediately.

M. PICHON said that it would be necessary for the Council to make up its mind as to what it wanted. Was it prepared in the end to say to the Archduke that he must resign? If the Council was bound by its decisions not to interfere in Hungarian internal politics, it would not be easy to do this. If the Archduke were told that he would not be recognised officially, this would be of little avail, as even without official relations, the Governments were to some extent committed to the intercourse they must have with the administration in power. The Archduke had formed a programme, and had communicated it to the Allied Generals in Budapest. The Generals had received him, and even their silence was construable as a sort of recognition. The question was therefore whether the Council should await the advice of the Allied representatives in Budapest or not before asking the Archduke to resign.

MR. POLK said that he thought it would probably be better to wait. But he reminded the Council that M. Clemenceau had made a strong point in the instructions to the Generals of not recognising this Government because of the bad example this would set to the rest of Europe. If the Generals, therefore, had recognised the Archduke's Government, they had exceeded their mission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that they had done so.

M. TITTONI said that they had been visited by the Archduke. They had received his programme, they had remained silent, they had made no protest.

All this amounted almost to a recognition. The question therefore was should the Archduke be asked to retire.

MR. POLK observed that there were precedents for official relations with unrecognised Governments. For instance, the Government of Lenin and Trotsky had not been recognised, but agents of the Powers had been in contact with them.

M. PICHON observed that the agents in question, at least as regards France, had not been officials. The telegram alluded to by Mr. Tittoni had not, he thought, contained a programme. It merely contained a communication by the Archduke of the members of his Cabinet.

M. TITTONI said that it was necessary to take into consideration public opinion. Throughout the Allied world it was thought that the Council was in some manner favourable to the Archduke's Government. The papers were engaged in speculations as to whether it was France, Italy or Roumania that backed the Archduke. All Governments would be questioned in their Parliaments. It was therefore important that the Council should take sides openly and that all should appear to be following the same course.

M. PICHON said that the Council had already declared that it would only recognise a Government representing the national will.

MR. BALFOUR then proposed a draft telegram for communication to the Allied Generals in Budapest. (See Appendix C.) He said that he thought the advantages of this telegram were that it would recognise the need of the Allied representatives to work with the people in power. It made it clear that the Conference did not trust these people; that the main reason for this distrust was that the head of the Hungarian Government was a Hapsburg; and that what the Conference desired was to obtain the opinion of the Hungarian people. A National Assembly based upon universal suffrage and direct and secret voting was necessary. It was only on these conditions that peace could be made with a Hungarian Government. He thought this constituted sufficient material for a very strong hint to the present Hungarian Government.

M. PICHON said that it was undesirable to use any sentence which might suggest that the Allies were ready to agree to the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Allies could not oppose a monarchical form of government in Hungary should the Hungarians desire it.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Pichon, not that he objected to a monarchical form of Government, but because in Hungary it would be bound to have a Hapsburg at its head, and because the Hapsburgs were the authors of the war.

(The telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour (see Appendix C) was then adopted.)

2. MR. POLK communicated to his colleagues a telegram from Mr. Hoover regarding the situation in Upper Silesia. (See Appendix D.)

*Situation in
Silesia*

M. TITTONI said that the conclusion of the telegram was that a military occupation was necessary. The Council, he understood, had already decided that there should be a military occupation of Silesia.

M. PICHON pointed out that the occupation could only [be] carried out after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI pointed out that a question affecting the very existence of Central Europe was at stake. If the coal mines of Silesia were destroyed, the life of Europe would be in jeopardy. Even if the Treaty did not give the Conference the right to intervene, he thought that in a case of this kind it would be quite fair to exceed Treaty rights.

M. PICHON said that the military occupation of Silesia before the ratification of the Treaty was a very serious matter. He suggested that General Weygand should be sent for.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought according to the armistice the Allies were entitled to occupy any strategic point they wished in Germany.

M. TITTONI pointed out that it was not necessary to occupy the whole of Silesia. It was, however, of vital interest to save the mines.

MR. POLK read another telegram from Mr. Hoover recommending that representatives of the Coal Commission should proceed at once to Upper Silesia. He thought this might be decided upon without awaiting General Weygand's arrival.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that M. Loucheur, who, he understood, presided over the Coal Commission should be asked to send its representatives to Silesia.

M. TITTONI said that he thought a Commission would not be able, without military assistance, to save the mines.

(At this point General Weygand entered the room.)

GENERAL WEYGAND, after reading the telegrams, said that he had just received from General Henrys similar news to that sent by Mr. Hoover. General Henrys also asked for troops to occupy Upper Silesia. A reply had already been sent to General Henrys to the effect that according to the Treaty the Allies had no right to enter Silesia, but that his request had been communicated to the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Allies had no rights under the Armistice.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that Silesia was still German territory, and that no article in the Armistice with Germany entitled the Allied Armies to enter into German territory. All that could be done was to anticipate the terms of the Treaty.

M. PICHON thought that all that could be done for the time being was to send the representatives of the Coal Commission.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the German Government, if questioned, would be bound to disavow the promoters of trouble in Upper Silesia. In this case the German Government would probably declare itself unable to control the situation. Should it do this, the Allies would have sufficient reason for offering to assist in controlling it.

M. PICHON said that he understood General Weygand's proposal to be that the German Government should be asked to remedy the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia. If it declared itself unable to do so, the Allies would tender their help.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Allies had not a right to send troops into Germany to occupy strategic points.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that a provision to this effect existed in the Armistice with Austria, but not in the Armistice with Germany.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that according to Mr. Hoover the strikes in Upper Silesia had a political character, and were really fostered by the Germans themselves. If the Allies asked the German Government to suppress the strikes, the Polish party in Upper Silesia would consider itself aggrieved and this policy might amount to sacrificing the Poles to the Germans.

M. TITTONI said that he understood that German troops had not yet evacuated Upper Silesia. In that case the responsibility for ensuring order was theirs.

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the passage in Mr. Hoover's telegram stating that the Polish miners had been protecting the mines against the Spartacists who appeared to have combined with the German Volunteer Corps in shooting the Poles. Under such circumstances it was difficult to send German soldiers into the district to restore order without incurring the reproaches of the Poles.

M. TITTONI said that the destruction of the mines must be put a stop to by some means or other. There was really no question of sending German troops to quell the disorder, as German troops were already there.

M. PICHON said that the Council was faced with a dilemma. The Germans would certainly fall upon the Poles. On the other hand, it was a big responsibility to occupy German territory before the Treaty.

M. TITTONI thought that the destruction of the coal supply in Central Europe was a worse evil.

M. PICHON said that the Military Commission suggested in Mr. Hoover's telegram was not, in his opinion, likely to have a very great effect.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that such a Mission could only be sent with the consent of the German Government. Should it proceed to Silesia without the consent of the German Government, the latter might refuse to be responsible for its safety.

M. PICHON said that the Allies had really no means of military intervention within the terms of the law.

MR. BALFOUR said that in one sense the Germans had as great an interest in putting a stop to the destruction of the mines as the Allies. German industries depended upon Silesian coal. They would therefore lose as much as Tchecho-Slovakia, Vienna or Italy. He suggested that the Germans might be told that if they declined to help, the Allies would arrange that they should have no coal from Silesia, should the district go to Poland.

M. BERTHELOT observed that Herr Erzberger in a recent speech had drawn attention to the diminishing production of coal in Silesia. He had added that there was reason to anticipate a still further diminution. For this reason he had urged that restrictions be imposed on the consumption of coal in Germany in order that sufficient coal should be left for the winter months. This indicated that the German Government was aware of the situation in

Silesia, and had perhaps contributed to bring it about. It was not therefore quite safe to speculate on the good faith of the German Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that in negotiating on this matter with Germany, it was reasonable to assume that the German Government acted in good faith, seeing that it could not admit that it was inspiring the destruction of the mines.

M. BERTHELOT said that the German Government would then resort to dilatory tactics. They would say that it was not a case of revolution but a case of strikes, which it was difficult to suppress.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the coal from Silesia was a matter of European interest. Many arguments were at the disposal of the Conference. This coal concerned Austria, Tchecho-Slovakia and other States. The Conference moreover was bound to hand over the territory to Poland in good condition should it ultimately be assigned to Poland.

M. PICHON said that General Dupont might perhaps be asked to intervene with the German Government and ask it to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. He suggested that General Weygand should prepare a text of a telegram to General Dupont, and submit it to the Council on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been struck by one of the considerations brought forward by General Weygand. The situation should be looked at in its broader aspect. The Silesian coal question affected not merely the comfort, but the very existence of the new states created by the Conference. The question was not one of local strikes and local destruction of property, which, unfortunate though it might be, might well be considered no business of the Conference. It was the consequences elsewhere that mattered. These consequences might perhaps justify the Conference in exceeding the letter both of the Armistice and of the Treaty, and in anticipating the terms of the latter by a few weeks. He thought the policy to which the discussion pointed might be summarised under three heads. First, the representatives of the Coal Commission should be sent to Silesia; second, an appeal should be made to the German Government in the manner suggested by General Weygand, and third, Marshal Foch should be asked to devise plans for combining with the forces of order in the country, in order to protect what was not merely German or Polish property, but a world interest.

M. PICHON said that he understood that the third proposal would only come into play if the two former were insufficient.

(It was then agreed that:—

- (a) M. Loucheur be asked to send representatives of the Coal Commission to Upper Silesia without delay, to examine the situation and to report on the means of remedying it.
- (b) That the attention of the German Government be called to the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia and to the danger of destruction of the coal mines, and that it be asked to take necessary steps to ensure order. General Weygand was asked to submit, at the following meeting, draft instructions to General Dupont, embodying this policy.

- (c) To ask Marshal Foch to prepare means of sending forces into Upper Silesia, should the need arise, in order to protect the mines from destruction.)

3. M. TITTONI said he wished to draw attention to a memorandum he had received from the British Delegation, regarding the plan according to which the Conference should work.

*Programme of work
for the Conference*

M. PICHON suggested that this question be held over until Thursday,¹ when M. Clemenceau was expected to return.²

4. M. TITTONI said that he thought the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed. He asked when this event could be expected.

*Functions of the
Editing Committee*

CAPTAIN PORTIER said that the first meeting of the Editing Committee was to take place on the following day. The last reports from the various Commissions had only just been received. He thought that the labours of the Editing Committee could, at best, be completed in 48 hours, provided that the Committee confined itself to co-ordinating the answers prepared by the Commissions, and that it did not deal afresh with the various problems.

MR. BALFOUR said that even after the Committee had finished its work, time would be required for printing and correcting proofs.

CAPTAIN PORTIER said that, presumably, the Austrians would be given, as the Germans had been given, 5 days to consider whether they would sign or not.

MR. BALFOUR asked if a timetable of the various necessary operations could be prepared by the Secretary-General. He agreed that the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed and the Bulgarian Treaty presented.

M. PICHON said he thought that all were agreed that the Editing Committee should confine its labours to co-ordinating reports of Commissions, except in case any two reports were inconsistent.

MR. POLK said that he would like to see the instructions to the Committee. He thought the Committee should not be too strictly limited, though its main task was certainly to co-ordinate the answers prepared by the Commissions. He understood that some of its members proposed to re-cast the Treaty.

CAPTAIN PORTIER pointed out that the Committee had received no instructions. There was merely a resolution to the effect that a similar organism should be set up to that set up to make the final reply to the Germans.

(It was agreed that the Editing Committee should be instructed to limit its labours to the co-ordination of the various replies prepared by Commissions, except when inconsistencies in these replies required examination of any question on its merits.)³

¹ August 21, 1919.

² M. Clemenceau was taking a brief rest in the west of France.

³ This resolution is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 72.

M. TITTONI observed that the Conference had dealt with many important matters. It might fairly be said that it had governed Europe, but it would be severely criticised by public opinion should it separate without having made peace.

5. MR. POLK said he had received a telegram from Sofia to the effect that General Franchet d'Esperey, acting under the authority of the Peace Conference, had ordered the Bulgarian Government to disarm its forces. He asked whether General Franchet d'Esperey had given an order to the Bulgarian Government, or had conveyed a request. The Council had agreed that no orders could be given. He would, therefore, like to know exactly in what manner the General had proceeded, as it appeared that he had obtained the removal to Constantinople of the firing mechanism of all the surplus small arms in Bulgaria. He was also informed that the General had gone to Bulgarian Thrace and told his officers to say that the country would be attributed to Greece, and that the Bulgarians must evacuate it.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had no information whatever regarding the second point, but he did not think that the information received by Mr. Polk could be accurate. As to the first the measures taken by General Franchet d'Esperey were the result of the telegram sent him from the Conference.⁴ He had been told he could not exact anything from the Bulgarians which was not required of them in the armistice. The results he had obtained had been reached by negotiation.

MR. POLK asked whether he could be furnished with a copy of the request addressed by General Franchet d'Esperey to the Bulgarian Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that no other instructions had been given to General Franchet d'Esperey except those sent from the Conference. He believed that his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government had been conducted verbally.

MR. POLK said he would like to have a report from General Franchet d'Esperey regarding these negotiations, as well as a copy of any documents that might have passed between him and the Bulgarians.

M. BERTHELOT said that there was a telegram sent by General Franchet d'Esperey to the French War Office, saying that he had gone to Sofia and had obtained his results by negotiation. It might have been pointed out that there were forty-five thousand Bulgarians under arms instead of the twenty-eight thousand to which they were entitled.

MR. POLK asked whether there was any objection to the furnishing of a report.

M. PICHON said he thought the General would have nothing to report.

MR. POLK said that the Bulgarians must be very easy people to manage if so much had been obtained from them even in excess of the terms of the armistice. Marshal Foch had told the Council that the Bulgarians had been very punctilious in executing the armistice. The honour of the Council was

⁴ See No. 27, appendix F, and No. 28, minute 1.

therefore engaged and General Franchet d'Esperey had acted as the agent of the Council. He did not question the way in which the General had acted, but he thought there could be no possible objection to his furnishing a report to the Council.

M. PICHON said that the General had only followed the instructions given him.

M. TITTONI pointed out that the armistice only prescribed the number of divisions the Bulgarians were to keep, not the number of men in each division.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed that this was so. The armistice had been deficient in this respect. Any request for reduction of the number of men under arms was in excess of the armistice, but this had been obtained by negotiation.

(It was decided: that General Franchet d'Esperey should be asked to furnish a report to the Council on his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government regarding disarmament and the alleged evacuation of Thrace.)

6. GENERAL WEYGAND said that according to a Nauen wireless message the *Recall of General von der Goltz* German Government had recalled General von der Goltz.⁵

7. M. DE ST. QUENTIN said that according to the terms of Peace handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 20th July some districts of Western Hungary had been attributed to Austria. In their note of the 1st August⁶ the Austrian Delegation complained that the Hungarian authorities, having obtained information of the intentions of the Conference, were exercising brutal reprisals on the populations of these districts. Cattle and agricultural implements were being removed. The inhabitants were being forcibly enlisted. The Austrian Delegation therefore requested that the Commission to superintend the plebiscite should be sent immediately to Western Hungary. No attention had yet been paid to this request as the Treaty did not provide for a plebiscite. Only the Austrian Delegation asked for one. The Conference had not taken a plebiscite into consideration.

M. TITTONI asked why the Austrians were asking for a plebiscite in a country which the Conference had attributed to them without one.

M. [DE] ST. QUENTIN said the Austrians asked for more territory than the Conference desired to give them. In addition to this the Austrians hoped to create a precedent in order to ask for a plebiscite in Styria for instance, where the Conference had no intention of holding one. On the 9th August the Austrian Delegation had been authorised by the Austrian Government to ask the Conference for authority to send Austrian police into the affected

⁵ General von der Goltz at that time returned only temporarily to Germany for consultation. He was not finally recalled from the Baltic Provinces by the German Government until October, 1919 (cf. No. 70, appendix A).

⁶ A translation of this note, no. 906, is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 419-20.

districts to maintain order until the plebiscite should take place. On the 14th August a letter had been received from the Austrian Delegation saying that the Hungarians threatened to retake Western Hungary by force. The letter further expressed anxiety as to the movements of Roumanian troops. It requested the Conference to forbid both the Hungarians and the Roumanians to enter the area attributed to Austria, and renewed the request for permission to send police into the country. Finally on the 15th August the Delegation informed the Conference that the necessities of the case had forced the Austrian Government to act and to send police and customs officials into Western Hungary up to the frontier line laid down by the Conference. The Delegation hoped that this action would be approved by the Conference. There were therefore two questions for the Council to settle. Would it ratify the *fait accompli* either expressly or by maintaining silence and in that case would it notify the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments?

In reply to a question M. [de] St. Quentin said the Austrians had occupied the whole of the territory assigned to them.

(It was decided that no answer should be sent to the various communications of the Austrian Delegation regarding the occupation of Western Hungary.)⁷

M. TITTONI observed that this did not imply approval.

8. M. [DE] ST. QUENTIN said that a similar instance arose in regard to Prekomurie. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation had asked for permission to occupy the portion of this territory attributed to them.⁸ Troops had been got in readiness to occupy the area.

Occupation of Prekomurie by Yugo-Slavs
The Delegation now asked that the Hungarian Government should be notified of the decision of the Conference, in order that opposition should not arise.

(It was agreed that as the Conference could not deal with any recognised Government in Hungary, notification in the sense desired by the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could not be made.)

9. M. [DE] ST. QUENTIN said that the frontier fixed in Barania⁹ had not been notified to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. The Delegation persisted in asking for localities beyond the line adopted by the Conference. He suggested that the best means of stopping these requests would be to inform them of the frontier so fixed.

Frontier of Barania
M. TITTONI asked why the Delegation had not been informed.

M. [DE] ST. QUENTIN replied that the general rule of the Council was that no frontiers should be communicated to any Delegation, without an express decision to that effect.

(It was decided that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation should be informed of the frontier laid down in the Barania.)

⁷ This resolution is printed, *ibid.*, p. 423.

⁸ See No. 25, minute 8.

⁹ See No. 25, minute 6 (*b*) and appendix F.

10.

*Distribution of expenses
of the Delimitation Com-
missions*

[Not printed]

11.

*Allowances to be assigned
to officers on Commissions
of Control in Germany*

[Not printed]

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 18, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 36

*Télégramme à son Excellence M. Clemenceau, Président de la Conférence de la Paix à
Paris*

BUDAPEST, le 15 août 1919.

La Commission des Généraux Alliés a reçu ce matin, 15 août, l'Archiduc Joseph, qui l'a avisée de la formation d'un nouveau Ministère de Coalition, sous la Présidence de M. Fridich [Friedrich]. Quatre Ministères restent à pourvoir. La liste en sera télégraphiée dès qu'elle sera complète et définitive. Après avoir conféré avec le Général Roumain Holban et le Ministre de la Guerre hongrois accompagné par le Chef de la Police de Budapest, la Commission a pris une décision au sujet de la garnison roumaine de Budapest et de la réorganisation de la police hongroise, afin de maintenir l'ordre dans la capitale. La garnison roumaine pour Budapest et les environs restera pour le moment fixée à une division d'Infanterie, dont la commission a légèrement modifié les emplacements pour dégager autant que possible le centre de la ville et mieux assurer l'ordre dans les environs parmi les ouvriers qui constituent l'élément le plus turbulent. La police hongroise pour la ville et les environs sera réorganisée aussitôt que possible et comptera une force effective de 6.000 hommes.

Le Général Holban a promis de traiter immédiatement cette question avec les autorités hongroises et de tenir la Commission au courant. La commission ayant été avisée que les troupes tchéco-slovaques n'ont pas encore évacué la région minière du Salgotarjan qui est dans la zone neutre, a, ce jour même, réitéré au Gouvernement de Prague, par télégraphe, l'invitation à retirer ses troupes immédiatement.

BANTHOLTZ [*sic*] — 10 heures 45.

APPENDIX B TO No. 36

Radio de Budapest N° 132 W 261 le 17/8 à 9 h. 15

Monsieur Georges Clemenceau, Président de la Conférence de la Paix, à Paris.

Monsieur le Président,

BUDAPEST, le 16 août 1919.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que, en Hongrie, le gouvernement définitif s'est constitué, dont le but est de rétablir l'ordre intérieur, fixer le plus tôt possible l'élection sur la base du suffrage universel et de conclure la paix.

Les membres du Cabinet sont:

Président du Conseil et Ministre du Commerce par intérim:	Etienne Friedrich, Industriel.
Intérieur:	Le Baron Sigismond Perenyi, employé d'Etat.
Affaires Etrangères:	Martin Lovahzi, Président des Partis Bourgeois Associés.
Finances:	Jean Gruehn, Employé d'Etat.
Justice:	Georges Baloghy, Juge.
Agriculture:	Etienne Szabo, Agriculteur.
Ministre des Intérêts des Petits Fermiers:	Jean Mayer, Laboureur.
Culte et Instruction Publique:	Charles Buszar [Huszar], Maître d'Ecole Socialiste Chrétien.
Santé Publique:	André Csillery, Médecin.
Ministre des Minorités Nationales:	Jacques Bleyer, Professeur à l'Université de Budapest.
Guerre:	François Schnetzer, Général.
Affaires de Propagande:	Etienne Haller, du parti Socialiste Chrétien.
Ministre chargé de la préparation des négociations de Paix.	Le Comte Paul Tolocki [Teleki], propriétaire.

En outre trois portefeuilles sont réservés aux ouvriers industriels, à savoir: les portefeuilles de la prévoyance publique, du ravitaillement et le ministère pour les intérêts industriels.

Ce Gouvernement donnera sa démission lors de la convocation de l'Assemblée Nationale.

A la même époque, mes fonctions de Chef de Gouvernement cesseront également; l'Assemblée Nationale devra ratifier la paix ainsi que fixer la forme de l'Etat et de la Constitution.

Veuillez bien prendre connaissance de cette communication.

ARCHIDUC JOSEPH

APPENDIX C TO NO. 36

Though it is necessary for you to take account of any Ministry which, for the moment, holds the machinery of power, we cannot recognise or make terms of peace with a Government which does not, as far as we can judge, represent the country. The mere fact that the Head of the State is a Hapsburg, diminishes the possibility of feeling confidence in an administration which has, in any case, been established by a *coup d'état* during a foreign occupation. We have, of course, no wish to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary, but we do wish to be assured that its Government represents its people. An assembly elected directly by universal suffrage and secret voting seems to us to be a necessary preliminary to any satisfactory arrangement, or any stable peace.

Please report on the political situation.

APPENDIX D TO NO. 36

Vienna, Commission to Negotiate Peace Paris.

Received at A.R.A. Aug. 18. 1:45.

Number Ham 1158. Complete strikes now in progress in Upper Silesia and appear more political than economical in character and has [*sic*] become so violent

as to already result in the destruction of one important coal mine and to threaten the destruction of the entire district. The whole of Central Europe is dependent upon this district for coal and unless all railway transport and municipal service are to totally disappear through these areas this coal district must be gotten back to operation at once. The causes of the trouble are somewhat obscure. Considerable arrest[s] and shooting of Poles were made by Germans stating that they were putting down a Spartacist uprising. There seems to be some genuine Spartacist agitation but the Poles claim that it is entirely manufactured by the Germans and have shown me various documents indicating direct complicity of the Government at Berlin if the documents can be demonstrated authentic. In any event the Polish miners have struck, claiming tyranny and persecution of the German Volunteer Corps, and the whole district is now idle. Curiously enough the Polish miners have been actually protecting the mines from destruction by the Spartacists, in two or three cases the Spartacists appear to be mixed with the German Volunteer Corps when it comes to shooting up the Poles. Altogether the situation requires immediate attention. There can be no settlement of the question without occupation, as provided for under the Treaty, and if the Allies do not occupy the district the repercussion on the coal supply will be terrible to all Europe. In any event another military commission comprising representatives of at least four Governments should be instantly dispatched to the district. The problem is not a question as to who is right or wrong in this disturbance. The fact of the case is that it is a largely political strike and is jeopardising the life of Europe through the stoppage of coal production and it fundamentally grows out of failure to create allied plebiscite commission to take charge of the district.

HOOVER

No. 37

H. D. 33.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, August 19, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel U. S. Grant. *British Empire:* Lieut.-Commander Bell. *France:* Captain A. Portier. *Italy:* Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Demolon.

1. During the discussion of this question the following were present: General Weygand, Mr. J. F. Dulles, M. Castoldi and Captain le Vavas seur.

*Functions of the
Editing Committee
with regard to the
Peace Treaty with
Austria*

MR. BALFOUR said that he felt compelled to ask the Council to re-consider the decision that it had taken at its previous Meeting. (See H. D. 32,¹ Minute 4.) Some time before, the

¹ No. 36.

question had arisen as to whether the Co-ordinating Committee should deal direct with all reports, which the various Technical Committees might prepare, on the subject of Austrian Notes; and whether, after dealing with them, they should send a unified report on the subject to the Council. (See H. D. 27,² Minute 3.) The decision arrived at had been, that the duties of the Co-ordinating Committee should be modified in that sense. But, in order to effect this, it would be necessary to give the Committee in question greater latitude. M. Pichon and M. Tittoni had, on the other hand, desired to restrict the functions of the Co-ordinating Committee, and to prevent it from dealing with any questions of principle. The ill consequences of these limitations could now be foreseen. In the case of the German Treaty, all reports of Committees had gone, in the first instance, to the Council of Four, who had examined them almost word for word at a great expenditure of trouble; and had then sent them back to the Co-ordinating Committee, for the preparation of a unified report, in which the decisions of the Council of Four were incorporated. He had hoped, by proposing that the Co-ordinating Committee should deal direct with the reports of the Committees, that the present Council might be spared a lot of work. In order to effect this, however, the Co-ordinating Committee must be given greater latitude than the decision arrived at on the previous day permitted. He would like to point out, that a great number of replies from the Austrian Delegation had not been submitted to any Committee at all. He would like to know the reason for this; and further wished to be informed to what particular body the questions raised by the Austrian Delegation were being referred. The existing decision would have, as a result, that the Co-ordinating Committee would actually be prevented from considering the Austrian notes. In this case it would be necessary for him, as a representative of Great Britain, to work through all the controversial points raised by the Austrians, in collaboration with his experts, and, after bringing all relevant questions before the notice of the Council, to send back the results to the Co-ordinating Committee. Such a procedure would take a great deal of time, and would be a strain on the temper of the Council. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be better to relax the restrictions imposed by the decision of the previous day, and to allow the Co-ordinating Committee to survey the Austrian notes, and the Austrian Peace Treaty, as a whole, and to report to the Council. He did not think it would be proper to allow it to be said that the Austrian Delegation had never had its case properly heard, or to permit it to be thought that the immense operation of liquidating the Austrian Empire had been effected without a due consideration of all the problems involved. He therefore hoped that the previous decision might be modified.

M. TITTONI asked whether it was correct to say that the Austrian notes had not been fully examined, or that certain points in them had not been referred to any Committee.

M. PICHON replied that he did not think the statement was correct, and

that, in his opinion, every question raised by the Austrian Delegation had been referred to a competent Committee.

MR. BALFOUR replied that this was not the opinion of his experts.

M. BERTHELOT, confirming M. Pichon's previous statement, said that only one question raised by the Austrian Delegation had not been considered. The question in point was, whether the Austrian State was to be considered as a New State, similar to Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, or Jugo-Slavia, or as an enemy State similar to Germany. The British Delegates had considered that Austria should be regarded as a New State; but the Council had already decided in an opposite sense, and their view had been strongly supported by President Wilson. It was most important that this decision should be upheld, since any withdrawal from the standpoint adopted would involve re-casting the Peace Treaty with Austria.

M. TITTONI said that if it were really thought that Austria was not an Enemy State, the Italians would have fought for over three and a half years, with a loss of over half a million dead, against a mere phantom.

(At this point M. Cambon and Members of the Editing Committee entered the room; and M. Pichon laid the question raised by Mr. Balfour before them.)

M. CAMBON said that he did not know of any question raised by the Austrian notes having failed to receive consideration, since the whole duties of the Co-ordinating Committee consisted in dealing with the reports of the Technical Committees, to which the notes in question were referred. The procedure of his Committee had been as follows. He had read a draft covering note to the general reply to be given to the Austrians [? in] which he summarised the remarks and criticisms raised by the Committees to whom the notes had been referred. In his note, he had insisted upon one point, which was, that the Council should exercise to the full its rights against Austria, which had been the author of the war, by the fact that it had sent its ultimatum to Serbia; and had, moreover, before any declaration of war, had [*sic*] performed belligerent acts against France and Belgium. When he had finished reading his draft covering letter, Mr. Headlam-Morley had read an alternative covering note, conceived in a totally different sense; and had argued therein, that Austria should be considered as a New State, and not as an Enemy one. But the question so raised had been decided previously in the sense that Austria must be regarded as the direct legitimate heir of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. With regard to all other clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria, dealing with economic, military and political questions, they had been adequately discussed by the Technical Committees. The one point raised by Mr. Headlam-Morley could not be dealt with in that way, since it was purely political, and must be left to the Council to reconsider, if necessary.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY drew attention to the words in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria stating that Austria was to be 'recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria'.

M. TITTONI replied that this was only intended to imply that Austria was a New State insofar as her old frontiers and status had been altered. The question now before the Council was whether it ought to regard the old State of Austria as no longer existing in any form; in which case all possibility of reparation, or of fixing responsibilities, would absolutely disappear.

M. PICHON said that President Wilson had urged that Austria should be regarded as a *new* and an *enemy* state, and the Council of Four had adopted his point of view. If the Peace Treaty with Austria were to be discussed under this new point of view, each separate clause that it contained would have to be reconsidered.

MR. BALFOUR said that the discussion had departed from the lines which he had originally intended for it. M. Tittoni and M. Pichon had explained with much fervour and eloquence that Austria must be regarded as guilty for the outbreak of war, and for a great deal of the suffering inflicted upon France and Italy; they had further shown that she could not be regarded in the same light as Jugo-Slavia or Czecho-Slovakia. He had never wished to dispute this, for it had always been perfectly clear to him that an absolute distinction existed between the Governments of Vienna and those of the other States, formed on the ruins of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had wished to draw the attention of the Conference to a new problem, deserving special consideration; the problem in question being, how the present Austrian Government was to be treated with regard to the Peace Treaty presented to it, and to the observations that it was making thereon. If M. Pichon and M. Tittoni thought that the Council should consider every problem raised by the Austrian Delegation, he had no objection to acceding to their wishes. He would, on the other hand, have preferred that the very highly qualified Committee presided over by M. Jules Cambon should have, in the first place, considered the Austrian replies. If the decision taken on the day before were upheld, he would be obliged to examine the Peace Treaty, and the Austrian notes upon it, word by word, in company with his experts. He thought that it would be unfortunate to compel members of the Council to concentrate their attention on these points of detail, in view of the enormous responsibilities that they were called upon to bear.

M. TITTONI thanked Mr. Balfour for his explanation, and said that the discussion had now been limited to a mere question of procedure. The Committees had examined the Austrian counter-proposals, and the Council must now discuss their reports. Mr. Balfour proposed to save time by an alteration in procedure, which would turn the Co-ordinating Committee into a sort of delegation of the Council. If time would really be saved by this, he would be the first to agree to it, but he did not think that it would have that result. He thought, on the contrary, that it would introduce a new complication, because, whatever the Co-ordination Committee might report, the Council would certainly have to reconsider it. When the questions raised came before the Council, he would certainly reserve to himself full liberty of discussion, in spite of anything the Co-ordinating Committee might have said.

By adopting Mr. Balfour's procedure, three separate discussions would become inevitable:—

- (1) The Austrian counter proposals would be discussed in the technical Committees:
- (2) The Reports of the technical Committees would be discussed in the Co-ordinating Committee:
- (3) The Co-ordinating Committee's Report would be discussed in the Council.

But if the Council were first to consider the Committee's Reports, and then send back its decisions to the Co-ordinating Committee, the procedure would be shortened by one set of discussions.

M. CAMBON said that he agreed with M. Tittoni when he said that a fresh complication would be introduced by the adoption of Mr. Balfour's proposal. At the same time M. Tittoni had not shewn all the steps through which the discussion of questions raised by the Austrian counter-proposals had to pass. The Co-ordinating Committee had been nominated in order to bring unity into the divergent questions brought before the Council by the counter-proposals of enemy States. The Committee thought it ought to carry its work through as rapidly as possible, and, for this reason, it had asked for assistance from the Drafting Committee on that morning. If it were decided that the functions of the Committee were to be fundamentally altered, it would be necessary for the Committee in question to refer back all questions previously decided to experts, and to the Drafting Committee. This would mean a delay of 15 days or more, which would be of no benefit to the Peace Conference. For this reason, it would be best to limit the functions of the Co-ordinating Committee in the manner laid down in the previous decision of the Council. Any member of the Committee, or the Committee as a whole, would always be in a position to draw the attention of the Council to special points worthy of its consideration. A short time previously the report of the Aeronautic Committee had been under discussion, and it had been noted that the report in question contained certain expressions on the subject of the Austrian Government, not couched in a very diplomatic form. The Co-ordinating Committee, however, had no intention of submitting points of this nature to the Council. The duty of the Committee was obviously to co-ordinate all the questions raised, and submit them to the Council in the form of a single report.

MR. POLK remarked that points on which the Co-ordinating Committee had been unanimous need not further be discussed.

M. PICHON said that when the Peace Treaty with Austria had been drawn up, all questions had been thoroughly examined by competent technical Committees, whose reports were to be placed before the Council of Five, who, after discussion, had sent the reports in question, together with their own decisions to the Drafting Committee. The clauses, as drawn up by the Drafting Committee, by virtue of this procedure had been re-submitted to the Council, who had transmitted them to the Austrian Delegation. The

Austrian Delegates then made counter-proposals, which were sent to experts, on whose reports decisions were made. The decisions and reports were sent to the Co-ordinating Committee, which re-submitted to the Council. M. Cambon had therefore accurately described the manner in which the Co-ordinating Committee was intended to work. The Co-ordinating Committee could not be regarded as a Court of Appeal for the Technical Committees, since the Members of the Committee were Delegates, and not Technical Experts. If the Council should decide that the Co-ordinating Committee should make decisions on the reports of the Committees, it would be doing no more than making a non-technical body decide over the heads of Experts. Everybody wished to make the procedure of the Council as rapid as possible. This would be best effected by keeping the Co-ordinating Committee strictly to its co-ordinating functions. Mr. Balfour's wishes would be fully met by instructing the Co-ordinating Committee to draw special attention to points demanding consideration from the Council.

M. CAMBON said that he thought it important to adhere to the procedure outlined by M. Pichon. If the Co-ordinating Committee were to be called upon to discuss questions of principle, it would, of necessity, be obliged to call in experts to assist it. This would indefinitely lengthen both its own labours, and those of the Conference. The consequences of the alternative proposals of M. Pichon and Mr. Balfour had been very clearly exemplified by the questions arising out of Mr. Headlam-Morley's letter and his own. Mr. Headlam-Morley had explained that, if his own letter were adopted, the Peace Treaty with Austria would have to be re-modelled almost in its entirety, whilst, if M. Cambon's draft reply were agreed to, no important changes in the Treaty would be necessary. The Conference had drawn up a Peace Treaty largely on the basis of reports of technical Committees. Doubtless the Treaty in question was open to criticism, but it would be even more so if it were known that a non-technical committee had been given a power of decision over the reports of experts.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he believed that it had been stated, that he wished to re-draft the whole Treaty with Austria. He wished to deny any such wish on his part, most emphatically. It had been his privilege to be a member of several Committees, whose duty it was to consider questions arising out of the Peace Treaty with Austria and out of the Austrian counter-proposals. It had been his own opinion, and that of his colleagues on the Committees to which he referred, that the Peace Treaty with Austria could not stand in its present form. This was so far accepted, that M. Laroche's Committee was largely re-modelling the provisions of the Austrian Treaty. To give one example, the original clauses on the subject of nationalities had been found to be inapplicable. The Austrian objection to the original articles had been supported by his Italian colleagues, and by the Czecho-Slovak delegates. The result was that they were now being re-drafted. This alteration in the original draft Treaty was not made in deference to the opinions of anybody so insignificant as himself, but merely because investigation had shown that the Treaty required recasting. In the case of the Peace Treaty

with Germany, the Council of Four had closely studied all problems arising out of the German counter-proposals. The procedure had now been altered, and the replies were being sent, in the first place, to the Co-ordinating Committees [*sic*], which had, in consequence, been compelled to recognise an alteration in its own functions. In the case in question, the work of considering counter-proposals was much more difficult. The German counter-proposals had raised problems referring to the cessation of a state of war. In the present instance, the Peace Conference was concerned with the liquidation of an entire Empire, and all observations on the problems raised involved a proportionately higher degree of complication. The Co-ordinating Committee was therefore called upon to examine answers to the Austrian Delegation, not only with a view to seeing that they were coherent, but also with the object of relieving the Council of some of its duties. The decision arrived at on the previous day prevented the Committee from duly fulfilling some of the duties that it was called upon to perform.

M. PICHON said that the Co-ordinating Committee was left free to draw the Council's attention to certain important points, but was not allowed to discuss questions of principle.

MR. POLK then submitted a draft proposal.

M. TITTONI then proposed a modification to the draft proposal in the sense that the Co-ordinating Committee should not, as a whole, draw attention to alterations in principle, but that its individual members should be allowed to do so.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the Editing Committee should:—

- (1) Co-ordinate the various replies to the Austrians, making only verbal changes, and
- (2) Submit to the Supreme Council Annexes pointing out all questions where one or more of the representatives of the Co-ordinating Committee thought that changes in substance should be made.)³

2. (At this point the Experts of the Editing Committee left the room, and the Naval Experts, with M. Seydoux entered.)

*Blockade of
Russia*

M. SEYDOUX read and commented on the report contained in Appendix A. He further read a telegram, received from Sweden (see Appendix B).

MR. DULLES called attention to two points of practical interest: first, as prompt action was necessary, because the Russian ports would be closed in about three months by ice, it was undesirable to undertake anything which would require prolonged negotiations with the neutral States: such as getting their consent to the stopping and searching of their ships by the Allied Navies. Moreover, this was not necessary, since, if they agreed not to give clearance papers to ships for Russian ports, any vessels found on their way

³ This resolution is printed with verbal variation by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 72. The text there printed reads: 'It was agreed that the Coordinating Committee shall . . .', etc.

to such ports would either be without clearance papers, or would have falsified them. Secondly, he noticed that, among the measures suggested, was the establishment of censorship over postal and telegraphic communications. As the United States had no agency for carrying out such a censorship, and no such agency could be re-established without the action of Congress: in asking this of the neutral States, the Allied and Associated Powers would be requesting them to do something which one of them would not be prepared to do.

M. SEYDOUX said that he proposed that in the Note which should be sent to the neutral Powers, they should be asked to refuse clearance papers to vessels proceeding to Bolshevik Russia, passports to individuals with the same destination, and banking facilities for operations of trade. They should further be invited to exercise censorship over mails and telegrams to Russia, *as far as it was in their power to do so.*

MR. POLK said that Admiral Knapp had drawn attention to the desirability of asking neutral countries to exercise censorship only over *their own* mails and telegrams.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it important that all action proposed under the resolution should be taken in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. SEYDOUX then asked what measures should be taken with the Germans.

M. PICHON said that, in his opinion, the German Government should be asked to take measures similar to those that neutral countries were to be invited to carry out.

M. TITTONI said that it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures proposed were in its own interests. It should be invited to carry them out for this reason, despite the fact that the provisions of the Peace Treaty gave the Allied and Associated Powers no right of dictating.

(It was decided to send a Note to the German Government and to neutral States in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, asking:—

- (a) that clearance papers should be refused to vessels intending to proceed to ports in Bolshevik Russia:
- (b) that an equivalent embargo should be placed upon goods intended to be transmitted by land to Russian destination:
- (c) that passports should be refused to individuals desirous of travelling to or from Bolshevik Russia:
- (d) that Banks should be prohibited from dealing with the affairs of, or transacting business with, Bolshevik Russia:
- (e) that as far as possible acceptance of mails and telegraphic communications destined for, or coming from, Bolshevik Russia should be refused:

and informing them:

- (f) that the Allied and Associated Powers had the intention of putting into force, in their own countries, measures similar to those that Neutral Governments were now invited to adopt:

(g) that ships of the Allied Navies, enforcing the intended embargo on the ports of Bolshevik Russia, would act under the authority of the Allied and Associated Governments.)

3. The resolution submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation Liechtenstein (see Annex [Appendix] C) was adopted.
and Vorarlberg

4. M. PICHON circulated a telegram on the situation in Silesia (see Annex [Appendix] D).
Silesia Mr. POLK drew the attention of the Council to a further telegram received from the United States' Minister at Warsaw (see Annex [Appendix] E).

GENERAL WEYGAND read a telegram that he had drafted for communication to General Dupont (see Annex [Appendix] F), and stated that he wished to make certain remarks upon it. In the first place he desired to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the negotiations, which it was intended that General Dupont should open, would not compel the German Government in any way. General Dupont was only President of the Armistice Commission at Berlin, and could only deal with the German President of the Armistice Commission. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had begun to bring the German Armistice Commission under his own orders. It was therefore evident that the German Government would have opportunities for delay in considering General Dupont's proposals, and would be able to gain time by its procrastinations; it might, therefore, carry out severe measures of repression against the Poles in the meantime. He asked whether a more speedy method of communication to the German Government could not be devised. The telegrams communicated to the Council showed that they were faced with an insurrection in Silesia. They were, therefore, called upon, not to maintain order in that country but to restore it. The Military Representative[s] of the Supreme War Council at Versailles had decided, previously, that one division would be sufficient for maintaining order in Silesia; but this decision had been based on the supposition that the country in question would be in a state of tranquillity. One division would certainly not suffice to maintain order in a populous district of 360,000 inhabitants, in a state of insurrection. The original figure must therefore be revised, and he reminded the Council that one inter-allied division had been raised with difficulty. Allied troops in Silesia must obviously be supported by some Government, and the only Government which would give them the support required, was the Government at Berlin. In order to avoid placing the troops under the orders of the German Government, he had proposed to send the Allied High Commission to Upper Silesia, in anticipation of the actual provisions of the Peace Treaty. The difficulties of maintaining troops in such a country were very great. He proposed, by way of lessening them, to ask the German Government to anticipate the provisions of the Treaty, only with regard to the disturbed parts of Upper Silesia. The area in question was not great, and consisted only of one-third of the entire plebiscite district.

MR. BALFOUR said that whilst Great Britain had no diplomatic representative at Berlin, he did not know that this was the case of the other Allied Powers.

M. TITTONI answered that the Italians were represented in Berlin by a Civil Commissioner, who would not, however, have any diplomatic attributions until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he proposed that the Germans should be dealt with through their Delegation at Versailles. He had negotiated with the German representatives, and had found them fairly reasonable, more particularly Von Lersner.

M. PICHON said that it would be necessary to hand a written note to the German representatives.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was, on the whole, better to negotiate by means of written communications in such cases. Notes were clearer and more concise than conversations. He pointed out, however, that Von Lersner could only be used as a medium of transmission.

M. PICHON then said that he thought it might, after all, be better to deal with the Germans through General Dupont.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that General Dupont could exercise no coercion upon the German Government, and negotiations through him would be lengthy. He gave, as an example, the length of time necessary to obtain Von der Goltz' recall.

M. PICHON remarked that if it were true that the German Government had promoted the strikes in Upper Silesia, they would obviously show no energy in re-establishing order there.

MR. BALFOUR said that General Weygand had not referred to a suggestion of the previous day, which was, that Germany should be threatened with the loss of the coal from Silesian coal-fields. If the Government at Berlin could be shown to have stirred up strife, the Allied Governments would be justified in exerting all their efforts to prevent the export of coal to Germany, until the requirements of other Allies had been satisfied. Such a measure would be equitable, and possibly effective.

M. TITTONI said that the information submitted to the Council at its present meeting, and on the previous day, had differed in one point. The Council had first been informed that the German Government had incited revolution in Silesia. They were now told that it had provoked insurrections against itself. The Allies should be careful not to allow the German Government the right of conducting repressive measures in the name of the Council.

MR. BALFOUR agreed with M. Tittoni.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Polish Delegation had drawn attention to the same point.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that the Reparation Commission which was now in direct touch with the German Delegation at Versailles, had opened [*sic*] negotiations with the Government at Berlin. He asked whether it would not be possible to employ Mr. Hoover. He enjoyed a special position which gave him the right to go anywhere in Central Europe. Mr. Hoover, though not

an accredited diplomatic officer of any of the Allied and Associated Governments, or of the American Delegation, was certainly capable of acting in the name of the Council. Would it not be possible to ask him to go and interview the Government at Berlin, and to advise the Council on the result of his conversation?

MR. POLK remarked that Mr. Hoover was now on his way back from Warsaw, and could not be stopped.

M. PICHON suggested that M. Loucheur should be asked to attend the meeting of the Council on the following day.

MR. POLK said that, in consequence of the strike in Upper Silesia, all train services in Austria were to be stopped. The train from Vienna had been held up on the night before.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that information from Polish sources was often exaggerated, and suggested that a delay of 24 hours would not spoil the decision of the Council.

M. PICHON suggested that Paragraph (c) of General Weygand's draft telegram should be omitted. He further suggested that General Dupont should be asked to give the Council an accurate report of the situation of affairs in Germany, and that he should suggest what measures he thought the Council might suitably take.

M. TITTONI suggested that General Dupont should give what information he could as to the action that the German Government proposed to take.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that General Dupont might be informed, purely for his own information, that the Allied and Associated Governments were considering the possibility of anticipating certain provisions in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would be wise to inform General Dupont of all the measures that the Council had proposed to take, and to draw his attention to the dangers that it foresaw from allowing German intervention.

M. PICHON said that he thought it would be wise to do so; providing that information of this sort was purely for General Dupont's personal guidance.

M. TITTONI asked whether General Dupont could be asked to consult with the local strike leaders in the affected districts in Silesia, and whether he could get information from them as to the possibility of a resumption of regular work.

MR. BALFOUR asked Mr. Polk to communicate with Mr. Hoover.

(It was decided:—

(a) that General Weygand should re-draft a telegram to General Dupont, incorporating the wishes of the Council, as expressed in the previous discussion:

(b) that M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover should attend at the Council after their return.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 19, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 37

Document 1

No. 265. Commercial W. M. 460.

Note regarding the Measures to be taken to prevent goods reaching Bolshevik Russia

A meeting of allied naval representatives was held on August 12th to consider the problem of carrying out joint measures which should be equivalent to a blockade of Russian Bolshevik ports. The memorandum, of which copy is enclosed herein, was agreed upon and was submitted this morning to a joint meeting of the allied naval representatives and the Eastern Blockade Committee.

2. The Eastern Blockade Committee approved at this meeting the proposals drawn up by the naval experts, and agreed upon the following resolutions for submission to the Council of Five:—

- (1) The Committee consider it necessary that it should be decided in the first place precisely what measures each of the allied and associated Governments can themselves take to prevent their nationals from resuming commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia through ports in the Baltic, North Sea, or the Black Sea.
- (2) These measures should consist, in so far as possible, in (a) the enforcement as regards goods destined for Bolshevik Russia of an embargo (or some equivalent measure) on exports and at frontier stations; (b) instructions to the postal authorities not to transmit wireless or other telegrams to or from Bolshevik Russia; (c) instructions to the postal authorities to refuse to transmit postal correspondence to or from Bolshevik Russia; (d) refusal of passports; (e) imposition on banks of a prohibition against transactions with Bolshevik Russia.
- (3) The neutral Governments should be requested to take, in conformity with the measures taken by the Associated Governments, steps similar to those indicated above; and similar measures should also be taken by the German Government.
- (4) The measures set out above should be indicated in a joint note to be presented to the neutral Governments by the allied and associated Governments, on the lines proposed by President Wilson.
- (5) As soon as an arrangement in the above sense has been concluded with the neutral Governments, instructions should be sent to the naval forces of the allied and associated Governments in the sense indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the memorandum drawn up by the naval advisers.

British Delegation, Paris.

August 13, 1919.

Document 2

Minutes of a Meeting of Allied Naval Representatives held at the Ministry of Marine at 2.30 p.m., 12th August 1919, to consider the Problem of carrying out, conjointly, measures which should be equivalent to a Blockade of Russian Baltic Ports

1. The naval advisers have not been informed that a state of war exists between the allied and associated Powers and Bolshevik Russia.

2. Short of a blockade, a belligerent measure, the naval advisers do not know any legal measure that the ships of the allied and associated Powers can exert to prevent trade with Russia, unless

3. An understanding be arrived at between the allied and associated Powers on the one hand and neutrals on the other, whereby a general embargo is proclaimed in respect of Bolshevik Russian ports, and the ships of the allied and associated Powers be authorised to enforce it. If such a measure is taken ships and their cargoes will not be captured, but they will be informed that they cannot enter a Russian port and that they will have no claim for any damages resulting from such action.

4. If the men-of-war of the allied and associated Powers are required to carry out the measures set forth in paragraph 3 above, it is necessary that their rôle should be defined by the allied and associated Governments. The said Governments will also have to emphasize that a ship of an allied or associated Power is representing the allied and associated Powers as a whole.

APPENDIX B TO No. 37

Je reçois de l'Attaché Naval à Stockholm le télégramme suivant en date du 15 août arrivé à Paris le 17 août à 21 heures.

Commencement citation: Vapeur suédois 'Aron' qui complète son chargement dans le port partira incessamment Pétrograd avec marchandises. Affaire est menée par Banques Ashberg Rosch Hort.

Marchandises seront payées en or et en peaux. Capitaine suédois déclare que tromper vigilance des bateaux avisos qui croisent devant Cronstadt est un jeu d'enfant. Fin citation.

Je crois devoir attirer votre attention sur ce télégramme qui pourrait être utilement porté à la connaissance du Conseil Suprême des Alliés au moment où ce Conseil va être appelé à discuter le rapport établi par le Comité de Blocus le 13 août courant.

APPENDIX C TO No. 37

M. 471.] Resolution for Submission to the Supreme Council

That the Central Committee on territorial questions in Europe be instructed to consider the question of Liechtenstein and of Vorarlberg, and the desirability of acceding to the requests which have been made that Vorarlberg should be permitted to join the Swiss Federation, and that the Committee be also instructed to consider the question whether it is desirable to insert in the Treaty with Austria a clause to the effect that the international status of Austria and the frontiers as defined in the Treaty shall not be altered without the consent, whether of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers or of the League of Nations.

British Delegation,

August 19, 1919.

APPENDIX D TO No. 37

Télégramme du Général Henrys, Varsovie

19 août, 1919.

1 heure 45.

Le mouvement gréviste en Haute-Silésie a dégénéré en insurrection armée. Il a son origine non dans la situation économique mais dans la situation politique: mécontentement de la population, vexations et provocations continuelles infligées par les Autorités allemandes, lassitude d'attendre l'intervention de l'Entente depuis si longtemps promise.

Les ouvriers insurgés se sont emparés de Kattsurtz [Kattowitz], Pless, Boujakow, Jedlin, Cichow [sic] et ont désarmé les troupes allemandes de la Grenzschutz. Les mouvements par voie ferrée sont arrêtés; la situation est grave.

Le Gouvernement Polonais, qui a réitéré ses ordres pour qu'aucune de ses troupes ne franchisse la frontière, insiste pour l'envoi des troupes de l'Entente en Silésie.

Cet envoi pouvant exiger un certain délai, je propose que pour arrêter la propagation des troubles et pour éviter l'intervention des troupes allemandes qui aggraverait la situation, les disposition[s] suivantes soient prises à titre transitoire: prélever sur l'armée Haller un détachement d'occupation ayant à sa tête un général français et composé d'unités commandées par des officiers français. Le Gouvernement Polonais est favorable à cette solution.

Si elle était adoptée, il y aurait lieu d'inviter le Gouvernement allemand à s'abstenir de tout retour offensif et à donner des ordres pour que ses fonctionnaires restant dans le pays s'inclinent devant l'Autorité des Officiers Français.

APPENDIX E TO No. 37

WARSAW. Misc. 1797.

Recd. 5 p.m. Aug. 18, 1919.

AMMISSION, PARIS.

For Polk. Minister Foreign Affairs states two small German detachments attacked Polish lines southeastern part Upper Silesia early this morning. They were thrown back, but the fact that local population rose against them and took over two villages on German side arouses anxiety lest revolt spread and affect Karwin coal region. Not certain therefore that Paris train will be able to leave tonight, will furnish further details later. This is not an unexpected crisis. The situation has been logically developing for a long period during which Paris has been urged to lay down the law definitely to the Germans that they must abide by terms of treaty, or be punished. The population has been dangerous exhorted [sic] for some time. The Polish Government has throughout recognised the danger from a Polish point of view of disorders and has sought by any means it could command, or that we could suggest, to keep the population quiet. While any action at this time comes very late, I feel that we ought to neglect no possible remedy. It seems to Barber⁴ and me that Goodyear and Logan, or some other officer chosen by you should leave at once for Kattowitz, and full powers be arranged from Paris to deal with emergency as seems best.⁵ . .

GIBSON, American Minister

⁴ Colonel Barber was Chief of Distribution in the American Relief Administration.

⁵ Punctuation as in original of this appendix.

Télégramme Chiffré. Projet

COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF DES ARMÉES ALLIÉES.

Etat-Major Général

3^{ème} section.

Le Maréchal Foch, Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées,
à Général Nudant, Président C.I.P.A. Cologne,
à Général Dupont, Chief Mission Militaire Française, Berlin.

Le Conseil Suprême des Alliés est informé que le mouvement gréviste, signalé en Haute Silésie, a dégénéré en insurrection armée, que les ouvriers insurgés se sont emparés de Kattowitz, Pless, Boujakow, Jedlin, Cichow, après avoir désarmé troupes allemandes de Grenzschutz; que le travail dans les mines est complètement arrêté, ainsi que les mouvements par voie ferrée. Cette insurrection semble avoir été fomentée par les Allemands qui, de leur côté, ariètent et fusillent des Polonais qu'ils accusent de favoriser un mouvement spartakiste. L'Europe Centrale toute entière dépend de cette région pour le charbon, et il est nécessaire que l'ordre y soit rétabli et que le travail dans les mines soit repris, sous peine des plus graves complications dans tous les pays qui en sont tributaires.

Le Gouvernement polonais, comme les représentants alliés en Pologne, ne voient d'autre moyen d'y arriver que l'occupation immédiate, par les troupes alliées, de ces régions troublées.

Mais aucune clause de l'armistice ne justifie cette occupation immédiate que seule la mise en vigueur du Traité de paix autoriserait.

Je vous prie d'entrer immédiatement en relations avec Gouvernement allemand pour lui faire entendre:

a) que ces émeutes, qui vont priver de charbon tous les états voisins, ont une portée qui dépasse de beaucoup la région où elles se produisent, et qu'en l'état actuel de la question du charbon en Europe, le Conseil Suprême des Alliés ne peut s'en désintéresser.

b) que d'autre part le Conseil Suprême est en droit d'exiger le maintien de l'ordre dans une région qui, par suite de l'exécution du traité de Paix avec l'Allemagne, doit être prochainement soumise au plébiscite.

c) que le Conseil Suprême, ne mettant pas en doute les intentions du Gouvernement allemand, est fondé à croire que si le travail n'a pas repris et si l'ordre n'a pas été rétabli, c'est que le Gouvernement allemand ne dispose pas de moyens suffisants pour le faire.

d) que dans ces conditions il envisage la possibilité d'anticiper, d'accord avec gouvernement allemand, sur la lettre du Traité, et d'en appliquer immédiatement l'esprit en mettant en vigueur de suite les dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'annexe jointe à l'article 88 du traité de paix, dispositions qui sont les suivantes: La zone du plébiscite sera immédiatement placée sous l'autorité d'une commission internationale de quatre membres désignés par les Etats Unis, la France, l'Empire britannique et l'Italie. Elle sera occupée par les troupes des Puissances Alliées et associées. Le Gouvernement allemand s'engage à faciliter le transport de ces troupes en Haute Silésie.

La Commission Internationale ci-dessus visée jouirait de tous les pouvoirs définis au paragraphe 3 de la dite annexe.

H. D. 34.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, August 20, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire:* Captain E. Abraham. *France:* Captain A. Portier. *Italy:* Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Demolon.

1. MR. BALFOUR said that he had received a telegram from the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, asking whether, in view of the appointment of a Greek Colonel as a consultative member of the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna, an Ottoman Colonel might be admitted on the same footing.

Attachment of Turkish Officer to Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna

Mr. Balfour asked whether he was authorised by the Council to reply in the affirmative.

(It was agreed that in view of the resolution taken on August 14th (H. D. 31¹, Minute 3) Mr. Balfour should reply that similar facilities to those afforded to the Greek representative should be granted to the Turkish representative on the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that the position in the Baltic States was very surprising. He had prepared a summary of the reports received from Reval. He thought it might be of interest to the Council to have this report read.

Situation in the Baltic States

The following Report was then read:—

‘On August 14th after negotiations in which the French, British and American representatives appear to have taken a prominent part, a North-Western Government for the provinces of Pskoff, Novgorod, and Petrograd was formed. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is Lianosov and General Yudenitch is Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief. General Rodzianko as acting Commander of the North-Western Army accepted this Government.

‘The Government proclaimed its intention of convoking a Congress of Representatives of the people in order to base itself on democratic principles. It was decided to establish the Headquarters of the Government at Reval, the reason being that the majority of its members feared that if they went to Pskoff their lives would be in danger from Balahovich, the former Commander of the Russian North-Western Corps, who might attempt a *coup d'état*.

"The Government, which proclaimed itself as "a group acting as an independent government in the North-Western provinces as part of a united Russia" proceeded to make a declaration of which the following were the principal points

- (a) that they assumed complete responsibility for deciding all provincial questions;
- (b) that they requested financial assistance as well as stores and equipment from the Allied and Associated Governments;
- (c) that they requested the immediate help of the Esthonian Government with armed forces to liberate Petrograd as well as the rest of the Petrograd, Pskoff and Novgorod Governments from the Bolsheviks;
- (d) that they requested the French, British and American representatives to obtain from their Governments the recognition of complete Esthonian independence;
- (e) that they proposed to open negotiations with the Esthonian Government at once in order to obtain an outlet to the sea through Esthonian ports and to regulate commercial relations between the two countries;
- (f) that they were informing the Supreme Russian Government of Kolchak of the decisions taken by them and were confident that he would appreciate the necessities of the situation.

'As soon as this declaration was issued, the French, British and American representatives at Reval together presented to the Esthonian Government a note from General Gough urging co-operation with the Russian North-Western Government and stating that the Esthonian claim to complete independence would be represented to the Allied and Associated Governments.

'The Esthonian Government have returned a formal reply, to the effect that they are unable to co-operate with the Russians as requested until the Allies recognise full Esthonian independence.

'General Gough reports that unless this is given at once the collapse of the Russian Army may be expected and it will be impossible to control the situation. He also considers that the new Government should receive immediate support.'

M. BERTHELOT said that the French Government had received similar information. The Esthonian Government did not merely require recognition as an independent Government, but also material assistance in arms and money—the financial aid amounting to 600 millions of francs.

M. TITTONI said that he had read in a newspaper that General Balahovich together with the Bolshevik force which he commanded, had gone over to the Esthonians and had proceeded to Pskoff. This appeared to corroborate the information received by Mr. Balfour.

M. BERTHELOT said that this General had always played an ambiguous part. He could not be seriously trusted by any side.

MR. POLK asked from what source Mr. Balfour had received his news.

MR. BALFOUR said he had received his information on the previous day, after the meeting.

M. PICHON said that he had also received similar news on the previous evening.

MR. BALFOUR said that the most noticeable feature of the news was that the French, British and American representatives seemed for the last week to have been engaged in fostering a *coup d'état* without consulting with their own Governments.

MR. POLK said that there was no American representative in the Baltic authorised to act on behalf of the American Government. There was an American General associated with General Gough, and also an officer employed on relief work. The General had lately been telegraphed to, that he must take no part in local politics. The Allied Missions in the Baltic were composed of representatives who acted independently. They were not subject to the orders of General Gough.

M. PICHON said that he thought the Conference had placed General Gough in command of the Allied representatives.

MR. POLK observed that although General Gough was the senior officer, he was not in command.

M. TITTONI said that the Allied representatives might have argued that as the Conference had recognised Admiral Koltchak in order that he might fight the Bolsheviks, they were justified in recognising any other Russian organization with a similar purpose.

M. PICHON suggested that Mr. Balfour should ask General Gough to send supplementary information.

MR. BALFOUR observed that General Gough had discreetly gone on leave. The really practical difficulty was that the Estonians were, in a manner, putting a pistol at the Head of the Council. If they came to terms with the Bolsheviks, there was no further hope of fighting Bolshevism in that area. They were threatening to do so. In other words, they were attempting methods of blackmail in order to be recognised and assisted with money and arms. General Gough informed the Council that failing recognition of the Estonian Government, disaster would inevitably overtake the North-Western Russian Armies.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the Estonians had been employing the same tactics for the last six months.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the Council could do very little. He would enquire, however, what the British Government proposed to do regarding General Gough.

M. TITTONI said that Admiral Koltchak might be asked whether he would recognise the independence of Estonia. He had already been asked to recognise its autonomy. With this the Estonians were not satisfied.

M. BERTHELOT said that Admiral Koltchak would never recognise the independence of Estonia. Admiral Koltchak had, hitherto, refused to

recognise the independence of Finland. In any case, the Baltic provinces were necessary to Russia as an outlet to the sea.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the second item on the Agenda, namely, 'Allied Policy in the Baltic States', was connected with the topic under discussion. He had prepared on this subject a proposal which he begged to submit to the Council:—

'The Baltic Commission are requested to submit to the Council a declaration of Allied and Associated policy with regard to the international position of the Baltic States, in the place of the draft declaration considered, but not accepted, by the Council on July 26th.²

'This declaration should be framed in strict accordance with the relevant portion of the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Koltchak on May 27,² which, unless and until other arrangements are made, must be regarded as the governing document in all their transactions. The declaration should therefore provide *in the first place* that, unless an agreement is speedily reached between these States and Russia, a settlement will be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations; and, *in the second place* that pending such settlement these States shall be recognised as autonomous, and fully competent to enter into relationship with the Allied and Associated Governments.'

M. BERTHELOT observed that every time the autonomy of the Baltic States was mentioned, these States were exasperated, as they continually asked for independence. He thought it was desirable to try and find a slightly different formula.

MR. BALFOUR said that the expressions used had been borrowed almost textually from the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Koltchak.

MR. POLK said he understood the draft to be an instruction to the Baltic Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that this was so. The Baltic Commission was inclined to recognise the independence of the Baltic States. It did not keep in mind the larger policy of the Conference. He thought this draft would remind them of the wider aspect of the question.

MR. POLK said that provided the Baltic Commission was being asked merely to submit a resolution for discussion by the Council, he would agree.

MR. BALFOUR said this was all that was proposed.

(The draft instruction above quoted was then adopted.)

3. GENERAL WEYGAND explained the Report on the evacuation of Latvia by the Germans, prepared by Marshal Foch (Appendix A).

*Evacuation of Latvia
by the Germans*

He observed that the note was prepared exclusively from a military point of view. As regards General von der Goltz, the German Government had replied that they could not admit the right of the Conference to demand the recall of the General. Nevertheless, there was

² See No. 19, minute 8.

news that he was at Mitau, on his way to Berlin. It was not yet clear whether he had been recalled or whether he was on his way to consult the German Government. As to the evacuation of the German troops by sea, he thought the German allegations were wrong. The operation was really possible and could only be settled locally by General Gough. As to evacuation by land, the German reasons were equally bad. The British, as far as he knew, had never promised to furnish engines. This question also could be settled locally. As to removal of material by the Germans, the Allied and Associated Powers had authority under the Armistice to forbid it. The conclusion was that of the five things asked for, only one, namely, the stoppage of reinforcements, had been agreed to by the German Government, although the Poles said that the agreement was not being fulfilled. As to the recall of General von der Goltz, the situation was not clear. As regards the remaining three, the Allies had a right to enforce their demands and General Gough was in a position to obtain satisfaction.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Allies had any right to make one particular German evacuate Latvia before any other.

GENERAL WEYGAND admitted that the Allies had no right to make a special case. However, General von der Goltz was undoubtedly the source of all the trouble, and he was every now and then disavowed by the German Government. In any case, the interpretation of his movements was not clear, and the matter remained in suspense.

M. PICHON said that according to the French representative at Helsingfors, General von der Goltz had certainly gone to Berlin.

(The conclusions of Marshal Foch's Note (Appendix A) were adopted and it was decided that General Gough should be asked by Marshal Foch to obtain the execution of the demands contained therein, with the exception of the recall of General von der Goltz, pending further information regarding that officer.)

4. M. PICHON said that he had obtained confirmation of the news communicated on the previous day regarding Silesia. He caused to be read a report of a speech by Chancellor Bauer before the German National Assembly. (See Appendix B.) In addition to the German version, he had received from M. Zamoiski³ the Polish version. (See Appendix C.) M. Zamoiski was of the opinion that unless the Allies intervened with troops, the situation would go from bad to worse. M. Pichon had told him that intervention in German territory was a very serious step, and that the Council had asked for further information. He had also told him that the Germans were to be informed that unless they could control the situation it might be necessary to intervene.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had received a telegram from Sir Percy Wyndham, of which the following was the most significant passage:—

'Polish Foreign Office informed me this morning position considered very serious, and Government is afraid German regular army will invade

³ Polish Minister at Paris and a member of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference.

Poland, and time has come when it will be impossible to resist the popular demand for intervention by Polish troops. Immediate outbreaks expected in Warsaw if this is not done. Deputation from Upper Silesia has arrived at Warsaw to bring pressure on Polish Government to above effect. Matters appear to be serious, and situation would be eased if Polish Government could be informed that the Allied Powers are bringing pressure to bear on German authorities.'

He proposed, subject to the approval of the Council, to send the following reply:—

'Evidently Germans have both the right and the duty of maintaining order in Upper Silesia until Treaty is ratified. In these circumstances the Poles would be breaking the Treaty if they send troops into the disturbed area except on German invitation.

'We shall endeavour without delay to send Allied representatives to the disturbed area, who will report to the Council, and may be able to act as a moderating influence on the spot.

'If we can by negotiation hasten the date at which the Inter-Allied Commission take charge of the plebiscite area, we will do so.

'The interest both of Poland and of all Central Europe urgently requires that work should at once be resumed in the mines; that order should be maintained; and that the Polish population should be patient during the very few weeks which still separate them from the date of the German evacuation.

'You should inform your Allied colleagues of this telegram, which has been sent after discussion at Supreme Council.'

This reply contained two practical proposals. The first to send representatives to Upper Silesia. Representatives of the Coal Commission were already being sent. It might be possible to attach a civilian mission not specifically concerned with coal. The second was that the Conference would attempt to negotiate with Germany, in order to hasten the date at which the Allied Commissioners should take charge of the plebiscite zone. In this connection it might be remembered that the German Government had forwarded a demand from the inhabitants of Danzig that the date of the separation of the town from the German State should be hastened. If the Germans favoured this in Danzig, they might be willing to show a similar spirit in regard to Upper Silesia. (The German note referred to was Note No. 5 of the 16th August. W. C. P. 1246.)

M. PICHON said that he sympathised with the proposals suggested by Mr. Balfour, but he must point out that it would be meeting the desires of the Poles. It would appear that the Polish workmen had brought about the strikes in Upper Silesia, with the purpose of rendering Allied intervention necessary.

MR. POLK said that he had learnt from Mr. Hoover that he was conducting negotiations with the German Government regarding the coal supply. It

might be possible to take advantage of this to ask Mr. Hoover to bring the situation of the Silesian coalfields to the notice of the German Government.

(It was agreed that the Coal Commission might urge the German Government to agree to an early holding of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia as a means of improving the coal supply for the coming winter.

It was further agreed that Mr. Balfour should send the telegram to Sir Percy Wyndham above quoted. The telegram drafted by General Weygand and sent to General Dupont in accordance with the decision of the previous day (H. D. 33,⁴ Minute 4) was approved.) (See Appendix D.)

5. GENERAL BELIN explained the revised Naval, Military and Air Clauses prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles. (See Appendix E.⁵) He stated that the only matter on which there was no definite conclusion was the number of men Hungary was to be allowed to keep under arms. The Military Representatives had attempted to act in accordance with the instructions of the Council, given on the 8th August, 1919. (See H. D. 27, Min. 10.) Various figures had been suggested, the two extreme figures being 45,000 and 18,000 men. The Military Representatives had suggested 35,000 as a compromise, and this was the only matter in which the clauses now proposed differed from the clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria.

M. PICHON said that on the matter of the number of men to be kept under arms in Hungary, he must reserve his decision pending the return of M. Clemenceau. With this exception he was prepared to accept the clauses drafted by the Military Representatives.

(Subject to the French reservation regarding the number of men to be maintained under arms in Hungary, the Articles proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles (see Appendix E³) were accepted.)

⁴ No. 37.

⁵ Not printed. This appendix contained 48 articles and five tables which constituted the draft for Parts V (articles 102-43) and XI (articles 260-7) of the Treaty of Trianon (Treaty Series, 1920, No. 10. Cmd. 896). Apart from minor drafting variation this draft was the same as the final text except:

- (i) Article 107 of the Treaty of Trianon: the second sentence of the first paragraph was not included in the draft (article 6).
- (ii) Article 115: the second sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph were not included in the draft (article 14).
- (iii) Article 120: the second paragraph of the draft (article 18), corresponding to the second and third paragraphs of the final text, read as follows: 'All the monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube Flotilla will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Hungary will, however, be allowed to maintain for the Danube River Police Service patrol launches, which will be selected by the Commission provided by Article 43 [138] of the present Treaty.'
- (iv) Article 122: the third paragraph was not included in the draft (article 20).

6. The Council had before them draft replies to the German Delegation, prepared by the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, regarding:—

*Replies to the
German Delegation*

(a) Calculation of damages in the territories devastated by the war.

(b) Restitution of topographical plans of the mines of Costoplitz.

(The proposed replies (see Appendices F and G⁶) were accepted.)

7.

[Not printed]⁷

Demand of Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to be heard on the subject of the financial and reparations clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria

⁶ Appendix G is not printed. It contained a draft note from M. Clemenceau to Baron von Lersner informing him that at its session on August 12, 1919, the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission had examined a request from the Yugoslav Delegation that a search be instituted for the topographical plans of a coal-mine at Costoplitz in the Pojarevatz district of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav note, dated April 8, 1919 (also included in the appendix), stated that at the time of writing the plans were in the possession of the German Lieutenants Winter and Kramer, attached to the company of sappers who had exploited the mine during their occupation. The draft to Baron von Lersner concluded: 'The Committee requests you to kindly make the necessary investigations immediately and inform them of the result.'

⁷ In opening the discussion on this item 'M. Pichon said that on the previous day he and Mr. Polk had had a conversation regarding the demand of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to be heard on the subject of the reparations due from Bulgaria. They had both agreed that it was desirable to accede to their request.' This request was made in a letter dated August 17, 1919, from M. Pachitch to M. Pichon enclosing an *aide-mémoire* headed 'Réserve de la Délégation du Royaume des Serbes, Croates, et Slovènes sur le projet du Traité de Paix avec la Bulgarie' (Appendix H in original). This *aide-mémoire*, after protesting against the alleged neglect of Serbian interests in the armistice with Bulgaria and the inadequate satisfaction accorded in the draft treaty of peace to Serbian territorial claims against Bulgaria, proceeded to reiterate the main objections of the Yugoslav Delegation to the draft economic and financial clauses (see No. 31, minute 5). In the concluding paragraph of the *aide-mémoire* it was stated: 'En dehors de ces dispositions spéciales, l'exécution du Traité avec la Bulgarie doit être garantie par des moyens appropriés, par les mêmes prévus par [pour] l'Allemagne, ce qui demande une occupation temporaire du territoire bulgare.'

In the ensuing discussion Signor Tittoni and Mr. Balfour expressed their sympathy with the desire of M. Pichon and Mr. Polk to grant the Yugoslav request for a hearing but thought that in granting it it would be difficult to avoid creating a precedent which would be invoked by other powers wishing to restate arguments that had previously been considered by the Conference, but not to the satisfaction of their proponents. This view was supported by Colonel Peel, who entered the meeting. Colonel Peel went on to say that 'he quite agreed that the Serbians had suffered extreme hardship [M. Berthelot had previously stressed the great loss of Serbian cattle], but it was not the Serbians who were presenting this claim, but the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. Two-thirds of this new state had been our enemies in the war; and probably contained quantities of cattle, some of them looted from the Allied countries. What the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation wanted was far more

8. MR. POLK said that he had received the following telegram:—

Situation in Hungary 'In the Sessions of August 18, the Commission heard Admiral Horthy, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Forces. He gave information as to the resources on which he counts in organising these forces. They seemed to consist chiefly of officers. He thinks that the Roumanians are influenced by the Bolsheviks. He thinks that the workmen have still many concealed arms. He calls attention to the considerable requisitions effected by the Roumanians.' The Commission summons for the 19th the General commanding the Roumanian forces or his representatives. He will indicate the measures that he has taken with a view to respecting the indications of the verbal note of August 16. He will make it known whether these measures are being carried out, especially concerning requisitions.

Interallied Military Commission.'

In this connection he had a proposal to make, which he would not ask the Council to accept at once, but which he would ask his colleagues to consider (see Appendix I).

9. MR. POLK said that the American officer in touch with the Austrian Delegation informed him that the Delegation when it received the final answer of the Conference, proposed to take the terms back to Vienna to submit them to the Austrian Assembly. It was further said that in all probability should no alterations be made in the territorial frontiers laid down for Austria, and especially should a plebiscite in Styria be denied, Dr. Renner would not be authorised by the Assembly to sign the peace. He would be forced to resign and a change of Government would result.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 20, 1919.

than could possibly be granted. They wanted the Treaty with Bulgaria to be on the lines of the Treaty with Germany. He could see no objection, however, to the hearing of the Delegation if they had anything new to say, which they had not previously urged.' After this statement by Colonel Peel: 'It was agreed that M. Pichon should reply to the request of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to the effect that their request could not be accepted for the various reasons given in the above discussion. If, however, the Delegation had any new facts or arguments to bring forward, the Council would be pleased to receive them, and then to decide whether or not a hearing was desirable.'

*American Commission to Negotiate Peace**S.H. Bulletin No. 702. August 18, 1919.*

Contents: Note from Marshal Foch on the Evacuation of Latvia by the Germans.
Translation.

General Headquarters, August 18, 1919.

GENERAL STAFF
 3rd Section.

From: The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: President Clemenceau.

Subject: The evacuation of Latvia by the Germans.

In its telegram of June 18th (Document No. 1⁸) the Supreme Council requested the German Government to begin as soon as possible the evacuation of all territories which had before the war formed part of the former Russian Empire, according to the stipulations of Article XII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

Later, General Gough was charged in the name of the Entente with arranging with the regional German authorities the conditions of this evacuation and with insuring the control of it.

On July 21 this general reported the impossibility of arriving at an understanding with General von der Goltz, whose policy of intrigue and evasion tended only to retarding to the maximum the execution of the measures of evacuation, and to finishing the seizure of Latvia by the Germans.

To remedy this situation, General Gough proposed:

- (a) the immediate recall of General von der Goltz,
- (b) the carrying out of the evacuation by sea,
- (c) the completion of the transportation by August 30,
- (d) to forbid the Germans to move any war material in Latvia without previous authorization,
- (e) the cessation of all German reinforcements sent into Latvia.

These propositions, accepted by the Supreme Council, were sent to the German Government for execution on August 1 (Document No. 2⁹).

The German Government has replied to this notification in a Note dated August 13 (Document No. 3⁸), in which it discusses and finally rejects, almost in their totality, the decisions of the Supreme Council.

The point of view of the German Government, as well as the remarks it calls for, are set forth herewith:

(a) *Recall of General von der Goltz.*

The German Government represents this recall as 'an attempt on the power of command of the German military authorities'.

It is, in fact, a measure of a special character, and which, as the German Government remarks, cannot be exacted by invoking Article XII of the Armistice of November 11.

⁸ None of the numbered documents in parentheses were attached to the original of this appendix. For the more important of these documents see Vol. III of this series.

⁹ See No. 23, minute 4 and No. 29, minute 5.

But this measure is necessary.

General von der Goltz is the soul of the resistance to the decisions of the Entente. It was he that organized the *coup d'état* against the Ulmanis Government, faithful to the cause of the Allies.

Beaten on this ground, he tried to re-establish the situation. All his efforts tend to maintain himself in the country at least till after harvest, in order to send it into Germany, then to install himself definitively in C[o]urland.¹⁰

To this end:

He continues to bring in reinforcements (40,000 men in C[o]urland),¹¹ in spite of the prohibition against sending new contingents into Latvia;

In spite of the orders of his Government, he is incorporating his elements in the Russian Bermont corps, after having acted in the same way in regard to the detachment of Prince Lieven. He even announces that he will favour the passage of *entire German formations* into the Russian troops at the moment that the evacuation is finished;

He is granting leaves of three years to German soldiers who desire to settle in the country;

At the same time, he is organizing Bolshevist propaganda at Riga, in order to create new pretexts for intervention;

Finally, in his relations with General Gough, he incessantly eludes discussion, and insolently refuses to allow any control on the part of the mandatory of the Allied Powers (Document No. 4, *bis*⁸).

In short, General von der Goltz is pursuing in Latvia and C[o]urland a very clear policy of German expansion, doubtless with the secret approval of his Government.

While appearing to accept the principle of evacuation, he is managing to reinforce his effectives, to get his hands on the Russian local formations and to insinuate himself into the interior affairs of the country, thus consolidating the situation and the prestige of Germany in Latvia.

He personifies clearly the German policy of duplicity.

All the Allied Representatives are of the opinion that his immediate recall is necessary, as a measure of prime importance.

This recall had already been laid down in principle, under certain conditions, by the Allied Powers, as early as May 28 (Document No. 9⁸, telegram 2726 of May 28).

None of these conditions having been fulfilled, the Powers renewed their request on August 1.

They obtained only a dilatory reply.

It is necessary, taking for basis the facts that have been set forth above, to exact categorically that the recall of General von der Goltz be ordered without delay.

(b) *Evacuation by sea.*

This method of evacuation has been demanded by General Gough; General von der Goltz declares it to be impossible. This is a question of modality, which demands only a new examination by the Inter-Allied Mission at Riga, and which

¹⁰ Note in original: 'Extract from the report of Colonel Du Parquet, dated August 13 (Document No. 4).'

¹¹ Note in original: 'Note of General Malcolm, transmitted by the C.I.P.A. on August 9, under No. 1590 (Document No. 5); Note of General Dupont, No. 4865 (Document No. 6); telegram from Stockholm of August 13 (Document No. 7); Extract from the Polish S.R. (Document No. 8).'

must be settled *on the ground*. What is important, in fact, is that the evacuation be *assured, as rapidly as possible* by all possible means: maritime or land.

On the subject of this question of the evacuation the German Government, revealing the plan that it has formed for colonizing Latvia, recalls the promise made by the Ulmanis cabinet to grant to German volunteers the right to settle in Latvia; it protests against violation of this promise and declines in advance all responsibility for dangers that may result from it.

The Lettish Government has settled this claim in a letter signed by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Meierevitcs, addressed to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Latvia (Document No. 10⁸).

There is no necessity therefore to consider this last question.

(c) *Plan of evacuation to be submitted before August 15. Time limit of evacuation fixed from August 15 to 30.*

The German Government declares it impossible to present a *detailed plan* of evacuation, and to complete the repatriation by August 30, since it does not know the number of locomotives to be put at its disposal, which, it says, have been promised by the English.

Now, no promise of this sort has been made, to my knowledge, by the British Government.

Moreover, this absence of locomotives would be one more reason for carrying out the repatriation by sea, as General Gough demands.

However this may be, this situation in no wise prevents the drawing up of a *general plan*, fixing the order of urgency for the removal of the various elements.

The development of this plan, as well as the time limits for the carrying out of the repatriation, will be determined as a function of the means, maritime or land, at the disposal of the Germans, as soon as an agreement on the subject of these means shall have been reached between General Gough and the German regional command, as indicated in S[ection] *b* above.

Subject to this condition, the decisions of the Entente are then to be maintained on this point.

(d) *Prohibition to move war material in Latvia without authorization—Obligation to give information on the emplacement of food and material stores.*

The German Government protests against this requirement, which it claims is based on no provision of the Armistice of November 11.

Now, on one hand, Article XIV provides:

'the immediate cessation by the German troops of all requisition, seizure, or compulsory measure with a view to procuring resources destined for Germany, in Rumania or Russia within their limits of August 1, 1914.'

On the other hand, numerous sources of information (see especially Document No. 11⁸, letter No. 2725 of May 28) have already revealed that the Germans, in the course of the evacuation, were carrying out of the Baltic countries important resources, notably railway material, and were proceeding to the distraction [*sic*] and removal of electric installations and communications.

If the Germans have the right, in the present circumstances, to carry off their war material, it falls within the competency of General Gough, nevertheless, to *verify* what they send away, to assure himself that no material and no resource are levied on [*sic*] the evacuated countries.

It is under the heading of this *verification* that the dispositions mentioned in paragraph (d) must be maintained.¹²

(e) *Prohibition to send any reinforcements into Latvia.*

The German Government accepts this provision.

Nevertheless it is true that at last news German troops were still being sent to Mitau (see Documents No. 7 and No. 8⁸).

Conclusions

From the preceding it results that the provisions covered by paragraphs (b), (c), and (d), above, must be maintained, subject to supplementary instructions to be given to General Gough with a view to settling, in accord with the German regional command, the question of means of transport in effecting the evacuation, and that of the time limits for the execution of it, which depends directly on the first question.

But the essential condition of a rapid and complete evacuation is still *the immediate recall of General von der Goltz.*

Experience proves that this measure cannot be obtained by new injunctions transmitted in the usual form, in the name of an armistice already old, and whose provisions cannot be invoked in this particular case.

The recall of General von der Goltz is before all a *measure of a political nature.* For this reason it necessitates a direct action of the Allied Governments with the German Government.

I have the honour to request that energetic steps be taken to this effect, without delay, and directly by the Supreme Council with the German representatives at Versailles.

APPENDIX B TO NO. 38

BERLIN, le 19 août 1919 — 17 h. 50.

Les journaux pangermanistes représentent la situation en Haute Silésie comme très grave. On mande de Kattowitz au journal *Der Abend* (19 août) les districts de Kattowitz et Misslowitz restent aux mains des troupes gouvernementales; à part cela tout le cercle de Kattowitz est au pouvoir des insurgés. Hier de nombreux combats ont eu lieu dans les localités de [?]odzin [?] Bedzin], Schoppinitz [?]now Gieschewalde avec des bandes armées de mitrailleuses et bien pourvues de munitions; celles-ci ont par endroits réussi à disperser les troupes de la Reichswehr. On a dû faire venir de grands renforts de Kattowitz et de Mystolwitz [?]Myslowitz]. Le Chancelier Bauer a fait cet après-midi à l'Assemblée Nationale les déclarations suivantes au sujet de la situation en Haute-Silésie: Contrairement aux efforts des Gouvernements qui essayaient d'établir entre la Prusse et la Pologne des relations de bon voisinage, des agitateurs polonais ont tenté en Haute-Silésie de provoquer une

¹² Note in original: 'We might, moreover, with the same object, invoke these clauses of Article 169 of the Peace Treaty which provide "that within two months after the entrance into force of the present treaty German war material coming from abroad, in whatever state it may be in, shall be surrendered to the Allied Governments, who will determine its destination".'

'From this provision there is evidently derived the right, on the part of the mandatory of the Allied Powers, to take cognizance of the distribution of this material, in order to be able when the time comes, to claim if necessary, and to control its delivery to the said powers. This is moreover the thesis sustained by General Gough.'

insurrection armée. On a répandu les nouvelles les plus alarmantes à ce sujet; je suis heureux de pouvoir communiquer qu'elles sont en grande partie exagérées et que la situation est sensiblement meilleure qu'on ne le pouvait croire au premier abord. Le Gouvernement a reçu le rapport officiel suivant. Le commandement en chef est en Haute-Silésie complètement maître de la situation. Les Polonais qui ont participé au mouvement sont battus ou prisonniers. D'autres mesures militaires sont en cours. La seule région occupée par les Polonais le 18 août était celle située au nord-est de la ligne Beuthen-Kattowitz. C'est le seul endroit où des troupes polonaises régulières aient passé la frontière. Il est établi que la révolte qui a éclaté près de Myslowitz est également le fait de bandes polonaises. Il y a parmi les Polonais des cercles nationalistes qui craignent que la consultation populaire ne tourne pas à leur avantage et qui veulent pour cette raison créer à tout prix un fait accompli. Nous aurons le devoir de nous opposer à de pareilles tentatives et de faire en sorte que la Haute-Silésie puisse se décider librement et d'une manière impartiale. Nous avons plaisir à constater que le Gouvernement polonais y est absolument étranger et que les troupes polonaises n'y ont pas pris part. Je crois que cette déclaration contribuera sensiblement à produire en Haute-Silésie un effet apaisant.

HAGUENIN

APPENDIX C TO No. 38

En vue de créer une forte armée les Allemands poursuivent une mobilisation énergique. Les désordres spartakistes sont volontairement exagérés pour servir de prétexte auprès des Alliés en faveur du renforcement de l'armée allemande.

En principe on prépare des armées qui le cas échéant pourraient entrer en action contre la Pologne et les Alliés tout en mettant à couvert le Gouvernement allemand auquel ces armées refuseraient apparemment d'obéir.

De plus, en Haute-Silésie, d'après les paroles mêmes du Chef de section du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères allemand, le Gouvernement est prêt à fournir en faveur d'une action préparatoire au plébiscite en Haute-Silésie une somme d'un milliard de marks. 20 millions sont destinés à corrompre les Officiers Alliés des armées d'occupation; un comité politique spécial a reçu du Gouvernement allemand la somme de 500 millions de marks pour payer les votants pendant le plébiscite.

La campagne allemande contre la réunion de la Haute-Silésie à la Pologne exploite principalement les points suivants:

- a) La Pologne doit rembourser la dette russe.
- b) La Haute-Silésie doit couvrir la dette allemande et aussi, bien entendu, la dette polonaise.
- c) Les Allemands donneraient l'autonomie à la Haute-Silésie; la Pologne ne l'accorderait jamais.
- d) L'organisation antisémite de Berlin répand l'opinion qu'en Pologne les Juifs jouissent de lois d'exception et que leur influence est plus grande que celle des Chrétiens.

Quant à l'état d'esprit régnant dans les territoires soumis au plébiscite, on peut dire en général que les Allemands pris parmi les intellectuels, les employés d'institutions privées, les propriétaires d'immeubles, les commerçants penchent du côté de la Pologne.

Enfin, il importe de noter que de Berlin on transporte des troupes aux Gares les plus rapprochées de la Haute-Silésie.

Télégramme Chiffré

COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF DES ARMÉES ALLIÉES.

Etat-Major Général

3^{ème} section.

G.Q.G.A., le 19 août 1919.

Maréchal Foch, Commandant en Chef Armées Alliées, à Général Dupont, Chef Mission Militaire Française, à Berlin.

N° 3972.

Ci-dessous télégramme qui vous est adressé par Ministre Affaires Etrangères :

Primo. Le Conseil Suprême des Alliés est informé que le mouvement gréviste, signalé en Haute-Silésie, a dégénéré en insurrection armée, que les ouvriers insurgés se sont emparés de Kattowitz, Pless, Boujakow, Jedlin, Cechow, après avoir désarmé troupes allemandes de Grenzschutz; que le travail dans les mines est complètement arrêté, ainsi que les mouvements par voie ferrée.

Cette insurrection semble engager les responsabilités des Allemands qui agissent contre les Polonais, arrêtant et fusillant des ouvriers qu'ils accusent de favoriser un mouvement spartakiste.

L'Europe Centrale, toute entière, dépend de cette région pour le charbon, et il est nécessaire que l'ordre y soit rétabli et que le travail dans les mines soit repris, sous peine des plus graves complications dans tous les pays qui en sont tributaires.

Secundo. Le seul moyen d'y arriver serait l'occupation immédiate, par les troupes alliées, de ces régions troublées, mais aucune clause de l'armistice ne justifierait cette occupation immédiate, que seule la mise en vigueur du traité de Paix autoriserait régulièrement.

Tertio. Cette situation a été envisagée par le Conseil Suprême qui estime que :

- a) Les émeutes de Haute-Silésie vont priver de charbon tous les Etats voisins, que le Conseil ne peut s'en désintéresser et qu'il peut être amené à demander au Gouvernement Polonais de réduire ou même de supprimer ultérieurement les envois de charbon prévus à destination de l'Allemagne.
- b) Le maintien de l'ordre dans une région qui doit être prochainement soumise au plébiscite revient à l'Allemagne, et à son défaut, pour être assuré directement, dès maintenant, par les Alliés par anticipation sur le traité.

Quarto. Ces renseignements vous sont donnés à titre personnel.

Quinto. Le Conseil Suprême vous charge :

- a) de le renseigner complètement sur situation actuelle en Haute-Silésie;
- b) de lui indiquer votre sentiment sur les mesures qui pourraient en pratique être prises sans rencontrer une opposition directe du Gouvernement allemand, peut-être même d'accord avec lui, pour remédier tout de suite à la situation, sans qu'il en résulte un danger pour la population polonaise.

Le Conseil Suprême vous autorise, en vous renseignant, à utiliser, si vous le jugez opportun, les indications du présent télégramme.

S. PICHON

Prière faire parvenir réponse extrême urgence.

P.O./Le Major Général

GEORGES

Proposed Reply to German Note with respect to Estimation of War Damages in the Devastated Regions

PARIS, 1919.

From: President Clemenceau.

To: Baron von Lersner.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 2, concerning the ascertaining of damage in the territories devastated by the war.

You offer to communicate to the French and Belgian Governments all the documents and information that the German Government possesses on the subject of these damages, and notably concerning 'field' requisitions and requisitions 'for the interior', as well as to transmit the studies made by it on the subject. You ask, in order to complete the work, the restoration, even temporary, of archives left by the German armies in their retreat. Finally, you propose a discussion, a verification and an examination in common and from apposite [*sic*] sides, between the representatives of the German Government and the representatives of the French and Belgian Governments, with a view to ascertaining the amount of damage, to collecting the material and to fixing the amount to be paid.

We take note of the offer made by the German Delegation and we are disposed to receive all the information that it is ready to communicate to us; the Allied and Associated Governments can only consider with satisfaction anything that will facilitate and accelerate the execution of the Peace Treaty. In the same spirit they will be happy to receive the same documentation on the subject of the damage caused in the zones of operations other than France and Belgian [*sic*] notably Italy and Serbia.

Concerning the archives whose temporary restoration is requested, it would be well for the German Delegation, since it is the one to make the demand, to communicate the list of services and archives in question. No decision can be reached in the matter till this is done. Finally, the Allied and Associated Governments must indicate at once, in the clearest manner, that there can be no question of discussion, verification and examination, in common and from different sides, on the ascertaining of the amount of damage and the fixing of the sum to be paid; they pledged themselves to this neither in the reply that they made of June 16 to the remarks of the German Delegation on the Peace Conditions, nor in the additional Protocol of June 28 to the Treaty of Versailles. On the contrary, in the aforesaid reply of June 16, they laid down the absolute conditions that 'the categories of damages and the reparation clauses will be accepted by the German authorities as being outside of all discussion'. Now, the Peace Treaty signed by Germany provides expressly, in paragraph 10 of Annex II to the reparation clauses, that 'the Commission will study the claims and will give the German Government a fair right to be heard, *without its being able to tax [take] any part whatever in the decisions*'.¹³

I will add, in closing, that the Allied and Associated Governments are ready to examine the propositions that you announce in your letter, concerning the restoration of the devastated regions.

¹³ The official text of the passage in question read: "The Commission shall consider the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard, but not to take any part whatever in the decisions of the Commission."

Moreover, in confirmation of their reply of June 16, 1919, they will give Germany, in good time, the necessary facilities to furnish a serious basis for the offers to be presented by her; without waiting for the Treaty to come into force, it is possible now to give the first facilities in certain sectors. Verbal indications will be given on this subject.

APPENDIX I TO No. 38

M. 477.] *Proposed Communication from the President of the Peace Conference to the Commission of Generals at Budapest*

In the event that you are not satisfied that the Roumanians have ceased the seizure of Hungarian grain, live stock, rolling stock, boats and other material, you are authorized to address to the Roumanian authorities with whom you are in contact a communication substantially as follows:

"The conditions of peace with Austria as originally drafted provided that all portions of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including that part proposed to be transferred to Roumania, would be liable to pay by way of reparation a sum to be fixed by the Reparation Commission. In deference to the urgent representations of the Roumanian Peace Delegation, the principal Allied and Associated Powers consented to renounce their right to secure indemnification from enemy resources and population to be transferred to Roumania upon Roumania agreeing to make a moderate fixed contribution toward the cost of liberating enemy territory to be transferred to her. An agreement relative to the payment of cost of liberation was, on June 27, 1919 signed by Mr. Antonesco, Roumanian Plenipotentiary, subject to the approval of his Government. In reliance of this agreement, the conditions of peace with Austria were modified so that no reparation liability will attach to enemy territory proposed to be transferred to Roumania.

"The agreement signed by Mr. Antonesco provides, among other things, that Roumania's contribution toward the costs of liberation will be discharged by offsetting the sum against the first reparation payments which Roumania would otherwise receive on account of damage suffered by her, and "no further payments on account of reparation shall be made until the other States to which reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation".

"The action of Roumania in seizing enemy property by way of reparation, prior to other States having received payment on account of their approved claims, is in contravention of the terms of the agreement of June 27th, and cannot be construed as other than a repudiation by Roumania of the agreement of June 27th. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers accordingly reserve full liberty of action with respect to imposing a liability for reparation upon enemy territory proposed to be transferred to Roumania, and these Powers now have under consideration the matter and form for the exercise of their rights in this respect."

H. D. 35.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, August 21, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Colonel U. S. Grant. *British Empire*: Captain E. Abraham. *France*: Captain A. Portier. *Italy*: Lieut.-Colonel Jones.

THE FOLLOWING ALSO ATTENDED: Mr. Hoover, General Weygand, Major General The Hon. C. Sackville West, C.M.G.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

1. MR. POLK asked that the letter he had addressed to M. Clemenceau (see Appendix A¹) be referred for examination and report to the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission.
Roumanian Requisitions in Hungary

(This was agreed to.)

2. MR. POLK said that he now begged to withdraw the reservation he had made on August 7th, regarding the Anglo-Belgian Agreement on the Belgian sphere in the ex-German Colony of East Africa. (See H. D. 26,² Minute 5.)
Anglo-Belgian Agreement regarding Man-date in East Africa

3. MR. HOOVER said that he had just returned from a trip of investigation into various economic questions. The main discovery of his trip had been the critical situation as to coal in Central Europe. There were three coal-fields, from which the entire supply for this section of Europe was drawn: first, the one in Upper Silesia, now affected by the strikes: one in Teschen, under dispute between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles: and one in Poland. The total output from these three fields was 5 to 6 million tons a month, and they constituted the very heart of Central Europe. Unless their production was kept up, it would be impossible to maintain the transportation and municipal services in Central Europe. The Upper Silesian coal-mines had practically stopped production on account of the strikes. One mine had been entirely destroyed. It would be only a matter of days before the remainder would be disabled beyond repair for several months. There were many
Coal Situation in Central Europe and Position in Upper Silesia

¹ Not printed. This letter, dated August 20, 1919, is printed by F. Deák, op. cit., pp. 488-9. Its substance was in the main incorporated in the telegram which the Supreme Council decided on August 23 to send to the Roumanian Government: see No. 41, appendix A.

² No. 30.

versions as to the cause for the situation. There appeared to be four parties to the quarrel: first, the Polish workmen; second, the German Grenzschutz troops, who were in a high state of emotional nationalism; third, the Spartacists; fourth, the German coal-owners and perhaps the German Government itself. The causes appeared to be not economic but political. The Polish authorities had shown him documents which, if they could be authenticated, would prove that the Germans had tried to stir up the Spartacists to make trouble, and that the German troops had actually attempted to drive out the Polish workmen. The Germans said, on the contrary, that the Polish workmen and the Spartacists had conspired together to foment the trouble, and that they were forced to restore order. One of the strange results of this state of affairs was that in one case some Polish workmen were guarding their mines to save them from destruction. In his own opinion, the only possible remedy was an occupation by Allied troops. No Commission could bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties. Colonel Goodyear, who had been in charge of coal distribution, had been sent there, and was trying to get the parties to come to some agreement together, but he was convinced that it would be impossible to do so. Mr. Hoover himself had had a discussion with Mr. Markensen, a German who had been a member of the Armistice Commission on the Eastern Front. He was very disturbed, and from his statements he had gathered that the German Government were not fully in control of the Grenzschutz troops, whom they were trying to replace by regular troops. This same German had said that the German Government was most anxious, as it necessarily ought to be, to restore order, but, of course, one could never tell what power the Berlin Government exercised over the various military bodies in the East. Undoubtedly, the German owners were in desperate fear of the destruction of their property, and would welcome any method of re-establishing order.

There were contradictory currents even amongst the Germans themselves, and it was his opinion that the racial animosities had reached such a point that nothing could stop the strife but a military occupation. He realised, of course, that this was not legally possible until after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, but the intentions of the German Government might here be put to the test, and he thought that the German Government would probably agree to anticipate the action proposed by the Treaty, and, of course, the Poles were asking that this be done. He believed that this would be the attitude of the German Government, because of the desire Mr. Markensen and his colleagues had expressed to get Allied troops all along the Eastern front, between the Poles and the German volunteer troops, and because the difficulty of controlling the latter made them fear a general conflagration.

He had had a meeting with the Trades Union Leaders of the Teschen district, and there also found the Trades Unions divided along the lines of nationality. The Polish leaders confessed that they would not help to increase production until they knew to whom the mines would fall, and they would not work for the Czechs. There was here also much political sentiment. He had asked whether strikes would be used to influence the plebiscite, and was

answered that undoubtedly they would be. This information he considered as of interest, both as affecting the political situation in the Teschen district, and also by analogy furnishing a clue to the situation in Upper Silesia.

There was a political question—that of restoring order; and there was also the economic question of stimulating production and getting the output from the mines necessary for the maintenance of the ordinary life of central Europe. From the last point of view, the three districts were one, and the selfish interests of any one nation must be entirely set aside for the general good of that section of the continent. At present the feeling of the Czechs towards the Austrians was such as to make it hopeless to ask them to keep coal shipments going to Austria, although the Austrian transportation, which was dependant on that coal supply, was absolutely essential to the Czechs themselves, and the same sort of feelings existed everywhere. He thought it necessary that the Coal Commission should appoint a sub-committee to control all three Districts with the authority of the Peace Conference. He suggested that this be done at once, and he would like to see the Coal Committee enter upon its duties with the prestige that would be given it by the assurance that it would constitute the Plebiscite Commission as soon as it became possible to appoint that body. He thought it possible to select men competent for both, and he thought that it would only be possible for the Coal Committee to perform its duties if invested with the double authority; only this double authority could solve either question.

M. PICHON asked Mr. Hoover at what time he had visited Upper Silesia.

MR. HOOVER replied that he had not visited Upper Silesia, but had interviewed people coming from there at a place on the Railway outside the mining area.

M. PICHON said that he had asked this question because he had just received news that the situation in Upper Silesia had improved.

MR. HOOVER said that, on his side, he had telegrams from Warsaw, informing him that there was continuous fighting along the whole of the German-Polish frontiers.

M. TITTONI said he thought the improvement in any case must be precarious. He was disposed to agree to the proposals made by Mr. Hoover.

M. PICHON said that there was a telegram from General Dupont which confirmed most of what Mr. Hoover had said. (See Appendix B.)

MR. HOOVER said that he was in possession of a proclamation of the socialist party, calling upon the Poles to expel the Germans from the mines. There was, therefore, a mixture of Spartacist and Nationalist feeling which was very confusing.

MR. POLK said that he had received a telegram from the American Minister in Warsaw stating that the Polish Government had refrained from intervening in Silesia, in spite of the excitement of the country over the situation, because they were afraid that such action would prejudice their case in the eyes of the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Hoover's proposals were very similar to those adopted by the Conference in its previous meetings. The Council

had thought it might be possible to ask Germany to allow an anticipated exercise of the Treaty. Mr. Hoover added the hope and expectation that the German Government would consent. The means by which the Council had hoped to obtain the acquiescence of the German Government was the Coal Commission.

MR. HOOVER said that he would suggest that the Coal Commission be strengthened by a German member and even by a Czech and a Polish member.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Mr. Hoover did not think that these members might obstruct business.

MR. HOOVER said that they might perhaps be disposed to do so, but that they could be controlled by the Great Powers. There had previously been a Coal Commission with a Czech, Polish, and German member, (together with a British and American representative), which had worked quite successfully before the signature of the Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was very favourably inclined to Mr. Hoover's proposals, but with regard to the suggestion that the Coal Committee should also conduct the administration in the plebiscite zone, he would like to ask a few questions. The Plebiscite Commission could not be precisely the Committee suggested by Mr. Hoover; it was hardly possible to have a plebiscite area in which Poland was interested, controlled by a Czech and a German Commissioner. The Coal Committee, moreover, not only had to carry out diplomatic negotiations with Germany, to superintend the production of coal in disturbed parts of Upper Silesia and Teschen, but it was also asked to control a plebiscite area, two-thirds of which was agricultural, and not coal-producing at all. In order to carry out its various duties, not only would it have to move over large areas, possess an intimate knowledge of coal production, considerable acquaintance with other industrial conditions, but it must also be endowed with political experience, tact, and knowledge of the conditions of all the neighbouring countries. Such universal competence might perhaps be difficult to find concentrated in one set of individuals.

MR. HOOVER said that what he meant to suggest was that the four Principal Allied representatives on the Coal Committee should ultimately become the administrators of the plebiscite area, in order that they should begin from the first with additional prestige.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Coal Committee would be composed of technical experts rather than of administrators and men of political experience.

MR. HOOVER said that he was not entirely of this opinion. The technical side of the Committee's work was comparatively simple; the distribution of the output of the mines was well established; the mine-owners were well acquainted with the quantities sent to the various consuming areas. The Committee would have chiefly to adjudicate among the rival claimants. Their functions would be, therefore, rather administrative than technical. He adhered to the belief that a merely technical committee would be of little use. There was already one, and its influence was not great.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would ask one more question. It had struck him previously that, should the German Government make difficulties, it might be threatened by being told that should the coal-fields be attributed to Poland, the Allied Powers would exercise their influence to see that Germany was last served in the distribution of coal from these mines. He asked Mr. Hoover whether he thought this form of pressure could be employed.

MR. HOOVER said that he thought it was possible. The method he was suggesting was not a logical one. It would be more reasonable, first to establish the administrative Commission, and under it a Coal Committee. He was reversing the process, and suggesting that the Coal Committee should be endowed in anticipation with the prestige of the administrative body.

MR. BALFOUR said that this method appeared to him to be very ingenious.

M. PICHON said that he agreed that the method was ingenious, but he thought that there was some danger in confusing the two functions. It was possible that the Coal Committee might, at a future date, assist the Plebiscite Commission. He thought it inadvisable to state at the present time that coal experts would become the future administrators of the country. This could not be done legally at present. Moreover, he did not think that the Germans would agree. They did not accept the Treaty in a very willing spirit. A demand of this kind would raise difficulties. The Council might make up its own mind that the Coal Committee, if, as it was hoped, it gained authority in the country, should later on assist the Plebiscite Commission. He did not think that this could be openly declared.

MR. HOOVER said that his feeling was that a Coal Committee, as such, would be helpless. It could only use arguments derived from the general coal situation in Europe. He pointed out that the Council was considering the prospect of military occupation. Should this take place, the only administrative organ possible would be the Plebiscite Commission.

M. TITTONI said that the essential thing was to find out whether the German Government would acquiesce. Should it do so, there would be no difficulty, and the Coal Committee could, as Mr. Hoover suggested, obtain political power. The principal thing was to approach the German Government without delay.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that if Allied troops were sent into Upper Silesia, it would be absolutely necessary to establish a high civil authority to ensure a *modus vivendi*. It appeared to him that this authority could not be the Coal Committee, whose functions extended to other areas than Upper Silesia. It must undoubtedly be the Commission provided for in the Annex to Section 8 of the Treaty.³ This Commission was doubtless that which had been called the Plebiscite Commission in the discussion. It was really a Commission to govern the country under the authority of the Allied and Associated Powers, pending the completion of the plebiscite.

MR. HOOVER then suggested that the Coal Committee be sent as a Coal

³ The reference was to the annex to article 88 in section 8 of part III of the Treaty of Versailles.

Committee, but that, as many Governments as might find it possible to do so, should appoint to it members who would subsequently serve on the Administrative Commission. Further, if the German Government should agree, no delay would occur in selecting new representatives.

M. PICHON said that the whole question was whether the German Government would agree to the exercise of the right which only accrued 15 days after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI urged that the question be put to the German Government immediately. A reply could perhaps be obtained within two days.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Conference had no regular diplomatic civil agent in touch with the German Government. He therefore suggested that Mr. Hoover should go to Berlin on behalf of the Council to negotiate on this matter. Mr. Hoover was so identified with the economic interests of Europe that no more suitable representative could be found for such a mission. His work had been outside the political arena so he had a better hope of success than anyone else.

M. PICHON said that he agreed.

MR. POLK suggested that Mr. Hoover be given an opportunity of consulting his French and British colleagues on the Coal Commission.

M. TITTONI suggested that in any case it should be explained to the German Government that the Allies had no political object in these negotiations. They were only animated by anxiety for the economic revival of Europe.

M. PICHON proposed certain draft instructions for Mr. Hoover (see Appendix C).

(These instructions were approved in principle and it was agreed that Mr. Hoover, after consultation with his colleagues on the Coal Commission, should report on the following day whether he was able to undertake the mission and whether any alteration of the draft instructions appeared desirable.)

4. MR. POLK asked that Mr. Hoover be heard on the situation in Hungary.

Situation in Hungary MR. HOOVER said that the staff of the Relief Organisation had been in Budapest and other parts of Hungary during the past ten days; that facts which had come to their personal attention might be of interest to the Council. Up to 10 a.m. on the previous Monday⁴ the Roumanians were still requisitioning food all over the country and in Budapest they were taking supplies even from the Children's Hospital. Trains carrying the requisitioned supplies were passing out of the country as fast as possible, although in one place some had accumulated because the Roumanians were awaiting the repair of a bridge before the trains could continue on their way. None of the members of the Relief Organisation believed for a moment that the Roumanians intended to accede to the desires of the Council. He was not concerned with the morality of their actions but with the practical effects. Two of his officials, Captains in the American

⁴ August 18, 1919.

Army, had themselves seen the Roumanians take sixteen waggon loads of supplies from the Children's Hospital and eleven deaths had resulted therefrom within twenty-four hours, for there was no way of replacing these supplies. He did not think that any action by the Roumanians could be secured unless the Military Mission were instructed to send agents to frontier points to stop the Roumanians from shipping out any more of the requisitioned material until its disposal could be decided by the Council. In his own opinion the supplies requisitioned should be turned back to Budapest to feed the population of that city. He would like to call attention to another point which threw a sidelight on the situation. While the *coup d'état*, by which the Archduke Joseph's Government had been installed, was not entirely a Roumanian affair, nevertheless Roumanian troops had surrounded the meeting place of the Ministry and had turned their machine guns on the building in which they were. This event had had an immediate repercussion throughout Poland and Eastern Europe and the Bolsheviks were making much of it and claiming that the Alliance was trying to re-establish reactionary government in its worst form and this had done more to re-habilitate the Bolshevik cause than anything that had happened for a long time. The social democrats had refused to have anything to do with the new Government and Garami, the leader of this group, thought that if things were allowed to continue as they were, the old reactionary party would be well established in ten days and the Allied and Associated Powers would have to be prepared to see the House of Hapsburg begin to re-establish itself throughout all its former dominions. He could only suggest that the Council should instruct its representatives in Budapest to call the Archduke before them and say that his Government could never be accepted or recognised. Such action might induce the Archduke to step aside and invite the social democrats to form a coalition government.

M. PICHON said that the Council had already taken a decision of a similar character. The telegram sent on the 18th August embodied this policy.⁵ In it the Council had said all that it could possibly say consistently with its declared policy of non-interference in the internal politics of Hungary. The Council could not take the responsibility of deliberately upsetting a Government in order to set up another.

MR. BALFOUR said that the only further step that could be taken would be to make the telegram more public, by asking the Generals in Budapest to make it widely known that Peace would never be signed with a Government not representing the people.

MR. HOOVER said that if the Hungarian people went to the Poles [polls] with only a choice between Bolshevism and a Hapsburg, the result of the elections might be in favour of the latter. This would be a paradoxical and disastrous result of a consultation of the people. Eastern Europe was past the blandishments of polite suggestion. Human life in those parts had declined in value to an extent not realised in Paris. Very energetic action was required. He thought the Generals in Budapest should summon the Archduke and

⁵ See No. 36, appendix C.

tell him clearly that he would never be recognised, and that he had better resign.

M. TITTONI said that if he felt certain that on the fall of the Archduke a good Government would be set up, he would risk intervening. Before doing so, however, he would like to ask the Generals in Budapest what Government they thought would result from upsetting the Archduke.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought this matter so important that he would like to wait until the following day, when M. Clemenceau would be present at the Council. As to the other proposal of Mr. Hoover, namely, to have the frontier between Hungary and Roumania watched, in order to stop the export of requisitioned material, he thought some decision should be taken.

M. TITTONI said that all instructions sent to the Generals in Budapest should be accompanied by a proviso that they should take action if they thought action suitable; as they were on the spot, they were better able to judge what could be done.

(It was then decided to send the following telegram:—

‘The Supreme Council learns that the Roumanian troops of occupation continue to make requisitions of every kind in Hungary, and to send the goods so obtained to Roumania.

‘The Council begs the Inter-Allied Commission to report on the practical possibility of sending officers to the frontier posts between Hungary and Roumania to prevent the export of goods requisitioned to the detriment of the Allies, and in diminution of their common security.

‘Should the Commission regard this suggestion as feasible, Supreme Council authorises it to act accordingly.’)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 21, 1919.

APPENDIX B TO No. 39

Télégrammes reçus du Général Dupont

La situation en Silésie est devenue particulièrement grave et la faute en incombe tout spécialement au Commissaire Hoersing et à l'administration allemande, qui exaspèrent les habitants polonais. Rien n'a été épargné à ces derniers, depuis les sept mois que durent [*sic*] l'état de siège—vols, pillages, arrestations se succèdent tous les jours et le Grenzschutz y a une grosse responsabilité.

Tout le territoire des mines est en grève générale. Depuis une dizaine de jours on n'a pas extrait une tonne de houille. La population doit résister par la force à la brutalité des troupes et étant en grande majorité polonaise, les combats sont sévères: grand nombre de pertes en tués et blessés.

Seule ressource pour ramener le calme est une occupation militaire interalliée, en Haute-Silésie. Si cette décision ne pouvait être obtenue rapidement, il serait indispensable de charger les troupes polonaises du maintien de l'ordre après retrait des troupes allemandes. Pour ce cas une commission interalliée devrait être

chargée d'instituer une administration mixte polonaise et allemande pour les usines et les mines.

Le Gouvernement allemand déclare qu'il ne suspecte nullement le Gouvernement polonais: seule la surexcitation populaire est cause de ces troubles: cet avis est partagé par les Polonais.

APPENDIX C TO No. 39

21 août 1919.

Résolution

Mission confiée à M. Hoover par le Conseil

La Mission de M. Hoover a pour objectif d'obtenir du Gouvernement allemand une anticipation de traité:

1° Pour l'envoi immédiat de la Haute Commission d'Administration Interalliée en Silésie;

2° Pour l'acceptation de l'occupation immédiate interalliée en Silésie.

Le Conseil Suprême charge M. Hoover de se rendre à Berlin, d'y prendre contact avec le Général Dupont (que le Conseil Suprême a déjà chargé de s'informer et d'aborder le Gouvernement allemand sur la situation en Silésie).

Il y aura lieu de faire remarquer au Gouvernement allemand que le Conseil des Alliés n'agit pas au nom d'un intérêt politique dans la question, mais seulement au nom des intérêts matériels les plus importants de l'Europe Centrale.

No. 40

H. D. 36.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, August 22, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Lieut.-Commander Bell. *France*: Captain Portier. *Italy*: Lieut.-Col. Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover to make his statement on the affairs of Silesia.

Affairs in Silesia

MR. HOOVER said that he and Mr. Loucheur had interviewed the German delegates at Versailles, and had made an informal suggestion to them. He had told them that if the present situation developed, it would lead the German Government into a very difficult position. In two months time, however, by the provisions of the Treaty, Silesia was to be occupied by

Allied troops for the purpose of the plebiscite. He suggested to them that the German Government should, in its own interests, advance the date of the Allied occupation, and invite the Allies to send troops earlier. The German Representatives had received the suggestion favourably, and had stated that a reply from Berlin would be received on the following day. It was, however, to be noted that the German Delegates in question belonged to the Reparation Commission, and had no diplomatic attributions. Their attitude on the point at issue was, therefore, not very important. He had further told them that a Sub-Commission, to inquire into the means of increasing the coal output, was shortly to be sent to the Silesian, Teschen, and Dombrovo coalfields. If the Germans should prove willing to co-operate with this Sub-Committee, the Allies would doubtless be willing to appoint a German member to it. He thought that his suggestion in this respect might be a fair bait to the German Government.

Col. Goodyear's dispatch was then read. (See Appen. A.)

In conclusion, he thought that the further information received from General Dupont should be placed before the Council.

M. PICHON then circulated a telegram from the French Representative in Berlin. (See Appendix B.)

MR. BALFOUR, commenting upon the telegram, said that he thought the number of Commissions now acting in Germany was very great, and asked which Commission was referred to in para. 2.

MR. POLK asked the same question.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the Allied Military Representatives at Berlin must have delegated some of their members with orders to proceed to Silesia, and he thought that the body so formed would be the Commission referred to in the telegram. He suggested that the Allied Representatives at Berlin ought to be informed of the measures which the Council proposed to carry into effect, and that they might know that the Coal Commission was being sent out on Monday.¹ He further suggested that the delegated Commission from the Allied Representatives in Berlin should act in collaboration with the Coal Commission which was shortly to be sent out. In the meantime he strongly recommended that Col. Goodyear should continue to act as a local arbitrator in the interests of the Council.

MR. HOOVER remarked that he felt the Council should know the composition of the Commission which was being sent out by the Allied Representatives in Berlin; and, if an American officer were to be included on this Commission, Col. Goodyear should be designated as the American representative by the Council.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that according to the information at present available there were two Commissions at present acting in Germany: (i) The Inter-Allied Commission which was coming to an end on the following day; and (ii) the subordinate body delegated from No. (i) to act in Silesia. Col. Goodyear ought certainly to be a member of this latter Commission, but the Council did not at the moment know of whom it was composed.

¹ August 25, 1919.

MR. POLK suggested that it might be a group of generals who were endeavouring to arrange matters between the Germans and the Poles.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that, at the present moment, there was a Committee negotiating between the Germans and the Poles. (See H. D. 23, Min. 4.²) General Malcolm, General Dupont, and General Bencivenga, were assisting this body. The negotiations between the two countries had continued until the events in Silesia had produced such a state of tension, that they could not be proceeded with. General Dupont had wanted, in the first place, to send out a local Committee to Silesia, but the proposal had been opposed by the Poles. The German Government had received the suggestion favourably, and it was probably for this reason that a Delegated Committee had now been sent.

M. TITTONI remarked that his information did not quite agree with that supplied by General Weygand. He had been told, that, after the rupture of negotiations, a committee had been sent out locally at the request of the Poles. He also thought that the original committee in Berlin had been negotiating on behalf of prisoners of war.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the Council had sent out a committee to deal with the question of Russian prisoners, and that it was this same committee which had assumed the conduct of present negotiations, owing to the fact that the various members of the committee had collaborated on many other questions in the past.

M. CLEMENCEAU then read out the decision of H. D. 23-4², and remarked that the Americans had not nominated a member to the Committee created under the resolution, as they were waiting for the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR said he thought that the Inter-Allied Committee at Berlin must be informed of the present measures taken by the Council. They should be told that a coal committee was leaving on Monday.¹ Col. Goodyear ought, at the same time, to be asked to continue the action that he had initiated; whilst, on the other hand, the new Coal Commission should be kept fully informed of what Col. Goodyear had done, and be told that he was at present staying at Mährisch Ostrau, and that they should collaborate as closely as possible with him.

MR. POLK said that Mr. Hoover had suggested that Col. Goodyear should be attached to the Delegated Committee sent out to Silesia from Berlin. A telegram should therefore be sent, instructing the Committee: (a) to proceed at once to Silesia and: (b) to establish relations with Col. Goodyear. At the same time, it was not possible for Col. Goodyear to be an active member of the Delegated Committee prior to the ratification of the Peace Treaty. He would, therefore, work as the representative of Mr. Hoover in matters connected with food and coal and would be in touch with the Generals of the Delegated Committee.

MR. BALFOUR asked what would be the relation between the Delegated Committee and the Coal Commission, both of which were being sent at the same time to the same place.

² No. 27, minute 4.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the Coal Committee was a purely technical body, and could be placed under the orders of the Delegated Committee.

MR. HOOVER said that the functions of the Coal Committee would be confined to questions of production and distribution. He did not believe that it could concern itself with questions of politics, and he felt that the work of this body should not be subordinated to a military committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover should draw up draft instructions to the Allied Representatives at Berlin, and should submit the text to the Council.

MR. HOOVER then suggested that General Weygand should assist them.

M. PICHON said that he had received a visit from Mr. Grabsky of the Polish Delegation. He had informed him that he would transmit a copy of the instructions sent by the Allied Generals, to the Polish authorities. He would tell them that he fully agreed with the instructions sent, and would ask that the local Polish authorities should collaborate with the Commissions sent out by the Council.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that a decision had been arrived at on the previous day to attach a German, a Czech, and a Pole to the Coal Committee.

M. LOUCHEUR then read the draft instructions to be sent to Berlin. (See Appendix C.)

(It was decided:—

1. That Colonel Goodyear should be instructed to continue the negotiations that he had initiated in Upper Silesia, pending the arrival of the Coal Committee, and the Committee delegated by the Inter-Allied representatives at Berlin. He was further to place himself in touch with these Bodies on their arrival and to act in close collaboration with them.
2. That the draft telegram to General Dupont (see Annex C) should be accepted and despatched through Marshal Foch.)

2. M. BALFOUR asked, in connection with the previous resolution, whether the troops, which might have to be despatched to Upper Silesia at very short notice, were now ready.

*Allied troops for
the Plebiscite zone
in Upper Silesia*

GENERAL WEYGAND said that it had only been decided that the troops for Upper Silesia should be formed out of four equal Allied contingents (see H. D. 27,³ Minute 7, and Appendix F). On the same day that the decision had been taken, Marshal Foch had been requested to study the method of victualling and the distribution of the troops in Silesia, in collaboration with the Military Representatives at Versailles. The Military Representatives had referred the matter to their respective Governments, and had not yet replied. He did not think that the discussions between Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives would be particularly fruitful, since the supposed difficulty of victualling did not exist. Far more complicated problems of the same kind had been solved in the past. There remained, however, the question of the total strength of effectives. On the proposal of

³ No. 31.

the Military Representatives one Division had been considered sufficient. This figure had been arrived at before the appearance of the existing difficulties. When one Division had been decided upon, the military problem consisted only in maintaining order in a tranquil country. At the present moment, the country, which contained four million inhabitants, 360,000 of whom were labourers, was in a state of ferment and insurrection. The fact that these insurgents had disarmed troops should not be lost sight of; for it showed they were capable of military action. In his opinion, two Divisions were required under present circumstances. His opinion had been formed without local knowledge, and it would be advisable to ask General Dupont, who was proceeding to Silesia, to report on the matter. In the meanwhile, however, independently of anything that General Dupont might ultimately say, two Divisions ought to be put into a state of military preparedness.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection to a simple military occupation of Silesian territory; but that if fighting occurred, parliamentary difficulties might arise in the Allied countries, and the idea that we were carrying out repressive measures might gain ground. The revolution in Silesia had an essentially Polish character. Was it not therefore desirable to obtain a declaration from the Polish Government, telling the local Polish population to receive our troops in a friendly spirit, and assist them as much as possible?

MR. BALFOUR said that the despatch of troops was part of a policy decided upon. All that could be done, therefore, was to have the troops in a state of readiness.

M. TITTONI replied that he did not question Mr. Balfour's statement but thought that a proclamation from the Polish Government would be of great help. He had interpreted General Weygand's statement in the sense that severe repressions might occur.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he did not think the question arose, since the Poles would obviously welcome our assistance against the Germans.

MR. POLK stated that he doubted whether authority existed under the American constitution for the United States to send troops into Silesia for the purpose of quelling a revolution in that country, since the Treaty with Germany provided only for troops of occupation during the Plebiscite. If the matters under discussion dealt simply with preliminary arrangements for the eventual despatch of troops, he was prepared to agree, but he could not commit himself to the despatch of forces for the purpose of quelling the revolution.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that when one Division had been decided upon for the Army of Occupation, during the Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, it had further been decided that the Force in question should be drawn from the Army of Occupation on the Rhine. At that time it had been decided to maintain a Force of 150,000 men on the Rhine. Subsequently, however, this figure had been reduced to 114,000 men. Marshal Foch had thought that the troops necessary for Upper Silesia should be formed from the 36,000 men who became available owing to the reduction in the original figure. As an example, France had six Divisions, i.e. 85,000 men, formed for the Army of

Occupation in Germany, and one extra contingent for Silesia. Marshal Foch would like the British Government to get ready, in addition to the mixed brigade detailed for the Rhine, a supplementary contingent which could be drawn upon for Silesia. He also wished that the American Government would provide a force available for Silesia in addition to the 6,800 men which was its share in the Army of Occupation on the Rhine.

MR. BALFOUR said that Field-Marshal Wilson had arrived in Paris and he would like General Weygand to consult with him on the present question.

MR. POLK remarked that General Weygand might also confer with General Pershing.

(It was decided:—

1. That Marshal Foch should be requested to make all arrangements necessary for putting two Divisions, which might ultimately be despatched to Upper Silesia on the orders of the Council, in a state of readiness.

2. That General Weygand should consult with Field-Marshal Wilson and General Pershing with regard to the furnishing of British and American troops for Upper Silesia from sources other than the Army of Occupation on the Rhine.)

3. (At this point M. Serruys, Mr. Headlam-Morley, the experts of the Economic Commission, and the Editing Committee entered the room.)

*Report of the
Economic Commission
with regard to
the Austrian
Counter-Proposals*

M. SERRUYS read and commented upon the report contained in Appendix D.⁴

(1) *Coal Supply to Austria:*

The question before the Council was whether the supply of coal to Austria from Poland and Tchecho-Slovakia should be guaranteed by a special clause in the Peace Treaty. The opinion of the Italian Delegation had been that it should. The other solution was, that the guarantee should be obtained by clauses in the Peace Treaties with Small States.

M. TRITTONI said that he agreed to the guarantee being given in the Treaty with Tchecho-Slovakia; but the Treaty with Poland had already been signed.

M. SERRUYS said that an additional clause might be inserted in the Polish Treaty, but remarked that Italy would obviously obtain more coal from Tchecho-Slovakia than from Poland.

M. TRITTONI suggested that the question could be referred to the Coal Committee, which could consult with [the] Economic Commission as to the best method of securing the necessary guarantees; and could advise the Council as to which Treaty it had better be included in. He did not insist on any alteration in the Peace Treaty with Austria.

(It was agreed that the question of obtaining the necessary guarantees for a coal supply by Czecho-Slovakia and Poland to Austria, to the new States

⁴ Not printed. The report, dated August 13, 1919, drew the attention of the Supreme Council to the questions enumerated below.

created from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the territories of that Empire ceded to the Allies, should be referred to the Coal Committee and to the Economic Commission jointly. The above Commissions should report to the Council on the Peace Treaties in which the clauses ensuring the above guarantees should be inserted.)

- (2) *Articles 225 and 226⁵ of the Peace Treaty with Austria: Subject of Nationalities:*
[Not printed.]⁶

- (3) *The solidarity between the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and the new Austrian Republic:*

The Council was called upon to consider the Austrian contention that there was a complete break of historical continuity between the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and the new Austrian Republic.

M. SERRUYS, in drawing the attention of the Council to the above point, said that almost every clause in the existing Peace Treaty with Austria was dependent upon the standpoint previously adopted by the Council. The Economic Commission, however, could not assume a final decision without a definite ruling from the Council on the point in question.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was obvious that the previous decision of the Council of Four must be upheld. The new Austrian Republic was in an absolutely different position from the other States which had arisen out of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The former was an enemy State, and the latter were now friendly and allied Powers. On the other hand, it was in the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers that the financial and economic clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be framed in such a way that ruin and bankruptcy should not be forced upon the Austrian Republic. The result of this would be that the Government at Vienna would think that their only hope of salvation lay in joining the German Empire. If any changes were to be made in the Peace Treaty, he thought they ought to be carried out with the above object.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it was decided that the Austrian contention contained in Letter No. 707⁷ was rejected.

MR. BALFOUR replied in the affirmative but added that he thought some of the objections raised by the Austrian Delegation were valid. For this reason, he reserved to himself the right to propose modifications in the Financial and Economic Clauses when they came up for final discussion.

M. TITTONI said that he wished to make a reservation. Mr. Balfour's proposal, if accepted, would result in a lessening of the total guarantees to

⁵ The numbering is that of the draft of July 20, 1919. See No. 21, note 8.

⁶ The resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on this item is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 612. The matter was raised by the Economic Commission in the light of the observations of the Austrian Delegation upon the nationality clauses. A translation of these observations is printed, *ibid.* pp. 607-12.

⁷ The Austrian note, No. 707, dated July 12, 1919, and its enclosures are printed in *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye*, vol. i, pp. 366-418.

be obtained from Austria. If Mr. Balfour proposed a more equitable distribution of guarantees among the States of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he agreed; but he insisted that the total amount of Reparation due to the Allies should not, on that account, be diminished. For this reason, if Mr. Balfour proposed to lessen the reparation payable by Austria, he would maintain that a corresponding increase should be placed upon the obligations of the other States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the question of the Financial and Economic guarantees should be adjourned until the consideration by the Council of the final reply to the Austrian Note.)

(4) *Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria.*

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the modifications introduced into the Economic Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be communicated by the Economic Commission to the States concerned, who should report, in writing, through their Delegations, any observations that they had to offer to the Supreme Council by Monday, August 25th.)

(4) [*sic*] *Distribution of funds accumulated in social insurance schemes amongst States deriving territory from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.*

M. SERRUYS said that in order to ensure a satisfactory solution of the problem, it had been suggested by the Italian Delegation that the matter should be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations, if disagreement arose.

M. TRITONI said that, as the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for arbitration in such cases as these, he could [?not] see why special bodies should be called into existence for settling disputes of this nature. If they were called upon to adjudicate in questions arising out of insurance funds, other bodies would be called into existence for other problems, and, in referring the matter to the League of Nations, he considered that the Italian Delegation was doing no more than calling upon that organization to carry out some of its recognised functions.

(It was decided that the following point should be laid before the Drafting Committee for report:—

Since numerous points in the Peace Treaty had to be settled by Conventions between the States concerned, what procedure was to be followed, and what form of arbitration adopted, if one of the States opposed the decisions? Was the procedure laid down in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations adequate and sufficient?)

Austrian Insurance Companies. The question before the Council was the retention or rejection of Article 12 in Section 5 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been advised by his expert that the clause in question had first been proposed by the Belgian Delegation. After some discussion it had been so amended as to become almost inoperative. The British Delegation and the Five Principal Powers thought that it ought to be

suppressed. The Belgian Delegation, however, desired its retention, even in its present form.

(After some further discussion it was decided that Article 12 of Section 5 of the Peace Treaty with Austria dealing with the suppression of Insurance Contracts between an Austrian Insurance Company and its nationals, 'under conditions which shall protect its nationals from any prejudice', should be suppressed.)

At this point Mr. Serruys, Mr. Headlam-Morley, and the other experts left the room.

4. At this stage Capt. Roper entered the room.

*Sale of Aeronautic
War Material by
Germany* CAPTAIN ROPER reported on the answer to the request of the Supreme Council (see H. D. 25-14⁸) on the subject of the sale and alienation of aeronautical material by the German Government. (See Appendix E.) The Committee on Aerial Clauses had attempted, without arriving at a unanimous agreement, to find a legal argument, whereby the German Government could be forbidden to alienate its aeronautical material. It had, however, been discovered, that in the Brussels Convention the Germans had agreed not to sell their war material, whilst the aforesaid Convention remained in force. One member of the Committee had thought that the Brussels Convention terminated with the raising of the blockade, and that this had removed the obligations remaining on the German Government. The majority of the Committee, however, thought that the raising of the blockade, being an advantage to the German people, could not destroy the obligations which they had accepted, in order to obtain the advantages which accrued to them under the Brussels Convention. The legal point at issue was whether the Supreme Economic Council had been right in stating that the prohibition on the sale of aeronautical material would remain in force until the end of the armistice, that is to say, until the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty. Another question arose, which was whether the Supreme Economic Council was entitled to decide on such a point. The Supreme Council is the only judge of the matter. An obvious obligation is imposed by the Peace Treaty with Germany, since, if the German Government alienated its material before the ratification of the Treaty, they would not be able to make the deliveries called for under that document. This point had been unanimously admitted by the Committee on Aerial Clauses. This might be regarded as a form of moral obligation which the Germans had acknowledged, as far as war material was concerned, in their letter to General Nudant, dated August 6th, 1919. (See Appendix E.)

GENERAL WEYGAND said that General Yudenitch was at present asking for permission to purchase from Germany Russian war material previously captured by the former power. Czecho-Slovakia was making a similar request to be allowed to purchase war material from Bavaria. He thought that the two questions should be considered conjointly.

CAPTAIN ROPER suggested that the principle of Allied ownership of war

⁸ No. 29, minute 14. See also No. 32, minute 9.

material in the hands of Germany should first be upheld. Thereafter the Allies might grant special authorisations for the sale of such material.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with this proposal, and suggested that, in accordance with the above principle, sales to General Yudenitch and the Czecho-Slovaks might be authorised at once.

M. TITTONI said, that as General Yudenitch's request for financial and material assistance could not be granted, it was incumbent upon the Council to accede to his wishes in this respect.

MR. POLK suggested that the entire question might be referred to the proposed advance Delegations of the Commissions of Control, which were about to proceed into Germany.

ADMIRAL KNAPP said that he had been a member of the Committee on Aerial Clauses, but had entertained certain doubts as to the legal position. His opinion had been that the Brussels Convention had not been binding on Germany after the Convention had lapsed. Morally he had not felt any doubt in the matter. If the majority point of view were to prevail, Germany would be restrained from consummating any future sales to neutrals, and would therefore be obliged to turn over to the Allies any sums which she had realised in the past.

MR. BALFOUR said that as everybody was agreed as to the existence of a moral obligation upon the German Government, he thought it would be best to make a specific demand on Germany, leaving it to her to bring forward such legal objections as might be made. He wished that the draft telegram to be sent to the German Government should be placed before the Council on the following day.

(It was agreed that the Allied and Associated Powers should inform Germany that they maintain the principle that Germany should not alienate its war material, more particularly material of an aeronautical description. At the same time, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, by virtue of their rights of propriety over this material, should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licences in certain cases.)

It was further decided that, in execution of the above resolution, a special authorisation should be granted to Germany for the sale of material asked for by General Yudenitch, and by the Czecho-Slovak Government. A draft telegram on the above lines, to be sent to General Nudant, should be prepared by General Weygand and submitted for approval at the next meeting of the Council.)

5. The Council took note of the telegram from the French Minister at Belgrade (Annex [Appendix] F).

Roumanian intentions in the Banat

M. TITTONI said that he thought explanations should be asked for from Bucharest.

MR. BALFOUR said that whilst agreeing with M. Tittoni, he thought it essential that the Government at Bucharest should be informed that the frontiers laid down by the Supreme Council in the Banat and elsewhere, were final.

(It was decided that M. Pichon should send a telegram to the French Minister at Bucharest in the name of the Supreme Council, asking for

further information on the intentions of the Roumanian Government with regard to the Banat. He should also inform the Roumanian Government that the frontiers laid down by the Council in the Banat and elsewhere, were final.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover to make a statement with regard to the situation in Hungary.

Situation in Hungary MR. HOOVER said that he had little to add to his statement on the previous day. He did not think that it would require much pressure to dispossess the Archduke of the Throne that he had seized.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that a telegram which he had drafted (see Annex [Appendix] G) should be despatched.

(After some discussion it was agreed that the telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour should be published immediately,⁹ and sent to the Mission of Allied Generals at Budapest.)

MR. HOOVER then read a further telegram from Mr. Gregory at Budapest (see Annex [Appendix] H).

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the telegram in question made it all the more necessary to send off Mr. Balfour's despatch.

7. The Council took note of the letter from Marshal Foch on the subject of the use of the Port of Dantzic and the Kiel Canal (see Annex I¹⁰).

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the use of the Port of Dantzic was connected with the Polish question, which was now very acute. Although Marshal Foch was in agreement with the German proposals,¹¹ he did not think that the discussion could be continued at the present time.

The question was therefore adjourned.

8. The Committee took note of Marshal Foch's proposals with regard to the immediate despatch of certain members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control into Germany (see Annex [Appendix] J).

MR. POLK stated that he agreed with Marshal Foch's conclusions but that he was unable to send any American Delegates until the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. He agreed, however, that General Bliss should be kept informed of the action taken by the advanced Delegations.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch's proposals with regard to the immediate despatch into Germany of Delegations representing the Commissions of

⁹ This telegram was published with verbal variation in the British press on August 25, 1919.

¹⁰ Not printed. This letter, dated August 18, 1919, reported upon the progress of the negotiations with the German Government initiated through General Nudant in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of July 21, 1919 (see No. 16, minute 4, and note 11 below).

¹¹ On August 15, 1919, the German Government had telegraphed that: (i) it did not recognise an obligation on its part to authorize the passage through Danzig of material for the Polish army; a thesis with which Marshal Foch fully concurred; (ii) it was, however, prepared to enter into negotiations upon the matter; (iii) it seemed opportune to bring such negotiations within the framework of those already being conducted in Berlin between the German and Polish Governments.

Control, should be accepted; and that the representation of the United States on the aforesaid Delegations should be held in abeyance for the present.

General Weygand was instructed to draft a letter for communication to the German Government informing them of the above proposals.)

9.

[Not printed]

*Use by the British and
American Armies of roll-
ing-stock taken over by
[from] the Germans under
the Armistice*

10. (It was decided that the proposal of the Committee supervising the execution of the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany (see Appendix L¹²) should be adopted.)
*Proposal of the
Schleswig Commission
suggesting despatch of
one member to Flensburg*

The meeting then adjourned.

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 22, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 40

A. R. A., Received Aug. 22, 1919.

VIENNA. Aug. 21, 1919, 7.30 p.m.

13x go 100.

Hoover, Paris.

For action.

Following received over phone from Mährisch Ostrau:

'Insurrectionists retiring to Poland have taken with them several hundred hostages. Germans have numerous prisoners including a number of Polish soldiers in uniform. Am leaving for Poland and will attempt to secure immediately return of all hostages. In the meantime have arranged with commanding general for suspension of execution by Germans until tomorrow morning. Hope in meantime to negotiate some arrangement between Germans and Poles. If possible secure authority for me from Entente and Germany to act as arbitrator in present situation until arrival Upper Silesian Commission. Under martial law Germans will doubtless execute many prisoners including Polish soldiers unless arrangements can be made to turn them over to Polish military authorities for discipline. To avoid further clashes hope to arrange this. Goodyear.'

GREGORY. 9 p.m.

¹² Not printed. The proposal, made by the committee in a note dated August 20, 1919, was that one member of the International Commission for the Schleswig plebiscite, then assembled at Copenhagen, should be sent to Flensburg and that the German Government be informed and requested that this delegate of the Commission be authorized to establish contact with the German authorities throughout the plebiscite zone with a view to preparing for the operation of the International Commission.

Télégramme. BERLIN, le 21 août 1919 à 17 h. 25
reçu le 22 à 0 h. 30.

Les Allemands et les Polonais viennent de se mettre d'accord sur les points suivants:

- 1° les Allemands ne procéderont plus à aucune exécution,
- 2° une commission interalliée partira demain pour la Haute-Silésie,
- 3° la délégation polonaise¹³ partira pour Varsovie; elle y restera jusqu'à ce que la mission interalliée ait présenté son rapport,
- 4° demain à 10 heures aura lieu une séance de clôture; à l'issue de la séance la délégation polonaise quittera Berlin.

L'Assemblée Nationale a constitué le comité des affaires extérieures prévu par l'article 35 de la Constitution. Scheidemann en est le président, Haussmann le vice-président; les socialistes y sont représentés par Braun (Franconie), Hildenbrand, Stucklen [?Stückeln], et Welss, le centre par Hörschel, Pfeiffer, Tricorn [?Trimborn], les démocrates par Schiffer et von Richtofen, les nationaux allemands par Graefe et Traub, le parti populaire allemand par Heinze. La commission chargée de l'examen de la question des responsabilités s'est également constituée aujourd'hui sous la présidence du démocrate Petersen; le député Spahn du centre a été nommé vice-président. Les séances seront publiques.

HAGUENIN

APPENDIX C TO NO. 40

Télégramme adressé au Général Dupont

Se référant à votre télégramme N° . . . ¹⁴ nous comprenons que la Commission composée de vous-même, du Général Malcolm et du Général Bencivenga va se transporter en Haute-Silésie. La Conférence désire que vous accélériez votre voyage et que dès votre arrivée vous vous adjoigniez le Colonel Goodyear comme représentant américain de votre Commission.

Le Colonel Goodyear a été le représentant du Conseil Suprême Economique pour la distribution du charbon et il est maintenant en Haute-Silésie à Mährisch-Ostrau.

La délégation américaine a reçu ce matin du Colonel Goodyear le télégramme suivant qui indique ce qu'il fait actuellement ' . . . '¹⁴

Notre désir est que toutes les questions soient prises en mains par la Commission comme formant un tout.

En même temps, nous avisons le Colonel Goodyear de ces arrangements et nous lui donnons les instructions pour continuer ses efforts dans le sens indiqué par lui, jusqu'à notre [? votre] arrivée.

La Conférence envisage que tout ce qui est possible doit être fait par la Commission pour arriver au rétablissement de l'ordre et elle espère que l'influence personnelle des membres de la Commission s'y emploiera. La Commission devra tenir la Conférence au courant et notamment télégraphier dès son arrivée quelle est la situation exacte et le plan qu'elle propose.

Pour votre information nous vous avisons qu'actuellement en l'état de ses

¹³ See No. 17, minute 8.

¹⁴ Omission in original.

renseignements la Conférence considère que les seules solutions pour assurer la sécurité et pour assurer également la production du charbon, consiste [*sic*] dans l'occupation immédiate par les troupes alliées.

Cela ne peut être fait sans l'accord de l'Allemagne jusqu'à 15 jours après la ratification du Traité. D'autre part, l'Allemagne doit souffrir grandement du fait de la destruction et de l'arrêt de la production.

Une suggestion non officielle a été fait[e], par le canal de la Délégation allemande à Versailles, pour que le Gouvernement allemand demande l'occupation immédiate. Conformément au Traité cette occupation va en tous cas être inévitable dans quelques semaines. Veuillez nous donner votre avis sur les effectifs nécessaires à cette occupation dans les circonstances actuelles.

Nous vous informons d'ailleurs qu'une Commission spéciale et technique est envoyée par nous à Mährisch-Ostrau pour étudier les moyens d'augmenter la production du charbon et sa distribution non seulement en Haute-Silésie, mais aussi à Teschen, à Dombrowa et autres bassins miniers voisins. Cette Commission comprendra non seulement des délégués des quatre Puissances, mais encore un délégué tchéco-slovaque et un délégué polonais. Nous avons invité les Allemands à y coopérer par la désignation d'un membre. Cette Commission arrivera jeudi. L'Amérique y a désigné le Colonel Goodyear comme son représentant.

APPENDIX E TO No. 40

Document 1

Le Général Duval, Président de la Commission des Clauses Aériennes, à Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix

PARIS, le 17 août 1919.

J'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre l'exposé de l'opinion de la Commission des Clauses Aériennes, réunie le jeudi 14 août 1919, sur la demande du Conseil Suprême, pour étudier à nouveau le texte des trois résolutions prises par le Conseil du 6 août 1919, au sujet de la vente par le Gouvernement Allemand de Matériel Aéronautique.⁸

La Commission a tout d'abord admis à l'unanimité:

A. Que doit être considéré comme matériel de guerre:

- 1° Tout le matériel construit avant la signature de l'armistice:
- 2° Tout le matériel qui se trouvait en cours de construction, lors de cette signature:
- 3° Tout le matériel qui a été construit depuis cette date, d'après les plans utilisés avant l'armistice.

B. Que pourraient être considérés comme aéronefs civils des aéronefs construits postérieurement à l'armistice et sur des plans entièrement nouveaux, mais qu'il est à peu près certain qu'il n'existe actuellement en Allemagne aucun appareil répondant à cette condition et pouvant être à juste titre appelé 'aéronef civil'.

C. Qu'il n'existe actuellement aucune différence véritable entre les aéronefs dits civils et les aéronefs militaires et qu'il faut considérer comme aéronefs militaires tous les aéronefs récemment transformés en aéronefs dits civils.

D. Qu'à plus forte raison doivent être considérés comme 'matériel de guerre' les 500 moteurs visés dans la 3^e résolution du Conseil Suprême du 6 août, puisque

ces 500 moteurs ont été capturés par l'Allemagne sur des appareils appartenant aux Puissances Alliées ou Associées.

La Commission a ensuite recherché, dans les textes officiels existants, les bases d'une argumentation tendant à interdire à l'Allemagne l'exportation de son matériel aéronautique :

- 1° Dans le texte de la Convention d'Armistice, il n'existe aucune disposition utilisable. Seule était prévue la rendition d'une certaine quantité de matériel, le surplus n'était pas visé.
- 2° Dans le Traité de Paix, il n'existe aucune disposition applicable, à la période antérieure à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, c'est-à-dire à la ratification.
- 3° Dans la Convention de Bruxelles seulement apparaît l'interdiction formelle d'exporter certain matériel désigné sous forme de liste, dans un télégramme en date du 25 mars 1919, adressé par le Conseil Suprême au Gouvernement Allemand par l'intermédiaire de la Commission Interalliée d'Armistice.

Mais la Convention de Bruxelles a cessé d'être en vigueur le 12 juillet 1919 — date de la levée du blocus.

Quel est alors le régime à appliquer entre cette date du 12 juillet 1919 et la date à laquelle le Traité de Paix sera applicable?

Le télégramme susvisé du Conseil Suprême Economique spécifie que l'exportation des articles mentionnés 'matériel de guerre etc. . . ' sera interdite pendant toute la durée de l'armistice et ceci conduirait jusqu'à la date de la ratification du Traité de Paix. La majorité des membres de la Commission des Clauses Aériennes pense, en outre, que la levée du blocus ne saurait relever les Allemands de l'engagement pris par eux à Bruxelles de renoncer à toute exportation du matériel désigné, engagement qui leur valait un desserrement du Blocus et un ravitaillement immédiat. La levée du blocus étant une amélioration à leur sort et une faveur plus grande ne peut délier l'Allemagne de ses obligations antérieurement acceptées.

Néanmoins, certains membres de la Commission des Clauses Aériennes ont mis en doute la compétence du Conseil Suprême Economique lorsqu'il a déclaré, dans son télégramme, que la prohibition d'exportation durerait jusqu'à la fin de l'Armistice, c'est-à-dire au delà de la durée de la Convention de Bruxelles en vertu de laquelle était dressée la liste prohibitive.

Le Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix peut seul juger de la valeur de cette décision du Conseil Suprême Economique, décision contre laquelle le Gouvernement Allemand n'a élevé aucune protestation.

Aucun *argument légal* n'a donc pu être retenu à l'unanimité par la Commission des Clauses Aériennes, mais il y a un *argument moral* en faveur de la prohibition d'exportation du matériel aéronautique allemand et la Commission des Clauses Aériennes pense à l'unanimité que :

- 1° Le matériel aéronautique fait partie du matériel de guerre.
- 2° Le matériel de guerre devant être livré aux termes du Traité de Paix par l'Allemagne aux Etats Alliés et Associés ne doit pas être exporté avant la ratification du dit Traité de Paix.
- 3° D'où il résulte que le matériel aéronautique — même les avions dits civils — ne doit pas être exporté.

D'ailleurs cette *obligation morale* a été reconnue par écrit, par le Gouvernement Allemand lui-même dans la lettre en date du 6 août 1919, adressée par le Président

de la Commission Allemande d'Armistice au Président de la Commission Interalliée d'Armistice, le Général Nudant.

Copie de cette lettre ci-jointe.

Document 2

Translation.

AAI II. 7207] *Le Président de la Commission allemande d'armistice au Président de la Commission Interalliée d'Armistice*

Objet: Vente d'avions. A la Note du 20 juillet N° 1441/G.

La réponse aux notes du Général Nudant, au sujet de l'exportation d'avions n'a pas été faite parce que la liste d'interdiction pour l'exportation de marchandises déterminées reposant sur le Gouvernement [? régime] de Bruxelles a perdu entre temps sa raison d'être par suite de la levée du blocus. Cette liste d'interdiction avait eu comme résultat pour le Gouvernement allemand la situation suivante:

Dans la liste d'interdiction les avions ne sont pas nominativement mentionnés. Cependant les avions tombaient sous l'acceptation matériel de guerre pour autant qu'il s'agissait parmi ceux-ci d'appareils militaires qui étaient destinés à être employés à des buts militaires par l'étranger. Par suite, il y avait une distinction à faire entre les avions militaires dont l'exportation était interdite et les avions pour des buts civils qui n'étaient pas soumis à des interdictions d'exportations. Le Gouvernement allemand a sévi contre l'exportation d'avions militaires ou de pièces de ces appareils aussitôt qu'il a eu connaissance de cas de ce genre. Actuellement, en ce qui concerne l'exportation d'avions du côté allemand, on agit d'après les dispositions établies dans le Traité de Paix.

En ce qui concerne la plainte élevée par le Maréchal Foch dans son télégramme du 14 juin N° 2930 au sujet de l'exportation d'anciens appareils militaires en pays scandinaves une enquête n'a pu être faite par suite du manque de renseignements détaillés.

Düsseldorf, le 6 août 1919

Signé: WILMS

Transmis à M. le Maréchal Commandant
en Chef les Armées Alliées,
4 bis, Bd. des Invalides, Paris.

Le Général Nudant,
Président de la C.I.A.P.
Signé . . .

APPENDIX F TO NO. 40

BELGRADE, le 20 août 1919.

Copie Tél.

Le Président du Conseil vient de me faire part des nouvelles inquiétantes que le Gouvernement S.H.S. reçoit de Bucarest.

M. Bratiano continue sa propagande; il réclame le Banat jusqu'à la Tisza; M. Marghiloman¹⁵ le soutient et déclare qu'on le prendra par l'armée s'il le faut, que, d'ailleurs, les Grandes Puissances ne peuvent rien pour s'y opposer. Tous deux refusent de reconnaître la délimitation qui a été faite dans le Banat. Certains diplomates à Bucarest sont anxieux et admettent que la Roumanie est à la veille de commettre un acte de folie.

¹⁵ Roumanian conservative statesman and former prime minister.

En Transylvanie, il y a déjà (?) divisions roumaines d'infanterie et deux de cavalerie; on croit qu'elles vont recevoir l'ordre d'envahir le Banat serbe.

Les Serbes sont décidés à se défendre quelque grande que soit leur fatigue. Rétablira-t-on l'effet du décret de démobilisation de 3 classes territoriales signé hier par le Prince Régent?

L'Etat-Major serbe pense qu'il devra envoyer des renforts dans le Banat.

Le Gouvernement S.H.S. s'adresse à la Conférence et lui demande instamment de prendre une décision qui mette fin aux machinations de M. Bratiano et de déclarer formellement que la répartition du Banat et sa délimitation doivent être considérées comme définitives. C'est ce que je disais déjà dans mes télégrammes Nos 341 et 342, et ma dépêche 428. La Conférence a assumé une véritable responsabilité vis-à-vis des Serbes en les obligeant à évacuer dans le Banat des points stratégiques qu'ils ont dû remettre aux Roumains et des territoires dont la population magyare et schwabe voulait, en cas de conflit, marcher aux côtés des Serbes contre les Roumains.

Le Gouvernement S.H.S. a reçu des Tchèques un avertissement pressant de se tenir sur ses gardes. De Budapest viennent les renseignements les plus alarmants sur les intentions agressives des Roumains. Sur la nouvelle frontière dans le Banat règne une grande nervosité provoquée par les menaces des Roumains.

Ce soir, le Conseil des Ministres a envisagé l'éventualité d'une nouvelle mobilisation générale, alors qu'hier il avait fait signer un premier décret de démobilisation.

Il est d'extrême urgence de prononcer des paroles décisives.

FONTENAY

APPENDIX G TO No. 40

Télégramme adressé par le Conseil Suprême à la Mission Interalliée de Généraux à Budapest

The Allied and Associated Powers have been further considering the information derived from your reports and from other sources as to recent events in Budapest: their conclusions are as follows:

They are most anxious to conclude a durable peace with the Hungarian people, but they feel that this cannot be done while the present Hungarian Government is in power. That Government has been brought into existence not by the will of the people but by a *coup d'état* carried out by a small body of police under the protection of a foreign army. It has at its head a member of the House of Hapsburg, whose policy and ambition were largely responsible for the calamities under which the world is suffering, and will long suffer. A peace negotiated by such a Government is not likely to be lasting, nor can the Allied and Associated Governments give it the economic support which Hungary so sorely needs.

If it be replied that the Archduke Joseph is prepared, before approaching the Allied and Associated Governments, to submit his claims to the test of popular election, we must reply that this procedure cannot be satisfactory if the election is carried out under the auspices of an administration which the Archduke himself controls. The difficulties in the way of obtaining, by election, a faithful reflexion of the popular will, are, in the present unhappy state of Hungary, of the most serious kind. They would be overwhelming if the election were carried out under Hapsburg influences. Even if the Assembly elected under such circumstances

were really representative, no one would think so. In the interests, therefore, of European Peace the Allied and Associated Governments must insist that the present claimant to the headship of the Hungarian State should resign, and that a Government in which all parties are represented should appeal to the Hungarian people. The Allied and Associated Powers would be prepared to negotiate with any Government which possessed the confidence of an Assembly so elected. You should have this message published locally.

22.8.19.

APPENDIX H TO No. 40

A.R.A., Received Aug. 22, 1919.

VIENNA. August 22, 1919.

7x u 224 Rush.

Hoover, Paris.

For action.

Ham No. 1192. At Conference yesterday afternoon, participated in by different parties in Hungary, it was determined to ask the Entente for a statement as to whether the Archduke was *person[a] grata* or not. In view of the repeated declarations which have been made directly and indirectly to the four generals and to other persons on this subject it would appear either that there is a studied attempt on the part of the Archduke and his man Friday, Friederich, to cause delays during which time the Roumanians continue to heavily propagandize the situation, or second, that the four generals to whom these instructions have been given have not with sufficient force conveyed and interpreted them to the members of the Government. In the meantime Roumanians are working very strongly with certain members of the Government who say that unless Entente gives clear answer to their question that it will [?be] best for them to throw their lot with the Roumanians. Naturally this talk is being made by the Archduke and Friederich, his prime minister, in view of the situation. Can you not arrange to have a direct and final answer given to these people upon this subject which will settle this business once and for all? Can you not do this today?

GREGORY. 1.23 p.m.

APPENDIX J TO No. 40

G.Q.G.A., le 17 août 1919.

Etat-Major Général. No 3940.

Le Maréchal Foch, Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées, à Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Président de la Conférence de la Paix, (Secrétariat de la Conférence)

Par lettre du 11 août, la Délégation Allemande de Versailles a demandé que, pour préparer, d'accord avec le Gouvernement Allemand, l'exécution de la partie V du Traité de Paix concernant l'armée, la marine et l'aéronautique, les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés envoient à Berlin, le plus tôt possible, une Commission qualifiée.

Les raisons indiquées par l'Allemagne: nécessité de prendre le plus tôt possible une série de mesures des plus importantes, financières, législatives, et administratives; intérêt d'éviter, dès le début, toute divergence de vues et de se garantir ainsi contre toute modification ultérieure aux mesures prises, ont une valeur indiscutable.

Du point de vue des Puissances Alliées et Associées, le Maréchal Foch a fait ressortir à plusieurs reprises combien il est utile que nos Commissions de Contrôle entrent en action dès la mise en vigueur du Traité, suivant un plan bien arrêté et avec les moyens nécessaires. La proposition du Gouvernement allemand est de nature à faciliter et accélérer grandement le travail de ces Commissions. Elle semble donc devoir être retenue.

D'autre part, étant donné que les Commissions de Contrôle, qui, aux termes du Traité, représentent auprès du Gouvernement allemand les Gouvernements des Puissances Alliées et Associées, seront chargées de veiller à l'exécution des clauses de la partie V du Traité, il y aurait les plus sérieux inconvénients à faire traiter les questions dont il s'agit par une nouvelle Commission qui viendrait se juxtaposer et même se superposer à elles. Il est demandé, en conséquence, que la Commission qui sera envoyée à Berlin soit une sorte d'avant-garde des Commissions de Contrôle, et soit composée d'un nombre réduit de membres de chaque Puissance pris dans chacune des Commissions militaire, navale et aérienne. Ces membres seront choisis parmi les plus élevés en grade, étant donné la valeur des décisions qu'ils auront à prendre, ou, dans les cas importants, à soumettre au Conseil Suprême des Gouvernements.

Enfin, la note de la Délégation allemande parle de *négociations*, de mesures à arrêter, *d'accord* entre les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés et le Gouvernement Allemand. Il semble nécessaire d'établir que, si la Commission Alliée envoyée à Berlin doit prendre en sérieuse considération et examiner avec tout le soin voulu les observations et propositions du Gouvernement Allemand pour arriver à une exécution pratique des clauses du Traité, il ne peut être question de *négociations* proprement dites. Elle a seulement à régler les modalités d'exécution d'un Traité, qui n'est susceptible d'aucune modification.

On a, en conséquence, l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil Suprême des Gouvernements la résolution suivante :

'Dans le but de préparer avec le Gouvernement Allemand l'exécution des clauses militaires, navales, aériennes du Traité, chaque Commission de Contrôle enverra, le plus tôt possible, à Berlin, une Délégation réduite composée du Président et des Membres les plus importants de cette Commission, de telle sorte que chaque Puissance, participant au Contrôle, y soit représentée.

'Ces Délégations ont pour mission de fixer, d'accord avec le Gouvernement allemand, les modalités d'exécution des clauses de la partie V du Traité de Paix, signé le 28 juin à Versailles, qui ne sont susceptibles d'aucune modification de principe. En cas de divergence persistante de vues avec le Gouvernement Allemand, comme en cas de décision particulièrement importante, ces Délégations devront se référer au Conseil Suprême des Gouvernements, par l'intermédiaire du Maréchal Foch.

'Le Maréchal Foch est chargé d'arrêter la composition de ces Délégations et la date de leur départ, et de les faire connaître au Gouvernement Allemand.'

P. O. le Major-Général :

WEYGAND

H. D. 37.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, August 23, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir Geo. Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Col. U. S. Grant. *British Empire*: Lt.-Commander Bell. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

1. Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson, Mr. J. F. Dulles, and General Sackville-West, together with M. Loucheur and General Weygand were present.

Roumanian Requisitions in Hungary

The Council took note of a draft telegram (see Appendix A), which it was proposed to send to the Roumanian Government at Bucarest in the name of the Council.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the telegram in question had been drafted by the Organisation Committee of the Reparations Commission.

(It was decided that the telegram for communication to the Roumanian Government at Bucarest, on the subject of the requisition of war material by the Roumanian Army in Hungary, should be accepted and despatched.)

MR. POLK informed the Council, that, when the Roumanians first showed an inclination to collect in Hungary whatever they thought due to them for reparation, he had asked the Government at Washington to stop the delivery of contracts undertaken between the United States and Roumania. The Roumanians had expressed indignation at this measure, but he thought it necessary to cut off all supplies to that country. He asked whether it had any other source of supply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not know of any.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Council had previously decided to supply war material to Roumania, some of which had not yet been delivered.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the supplies not yet sent ought to be stopped.

MR. BALFOUR said that similar measures could be taken from London.

GENERAL WEYGAND asked whether supplies for which payment had been made should also be stopped.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they should.

M. TITTONI said that the Council of Four had decided on a previous occasion to reduce the armaments of new states. This decision had never been put into effect. The Military Representatives at Versailles ought to have suggested concrete proposals, but had not done so.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that a preliminary report had been given and a request made for further information on certain points: when this had been received a final report could be sent.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he had been the Chairman of the Committee dealing with the question. He and his colleagues had wished to know what material had been sent to the small States, but the Military Representatives at Versailles wanted to know the total armament under the control of each separate State. This was information that could not be obtained, since the countries concerned would not supply the necessary data. The amount of material delivered by Great Britain, Italy, and other Powers, had been communicated to Versailles, who could now make a report.

M. TITTONI, insisting on his previous point, stated that, despite the wish of the Council that armaments should be limited, so as to avoid future wars, no real effort was being made to impose this decision on the small States. It would appear that every nation was making further warlike preparations, which fact made the early solution of the question important.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when the question had been discussed, he had made considerable reservations. He had not seen how such restrictions could be imposed upon victorious States by their own Allies.

M. TITTONI remarked that some of the victorious countries appeared to be making ready for war.

(It was decided that all delivery of war material to Roumania by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should be stopped immediately, and that the prohibition should remain in force until further orders. The aforesaid prohibition was to extend to war material to be delivered under contract, and to war materials for which payment had been made.)

2. The Council took note of a telegram from Colonel Goodyear on the subject of the situation in Silesia. (See Appendix B.)

*Situation in
Silesia*

M. LOUCHEUR said that he and Mr. Hoover were going to meet the German Representatives at Versailles, who hoped that a reply from the German Government would be to hand during the course of the afternoon.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be unwise to send the telegram drafted by the Organising Committee of the Reparations Commission until we knew whether the German Government would consent to the despatch of troops to Silesia, before the date specified in the Peace Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the German Government's consent was only necessary for the despatch of troops, and not for the Coal Committee.

(M. Loucheur and Mr. J. F. Dulles then withdrew.)

3. MR. BALFOUR said that he desired to make an appeal to his colleagues of the Council. Under the provisions of the Peace Treaty,

*German Prisoners
of War in Allied
Countries*

German Prisoners ought to be returned to their own country on ratification. If the Parliaments of Italy, France and of other Allied countries had been able to ratify the Treaty, the prisoners would have been returned by now. He did not wish his colleagues

to think that this remark implied any criticism whatsoever upon the parliamentary procedure in Allied countries. He did, however, draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the result of the delay was extremely burdensome. He had been informed by Field-Marshal Wilson that there were 220,000 prisoners in English hands, and that the cost of keeping them was £90,000 a day, that is, £1,000,000 in 11 days. There was no military advantage to be gained from the retention of these prisoners. On the contrary, they detained British troops which were needed elsewhere. He hoped, therefore, that the Council might give a 'bienveillant' consideration to the point that he laid before them.

MR. POLK said that the same question arose for the United States. The Americans had 40,000 prisoners guarded by 10,000 men. The demobilization of the specially raised American Armies was proceeding, and by the 30th September, the dissolution of the American War Forces should be complete. He had asked his legal advisers whether the prisoners in question might be transferred to another Power, and the answer had been, that, under the provisions of existing Treaties, such a transfer would not be legal. General Pershing had stated that the question was urgent. The total cost of paying the troops guarding the prisoners and of maintaining the prisoners themselves came to about 2,000,000 dollars a month.

FIELD-MARSHAL WILSON then said that the total number of troops necessary for the custody of German prisoners was 60,000.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he approached the question from a different standpoint, in that he had 350,000 German prisoners employed in useful work on the devastated regions. He would therefore have preferred that the German prisoners should be transferred to him, so long as they remained under the control of the Government of the captor. He knew nothing of the legal aspect of the question of transfer, but wondered whether some form of contract could not be drawn up. Speaking frankly, he intended to return the German prisoners as late as he possibly could, but he had no intention of doing anything contrary to the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Whilst seeing the force of the British point of view, it did not seem to him possible to return the prisoners before the date stipulated under the Treaty. If, however, it were possible to do so, he wanted to retain the German prisoners in France to the last moment. The French Government had opened a discussion with the Austrian and Polish Governments with a view to obtaining labour for the devastated regions, and he had reasons for hoping that negotiations would be successful. The German prisoners did not work well, and they were under custody of young soldiers of 19 and 20 years of age, who could not exercise much control over them. On the other hand, he would rather have German prisoners than nobody. He asked on what date the Peace Treaty would be ratified in Allied countries.

MR. BALFOUR replied that he thought Great Britain would ratify on the 10th September.

M. CLEMENCEAU said France would ratify about the 15th September.

M. TITTONI gave the same date.

MR. POLK said that America might ratify later, possibly on about the 1st October.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that it was not necessary for the other Allied Powers to wait for America. The ratification by the British Colonies would be early in September. The Treaty would come fully into force when Great Britain, France and Italy had ratified it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in accordance with the dates just given, the Treaty would come into force in three weeks' time. He suggested that Field-Marshal Wilson should consult with General Weygand. It would, of course, be understood that Great Britain should retain all her rights over the prisoners taken by her Armies. He suggested that some kind of transfer might be found possible.

MR. BALFOUR asked what were the provisions of military law on the point in question.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he did not know: he only wanted the two Generals to confer and report.

FIELD-MARSHAL WILSON said that the question seemed rather to be one for lawyers.

MR. POLK asked that General Pershing should also discuss the matter with Field-Marshal Wilson and General Weygand.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the Generals should bear in mind that prisoners could not be sent back at once. Such a measure would put France in a most difficult position, since it was evident that she had been devastated, and required work, whilst Great Britain and America had no such special needs.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that a precedent for the transfer of prisoners of war existed in the case of Belgium, which country had allocated seven or eight thousand men to France.

M. TITTONI added that after Serbia had been invaded, and the Austrian prisoners taken by that country delivered to Italy, Italy had made a loan of them to France.

(It was decided that Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Pershing and General Weygand should examine conjointly by what means German prisoners in American and British hands, and at present in France, could be transferred to the French Government. The rights of the British and American Governments over the aforesaid prisoners should remain without alteration. A report on the above question should be submitted to the Council.)

4. MR. BALFOUR said that Allied troops had been promised for plebiscite areas in Dantzic, Memel, Upper Silesia, Schleswig, and Klagenfurt. He did not wish in any way to raise the question of the number of troops that each of the Allies was to supply. He wished to take the opportunity of repeating that Great Britain would carry out all engagements that she had entered into. He was only going to raise the question of how the troops should be distributed. He

*Inter-Allied Troops
for Plebiscite Areas
in Eastern Europe*

had been told that mixed forces raised difficulties of command and supply. The great harmony which existed between the Allied troops did not overcome the difficulties to which he had drawn attention. Troops were accustomed to be commanded by their own officers. They did not like passing under the orders of foreign Generals. They were, moreover, accustomed to have their own food, and be treated in their own hospitals. In a mixed division, every kind of supply had to come from four separate sources. He would therefore like to see each body of troops, in a given locality, homogeneous. It was not quite possible, for the numbers of troops necessary for different localities varied. He wished, therefore, that the military experts could advise the Council how far some such measure could be put into effect.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he regarded Mr. Balfour's argument as conclusive. There was, however, another, political, side to the question. He did not desire that any military occupation of Poland should take place without the French being represented. The relations between France and Poland were intimate, and he thought it most important that the French Army should go to that country. He considered Mr. Balfour's remarks so forcible, however, that he thought his proposals might be considered at once with regard to Silesia.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that, on the previous day, the Council had taken a decision for the despatch of two divisions. He had already been in consultation with General Pershing and Field-Marshal Wilson on the subject. The discussion had been based on the understanding that each country should supply one-quarter of the total force.

M. TITTONI suggested that each contingent might be placed under its own command.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the French troops in Asia had been placed under the orders of a British General without the slightest discord arising. He thought, therefore, that General Weygand should continue to examine the question.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that France should not only be represented in any military occupation of Poland, but that she should be largely represented.

GENERAL WEYGAND, remarking on Mr. Balfour's last statement, said that the decision communicated to him had been that each Allied contingent should be equal.

M. TITTONI said that he had only agreed to equal contributions for one division. He made a reservation on the same principle being applied to the composition of two divisions.

MR. POLK asked if he was right in understanding that the Committee of General Officers would report back their recommendations to the Council for final action.

(It was decided that Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Pershing, General Weygand and General Cavallero should recommend a distribution among the Allies of the contingents to be furnished for the various plebis-

cite zones, such as to make each contingent a homogeneous national unit as far as consistent with the political necessity of having all the Allies represented in each region.)

5. GENERAL WEYGAND read the draft of a telegram to be transmitted to the German Government on the sale of aeronautical war material (see Appendix C and H. D. 36,¹ Minute 4).

*Sale of Aeronautical
War Material by
Germany*

MR. POLK said that he was ready to accept the draft telegram, subject to his military advisers raising no objection.

If any points were raised, he would let General Weygand know in the afternoon so that the transmission should not be delayed.

(It was decided that the draft telegram for transmission to the German Government on the subject of the sale of aeronautical war material should be accepted; subject to notification by Mr. Polk that he had no objection.)

(At this point General Weygand and General Sackville-West left the room.)

6. The Council took note of the report of the Blockade Committee on the subject of the measures to be taken in order to prevent trade with Bolshevik Russia (see Appendix D).

Blockade of Russia

MR. POLK said that certain points raised by his experts made it necessary for him to withhold his assent from the note for the present. In order to save time, however, he suggested that the note should be referred back to the Blockade Committee, and he would see that the American representative would lay before his colleagues such objections as might be raised, from an American point of view.

(It was decided that the draft note of the Blockade Committee should be referred back to that body for a further consideration of the American standpoint.)

7. The Council took note of a draft declaration prepared by the British Delegation on the subject of the blockade of Hungary.

*Modification of declaration
to be signed by
Austria undertaking to
maintain the cessation
of commercial relations
with Hungary*

(It was decided that the special declaration for signature by the Austrian Delegation (see Appendix E²) should be accepted.)

¹ No. 40.

² Not printed. This appendix contained a note from the British Delegation, dated August 22, 1919, referring to the draft declaration on this subject which had been considered by the Supreme Council on July 28, 1919 (see No. 20, minute 5), and observing that 'now that Bela Kun's Government has fallen it would seem desirable to modify the terms of this Declaration. The following form is suggested: "*Special Declaration.* The Austrian Government will continue, in the absence of a request to the contrary by the Governments of . . .". The remainder of the proposed Special Declaration was identical with the first paragraph of that which was annexed in the final text to the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 11. Cmd. 400).

8. (At this point, M. Haas,³ Mr. Tyman [? Tirman], Mr. Headlam-Morley and M. Adaci entered the room.)

*Clauses dealing with
Ports, Waterways and
Railways in the Peace
Treaty with Austria*

M. HAAS reported and commented upon Appendix F.⁴ He stated that the immediate application of the reciprocity clauses, as requested by Austria, had been refused in the case of the Germans, on the ground that it was not wished that the latter should profit by the devastations committed by its Armies. The Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways thought another reason existed for postponing the application of these articles. The reason was that the economic position of the New States previously under the government of Vienna should be supported in the years immediately following the war. The Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways also considered, that it could not alter clauses involving material changes in the principles of the Peace Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council was surely of the opinion that some kind of economic unity between the States of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire should be encouraged. If this could not be effected, the States in question would be powerless and would become subject to German economic penetration on a more extended scale than had existed before the war. Each State formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could be given a fair power of bargaining. If the Peace Treaty were presented in its present form, the Austrian Republic would not be in a position to bargain with its neighbours. We had a right to impose this disadvantage upon her, but it was not in our interest. But he certainly considered that it *was* to the advantage of the Allied Powers that Austria should not be in a position to bargain with them. He would like to know the views of his colleagues on the subject.

M. TITTONI said that the Council might well consider whether immediate reciprocity could not be extended to Austria and the New States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He thought that the second argument brought forward by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as to the necessity of stabilizing the economic conditions of the States of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was a weak one. He did not see how the previous system of centralised government could affect transport problems in the New States. He added, that the transport system, which had previously been centralised at Vienna and Budapest, had worked very well.

MR. POLK said he thought that they might be placing a severe handicap on the Austrian Republic by postponing the application of the reciprocity

³ Assistant Secretary-General of the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

⁴ Not printed. This appendix contained a report dated August 13, 1919, from the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways with regard to the observations of the Austrian Delegation concerning part XII of the draft conditions of peace. This report, together with annexes I (draft reply to the Austrian observations) and II (amendments to relevant articles of draft conditions of peace), is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xi, pp. 136-48. The Austrian observations in question are printed ibid., pp. 149-74.

clauses. The Czecho-Slovak State would find it to their interest to have the restrictions placed on Austria removed. Bohemia had been so connected with Austria in the past that an interference in the commercial exchange between the two States would obviously be a disadvantage to Czecho-Slovakia.

M. HAAS said that the Committee on Ports and Waterways had made no specific proposal, but had drawn the attention of the Council to the problem. Its opinion coincided with that of Mr. Balfour. If the Council thought that the States concerned were to be regarded as possessing equal rights, reciprocity should be applied immediately. If they were not in that position, it should be withheld for a time.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was in favour of granting immediate reciprocity between Austria and the New States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

M. TITTONI said that he would only agree on the understanding that the reciprocity under discussion should exist between Austria and the New States formed by the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He further insisted that the reciprocity should apply only to the clauses dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways.

(It was agreed that the articles dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways (Part XII) of the Peace Treaty with Austria, should be amended so as to allow of the immediate application of the reciprocity clauses between Austria and the States formed from the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by virtue of acquisitions of part of her territory.)

9. (It was decided that the alterations proposed in the Articles of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria dealing with Ports, Railways and Waterways, should be accepted.) (See Appendix G.⁵)
- Clauses on Ports, Waterways and Railways in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria* (At this point, M. Haas, Mr. Tyman [?Tirman], Mr. Headlam-Morley and M. Adaci left the room.)

10. MR. POLK asked that the consideration of the proposed draft (see Appendix H), should be postponed to the next meeting.
- Reply by the Communication Section of the Supreme Economic Council to the Roumanian Note relative to regulation of traffic on the Danube* (This was agreed to.)

II.

Draft Treaties [Treaty] between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia,

⁵ Not printed. This appendix contained a report dated August [20], 1919, from the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways enclosing certain draft alterations to the articles in question (draft articles 8, 9, 9a, 16, 19, 35). This report and the proposed alterations are printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xi, pp. 175-6 and 131-3.

on the subject of the cost of liberation of the territories in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Appendix I⁶)

12.

Agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the contribution payable by Italy for the liberation of territories belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. (See Appendix J⁷)

(It was agreed that the consideration of the above draft agreements should be postponed.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 23, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO NO. 41

Télégramme du Président de la Conférence de la Paix. Au Gouvernement Roumain à Bucarest

La Conférence de la Paix a reçu des indications dont il semble malheureusement impossible de contester la véracité, indiquant que les forces roumaines en Hongrie continuent systématiquement à saisir et à enlever les biens hongrois.

Étant donnée la correspondance échangée récemment entre la Conférence de la Paix et le Gouvernement roumain, il est difficile de comprendre une telle action de la part du Gouvernement roumain, sauf dans l'hypothèse que le Gouvernement roumain ignore les principes acceptés de la réparation.

Le Gouvernement roumain, en raison de sa participation dans les travaux de la Conférence de la Paix et comme un des signataires du Traité de Paix avec l'Allemagne, ne devrait cependant pas ignorer le soin qu'ont apporté les Puissances Alliées et Associées à établir un plan rationnel de réparation. Si le principe que le dédommagement pour les pertes subies avait dû dépendre seulement de facteurs tels que la proximité des biens ennemis ou du résultat d'une concurrence entre les États alliés pour se rendre maîtres de ces biens, des injustices flagrantes et des désaccords sérieux en auraient été le résultat inévitable. Aussi, le Traité avec l'Allemagne, dont la Roumanie est une partie contractante, a consacré certains principes fondamentaux de réparations, principalement les suivants :

- 1°) Tous les États ennemis sont solidaires et, dans ce but, leurs actifs sont mis en commun dans l'intérêt de toutes les Puissances.
- 2°) Il est établi un système de comptabilité tel que tous les États intéressés participent au fond commun proportionnellement au montant de leurs

⁶ Not printed. The draft articles of this treaty were, apart from minor drafting variation, the same as those of the final text signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919. (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 14. Cmd. 458.)

⁷ Not printed. The draft articles of this treaty were, apart from minor drafting variation, the same as those of the final text signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919. (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 15. Cmd. 459.)

réclamations approuvées, desquelles il est déduit le montant des compensations approuvées.

- 3°) Une Commission centrale de réparation qui fonctionnera comme le représentant exclusif des Puissances Alliées et Associées, sera chargée de procéder au récolement et à la distribution à titre de réparation des actifs ennemis.

L'action des forces roumaines, à laquelle il a été fait allusion plus haut, ne peut être considérée que comme un manquement à ce principe de solidarité, en ce sens qu'elle implique l'appropriation, par la Roumanie, et cela pour son usage personnel, de biens ennemis qui constituent en réalité le gage commun de tous les alliés. Les actes ci-dessus visés contreviennent également au principe agréé, que la Commission des réparations doit agir comme le représentant exclusif des Puissances Alliées et Associées, dans le récolement à titre de réparation des biens ennemis.

A cet égard, l'attitude de la Roumanie n'est pas compatible avec celle d'un État qui a le désir et l'espoir de profiter des clauses de réparation des Traités de paix, conclus ou à conclure.

Bien plus, le Gouvernement de la Roumanie ne peut pas ignorer le fait que M. Antonesco, son plénipotentiaire à la Conférence de la Paix, accepta, à la date du 27 juin, et sous réserve de l'approbation de son Gouvernement, le principe d'une contribution de la Roumanie dans les dépenses de libération des peuples et des territoires ennemis qu'elle acquerrait, cette contribution étant compensée en balançant le montant avec les premières réclamations de la Roumanie pour réparation.

Le Gouvernement roumain ne peut pas ignorer, non plus, qu'il a été stipulé à ce moment qu'aucun nouveau paiement, au titre des réparations, ne pourra être fait tant que les autres États, à qui il est dû réparation, n'auront pas reçu leur part proportionnelle.

C'est en se basant sur cet accord que les autres Puissances Alliées et Associées ont consenti à ne pas se prévaloir de leurs droits d'imposer une échelle d'indemnité basée sur les ressources considérables que la Roumanie doit acquérir de l'ennemi.

Les récents actes de la Roumanie, sauf rétractation de sa part, ne peuvent être considérés que comme le renoncement, par ce gouvernement, à l'accord du 27 juin; ce renoncement redonnerait aux Puissances Alliées et Associées leur entière liberté d'action, en ce qui concerne l'imposition d'une hypothèque pour réparation sur tous les territoires de l'ancienne Monarchie austro-hongroise que le Gouvernement de la Roumanie peut espérer recevoir.

Les autres conséquences possibles de la ligne de conduite que la Roumanie paraît avoir adoptée, sont si sérieuses et seraient un tel danger à la restauration équitable de l'Europe, que les Puissances Alliées et Associées se sentiraient contraintes, si la nécessité les y pousse, à adopter une ligne de conduite beaucoup plus ferme, afin d'éviter ces conséquences. Il est bien évident que, si le principe des réparations devait dégénérer dans une appropriation individuelle et une concurrence entre les différentes Puissances intéressées, il en résulterait certainement des injustices, il se créerait des appétits, et, dans la confusion produite par ces actions désordonnées, ou bien l'ennemi 'se déroberait', ou il serait impossible d'exiger de lui le maximum de réparations. Néanmoins, les Puissances Alliées et Associées ne peuvent pas croire que le Gouvernement roumain voudrait créer un tel danger et les obliger à faire disparaître ce danger. En conséquence, la Conférence de la

Paix attend que le Gouvernement roumain lui fournisse immédiatement, et sans équivoque, la déclaration suivante:

- 1°) Le Gouvernement roumain reconnaît le principe que les biens des États ennemis constituent une sécurité commune pour toutes les Puissances Alliées et Associées.
- 2°) Il reconnaît la Commission des réparations comme le représentant exclusif, pour le récolement à titre de réparation, des biens ennemis.
- 3°) Les actifs hongrois, reçus par la Roumanie, depuis l'armistice du 3 novembre 1918, feront l'objet de la part du Gouvernement roumain, d'une prise en charge détaillée, et seront mis à la disposition de la Commission des réparations, ou de l'organe intérimaire que la Conférence de la Paix pourrait désigner en attendant le statut définitif de cette Commission. La Roumanie ne conservera le droit de disposer que des biens pouvant être identifiés actuellement, comme anciennes propriétés roumaines qui avaient été prises par l'ennemi et ceci d'accord avec la Commission des Réparations.
- 4°) Toutes nouvelles expéditions de biens hongrois en Roumanie cesseront immédiatement, à moins qu'elles n'aient l'accord de la Conférence de la Paix ou de ses représentants.
- 5°) Le Gouvernement roumain ratifiera l'accord du 27 juin signé par M. Antonesco et ci-dessus visé.

La Conférence de la Paix autorise les généraux alliés à Budapest à désigner des agents qui représenteront la Conférence de la Paix dans toute la procédure pouvant être envisagée.

APPENDIX B to No. 41

A.R.A. Received Aug. 22, 1919, 104 p.m.

MÄHRISCH OSTRAU Aug. 21, 1919.

I X. U. 200

Hoover, Paris.

For action.

Conferences this morning and evening with mine owners and military authorities has [sic] resulted in agreement by commanding general of district that no more executions will take place until further conference. I agreed to undertake return of prisoners taken into Poland by retiring insurgents and have had meeting with General Commandant Polish front this afternoon. All these prisoners have been sent to Crakow and held there under charge of Haller.⁸ I communicated with Haller and he agreed to hold there until further notice from me. I have appointment with Haller tomorrow noon and will arrange with them [?him] to return the prisoners with an American officer accompanying them. Polish authorities have directed Haller to follow my directions in these matters. I will have further meeting with the German General Friday afternoon. Will instruct strongly against any action before arrival of Upper Silesian committee. Haller's troops are behaving very well and without their presence here a state of war would have arrived before now. It is of utmost importance that announcement be made of appointment of Upper Silesian Commission at once, this announcement to state when Commission will

⁸ Polish General.

commence to act and to be published in German and Polish newspapers. If Paris does not act now after all the months' delay that have produced so much bitterness between Poles and Germans I can guarantee that there will be another war.

GOODYEAR.

APPENDIX C TO No. 41

Télégramme à la Commission Interalliée d'Armistice

22 août 1919.

Prière notifier à Commission Allemande d'Armistice pour Gouvernement allemand décision suivante du Conseil Suprême des Alliés:

Primo: Article 169 du Traité de Paix prescrit que tout le matériel de guerre allemand en excédent des quantités qu'Allemagne est autorisée par le Traité à conserver doit être livré aux Puissances Alliées et Associées.

En conséquence, l'Allemagne ne doit ni vendre, ni céder ou exporter ce matériel de guerre qui, d'ores et déjà est la propriété des Alliés.

Secundo: En particulier, elle ne doit ni vendre, ni céder ou exporter tout matériel aéronautique (aéronefs, moteurs, pièces de rechange) y compris moteurs capturés sur les Alliés ainsi qu'aéronefs transformés dits aéronefs civils, qui sont en fait matériel de guerre.

Tertio: Exceptionnellement, les Alliés usant de leur droit de propriété du matériel qui doit leur être livré autorisent l'Allemagne à céder:

- a) A Général Yudenitch: 8 canons russes capturés, 1.000.000 cartouches pour fusils, 50 revolvers russes, 3 aéroplanes allemands, vêtements pour 1.000 hommes (matériel demandé par télégramme 977/P.G. 2 de C.I.P.A.).
- b) à Tchéco-Slovaques [*sic*]: 50.000 fusils Mauser, 10.000 carabines Mauser, environ 2.000 mitrailleuses, avec 10.000 cartouches pour chacune et 100.000 coups d'artillerie pour mortiers de campagne (matériel demandé par Note 1685 de C.I.P.A.), plus 500 projecteurs de signalisation avec accessoires demandés par Tchéco-Slovaques.

APPENDIX D TO No. 41

Note à remettre par la Commission Interalliée d'Armistice au Gouvernement allemand

Les Gouvernements alliés et associés ont décidé de remettre aux Gouvernements des États neutres la note ci-jointe, pour les inviter à prendre des mesures immédiates en vue d'empêcher la reprise des relations commerciales avec la Russie Bolchevique.

Le Gouvernement allemand est prié de prendre de son côté des mesures analogues.

Note

21 août 1919.

Blocus de la Russie Bolcheviste.

L'hostilité avouée des bolchevistes contre tous les Gouvernements et le programme de révolution internationale qu'ils répandent constitue[n]t un grave danger pour la sécurité nationale de toutes les Puissances. Tout accroissement de

la force des bolchevistes augmenterait le danger et serait contraire au désir de tous les peuples qui cherchent à rétablir la paix et l'ordre social.

C'est dans cet esprit que les Gouvernements alliés et associés après la levée du blocus de l'Allemagne n'ont pas autorisé leurs ressortissants à reprendre les relations commerciales avec la Russie bolcheviste; ces relations, en effet, ne pourraient avoir lieu que par l'entremise des chefs du Gouvernement bolcheviste, qui, disposant à leur gré des produits et ressources que leur apporterait la liberté commerciale, y puiseraient une augmentation considérable de leur force et de la tyrannie qu'ils exercent sur les populations russes.

Dans ces conditions, les Gouvernements alliés et associés demandent au Gouvernement [. . .] de bien vouloir prendre des mesures immédiates pour empêcher ses ressortissants de se livrer à tout commerce avec la Russie bolcheviste et de donner l'assurance qu'il mettra rigoureusement à exécution cette politique, d'accord avec les Gouvernements alliés et associés.

Les mesures dont il s'agit et qui seront appliquées par les Gouvernements alliés et associés à partir de la date de la présente note, sont les suivantes:

- A) Refus des papiers de départ à tout navire se rendant dans les ports russes entre les mains des bolchevistes ou venant des dits ports.
- B) Etablissement d'une mesure similaire sur toutes les marchandises destinées à être envoyées soit directement soit indirectement en Russie bolcheviste.
- C) Refus des passeports à toutes personnes allant en Russie bolcheviste ou en venant (sauf entente pour des cas spéciaux avec les Gouvernements alliés et associés).
- D) Disposition en vue d'empêcher les banques de traiter des affaires avec la Russie bolcheviste.
- E) Autant que possible, refus par chaque Gouvernement à ses propres nationaux de facilités de correspondance avec la Russie bolcheviste par la poste, le télégraphe ou la télégraphie sans fil.

L'attention du Gouvernement [. . .] est appelée sur le fait qu'aucune proclamation des dites mesures n'est nécessaire, et qu'il suffit d'en aviser par la voie administrative les Administrations et les Banques intéressées.

Il sera bien entendu que tout navire de guerre d'une puissance alliée ou associée chargé de l'exécution des mesures ci-dessus, agira au nom des Puissances alliées et associées dans leur ensemble.

APPENDIX H TO NO. 41

M. 491.] *Regulation of Trade on the Danube*

Draft Letter from the President of the Conference to M. Bratiano

(Draft agreed by Communications Section of Supreme Economic Council.)

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th June on the subject of the Danube which was addressed separately to the Heads of the European States represented on the Supreme Council at Paris.

I regret the delay in sending a reply which has been due partly to the delay in bringing into touch officials to whom the separate letters had been referred, and partly because it was desired to await the decisions resulting from certain

proposals which were already under consideration in the sense of the requests made by you.

It is observed that the first part of your letter which is historical deals largely with matters which have been very contentious and cannot be regarded as complete. The questions referred to will doubtless be fully dealt with at the Conference on the Danube referred to in Article 349 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and it does not appear necessary to consider them further at the present moment. It is sufficient to draw attention to the fact that under Articles 346, 347 and 348 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, a provisional arrangement is arrived at:—

- (a) For the reconstitution of the European Commission of the Danube with the powers it possessed before the War, but limited to representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Roumania.
- (b) For the constitution of an International Commission to undertake provisionally the administration of the river above the point where the competence of the European Commission ceases until such time as a definitive statute regarding the Danube is concluded by the Conference referred to in Article 349.

The European Commission of the Danube is in effect in existence. Members of the different nations represented on it have been designated and it is understood the question of the necessary credits is receiving the attention of the Governments concerned. As regards the Commission for the provisional administration of the Upper Danube, this is to take effect as soon as possible after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. As, however, several Enemy States are concerned, it is essential that arrangements should be made for the functioning of this Commission before the Peace Treaties have been concluded with all such Enemy States.

At the present moment the only International régime possible on the Danube is a military one under the Allied Commander-in-Chief, who has the necessary control over the Enemy States in virtue of the conditions of the Armistice and of his powers for the maintenance of order. In order, however, that normal conditions may be resumed on the Danube at the earliest possible moment, notwithstanding the uncertainty as regards frontiers, the contested final ownership of many of the river craft and until recently the maintenance of the Blockade, the Supreme Economic Council arranged for the necessary instructions to be sent to the Allied Commander-in-Chief to give facilities for the re-opening of all river traffic under conditions of equality of treatment underlying the Treaty of Peace. For this reason an Allied Commission under the Presidency of Admiral Troubridge was constituted, one of whose functions was the issue of licences to enable relief and commercial traffic to pass freely along the river, notwithstanding the Blockade. This Commission is further responsible to the High Command for the provisional administration of common services, such as pilotage and the organization of the Iron Gates, some of which were previously carried out by Enemy States.

It will be seen therefore, that the functions of the Commission are vital to the re-establishment of commercial traffic on the Danube during the present period of the military control of the river. It is recognised, however, that, in so far as control of the International regulation of the river is concerned, there should be continuity between the present régime and that which will be established under Articles 347 and 348 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. An invitation will, therefore, be sent to the non-enemy riparian States to nominate each a representative to be attached to the provisional Inter-Allied Commission in order to co-operate in

working out the regulations for the navigation of the Upper Danube. It is hoped that the riparian States will designate as their representatives their proposed representatives on the Upper Danube Commission referred to in Article 347 of the Treaty with Germany, as in this way it should be possible to transfer to this Commission the functions of regulating the navigation of the Upper Danube at a considerably earlier date than would have been possible without the transitional arrangement.

It is well known that a complex situation has arisen as regards the ownership of a large number of vessels on the Danube. A final solution of all these cases has been provided for in the Peace Treaty by extending the competence of the arbitrator, to be designated by the United States, to the settlement of all questions of disputed ownership of vessels, the interim period being provided for by the constitution of a special Commission consisting of representatives of America, Great Britain, France and Italy to exercise provisional control over vessels of disputed ownership.

In order to facilitate the circulation of vessels which are at the present moment understood to be retained within national frontiers by the fear of their being claimed and taken possession of by adjacent States, it is proposed to anticipate the formation of the above special Commission by constituting the existing Allied Commission as trustee for all vessels the ownership of which is disputed until such time as the final decision has been given by the American arbitrator under the Treaty of Peace as to the ownership of these vessels. This Commission would arrange for all vessels of undisputed ownership to be returned as quickly as possible to their proper owners and, as regards vessels, the ownership of which involves disputes between two States would have authority to place them at the disposal of the most convenient local administration or if necessary provisionally to operate them in order to assure the unmolested working of such vessels in all parts of the river without in any way prejudicing the decisions of the American arbitrator as to final ownership.

It will be evident from this explanation that all the action taken has been in the interests of that complete freedom of navigation which the Roumanian Government desires to see re-established, and tends to the earliest possible introduction of the régime which has been prescribed in the Treaties of Peace.

No. 42

H. D. 38.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 25, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir G. Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. British Empire: Captain E. Abraham. France: Captain A. Portier. Italy: Lt.-Colonel A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Prof. Coolidge, Mr. Woolsey, Mr. J. F. Dulles.

British Empire: Field-Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, Colonel Peel, Mr. Nicolson, Mr. Hutchinson, Colonel Henniker.

France: M. Loucheur, M. Tardieu, M. Jules Cambon, M. Clémentel, M. Sergent, M. Aubert, General Le Rond, General Belin, M. Hermitte, M. Massigli.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey, M. Russo, M. Brofferio, General Cavallero, Lt.-Colonel Toni.

1. After an exchange of views between M. CLEMENCEAU and M. TITTONI, regarding the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Fiume Incidents (Appendix A),

Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Incidents at Fiume

It was agreed to accept the conclusions of the Commission's Report. The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these recommendations.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had heard from General Graziani, who had been the last of the Generals to reach Budapest, that his colleagues had already decided that the Chairmanship of the Meetings should be held by each in turn. He had accepted provisionally, but asked for orders, as he was the senior officer. M. Clemenceau thought that for purposes of continuity, it was better to have one Chairman. He would not insist, however.

M. TITTONI thought that it was best to let the Generals settle this question among themselves.

MR. BALFOUR said that, although alternating chairmanship was a bad system, it was, perhaps, the best way of avoiding friction.

MR. POLK said that in General Bandholtz' view, rotation was necessary.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should inform General Graziani that the Council saw no objection to the maintenance of the system of rotation in the chairmanship of the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest.)

3. MR. POLK said that he was informed by General Bandholtz that General Graziani had sent a report to the effect that, in the opinion of the Allied Generals, it was necessary to break off relations with the Roumanians. He begged to communicate the following telegram to the Council:—

Situation in Hungary

'Budapest—August 24, 1919. Received 1.20 a.m. August 25.

Ammission. Paris.

The following instances of Roumanian requisitions and seizures are given for your information. August 17, all the typewriters of the Underwood Agency, about 20, were seized. August 18—30 car-loads of wool, the property of the Hungarian Wool Trust, were shipped [?out] of Budapest. August 18—the Hungarian Minister Hygiene reported the seizure of all their supplies by Roumanian officials. August 21—there was seized car-loads

of coal which belonged to the Municipal Water Plant of Budapest. August 21—there was seized 110 race horses at the Alge Farm. These were the property of private individuals. August 22—all the machinery of the Hungarian State shops was dismantled, resulting in six thousand men being out of work. August 22—a demand was made on the Minister of Agriculture for topographical charts, instruments, etc., stating that if they were not delivered, same would be taken by force of arms. August 22—the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that the Roumanians had requisitioned all of the valuable breeding animals on the three Hungarian State stud farms. On August 23—50% of all the material of the Ganz Danubius Company, Limited, a large building concern, was taken, throwing out of employment over 4,300 persons. August 22—there was being loaded the remaining half of these [*sic*] supplies of the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the other half having been previously taken about August 10. On August 22 mechanics were being sent around to remove 4,000 telephones from private houses.

'All of the foregoing occurred subsequent to the promise of the Roumanians that they would comply with instructions of the Inter-Allied Mission. Many delicate instruments were thrown into boxes and other receptacles in such a careless manner that they could never be of use to anybody. Many other similar instances occurred during the period indicated. As near as can be now estimated, the Roumanians have seized about 60% of all Hungarian locomotives in good condition, 95% of all passenger equipment and about 5,000 freight cars.

BANDHOLTZ.'

Mr. Polk added that he had received another communication from General Bandholtz. He said that in his view the time of the Mission had been wasted, and that nothing was to be gained by any further intercourse with the Roumanian authorities. The latter maintained their policy of procrastination and had repeatedly broken their promises. The Roumanians, in his opinion, were making the Council appear ridiculous.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had received a telegram to the effect that the Roumanian plenipotentiaries had brought the Generals in Budapest a note from their Government, stating that they were ready to act in friendly agreement and in accord with the instructions sent by the Council on the 5th August, but not without certain modifications. The security of Roumania and her economic needs were considerations which must modify the instructions. The Roumanian Government meant to move all war material into Roumania, on the ground that there would be no force able to compel Hungary to give it up when the Roumanian Army was withdrawn. In addition, Roumania would have to requisition all that her Army required, and 30% besides for her own population. She must also take away the rolling stock, as Germany had only left her sixty engines out of twelve hundred. They also declared that they had a right to take any goods recognised as previously belonging to the Roumanian Government; these goods not counting as a portion of the spoil to be divided among the Allies.

M. Diamandy, questioned as to his attitude, should the Commission refuse to discuss these conditions, had replied that he would be forced to refer to M. Bratiano. Every means of procuring delay was being employed, and in the meantime the despoiling of Hungary continued.

M. TITTONI said that one thing he could not understand was why the Mission did not make a corporate report to the Conference.

M. PICHON said that one such report had just been received. (See Appendix B.)

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that what was practically an ultimatum had been sent to the Roumanian Government on the previous Saturday.¹ He suggested that an answer be awaited before any further decision was taken.

MR. POLK said that for the last fortnight the Council had been sending telegrams to Roumania. No attention had been paid to these telegrams. It was intolerable that the Council should be flouted in this way by the Roumanians.

M. TITTONI said that what the Council required was an answer from Bukarest. It could not be satisfied with answers given by Roumanian Generals. Should the Roumanian Government delay its reply, the Allied representatives in Bukarest should demand an explanation.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Council could take any steps short of belligerency to signify their displeasure, should the Roumanian Government unduly delay its reply.

MR. POLK said that at a previous meeting, it had been decided to stop the sending of all supplies to Roumania. He noticed in the minutes that the decision was limited to 'war supplies'.²

MR. BALFOUR said that in referring to the British Government, he had mentioned all supplies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had done likewise, and that the export of all supplies from France had already been stopped.

(It was agreed, with reference to H. D. 37, Minute 1,² that the export of all supplies to Roumania should be stopped from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, until further orders. It was further decided to send the Roumanian Government, through the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bukarest, a reminder that a reply to telegrams was expected. (See Appendix C.))

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received information that the British and American Armies on the Rhine were selling horses and cars to the Germans. (See Appendix D.)

*Sale of horses and
motors to the Ger-
mans by the Ameri-
can and British
troops of occupation*

MR. BALFOUR said that he had at once spoken about this matter to Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, who had tried to telephone to Cologne for news. The telephone, however, was not working. As soon as he obtained news, the Council would be informed.

¹ See No. 41, appendix A.

² See No. 41, minute 1.

MR. POLK said he had no information whatever but that he undertook to obtain it.

(It was agreed that the British and American Delegations should give the Council any information available regarding the alleged sales to the Germans by the Armies of Occupation.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to a report stating that Admiral Bristol, the American High Commissioner in Constantinople, had presented a threatening memorandum to the Grand Vizier, without previous consultation of the Allied High Commissioners. (See Appendix E.) He did not think that President Wilson would approve of this policy. He drew special attention to the twelfth of the Fourteen Points:

Notification to the Ottoman Government by the United States High Commissioner regarding Armenian massacres

'The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.'

All the Allies had adhered to this and the policy could not now be changed. Least of all could one High Commissioner dictate terms to Turkey, with whom his State had not been at war, without consultation with the Associated Powers. As to saving the Armenians, he did not know what could be done. There were no American troops. British troops were employed elsewhere. The French were not allowed by the British to play any part in Asia Minor. The Italians, it was true, had gone to Asia Minor in spite of the British, but they declined to replace the British in the Caucasus. As to the Turks, they were themselves powerless, as they could not control their own troops. He did not see from what quarter the Armenians could expect any assistance.

M. TITTONI said that this was one of the inevitable consequences of delaying Peace with Turkey.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that even when Peace had been made, it was not likely that the Armenians would be better off.

MR. BALFOUR said that this situation was really the consequence of a lack of troops. He understood that the United States were raising a volunteer army. If so, perhaps some of these troops could be employed in Armenia.

MR. POLK said that recruiting for the volunteer army was beginning.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Clemenceau whether, but for British opposition, he would send French troops to prevent the massacres in Armenia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would consider the matter.

MR. BALFOUR said that he took note of this declaration.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he made no undertaking. The French had very few troops in Cilicia, but he would enquire whether they could do anything to save the Armenians. What he had meant to convey was that nothing could be expected from the Americans, who were hampered by their constitution, from the British, who were leaving the Caucasus, from the Italians,

who would not go there, or from the French who were not allowed a free hand. The Turks, not being masters in their own house, were equally impotent. The Armenians were therefore no-one's responsibility.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Clemenceau whether he thought it worth while to ask the French Military Authorities whether they could do anything.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had not come to the Meeting with this idea. As he was pushed, however, he would consent to be pushed. He would make enquiries. Possibly the French Army might be able to do something.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it would be well worth while to find out.

(It was agreed that the French Government should enquire into the possibility of sending military protection to the Armenians.)

It was also agreed that no pressure should be brought on the Sultan by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, acting alone.)

6. M. CAMBON explained the procedure followed by his Committee. He proposed to begin by explaining the covering letter.

*Reply to the Austrian
Delegation on the
Treaty of Peace*

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that as the covering letter was a result of the various answers on particular questions, it had better be reserved for the end.

M. CAMBON said that the first question to be discussed was that of frontiers.

(a) *Frontiers* (The covering letter, the various draft replies, and the minority reservations, are all contained in Appendix F.)

On the subject of frontiers, the Austrian objections had been rejected. The only dissentients were the British and American Delegates, who desired to give Gmünd to Austria.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the question was a simple one. The principle of the historic frontier had been adopted for Czecho-Slovakia. By it, the inclusion of a considerable number of Germans in the new State was justified. It was undesirable to deviate from this principle in order to add still more Germans to Czecho-Slovakia. The attribution of Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia constituted a derogation from the principle of the historic frontier, and still further aggravated the ethnological anomaly. It was justified on grounds of railway communication. He had consulted General Mance, who told him that, on purely technical grounds, it was better to leave Gmünd in Austria. If this was so, there was no sufficient reason for taking Gmünd out of its natural surroundings. He understood that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had never been consulted.

M. TARDIEU said that the question had been studied carefully before, both in Commissions, and in Council.³ The Czecho-Slovak Delegation had also been heard on the subject. A change now would amount to a third alteration in the decisions of the Council. It was true that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had not been consulted, but territorial committees had never consulted that body as such. Each representative consulted his

³ Cf. No. 8, minute 10 and No. 9, minute 1.

own experts. The case had therefore been judged and re-judged, and the opinion now brought forward by Mr. Headlam-Morley was merely that of an individual expert.

MR. BALFOUR said he recognised that it was a pity to re-open questions which had been settled. Nevertheless, the *argument on the merits in this case* was very strong. The rule of following the historic frontier was being broken to hand over a purely German population to Czecho-Slovakia. There were already too many Germans in Czecho-Slovakia, even if the historic line were followed. The two or three million Germans already included would certainly be a great perplexity to a new State. Nevertheless, the whole history of Bohemia afforded some justification for preserving the country as a unit. The district of Gmünd had never been Bohemian. The only ground for putting Gmünd within Czecho-Slovakia was economic. He was told that Gmünd was the first big railway junction out of Vienna. The population was incontestably German, and the British railway expert thought that the junction was better in Austria than in Czecho-Slovakia, on purely technical grounds. M. Tardieu had said nothing on the merits except that the Council had twice decided to give Gmünd to the Czechs. If the Council was never to revise its decisions, its task would doubtless be rendered easier. It did not follow, however, that its results would be better.

M. TARDIEU said that he had not only referred to the decision of the Council; he had pointed out that there had been an agreement with the Czecho-Slovak Delegation itself. The attribution of the junction of Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia had been part of a general arrangement which extended to Pressburg and other places. If this arrangement were changed at the last moment, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation would have reason to complain of bad faith. All the previous decisions had been unanimous. It was therefore a political reason, and, in addition, two essential Bohemian railway lines converged at this point.

MR. POLK said that Mr. Lansing and the American experts had felt at the beginning that Gmünd should be Austrian. Nevertheless, in order to obtain agreement, they had yielded to the majority opinion. They still thought, however, that the rule established in favour of the historic frontier should not be broken. For this reason he supported the British view.

M. TITTONI said that there appeared to be good arguments on both sides. He was ready to accept either solution.

M. MATSUI said that the Japanese adhered to the former decision of the Council, and wished to maintain it.

(After a long discussion, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk, seeing that Gmünd had been attributed to Czecho-Slovakia as part of a compromise, the other parts of which were not called in question, withdrew the objection raised by the British and the American Delegates.)

The answer prepared to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the frontier between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia was accepted.)

M. CAMBON pointed out that there was a difference of opinion on the subject of Styria. The American, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations

thought that the Austrian demand for a plebiscite in the region of Marburg should be accepted. The French Delegation was not of this opinion. It was recognised that Marburg was German, but the surrounding districts were undoubtedly Slovene.

M. TRITONI said that as the neighbouring region was to have a plebiscite, it was easy to extend it to Marburg.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it would be difficult to refuse the plebiscite.

M. TARDIEU said he had no prejudice against plebiscites, but in this case he thought it was unnecessary. Marburg was certainly German, but in a region peopled by Slovenes. The result of a plebiscite was a foregone conclusion. Marburg would vote German and the country round it would vote Slovene. What could then be done? Was the town to be sacrificed to the country or the country to the town? No frontier line could be obtained as a result of the plebiscite. In Carinthia, on the other hand, a frontier might be obtained. There would therefore be quite needless trouble without any useful result.

(After considerable further discussion, it was decided to accept the Austrian demands and to extend the plebiscite zone in such a manner as to include in it the district of Marburg and Radkersburg.)

M. CAMBON observed that the British and Italian Delegations held a minority view on the subject of the plebiscite zones in Carinthia. They proposed four instead of two plebiscite areas.

(After some discussion, the British and Italian reservations were withdrawn and the reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of Carinthia was accepted.

The reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the frontier between Austria and Hungary and on the frontier between Austria and Italy was likewise accepted.)

(b) *Nationality questions* The reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of nationality questions was accepted.

(c) *Austrian interests outside of Europe* The question was adjourned.

The British Delegation withdrew its objections, and the reply prepared to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses was accepted.

The reply drafted to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of prisoners of war was accepted.

M. CAMBON pointed out that there were two draft replies on this subject, one prepared by the Commission and the other suggested by the British and Japanese Delegation.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY observed that on the substance, he was in agreement with the majority. He wished to defend the Treaty but he thought that

the draft he proposed defended it more accurately. There was a very technical legal point involved.

(It was decided to refer both drafts to the Drafting Committee for co-ordination.)

The draft reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of reparations (g) *Reparations* was accepted.

After long discussion, the proposed reply to the Austrian Delegation on the financial clauses was accepted, with the exception of the alternative proposal of the American, British and Japanese Delegation[s] regarding Article 199 [203]⁴ which was adjourned until the following day.

7.

Agreement between the Allies regarding the contribution of Poland, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia to the cost of liberation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

The agreement annexed in Appendix G⁵ was accepted.

8.

Agreement between the Allies regarding Italian contribution towards cost of liberating territories of former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

The agreement annexed in Appendix H⁶ was accepted.

9. M. TARDIEU proposed that a Committee be charged with the examination of a proposal which had been drafted in the following terms:—

Declaration by Austria that all action tending to overthrow of the Austrian State as constituted by the Treaty would be prohibited

‘Austria undertakes not to tolerate on her territory any act whether of propaganda or of any other sort by Austrian subjects or by foreign subjects with a purpose subversive of Austria as an independent State. Acts of this character should be regarded as directed against the security of the

State and treated as such. The Austrian Government should interpret on its part this enactment as an undertaking not to compromise or allow to be compromised, directly or indirectly, the independence of the State, particularly in the legislative sphere, by preparatory measures, and in the

⁴ Here and subsequently the number in brackets refers to the article in the final text of the treaty; the original numbering is that of the draft communicated to the Austrian Delegation on July 20, 1919.

⁵ Not printed: identical with appendix I to No. 41: see No. 41, note 6.

⁶ Not printed: identical with appendix J to No. 41: see No. 41, note 7.

sphere of public or private instruction by propaganda. No law or regulation or official action of any sort shall conflict with these stipulations. In case there should be any divergence of interpretation between the Austrian Government and one, or several, of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the discrepancy will be referred either to the Council of the League of Nations or, when instituted, brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice. These bodies will also pass decrees regarding measures desirable to ensure the carrying into effect of their findings and to prevent the recurrence of similar difficulties.'

M. TITTONI said that this was a very serious proposal. It attempted to regulate the internal Constitution of Austria for all time, not on a special point, but through the whole of its extent.

MR. BALFOUR said that he hoped the Council would be very careful before putting into the Treaty, or into a letter having the force of a Treaty, any form of words which would compel the Allied and Associated Powers to impose domestic legislation on Austria, and to maintain police authority over private, as well as public, speech. He thought the proposal was really very repugnant to all that constituted an independent state. He believed, moreover, that if agreed to, it would remain ineffective. The only way to prevent Austria from gravitating towards Germany was to make terms such that she would be content to live apart. Any attempt to prevent an Austrian from saying that he wished to join Germany would, he thought, cover both the Council and the League of Nations with ridicule.

M. TARDIEU said that he was impressed by Mr. Balfour's criticisms regarding the methods suggested. He thought that perhaps the first sentence alone would suffice. The suggestion was a corollary to what had been put into the German Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that the omission of the bulk of the document would be an improvement. He observed that the corollary to the provisions of the German Treaty would be to forbid the Austrian Government to do certain things. This might be done without incurring the objections he had previously stated.

M. TARDIEU said that the Austrians were already saying that they had no hope of living apart unless the League of Nations took special care of them. The Council was trying to give the Austrians conditions which might make it possible for them to live independently. What he now suggested was a counterpart to these favours. He believed that Dr. Renner would readily agree, seeing that Herr Bauer had resigned because he could not convert the Government to the contrary view.⁷ It would be enough, he thought, if the mere principle were agreed to.

MR. POLK asked whether M. Tardieu suggested that this should be said in the Treaty.

M. TARDIEU said he thought it would be sufficient if agreed to in the covering letter sent with the replies.

⁷ See No. 22, note 2.

MR. POLK thought this was preferable.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought this proposal had better be put into a new form, and suggested that M. Tardieu should propose one.

M. TARDIEU said that he would do so; what he suggested was to say in the covering letter that the Allies were confident that the Austrian Government meant to do what the Allies hoped would be done, and he believed that the Austrian Delegation would give a satisfactory answer.

(It was decided that a sentence to the effect desired should be introduced in the covering letter, and considered on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 25, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 42

Rapport de la Commission Interalliée d'Enquête⁸

Les travaux de la Commission chargée par le Conseil suprême interallié de procéder à une enquête sur les événements survenus à Fiume, dans les premiers jours de juillet,⁹ sont résumés dans les vingt procès-verbaux joints au présent rapport (81 pièces annexes).⁸

A. Les causes

1. L'armistice, qui marqua la fin des hostilités de l'Autriche-Hongrie avec les Puissances Alliées et Associées de l'Entente, fut signé à Villa-Giusti le 4 [3] novembre 1918. Les conditions avaient été préalablement étudiées et fixées à Versailles par le Conseil supérieur de la Guerre.

Ces conditions permettaient d'occuper les points stratégiques jugés nécessaires au delà de la ligne de démarcation qui avait été établie, et prescrivaient que les gouvernements locaux, trouvés installés dans les territoires occupés par les troupes alliées, continueraient à exercer leur pouvoir pendant l'occupation.

2. Le 17 novembre 1918, en vertu du paragraphe 4 de la Convention d'armistice signée par le Général Diaz avec le Commandant en chef des armées austro-hongroises, les troupes italiennes entraient à Fiume considéré par le Commandement italien comme 'point stratégique', et précédemment occupé, puis évacué, par un bataillon serbe de l'Armée interalliée d'Orient. Des forces considérables (13,000 hommes encore officiellement présents le 15 juillet malgré les réductions d'effectifs provenant de la démobilisation) occupent la ville et ses environs, dans un rayon de 6 à 8 kilomètres. Des détachements français, anglais et américains complètent le corps d'occupation qui devient ainsi interallié, sous le commandement du Général Grazioli de l'armée italienne. (Le bataillon américain quitta la ville dans les premiers jours de février 1919.)

3. Tandis que l'occupation italienne était en cours, le Commandant de l'Armée

⁸ The original of this appendix included the twenty *procès-verbaux* annexed to the report. These documents, which fill 120 pages of print, are not reproduced.

⁹ See No. 8, minute 6.

interalliée d'Orient, jugeant nécessaire d'établir à Fiume une base pour le ravitaillement de ses troupes, leur donna l'ordre de l'occuper.

Il est à noter ceci :

a) Qu'aucune ligne de démarcation n'avait été fixée à Versailles, pour séparer dans la Monarchie austro-hongroise les territoires, qui auraient pu être occupés pour des raisons stratégiques par l'Armée d'Italie, de ceux qui auraient pu l'être par l'Armée d'Orient ;

b) Que l'ordre d'occuper Fiume avec des troupes françaises et serbes, donné par le Commandant des Armées d'Orient, n'engageait que la responsabilité du Général qui l'avait donné, et non celle du Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre de Versailles, qui n'avait pas été saisi de la question ;

Ce fut la première cause des conflits. Le Commandant italien à Fiume alléguait son droit, qui était incontestable et basé sur une convention internationale. Le Commandant français à Fiume ne pouvait qu'alléguer les ordres de son général. Les difficultés rencontrées par les français pour établir leur base et les tiraillements dans les rapports avec le Commandement italien pour y loger leurs troupes n'ont pas d'autre origine.

Ce fut alors que la question fut déferée par les Gouvernements intéressés au Maréchal Foch, qui proposa au Conseil supérieur de Guerre que l'occupation de Fiume serait italienne, mais qu'on y établirait une base française pour le ravitaillement de l'Armée d'Orient ainsi qu'un détachement franco-serbe pour le service de cette base. Les troupes interalliées d'Italie dépendraient de l'Armée d'Italie, celles de la base française de l'Armée d'Orient. En cas de conflit, les deux Commandants en Chef saisiraient leurs Gouvernements respectifs de la question par l'entremise du Maréchal Foch. Ces propositions furent approuvées par le protocole de Londres.

4. La co-existence à Fiume des troupes italiennes et de la base française fut ainsi établie en droit, et les tiraillements entre les deux Commandements cessèrent virtuellement de fait, mais de nouvelles causes de conflit ne tardèrent pas à surgir, dont les suivantes :

a) Le fait de la dépendance respective des troupes italiennes et françaises de deux Commandements différents agissant indépendamment l'un de l'autre amena des conflits de juridiction qui laissèrent des rancunes.

b) La constitution d'une base française dans les lignes de l'armée interalliée d'Italie qui, dans l'opinion de la population et des troupes italiennes ravitaillait les Yougo-Slaves, parmi lesquels les Slovènes et les Croates qui se sont battus contre l'Italie jusqu'au dernier jour et que l'Italie considérera comme des ennemis jusqu'à ce que la paix soit signée, amena une situation qui irrita profondément les Italiens.

c) Le commandant et certains officiers de la base française n'ont jamais voulu reconnaître le Conseil national italien qui gouverne à Fiume comme un gouvernement de fait sinon de droit.

Il faut ajouter à cela que, dans la population mixte de Fiume, il y eut toujours des conflits entre les Italiens et les Croates, et que la ville jouissait sous le Gouvernement hongrois d'une large autonomie fondée sur d'anciens privilèges qui en laissaient en général l'administration aux Italiens.

d) La nomination d'un Conseil national italien nommé sans élections régulières pour remplacer le Conseil qui avait pris en main, sous la présidence du Dr. Lanaz, l'administration de la ville après le départ des Autorités hongroises au nom du Conseil national yougo-slave de Zagreb, nommé également sans élections.

Ce Conseil national italien dont les Croates contestent avec raison la légitimité, outrepassa ses droits en proclamant l'annexion au Royaume d'Italie.

Soutenu par le Commandement italien il prit très rapidement un ensemble de mesures destinées à placer les Gouvernements alliés en présence d'un état de choses qu'ils n'auraient plus qu'à sanctionner.

En particulier, les rues et les places de la ville furent débaptisées et reçurent des noms italiens, la justice fut rendue au nom du Roi d'Italie, et le serment fut exigé des avocats.

e) Les Français n'ont pas dissimulé leur sympathie pour l'élément yougo-slave, le commandement italien de son côté a ouvertement appuyé l'élément italien et son appui est allé jusqu'à tolérer la constitution de sociétés comme la *Giovine Fiume*, la *Giovane Italia* et la formation d'un bataillon fiumain, qui se proposaient de rétablir l'annexion, même en employant la violence. La censure peu rigoureuse a permis la publication dans la presse d'articles excitant à la révolte et la police trop indulgente a donné aux agitateurs de métier le sentiment de l'impunité.

f) Cette situation, déjà par elle-même très difficile, devint plus tendue encore après la Paix de Versailles, quand la reconnaissance de la Yougo-Slavie par les Alliés de l'Italie devint un fait accompli et quand on se rendit compte que les aspirations de cette Puissance sur Fiume et une partie de la Dalmatie ne recevraient pas satisfaction. L'exaspération de l'opinion publique italienne, dirigée surtout contre la France, amena la chute du Ministère en Italie et donna lieu à une violente campagne de presse dont on eut la répercussion à Fiume et qui contribua indirectement aux événements douloureux qui donnèrent lieu à l'enquête.

g) Quelques actes de peu d'importance de soldats français, qui dans les circonstances actuelles ont, sans aucun doute, offensé la population italienne, peuvent peut-être aussi être compris parmi les causes immédiates et occasionnelles de l'hostilité locale contre les troupes françaises.

h) La 3^e Armée italienne se livra aussi à une propagande anti-alliée, sous forme de bulletins distribués aux troupes.

i) La très forte prépondérance des troupes italiennes dans la ville de Fiume, par rapport aux troupes des autres Alliés, encouragea la population dans son attitude vis-à-vis des Français et des Yougo-Slaves dans la ville de Fiume.

j) Un déploiement considérable d'affiches a contribué également à exciter le sentiment italien.

k) Le 25 avril, le manifeste du Président Wilson relatif au sort de Fiume cause en ville une grosse émotion. Une manifestation de plusieurs milliers de personnes a lieu devant le palais du Gouverneur. Le Général commandant le Corps d'occupation, dans un discours, se déclare ouvertement en faveur de l'annexion à l'Italie et recommanda le calme.

l) Le 17 juin, le Général commandant le Corps d'occupation invite le Général commandant des Troupes françaises à éloigner les Serbes de la ville. Le Général français refuse.

B. Les faits

5. 29 juin. — Un groupe de soldats français, égayés par un bon repas pris à la caserne pour fêter la paix, vint du fauborg de Susak en ville accompagné d'un clairon. Les soldats étaient plutôt gais; ils chantaient et entremêlaient leurs chansons de quelques cris, entre autres: 'Vive la France!', 'Vive la Yougo-Slavie!', 'A bas l'Italie!' Le dernier cri est contesté. Celui de 'Vive la Yougo-Slavie!' fut considéré comme une provocation, qui fut d'autant plus ressentie par les Italiens

de Fiume ce jour-là où ils étaient fortement excités par la nature de la paix qui venait d'être signée. Heureusement l'affaire n'eut pas de suites, mais elle contribua à créer dans la foule l'état d'esprit qui provoqua les faits des jours suivants.

6. 2 juillet. — Deux soldats français ivres venant de Susak croisèrent deux jeunes filles portant sur la poitrine la cocarde italienne; un d'eux arracha une de ces cocardes, des grenadiers italiens le rossèrent et, avec d'autres personnes, le ramenèrent à la caserne, où le commandant français lui infligea le maximum de prison. En attendant, la nouvelle se répandit comme une trainée de poudre dans la ville et tous les Français qui se promenaient en groupe ou isolés, sans armes, furent violemment attaqués par une foule hurlante et armée de matraques, où civils et militaires italiens étaient mêlés dans une proportion qui n'a pu être établie, les témoignages étant contradictoires. On sonna l'alerte pour faire rentrer les soldats italiens dans leurs casernes, tandis que des piquets armés et des patrouilles cherchaient à débayer les rues, à établir des barrages pour protéger les casernes françaises et à protéger les Français en les mettant à l'abri. On réussit ainsi à les sauver, mais on ne put empêcher 9 officiers et 41 soldats français d'être blessés, dont un assez grièvement. On reproche aux soldats italiens d'avoir mollement défendu les Français qu'ils voulaient protéger et même de les avoir à leur tour frappés; des témoins l'affirment, d'autres le contestent; il est prouvé toutefois que cela est arrivé en certain nombre de cas et en particulier à un officier et à un adjudant français dont les dépositions ne laissent aucun doute.

Tandis que ces faits se passaient, une foule de civils envahit le Club croate. Les envahisseurs brisèrent les glaces et jetèrent par la fenêtre quelques meubles que la foule se plut à casser en morceaux. Enfin des soldats italiens entrèrent à leur tour, firent vider les lieux, mais n'arrêtèrent personne.

L'attaque du Cercle croate n'était pas prévue et on en a été d'autant plus surpris que, depuis l'occupation, il n'y avait eu aucun conflit entre civils italiens et croates de Fiume et que les soldats italiens sont dans les meilleurs termes avec les Croates de Susak. Ce fait ne peut donc s'expliquer que par l'état d'esprit de la foule, à la suite des causes déjà mentionnées. Le service d'ordre a été mal compris, l'absence d'arrestations ne s'explique pas.

7. 5 juillet. — Un groupe de six soldats français se querelle avec des civils, un Français tire un coup de revolver, un autre en tire un second. Un officier italien accourt et tire à son tour un coup sur eux. Un soldat français est atteint. Les Français s'enfuient dans la direction de leur caserne. Un rassemblement qui se forme et grossit à vue d'œil les poursuit. Pendant la fuite trois d'entre eux s'abritent dans une caserne italienne, un disparaît, les deux autres arrivent à la caserne et crient aux armes. Des coups de fusil et de mitrailleuse partent de la caserne. L'officier italien s'avance sur la place restée libre et parle avec les soldats français qui promettent de ne plus tirer si la foule s'en va. Ils tiennent parole et ne tirent plus; un piquet italien armé repousse la foule qui s'était mise à l'abri, établit un barrage et le calme revient. Pendant la poursuite, une grenade lancée par un civil éclate et blesse deux Français; quelques coups de feu partent d'une maison en face de la caserne et de la maison 3, rue Parini, où un civil, de nationalité croate, est arrêté. Quelques instants plus tard, la foule rencontre une patrouille française du *Sakalave*, l'entoure et l'injurie sans raison; deux piquets armés italiens la prennent entre eux et la reconduisent à son bord sans pouvoir la protéger des cailloux que lui lance la foule tenue à distance. Un barrage de marins italiens est établi sur le quai pour la protection du *Sakalave* qui y est amarré.

C'est un Français qui a tiré le premier, et ce qui a suivi en est la conséquence, étant donné l'état d'esprit de la foule, de plus en plus surexcitée. Les coups partis de la caserne occupée par les soldats français surexcités eux aussi et qui, se croyant attaqués, avaient le devoir de se défendre, sont justifiés. Pas plus que les autres fois le service d'ordre n'a été suffisant et, comme toujours, il n'y a pas eu d'arrestations. On pouvait, au moins, arrêter ceux qui insultaient la patrouille du *Sakalave*, vue que des carabiniers étaient là. Pour la première fois on voit la foule lancer une grenade et quelqu'un tirer d'une fenêtre.

8. 6 juillet. — C'était un dimanche; trois soldats français en armes qui venaient de Susak où ils avaient acheté des cigarettes et bu du vin et du vermouth, traversent le centre de la ville contrairement aux ordres reçus de leurs chefs. Ils ne sont pas provoqués et ne provoquent pas. Une patrouille italienne et une foule les suit. A plusieurs reprises des coups de feu avaient été tirés dans la ville. Sur le quai un de ces soldats quitte ses camarades et rejoint son poste sans être inquiété. Les deux autres soldats arrivèrent à la hauteur du palais Adria; l'un d'eux fait demi-tour et tire dans la direction de la foule. La patrouille italienne qui les suit se dérobe derrière le chalet de la douane, d'où elle tire à son tour quelques coups sur les Français. Personne ne fut touché et les deux Français se sauvèrent, poursuivis par la foule où les militaires italiens étaient assez nombreux; un d'eux fut arrêté et désarmé par un civil qui reçut un coup de baïonnette dans une jambe; l'autre, mortellement blessé par un coup de revolver, on ne sait pas exactement par qui. Plusieurs coups de revolver partirent de la foule, où il y avait aussi des officiers italiens que des témoins assurent avoir vu tirer. Un d'eux, dont le signalement a été donné, vient déposer: il avoue avoir tiré sur le soldat quatre coups de son arme à une distance de quarante pas; mais ajoute: qu'il l'a manqué, ne l'ayant pas vu tomber.

La participation à ce combat peu généreux de quelques officiers italiens qui auraient dû défendre ce soldat est établie. A noter une fois de plus l'insuffisance absolue des mesures d'ordre et l'absence de toute arrestation.

Cet incident est à peine terminé que la foule se dirige, on ne sait pourquoi, vers les magasins français du port Barros. Il n'y avait jamais rien eu dans ces parages, ni provocations, ni querelles; une petite garnison de 27 hommes, en partie soldats annamites, en partie ouvriers français d'administration, gardait ces magasins et y était cantonnée. Deux coups de revolver partent de la foule, tirés par des civils sur la sentinelle annamite qui riposte, des coups de revolver partent des fenêtres des maisons qui font face au quai Christophe-Colomb et à la rue Marco-Polo, d'autres coups de revolver et de fusil traversent le bassin du port intérieur, provenant on ne sait d'où en laissant quelques traces sur les cuirassés italiens qui sont dans le port. A peu près au moment où ce feu cesse, trois compagnies de marins italiens armés encadrés de leurs officiers sont mises à terre. Celle de l'*Emmanuel Filiberto* se rend sur le quai où les contre-torpilleurs français sont amarrés et étend un cordon pour les protéger; celle du *Dante* se rend sur la place du même nom avec l'ordre de maintenir la circulation et d'empêcher tout rassemblement. Ni l'une ni l'autre n'est attaquée et il leur est possible d'exécuter les ordres reçus sans rencontrer d'obstacles. La troisième, celle du *San Marco*, reçoit du Commandant Acton l'ordre précis de s'interposer entre la foule et les magasins français de la base pour les protéger sans faire usage des armes. La compagnie s'avance en colonne par quatre et, une fois qu'elle a passé le pont tournant, entend siffler quelques balles. Elle prend des dispositions de combat. D'abord, elle se déploie et fait une salve; ensuite elle court à l'attaque, se partage en trois colonnes, cerne les magasins, les fouille,

tue ou blesse les quelques Français et Annamites qui s'étaient réfugiés à l'intérieur et emmène les survivants sur l'*Emmanuel Filiberto* où les blessés sont pansés.

Pendant ce bref combat une vingtaine de coups de fusil furent tirés par les Franco-Annamites, autant qu'on en peut juger par le nombre d'étais de cartouches retrouvés; à peu près deux cents furent tirés par les marins italiens, de l'aveu de leurs officiers. Un Français et un Italien civil furent tués, près d'un bateau de pêche italien amarré au quai, par des coups de revolver tirés de la foule par des civils; deux Annamites furent tués dans l'intérieur du poste par des marins italiens; deux autres le furent, bien que sans armes et quand ils s'étaient déjà rendus, l'un par un coup de poignard dans le dos, l'autre par un coup de crosse de fusil sur la tête; deux grenades furent lancées par la foule, dont l'une tomba dans la mer, l'autre éclata tuant un Annamite et blessant un matelot italien. La foule et les marins italiens se livrèrent à des scènes de sauvagerie constatées par de nombreux témoins.

On ne comprend pas qu'un fait pareil ait pu se passer et que quelques coups de feu, tirés par un poste qui se croyait menacé par la foule, aient fait perdre le sang-froid aux officiers du *San Marco* au point d'attaquer ce même poste qu'ils devaient protéger, et de l'attaquer en faisant usage de leurs armes avec une centaine d'hommes, sachant que la garnison était minime et n'avait pas la moindre idée de se défendre, comme on le vit lorsqu'à la première sommation la sentinelle se rendit avec quatre autres hommes. Il aurait été si facile de s'expliquer; le sang aurait été épargné et les civils qu'on aurait pu et dû repousser au loin n'auraient pas pu pénétrer, comme ils l'ont fait, dans l'enceinte du port Barros, où avec le revolver et la grenade ils ont fait trois victimes. Il est possible que ces officiers et ces marins qui n'avaient jamais combattu à terre aient jugé la situation qui se présentait à eux non d'après la réalité, mais d'après les suggestions erronées de leur imagination surexcitée.

On fit des descentes dans plusieurs maisons sans autres résultats que l'arrestation d'un officier français qui n'avait fait que regarder par la fenêtre ce qui se passait, et celle d'un Croate garçon d'hôtel à Susak.

L'absence de toute sanction est encore plus incompréhensible que les autres fois.

Le total des pertes françaises pour le 6 juillet fut de 9 tués et 11 blessés. Les Italiens eurent trois marins légèrement blessés.

C. Responsabilités

9. Il n'y a aucun doute que la responsabilité des causes de la tension dans les rapports entre les Italiens du Royaume et ceux de Fiume avec les Français est due, non à des personnes, mais [?] à des faits qui appartiennent désormais à l'histoire. Ce sont: la reconnaissance de la Yougo-Slavie de la part des Alliés en dehors de l'Italie; la Paix de Versailles, où le règlement de toutes les questions relatives à l'Italie fut renvoyé à une date indéterminée; la croyance du peuple italien à une politique slavophile et hellénophile de la France qui, d'après lui, tend à reconstruire, sous la forme d'une Confédération danubienne, son ancienne ennemie l'Autriche-Hongrie, pour lui barrer les voies de l'Orient.

10. Cette situation de fait, qu'il ne dépendait de personne de changer et devait être acceptée par tous, n'en était pas moins d'une nature très délicate, surtout à Fiume où les intérêts qui se considéraient lésés par elle étaient en contact immédiat et où, par conséquent, un choc d'un moment à l'autre pouvait se produire. Il aurait donc été absolument nécessaire que toutes les autorités qui, pour une raison

quelconque, se trouvaient exercer la juridiction à Fiume se fussent efforcées, en parfait accord avec [? entre] elles, de rester au-dessus des passions qui s'agitaient dans la ville et de maintenir un équilibre parfait entre les partis, cherchant à n'en mécontenter aucun, puisqu'il leur était impossible de les contenter tous. Or c'est précisément le contraire qui est arrivé.

11. Le Conseil national italien, autorité politique de fait, quoique discutée en droit, allant au delà de ses attributions, proclame l'annexion au royaume d'Italie, comme s'il n'existait pas à Paris une Conférence de la Paix pour décider ces grandes questions. Il prit ensuite des mesures vexatoires contre les Croates, qui ne voulaient pas le reconnaître, et toléra l'existence de sociétés de jeunes gens qui travaillaient pour l'annexion, proclamant qu'ils n'hésiteraient pas, le cas échéant, à recourir même à la violence pour y arriver.

12. Le Conseil national croate à Susak, qui n'a plus d'autorité ni en droit ni en fait, puisque l'administration est confiée à un capitaine de district relevant directement de Zagreb, n'en continue pas moins à exister pour faire œuvre de propagande croate.

13. Le commandement italien, au lieu de se retrancher dans ses attributions militaires dérivant des raisons purement stratégiques pour lesquelles l'occupation de Fiume lui a été dévolue, appuie ouvertement le Conseil national italien dans ses agissements et, malgré les forces dont il dispose, se garde de sévir contre les éléments italiens de la ville, même les plus turbulents; et tout en censurant avec rigueur les journaux croates, permet la publication d'articles dangereux dans les journaux italiens.

14. Le Commandement et les officiers français se sont vu reprocher leurs sympathies yougo-slaves, soit parce que les Italiens refusaient de s'associer à eux, soit parce que les Français préféraient fréquenter ces Yougo-Slaves. Il en est résulté chez les Italiens la croyance que les Français étaient avec les Yougo-Slaves contre les aspirations italiennes, et une profonde rancune locale.

15. Il n'y a donc pas de doute que la responsabilité générale de ce qui vient de se passer retombe sur tous ces organes, moins pour les fonctions qu'ils exercent que pour la manière dont ils les ont comprises et exercées.

16. La responsabilité des lacunes du service de police et du manque total de sanctions retombe sur le Commandement italien.

D. Propositions

17. Etant donné ce qui précède, le meilleur moyen de rétablir l'ordre et d'empêcher le renouvellement des troubles, serait de décider le sort de Fiume le plus tôt possible, pour mettre fin à une période d'attente qui encourage tous les éléments subversifs à s'agiter afin d'obtenir la solution qu'ils souhaitent.

On pourrait prendre, dès maintenant, les mesures suivantes :

1^o Remplacer le Conseil national italien de Fiume par un Gouvernement élu sous le contrôle d'une Commission militaire interallié[e] qui en garantira l'impartialité.

2^o Constituer une Commission militaire interalliée chargée de la surveillance et de l'administration civile du 'Corpus separatum' de Fiume et de Susak. Cette Commission comprendrait un représentant des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie. Elle contrôlerait également les élections mentionnées au paragraphe précédent. Le Président en sera le Représentant américain ou anglais.

3^o a) Changer le personnel du Commandement italien et les troupes qui ont pris part aux derniers troubles. Prévenir le nouveau Commandement que son action

doit être exclusivement militaire et qu'il ne doit pas intervenir dans l'Administration civile;

b) Les forces italiennes d'occupation, à l'Est de la ligne d'armistice seront réduites à une brigade d'infanterie et un escadron de cavalerie, un seul bataillon de cette brigade étant cantonné dans Fiume-Susak. Le Général commandant cette brigade pourrait résider à Fiume et il y exercera le commandement tactique des forces interalliées. Aucune puissance ne pourra avoir plus d'un bataillon stationné dans la ville, y compris la police militaire.

5° [4°] a) Relever en entier le bataillon d'infanterie coloniale français;

b) Changer le personnel de la base française;

c) En raison de l'hostilité de la population fiumaine à l'égard de cette base, il est désirable qu'elle soit supprimée le plus tôt possible.

5° Deux navires de guerre par nation au maximum pourront être présents sur rade en même temps, à l'exclusion des navires de guerre français et italiens, avec leur personnel, qui se sont déjà trouvés à Fiume depuis l'armistice à quelque époque que ce soit.

6° En attendant la création d'une police locale militaire, créer, pour maintenir l'ordre, un corps de police anglais ou américain de la force d'un bataillon, dépendant de la Commission militaire interalliée, prévue au paragraphe 2. Le Président de cette Commission pourrait s'adresser au Commandement du Corps interallié d'occupation et aux Commandants des navires de guerre interalliés pour avoir des renforts en cas de besoin.

7° Suppression immédiate du bataillon fiumain.

8° Enquête judiciaire:

a) Sur la mort du soldat français Penuisic;

b) Sur les faits reprochés:

A l'officier supérieur commandant les compagnies de débarquement;

Au commandant de la compagnie de débarquement qui a attaqué le poste du Port Barros;

A l'officier qui s'est introduit dans l'appartement d'un officier français pour procéder, sans en avoir reçu l'ordre, à son arrestation;

Au Commandant des carabiniers italiens.

9. Les réparations d'ordre moral et d'ordre matériel dues à la France pour la mort de ses soldats et les dégâts des magasins de la base seront réglées, selon les usages diplomatiques, par entente directe entre les Gouvernements intéressés.

10. Rien ne doit être négligé pour que l'entente parfaite et la camaraderie qui, hors de Fiume, ont toujours existé entre l'armée française et l'armée italienne, si dignes l'une de l'autre, soient rétablies pour l'intérêt commun et pour mener à bien la grande œuvre de la paix.

11. Action immédiate et effective de la part des Alliés dans le but de fournir à l'Italie tout ce dont elle a besoin pour faire revivre son industrie et assurer sa prospérité. Ceci aiderait beaucoup à faire renaître les bons sentiments et serait une démonstration, de la part des Alliés, de leur appréciation des sacrifices faits par l'Italie pour la cause commune.

12. Etant donné le manque de vivres, la Commission recommande vivement que la Serbie soit invitée à lever immédiatement les prohibitions d'exportation sur les objets d'alimentation à destination de Fiume et de la Dalmatie.

Fiume, le 9 août 1919.

Document 1

Télégramme adressé au Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix, Paris

BUDAPEST, 23 août 1919, 9 h.

N. 181. De prot. compte rendu séance après midi du 23 août. Commission a communiqué à Archiduc télégramme Conseil Suprême du 23 août¹⁰ accompagné par lettre dans laquelle on lui donnait deux heures de temps pour faire connaître sa décision en l'informant que si celle-ci n'était pas conforme aux intentions exprimées par Conférence Paix, la Commission aurait été obligée de livrer ce document à la publicité. A 8 heures du soir, Président du Conseil hongrois Friedrich a informé par lettre la Commission que Archiduc et Gouvernement actuel donnent leur démission et prient faire tout ce qui leur semblera nécessaire. Commission à toutes fins utiles a cru bon appeler immédiatement Monsieur Friedrich et lui conformer [*sic*] que Commission ayant déjà communiqué ce que Conférence Paix croit nécessaire retient que Gouvernement actuel assurera comme il est d'usage expédition affaires courantes jusque formation du nouveau gouvernement dans lequel tous les partis soient représentés. Monsieur Friedrich a promis que dans quelques jours espère pouvoir présenter liste du nouveau cabinet.

MISSION MILITAIRE INTERALLIÉE.

Document 2

Télégramme adressé au Conseil Suprême Interallié, Paris

BUDAPEST, 24 août — 20 h. 31.

T. 180 de Prot compte rendu séance matinée du 23 août.

La Commission a entendu ce matin M. Diamandi qui, ayant reçu instructions de Bucarest, est venu exposer thèse du Gouvernement roumain en ce qui concerne matériel. D'après ces déclarations, cette thèse doit être soutenue en même temps à Paris devant Conseil Suprême. La Roumanie voit ses propres locomotives et wagons aux mains des Hongrois, alors qu'elle n'en a pas pour ses propres besoins.

'Le matériel que lui ont pris les Hongrois ne peut pas être considéré comme un gage appartenant aux Puissances Alliées.

'D'autre part, le Comte Czernin a donné en plein Parlement l'énumération de ce qui a été pris en Roumanie. Comme compensation Roumanie estime qu'elle doit requérir non seulement ce qui est strictement indispensable aux besoins des troupes d'occupation, mais aussi 30 pour-cent de tous les articles existant en Hongrie.

'Que se passerait-il si Roumains se retiraient? Quelles garanties qu'on leur restituerait le matériel abandonné par eux en Hongrie? Qui protégera Roumanie contre l'emploi qui pourrait en être fait contre elle? Le retard apporté à saisir matériel hongrois est à l'avantage hongrois et cause de grands dommages à Roumanie.

'Il ne faut pas oublier que Roumanie est également menacée sur front russe.

¹⁰ See No. 40, appendix G.

‘Un peu moins de rigidité dans décision de Paris pourrait faciliter accord qui sans cela serait difficile.’

Sans énumérer autres arguments présentés par M. Diamandi, il est certain que la réquisition et les envois en Roumanie sont continués.

La Commission pourra contrôler les envois par des Commissions d'officiers dont une fonctionnera à partir de demain à Szolnok où pont de chemin de fer va être rétabli et les autres à bref délai en d'autres points.

Il n'est pas au pouvoir de la Commission d'empêcher réquisition et elle ne peut qu'en référer au Conseil Suprême. Jusqu'à présent, en ce qui concerne les Roumains, l'œuvre de la Mission [n']a été pratiquement d'aucune valeur.

En conséquence, cette mission est d'avis que serait inutile de continuer ces pourparlers avec autorités roumaines locales qui suivent une conduite de procrastination avec intention évidente s'emparer de toute chose de valeur qui reste en Hongrie et qui ont continuellement manqué à leurs promesses.

MISSION MILITAIRE INTERALLIÉE.

APPENDIX C TO No. 42

Télégramme adressé par le Conseil Suprême des Alliés au Gouvernement Roumain

(par l'intermédiaire du Chargé d'Affaires de France à Bucarest.)

PARIS, le 25 août 1919.

Les rapports de la Commission Interalliée des Généraux de Budapest établissent que les autorités militaires roumaines continuent, en dépit des assurances données tant par le Gouvernement roumain que par ses représentants à Paris, à vider la Hongrie de ses ressources de tout ordre.

La Conférence de la Paix a pris connaissance de ces informations avec la plus pénible surprise. Elle attend avec la plus grande impatience la réponse du Gouvernement roumain au télégramme que le Conseil Suprême lui a adressé le 23 courant, qui a confirmé définitivement ses vues, déjà exprimées, à plusieurs reprises, mais elle doit dès maintenant avertir le Gouvernement roumain que si les procédés des autorités roumaines en Hongrie ne sont pas entièrement et immédiatement modifiés, une telle attitude entraînera pour la Roumanie les plus sérieuses conséquences.

G. CLEMENCEAU

APPENDIX D TO No. 42

GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY.

S H Bulletin No. 771.

2^e Bureau A.

August 23, 1919.

Sale of Material belonging to British and American Troops

The newspapers of Cologne continue to publish for the British authorities, announcements of auction sales of automobiles, horses and mules belonging to the army. The Americans also circulate announcements: at Boppard they are proceeding to conduct sales of military material.

Annexed is the original and the translation of an announcement of the *Koel-nische Volkszeitung* relative to an auction sale of horses and mules. Other similar

announcements, relative to the sale of automobiles and trucks by the British, recently communicated to the General staff, have been destroyed.

'Notice.

Upon the order of the British Army
Sales at auction of
250 surplus horses and mules.

Mr. Carl Polhaus
will sell these animals at public auction
at Solingen.
Loup-Garou. Sebastian-Schützenplatz.

The sale will commence at 9 o'clock.

Payments will be made in cash. Checks [Cheques] will not be accepted. The animals will be delivered without halters; they can be taken away immediately after payment for same. Their transfer into the non-occupied zone is authorized.'

APPENDIX E TO No. 42

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

S H Bulletin No. 772.

August 25, 1919.

Telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople on the action of Admiral Bristol in presenting a Telegram to the Turkish Government before consultation with the Inter-Allied High Commission

August 23, 1919.

Translation.

Admiral Bristol, recently appointed American High Commissioner to Constantinople, remitted a comminatory memorandum to the Grand Vizir on the 22nd instant without having advised the Allied High Commissioners.

The following is a résumé of the note:

'President Wilson notifies the Turkish Government that if immediate measures are not taken to prohibit all violence or massacres on the part of the Turks, Kurds, or other Mussulmans against the Armenians in the Caucasus or elsewhere, the President will withdraw Article 12 from the Peace Conditions¹¹ (rules concerning the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty). This action would result in the complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. If the Turks desire to continue to exercise any sovereignty over any part of the Empire they must show that they not only have the intention, but the authority to prohibit their nationals from engaging in these atrocities: no excuse being powerless in the matter will be accepted from the Turks.'

The Grand Vizir communicated this memorandum to the English and French High Commissioners. He is very uneasy and declares that he has not been authorised to control the necessary forces to maintain order or to obtain the financial resources indispensable for the payment of his soldiers and functionaries; under these conditions he is completely at bay. He could not help remarking that

¹¹ i.e. the Fourteen Points. See minute 5 above.

America, a country which has not been at war with Turkey and did not sign the Armistice, gave this imperative notification separately and without participation on the part of the Allied Powers.

APPENDIX F TO NO. 42

Document I

COMITÉ DE COORDINATION POUR LA RÉPONSE À L'AUTRICHE

Note pour le Conseil Suprême

25 août 1919.

Dans sa séance du 19 août, le Conseil suprême, voulant se réserver l'examen des projets de réponse à la note autrichienne, au point de vue du fond, a décidé que les fonctions du Comité de coordination se borneraient à des changements de forme.¹²

Toutefois, le Conseil suprême a donné des instructions pour que les membres du Comité lui soumettent des rapports sur tous les points où il leur paraît qu'il y aurait lieu d'introduire des changements de fond.

En exécution de ces instructions, le Comité de coordination a l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil suprême:

1° Un projet de lettre d'envoi;

2° Un mémorandum annexe contenant les projets préparés par les Commissions en réponse aux contre-propositions autrichiennes et coordonnés par le Comité.¹³

¹² See No. 37, minute 1.

¹³ Not printed. This draft reply of 51 pages in the original was in the main the same as the final text of the 'Réponse des Puissances Alliées et Associées aux Remarques de la Délégation Autrichienne sur les Conditions de Paix', printed in *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye*, vol. ii, pp. 318-73. The more considerable divergencies between the final text and the draft in this appendix were:

(i) *Part II: Section III: Styria*. In place of the last two paragraphs (attribution of Radkersburg) the draft read: 'Dans ces conditions elles [les Puissances alliées et associées] restent convaincues que leur solution répond à la fois au sentiment et à l'intérêt de la majorité des populations.' (Correspondingly the draft did not include the phrase 'sauf sur un point' in the last sentence of the second paragraph of Part II.)

(ii) *Part III: Sections V and VIII*. Not included in the draft.

(iii) *Part III: Section VI (Nationalities)*. The draft differed in minor particulars from the final text (cf. No. 43, minute 3 b) and was headed Section II.

(iv) *Part VII (Sanctions)*. The draft did not include the sixth and seventh paragraphs (beginning: 'Les Puissances alliées et associées ne désirent. . .').

(v) *Part X: Section I (Economic Clauses)*. Paragraph 2 of the new article 224 was not included in the draft, and the draft for paragraph 3 read 'La Tchéco-Slovaquie et la Pologne s'engagent en outre à ne pas imposer pendant chacune des trois premières années de cette période aucun droit à l'exportation ou autre restriction à l'exportation vers l'Autriche de charbon ou de lignite, jusqu'à concurrence d'une quantité raisonnable qui sera fixée, à défaut d'accord entre les États intéressés, par la Commission des Réparations. Dans la détermination de cette quantité, la Commission des Réparations tiendra compte des quantités de charbon comme de lignite normalement fournies aux territoires de l'Autriche actuelle par la Haute-Silésie et les territoires autrichiens cédés à la Tchéco-Slovaquie et à la Pologne en exécution du Traité de Paix.'

(vi) *Part X: Section VIII*. The draft relative to article 260 [266] differed somewhat from

3° Une annexe¹⁴ énumérant les différents points sur lesquels un ou plusieurs membres du Comité sont d'avis qu'il y aurait lieu d'attirer l'attention du Conseil suprême. Il est à peine besoin d'ajouter que les auteurs de ces notes n'ont eu pour intention que de faciliter la tâche du Conseil Suprême, dans l'examen des projets de réponse.

Le Président: J. CAMBON

Document 2

Projet. *Lettre d'Envoi au Président de la Délégation Autrichienne de la Réponse des Puissances Alliées et Associées*

A Son Excellence,

M. Renner, Président de la Délégation autrichienne, à Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

PARIS, le [. . .] août 1919.

Monsieur le Président,

Les Puissances alliées et associées ont examiné avec une particulière attention les observations de la Délégation autrichienne relatives aux Conditions de paix.

Vous trouverez ci-joint leur réponse, qui contient tous les amendements dont l'introduction dans le Traité a paru équitable et pratiquement réalisable.

La Délégation autrichienne a soulevé des objections de principe contre certaines clauses du projet primitif du Traité de paix; elle a fait remarquer qu'elles impliquaient d'abord que l'Autriche est un État ennemi et, en outre, qu'elle est l'héritière des obligations de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. La Délégation autrichienne prétend que l'Autriche est un État entièrement nouveau, né de la dissolution de la Monarchie: créé après l'armistice, il n'a en fait jamais été en guerre avec les Puissances alliées et associées, qui ne sauraient donc le traiter en ennemi; il ne serait pas juste d'en faire spécialement l'héritier des obligations de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de lui faire supporter le poids des indemnités et réparations qu'on aurait certainement imposées à la Monarchie si elle avait encore existé.

Les Puissances alliées et associées ne peuvent admettre ce point de vue. Il ne faut pas oublier que la guerre a son origine dans l'ultimatum si rigoureux adressé de Vienne à la Serbie le 23 juillet 1914, et suivi de la déclaration de guerre du 25 juillet, malgré une réponse du Gouvernement serbe universellement jugée conciliante. Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que, dès les premiers jours d'août 1914, les pièces d'artillerie autrichiennes de gros calibre bombardaient les places fortes de la Belgique, associant ainsi le Gouvernement autrichien à la violation de la neutralité de ce pays.

Il est vrai sans doute que la responsabilité première de la guerre incombe au Gouvernement de l'ancienne Monarchie et que ce Gouvernement a disparu; mais se borner à cette constatation, c'est donner de la situation une image incomplète. Pendant toute une génération, la politique de l'État austro-hongrois, qu'il s'agît des affaires constitutionnelles intérieures ou des relations extérieures, n'a eu d'autre objet que de rechercher l'appui de l'Empire allemand pour cimenter l'hégémonie

the final text and no draft was included for the observations on article 261 [267]

(vii) *Part XII* (Ports, Waterways and Railways). The draft for the third and fourth paragraphs was as printed in translation by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xi, p. 138.

¹⁴ Document 3 in this appendix.

des éléments allemands et magyars sur les éléments slaves et latins de la Monarchie, et pour l'étendre sur les États indépendants des Balkans. Les événements des six dernières années font apparaître la guerre comme une lutte entre les éléments germaniques, slaves et latins de l'Europe orientale. Le succès des Puissances centrales aurait indubitablement conduit à l'établissement d'une hégémonie complète et permanente de la puissance militaire allemande, de la pensée politique allemande, des idées intellectuelles allemandes sur la plus grande partie du continent européen.

La rupture du lien qui unissait l'Autriche à la Hongrie n'a rien changé à leur condition de belligérants dans la présente guerre; elle a affecté sans doute la situation de l'organisme international jusque-là reconnu par les Puissances, mais on aurait quelque peine à nier qu'en fait, — et la guerre est une question de fait — l'état de guerre a subsisté. D'ailleurs, on ne saurait dire que l'établissement à Vienne d'un nouveau Gouvernement fût de nature à modifier les rapports de l'Autriche avec ses ennemis. Pas plus que la rupture d'un lien fédéral, un changement de gouvernement ne procure la paix. Ce sont là des actes de forme, qui ne vont pas au fond de si graves affaires. C'est dans le caractère des peuples que plongent les racines de la guerre; aussi longtemps qu'ils ne se sont pas mis d'accord pour vivre en paix, les Gouvernements peuvent se faire ou se défaire, se désagréger ou durer: les peuples n'en continueront pas moins à se battre. C'est ainsi que les Puissances alliées et associées estiment que l'état de guerre, créé par la Monarchie en juillet 1914, a duré jusqu'à aujourd'hui, et que l'Autriche y a participé et y participe encore. Aux yeux des Puissances alliées et associées, l'Autriche est donc un État ennemi.

Au contraire, en pleine guerre et longtemps avant l'armistice, les slaves et les latins de l'ancienne Monarchie se sont ralliés aux légions des hommes libres sous les drapeaux des Grandes Puissances. Leurs soldats se sont enrôlés dans les armées de la Liberté; ils ont servi sur les différents fronts, ont organisé des unités indépendantes et ont été reconnus comme co-belligérants par les Gouvernements alliés et associés. Leur exemple a inspiré leurs concitoyens et les aspirations longtemps contenues de ses peuples se sont donné libre cours dans une explosion de vie nationale. Ils ont pris leur place parmi les autres États. Ce n'est pas de leur propre gré qu'ils ont fait la guerre dans les rangs des soldats de la Monarchie; ils l'ont montré depuis, en s'unissant à leurs prétendus ennemis qui les ont admis dans leur alliance.

Ce démembrement de la Monarchie n'a pas éteint ses obligations d'avant-guerre ni celles qu'elle a contractées pour faire la guerre, et les Puissances alliées et associées victorieuses ont dû résoudre le difficile problème de leur liquidation, dans un esprit d'équité et de justice. Il n'existait ni théorie ni pratique réglant les relations entre États qui pussent les guider dans cette situation sans précédent.

Bien que l'Autriche (avec la Hongrie) soit l'héritière de la Monarchie, on n'en est pas moins obligé de reconnaître que réduite à l'état d'un petit peuple de 6 millions d'âmes, elle ne peut supporter ni éteindre les obligations contractées par une grande Puissance d'environ cinquante millions d'habitants occupant d'immenses territoires comme l'ancienne Monarchie avant son effondrement.

Pénétrés de ces faits, nous avons inséré dans le Traité qu'accompagne cette lettre des dispositions assez élastiques relatives aux responsabilités d'ordre matériel incombant à l'Autriche, de manière à lui permettre d'adapter dès maintenant et à l'avenir son existence à ces nouvelles conditions. De plus, on a procédé à la répartition de certaines de ces obligations entre les États issus de l'ancienne

Monarchie ou agrandis à ses dépens; ainsi la liquidation du grand Empire pourra s'effectuer en tenant compte aussi bien des faits qu'implique la situation actuelle, que de cet autre fait inoubliable, que l'Empire a attiré sur le monde un cortège de destructions, de misères et d'horreurs.

En outre, les Puissances alliées et associées se rappellent que la Monarchie austro-hongroise, en demandant un armistice et en acceptant sans conditions ses clauses, a reconnu pleinement sa défaite complète sur le champ de bataille.

L'Autriche est un grand État ennemi; elle hérite des responsabilités qu'elle a encourues lorsqu'elle faisait partie de l'ancienne Monarchie; elle est du côté des vaincus dans cette guerre: ce sont là les justes déductions qui ont servi de base à l'examen des contre-propositions autrichiennes et qui constituent le fondement de la paix que les Puissances alliées et associées doivent conclure avec l'Autriche.

Nous n'avons pas jugé devoir reviser les clauses territoriales, pour les raisons qu'expose la réponse des Alliés. Nous nous bornerons à indiquer ici que si certaines considérations géographiques ou économiques d'ordre supérieur nous ont amenés à maintenir en dehors de l'Autriche quelques populations allemandes, c'est que la constitution de cet état de choses est apparue comme plus nécessaire à l'existence des nouveaux États issus de l'ancien Empire austro-hongrois et aux intérêts des autres États limitrophes que la conservation de ces populations par l'Autriche actuelle n'était indispensable à celle-ci. La solution adoptée est du reste de nature à assurer le bien-être de ces populations allemandes, en les maintenant dans le ressort des pays avec lesquels s'effectuent toutes leurs relations commerciales et industrielles et dans lesquels elles peuvent le plus aisément faire prospérer leurs industries: tel est le cas, notamment, pour les Allemands de Bohême.

Les Puissances alliées et associées ont l'intime conviction que les solutions adoptées pour le tracé des frontières sont indispensables si l'on veut assurer l'existence de tous les peuples issus de l'ancienne Autriche-Hongrie, sans les exposer tous, y compris la nouvelle Autriche, à l'anarchie et à des rivalités pouvant les entraîner à la guerre.

Constatant d'ailleurs que la Délégation autrichienne n'exclut pas l'espoir de s'accommoder de la nouvelle répartition géographique des territoires, grâce à l'heureuse influence que pourra exercer la Société des Nations sur tous les peuples du monde, elles saisissent cette occasion pour renouveler à la Délégation autrichienne l'assurance que leur sincère désir est de voir admettre l'Autriche à très brève échéance dans la Société des Nations.

En ce qui concerne les clauses économiques et financières signalées avec une particulière insistance dans la note de la Délégation, les Puissances alliées et associées se sont appliquées à rechercher tous les accommodements possibles.

Elles tiennent avant tout, à assurer l'Autriche que la Commission des Réparations, tout en poursuivant sa mission, se montrera imbuë des principes hautement humanitaires, et usera des ménagements que comporte actuellement la situation critique de l'Autriche au point de vue alimentaire. Confiante dans la loyauté avec laquelle l'Autriche poursuivra l'accomplissement de l'ensemble des stipulations du Traité, les Puissances alliées et associées chargeront la Commission de veiller à ce que le ravitaillement indispensable ne soit à aucun moment compromis.

Au point de vue financier, le principal effort des Puissances alliées et associées a porté sur la question du partage des dettes d'avant-guerre et des dettes de guerre entre l'Autriche et les divers États issus de l'ancien Empire. Elles ont décidé d'apporter en ces matières des modifications importantes aux dispositions initialement

prévues, et leur réponse en donne le détail. Il n'est pas possible aux Puissances d'aller plus loin et de mettre les nouveaux États sur le même pied que l'Autriche et la Hongrie.

En dehors de la question du règlement des dettes, plusieurs autres modifications conformes aux désirs de la Délégation autrichienne ont été introduites dans le Traité.

Les Puissances alliées et associées ont prévu d'autre part l'insertion dans le Traité de quelques dispositions nécessaires pour le mettre en harmonie avec les accords qui régleront les rapports de tous les États successeurs. Il ne s'agit là que de clauses secondaires, ne portant pas sur les droits de souveraineté de l'Autriche et dont l'insertion constituera un avantage réciproque pour toutes les Parties.

Le Gouvernement de l'Autriche, à maintes reprises, a réclamé le droit de parler non pas seulement au nom des populations habitant les territoires sur lesquels il a, en fait, exercé sa souveraineté depuis la dissolution de l'Empire, mais aussi, au nom de toutes les populations de langue allemande de la Monarchie. La paix ne peut être signée que s'il représente seulement la population des territoires qui lui sont assignés et à l'égard desquels il sera désormais reconnu officiellement comme le Gouvernement régulier. La Délégation autrichienne a fait mainte fois allusion à la situation des populations de langue allemande dans le nord de la Bohême. C'est là une question qui ne la regarde en rien. Ce n'est pas au Gouvernement autrichien qu'incombe le devoir de représenter les désirs ou de veiller aux intérêts de ces populations.

Conformément à ce principe, la Conférence a décidé que l'État que vous représentez sera connu sous le nom d'Autriche et non pas sous le nom d'Autriche allemande.

Si cette dernière dénomination avait été acceptée, on aurait pu interpréter cette décision comme la reconnaissance d'un droit qui n'existe pas. Parler d'une Autriche allemande impliquerait qu'il existe une autre Autriche qui n'est pas allemande. Or, il n'existe pas d'autre Autriche. L'Autriche, la Bohême et la Hongrie, pendant longtemps unies dans le même système politique, se sont séparées; chacun de ces pays reprend la situation qu'il occupait jadis comme État séparé.

Les modifications que nous venons d'apporter au projet initial de Traité sont les dernières dont celui-ci nous paraît susceptible: autrement, il ne serait pas une paix de justice. Mais nous devons rappeler en terminant que le Gouvernement autrichien ne saurait s'attendre à une clémence plus grande et à une absolution plus complète des événements survenus pendant la récente guerre.

Les Puissances alliées et associées n'ont pas répondu expressément à tous les points soulevés par la Délégation autrichienne dans les notes remises par elle. Mais elles entendent établir clairement que l'absence de réponse de leur part n'implique pas un acquiescement aux objections formulées, ni à telles interprétations du texte du Traité auxquelles cette absence de réponse pourrait donner lieu.

La rédaction du Traité que nous vous apportons aujourd'hui, venant après celle du 20 juillet dernier qui avait déjà fait subir de considérables modifications au texte initial du 2 juin, doit être acceptée ou rejetée dans les termes mêmes où elle est conçue.

En conséquence, les Puissances alliées et associées attendent de la Délégation autrichienne, dans les 5 jours à compter de la date de la présente communication, une déclaration leur faisant connaître qu'elle est prête à signer le traité tel qu'il est. Aussitôt cette déclaration parvenue aux Puissances alliées et associées, les

dispositions seront prises pour la signature immédiate de la paix à Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

Faute d'une telle déclaration dans le délai ci-dessus, l'armistice conclu le 3 novembre 1918 serait considéré comme ayant pris fin, et les Puissances alliées et associées prendraient les mesures qu'elles jugeraient nécessaires pour imposer leurs conditions.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

Document 3

Réserves formulées par les Délégations

LETTRE D'ENVOI

Proposition britannique

La Délégation britannique propose que le libellé de la lettre d'envoi soit modifié de façon à incorporer les principes suivants :

I. 1° L'état de guerre qui, jusqu'à l'armistice a incontestablement existé, n'a en fait pas cessé jusqu'à maintenant pour les populations de l'Autriche et le fait qu'un nouveau Gouvernement a été institué n'y a pas mis fin ;

2° Les Puissances alliées et associées ont donc le droit de mettre à la conclusion de la Paix des conditions qu'il leur appartient à elles seules d'imposer ;

3° Par le fait même de la signature de la Paix ces Puissances reconnaissent le nouveau Gouvernement de la République d'Autriche ; en le faisant, elles sont disposées à reconnaître aussi que l'Autriche est un nouvel État qui n'hérite ni des droits, ni des obligations de l'ancienne Monarchie austro-hongroise ou de la partie cisleithane de cette Monarchie, sauf des droits et obligations créés par le texte même du Traité.

Il faudrait à ce texte des modifications afin de le rendre plus clairement conforme à ces principes.

Les paragraphes 1 et 2 sont acceptés par les autres Délégations qui estiment qu'ils figurent déjà dans la lettre et ils repoussent le 3^e point.

II. Le Représentant britannique fait une réserve d'ordre général au premier paragraphe concernant la question de frontière jusqu'à ce qu'une décision définitive ait été prise par le Conseil Suprême, sur les observations présentées pour ce chapitre.

Le Représentant britannique ne peut non plus accepter le deuxième paragraphe qui stipule que la fixation de frontières englobant l'attribution à l'Italie du Tyrol moyen est indispensable. Il s'associe entièrement à la décision prise à l'unanimité par la Commission centrale territoriale, déclarant que, la décision concernant le Tyrol moyen ayant été prise par le Conseil Suprême, il n'appartient à aucun autre organe d'expliquer et de justifier les raisons qui ont motivé cette décision ; ignorant ces raisons, le Représentant britannique ne peut s'associer à une déclaration disant que l'attribution de ce territoire à l'Italie était indispensable.

Les Délégations américaine, française, italienne et japonaise sont opposées à cette réserve.

Proposition américaine

La Délégation américaine appelle l'attention sur les observations suivantes :

La lettre d'envoi à la Délégation autrichienne adopte le point de vue que l'Autriche est, jusqu'à un certain point au moins, le successeur de la Monarchie

austro-hongroise. C'est le point de vue qui, semble-t-il, a été affirmé précédemment à plusieurs reprises, ainsi que le montre l'extrait suivant d'une lettre envoyée le 16 août par la Commission financière au Secrétaire général de la Conférence :

'La Commission financière estime qu'elle n'est pas compétente pour modifier les directives qu'elle a reçues du Conseil Suprême des Puissances alliées et associées, particulièrement par la lettre envoyée par M. Clemenceau à Lord Cunliffe le 12 mai 1919.

'I. La République d'Autriche est le successeur de l'ancienne Monarchie; elle ne saurait être placée sur le même pied que les États auxquels ont été transférés des territoires de l'ancien Empire d'Autriche, ou que les États nés du démembrement de l'Empire: ces États font partie des Puissances alliées et associées et on ne saurait leur imposer le fardeau de la dette de guerre de l'ancienne Monarchie autrichienne . . .'

D'autre part, la lettre de M. Clemenceau à Lord Cunliffe, en date du 12 mai 1919, dit:

'Cher Lord Cunliffe,

'Je suis chargé de vous informer que le Conseil Suprême, dans sa séance du samedi après-midi, 10 mai, a examiné votre lettre du 8 mai par laquelle vous demandez si les États nouvellement créés, tels que la Pologne, etc., doivent assumer une partie de la dette de guerre austro-hongroise.

'Il a été décidé qu'aucune portion de la dette de guerre austro-hongroise ne serait mise à la charge de ces États. En ce qui concerne les réparations, il a été décidé que la Commission dont vous faites partie serait priée de prendre comme base de ses travaux le principe de la participation de tous les États qui ont appartenu à l'ancienne Monarchie austro-hongroise, aux paiements dûs à ce titre. Sur cette base, la Commission aura à fixer le montant total que pourra payer l'ensemble des États qui faisaient partie de l'ancien Empire austro-hongrois; puis elle présentera des propositions sur la part que devra verser chaque État intéressé, en tenant compte de ses engagements antérieurs et de sa capacité de payement . . .'

Nous rappelons également la déclaration faite par la Grande-Bretagne et la France le 28 mars 1918, à la suite de la communication dans laquelle le gouvernement soviétiste de Russie exprimait l'intention de répudier la totalité de la dette publique russe. Cette déclaration disait:

'Aucun principe n'est mieux établi que celui qui veut qu'une nation soit responsable des actes de son gouvernement, et qu'aucun changement de gouvernement ne puisse affecter les obligations précédemment contractées.

'Les obligations de la Russie subsistent; elles lient et continueront à lier les nouveaux États ou le groupe d'États qui représentent ou représenteront la Russie.'

Malgré la position adoptée dans la lettre d'envoi qui va être remise à la Délégation autrichienne, ainsi que dans les autres déclarations citées ci-dessus, le préambule du Traité avec l'Autriche déclare que:

'L'Autriche est reconnue comme *État nouveau et indépendant*, sous le nom de République d'Autriche.'

Il est laissé au Conseil Suprême le soin de décider si cette phrase du Préambule du Traité n'est pas en contradiction avec la déclaration faite dans la lettre d'envoi ainsi qu'avec les autres déclarations citées ci-dessus.

En outre, nous faisons remarquer que la clause du Traité déclarant que 'l'Autriche est reconnue comme un état nouveau et indépendant, sous le nom de République d'Autriche' pourrait amener des erreurs d'interprétation, quant aux droits et obligations (en dehors de ceux mentionnés dans le Traité) de la nouvelle Autriche, en tant que faisant partie des États héritiers de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. On ne peut prévoir sur quels points les Puissances alliées et associées voudront tenir l'Autriche responsable en ce qui concerne les droits et obligations qui, au point de vue du droit international et de la justice, lui reviennent en raison de son ancienne situation dans la Monarchie austro-hongroise — droits et obligations qui ne rentrent pas dans le présent Traité. De plus, les États neutres comptent que l'Autriche remplira certaines obligations, et l'Autriche compte que ces États lui reconnaîtront certains droits qui résultent de son ancienne situation dans la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Il est possible que le nouvel État d'Autriche se considère, en raison de sa reconnaissance par le Traité 'comme État nouveau et indépendant', comme dégagé, selon le droit des gens et la pratique internationale, de toutes les obligations, à l'égard des Principales Puissances alliées et associées ou des États neutres, obligations qui découlent de ses anciens liens avec la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Elle peut même, en se basant sur cette reconnaissance comme 'État nouveau et indépendant', présenter l'argument qu'elle commence son existence, libre de tout passé, sans autres obligations que celles qui lui sont imposées par le Traité de paix. Il est fait remarquer qu'il serait dangereux et probablement gênant pour les Principales Puissances alliées et associées de permettre à l'Autriche par un document officiel, comme le Traité de paix, de prendre une semblable attitude.

En conséquence il est proposé que la clause du Traité, ci-dessus mentionnée, soit rédigée comme suit:

1° L'Autriche est reconnue comme une République, sous le nom de République d'Autriche,

ou bien:

2° Que la clause soit entièrement supprimée et que le nom 'Autriche' dans l'énumération des 'Hautes Puissances Contractantes' soit remplacé par celui de 'République d'Autriche'.

Partie II. FRONTIÈRES DE L'AUTRICHE. [Not printed.]¹⁵

Partie III. CLAUSES POLITIQUES. [Not printed.]¹⁶

Partie IV. INTÉRÊTS AUTRICHIENS HORS D'EUROPE

Les bâtiments diplomatiques et consulaires au Maroc et en Égypte ne doivent pas faire l'objet d'une cession. L'ensemble de la question de la propriété des

¹⁵ Part II contained three reservations with regard to Gmünd, Styria (Marburg), and Carinthia (Klagenfurt) respectively: for which see minute 6 (a), above.

¹⁶ Part III was a note stating that the Editing Committee was considering a proposal from the Committee on Political Clauses, arising out of its discussion of a draft convention with the representatives of Allied States to which territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been transferred, that the following additional paragraph be inserted in the appropriate place in the treaty of peace with Austria: 'L'Autriche communiquera, sous condition de réciprocité, aux Gouvernements alliés et associés intéressés toutes les archives, registres, plans, titres de propriété et documents de quelque nature qu'ils soient, se rapportant à des questions d'ordre civil, financier, judiciaire sur ces territoires et qui intéresseraient un organisme public, sur l'un des territoires transférés par le présent Traité.'

bâtiments diplomatiques et consulaires appartenant à la Monarchie austro-hongroise devrait faire l'objet d'une convention spéciale entre les États intéressés et une clause à cet effet devrait être insérée dans le Traité.

Recommandé par les Délégations américaine et britannique

Partie V. CLAUSES AÉRIENNES

Section III

L'article 143 [147]⁴ dit :

'Pendant les six mois qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, la fabrication, l'importation et l'exportation des aéronefs, pièces d'aéronefs, ainsi que des moteurs d'aéronefs et pièces de moteurs d'aéronefs, seront interdites dans tout le territoire de l'Autriche.'

La Délégation autrichienne fait remarquer, au sujet de cette clause, que d'interdire en Autriche l'emploi de main-d'œuvre pour des constructions aéronautiques, reviendrait à réduire au chômage un grand nombre d'hommes, ce qui augmenterait la désorganisation sociale dont souffre ce pays.

Le projet de réponse refuse de tenir compte de cet argument. D'abord, on y allègue que les ouvriers n'auront pas de peine à trouver un autre travail, à l'appui de quoi on cite l'exemple de la France et de l'Angleterre; secondement, on y affirme qu'il y aurait un danger d'ordre militaire à permettre à l'Autriche de continuer la fabrication du matériel aéronautique, parce qu'il pourrait servir à approvisionner l'Allemagne.

Ni l'une ni l'autre de ces raisons ne semblent valables [*sic*]. Quant à la première, l'analogie avec la France et l'Angleterre est de nature à induire en erreur; d'autres raisons spéciales à l'Autriche rendront la recherche d'emplois très difficile pour de grandes populations industrielles.

Quant aux raisons d'ordre militaire, il faut remarquer d'abord que la clause en question ne s'appliquera que pendant six mois. Et si jamais un danger est à craindre du côté de l'Allemagne, il est bien improbable qu'il se produise durant cette période. Si jamais ce danger devait se produire, ce serait plus tard, mais alors l'article en question sera devenu inopérant. D'autre part, au point de vue chômage, il faut remarquer que l'article deviendrait opérant au commencement de l'hiver, époque à laquelle la désorganisation sociale a toute chance d'atteindre son point culminant.

Si l'on maintient la clause, il semble donc nécessaire de lui trouver une meilleure justification. Au point de vue politique, la rédaction de tous ces paragraphes semble bien imprudente. Il faut aussi remarquer qu'en vertu du Traité avec l'Allemagne (art. 201), l'importation du matériel aéronautique est interdite pendant les six mois durant lesquels la clause en question reste opérante. Il semblerait que ce soit là une garantie suffisante contre le danger qu'on appréhende, de voir l'Autriche fournir à l'Allemagne de ce matériel.

Recommandée par les Délégations britannique et japonaise.

Repoussée par les Délégations américaine, française et italienne.

Partie VII. RESPONSABILITÉS ET SANCTIONS

Le projet de réponse de la Commission des responsabilités peut se diviser en deux parties: la première traite de la question d'ordre général, de la responsabilité morale de l'Autriche dans la guerre et des relations de l'Autriche avec les nouvelles

nationalités. Les Délégations britannique et japonaise proposent de traiter cette question dans la lettre d'envoi; il ne semble pas opportun de remettre ici sur le tapis cette question d'ordre général, en la traitant comme une simple question de coordination; on propose donc de laisser de côté cette partie de la réponse.

Le reste de la réponse se rapporte à une question soulevée par les Autrichiens dans leur note N° 914, du 6 août.

Comme la Tchéco-Slovaquie et la Pologne n'ont pas été des belligérants, il faudrait reconnaître qu'elles n'ont pas acquis le droit d'exiger la livraison de personnes accusées de violation des lois du droit international, afin d'être jugées et, quant à l'Italie, la Roumanie et l'État Serbo-Croate-Slovène, ce droit devrait se limiter aux portions de leur territoire actuel et à ceux de leurs nationaux qui ont appartenu aux États en question avant la dissolution de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le projet de réponse refuse de reconnaître le bien fondé de ce point et fonde son refus sur 'la reconnaissance d'insurgés comme belligérants'.

Cet argument ne semble pas correspondre aux faits. En Tchéco-Slovaquie, par exemple, il n'y avait pas d'insurgés à proprement parler, et il sera difficile de prouver qu'en Pologne il y ait eu des insurgés qui aient été ou aient pu être reconnus comme belligérants, excepté les légionnaires sous les ordres du Général Pilsudski, lesquels se sont battus dans les rangs autrichiens.

La thèse soutenue par les Autrichiens est juste, et il y aurait lieu d'expliquer que, comme les clauses ne visent que les infractions aux lois et coutumes de la guerre, elles ne visent évidemment pas des actes commis avant la dissolution de la Monarchie austro-hongroise contre des ressortissants de cette Monarchie ou des destructions commises sur son territoire.

Notre réponse qui pourrait être présentée aux Autrichiens, en supposant que ce point rencontre l'approbation du Conseil Suprême, a été rédigée et se trouve ci-jointe.

Recommandée par les Délégations britannique et japonaise.

Repoussée par les Délégations américaine, française et italienne.

Projet de réponse à la note autrichienne

SANCTIONS

Les Puissances alliées et associées ont examiné avec grand soin les arguments contenus dans la note autrichienne du 12 juillet disant que les articles 169 [173] et 172 [176] concernant les sanctions dans leur forme actuelle sont inapplicables aux conditions qui s'appliquaient dans l'ancienne Monarchie austro-hongroise, pour la raison que les lois de la guerre ne s'appliquent qu'entre belligérants, et que les actes dont peuvent avoir à se plaindre les anciens ressortissants autrichiens de la part d'officiers des forces austro-hongroises ne peuvent, par conséquent, constituer des violations des lois de la guerre.

Les Puissances alliées et associées ne désirent pas traiter ici des actes commis par un membre des forces austro-hongroises contre des personnes qui, à ce moment, faisaient également partie de ces forces, ou contre d'autres qui étaient sujets de l'empire d'Autriche ou du royaume de Hongrie, et elles sont d'accord que les lois et coutumes de guerre telles qu'elles sont exposées dans la Convention sur les lois de la guerre terrestre (n° 4 de la Convention signée à la Haye en 1907) et que les règles exposées dans cette Convention ne s'appliquent pas à ces cas.

Ce n'est que dans les cas où les lois et coutumes de la guerre s'appliquent, que les

Puissances alliées et associées désirent ouvrir des poursuites contre les individus faisant partie des forces de l'ancienne Monarchie austro-hongroise; et c'est à des délits de cette nature que sont limitées les poursuites intentées par elle. Les individus qui seront livrés seront mis en jugement dans des conditions qui offriront toute garantie d'un jugement juste. L'article 170 [174] prévoit spécialement que dans tous les cas l'accusé sera autorisé à nommer son propre avocat. La situation est donc, que si un individu quelconque trouve qu'il est accusé d'un délit qui ne constitue pas une violation des lois de la guerre, parce que c'est un acte auquel ne s'appliquent pas les lois de la guerre, il sera évidemment sujet à être acquitté.

Les droits garantis aux individus en question sont si bien définis sous ce rapport qu'il est peu probable qu'on demande de livrer un individu déterminé faisant partie des anciennes forces austro-hongroises pour des actes auxquels ne s'appliquent pas les lois de la guerre. Pour ces raisons, les Puissances alliées et associées n'estiment pas qu'il soit nécessaire d'apporter une modification à ces articles. L'argument exposé dans la même note disant que les lois intérieures de la République d'Autriche empêchent de livrer des ressortissants autrichiens pour être jugés par un tribunal étranger est un argument que les Gouvernements alliés et associés ne peuvent, en aucune façon, admettre et c'est avec quelque surpris qu'ils ont remarqué qu'il en est fait usage. Cela est absolument contraire au principe qu'ils ont jugé essentiel, après mûr examen, d'imposer dans tous les Traités de Paix, à savoir, que les individus coupables des atrocités qui ont été commises dans cette dernière guerre doivent être jugés d'une façon qui empêche, dans l'avenir, le renouvellement d'une pareille conduite.

Recommandée par les Délégations britannique et japonaise.

Repoussée par les Délégations américaine, française et italienne.

Partie VIII. RÉPARATIONS

Le paragraphe 2 de l'Annexe IV donne aux Gouvernements alliés et associés le droit d'établir avec la Commission des Réparations, des listes indiquant le matériel et les objets qui ont été saisis, consommés ou détruits par l'Autriche, et ce en vue de leur remplacement. Si, d'une manière générale, il appartient à la Commission des Réparations de fixer les époques et le chiffre de ces réparations, il y a cependant une exception relative au cheptel vif dont une partie doit être immédiatement livrée aux Gouvernements italien, serbe-croate-slovène et roumain. La Délégation autrichienne a élevé des objections sérieuses contre cette condition. Elle allègue qu'il semble vraiment peu équitable de contraindre l'Autriche à se dessaisir de denrées de valeur au moment précis où les Alliés eux-mêmes jugent nécessaire d'importer des denrées à Vienne.

Les Délégations ci-dessous se permettent de suggérer qu'un examen plus approfondi pourrait faire juger désirable étant donné la situation alimentaire de l'Autriche de laisser de toute manière la Commission des Réparations juge de la question de la livraison du cheptel vivant.

En faisant cette recommandation, elles ont été mues par les motifs suivants:

1. Bien qu'il soit indéniable que pendant la guerre, une quantité considérable de cheptel vif ait été enlevée d'Italie, de Serbie et Roumanie, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les grandes cessions de territoires austro-hongrois faites à ces États leur vaudront, sans aucun doute, l'acquisition de grandes quantités de cheptel vif ayant appartenu à l'Autriche-Hongrie. Sous ce rapport, le cas est très différent de celui de l'Allemagne dont le territoire est demeuré presque intact.

2. Dans une question de cette nature, nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre de négliger l'opinion publique du monde maintenant et dans l'avenir. Chacun, hors de cette Conférence, dira qu'au moment où le peuple de Vienne est affamé, au moment où il est nécessaire d'importer des vivres et, en particulier, du lait pour sauver la vie des petits enfants, nous contraignons l'Autriche à nous livrer une partie de son cheptel vif dont dépend sa subsistance. Néanmoins, il semble douteux, à supposer même — ce qui n'est pas clairement démontré — qu'on puisse trouver une justification à cette mesure dans une comparaison entre la situation alimentaire de l'Autriche et celle des autres pays intéressés, que l'avantage matériel qu'elle rapporterait à ces États puisse contrebalancer les désavantages politiques et moraux qui résulteraient certainement du maintien de cette exigence.

Il est bien malheureux qu'on ne puisse trouver, pour le motiver, des renseignements sûrs et concluants ou des statistiques certaines, à défaut de quoi, le projet de réponse de la Commission des Réparations n'est pas concluant.

Ce n'est pas un argument valable que de dire, ainsi qu'on l'a fait, qu'il existe des villages éloignés dans les confins lointains de la République d'Autriche, par exemple dans le Vorarlberg ou le Salzkammergut d'où on ne puisse pas expédier du lait à Vienne. Le lait produit par le bétail peut être transformé en aliments sous forme de beurre et de fromage. D'une manière générale, toute livraison de moyens de production alimentaire doit tendre à appauvrir l'ensemble de l'État. De plus, il semble que les principales régions productrices d'aliments en Autriche se trouvent être les plus rapprochées de Vienne, en particulier la Haute et la Basse-Autriche, la Styrie et la Carinthie, alors que les districts montagneux éloignés n'arrivent pas à produire le nécessaire pour leur propre population.

Recommandée par les Délégations britannique et japonaise.

Repoussée par les Délégations italienne et française.

La Délégation américaine réserve son opinion.

Comme suite aux raisons données par la Délégation américaine dans le chapitre relatif aux ports, voies d'eau et voies ferrées, cette Délégation attire l'attention sur le caractère interprétatif du passage suivant dans le projet de réponse préparé par la Commission des Réparations.

Le projet de réponse contient à la page 3, quatrième paragraphe,¹⁷ le passage suivant:

'L'intention des Gouvernements alliés et associés n'est pas d'amener par cette disposition les prix du marché intérieur de ces articles au niveau des prix du marché international; ils désirent seulement que l'option leur soit conférée de les acquérir aux prix du marché intérieur et que tout bénéfice résultant de ce privilège soit considéré, ainsi qu'il est dit au début de l'annexe, comme une réparation partielle des dommages causés aux Gouvernements alliés et associés pendant la guerre.'

Au premier paragraphe de l'Annexe V à l'article 186 [190], on lit:

'L'Autriche donne à chacun des Gouvernements alliés et associés, à titre de réparation partielle, une option pour la livraison annuelle, etc. . . .'

Il ne semble pas que les mots *réparation partielle* aient dans ce texte le sens que leur attribue le projet de réponse.

Il est donc suggéré que la dernière clause soit supprimée.

Recommandée par la Délégation américaine.

¹⁷ Eighth paragraph of section II (Examen Détaillé). Cf. note 13 above.

Les autres Délégations réservent leur opinion à l'exception de la Délégation japonaise qui refuse cette suppression.

Il y aurait donc lieu d'omettre [? omettre] dans la réponse la phrase 'et que tout bénéfice etc. . . .'

Recommandée par la Délégation américaine.

Les autres Délégations réservent leur opinion à l'exception de la Délégation japonaise qui y est opposée.

Partie IX. CLAUSES FINANCIÈRES

Proposition Américaine

Dettes d'avant-guerre — Article 199 [203], Section 2

Le projet de réponse proposé par la Commission est rédigé comme suit:

'Il résulte clairement de cet article que la Commission des Réparations aura le devoir de choisir les revenus d'avant-guerre qui seront les plus aptes à l'établissement d'une base de répartition équitable de la dette, en tenant compte des changements de circonstance actuelle.

'Les Gouvernements alliés et associés ne voient aucune raison d'abandonner le principe que la République d'Autriche sera seule responsable, etc. . . .'

Ces paragraphes étant une paraphrase de l'article 199 [203] du Traité, et paraissant en être l'interprétation, il est proposé qu'ils suivent de plus près le texte de l'article 199 de façon à ne pas en paraître une interprétation.

Il est donc suggéré que ces clauses soient rédigées comme suit:

'Il résulte clairement de l'article que la Commission des Réparations aura à choisir les revenus d'avant-guerre qui seront, à son avis, les plus aptes à donner la juste mesure des facultés contributives respectives de ces territoires.

'Les Gouvernements alliés et associés ne voient aucune raison d'abandonner la position qu'ils ont prise, à savoir que . . .'

Cette proposition est appuyée par les Délégations américaine, britannique et japonaise.

La Délégation italienne fait au contraire une réserve formelle.

Partie X. CLAUSES ÉCONOMIQUES

I. — Il doit y avoir en matière de douane une réciprocité entre l'Autriche et les autres États héritiers semblable à celle qui lui a été accordée en matière de communication.

Proposition britannique. Appuyée par les Délégations américaine et japonaise.

Repoussée par la Délégation française.

Réservée par la Délégation italienne.

II. — Un grand nombre des objections élevées par la Délégation autrichienne contre le Traité portent sur ce que les ressortissants des nouveaux États, tels que la Tchéco-Slovaquie, issus de l'Empire autrichien, et ceux des anciens territoires austro-hongrois transférés à des États existants reçoivent en fait certains avantages qui sont accordés aux peuples qui furent antérieurement ennemis de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. On propose de considérer cette vue comme juste. Nous devons distinguer avec soin deux choses:

1° La terminaison de l'état de guerre;

2° La liquidation de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'Empire autrichien.

Même si ceux qui furent antérieurement co-nationaux des habitants de la nouvelle Autriche sont devenus en réalité ennemis de l'Autriche en tant qu'ils ont été reconnus comme membres de l'Alliance, il ne s'ensuit pas qu'ils doivent obtenir, à tous égards, les avantages du traitement réservé, par exemple, à la France et à l'Angleterre.

Il est extrêmement difficile de déterminer, à cette époque-ci précisément, quels sont le sens et les effets du Traité. Tout d'abord, un nombre considérable de modifications ont été suggérées par la Commission économique elle-même, et deuxièmement la Commission des Clauses politiques s'occupe activement de traiter ces questions particulières.

En vue d'éviter un mémoire approfondi traitant d'un grand nombre de clauses séparées, il pourra suffire, dans ces circonstances, que le Conseil Suprême donne des instructions aux fins suivantes : n'inclure dans le Traité aucune clause ayant pour résultat d'imposer aux nationaux autrichiens des désavantages dans le règlement des dettes privées, des contrats, etc., existant entre eux et d'autres ex-sujets austro-hongrois.

Pour rendre claire la position adoptée, les propositions suivantes sont présentées :

1^o Il devra être clairement exposé que les dispositions des sections III, IV, V, VI et VII qui traitent des relations entre ennemis ne s'appliquent pas aux relations entre les nationaux autrichiens et ceux qui étaient antérieurement nationaux soit d'Autriche, soit de Hongrie. Il semble que ce soit bien là ce que l'on veuille dire, mais ce n'est nulle part énoncé ainsi dans le Traité et il pourrait s'élever en conséquence des difficultés d'interprétation.

2^o Comme suite de ce qui précède, il devrait être clairement précisé que, dans la section VIII des clauses économiques, il ne s'agit exclusivement que des relations entre citoyens autrichiens et anciens nationaux d'Autriche ou de Hongrie.

La section VIII sera alors à reviser avec soin, de façon à établir une égalité entre les différentes fractions et à ne pas imposer à l'Autriche des obligations unilatérales.

La Commission des Clauses politiques s'occupe de discuter ces questions avec les autres États alliés. Il est proposé de déclarer que le seul système équitable est celui d'après lequel tous accords faits entre les États alliés qui sont des héritiers, s'appliqueront aussi à l'Autriche. En conséquence, les Autrichiens devraient être assurés des avantages de l'un quelconque de ces accords actuellement en préparation, que ce résultat soit obtenu en modifiant le Traité autrichien, de façon à le mettre en harmonie avec l'autre Traité, ou en autorisant l'Autriche à devenir elle-même partie à l'autre Traité. En plus de ceci, la Commission des Clauses politiques prépare une série de conventions particulières traitant de sujets qui ne peuvent être achevés avant que le Traité autrichien ne soit signé. Il est tout à fait essentiel de spécifier et de déterminer que l'Autriche devra être autorisée à être partie aux négociations qui s'engageront pour ces conventions séparées, dans les mêmes conditions que les autres États héritiers.

Proposition britannique.

Les autres Délégations réservent leur opinion.

Partie XII. PORTS, VOIES D'EAU ET VOIES FERRÉES

I. — La restriction imposée à l'Autriche par le deuxième paragraphe de l'article 287 [293] qui lui interdit de participer au service régulier de la navigation sur le Danube entre les ports de l'une quelconque des Puissances alliées et associées, sans

une autorisation formelle de cette Puissance, est, si on la considère avec l'esprit de l'article 294 [300], très dure.

L'objet de cette stipulation est de permettre aux autres États de se réserver une certaine partie du trafic du Danube; ils paraissent craindre qu'ils ne puissent y parvenir, car en réalité tous les bateaux employés pour ce trafic, appartiennent à des Compagnies viennoises. Si, d'autre part, l'Autriche est forcée de céder un certain nombre de ces bateaux, il paraît tout à fait inutile de lui imposer en outre la restriction en question.

Recommandée par la Délégation britannique.

Repoussée par les autres Délégations.

II. — L'article 310 [318] paraît demander une revision. Tout d'abord, il n'est pas correct de parler de la 'cession' de ports, de voies navigables, et de chemins de fer. La présente rédaction paraît impliquer que les chemins de fer, les ports et les voies navigables appartiennent à l'Autriche et sont cédés aux autres États; une vue plus juste semble être que les chemins de fer, etc., appartiennent au territoire sur lequel ils sont situés; le territoire n'est pas cédé par l'Autriche, mais est assigné à ces États de la même manière que le territoire autrichien est assigné à l'Autriche.

L'article sous sa forme actuelle semble impliquer que l'Autriche contracte une obligation de remettre les chemins de fer, par exemple à Prague, à l'État Tchéco-Slovaque, dans leur totalité et en bon état; mais l'Autriche n'a jamais eu à aucun moment, depuis que l'État actuel d'Autriche a pris naissance, aucun pouvoir ou aucune autorité sur ces chemins de fer, et cette obligation ne peut lui être imposée. De même, le paragraphe 2 ne semble avoir aucun sens. Un système de chemins de fer possédant son propre matériel roulant ne peut en réalité être remis par l'Autriche, parce que tout réseau de chemins de fer de ce genre doit être un réseau situé entièrement en dehors de l'Autriche. L'objection faite à ce paragraphe par l'Autriche semble donc juste.

Recommandée par les Délégations britannique, japonaise et italienne.

Repoussée par les Délégations américaine et française.

Le paragraphe 3 devrait être révisé de manière à lui donner une forme de réciprocité, car il n'est pas impossible que les Commissions aient à demander aux autres territoires de remettre le matériel roulant à l'Autriche, tout aussi bien qu'ils pourront avoir à demander à l'Autriche de remettre du matériel roulant à ces autres territoires.

Recommandée par les Délégations américaine, britannique et japonaise.

Proposition américaine

La Délégation américaine présente les observations suivantes:

Il a été remarqué que, dans plusieurs cas, les projets de réponse aux notes autrichiennes préparés par les diverses Commissions, contiennent des phrases ou des passages qui paraphrasent le texte du Traité et accréditent ainsi certaines interprétations du texte sans suggérer aucune modification dans la rédaction. Ceci soulève la question de savoir quelle est la portée de la réponse actuellement en préparation pour être transmise à la Délégation autrichienne. Cette réponse doit-elle être considérée comme une modification des termes des Conditions de Paix, ou comme une interprétation, en plus des changements effectivement proposés dans le texte du Traité? La Délégation américaine désire simplement marquer que c'est

là un point important pour les États-Unis par la raison que si la réponse doit être regardée comme modifiant officiellement le texte du Traité, elle devient partie intégrante de la convention avec l'Autriche et doit être présentée en même temps que le Traité au Sénat américain. Il importe que les représentants des autres États à la Conférence comprennent la position américaine au sujet de la réponse à la Délégation autrichienne.

Il est à remarquer que les raisons qui ont influé sur les conditions dans lesquelles a été élaboré la réponse aux notes de la Délégation allemande concernant le Traité avec l'Allemagne n'existent plus à l'heure actuelle. A ce moment-là, pour des raisons politiques, il était désirable de ne pas apporter de changements au texte du Traité, et tous les changements que l'on fit furent par suite compris dans un protocole annexe au Traité. Dans le cas présent, on a affaire à un petit État dont la situation est très différente de celle de l'Allemagne. Il semblerait, en conséquence, que le texte du Traité pourrait être modifié là où le sens en est modifié ou interprété dans les projets de réponse des Commissions. Si cette manière de procéder est adoptée, le texte du Traité sera l'unique document auquel les signataires devront se référer pour l'interprétation de son contenu. On pourra ajouter un paragraphe à la lettre d'envoi indiquant que cette lettre et ses annexes ne doivent pas être regardées comme une interprétation officielle du texte du Traité ou comme en modifiant les termes en quoi que ce soit.

Pour les raisons ci-dessus indiquées la Délégation américaine insiste sur les passages suivants relatifs à l'interprétation du Traité:

À la page 6 le texte actuel¹⁸ est ainsi conçu:

'Ce transport sera soumis aux règles édictées par les articles 283 [288] et 284 [289] qu'il s'effectue ou non avec transbordement dans un port fluvial autrichien ou étranger, et c'est là le seul cas visé par les Puissances alliées et associées.'

Il semble que cette rédaction constitue une interprétation du Traité, et afin d'éviter que la réponse américaine ne devienne une interprétation officielle, on propose de modifier cette clause en omettant les mots: 'et c'est là le seul cas visé par les Puissances alliées et associées'.

Le texte actuel du rapport, page 9,¹⁹ est ainsi conçu:

'L'Autriche recevra ainsi sur cette voie navigable toutes les garanties de libre circulation qui paraîtront nécessaires en vue de son accès économique à la Baltique et à la Mer du Nord.'

Cette clause constitue pour l'Autriche une assurance de garanties de libre circulation sur le canal projeté du Danube à l'Oder. Il est douteux que cette assurance formelle soit donnée par le Traité et on suggère qu'elle pourrait sans inconvénient être supprimée.

Recommandée par la Délégation américaine.

¹⁸ Tenth paragraph of the text adopted. Cf. note 13 above.

¹⁹ Thirteenth paragraph of the text adopted. Cf. note 13 above.

H. D. 39.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, August 26, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir G. Clerk.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARY, M. Berthelot.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Lieut.-Com. Bell. *France*: Captain Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Colonel A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. Woolsey, Mr. J. F. Dulles, Mr. Nielsen.

British Empire: Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, Colonel Peel, Mr. Nicolson.

France: M. Loucheur, M. Tardieu, M. Jules Cambon, M. Clémentel, M. Sergent, M. Hermitte, M. Massigli.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey, M. Russo, M. Brofferio, M. di Palma, Col. Castoldi.

1. M. PICHON circulated a telegram from General Dupont (see Appendix A).

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not understand the delay referred to in the telegram. It stated that General Dupont could not act in the absence of precise instructions. In stating that he could have taken action had instructions been given to him earlier and with more precision, he was criticising the procedure of the Council in a manner which did not appear justifiable.

MR. POLK said that as the instructions given to the three Generals delegated by the Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin had been drawn up after M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover had been heard by the Council, he proposed that this new telegram should be referred to them for comment.

M. TITTONI asked whether the Coal Committee had started.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the Coal Committee had started last night, and that the French representative, at present in Warsaw, would meet them at Ostrau. This fact, however, did not alter the question at issue. The German Delegation had agreed that the Committee of three Generals should be sent. It had also stated that the German Government would not ask for Allied troops, for the occupation of Upper Silesia, for reasons connected with their internal politics. As the news before the Council was at present contradictory and confused, he thought that the previous decision should be maintained, which was, that the Generals should proceed to Silesia and join Colonel Goodyear; after this had been done, they were to forward a report. The Coal Committee, on the other hand, could only deal with the technical problems connected with the distribution and production of coal: the

Silesian problem did not come within its functions. He would consult with Mr. Hoover on the subject of the telegram before the Council.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether General Dupont opposed the Allied policy.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he did not, and re-read the telegram in confirmation of his statement. Von Lersner had said that the German Government agreed to the despatch of the Generals. This was a statement of fact, whereas General Dupont's telegram was only a statement of personal opinion. The German representatives at Versailles might be made to confirm Von Lersner's previous statement.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that General Dupont was opposed to the measures proposed by the Council.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that General Dupont did not oppose the Council's decision, but only stated that it would cause more excitement than tranquillity.

MR. BALFOUR said that such a statement implied a very severe criticism of the Council's policy.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that a decision had been arrived at to the effect that Generals should be sent, and this decision had been communicated to the Polish Government with a request to make it publicly known. If this decision were reversed, the Government at Warsaw must be immediately informed. Colonel Goodyear had varied his opinion. It appeared to be eminently necessary that the Council should obtain clear and reliable information upon the situation, which was, at present, confused.

M. TITTONI remarked that in his opinion there were two points calling for the Council's attention. First, the actual intentions of the German Government should be ascertained. Secondly, as General Dupont stated that the presence of the Generals would cause excitement, this point should also be considered.

(It was agreed that the previous decision of the Council, with regard to the despatch of the Allied Generals to Silesia,¹ should be upheld, and that M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover should consult together upon the latest telegram from General Dupont (see Appendix A) and report on any measures that it called for.)

2. MR. POLK said that he wished to call attention to the Resolution of the previous day (see H. D. 38,² Minute 1) with regard to the report of the Commission of Enquiry on the incidents at Fiume. He wished to know whether the report in question had been adopted in principle or in detail. He had understood that only the principles of the report had been accepted by the Council, and that the Council had not agreed, or committed itself, to carry out the details of execution recommended by the Commission, such as the sending of American troops to Fiume. He was unable to agree to the sending of these troops at once, without consulting his Military Advisers, and therefore limited his action in the matter to accepting the report in principle.

*Report with regard to
the incidents at Fiume*

¹ See No. 40, minute 1.

² No. 42.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with Mr. Polk. The report raised two questions. The first dealt with the despatch of troops. According to the Resolution, responsibility for this rested entirely with the French, and with the Italians, to the exclusion of Great Britain and the United States. The second question was raised by the wording of Resolution No. 11 in the report, which concerned the general economic policy of the Allies. The sentiments expressed in this Resolution were admirable, since everybody wished to assist the Italians. He thought, however, that they were misplaced in a report of this kind.

M. TITTONI said that before the report had been discussed in the Council, he had had a private exchange of views with M. Clemenceau, and they had agreed to accept, and to take action, on the conclusions of the report affecting their countries. With regard to Resolution 11 of the report, he understood that it had been inserted by the American delegate on the Commission of Enquiry. He took the opportunity of thanking him for the sentiments expressed.

M. PICHON, in support of M. Tittoni's remarks, read the resolution of the previous meeting. He noticed, however, that the report of the Commission of Enquiry on incidents at Fiume had involved the despatch of Allied troops, and he had been of the opinion that everybody present had assented.

MR. BALFOUR said that the previous resolution of the Council had been examined by his experts, and that by its wording [it] excluded the despatch of British troops. His objection, therefore, was that, whilst executive action was called for in Fiume, Great Britain and the United States appeared to be excluded from participation in it.

M. PICHON said that he could not regard Great Britain and the United States as being excluded from participation in the executive measures at Fiume. He failed to see how the previous resolution could be interpreted as a separate agreement between France and Italy, since both these countries had merely accepted a report drawn up by the four Inter-Allied Generals.

MR. POLK said that he differed from Mr. Balfour's conclusions. France and Italy had special obligations between themselves in the matter; by recognising them, they did not disregard the obligations of other Powers, such as Great Britain and the United States.

M. TITTONI agreed with Mr. Polk.

MR. POLK said that the resolution did not imply the existence of a special agreement between France and Italy. Though assenting in principle, he could not accept the details of the report without further consultation with his Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be sufficient to alter the resolution to read:—

'It was agreed to accept, in principle, the conclusions of the Commission's report. The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these recommendations, in so far as they were specially concerned.'

His second point had been that it was not proper for a Commission of this description to include in its resolutions a general recommendation with regard to economic assistance for Italy. The incidents at Fiume were quite independent of such considerations, and the Generals ought not to have raised the question, however natural their desire to assist Italy might be. As long as his protests on the subject were recorded, he would be satisfied.

M. TITTONI remarked that the resolution to which Mr. Balfour had objected had not been brought forward by the Italian representative on the Commission.

MR. POLK said that he accepted the report in principle as a recommendation to be made to the United States' Government.

(It was agreed that the Resolution to Minute 1 of H. D. 38² should be amended so as to read:—

'It was agreed to accept, in principle, the conclusions of the Commission's Report. The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these recommendations in so far as they were specially concerned.')

3. At the request of Mr. Polk, CAPTAIN PORTIER, on behalf of the Joint Secretariat, read out Resolutions passed at the previous meeting of the Council (see H. D. 38², Minute 6.).

*Reply to the Austrian
Delegation on the Peace
Treaty*

(The resolution with regard to Gmünd was confirmed.

(a) *Frontiers*

The Resolution with regard to Marburg and Radkersburg was amended so that Radkersburg should be deleted.

The Resolution with regard to Carinthia was accepted and confirmed.)

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that it was important that all answers to the Austrian note should go back to the Editing Committee for final revision and co-ordination. With regard to nationalities, the question was extremely complicated. The Drafting Committee had completely revised the Nationality Clauses in the Peace Treaty. The new draft of the Treaty, as amended by them, had not yet been submitted to the Council, but, by virtue of the fact that on the previous day the Council had accepted the principles laid down by the Committee on Political Clauses, the Editing Committee were committed *ipso facto* to the existing draft of the Nationality Clauses, as drawn up by the Drafting Committee. The Editing Committee were, however, compelled to introduce a few minor amendments into the replies to the Austrian notes.

M. TITTONI remarked that the Editing Committee should only be free to introduce modifications of form, and not of substance, into the replies to the Austrian note.

(It was agreed that the Resolution taken on the previous day with regard to the Nationality Clauses in the Austrian Treaty, should be accepted, but that the words 'subject to such modifications of form as the Editing Committee might introduce, in order to bring them into agreement with the clauses drawn up by the Drafting Committee' should be added.)

The resolution passed on the previous day was accepted and confirmed.

(c) *Austrian interests
outside Europe*

M. LOUCHEUR said that Part IV of the Austrian Treaty had been accepted on the previous day, but that he feared there had been a misunderstanding on the point. The Italian Delegation had thought that it applied only to Austrian property in Morocco and Egypt. He thought, however, that it applied to all Austrian property wherever situated.

M. CAMBON said that the title showed that the Austrian Peace Treaty referred only to Austrian property outside Europe.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he had withdrawn his reservation quoted in Appendix F to H. D. 38². He had, at the same time, pointed out to the Editing Committee that no provision existed in the Treaty, with regard to the diplomatic buildings in Europe belonging to the Austrian Empire. He did not know what would happen to all these embassies after the final dismemberment of Austro-Hungary, and feared they might be the cause of a great deal of most improper wrangling. Giving an example, he asked whether the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Paris belonged to the present Austrian State. He thought that diplomatic buildings should be held as sacred, and hoped that no exception would be made in the present Treaty to this generally accepted rule. For this reason he had desired that a special Convention should be drawn up between Austria and the new States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to settle the point with order and decency.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he could not accept Mr. Headlam-Morley's statement, since there was a most formal stipulation in the Peace Treaty with Austria with regard to the disposal of public buildings belonging to the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He gave as an example the Palazzo Venezia at Rome, for which special provision had been made, showing clearly that the sacred character attributed to diplomatic buildings by Mr. Headlam-Morley had not been acknowledged. It was the intention of the French Government to sell the diplomatic buildings of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire situated in French territory.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he wished to protest most emphatically against the example of the Palazzo Venezia being quoted in this connection. The building in question had been decided to be a Venetian Palace. It had never been thought that, by making special provision with regard to it, the clause which did so would alter the accepted character of diplomatic buildings.

M. PICHON said that the title to Part IV of the Peace Treaty 'outside Europe' made it unnecessary to proceed with the consideration of Mr. Headlam-Morley's reservation, and added that he wished to limit the discussion to a consideration of Part IV of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and to exclude such general questions as Mr. Headlam-Morley wished to raise.

MR. BALFOUR asked why Austrian property outside and inside Europe was to be treated in different ways. He did not know why the similar clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany could not be followed.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the analogy of the German Peace Treaty was irrelevant. The old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been dismembered into separate states, each one of which might ask for the embassies of the old Kingdom. Mr. Headlam-Morley had asked that the States affected should make a Convention between themselves. The question then arose, who actually were the States affected. Some of the diplomatic buildings might be regarded as belonging to the Throne of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. As such they could be liquidated, and the proceeds given to the Reparations Commission. He admitted, however, that special Conventions were necessary, but he did not see what would happen if the States concerned could not agree. As a particular example of the difficulties that might be raised, the old Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Constantinople was no longer suitable to the needs either of Austria or of Hungary or of Czecho-Slovakia. It was evident that, in such a case as this, the Embassy in question ought to be sold and the proceeds placed at the disposal of the Reparations Commission. The old Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Paris belonged to the late Monarch, and the Treaty provided for the sale of property of this class. The Austro-Hungarian diplomatic property in Japan had already been sold. It would possibly be better to leave the States concerned to effect the sale of diplomatic buildings, and if discord arose to allow the Reparations Commission to adjudicate.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not offer any opinion. But he failed to understand why Austrian property inside and outside Europe was dealt with under two separate sections. He did not see any distinction, either in law or in fact, between these two classes of property.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour and would ask M. Gout for information on the point. He proposed that the Clauses in Section IV, dealing with Austro-Hungarian property in Morocco and Egypt, should be left untouched. With regard to the diplomatic properties of the old Empire in Europe, by the fact of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they fell under the disposal of the Reparations Commission, which would sell them at the best prices obtainable.

(It was decided that the reply to the Austrian Delegation with regard to Part IV of the Peace Treaty (Austrian property outside Europe) should be accepted.)

M. CAMBON said that he had received a comment from the American Delegation with regard to Article 154 [158] in the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the subject of the enrolment of Austrians in foreign armies. (Appendix B.)³

MR. POLK said that he did not see how the restrictions imposed upon Austria by virtue of Article 154 could possibly be effected, since the

³ Not printed. The American note expressed doubt as to the practical applicability of the article in question (prohibiting foreign enlistment of Austrian nationals) in its existing form. Attention was drawn to a suggestion that the applicability of the article might be limited in time to 10, 15, or 20 years.

Austrian Government had no power to carry them out. He was willing, however, to withdraw the American proposal, but wished to call the attention of the Council to the fact that restrictions of this kind could not, as a rule, be enforced.

M. TITTONI said that, by an elementary principle of jurisprudence, men lost their nationality by enlisting in the armies of a foreign State. Obviously, therefore, the Austrian Government would have no legislative power over Austrian citizens who enrolled themselves in foreign armies. How, therefore, could Article 154 be put into effect?

M. PICHON said that the Article had been drawn up on the basis of a similar provision in the German Peace Treaty.

(After some further discussion, the American proposal was withdrawn. The resolution passed on the previous day with regard to the Military, Naval and Air Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria was accepted and upheld.)

(The resolutions passed at the meeting on the previous day with regard to

- (e) *Prisoners of War* Prisoners of War, Penalties and Reparations were accepted
- (f) *Penalties* and upheld.)
- (g) *Reparations*

The resolution passed at the meeting on the previous day on the subject of
(h) *Financial* Financial Clauses was accepted and upheld.
Clauses

M. PICHON said that the Council was called upon to consider the draft
reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of Part X
(i) *Economic Clauses.* (Economic Clauses) of the Peace Treaty with Austria. (See
Part X Appendix F, H. D. 382.)

M. CLÉMENTEL said that Austria had been compelled by the Peace Treaty to extend all customs privileges, granted to the neighbouring States, to the Allies. The Austrian Government had protested against this, and had said that they would be in the position of the Palace at Versailles deprived of its domains. They had asked to be able to grant special preferential treatment, in which the other Allies would not be included, to Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. The Economic Commission had discussed this proposal, and had thought, at first, that the special preferential treatment in question ought to be extended, not only to Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, but to all new States formed out of the old Monarchy. M. Crespi had in his turn protested against this, and had said that such a provision would compel his own country to lay down special inner customs barriers. It had then been proposed to the Commission that the preferential treatment should be extended to all States which had acquired territory from any part of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This proposal would have included in a sort of 'Zollverein' countries extending from Poland to Italy, and would have established a customs union from Dantzic to Sicily. It had occasioned a further protest from Czecho-Slovakia, the Delegates of which country had stated that they could not possibly compete on terms of equality with such a State as Italy,

which, by the last proposal, would be included in the Customs Union. After some further discussion the Commission had agreed that the preferential rights should be limited to Austria, to Hungary, and to Czecho-Slovakia; but this proposal affected the Roumanians and the Jugo-Slavs adversely. After very lengthy discussions inside the Commission, with all the States concerned, the last proposal that he had detailed, had been accepted. If it were reversed, it would be necessary for the Economic Commission to take note of the new decision, and to discuss its consequences, which might be very onerous to the new States. The British counter-proposals seemed to him quite inexplicable in view of the fact that Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith⁴ had agreed with him, and had helped him to draft the final proposals. Large differences between the Peace Treaty with Austria and that with Germany had been introduced. In the first place, the Customs Union between Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, had been accepted, the result of which would be that the thirty million inhabitants of these countries could transact their business with one another without restrictions. The second great difference was that Germany would only be in a position to ask for equal treatment in the matter of customs from the Allies after five years, whilst Austria could obtain it in three years.

MR. BALFOUR said that the original proposal had been, that all the customs privileges of the States composing the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom should be extended to the new States formed out of it; but, as these privileges would be based on the old limits of the States concerned, these latter would have been compelled to set up a political frontier, and another frontier for the purposes of customs. On the other hand, by including in the Customs union all countries enriched by acquisition of Austro-Hungarian territory, privileges greater than any ever possessed by the old Austro-Hungarian Empire Kingdom would be granted to them. These two proposals, therefore, outlined the question now before the Conference.

M. CLÉMENTEL said that Mr. Baruch⁵ and Mr. Taussig⁶ had agreed with the findings of the Economic Commission. If the agreement arrived at were reversed, a vast customs union, extending from Dantzic to Sicily, would be established. It was absolutely impossible to ask countries to set up customs barriers inside their own frontiers.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council must choose between limiting the privileges of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and extending them. He would have liked to have seen those privileges maintained as they had existed previously, but he recognised that this was no longer possible. The alternatives before the Council were (1) consenting to a vast extension of Customs Unions between States, or (2) curtailing the former privileges of the dismembered Monarchy. He felt that the compromise arrived at ought to be

⁴ Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade and head of the Economic Section of the British Delegation.

⁵ Representative of the United States on the Economic Commission.

⁶ Representative of the United States and Chairman of the Sub-commission of the Economic Commission on Customs Regulations, Duties and Restrictions.

adhered to. The proposal of establishing an entirely new customs system over half Europe alarmed him.

MR. POLK asked what Austria's position after three years would be in the matter of customs.

M. CLÉMENTEL replied that, unless the League of Nations thought that certain countries had not been sufficiently indemnified (Article 24), reciprocity with all countries might be granted to Austria.

(It was decided that the draft reply of the Economic Commission on the subject of the clauses dealing with Customs regulations, duties and restrictions, in the Peace Treaty with Austria, should be accepted.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the Joint Secretariat in drawing up the Minutes of the previous day's proceedings, had acquitted themselves most creditably of an extremely difficult task.

MR. POLK said that the average correctness of the work of the Joint Secretariat had been exceedingly high throughout.

M. TARDIEU said that the resolution with regard to the Plebiscite in Marburg (see H. D. 37, Minute 6(d)2)⁷ had caused complete disagreement in the Central Territorial Commission. Two of the delegates had adopted the Plebiscite line of demarcation proposed by M. Tittoni. The others had disputed it, and had said that it was an artificial line which would give special advantages to the Austrians, and, if adopted, would effect what had been avoided in the Klagenfurt area. The Council must therefore decide whether they wished to uphold the new demarcation line, but he suggested the Central Territorial Commission should be heard on the subject.

M. TITTONI said that he regretted that the Central Territorial Commission had disagreed on the subject of the resolution under discussion. He had originally proposed the line of the River Drave. He had subsequently been shown a map, marked with a blue line, and presented by the British Delegate. He had accepted the new line with the remainder of the Council, and his adherence to it had not been due to any personal opinion of his own.

M. TARDIEU said that the Central Territorial Commission was opposed to taking the Plebiscite inside the area defined by the blue line on the map to which M. Tittoni had referred, because, as he had said before, it would give the Austrians an artificial majority.

M. TITTONI said that he did not oppose a hearing being given to the Central Territorial Commission, but he pointed out that the decision of the previous day had been arrived at after due deliberation. The question involved was one of procedure.

M. TARDIEU said that the replies to the Austrian Delegation had not been properly co-ordinated, and confusion had resulted. Since the Plebiscite had been decided on, the area in which it was to be taken must necessarily be laid down. The Central Territorial Commission disagreed on the manner

⁷ In error for H. D. 38 (i.e. No. 42) minute 6 (a) 2.

in which the line defined by the resolution of the previous day was to be established.

M. TRITONI repeated that he did not wish to refuse a hearing to the Commission, but thought that the resolution taken on the day previous still held good.

(It was decided that the Central Territorial Commission should be heard at the Council on August 27th, 1919, on the question of the Plebiscite in the Marburg area in Styria.)⁸

4. M. PICHON drew the Council's attention to a clause in the new Constitution of the German Reich; the articles in question dealt with the future relations between Austria and Germany in a manner which violated the provisions of the Peace Treaty. *Violation of the Peace Treaty with Germany in the Constitution of the new German State* M. BERTHELOT read the Articles referred to. (Appendix C.)⁹

They showed that the German Government was making provision for the final inclusion of Austria in the new German Reich. This was in flagrant violation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, whereby that country formally recognised the independence of Austria. In addition to this, the articles of the new Constitution gave Austrian citizens the right of immediate representation in the German Reich, although only in an advisory capacity. The matter was rendered more difficult by the fact that the German Parliament was not at present in session, so that the urgent necessity of having this provision in the German Constitution altered would be subject to delay. The German Constitution had been adopted in a final manner on August 11th. Previous to that date, a provisional vote had been taken, referring indirectly to the point now under discussion.

MR. BALFOUR said that the problem now before the Council showed the extreme inconvenience of having no diplomatic agent at Berlin. Such a representative would have called attention to the article in question long before. The military representatives of the Allies at Berlin were, of course, not concerned with such points.

M. PICHON said that he thought action was urgently necessary, and that the Drafting Committee ought to draw up a formal protest as rapidly as possible.

MR. POLK asked whether the articles in the new German Constitution could be communicated to each separate Delegation for examination and study. He agreed that the matter was extremely serious and that it demanded immediate action.

M. TARDIEU said that, in his opinion, the news now before the Council made it more necessary than ever to uphold the proposal that he had made on the previous day. (See H. D. 38², Minute 9.)

MR. POLK remarked that no great results could be expected from the

⁸ This resolution is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 400.

⁹ Not printed. This appendix contained an English translation of articles 60 and 61 of the constitution of the German Republic. For the text of article 61, which more particularly engaged the attention of the Supreme Council, see No. 46, minute 6.

inclusion of M. Tardieu's proposal in the Austrian Treaty, in view of the fact that Germany had not respected a similar obligation.

(It was decided that the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution voted on the 11th August, 1919, in the German National Assembly on the subject of Austria, should be discussed at the next meeting of the Council on the 27th August, together with such consequences as the aforesaid article in the German Constitution might have upon the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

5. MR. POLK stated that he had no objection to the draft letter, prepared by the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council, to be sent from the President of the Peace Conference to M. Bratiano. (See H. D. 37,¹⁰ Minute 10, and Appendix H.)
Reply by the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council to the Rumanian Note relative to regulation of Traffic on the Danube (The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
August 26, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 43

Général Dupont à Maréchal Foch

BERLIN, 25 août 1919 à 20 h. 35.

La composition et le Chef de la Commission de Silésie ont été indiqués par un télégramme précédent qui ajoutait que je n'irais que sur votre ordre. La transmission de mes télégrammes a dû en transformer le sens pour laisser croire que cette Commission était formée de généraux.

Le 21 j'ai tâté mes collègues au sujet d'un voyage en commun, mais j'ai rencontré de l'opposition. Il ne m'était pas possible de me séparer d'eux sans avoir reçu un ordre précis de votre part. Les Polonais désiraient me voir partir seul pour ce voyage que nous aurions pu faire le 21 mais qui apporterait à présent plus d'excitation que d'apaisement. J'estime d'accord avec mes collègues qu'il ne serait plus accepté par le gouvernement allemand sans un ordre formel du Conseil.

Vous pouvez tout faire sur le Rhin mais rien en Pologne prussienne, tant que le traité ne sera pas ratifié.

Dans les districts entièrement polonais de Rybnik, les journaux signalent la reprise complète du travail dans la proportion de 60 à 80 %.

Vous supposez l'Allemagne plus résignée qu'elle ne l'est et l'assentiment de son gouvernement d'une occupation militaire par l'Entente, qui eût été peut-être encore possible il y a six semaines, doit être exclu absolument.

Aucun Allemand n'oserait le proposer et jusqu'au dernier moment, ces derniers espèrent. Les troupes allemandes, excitées et très nombreuses, devraient être expulsées par la force dans le cas où le gouvernement céderait.

¹⁰ No. 41.

H. D. 40.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, August 27, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir G. Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Col. U. S. Grant. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Lt.-Colonel A. Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the items with which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Tasker H. Bliss, Professor Coolidge, Professor Johnstone, Mr. Woolsey, Mr. Nielsen.

British Empire: Major-General Sir C. J. Sackville-West, Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, Mr. H. Nicolson, Mr. A. Leeper.

France: M. Clémentel, M. Loucheur, M. Jules Cambon, General Le Rond, M. Aubert, M. Hermitte, M. Serruys, M. Laroche.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey, M. d'Ameglio, M. di Palma.

1. M. CLÉMENTEL said that the second proposal of the British Delegation aimed at including in the Treaty no clause imposing on Austrian Nationals any disadvantage in the settlement of private debts, contracts, etc., in a word, in the whole sphere of properties, rights and interests. The Economic Commission had first of all worked on the principle that the stipulations in the Austrian Treaty were to be similar to those of the German Treaty. This principle was subsequently modified very thoroughly. The Commission, in Article 261, had provided for the liquidation of Austrian properties under the control of the Reparations Commission in the case of States, heirs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, not participating in reparations. A special Committee composed of Colonel Peel, M. Loucheur, M. Crespi and Mr. Norman Davies, had, on the instructions of the Council, changed these dispositions. The result was that Austrian properties would not be liquidated; in consequence, the Economic Commission, in the draft reply prepared for the Austrian Delegation, had laid down *as far as possible* that equality and reciprocity should prevail in the settlement of properties, rights and interests between Austrian Nationals and the previous subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The British proposal, however, went much further, and suggested that Austria should have the benefit of all agreements which might hereafter be made between

Economic Clauses in Treaty with Austria (Reference H. D. 39,¹ Minute 3(i) Economic Clauses Part X)

the various States inheriting from the Austrian Empire. So complete an assimilation appeared to him unjustified for the following reasons:—

(a) Austria had taken certain measures contrary to the interests of the territories now transferred, and it was necessary to annul these measures.

(b) The States receiving portions of former Austro-Hungarian territory and the transferred territories themselves had always protested most vigorously against any such assimilation, even in the limited form suggested by the Economic Commission.

(c) Without going so far as complete assimilation, the Economic Commission had given Austria all guarantees required by justice for the liquidation of the past state of things for which she was responsible.

It was merely a question of re-drafting to make it clear that the proposal of the Editing Committee meant:—

1. That Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, did not apply to transferred territories.
2. That Section 8 applied to them.

The principle of complete assimilation of Austria to the new States or to the inheriting States was a non-economic matter. It was a political question which could only be decided by the Supreme Council. He thought, moreover, that it would require the assent of the States concerned. The Economic Commission could only discuss this matter with them if instructed to do so by the Council.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the proposals referred to applied only in the economic sphere.

M. CLÉMENTEL replied in the affirmative.

MR. BALFOUR said that on the previous day it had been decided that economic advantages should be limited to Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary.

M. CLÉMENTEL said that the proposal before the meeting went further. It amounted to this—that any agreement of an economic nature concluded between any of the new States and any other must *ipso facto* apply to Austria. This would produce an exceptionally privileged situation for Austria. The new States, moreover, had already protested against even the amount of assimilation hitherto accorded to Austria. The Economic Commission could go no further than it had gone. The question in its present stage was a political question which must be determined by the Council. He thought that the proposal of the British Delegation was not economically sound, and he could not, without calling a new meeting of the Economic Commission, accept it on their behalf.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that it appeared to him to be a wrong interpretation of the British proposals that Austria must be held to be party to any Convention between the new States. He had meant to refer only to the negotiations conducted by the Committee on political clauses. These negotiations applied to specific problems. The present situation made it necessary to liquidate certain questions by special pacts. It was for the purpose of these pacts that he pleaded that Austria should be placed on an equal footing with the other States. He thought that M. Laroche, who was Chairman of the

Committee, would be able to state the position to the satisfaction of the Council.

M. CLÉMENTEL said that from the economic point of view he was convinced that the Economic Commission had done all that was possible, short of establishing complete assimilation. For instance, in the Treaty with Germany all pre-war contracts were annulled unless some special public interest demanded the contrary. In the Treaty with Austria, all pre-war contracts were maintained unless some special public interest demanded the contrary. In any case, he thought the change proposed by Mr. Headlam-Morley could not be made without consulting the small States.

M. LAROCHE said that the question had not the scope attributed to it by M. Clémentel. It had been agreed on the previous day in the Committee on Political Clauses, not to demand the insertion of any special clause in the Treaty with Austria itself. The Committee would propose to the Council that Austria and Hungary should be asked to adhere to certain Conventions to be negotiated between the New States. There were for instance Conventions necessary to regulate the payment of civilian, military and clerical pensions. These matters could be dealt with outside the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Clémentel maintained any objection to this, and whether he thought it would require reconsultation of the new states.

M. CLÉMENTEL thought this proposal would raise no difficulty.

M. LAROCHE said that the new States would inevitably to be consulted, as they had to be parties to the Conventions suggested.

M. CLÉMENTEL said the only thing to which he objected was any assertion of complete assimilation between Austria and the other new States.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the policy of the Council was to give all that could be given to Austria without any ostentatious declaration, likely to offend Czecho-Slovakia.

(It was decided that it was unnecessary to insert any new Article in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. It would be clearly explained in the answer to the Austrian Delegation that Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Economic Clauses did not apply to the relations between Austrian subjects and the former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On the other hand it should be clearly explained that Section 8 of the Economic Clauses only referred to the relations between persons of these two categories.

It was further decided that Austria would be required in the Treaty of Peace to adhere to special Conventions with the new States, now being prepared by the Committee on Political Clauses.)

2. M. LOUCHEUR said that the Austrian Delegation asked that a special clause be inserted in the Treaties with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, requiring these States to supply Austria with the same amount of coal that Austria received from the areas ceded to these States before the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Czecho-Slovakia and Poland were unwilling

*Supply of Coal to
Austria by Czecho-
Slovakia and Poland*

to acquiesce, because they wished to be able to control the export of coal in such a manner as to exercise pressure on Austria and obtain from her equivalent advantages. For instance, Czecho-Slovakia would require magnesia from Austria. He therefore proposed a series of articles providing for an exchange of raw material between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Austria, and as an interim measure for the control of these exchanges by the Reparations Commission. (For these Clauses see Appendix A.)²

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the proposals stipulated for absolute quantities. If they did, difficulties might ensue. The quantities should, he thought, be proportional and not absolute, otherwise a State might be bound by the Treaty to furnish the greater part of its production, irrespective of home needs, to its neighbours.

M. LOUCHEUR explained that this difficulty had been foreseen, and was carefully guarded against in the clauses he proposed.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was satisfied with this explanation.

(It was decided that the clauses proposed by M. Loucheur (Appendix A)² should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)

3.

*Col de Reschen and Pas
de Predil Railway*

[Not printed]

4. M. LOUCHEUR said that, in consultation with Mr. Hoover, he had prepared a telegram to be addressed to General Dupont in accordance with the decision taken on the previous day. (See H. D. 39¹, Minute 1.)

M. Loucheur read the telegram annexed in Appendix C.

(This draft was accepted.)

5. MR. POLK asked whether the telegram sent on the previous Saturday (H. D. 37³, Minute 1, Appendix A) could be given to the Press. He added that the smaller Powers had been making enquiries.

*Publication of tele-
gram in answer to
Roumanian Govern-
ment, despatched
23rd August, 1919*

(It was decided that the telegram accepted for despatch to the Roumanian Government on Saturday, 23rd August, 1919 (H. D. 37³, Minute 1, Appendix A), should be published in the Press.)

6. MR. POLK said that the situation was just about as Mr. Balfour had stated at a previous meeting (H. D. 37³, Minute 3). M. Clemenceau had suggested that the German prisoners of war in the hands of the American and British Armies should be turned over in some manner to the French Authorities. At the meeting of

*German Prisoners
of War*

² Not printed. These clauses were inserted in the treaty of peace with Austria as article 224.

³ No. 41.

the Special Committee of General Officers, both Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson and General Pershing had felt that they were not authorised to turn over their prisoners to the French Authorities. They did not consider themselves qualified to decide the legal and political questions involved. The British Government was anxious to return these prisoners to Germany, and their Secretary of State for War had urged it very strongly. The situation was the same for the Americans. If the repatriation of these prisoners were begun now, three to four months would be necessary to complete it. It was the desire of the American Government to act in this matter in full agreement with the French Government. If repatriation could be begun immediately, he thought it would be most desirable to do so, as these prisoners were a great expense and were accomplishing nothing. Because of the time it would take to complete it, the repatriation would not embarrass the French Government in their desire to retain the prisoners in their hands until after the ratification of the Treaty. He thought that even if the repatriation were started now by the British and American Authorities, it could not be completed before the French would have made all arrangements necessary for the labour they desired.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to corroborate the last part of Mr. Polk's statement. On the previous occasion when he had spoken on this matter, he had not realised how slow the process of repatriation would be. It was now August 27th. The Treaty, he thought, would be ratified by three Powers by about the 15th September. In other words, in less than three weeks. On the 15th September, therefore, repatriation would have to begin in accordance with the terms of the Treaty. Retention of the prisoners during these three weeks would cost the American and British Governments £150,000 a day. The number that could be repatriated was only 2,000 a day overland, and no more could be sent home until shipping could be provided to assist in the process. In the three weeks, therefore, no very considerable diminution of the prisoners held in France would take place. Meanwhile, it was difficult to ask the British and American taxpayers to continue spending so much on practically useless prisoners. He hoped, therefore, that the French Government would accede to the very modest request he had to make. He believed that no detriment would be caused to France thereby.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he made no comment on the internal political reasons which actuated his colleagues. On the question of legal right, he was prepared to bring forward the action of the Belgians, who had handed over prisoners to France. He was bound, however, to acquiesce in what he was asked to do by his British and American colleagues. He confessed that he did it with regret, because the retention of the prisoners represented the only hold the Allies now possessed over Germany. The insertion of the Article in the German Constitution regarding Austria⁴ showed how necessary it was to preserve some means of pressure on Germany. There had been an agreement between himself, Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson to use

⁴ See No. 43, minute 4.

the prisoners as a means of inducing Germany to hand over persons guilty of breaches of the laws of war. If the British and American Governments had made up their minds, he would ask that a Repatriation Committee should be formed, representing all the Powers, in order that there should be no appearance of dissension on this point. The German Delegation would be told that for reasons of their own, the Allies proposed to begin repatriating prisoners without waiting for the ratification of the Treaty. He would ask Mr. Balfour to explain this in suitable words.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed it was desirable to keep a hold over Germany. He would point out that the proposal he had made did not diminish this hold in any appreciable degree. As to the proposal just made by M. Clemenceau, he entirely agreed that it was very desirable that all the Powers should appear to be acting in harmony. Unless there were any practical objection, he would welcome the proposal.

MR. POLK said that he also assented to it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the hold over Germany would ultimately be represented by the prisoners held by the French Army.

M. MATSUI observed that a Commission to deal with prisoners was provided for in the Treaty. He questioned whether it was desirable to set up a new Commission. It might be preferable to set the Commission provided for in the Treaty to work at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU read Article 215. He pointed out that a German member was provided for.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it was absolutely necessary to have a German representative on the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought perhaps not, as the Treaty was not yet ratified.

M. MATSUI said that a Commission on Prisoners of War already existed. It had, he understood, prepared a provisional scheme for repatriation. Could this Commission be empowered to proceed with the repatriation suggested? Japan, he added, had some prisoners. She had been feeding them for a long time, and was anxious to repatriate them. Repatriation from Japan would be a long process. Japan, therefore, would gladly associate herself with any measures taken to that end.

(It was decided:—

- (a) That an Inter-Allied Commission of one military and one civil member from each of the five Powers be set up at once to begin repatriation of German prisoners, starting with prisoners held by the British and American Armies.
- (b) That Mr. Balfour should draft a letter to the German Delegation, explaining the reasons for anticipating the Treaty in this matter, and making it clear that this was a gratuitous act of humanity, and that the execution of the project would depend on the good behaviour of Germany.
- (c) That the nominations should be made at the following meeting.)

7. M. TARDIEU read and explained the Report contained in Appendix D.⁵

Plebiscite in Styria M. TITTONI said that the Council had decided to divide the Klagenfurt area for plebiscite purposes. He could not see why it should decline to do likewise in Styria. Moreover, the Council had already decided on a plebiscite in this area. (See H. D. 38,⁶ Minute 6(a) and H. D. 39¹, Minute 3 (a)). Why should this decision be reversed? The land in question was not Italian, and he had no direct interest in its fate. It was of the utmost importance, however, that the Austrians should sign the Treaty. The Austrian Cabinet depended on a majority, in which there were 28 Styrian Deputies. Should these Deputies receive no satisfaction, they might not support the Government in signing the Treaty. This would produce a most perilous situation. He did not know whether M. Clemenceau was ready to occupy Austria with French troops, but he must declare that Italy would find it extremely difficult to do so.

M. TARDIEU said that in analogous cases, the Council had not decided in favour of a plebiscite. There was no strong motive for holding one in Styria. There were in the area 75,000 Slovenes against 18,000 Germans.

M. TITTONI said that in that case the result need not be feared. In order to upset the decision taken 24 hours earlier, very strong reasons should be alleged. He knew of no such reasons.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the previous resolution to have been to the effect that a plebiscite should be held in the district of Marburg. The limits of this district had not been settled. The question had been referred to the experts in order that they should examine it and make a report.

M. TITTONI said that the Minutes of the meeting (H. D. 38,⁶ Minute 6(a)) stated that the Austrian demand was accepted, although he had himself proposed the line of the Drave as the limit of the plebiscite area.

MR. POLK said that his understanding was that the line proposed by the Austrian Delegation had been more or less accepted. He had not understood that so large an addition as was proposed by the British and French Members of the Commission was to be made. The question was whether the delimitation of the area was to be influenced by the Austrian or by the Jugo-Slav requests. If the area were made large, the result was a foregone conclusion in favour of the Jugo-Slavs. In that case, he thought it would be preferable to attribute the territory to the Jugo-Slavs outright.

M. TARDIEU said that the Commission was not in a position to make a

⁵ Not printed. An English translation of this report is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 402-5. This undated report comprised: (i) a statement of the divergent views of the British and French Delegations on the one hand and the American and Italian Delegations on the other as regards the limits of the proposed plebiscite zone (see the discussion below); (ii) joint recommendations by the four delegations as to the methods of the plebiscite; (iii) a statement of the reasons which prompted the British and French Delegations respectfully to inform the Supreme Council of their opinion that the plebiscite had serious inconveniences and would be perilous; (iv) observations by the American and Italian Delegations in opposition to the above view.

⁶ No. 42.

unanimous report. It could only place the divergent views of the Delegates before the Council. The line proposed by the Austrians was clearly to the detriment of the Jugo-Slavs. The latter had had good reason to suppose that the country was theirs. If the settlement was now to be altered entirely at the instance of the Austrians, they would reasonably think themselves aggrieved. Four a [*sic*] unanimous decisions had been taken. In any case, the Slovenes were treated very hardly by the Treaty. The last decision of the Council would make their case worse. Marburg was the economic and intellectual centre of Southern Styria. It had even been admitted to be so by the previous Austrian administration. In his view, the Jugo-Slav position should be maintained as he regarded it as entirely right.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Tardieu whether his Committee had enquired whether the area under consideration was economically connected with Marburg, as M. Tittoni denied this.

M. TITTONI gave certain figures about the traffic from Marburg. On the Marburg-Villach line there were 32,372 departures and 32,349 arrivals. On the Marburg-Graz line there were 30,742 departures and 49,230 arrivals. On the Marburg-Laibach line there were 26,834 departures and 34,462 arrivals. On the Marburg-Agram line there were 1,975 departures and 2,299 arrivals. From these figures it clearly appeared that the traffic of Marburg was towards the north. The southern area was, moreover, divided from it by a mountain range.

M. TARDIEU said these figures were well known to the Committee. They were the result of the deliberate economic policy of the Austrian administration. The natural market of Marburg was to the south. In spite of all their efforts, the Austrians had had to abandon the idea of administering Southern Styria, except from Marburg. The Italians had good reason to know what the methods of the Austrians were, as they had experienced them at Trieste.

M. TITTONI said that the comparison was not quite correct. The Italian population had never been sufficiently represented in the Austrian Parliament to obtain any concessions in its favour. The Slovenes, on the other hand, like the Poles, had been strong enough to produce a balance of parties. They had, therefore, received some consideration.

M. TARDIEU said that he did not wish to question the decision made on the previous day, but he thought it was paying the Austrians an undue compliment to accept their line exactly as they proposed it. The Jugo-Slavs had asked for consultation of the population throughout. This had been refused and the Conference was now asked to impose on them a plebiscite in an area in which they did not expect it, and in a form which would annoy them without reason.

M. TITTONI said that he was willing to extend the plebiscite area to the limits of the judicial district of Marburg, in order to meet the views of the French and British Delegates.

M. TARDIEU said that he thought this would produce very little effect on the position.

M. PICHON observed that the Jugo-Slavs had been in occupation of the area for the last nine months. They could not be evicted without certain trouble.

MR. POLK asked whether this occupation was under the authority of the Conference, or whether the Jugo-Slavs had just taken possession on their own initiative.

M. PICHON said that no formal authorization had been given but that no protest had been made.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that in order to reach some decision, the whole notion of a plebiscite should be dropped.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed.

M. TITTONI said that he would prefer to hold a plebiscite in the extended area.

MR. POLK said that he would rather abandon the plebiscite altogether than adopt a compromise which, he thought, would satisfy neither party.

M. TITTONI said his main desire was that the Treaty should be signed, because should the Austrians refuse to sign it, he did not know what the Conference could do.

(After some further discussion, the American, British, French and Japanese Delegations agreed to abandon entirely the idea of a plebiscite in Styria, and to stand by the territorial settlement made in the Treaty handed to the Austrian Delegation.

M. Tittoni reserved his agreement and said that he would communicate his conclusion to the Secretary-General in the course of the afternoon.)⁷

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 27, 1919.

APPENDIX C TO No. 44

Le Président de la Conférence de la Paix à Monsieur le Général Dupont, Berlin

La Conférence a décidé que la Commission de trois généraux auxquels devra s'adjoindre le Colonel Goodyear comme représentant américain devrait se rendre immédiatement en Haute-Silésie pour y remplir la mission prévue par mon télégramme 4040 — Stop — Les représentants du gouvernement allemand à Versailles ont été avisés il y a plusieurs jours de ce voyage et ont déclaré que leur gouvernement le faciliterait — Stop — Il s'agit de se rendre un compte exact de la situation et de nous proposer les mesures propres à ramener le calme dans le plus bref délai possible en tenant compte de la situation politique — Stop — Veuillez communiquer à vos collègues cette décision de la conférence et me rendre compte de l'exécution.

CLEMENCEAU

⁷ This resolution is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 406.

H. D. 41.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, August 28, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARIES, Mr. L. Harrison, Colonel U. S. Grant.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire:* Commander Bell. *France:* Captain A. Portier. *Italy:* Lieut.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the questions with which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. Woolsey, Mr. Nielsen.

British Empire: Major-General Sir C. J. Sackville-West, Colonel Henniker, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Headlam-Morley, Mr. Hutchinson.

France: M. Tardieu, M. Loucheur, M. Jules Cambon, M. Laroche, M. Tirman.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey, M. d'Ameglio, M. di Palma.

1. MR. POLK suggested that before proceeding to the order of the day, the resolutions of the previous meeting might be read, and further suggested that this might be made the rule for the future.

Procedure of the Council M. CLEMENCEAU said that such a procedure would waste the Council's time.

MR. BALFOUR agreed with M. Clemenceau.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that copies of all resolutions passed by the Council should be laid on the table of each Delegate, on the day following the meeting at which the aforesaid resolutions had been taken; and that, if no objections were raised by the Delegates, the text of the resolutions, as submitted, should be considered to have been accepted.)

2. MR. BALFOUR circulated the following draft declaration with regard to the repatriation of German prisoners:—

German Prisoners of War in British and American hands.
(Reference H. D. 40,¹ Minute 6)

'In order to diminish as rapidly as possible the sufferings caused by the war, the Allied and Associated Powers have determined to anticipate the date of ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, so far as the repatriation of German prisoners is concerned. The process of repatriation will begin immediately, and it will be conducted under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Committee, to which will be added a German representative as soon as the Treaty comes into force.

¹ No. 44.

M. PICHON observed that the Jugo-Slavs had been in occupation of the area for the last nine months. They could not be evicted without certain trouble.

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immediately, and it will be conducted under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Committee, to which will be added a German representative as soon as the Treaty comes into force.

¹ No. 44.

'The Allied and Associated Powers desire to make it quite clear that the continuance of this benevolent policy, from which German soldiers will so greatly benefit, must depend on the fulfilment by the German Government and People of all their obligations.'

(The draft declaration prepared by Mr. Balfour was accepted for transmission and publication.)²

The following nominations were then made for the Prisoners of War Committee provided for by the resolution taken on August 27th (see H. D. 40,¹ Minute 6):

British Empire	Mr. Vansittart, General Belfield.
America, United States of .	Mr. Dresel, Brig.-Gen. W. D. Connor.
France	M. Alphan[d], Colonel Jouvin.
Italy	Colonel Toni.
Japan	M. Shigemitsu, Colonel Nagai.

3. MR. POLK said that Article 61 of the German Constitution should be referred to the Drafting Committee, who should advise the Council as to the measures which might be taken, since any subsequent action by the Council ought to be taken on the advice of competent lawyers.

The German Constitution and violation of the Peace Treaty.

(Reference H. D. 39,³ Minute 4)

(It was decided that Article 61 of the German Constitution should be sent to the Drafting Committee, who should examine the extent to which the aforesaid Article violated the terms of the Peace Treaty with Germany, and should advise the Council as to the measures which ought to be taken.)

4.

Reply to the letter of the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the frontiers in Styria

(Owing to the illness of M. Tittoni, this question was adjourned to the following day).

5. M. LAROCHE read an Article for insertion in Part 3 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the subject of Special Conventions to be drawn up between Austria and the New States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Appendix A.⁵)

Reply to the Austrian Delegation with regard to Part 3 of the Peace Treaty with Austria. (Political Clauses.)

See Annex F, H. D. 38.⁴

(It was agreed that a new clause on the subject of Special Conventions for Austria and the States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on the subject of the rights, privileges and goods of private persons in the aforesaid States (see Appendix A⁵), should be accepted.)

² The declaration was published in the British press on August 30, 1919.

³ No. 43.

⁴ No. 42.

⁵ Not printed. This appendix contained a French text of what became article 265 of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye. In this text the last clause of the first paragraph of the article was underlined.

6. M. CAMBON read and commented upon the British and American reservations with regard to the reply to the Austrian Delegation, on the subject of Part 12 of the Peace Treaty with Austria. (See Annex F, H. D. 38.)⁴

Reply to the Notes of the Austrian Delegation with regard to Part 12 of the Peace Treaty with Austria. Ports, Waterways and Railways

M. TIRMAN said that the British reservations had been made before Article 322 [330] of the Peace Treaty had been altered. By a previous decision of the Council, it had been laid down that immediate reciprocity should be granted in the matter of Ports, Waterways and Railways, to Austria, and other states formed out of the old Monarchy. (See H. D. 37,⁶ Minute 8.) By virtue of this decision, the British reservation fell to the ground.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY agreed with M. Tirman, and said that the reservation of the British Delegation had been satisfied.

M. CAMBON explained the reservations of the British, Japanese and Italian Delegations on the subject of Article 310 [318] of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

M. TIRMAN said that the reservation formulated by the British, Japanese and Italian Delegations might be met by altering the expression '*cession*' of Ports, Waterways and Railways to the '*transfer*' of Ports, Waterways and Railways throughout. In addition to this, in Part 3 of Article 310 the word '*proportion*' should be altered to '*distribution*', and the expression '*handed over*' should be altered to '*be effected*'.

(It was decided that Article 310 [318] of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be amended, so as to read:—

Article 310

'Subject to any special provisions concerning the transfer of ports, waterways and railways situated in the territories transferred under the present Treaty, and to the financial conditions relating to the concessionnaires and the pensioning of the personnel, the transfer of railways will take place under the following conditions:

'(1) The works and installations of all the railroads shall be handed over complete and in good condition.

'(2) When a railway system, possessing its own rolling-stock, is handed over in its entirety by Austria to one of the Allied and Associated Powers, such stock shall be handed over complete, in accordance with the last inventory before November 3, 1918, and in a normal state of upkeep.

'(3) As regards lines without any special rolling-stock, Commissions of experts designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, on which Austria shall be represented, shall fix the distribution of the stock existing on the system to which those lines belong to be effected [*sic*]. Those Commissions shall have regard to the amount of the material registered on these lines in the last inventory before November 3, 1918, the length of track (sidings included), and the nature and amount of the traffic. These Commissions shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case; they shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in Austrian workshops.

⁶ No 41.

‘(4) Stocks of stores, fittings and plant shall be handed over under the same conditions as the rolling-stock.

‘The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be applied to the lines of former Russian Poland converted by Austria to the Austrian gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian system.’)

M. CAMBON then explained the American reservation with regard to Part XII of the reply to the Austrian Delegation. (See Appendix F, H. D. 384.)

MR. POLK explained that the American proposal did not deal exclusively with the portion of the reply to the Austrians dealing with Ports, Railways and Waterways, but that it was concerned with the interpretative passages which had been introduced throughout the reply. Such passages referred to the Financial Clauses (Part IX), Reparation Clauses (Part VIII), the Waterways and Railways Clauses (Part XII), and the Report of the Minorities Commission. By virtue of these passages, the Drafting Committee were really giving interpretations to the text of the Peace Treaty, and the fact might be of advantage either to Austria, or to the Allies. Such interpretations were official, and would, as such, become part of the agreement with Austria. If they did, they would have to be submitted to the United States Senate, together with the Treaty itself. If they were ratified by the Senate, the United States would be bound. He did not think that the United States should be bound by interpretative passages, unless it were understood that other Powers were bound also. It was therefore necessary either (a) to have it clearly understood that all Powers should be bound by such interpretative passages, or (b) to insert a clause in the reply to the Austrian Delegation, telling them that the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers was not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that the Peace Treaty should be drafted in such a manner as to require any interpretation at all.

M. CAMBON said that the interpretative passages referred only to the text of the reply, and not to the Peace Treaty itself.

(It was decided after some further discussion that:—

- (1) The reply to the Austrian Delegation should be referred as a whole to the Drafting Committee, to co-ordinate it with the terms of the Peace Treaty.
- (2) A clause should be inserted in the reply to the Austrian Delegation to the effect that the aforesaid reply was not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty.)

7.

*Reply to the Austrian Note on
the subject of the Labour Clauses
in the Treaty of Peace with
Austria, Part XIII*

[Not printed]⁸

⁷ This resolution is printed with minor variation by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 223.

⁸ Arising out of discussion on this item the Supreme Council decided: (i) to refer to the Editing Committee, for report to the Council next day, the resolution (appendix B in original)

8. M. CAMBON read the covering letter to the reply to the Austrian Delegation. (See Appendix F, H. D. 38⁴.) He drew attention to the fact that the note had been drawn up on the basis of the reports of several separate Committees.

The main object in the reply had been to settle finally the responsibility of the Austrian Government with regard to the war.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Cambon's statement with regard to the character of the covering note was quite evident.

MR. BALFOUR said that the draft reply read by M. Cambon was a most able document. He thought, however, that the procedure followed in the case of the Peace Treaty with Germany might be adopted in the present instance. Mr. Philip Kerr⁹ had drafted the covering letter accompanying the reply to the German counter-proposals, and his letter had been very favourably commented upon by the press in all the Allied countries. He suggested that Mr. Kerr should also draft the covering letter to the replies to the Austrian counter-proposals, and submit his draft to the Council on the following day.

M. TARDIEU said that the Reparations Commission, together with M. Loucheur, had, on the previous day, drawn up a note on the subject of reparations by Austria. He thought that the note in question ought to be embodied in the covering letter to the reply to the Austrian counter-proposals.

(It was decided:—

1. That the note drafted by M. Loucheur and the Reparations Commission should be embodied in the covering letter accompanying the answer to the Austrian counter-proposals;
2. That the draft of the covering letter prepared by the Editing Committee, together with the above note of the Reparations Commission, should be referred to Mr. Philip Kerr for re-draft, and that the new

passed by the Labour Committee on June 4, 1919, proposing the insertion in the peace treaties to be concluded with enemy powers of the following clause: 'Workpeople belonging to one of the Allied and Associated Powers who have been admitted to the territory of . . . and their families, will possess the rights and privileges granted to workmen nationals by the labour and social laws of . . . , and the conditions which regulate them, provided that the said Allied and Associated Power guarantees reciprocal treatment to . . . workmen admitted to her territories, and to their families.' (ii) To submit at once to the Labour Committee the proposal of the Italian Delegation in favour of 'the admission of Austrian Representatives to the Labour Congress to be held at Washington in the following autumn. The Labour Committee should examine the question, keeping in mind the consequences that might result on the situation of Germany in this Congress'. The Committee should make proposals regarding the admission of both countries to the Congress. (M. Pichon had stated during the discussion that 'if the admission of Austrian workmen to the International Congress of Labour were allowed, this would, *ipso facto*, involve the admission of German workmen on the same terms. The International Congress of Labour had originally decided against the admission of German workmen to the First Session at Washington. It had now changed its mind and was demanding that German representatives should actually be admitted after the order of business of the Session had been drawn up. This had been done in order to prevent Germany from having any say in the matters to be discussed.')

⁹ Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

text, as prepared by him, should be submitted at the next Meeting of the Council.)¹⁰

M. CAMBON then drew attention to the fact that it might be considered necessary to make some allusion in the covering note to the independence of the Austrian State, since Article 61 of the German Constitution appeared to question it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the whole question would be considered on the following day.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris,

August 28, 1919.

¹⁰ This resolution is printed with minor variation by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 223.

No. 46

H. D. 42.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, August 29, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire:* Capt. E. Abraham. *France:* M. de Percin. *Italy:* Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the questions with which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Professor Coolidge, Professor Johnson, Mr. Woolsey, Mr. Scott.

British Empire: Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, Mr. H. Nicolson, Captain C. T. M. Fuller, R.N.

France: M. Tardieu, M. Loucheur, M. Jules Cambon, M. Seydoux, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Hermitte, M. Massigli, Commdt. Levavasseur.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey, M. Brambilla, M. di Palma.

I. M. TARDIEU said that on the previous day he had received from M. Tittoni a new proposal. There was no further question of a Plebiscite in the Marburg Area except in a small area near Radkersburg.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked why M. Tittoni wished to hold a Plebiscite there.

M. TITTONI replied that his main object was to get an Austrian signature to the Treaty. What he proposed was a considerable reduction to the Austrian demands, but the area was entirely German, and though the district of Marburg would remain Jugo-Slav, he thought it was desirable to give the Austrians satisfaction somewhere. One of the reasons for holding a plebiscite in this area was that the Chief of the Christian Social Party which supported the State had been returned for Radkersburg.

M. TARDIEU said that without expressing any opinion on the reason alleged by M. Tittoni, he thought the area of Radkersburg ought to be attached to Prekomurje. Should the Plebiscite go in favour of Austria, the resulting frontier would be a bad one.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked General Le Rond to state what, from a geographical point of view, would be the result.

GENERAL LE ROND said that it had been recognised long ago that the population in this area was mainly German, and in making a frontier, it was not possible to take any account of every little variation in the character of the population. This was all the less necessary as a considerable number of Slovene villages had been left within Austria. If the Plebiscite suggested by M. Tittoni turned out in favour of the Austrians, the frontier in this area would be geographically unsound, cutting valleys in a capricious manner and leaving Radkersburg almost on the boundary line. Should the vote be in favour of the Jugo-Slavs, which was unlikely, the frontier would be the same as that proposed by the Commission. In the area in question, there were about 10,000 Austrians. The number of Slovenes left outside Jugo-Slavia could be counted in hundreds of thousands. If the question of the Austrians in this area were raised, the question of the Slovenes left outside Jugo-Slavia would also have to be raised.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Austrians would still demand a Plebiscite in this region if a Plebiscite in the Slovene area left to them were required.

MR. POLK observed that the Slovenes left outside Jugo-Slavia would remain in Hungary and not in Austria. Austria would therefore raise no objection.

M. TITTONI said that if the line of the Drave had been accepted, it would have yielded a more logical frontier than any other line. He pointed out further that the area in question was included in an administrative boundary. The geographical objections, therefore, did not appear strong, as the frontier adopted by the Commission was not itself a good geographical line.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the line proposed by the Commission followed the crest of the hills.

M. TITTONI said that for so small a matter, he did not wish to risk a refusal of the Austrian signature.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought there was no great need to fear the refusal of signature.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that the River Mur be taken as the frontier

line and that no Plebiscite should be held at all. Radkersburg would then remain Austrian.

(It was then decided that no Plebiscite should be held in Styria, and that the River Mur should be accepted as the frontier between Austria and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in this area.)

Radkersburg would be attributed to Austria, and Marburg to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.)

2. M. CAMBON said that the proposal referred to the Editing Committee by the Council on the previous day (H. D. 41, Paragraph 7, Appendix B¹) had been examined. In the opinion of the Editing Committee, the Council had refused to recognise the principle involved, in the Treaty with Germany. The Committee therefore regarded it a mistake to record in the Treaty with Austria anything so diametrically different from the treatment accorded to Germany. For his part, he would suggest, should the Council adopt the proposal, that it be communicated to Austria in the form of a special additional document. The British Delegate on the Editing Committee regarded the question as one of general interest concerning all countries, including neutral countries. He thought, therefore, that it should be referred to the League of Nations.

M. TITTONI said that he favoured the suggestion made by M. Cambon that the agreement be made additional to the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer that nothing should be said in the Treaty.

MR. POLK suggested that the proposal be referred to the International Labour Congress in Washington.

(It was then decided that no mention be made in the Treaty with Austria of the rights and privileges of Allied workpeople admitted to enemy territories and vice versa, but that the resolution passed by the Labour Committee on June 4, 1919 (Appendix B to H. D. 41)¹ should be referred to the International Labour Congress in Washington.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had previously decided that German Labour Delegates should be admitted to the next meeting of the International Labour Congress, after that to be held in Washington. The same principle should presumably apply to the Austrians. The labour organisations in various Allied and Neutral countries, notably in France, were, however, asking that the German labour delegates be admitted at once. His proposal was that the question of their admission or non-admission be left to the discretion of the Congress itself.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the proposal to be that the International Labour Congress should meet according to the constitution at present laid down for it, and that it should then decide whether or not German and Austrian delegates should be heard.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was his intention.

¹ See No. 45, note 8.

M. TRITTONI said that the Italian C.G.T. declared it would not send representatives to Washington and would not recognise the International Labour Congress or its decisions unless the German delegates were admitted. No International Labour legislation could be enforced in Italy against the will of Italian labour. He believed the same conditions existed in France.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not intimidated by threats. The French Labour Party had spoken to him very much in the same manner, but he thought his proposal was sufficient to meet the situation.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Clemenceau's proposal appeared to him to be very reasonable, though it was a modification of a previous decision. As he had no expert on labour matters whom he could consult, he would like to postpone giving his assent until he had had time to obtain the views of the British Minister specially concerned with this subject. In referring the matter to him, he would express his personal agreement with M. Clemenceau's views.

MR. POLK said that he was in a similar situation to Mr. Balfour and would take up the matter with his Government.

M. TRITTONI said that there was one practical difficulty in M. Clemenceau's scheme. Should the Congress decide to give a hearing to the Germans and Austrians, they would require a month to get to Washington.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had been assured that the Germans and Austrians would go to Washington in expectation of a favourable decision, should the Council adopt the proposal he had made.

(It was decided to postpone the decision on the question of the admission of German and Austrian Labour Delegates to the International Labour Congress at Washington, until Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk had consulted their respective Governments.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a disquieting telegram from Colonel Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia. (The telegram contained in Appendix A was then read.) He added that he had ordered a note to be circulated to his colleagues to the effect that he was ready to send 12,000 men to Cilicia. This force would be able to occupy the points mentioned by Colonel Haskell. It would be necessary to utilise the Bagdad railway as a means of supplying this force. The note contained in Appendix B was then read.

MR. POLK asked whether the area referred to by Colonel Haskell was not one that was accessible from the Black Sea.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was also accessible from Cilicia, as the roads were good and suitable for motor lorries. It would be possible, he considered, to send supplies into Armenia from Mersina and Alexandretta. An agreement for the use of the railway would, however, be necessary.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether this had been studied by the French General Staff.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the note was a result of a study by the Staff.

(It was decided to postpone the consideration of the Note contained in Appendix B till the following day.)

5. (It was decided to postpone the consideration of the new English draft *Covering Letter to* covering letter until the following day, and in connection with *Reply to Austrian* it, to discuss the question whether or not Austria was a New *Delegation* State.)

6. M. BERTHELOT said that Article 61 of the new German Constitution was to the following effect:—

Article No. 61 of the new German Constitution. (Reference H. D. 41,² Minute 3) 'Each land has at least one vote in the Reichsrat. In the case of the greater lands, one vote is assigned to a million inhabitants. An excess which is at least equal to the population of the smallest land is reckoned as a complete million. No land can be represented by more than two-fifths of the total votes.

'German Austria, after its junction with the German Reich, receives the right of participation in the Reichsrat with the number of votes corresponding to its population. Till then, the representatives of German Austria have a consultative voice.

'The number of votes is fixed anew by the Reichsrat after each general census.'

Article 61 appeared to be out of harmony with Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace. The American Delegation, however, questioned whether Article 178 of the new German Constitution did not dispel the apparent contradiction. Article 178 was to the effect that no provision in the Constitution could be held to modify the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles. The question had been submitted to the legal advisers, who thought that Article 178 rendered Article 61, in so far as it conflicted with the stipulations of the Treaty, null and void. This appeared to furnish an additional reason for asking the German Government to cancel Article 61. The Council should therefore decide whether, and in what form, the protest should be made to the German Government. It should also decide whether M. Tardieu's proposal should be carried out, namely, to insert a counterpart of Article 80 in the Treaty with Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution had been referred to the Drafting Committee, and that agreement had not yet been reached within the Committee. He thought, therefore, that it would be better to await its recommendations. He thought that the first of the problems alluded to by M. Berthelot was the more important. He did not think it mattered much whether anything was inserted in the Treaty with Austria.

(It was decided to postpone the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution to the following day, in order to obtain the views of the Drafting Committee.)

7.

*Col de Reschen and
Pas de Predil Railway*

[Not printed]

² No. 45.

8. M. BERTHELOT explained that the people of Vorarlberg had expressed a desire to join the Swiss Federation. The Austrian Delegation, as might have been expected, had protested. The Swiss Federal Council, meanwhile, had not adopted any resolution in favour of union with Vorarlberg. The Federal Council hesitated because the inclusion of this district would upset the present balance of power between the German and French cantons. The Conference, therefore, had before it only an appeal from the Vorarlberg. It could take no decision until it had before it a proposal from the Swiss Government.

MR. BALFOUR said he quite agreed that this was a matter that could not be settled without the Swiss. The only question left to the Council was to know whether the door should be left open for the Swiss to invite Vorarlberg to join them. He thought it might be better to leave the whole question alone.

M. BERTHELOT said that the following was the proposal of the Central Territorial Committee for insertion in the Treaty.

‘23 août, 1919.

‘En présence des manifestations des habitants du Vorarlberg en faveur d’un rattachement de leur territoire à la Suisse, la République d’Autriche, au cas où la Suisse elle-même déclarerait formellement qu’elle accepte un tel rattachement, s’engage à reconnaître la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations devant qui le cas devrait être porté.’

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the petition received from the Vorarlberg represented the majority of the population.

M. LAROCHE said that two unofficial plebiscites had been held, and they yielded the result of 4 to 1 in favour of union with Switzerland. The second had been even more decisive than the first.

M. TITTONI said that he would suggest reference to a regular plebiscite.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer to take no action. The matter had not been brought officially to the cognisance of the Conference. There was in Switzerland a balance of power between the German and French elements. The Swiss Government was satisfactory from an international point of view. It might cease to be so if its German population were increased.

M. LAROCHE observed that it was for this reason that the Committee recommended that a formal declaration by Switzerland should be obtained.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that so far Switzerland had asked for nothing.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was also in favour of not adding to the German majority in Switzerland.

M. PICHON observed that the problem was complicated by a financial question. Switzerland would only accept Vorarlberg if the area were relieved of its share of the Austrian debt. The hope of escape from this burden was one of the determining motives in the result of the plebiscites.

M. TARDIEU said that there was also a political reason against inserting anything in the Treaty regarding Vorarlberg. The Conference was attempting to meet the Austrians as far as possible. The Austrian Delegation would

be greatly offended at any Article tending to deprive it of Vorarlberg. The Conference had received expressions of opinion from Dutch Limburg in favour of union with Belgium. No notice had been taken. He thought the question should be left for the League of Nations to consider at a later date.

(It was decided that no action need be taken on the subject of the union of Vorarlberg with Switzerland.)

9. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the conclusions of the report had been accepted by the Council (H. D. 39, Para. 2³). He observed that he had taken action and fulfilled his part of the undertaking. *Report of Inter-Allied Commission on the incidents at Fiume* He had given orders that the French troops in Fiume should be replaced by others. As to the suppression of the French base, this could not be undertaken immediately, as the base must be maintained while there were French troops. In the meantime, however, there had been a recrudescence of unpleasant incidents. He thought it was necessary that General Grazioli should be recalled forthwith, and that Italy should take as prompt action as he had taken himself, otherwise further bloodshed would occur, as threatening posters were appearing in Fiume, directed against both the French and the British.

M. TITTONI undertook to act and to fulfil all the undertaking of the Italian Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he took note of this declaration.

10. M. SEYDOUX explained that the Note prepared by the Eastern Blockade Committee for the Council, and considered by the latter on the 23rd August (H. D. 37,⁴ Minute 6) had been reconsidered in order to meet the views of the American Delegation. Certain modifications had been made, but the Blockade Committee thought it absolutely necessary to maintain a sentence to the effect that any action taken by a warship of an Allied or Associated Power should be understood to be taken in the name of all the Allied and Associated Powers. Without such a stipulation, it would be impossible for the ships in the Baltic to take any action at all.

MR. POLK observed that there appeared to be no amendment in that case of the previous provisional decision. What was proposed was equivalent to a blockade.

M. SEYDOUX said that it was not blockade, because merchant shipping could not be captured, but could only be turned back.

MR. POLK said he regretted that he could not agree. The phrase M. Seydoux attached such importance to represented a blockade. The American Government had always held very strong views on this subject. He thought, however, that some compromise might be possible. According to M. Seydoux, a neutral ship, attempting to trade with Bolshevik Russia, could not be captured, but could be turned back. Should the neutral ship refuse to turn

³ No. 43, minute 2.

⁴ No. 41.

back and should its papers be in order, Allied ships would not be entitled to take any action at all. What he suggested was,

‘that vessels of the Allied and Associated Powers should, in the name of those Powers as a whole, be authorised to prevent any vessel not provided with legal clearance for a Bolshevik Russian port, or any vessels whose papers are falsified, from proceeding to a Bolshevik destination.’

MR. BALFOUR asked what the United States Government would do if an American trader asked for clearance papers for a cargo to Petrograd.

MR. POLK said that the United States Government would refuse clearance.

MR. BALFOUR said the British Government would do the same.

MR. POLK pointed out that stopping a neutral ship at sea if it carried regular papers, was nothing less than blockade.

MR. BALFOUR said that the United States Government made a distinction between fighting Russia and being at war with Russia.

MR. POLK observed that the British Government made the same distinction.

MR. BALFOUR said that according to International lawyers, it was impossible to be at war with any Government unless that Government were recognised. He did not, himself, attach much value to the opinion of international lawyers.

M. SEYDOUX said that it was known that several Swedish ships were ready to sail with cargoes for Petrograd. If the American proposal were adopted, the Allied Navies would not be able to intercept them.

MR. POLK asked how the Navies could stop them at present.

M. SEYDOUX said that hitherto no such shipments had gone to Petrograd. He suggested that the British Admiralty Notice No. 1298 of the 18th July, warning shipping against entering the zone in which operations were taking place, should be re-affirmed in the ‘Journal Officiel’ of the various Allied Governments.

MR. POLK said that he would try and find some formula to which the American Government could consent.

(The question was then adjourned.)

11. MR. POLK asked whether Treaties with the New States were to be between the New State on the one hand, and all the Allied and Associated Powers on the other, or between the New State on the one hand, and the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.

*Treaties with
New States*

(It was decided that the Treaties with the New States should be between the New State on the one hand, and the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
29 August, 1919.*

Priorité — Tiflis 715-182-18-17^k-Vmalte.

President, Council of Peace, Paris.

I have personally investigated conditions in Armenia and find the horrible situation beyond description. Relief can and will reach the destitute in time to prevent starvation providing you support me with troops. Cavalry most suitable if available. The equivalent of an American reinforced infantry brigade will save situation in Russian Armenia. Tartars attacking on east and south with Tartar uprisings increasing daily throughout interior. Arrival of even one regiment might decide fate of our Armenian allies who may be exterminated at any time unless troops are rushed. British now leaving Caucasus and have already refused even temporarily to use any of their troops in Armenia stating that orders from above forbid their stationing of any British troops in Armenian territory. If British policy forbids protection of Armenians indicated by above conditions, this must be changed or other troops must be found and their arrival expedited. British troops now here are principally Indian. Please acknowledge receipt this telegram.

W. M. N. HASKELL, Col. G.S., U.S.A.
Allied High Commissioner to Armenia.

APPENDIX B TO No. 46

DÉLÉGATION FRANÇAISE.

PARIS, le 5 août 1919.

Protection des Arméniens

En exécution de la décision de la Conférence du 25 août,⁶ la possibilité d'envoyer un petit contingent expéditionnaire pour la protection des Arméniens a été étudiée par le Gouvernement Français et conduit aux conclusions suivantes :

1° Le Gouvernement Français reconnaît possible de constituer une force expéditionnaire d'une douzaine de mille hommes de toutes armes, à prélever pour la plus grande partie sur l'Armée du Général Franchet d'Esperey, lorsque aura été opérée la reconstitution de cette armée, c'est à dire après le 10 septembre.

L'opération serait faite en prenant pour point de débarquement les ports de Cilicie où seraient créées deux bases françaises (à Mersina et Alexandrette).

Toutefois, il serait nécessaire, en vue de gagner du temps, de réserver la voie maritime pour le transport des troupes; le matériel et les chevaux seraient transportés par la voie ferrée Hajdar-Pacha, Konia, Adana; une entente à ce sujet serait établie avec la compagnie d'exploitation du chemin de fer pour le contrôle des transports.

2° La force d'occupation assurerait ses ravitaillements d'abord par les voies ferrées partant de Mersina et d'Alexandrette et, au delà, au moyen de camions automobiles dont le bon état des routes en Arménie permet un large emploi.

Le ravitaillement des bases pourrait être assuré par nos propres moyens comme pour les troupes françaises du Levant, à condition que les Anglais continuent à nous assurer la fourniture de la viande frigorifiée.

3° En résumé, l'opération envisagée est possible à partir du 10 septembre sans grosses difficultés, sous la réserve qu'une entente soit établie pour les transports et les ravitaillements.

⁵ Omission in original.⁶ See No. 42, minute 5.

H. D. 43.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, August 30, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Lt.-Commander Bell. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the items with which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Dr. James Brown-Scott, Mr. Woolsey.

British Empire: Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, Major-General Sir C. J. Sackville-West, Mr. H. Nicolson, Mr. A. Leeper.

France: M. Tardieu, M. Cambon, M. Laroche, M. Fromageot, M. Hermitte, M. Massigli, M. Kammerer.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey, M. Galli, M. Castoldi, M. Ricci-Busatti.

1. M. CAMBON read aloud the French text of the draft covering letter, in reply to the Austrian counter-proposals prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr. On concluding, he remarked that the letter now before the Council was longer than the former communication drafted by the Editing Committee. He further remarked, that in Mr. Philip Kerr's draft covering letter no mention was made of the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to call the new Austrian State the Austrian Republic, and to avoid all mention of the expression 'German Austria'.

The covering letter in reply to the Austrian counter-proposals.
(See Appendix A¹)

M. TITTONI said that it had been decided that the expression 'Republic of Austria' should be employed in all official communications addressed to that Country. He did not think that it was within the power of the Council to do more. (See H. D. 29,² Minute 4.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with M. Tittoni.

M. CAMBON read the passage in the original covering letter drafted by the Editing Committee, dealing explicitly with the point in question (see H. D. 38,³ Appendix F).

¹ Not printed. This draft text of the covering letter was, subject to the amendments adopted by the Supreme Council (see minute 1 below, and No. 49, minute 6), that communicated to the Austrian Delegation on September 2, 1919, and printed in the British press on the following day. For the French text see *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye*, vol. ii, pp. 310-17.

² No. 33.

³ No. 42.

MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to make a general comparison between the former document, prepared by the Editing Committee, and the one now before the Council. He accepted M. Cambon's statement that the new draft covering letter was longer than the former. He also agreed with him that the new letter omitted certain points which had been dealt with by the Editing Committee. With regard to the manner in which the Austrian Government should henceforth be addressed, the Council had always referred to the 'Austrian Republic' in all official documents, and it was not possible to do more than this. Neither the Council nor the League of Nations could prevent any Country from conferring upon itself any title that it might desire to be known by. The original document drawn up by the Editing Committee was an extremely able one and a proof of this statement consisted in the fact that the new draft before the Council was based entirely upon the old covering letter, to which it owed everything. None the less, he preferred the new version to the old. What was desired was a document drafted in such a form, that it should be read widely in Allied, and in enemy, countries. This document should, moreover, express in the clearest and most forcible terms, the main contention of the Allied and Associated Governments, which was that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had largely caused the war and that the Austrian Republic was the direct successor of the old Kingdom. He thought that this main argument was expressed with greater force in the new document. If, however, the Council desired to adhere to the former draft covering letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, he would point out that it had not been the work of a single mind; that, in consequence, it contained a certain number of repetitions; and that it insisted on details, which, though important to the Allied Governments, and possibly to Austria, would not excite the interest of the ordinary public.

He thought that in the new document, Italy's case had been better stated. Attention was drawn to the selfish and unscrupulous manner in which the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had always tried to arrange her frontiers with Italy in such a way that she would have that country at her mercy. He did not think that too much emphasis could be given to this. In favouring the acceptance of the new document before the Council, he based his preference on the conviction that it would be more accessible to the mind of the ordinary public throughout the world.

MR. POLK said that there was no great choice between either draft. On the whole, however, he was ready to agree with Mr. Balfour to accept the one prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, but drew attention to the fact that a few changes would be necessary in it.

M. TITTONI said that the new document before the Council had been very well drawn up, and that it possessed the qualities ascribed to it by Mr. Balfour. He therefore accepted it.

M. MATSUI said that he accepted the English draft.

M. CAMBON drew attention to the fact that in the old draft letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, the question of a possible union between

Germany and Austria was dealt with. It was not mentioned in the new document.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question of the future relations between Germany and Austria would be discussed.

M. CAMBON drew attention to the American proposal contained in Appendix F of H. D. 38.³ This proposal pointed out that the original covering letter was not in agreement with the preamble of the Peace Treaty on the subject of the present status of Austria.

MR. POLK, in further explanation, stated that in the preamble of the Peace Treaty the words 'Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria' appeared. In the original covering letter, Austria had been treated as the *successor* of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He suggested that the matter could be settled by deleting from the preamble of the Treaty the phrase above quoted. In addition to this, the word 'Austria' on page 8 of the preamble, should be replaced by the expression 'Republic of Austria'.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the words 'Austria is recognised as a new and independent State' had been inserted by President Wilson who would not, he thought, raise any objection to their suppression.

MR. POLK said that the manner in which Austria was referred to in the preamble had an important bearing upon the future obligations of the new Republic. The phrase in question affected the Peace Treaty; the covering letter was not concerned with it.

M. TITTONI remarked that in the new document before the Council, the 'tyranny' of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was emphasised in one place and the 'centralization' of that Government in another. He thought that the last expression weakened the first.

MR. BALFOUR said that the centralization of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been drawn attention to, in order to show the Austrian people how much the dominant position of Vienna, in former days, stood to their prejudice at present.

MR. POLK said that on page 7 of the English Draft,⁴ the words 'Committees who reported on the question' should be replaced by the word 'Conference'. He also said that the resolution passed on the previous day, with regard to Radkersburg, made it necessary to amend the statement on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

M. TARDIEU said that a small sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission had been of the opinion that a special clause (see Appendix B⁵) should be inserted in the draft letter.

³ In the second sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft.

⁵ Not printed. This appendix contained a draft in French of seven paragraphs adopted for insertion in the covering letter to the Austrian delegation by the following members of the Reparations Commission: Mr. J. F. Dulles (United States), Col. Peel (Great Britain), M. Loucheur (France), Signor d'Amelio (Italy). These paragraphs, which related to the execution of article 179 of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye as regards the functioning of the special Section for Austria of the Reparations Commission, were appended to the covering letter as a postscript. (For an English translation see N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-1.)

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought such a clause ought to be put in a separate document.

(After some discussion, it was agreed the proposed special clause should be added to the covering letter, in some way, possibly as a foot-note.

It was decided:—

- (1) That the covering letter prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, and submitted to the Council, should be accepted as a whole, but that the following modifications should be introduced:—

- (a) Page 7 (English Text) Paragraph 4, Lines 8 and 9,⁴ the words 'Committees who reported on the question', should be replaced by the word 'Conference'.

- (b) That the statements in Paragraph 4, Page 7 (English Text) on the subject of the Austrian frontiers, should be amended in conformity with the resolution taken on the previous day with regard to Radkersburg and Marburg.⁶ (See H. D. 42,⁷ Minute 1.)

- (c) That the draft resolution passed by the Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission (see Appendix B)⁸ should be added to the covering letter in the form of a foot-note, or in some other suitable manner.

- (2) It was also decided that the following changes should be made in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria:—

- (a) On Page 8, Line 11 from the bottom, the word 'Austria' should be replaced by the words 'Republic of Austria'.

- (b) On Page 8, Lines 5 and 6 from the bottom the words 'Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria', should be deleted.⁹

2. The Council took note of the reply of the Drafting Committee to the question put before it by the Council on the 27th August. (See H. D. 39,¹⁰ Minute 4, and see Appendix C.)

Article in the German Constitution violating the stipulations of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

Reference H. D. 46,⁹ Minute 6

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not agree with the reply of the Drafting Committee. In his opinion, Article 61 of the new German Constitution not only violated the Treaty of Versailles, but called for the collaboration of the Austrian Republic in that very violation. The situation caused was a serious one, and must be faced. In his opinion, the attention of the German Government should be called to this act of violation and should be forced [*sic*] to give a reply. He thought that the Drafting Committee's argument was an extremely clever one; but the assent of the German Government to that argument must be obtained. International lawyers were notorious for their differences of opinion. One lawyer would assert that an object was red, another that it was blue, whilst a third would be equally certain that it had no colour at all. These differences of opinion, though

⁶ This was effected by adding a sentence concerning Radkersburg to the end of the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 4.

⁷ No. 46.

⁸ This resolution is printed with minor variation by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

⁹ In error for H. D. 42 (No. 46).

¹⁰ No. 43.

entertaining, were not a suitable basis for measures affecting the peace of Europe.

MR. BALFOUR said that there were two questions before the Council. Firstly, the insertion of a clause in the Peace Treaty with Austria, with a view to counteracting the provisions of Article 61 of the new German Constitution; and, secondly, the action which should be taken with regard to Germany in view of her violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. He would like to know the opinion of the lawyers of the Drafting Committee upon the legal side of the question.

DR. SCOTT said that, in his opinion, the insertion of Article 61 in the German Constitution showed that the German Government had wilfully, deliberately, and without cause, broken the pact into which she had entered at Versailles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it might be sufficient to make the Austrian Government undertake not to be a party to the German Government's manoeuvre.

(It was agreed that a special clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau, but that he would like to hear a concise statement of the problem in international law raised by Article 61. He believed that the Drafting Committee had not been unanimous in its opinion on the subject.

M. FROMAGEOT said that he thought that the new German Constitution violated the Peace Treaty, and added, that the advice to the Council, in the form submitted, had been unanimously accepted by the Drafting Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had news, in the form of a letter which he had not yet circulated to the Council, that the attitude of the German Government was quite unsatisfactory. They were opposing Allied action in Silesia and his latest information was to the effect that one army corps would now be necessary for that country. All this only constituted an extra proof of the bad faith of the German people, and its Government.

MR. HURST said that there had been a difference of opinion in the Drafting Committee as to the extent to which the Peace Treaty of Versailles had been violated, although all were agreed that it had been violated in a certain degree. The point at issue was as follows. Article 80 of the Peace Treaty with Germany contained two references to the independence of Austria. In the first, Germany was called upon 'to respect strictly the independence of Austria'. In the second, she agreed that 'this independence shall be inalienable'. Undoubtedly Article 61 of the German Constitution violated the letter of the Peace of Versailles, but it was in the form of an *invitation* to Austria to join Germany. A country's independence was recognised by abstaining from all acts of coercion against it; and an invitation, which was the very reverse of a coercive measure, could hardly be said to threaten the independence of a sovereign State.

M. TARDIEU said that Mr. Hurst's argument was to the effect that Article 61

of the German Constitution exerted no pressure against Austria. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, however, stipulated that nothing should be done to interfere with Austrian independence. As an act prejudicial to that independence had been taken, the question of whether there had, or had not, been direct pressure, could be laid to one side.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought a letter should be sent on the subject to the German Government, which should be called upon to reply.

M. TARDIEU said that the action of the German Government had been taken by the Legislative Authorities. In previous cases (Slesvig, etc.) the Executive Authorities had been concerned. In either case, the Council could act.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council was called upon to take a political and not a legal decision; and suggested that Mr. Balfour, who was a moderate man, should draft the communication to be sent to the German Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that moderation was the exact quality required, and he thought that M. Berthelot, who was *not* a moderate man, ought to draft the letter.

M. TITTONI remarked that the cases of Austria and of Germany was [*sic*] not quite analogous. Germany must be called upon to perform her Treaty engagements. He did not know whether Austria could be called upon to settle, finally, her future condition, at the dictation of the Council.

M. PICHON said that in the draft Article for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Austria (see Appendix C), the manner in which the future independence of Austria was to be assured by the League of Nations was clearly provided for.

(It was agreed:—

- (1) that the draft Article regarding the independence of Austria (see Appendix C) should be accepted and inserted in the Austrian Peace Treaty:
- (2) that M. Berthelot should draft a letter for transmission to the German Government on the subject of Article 61 of the new German Constitution and should submit his draft to the Council at its next meeting.)

3.

*Draft Articles for the
Treaty with Austria for
the settlement of differ-
ences between States
called upon by the Treaty
to conclude special Con-
ventions*

[Not printed]¹¹

¹¹ The Supreme Council took note of a report of the Drafting Committee (appendix D in original), dated August 26, 1919, in answer to the questions put to it by the Council on August 22: see No. 40, minute 3 (*4 bis*). The Committee reported that article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations applied to disputes between states members of the League and was consequently inapplicable to a dispute with Austria so long as she was not a member. The Committee accordingly proposed, and the Council accepted, a draft for an article which was inserted in the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye as article 380.

4. The Council took note of a document drawing attention to the divergences between the French and English texts of the Covenant of the League of Nations. (See Annex [Appendix] E.)
Languages of the Peace Treaty

MR. BALFOUR proposed the following draft resolution:—

‘The present Treaty in French, in English and in Italian shall be ratified.

In case of divergence, the French text shall prevail, except in Parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts shall be of equal force.’

He said that in bringing forward this resolution, he desired to make it quite clear, that he did not wish it to be thought that he was provoking a competition for priority between the French and English languages.

(After some discussion, it was agreed:—

1. That in the case of divergence between the French, English and Italian texts of the Peace Treaty with Austria, the French text should prevail, except in parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts should be of equal force.

2. That the Drafting Committee should insert an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria in conformity with the aforesaid resolution.)¹²

5. The Council took note of a communication from M. Pachitch, on behalf of the Yugo-Slav State, to the effect that the Yugo-Slav Government could not undertake to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria until the special Treaty between themselves and the Allied and Associated Govts., provided for in Article 59 [51] of the Peace Treaty with Austria, had been communicated to them.
Proposed Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Yugo-Slav State

(It was agreed that the consideration of this question should be adjourned to the Meeting of the Council on Monday, September 1st, 1919.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris,

August 30, 1919.

APPENDIX C TO No. 47

Article 61 de la Constitution Allemande

En réponse à la décision du 27 août courant, le Comité de Rédaction est d'accord pour adresser au Conseil Suprême l'opinion suivante:

1°) L'article 61 de la Constitution allemande du 11 août 1919 n'est pas conforme à l'esprit de l'article 80 du Traité allemand.

2°) l'envoi de la note ci-après et l'insertion de la stipulation suivante dans le Traité autrichien seraient de nature à éviter des contestations ultérieures:

(a) *Note à l'Allemagne:*

Les Puissances Alliées et Associées ayant pris connaissance de la Constitution allemande du 11 août 1919, font connaître au Gouvernement allemand qu'elles considèrent que la disposition de l'article 61 alinéa 2 de ladite Constitution ne satisfait pas à l'esprit de l'article 80 du Traité de Paix signé à Versailles le 28 juin

¹² This resolution is printed with minor variation by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., p. 224.

1919 et que, conformément à l'article 178 de cette Constitution, la disposition ci-dessus visée ne saurait avoir aucun effet en dehors des conditions stipulées à l'article 80 dudit Traité de Paix.

(b) *Projet d'article à insérer dans le Traité autrichien.*

L'indépendance de l'Autriche est inaliénable si ce n'est du consentement du Conseil de la Société des Nations. En conséquence l'Autriche s'engage à s'abstenir, sauf le consentement dudit Conseil, de tout acte de nature à compromettre son indépendance directement ou indirectement et par quelque voie que ce soit, notamment et jusqu'à son admission comme Membre de la Société des Nations, par voie de participation aux affaires d'une autre Puissance.

Pour le Comité de Rédaction

HENRI FROMAGEOT

29 août 1919.

APPENDIX E TO No. 47

Divergences in the Covenant

[The] Report of the Committee shows that the French text is in many places capable of bearing a different interpretation to the English, though the English was the text originally agreed to.

Article 1. French text might mean that a signatory power who fails to ratify the Treaty might join the League by adhering. The English text makes it plain that it is only non-signatories who can adhere.

Again as to withdrawal. Withdrawal is only permissible if two years notice is given and all obligations have been fulfilled 'à ce moment'. Under the French text these words are ambiguous, but the English makes it clear that it applies to the moment of withdrawal.

Article 10 — in many ways the most important of the Covenant. The English text makes it clear that the guarantee is only against *external* aggression, whereas the French is vaguer and might imply a guarantee against aggression including internal.

The English text is necessary therefore to give precision to the meaning.

The German Treaty has now been signed and cannot be altered. In that Treaty the French and English texts are of equal value; consequently the divergences cannot be got rid of.

If the Austrian Treaty is signed with a provision that the French text shall prevail, additional complications to those given above will ensue.

e.g. China, having refused to sign the German Treaty, will come into the League through the *Austrian Treaty*: her rights and her obligations under the League and those of other Powers towards her would be that of the French text alone. The somewhat serious divergence in Article 10 under which the Powers undertake to preserve the Members from all aggression, including internal, in the French text, and from *external* aggression in the English text is of particular importance in the case of China.

It would be equally impossible in the Austrian Treaty to make the English text alone the predominant text, because that again would change the *status quo* created by the German Treaty.

The position of neutral States which are to adhere must be borne in mind. There is but one League and one Covenant, and it would be intolerable if a State might claim to have adhered under the Austrian Treaty and therefore be bound by slightly different rules.

The only course is to perpetuate the conditions of the German Treaty and to make the French and English text of the Covenant of equal value in all treaties in which the Covenant is reproduced.

The Labour Convention is also reproduced textually from the German Treaty and will appear in all the Treaties of Peace. Whatever rule is adopted as to the Covenant should apply to the Labour Convention.

To give effect to the suggestion the Drafting Committee should be directed to word the Final Clause as follows:—

The present Treaty in French, in English and in Italian shall be ratified. In case of divergence the French text shall prevail, except in Parts I and XIII where the French and English texts shall be of equal force.

No. 48

H. D. 44.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 1, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Lt.-Colonel Jones.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the Items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Professor Coolidge, Mr. A. Dulles.

British Empire: Mr. Headlam-Morley, Mr. A. Leeper, Hon. H. Nicolson, Mr. Carr, Colonel Horlick.

France: M. Tardieu, M. J. Cambon, General Le Rond, M. Aubert, M. Alphand, M. Kammerer, M. Laroche, Colonel Jourin, M. de Montille.

Italy: M. Stranieri, M. Galli, M. Brambilla, Colonel Castoldi, Capt. Rossi.

I. The Council had before it the text contained in Appendix A.¹

Treaty with Serb-Croat-Slovene State for the protection of minorities MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Treaty before the Council was similar to that with Roumania already approved by the Council.² There were three such Treaties, one with Roumania, one with Jugo-Slavia and one with Greece, all on the same lines. The Treaty with Greece would be ready

¹ Not printed. The text of this draft, headed '4^e épreuve — 22 août 1919', was in the main the same as that of the treaty as signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919 (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 17. Cmd. 461), with the exception of the preamble and draft articles 12 (see minute 1 and note 4 below), and 13. This draft is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 409-21.

² See No. 29, minute 8.

in a few days. The Committee³ had had the advantage of consultation with M. Venizelos in regard to the last of these Treaties. The suggestions he had made had been very helpful. His attitude had been very different from that adopted by the other States. As to the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the Delegation of that State had protested both against the principles of the Treaty as a whole, and also against its application to old Serbia. The first of these objections was no concern of the Committee. As to the second, the Committee was of opinion that the questions involved were questions of principle which should govern the whole policy of the State. The Committee thought that it was not practically possible to distinguish between one part of the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and another. Serbia in 1912 had had a population of three millions, but after the Balkan war, this population increased to five millions, and at the present time it amounted to twelve millions. The State, moreover, had changed its name and a Constituent Assembly was to be gathered in order to draw up the Constitution for the whole territory. The Committee, therefore, thought it was fair to consider the whole as a new State. It did not think that the stipulations in the Draft Treaty represented any real derogation from the authority of the sovereign State.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the supervision of the Minority Clauses was to vest in the Allied and Associated Powers, or in the League of Nations.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the State conferred these rights on the Allied and Associated Powers pending the creation of a League of Nations, and thereafter stipulated that they should be transferred to the latter.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this provision satisfied him.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that there was agreement in the Committee on all points save one. Before proceeding to describe this point, he wished to draw attention to the very first sentence of the preamble. The date 1913 had been deliberately chosen in order to show that the Treaty had under consideration, not only the acquisition of territory, made subsequent to the Great War, but also those which resulted from the Balkan War. This was the more necessary as the territory acquired in the Balkan War contained most of the population for whom special minority legislation was necessary, for instance, Macedonia. All were agreed that a strong and a just Government was necessary in Serbia. It was even more necessary that the Government should be strong than that it should be just. Macedonia was now to be delivered to Serbia in perpetuity. The question arose whether any restriction, not contained in the general clauses, for the protection of Minorities, should be imposed on the Serbian Government in this area. The French Delegation was of opinion that nothing should be done in this sense. The argument was that freedom of religion and language were to prevail in Macedonia and that the population would have appeal to the League of Nations. The French Delegation thought this sufficient. The Italian Delegation on the other hand proposed a far reaching scheme amounting to a special form of autonomous Government for Macedonia. He would not explain this scheme as the British Delegation had not supported it. He would prefer that it should be

³ Committee on New States.

explained by a member of the Italian Delegation. The American, British and Japanese Delegations proposed what was included in the first version of Article 12⁴ (see Appendix A¹). The suggestion was that the League of Nations should have their representative living in the country, who should report to the League and give advice to the Serbian Government. It was thought the presence of such a representative would be beneficial to the population as well as to the Serbian Government and might help to avoid outbreaks of violence. It was proposed that this arrangement should last five years. He had taken the liberty of consulting the Secretary-General of the League of Nations unofficially. He, on his side, made no objection.

M. TIRTONI said that he would not insist on the Italian proposal (see second version of Article 12,⁴ Appendix A). He was ready to adhere to the proposal of the majority.

+ The draft text of article 12 was as follows:

'Article 12

'(Proposed by the British, American and Japanese Delegations. Not accepted by the French Delegation.)

'In view of the peculiar conditions which have arisen in the former Ottoman provinces of Serbia, as a result of the wars of the last six years, and in order to inspire confidence in the population concerned, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government undertakes to invite the Council of the League of Nations at its discretion to nominate a Commissioner who shall reside in the district and who shall advise the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government in its execution of the foregoing clauses. The functions of this Commissioner shall be advisory only, and he shall furnish periodical reports to the Council of the League of Nations.

'The Commissioner and his staff shall be accorded diplomatic privileges, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government undertake to give him all necessary assistance in the performance of his duties. His appointment shall in the first place be for five years, but will be renewable at the expiration of this period by a decision of a majority of the Council of the League.

'or

'Article 12

'(Proposed by the Italian Delegation. Not accepted by the French Delegation.)

'I. The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes agrees to grant to the districts of Macedonia (within the boundaries fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers) autonomy in matters of language, instruction and religion as well as in questions of local administration.

'II. A Central Administrative Council whose seat shall be at Monastir and an Administrative Council for each district shall have the power to regulate these matters, as well as all others over which jurisdiction shall be granted to it by the laws of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

*'The number of elective members in the Administrative Councils shall be at least three times as large as that of the *de jure* members.*

*'The Religious Heads of each confession shall be *de jure* members of the Administrative Councils. The other members shall be elected in conformity with the laws of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.*

'III. The Administrative sub-division of the Macedonian territory shall be made so as to group, as far as possible, the populations of the same nationality and religion.

'IV. The Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes agrees that the officials of the districts of Macedonia shall be chosen among the inhabitants of these districts.

'V. The Governor of each district shall be appointed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, taking into consideration, as to their choice and designation, the numerical importance of the population as regards nationality and religion.

'VI. An organic regulation shall be prepared, within three months after the signing of

M. BERTHELOT said that the view of the French Delegation was that the Article proposed by the American, British and Japanese Delegations constituted an obvious mark of distrust of the Serbian Government. It had a further objectionable feature in that it left Macedonia open to Greek and Bulgarian intrigue, instead of allowing it to merge into Serbia, as it more naturally should, since it became part of Serbian territory. He thought the proposal would make it very difficult for the Serbian Government to accept the Treaty, especially as no special reasons for this distrust could be alleged.

MR. POLK asked whether the proposal applied only to Macedonia.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that it was intended to apply not only to Macedonia, but also to areas in the neighbourhood of Albania, where a considerable part of the population was Albanian.

M. BERTHELOT said that these people, like other minorities, had certain guarantees, including appeal to the League of Nations. The view of the French Delegation was that the Serbian Government had not deserved any special mark of suspicion.

M. TRITTONI observed that the measure was a temporary one, and that the Commissioner could be withdrawn after five years.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer to tell the Serbian Government that the League of Nations would establish a Commissioner in the country if disturbances arose. The Minority Treaties were already ill-received by the Poles and the Roumanians. He thought it very undesirable to incur the ill-will of the Jugo-Slavs as well.

MR. BALFOUR said that he also would like to avoid hurting the feelings of the Serbs. Apart from their feelings, however, he thought there were strong arguments in favour of the British-American-Japanese proposal. It was said that the people of Macedonia could appeal to the League of Nations if they were oppressed. Was it not better for the League of Nations to have an Officer on the spot who could report on the state of the country, rather than to receive Delegations from Macedonia in Geneva, Brussels or wherever the seat of the League might be? In the latter alternative, the League of Nations would have a poor chance of estimating the comparative mendacity of the reports brought to them. The Council had had experience of the kind of evidence supplied from the Balkans. There was equally hard swearing on both sides, and it was hardly ever possible to disentangle rights and wrongs. The Commissioner on the spot, assuming he were an able man, would know what really happened and he could give the League better evidence than could ever be obtained from rival Delegations. He did, however, think it was a serious matter to give offence to small Nations who were perhaps unduly sensitive about their sovereign rights. He was therefore inclined somewhat

the Peace Treaty, to determine the powers and the attributions of the Governors as well as the administrative, judicial and financial regime of the districts of Macedonia, taking as a starting point the preceding regulations on that matter.

'Provisions shall be included concerning the right of the General Council to propose modifications to this regulation, in the course of its first session.

'The final text, once decided upon, can be modified only on the initiative of the Scoutchina.'

favourably towards M. Clemenceau's proposal; but it involved delivering Macedonia to the mercy of the Serbs until such time as the arrangement broke down.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Committee had been influenced by the evidence of people with a knowledge of Balkan affairs. They had led the Committee to apprehend not legal injustices as in Poland, but outbreaks of illegal violence, such as massacres and petty persecutions. He ventured to suggest that if the outbreak of such forms of disorder were to be awaited, the object of the Conference would not be attained. He thought it could be fairly stated to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation that it was a matter of common knowledge that they would have trouble in governing certain areas, and it would be an advantage not only to the local populations, but also to their Government, to have a representative of the League of Nations on the spot.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the adoption of the preventive system would cause the Conference to have great difficulties with the Serbs. On the merits, he thought Mr. Headlam-Morley was quite right, but the result of any stipulation such as he proposed would be to encourage a large section of the Macedonian population to have recourse to the Commissioner of the League of Nations in opposition to the Central Serbian Government. This would in the end probably come about, but he would prefer that it should come about as the result of the faults of the Serbian Government, rather than as the result of action by the Conference.

M. TITTONI said that he thought an extraordinary commissioner might possibly cause annoyance. The desired result might be obtained by extending the powers of Consuls in Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that conflict would inevitably ensue with any such system. It might even amount to the re-introduction of the 'capitulations'.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the object of the Committee should be to do away with any reminiscences of the old control of the Powers. A very careful attempt had been made to avoid this difficulty.

MR. POLK said that he felt the same scruple as M. Clemenceau. He did not wish to hurt the national pride of the Serbs. On the other hand if nothing was done the Macedonians would suffer.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was for this reason that he suggested the threat of imposing a Commissioner. He suggested that a formula be introduced in the Treaty to the effect that the League of Nations would send a Commissioner to Macedonia, should trouble arise in the area. The Serbs would understand that they must behave.

MR. POLK asked whether M. Clemenceau suggested the insertion of this in the Treaty of Peace itself.

M. TARDIEU said that he thought that if anything of the sort was said, it would be better to say it in a letter, but he did not think it desirable to say anything of the kind. Why should Macedonia be specially singled out?

MR. POLK asked whether the suggestion could not be made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. Their opinion might then be obtained.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that though the Delegation had not seen the draft Treaty, he was quite certain they would refuse to sign it. He did, however, think it urgent to submit the Treaty to them. They would certainly make comment on the Article as at present drafted. It was better to submit it to them in a strong form, in order to have a margin for concessions.

MR. POLK said he thought in the end it would be necessary to amend the Article in the sense suggested by M. Clemenceau. He agreed, however, that the Article in its present form might be shown to the Serbs.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Committee wished genuinely to obtain the views of the Delegation. The Committee had not had the advantage of discussing the question with them in consequence of their uncompromising attitude. The conversations with M. Venizelos on the other hand had been very fruitful.

MR. BALFOUR asked what the Committee would do if the Serbs regarded the Article as such an insult to them that they refused to discuss it.

M. TITTONI suggested that the Article be so worded as not to impose a Commissioner, but to suggest the appointment of one if necessary.

M. TARDIEU said that whatever the situation in Macedonia might be, he did not think it right to add a special provision to the clauses, which in themselves were extremely unpopular. There were other areas in which disturbances might be expected. He did not look forward to the administration of part of Serbia by the League of Nations. Such a provision could not in any case be made general.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Commissioner, he thought, would not have an agreeable post. He would have no executive authority and no protection. He could only offer advice which might be neglected with impunity. There seemed to be areas in which mutual massacres were the only method of reaching conclusions.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that this was what the Committee expected would take place, if no arrangements were made in anticipation. There would be at once considerable agitation fostered by the friends of the Bulgars, in America, Great Britain and perhaps in France. They would claim the attention of the League of Nations; and the trouble would be aggravated.

M. TARDIEU said that if information was all that was desired, consuls could make reports.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that this was the old system, which it was desirable to eschew.

M. TARDIEU said that the old system included international gendarmerie. The appointment of a Commissioner appeared to re-introduce that system, in contradiction of the principles of the Conference, and in particular of the League of Nations.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he accepted M. Tardieu's general criticism, but that he thought this special exception was justified.

MR. BALFOUR said that no doubt the Serbs, if they knew their own interests, would suggest the appointment of the Commissioner themselves, but it was clear they did not.

M. PICHON said that what chiefly shocked the world in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was the violation of Serbian sovereignty. If the Conference were to adopt the same course, Serbia would refuse to sign. M. Pachitch had already declared quite clearly that he would not.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the League of Nations had a right under the Covenant to send representatives to make an enquiry, should massacres take place.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the League had this power according to the terms of the Minority Treaties; in this instance, according to Article 11, the League of Nations could act if an infraction of the Treaty occurred.

M. CLEMENCEAU after reading Article 11, expressed the opinion that these stipulations were sufficient to protect Macedonian and Albanian minorities in the Serbian State.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that it would be easier in practice to give effect to Article 11, rather than to Article 12.

M. TITTONI suggested that the words 'prendre telles mesures' be substituted for the words 'procéder de telle façon' in the French text of Article 11.

(It was then decided to accept the Treaty as a whole, to expunge Article 12 entirely, to amend Article 11 by the substitution of the words 'prendre telles mesures' for 'procéder de telle façon',⁵ and, after the necessary drafting amendments, to communicate the Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.)

2. M. TARDIEU explained the letter sent by M. Venizelos to the President of the Council on the 24th August. (Appendix B.) He pointed out that since then a new element in the situation had been introduced by the telegram from President Wilson (Appendix C). This telegram set aside both the alternatives considered.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that it was a very dangerous proposal to ask the Commissioner at Constantinople to take charge of an area containing 700,000 Greeks and 700,000 Turks, who would be in a continual state of warfare. He could not therefore accept the proposals made by President Wilson, but he was ready to listen to any new proposals that might be made.

M. TITTONI suggested that the question be adjourned, as no decision could be reached that day.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the Bulgarians were awaiting the Treaty, which must be completed without further delay.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if President Wilson adhered to his proposal it was not possible to reach a settlement.

MR. BALFOUR said that the future of Constantinople and Asia Minor need not be settled before the conclusion of the Treaty with Bulgaria. It was possible to say that Bulgaria should have nothing south or south-east of a given line. The fate of the territories outside that line might be reserved.

M. TITTONI said that if this plan was followed, difficulties would arise in

⁵ The English text ('take such action') remained unaltered.

Western Thrace. Eastern Thrace could be reserved without any difficulty, as it was occupied by Turkish troops. But the Bulgarians would be called upon to evacuate that part of Western Thrace they at present occupied. If so, they must be told to whom they were to deliver the country.

M. TARDIEU said that there was also a difficulty for Greece if the decision were adjourned until the fate of Constantinople had been settled.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was possible to distinguish between the questions at issue. The most pressing of the problems was to decide what was the boundary of Bulgaria. The other questions as to exactly how the parts of the Turkish Empire South of the Bulgarian boundary should be disposed of, could be for the time being deferred. As to President Wilson's telegram, he could not help feeling the President had not given sufficient consideration to the position of M. Venizelos. M. Venizelos was the only statesman in the Balkans who had sincerely tried to assist the Conference, and whose policy aimed at maintaining peace in the Balkans, yet if the American policy in Eastern Europe were carried out, Greece, of all these States, would fare worst. Serbia would acquire three times as much territory as she previously possessed. Roumania, in spite of her constant defiance of the Conference, would double her population. Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were created by the Conference itself. Greece, if a large Greek population in Thrace were not added to her, would hardly increase at all, except in national debt which was as great as Bulgaria's, even when the Bulgarian indemnity of £90,000,000 was counted in. He thought that it was not altogether fair to treat M. Venizelos in this manner nor did he believe it to be in the interest of Peace, especially as all Greece asked for was the application of the Fourteen Points. The President's message, however, must be seriously considered. He therefore suggested that a line be adopted for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria and that the attribution of all territories south of it be reserved.

M. TARDIEU said that to the reasons adduced by Mr. Balfour might be added the fact that Greece since the Armistice, at the instance of the Conference, had mobilised three more divisions than she had under arms during the war. She had increased her army from 9 to 12 divisions. Greece was the only Power which had increased her Army since the Armistice. Out of 7½ million Greeks living in compact masses in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor, 2,300,000 living at the very gates of their own country would be excluded from it by the President's plan. He did not think this would conduce to peace. There was also another aspect to the question. The Council had seen fit to deny the Hapsburgs the recovery of the throne in Hungary. If Greece were to be treated as was now suggested, King Constantine would be back on the throne within six months. He agreed that Mr. Balfour's solution would meet the practical necessity of framing a treaty for Bulgaria, but he thought the arguments raised against the President's message should be put to him.

MR. POLK said he would gladly send the arguments to President Wilson. He heartily agreed with what Mr. Balfour had said concerning the attitude of M. Venizelos during the Conference. This attitude had always been most

loyal and generous. It was therefore most distasteful to the American Delegation to adopt any decision not immediately acceptable to M. Venizelos. He did not wish to enter into all the reasons which had determined President Wilson. He would only point out to M. Tardieu that, if all the Greeks outside Greece were allowed to join Greece, it was rather the territory round Constantinople than the territory round Adrianople which would become Greek. He felt sure that the danger of the restoration of Constantine was recognised by President Wilson.

(It was decided that the Central Territorial Committee should determine a boundary line in accordance with President Wilson's message, as the Southern frontier of Bulgaria. The portion of Western Thrace to be ceded by Bulgaria would be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. This territory would be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek troops, the last being kept in the portion of this territory by general agreement attributed to Greece. The Treaty should, further, stipulate for Bulgarian access to a port on the Aegean.)

3. MR. BALFOUR said that he had sent M. Clemenceau's proposals (see H.D. 42,⁶ Minute 4), to the British Government, with a personal opinion in their favour, and was waiting to hear further as to representatives being sent out to confer regarding details, but, as yet, he had received no answer.

(It was agreed the question should be adjourned.)

4. MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the policy of the Conference to be that repatriation of the German prisoners in British and American hands should be carried out without delay under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Commission. It was not intended that the Commission should delay repatriation, even for an hour. The Commission itself was mere camouflage. He was ready to discuss any report the Commission might make, provided repatriation went on in the meantime. He did not, however, think that it was necessary for the Commission to make any report. All it had to do was to give a free hand to the British and American Authorities to carry out the repatriation. On Saturday⁷ he had heard that the engine drivers on the French trains said that they would take no German prisoner trains into Germany without a direct order from M. Clemenceau.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no obstruction had been put by him on the process of repatriation.

M. ALPHAND explained the report made to the Council (Appendix D⁸)

⁶ No. 46.

⁷ August 30, 1919.

⁸ Not printed. The Interallied Commission on Prisoners of War reported that it had met in accordance with the decision of the Supreme council of August 27, 1919 (see No. 44, minute 6), and submitted to the Council the propositions that: (i) the sub-commissions envisaged by paragraph 2 of article 215 of the Treaty of Versailles be immediately constituted so far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned: these sub-commissions to meet at Versailles in connection with prisoners in France, and French delegates to be attached to them in view of questions of transit through France; (ii) the Japanese Delegation

and the interpretation of its orders made by the Commission. He further pointed out that the Treaty stipulated that repatriation of prisoners should be carried out with the help of German rolling stock.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that it had not been intended that the Commission should make any arrangements with the Germans. All it was to do was to facilitate in every way the repatriation of the prisoners held by the British and the Americans.

M. MATSUI asked whether there was any objection to a discussion within the Commission regarding repatriation of prisoners held by the Japanese.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he saw no objection.

M. ALPHAND asked whether German civilian prisoners held by the French Government should also be repatriated.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the negative.

5. The Council had before it a draft note to the German Government regarding the violation of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 in the new German Constitution. (Appendix E.)

Article 61 of the new German Constitution
M. CLEMENCEAU said that he saw several solutions, none of which were entirely satisfactory. One was to tell the Germans that the Treaty would not be ratified unless they altered their Constitution. Another was to say that, as Article 178 of the German Constitution rendered Article 61 inoperative, the German Government was asked to acknowledge the nullity of the latter. The third idea that struck him was that the Council should avail itself of the article in the Treaty providing for a prolongation of the occupation of the Rhine if guarantees against German aggression appeared insufficient.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that Article 428 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany stipulated for something to take place after the lapse of 15 years. The breach of the Treaty complained of had just occurred. It seemed a long time to wait before taking action.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought the notion of not ratifying the Treaty must be rejected. He thought, however, it would be quite legitimate to occupy more territory on the East of the Rhine should the Germans not amend their Constitution.

M. TARDIEU agreed with Mr. Balfour that action should be taken at once of such a kind as to discourage Germany from a repetition of the offence.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the German Government alone could do nothing. It could not alter the Constitution. It could interpret it but its interpretation could be called in question by another Government. Only the German Parliament could deal with the matter and the German Parliament was not sitting. He suggested that the German Government be told that it had committed a breach of the Treaty which could not be accepted, and that this breach must be remedied within a certain time, failing which

had asked that the Japanese sub-commission be immediately constituted; (iii) in the light of the advance application of article 214 of the Treaty of Versailles, it would be appropriate to demand forthwith the application by Germany of articles 222 and 223.

the Allied and Associated Powers would take such action as they might think fit.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that such action might be the occupation of Frankfurt.

(It was decided that M. Berthelot should re-draft the message to the German Government regarding the breach of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 of the new German Constitution in the spirit of the discussion and that the new draft should be considered at the following meeting.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Astoria Hotel,

September 1, 1919.

APPENDIX B TO No. 48

DÉLÉGATION HELLÉNIQUE AU CONGRÈS DE LA PAIX.

PARIS, le 24 août 1919.

Monsieur le Président,

Il y a une dizaine de jours, Monsieur Tardieu m'avait fait savoir, au sujet de la question de la Thrace, que deux solutions étaient en vue.

Suivant la première, la Grèce obtiendrait dans la Thrace Occidentale les Kazas de Xanti et de Gioumouldjina, tandis que les territoires situés au Nord de ces Kazas seraient laissés à la Bulgarie et que l'on ferait un État international de la partie Est de la Thrace Occidentale. On accorderait en outre à la Grèce, la Thrace Occidentale, avec, comme limite au Nord et à l'Ouest des frontières turco-bulgares de 1913, et au Sud une ligne allant du golfe de Xéros à un point au Sud de Midia sur la Mer Noire.

La seconde des solutions envisagées attribuait à la Grèce la Thrace Occidentale, sauf une partie au Nord-Ouest, ainsi que la partie y adjacente de la Thrace Orientale, environ les 2/5 de celle-ci. La ville seule et le port de Dédéagatch et la voie ferrée qui y mène seraient internationalisés.

Entre ces deux solutions je m'étais vu forcé de préférer la dernière, afin d'éviter le grand inconvénient d'une discontinuité du territoire grec.

M. Tardieu m'avait alors recommandé de voir M. Polk, qui avait dit qu'il télégraphierait volontiers mon avis au Président Wilson et en attendrait la réponse.

J'ai eu en effet, un entretien avec M. Polk vendredi passé, 15 août, et sur sa demande je lui ai adressé à cette même date une lettre, dont copie ci-jointe,⁹ résumant ce que je venais de lui exposer verbalement.

Malheureusement, à l'heure qu'il est, aucune réponse n'est encore parvenue du Président Wilson, et de ce fait aucune décision n'a pu être prise par le Conseil Suprême, concernant la question de la Thrace.

Cela étant, je me permets de porter à votre connaissance que désireux de hâter le règlement de cette question, je serais disposé, à la rigueur, à accepter même la première des solutions proposées.

Toutefois, pour atténuer les inconvénients que comporterait cette solution, il est nécessaire:

1^o) qu'un droit de passage commercial et militaire vers la Thrace Orientale en

⁹ Not attached to original of this appendix.

temps de guerre, comme en temps de paix soit accordé à la Grèce, non seulement à travers le territoire de l'État international, mais aussi par le port de Rodosto.

2^o) que les Grecs et le[s] Musulmans habitants des territoires devant faire partie du nouvel État international, qui ont été forcés de s'expatrier lors et pendant l'occupation bulgare, soient rapatriés sous le contrôle et la protection d'une Commission Internationale et réintégrés dans leurs biens confisqués par le Gouvernement bulgare.

Qu'il me soit enfin permis d'ajouter que si cet État international venait à être constitué, rien ne saurait justifier que la population purement turque de 100,000 âmes habitant les territoires au Nord de la Thrace Occidentale, adjugée à la Grèce, ne fût également incorporée dans l'État international.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

E. K. VENIZELOS.

APPENDIX C TO No. 48

We are unable to justify in our own minds the acceptance of the suggested compromise.

The rejection of the proposals, it should be stated, is not on account of any lack of warm friendship for Greece or because of sympathy with Bulgaria. The loyal and worthy service rendered by the Greeks is by no means overlooked by us. We have furthermore given sympathetic consideration to their natural wish to include all territories inhabited by those of Greek blood within the boundaries of Greece. We cannot, however, allow our judgment regarding a settlement upon which depends the stability of future peace to be affected by sentiments of friendship and regard. If the United States is to be a signatory of the Bulgarian and Turkish treaties as well as one of the guarantors of the territorial settlements set forth therein, those settlements must not be based exclusively upon the principle of the national aspirations of a brave people or of reward. Primarily, they must be based upon the purpose of removing the causes of future wars and upon the permanence of the settlements, because of their reasonable and equitable nature. In our opinion these conditions are not met by the compromises suggested. The separation of the Greek territories and the separation of the territories of the international state would make neither for stability nor for continued peace.

Moved by a strong desire to meet the wishes of the Greek nation as far as is compatible with his conception of a settlement which is to be permanent in nature, the President would agree to the cession to Greece of the west portion of western Thrace, while the east portion of western Thrace as well as all of eastern Thrace should be included in the international state. According to this arrangement the division of the territory would be as follows:—in Western Thrace the eastern boundary of Greece would be a line running due north from the Aegean Sea through Maronia to a point just south of Chelepi. From that point the line would run in a westerly direction until it touched the 1913 Greek-Bulgar boundary. The territory of the international state in west Thrace would lie east of the Greek territory. It would be bounded on the north by a line commencing at the northeast corner of the Greek territory and running in an easterly direction through Karakalissa to the Maritza River and thence northward and following the Turkish-Bulgar boundary up to the Black Sea. A land right of way to the Aegean Sea across the territory of Western Thrace included within the international state as well as the free use of the port of Dedeagatch should be granted to Bulgaria.

The foregoing settlement, in the President's opinion, appears to have elements of permanency which the others lack. The Greek aspiration to secure sovereignty over the greater part of Eastern Thrace is of course denied. In view, however, of the mixture of races in that region hostility and bitterness would be excited by the grant of sovereignty to one of the races. The populations would be free from national intrigues and quarrels if incorporated in the international state.

It may be pointed out that the maintenance of the government of Constantinople will be a constant and very considerable expense to the power or group of powers which is charged with the government unless a considerable territory is attached to it.

APPENDIX E TO NO. 48

Les puissances alliées et associées ont pris connaissance de la Constitution allemande du 11 août 1919 et signalent au Gouvernement allemand que les dispositions du second alinéa de l'article 61 sont en contradiction absolue avec l'article 80 du Traité de Paix signé à Versailles le 28 juin 1919.

L'article 80, par lequel l'Allemagne s'est engagé à 'reconnaître et respecter strictement l'indépendance de l'Autriche' et a reconnu 'que cette indépendance sera inaliénable, si ce n'est du consentement du Conseil de la Société des Nations' s'inspire d'un double sentiment: d'une part, l'impossibilité que le premier résultat de la Paix fût un accroissement de la population et de la force allemandes par l'union de l'Allemagne et de l'Autriche dont le concert a provoqué la guerre; d'autre part, le respect du droit des peuples de disposer d'eux-mêmes confié à la Ligue des Nations, à qui il appartiendra d'en contrôler l'expression et d'apprécier les preuves et garanties données par l'Allemagne d'une mentalité nouvelle.

Les puissances alliées et associées estiment que le second alinéa de l'Article 61 de la Constitution allemande viole non seulement l'esprit mais le texte de l'Article 80 du traité de Paix.

Cette violation est double: en premier lieu l'article 61, en stipulant l'admission de l'Autriche au Reichsrat, assimile l'Autriche aux terres allemandes (*Deutsche Länder*) qui composent l'Empire Allemand, assimilation incompatible avec le respect de l'indépendance de l'Autriche.

En second lieu, en admettant et en réglementant la participation de l'Autriche au Conseil d'Empire, l'article 61 crée un lien politique et une action politique commune à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche en opposition absolue avec l'indépendance de celle-ci.

Les puissances alliées et associées ne sont nullement disposées à entamer une controverse juridique à cet égard: à la séance du 28 juin 1919, avant qu'il soit procédé à la signature du Traité de Paix avec l'Allemagne, le Président de la Conférence a expressément rappelé et déclaré aux Plénipotentiaires allemands que le Traité était un traité de bonne foi, à interpréter et exécuter comme tel. Au point de vue politique comme au point de vue du bon sens l'article 61 de la Constitution est une violation de l'Article 80 du Traité. L'article 178 de la Constitution allemande qui déclare que 'les dispositions du Traité de Versailles ne sauraient être affectées par la Constitution' en consacre lui-même la nullité.

Le Conseil Suprême avertit en conséquence le Gouvernement allemand qu'il considère le maintien des dispositions visées par le second alinéa de l'article 61 comme une violation de nature à empêcher la ratification du Traité de Paix, et l'invite à en provoquer la suppression, en l'avisant dès maintenant des dispositions prises à cet effet.

H. D. 45.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 2, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT-SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Commander Bell. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Captain Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. Woolsey, Professor Coolidge, Dr. Johnston, Dr. Scott, Mr. Nielsen.

British Empire: Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, Mr. A. Leeper, Hon. H. Nicolson.

France: M. Tardieu, M. Fromageot, General Le Rond, M. Aubert, M. de Montille.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi, M. Ricci Busatti.

1. The Council took note of the new draft letter to the German Government on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty, by virtue of Article 61 of the German constitution (see Appendix A).

MR. BALFOUR said that he noticed that the Germans were only given fifteen days in which to reply. It might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to answer within such a period. Their Parliament was not now in session, and he thought it doubtful whether their parliamentary procedure, of which he knew nothing, would permit them to accede to the wishes of the Council within the period stated.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had foreseen the difficulty, but thought it was rather an advantage than otherwise, to give the Germans a short period within which to reply. They would be sure to object, and to say that it was impossible, but the brief period imposed upon them in the letter would make it necessary for them to deal with the subject-matter of the letter without delay.

(It was agreed that the draft letter, for communication to the German Government, calling their attention to the violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, by virtue of Article 61 of the new German constitution, should be accepted.²)

¹ No. 48.

² This letter was printed in the British press on September 6, 1919.

2. MR. POLK stated that he had received a telegram sent from Colonel Goodyear to Mr. Hoover. It was stated therein that Colonel Goodyear had been informed, by a telephonic message from General Dupont, that this latter officer had received no orders from M. Clemenceau to proceed to Silesia. The telephonic communication had been made on 31st August.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a later telegram to the effect that General Dupont was ready to start.

MR. POLK said that he would so inform Mr. Hoover.

3. M. TARDIEU explained the frontier line which the Central Territorial Commission proposed for acceptance by the Council, (see Appendix B), with the assistance of a map.

Bulgarian frontiers in Thrace

(a) *Thracian Frontier* MR. POLK remarked that the line drawn on the map differed from the frontier proposed by President Wilson. The United States were, none the less, prepared to adopt the frontier line now proposed by the Central Territorial Commission.

(It was decided that the frontier line presented to the Council by the Central Territorial Commission and adopted unanimously by them, should be accepted.)

M. TARDIEU explained the problem of the Bulgarian access to the Aegean, and said that the question had been dealt with by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, when it had discussed Article 24 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.³ The central point of the problem was whether Dedeagatch should belong to Greece, or whether it should be part of an International State. This was a question which, of course, only the Council could settle. If it should be decided that it were to belong to Greece, the Central Territorial Commission was of the opinion that a general clause ought to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing to that country free access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway. The final allocation of Dedeagatch also raised the question of how the International Commission for that port ought to be constituted. The original proposal had been that the International Harbour Authority ought to be composed of a British, a Bulgarian and a Greek official. He considered that a French port officer should be added and, in addition, a representative of the United States, who would certainly act in a most impartial manner in all questions that came before him. His reason for suggesting a French representative was that France had been one of the Powers signatory to the Peace Treaty assuring Greek independence.

M. TITTONI said that whilst agreeing to M. Tardieu's proposals, he did not quite understand why no Italian representative was suggested for the International Harbour Commission at Dedeagatch.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would take note of M. Tittoni's suggestion.

MR. POLK said that it was important that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria guaranteeing free access to the Aegean Sea

³ See No. 23, minute 2 and note 1.

for that country; it was also important that Greece should have a free economic access to Eastern and Western Thrace.

M. TARDIEU said that Greek troops ought to occupy such territory as was definitely to be assigned to them by common consent. With regard to the remaining portion, he had consulted with Marshal Foch's staff, and with that of General Alby.⁴ He had been told by these military experts, that one mixed Brigade, composed of six Battalions, and four Squadrons of Cavalry, would be necessary. There was, at the present moment at Dedeagatch, a force composed of two Battalions of French infantry and one Squadron of French cavalry: the French contribution could not be increased, except possibly by a small contingent of mountain artillery. The four Battalions and 3 squadrons of cavalry necessary to bring the force of occupation up to the strength required could be supplied by the other Allied Powers. If necessary, small reinforcements could be supplied by the Greek Government. He did not consider the situation to be disquieting, in view of the fact that troops were already in occupation, and others might be sent.

MR. POLK said that it would, in his opinion, be most unwise to send any Greek troops, for it would be absolutely impossible to get them out again, he thought it would be preferable to leave the Bulgarian forces in the area under discussion, since they would probably behave better, under the threat of the eventual occupation of the territory by Greek troops. He added that no United States troops would be available for any Inter-Allied occupation of Thrace. He was sure that no trouble would occur so long as Inter-Allied troops were used for the occupation of the country.

M. TITTONI said that the Italians already had one battalion in Bulgaria, and that, if an Inter-Allied occupation of the areas now under discussion took place, the populations would remain in a state of tranquillity, even though the military occupation were effected by small forces.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Great Britain was in a position to make her contribution, but he did not like to make a definite statement without consulting his experts. He thought, however, that the British troops in Constantinople might be utilised.

(It was agreed that M. Tardieu should examine—

- (a) The question of assuring free economic access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway to Bulgaria, by means of general guaranteeing articles in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.
- (b) The question of an Inter-Allied Military occupation of the territories in Thrace now held by Bulgarian troops.
- (c) That his report on these subjects should be presented to the Council at an early date.)

4. M. TARDIEU explained the proposed Roumanian frontier in the Dobrudja with the assistance of a map.

*Roumanian
Affairs*

MR. BALFOUR said that the original idea of the Council had been that the southern portion of Dobrudja was properly speaking

⁴ Chief of French Army Headquarters Staff.

Bulgarian but that as it was Roumanian territory, and as Roumania was an Allied and friendly Power, she could not be forced to cede any portion of her territory to an enemy State. At the present moment, however, Roumania had almost ceased to have that character. He had just received a telegram from Admiral Troubridge showing the grave situation in Hungary caused by the action of the Roumanian authorities. (See Appendix C.)

MR. POLK said that the American Delegation had received similar information from General Bandholtz on the previous day.

M. TITTONI said that the four Generals were the source of information from which the Council ought to draw. He did not know why reports were being received independently, whilst the Inter-Allied Committee of Generals was in session.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that eight days had elapsed since a telegram had been sent to the Roumanian Government by the Council,⁵ and that no reply had been received.

M. TITTONI said that he thought the Council ought to receive a collective opinion on the situation from the four Generals. It was most important that the Council should be kept informed of their views, and he did not understand why they did not communicate their joint opinions more frequently. He thought that they ought to be called upon to do so.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians had now been defying the Conference for an entire three weeks, and had given no answer to the numerous communications sent to them. Every kind of Note had been sent to them. Some were couched in moderate terms, some in more forcible language, and others in a menacing style. Each style had failed to produce any result, and he thought that the time for sending Notes was now over. All information received combined to show that the Roumanians intended to make a separate Peace with Hungary. They were making requisitions on their own behalf, and acting in a completely independent manner. It was inconceivable to him that Roumania should defy the Council, which had behind it the support of three Great European Powers, without receiving encouragement from some quarter or another.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had recently received a visit from M. Antonescu, who, when asked why no reply had been given to the communications of the Council, had answered that they were couched in too violent terms.

MR. BALFOUR then read a telegram from General Gorton and remarked that the last sentence contained in it did not seem to be connected with the first part (see Annex [Appendix] D).

At this point the Council took note of all the telegrams received by the French Foreign Office and signed by the Inter-Allied Military Mission, since August 26th, on the subject of the situation in Hungary. (See Appendix E.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it appeared to him to be clear that the Allied Generals were not carrying out their original instructions, which had been that they should keep in communication with the Roumanian authorities, and report to the Council on what they discovered. Instead of doing this

⁵ See No. 42, appendix C.

they were plunging themselves into political questions. He had come to the opinion that the Roumanian situation was now so grave that prompt measures were necessary in order to prevent it from developing further.

MR. POLK said that the Inter-Allied Generals at Budapest had originally attempted to carry out their instructions. They had got into communication with the Roumanian Authorities, as directed, but had found that it was of no use receiving polite assurances from the Roumanians, and taking note of promises which these latter had no intention of fulfilling. The Military Mission had been at Budapest for three weeks, and, having found that it was impossible to carry out their instructions as originally drafted, had none the less attempted to make themselves useful to the Council, and had, in consequence, got involved in political questions.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the moment had come to send an ultimatum to the Roumanians. He thought it should be communicated to them by some well-known public man, whose nationality was not a point of any importance.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had a plan which might be followed in conjunction with that of M. Clemenceau. It had for long been evident that the promises of the Roumanian authorities were of no use. The only success that the Council had obtained in its dealings with the Roumanians had occurred when the authorities of that country had been told that they must either accede to the wishes of the Council, or come into open conflict with the Allied troops. He gave as an example the action of Admiral Troubridge, who, when in charge of the monitors on the Danube, had resisted the Roumanian requisitions of barges, and the action of the Roumanian authorities in stopping the transit of food across the river. Admiral Troubridge's attitude had been firm, and, as it was backed by force, the Roumanians had given way. At the present moment the Council was unable to get any reply to its communications to the Roumanian Government, but although this was the case, he was certain that no Roumanian statesman would take the responsibility of bringing the troops of his country into conflict with the Allied Armies. His proposal, therefore, was to occupy some place in Hungary with a small body of Allied troops. He was sure that the Roumanians would never fight them. It might possibly be easier to send a force of warships into the Black Sea.

MR. POLK said that the only vessels belonging to the United States of America in the Mediterranean area were stationed at Fiume and Smyrna.

M. TITTONI said that, before taking the action proposed by M. Clemenceau, the Council ought to wait for a complete report from the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Budapest.

M. CLEMENCEAU, commenting upon Mr. Balfour's last remark, said that the Roumanians had recently got hold of the Paris press. He did not attach great importance to this, but, at the same time, he did not wish to let the French people think that he had performed a quasi-belligerent act against the Roumanians, without having previously communicated an ultimatum to them. He thought that Allied war vessels might be sent into the Black Sea,

pending a reply from the Roumanian Government, but that they should not be called upon to act until an answer had been obtained.

The three demands which he proposed to make to the Roumanians were:

- (1) that they should cease from making requisitions in Hungary, and should place all the material that they had seized at the disposal of the Council:
- (2) that they should promise definitely that they would make no separate peace with Hungary:
- (3) that they should withdraw their troops from Hungary.

M. TITTONI said that he thought that, before warships were sent to Roumania, a reply to M. Clemenceau's ultimatum ought to be obtained. With regard to the three demands which M. Clemenceau proposed to make to the Roumanian authorities, he agreed that the Roumanian Armies should be ordered to cease their requisitions, and place the material seized at the disposal of the Allies; he agreed that they should be ordered to make no separate peace; but before he could consent to ordering the Roumanians to evacuate Hungary, he thought the Council ought to be sure that the Roumanian withdrawal would not open the door to a recrudescence of Bolshevism, and a revival of a new series of Bela Kuns. A police force sufficient to maintain order in that country should be raised.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the occupation of Budapest by Roumania, and the continued defiance of the Council, was a situation quite as grave as any produced by a Bolshevik Government in Hungary.

M. TITTONI said that it might possibly be best to make the Roumanians promise that they would retire on receiving orders from the Council.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that a decision ought not to be taken finally until the following day.

(At this point a general discussion as to the most suitable person to be entrusted with the ultimatum to Roumania, ensued. The names of Sir Eyre Crowe and Admiral Troubridge were mentioned in this connection.)

M. TITTONI said that he could not for the moment promise Italian participation in any naval action that might ensue. With regard to the person who should be entrusted with the communication of the ultimatum, he thought that sending an Admiral to Bucharest would be like making a naval demonstration without ships. He preferred that a diplomat should convey the orders of the Conference.

MR. POLK said that, in his opinion, the despatch of an ultimatum to Roumania did not bind the United States to subsequent Naval action.

(It was decided that the question should be adjourned to the following day.)

6. MR. WOOLSEY said that the reply to the Austrian Government on the subject of the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty, had referred to certain concessions made in a Note from the Council, dated July 8, 1919, and addressed to the Austrian Delegation.⁶ In view of the importance of the Note, and of the decision of the Council on August 28th, to refer the reply now being made to the Austrian Government to the Drafting Committee, in order to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty were necessary on account of interpretative passages in the proposed reply,⁷ he made the following suggestion:—

*Interpretations of the
Austrian Peace Treaty
contained in the replies to
the Austrian Delegation*

‘That the Note of July 8, 1919, as well as any other Notes to the Austrian Delegation, containing interpretative passages on the Treaty of Peace, should likewise be referred to the Drafting Committee, to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty might be necessary, on account of such interpretative passages.’

He had another point which he wished to bring before the notice of the Council. On August 28th, the Council had decided that a Clause should be inserted in the proposed covering letter to the replies to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the Peace Treaty to the effect that the covering letter in question ought not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty.⁷ In view of the fact that the reply of July 8, 1919, to the Austrian Delegation might be regarded as interpretative of the text of the Treaty, he suggested:—

‘That the clause in the covering letter should be made to cover all replies made to the Austrian Delegation, and not only the covering letter under consideration.’

(These two proposals were referred to the Drafting Committee, who entered the room to report on them.)

M. FROMAGEOT said that, in answer to the first point raised by Mr. Woolsey, he would draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that the first edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Austrians on June 6th. A long series of communications had followed; and the second edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented on July 20th. It was with this second edition that all replies to the Austrian Delegation were concerned, and it was therefore not necessary to discover whether replies of an earlier date than July 20th contained interpretative passages of a superseded text of the Peace Treaty.

(Mr. Woolsey’s first proposal was therefore rejected.)

He thought that Mr. Woolsey’s second suggestion ought to be adopted, and the phraseology of the covering letter altered, so as to meet the point.

(It was agreed that the wording of the general covering letter to the replies of [*sic*] the Austrian counter-proposals of the Peace Treaty should be so

⁶ See No. 5, minute 7 and note 8.

⁷ See No. 45, minute 6.

modified as to state that no passage in any of the replies should be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the Peace Treaty.)

(The Meeting then adjourned for a discussion in camera.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris,

September 2, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 49

Projet de Lettre aux Allemands²

2 septembre 1919

Les Puissances Alliées et Associées ont pris connaissance de la constitution allemande du 11 août 1919. Elles constatent que les dispositions du second alinéa de l'article 61 constituent une violation formelle de l'article 80 du Traité de Paix signé à Versailles le 28 juin 1919.

Cette violation est double:

1°. L'article 61, en stipulant l'admission de l'Autriche au Reichsrat, assimile cette République aux terres allemandes (*Deutsche Länder*) qui composent l'Empire allemand, assimilation incompatible avec le respect de l'indépendance de l'Autriche.

2°. En admettant et en réglementant la participation de l'Autriche au Conseil d'Empire, l'article 61 crée un lien politique et une action politique commune à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche, en opposition absolue avec l'indépendance de celle-ci.

En conséquence, les Puissances Alliées et Associées, après avoir rappelé au Gouvernement allemand, que l'article 178 de la constitution allemande déclare que 'les dispositions du Traité de Versailles ne sauraient être affectées par la constitution' invitent le Gouvernement allemand à prendre telles mesures que de droit pour effacer sans délai cette violation en déclarant nul l'article 61, second alinéa.

Sans préjudice de mesures ultérieures, en cas de refus, et en vertu même du traité (notamment de l'article 429), les Puissances Alliées et Associées font connaître au Gouvernement allemand que cette violation de ses engagements, que [? sur] un point essentiel, les contraindra, s'il n'est pas fait droit à leur juste demande, dans un délai de quinze jours à dater de la présente, à prescrire immédiatement l'extension de leur occupation sur la rive droite du Rhin.

APPENDIX B TO No. 49

Rapport du Comité Central des Questions Territoriales sur la Frontière Sud de la Bulgarie

PARIS, 1^{er} septembre 1919

Conformément aux instructions du Conseil Suprême, le Comité central territorial a examiné à nouveau la question de la frontière sud de la Bulgarie, en s'inspirant des vues contenues dans la dépêche du Président Wilson.

Il a l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil Suprême le rapport suivant, qu'il a arrêté à l'unanimité:

1°. La frontière actuelle entre la Bulgarie et la Grèce doit être rectifiée dans la région au nord de Buk pour enlever aux Bulgares toutes facilités offensives sur la

ville et le pont de Buk. Cette région est d'une petite étendue et a une faible population musulmane, et la frontière actuelle présente des inconvénients;

2°. En ce qui concerne la frontière sud de la Bulgarie dans la Thrace bulgare, le Comité est unanime à recommander l'adoption de la frontière définie dans l'annexe ci-jointe.⁸

Cette annexe a été établie dans une forme telle qu'elle peut être immédiatement insérée dans les conditions de paix avec la Bulgarie;

3°. En ce qui concerne la question de la liberté d'accès de la Bulgarie à la Mer Égée, cette question a été traitée dans la Commission du régime international des Ports, Voies d'eau et Voies ferrées, à l'article 24 des clauses à insérer dans le Traité de Paix avec la Bulgarie.³

Cet article ayant été rédigé à la date du 21 juin dans l'hypothèse où le port de Dédéagatch appartiendrait à la Grèce, il convient d'inviter la dite Commission à en établir une nouvelle rédaction dans l'hypothèse présente.

La Commission croit devoir à cette occasion, attirer l'attention du Conseil Suprême sur les conclusions de la note ci-jointe⁹ de la Délégation française, pour le cas où il serait constitué à Dédéagatch une Commission Internationale.

Une note analogue¹⁰ a été présentée par la Délégation italienne.

Il paraît nécessaire d'inviter la Commission des Ports à tenir compte des considérations de la dite note, en raison du fait que cette Commission a antérieurement estimé qu'il ne lui appartenait pas de faire entrer en ligne de compte des facteurs politiques.

Il paraît d'ailleurs inutile à la Commission d'insérer dans le traité avec la Bulgarie les dispositions de détails qui seront prises par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées pour assurer à cette Puissance un libre accès à la Mer Égée.

APPENDIX C TO No. 49

*Telegram from Admiral Troubridge, Buda-Pest, to Astoria.*¹¹

D. 30th August 1919. R. 1st September 1919, 10.00.

Unnumbered.

Forward to War Office. Following for Admiralty, begins:

Situation here is critical for Europe. Roumanians demand immediate acceptance by Hungarian Government of following conditions.

Occupation of Hungary for one year giving opportunity for preparing country for personal (*sic*) (? commencement of) union with Roumania. Immediate customs union with Roumania. Cession of strategic points near Szegedin on mouth of

⁸ Not printed. This annex, with, for the most part, drafting amendment, was inserted in the Treaty of Neuilly as paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 27. There was, however, a variation between the draft and final texts in that the second and third subparagraphs of paragraph 3 of article 27 of the treaty were not included in the draft but were replaced by the following subparagraph: 'De là vers l'est jusqu'au point où elle rencontre l'ancienne frontière de 1913 sur la rivière Kizildeli Suja (Cetakca).'

⁹ Not printed. This note, dated June 25, 1919, raised the question of the composition of the International Commission for Dedeagatch in the sense of M. Tardieu's observations in the discussion in the Supreme Council. This note is printed in translation by D. H. Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. xii, pp. 248-9.

¹⁰ Not printed. This note, dated July 6, 1919, is printed in translation, *ibid.*, vol. xii, pp. 249-50.

¹¹ Telegraphic address of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference.

Maros River and Becse [Békés] Csaba. No treaties to be made with Great Britain or Jugo-Slavs. They state to Hungarian Ministers they have already an alliance with Italy in which Hungary must join in order to assume policy of encirclement of Jugo-Slavs. I have urged Ministers to refuse any armistice or treaty with Roumania and to follow the counsels of the Supreme War Council at Paris. It is necessary to recognise at once any Government formed here and support them with energy.

APPENDIX D TO No. 49

*Paraphrase of Telegram from General Gorton, Budapest, received through
U.S. Naval Communication Service, Paris, to Astoria,¹¹ Paris*

No. G. 45.

D. 30-31 August, 1919.

Admiral Troubridge has been told by Diamandy that the telegraphic despatches of the Supreme Council, dated 23rd and 25th August had not been communicated to him.

The veracity of this is doubtful, but Roumania continues to make requisitions. There is no doubt that Roumania is striving to establish a separate Treaty with Hungary; telegrams of 23rd and 25th might therefore be transmitted privately to the Hungarian Government with advantage.

APPENDIX E TO No. 49

Document 1

*Télégramme de Mission Militaire Interalliée, Budapest, 26 août,
à Conseil Suprême, Conférence de la Paix, Paris*

N° 191—Urgent—Situation gouvernementale en Hongrie sans changement. Deux délégations, l'une représentant les petits fermiers, et l'autre les ouvriers des fabriques, ont désiré voir la Mission pour demander à être représentées dans le nouveau Gouvernement. Une autre délégation s'intitulant socialistes chrétiens est venue protester contre le départ de l'Archiduc en déclarant que le résultat allait être de livrer leur pays aux Juifs et que Budapest devrait être appelée Judapest. Il a été répondu à toutes les Délégations que la Mission Interalliée ne pouvait s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures de Hongrie. Aucun changement dans l'attitude des Roumains. Une seule amélioration à la situation depuis l'arrivée de la Mission: on a laissé entrer à Budapest une certaine quantité de denrées. On croit que les Roumains ont l'intention de partir soudainement dès qu'ils auront satisfait tous leurs instincts de pillage. En attendant, tous leurs actes, intentionnels ou non, tendent à livrer la Hongrie au bolchevisme et au chaos. Le Général Holban à Budapest a promis la semaine dernière d'armer immédiatement, de revolvers et de sabres, 4.000 hommes de la police; mais, au lieu de le faire, et au mépris des instructions de la Mission, lui demandant de maintenir toutes les troupes roumaines à l'Est du Danube, sauf la garnison de Budapest, on croit qu'il a l'intention d'envahir toute la Hongrie, de désarmer ou d'énécantir le petit noyau hongrois de l'amiral Horthis [*sic*] qui constitue la seule défense de la Hongrie contre le bolchevisme au cas où les Roumains évacueraient brusquement le pays. Ces mesures envisagées en même temps que la récente déclaration de M. Diamandy, disant qu'un plus long séjour des Roumains en Hongrie ne pourrait que faire tort

à leur prestige, donnent l'impression que, si la Roumanie trouve les conditions imposées par le Conseil Suprême trop sévères pour qu'elle les accepte, elle prendra tout ce qu'elle pourra, puis quittera rapidement la Hongrie qui, en raison de la passivité des Commandants roumains, sera laissée sans aucun moyen de défense contre le bolchevisme et le désordre. La Mission a consacré sa séance du 25 août à des affaires relativement peu importantes, sauf le rapport de l'Officier Britannique envoyé pour inspecter les trains se rendant en Roumanie par le pont de Szolnok. L'Officier Britannique rend compte que le pont ne sera pas réparé avant deux ou trois semaines, mais qu'il a vu, prêts à le traverser, 150 locomotives, 2 à 300 wagons de ravitaillement militaires, 300 wagons de marchandises vides, 4 avions sur des wagons, 2 à 300 wagons citernes, et entre Szolnok et Budapest, plusieurs centaines de wagons de marchandises.

MISSION MILITAIRE ENTENTE.¹²

Document 2

Télégramme

BUDAPEST, le 28-30 août 1919.

N° 206 De Prot.—La Commission reçoit à l'instant lettre du nouveau Président du Conseil hongrois. Elle est adressée au Président du Conseil Suprême et vous sera transmise par prochain courrier. Ci-après, le texte de cette lettre :

Monsieur le Président, en concordance avec la démarche de la séance du 22 août, le Prince Joseph, Gouverneur de la Hongrie, et le Gouvernement nommé par lui, ont démissionné. Les membres du nouveau Cabinet sont les suivants : Président du Conseil, Ministre de l'Intérieur : Étienne Friedrich, industriel. Ministre des Affaires Étrangères désigné, en ce moment absent, le Comte Imre de Csaky. Sous-Secrétaire d'État de l'Intérieur : Edmond de Benitzky, ancien fonctionnaire. Ministre d'Agriculture : Jules Rubinek, Directeur de la Société Agricole Nationale. Sous-Secrétaire d'État : Étienne Scabo Sokorapatka, cultivateur. Ministre du Commerce : François de Henrich, commerçant. Ministre des Finances : Jean Grunn, ancien fonctionnaire. Ministre de la Guerre : le Général François Schnitzer. Ministre de l'Alimentation Publique : Charles Ereky, ingénieur commerçant. Ministre des Cultes et de l'Industrie [? Instruction] Publique : Charles Huszar, instituteur du peuple. Sous-Secrétaire d'État : Jules Pokar, homme de lettres. Ministre de la Justice : Georges Baloghy, juge. Ministre des Minorités Nationales : Jacques Bleyer, professeur d'université. Ministre d'Hygiène Publique :

¹² In the original of this appendix there followed two telegrams, not here printed, from the Interallied Military Mission in Budapest to the Supreme Council: (i) No. 197 dated August 27, 1919, reporting: receipt of a protest from the Commissioner of the Hungarian Government for Western Hungary against an alleged advance by Roumanian forces; a large procession and a delegation of Christian Socialists requesting allied protection against the return of a Jewish and Bolshevist regime; receipt of a report that it would take a month to enrol the 4,000 Hungarian police, and of another stating that on the previous day the bridge repaired at Csongrád had been tested with the result that the testing locomotive fell into the river. (ii) No. 200 dated August 28-30, 1919, reporting that since the withdrawal of the Archduke Joseph several deputations had asked permission to present petitions to the Mission, generally with a view to preventing the return of Jewish or Bolshevist influence, and that the Mission proposed to receive the deputations, as was unavoidable, in order to inform them that it was expressly prohibited from interfering in internal Hungarian affairs but would convey their petitions to the Supreme Council.

André Csillery, médecin. Ministre de Propagande: Étienne Haller, homme de lettres. Ministre des Cultivateurs: Gan Mayre, cultivateur. Ministre des Ouvriers industriels: Daniel Olah, ouvrier de l'industrie métallurgique.

C'était et ce sera toujours presque impossible de construire un Ministère, qui pourrait contenter en même temps les diverses missions militaires résidant à Budapest, nos nombreux fragments de partis politiques et, outre cela, acquérir la satisfaction du commandement des troupes royales de Roumanie. Une chose, cependant, est certaine, c'est que le Ministère, dans la présente composition, possède la sympathie et la confiance absolues de la grande et décisive majorité du peuple hongrois. Les chefs des Missions Militaires ont certainement eu l'occasion de s'en persuader. J'ai tâché de tenir compte de ménager et de satisfaire, d'une façon loyale, à tous les justes désirs, qui se sont présentés au fur et à mesure des délibérations. Par conséquent, sont représentés dans ce Cabinet: les grands et les petits industriels, les commerçants, les fonctionnaires, les cultivateurs et les ouvriers industriels. Monsieur le Président, au temps du Gouvernement bolcheviste de Bela Kun, le parti des démocrates socialistes et amalgame faire (*sic*) le parti des communistes, ce que les leaders socialistes, restés ici pendant la commune, ont toujours accentué dans tous leurs discours au Congrès du Soviet, de même que dans leur journal officiel. Car leaders socialistes des ouvriers ne se sont pas servis de leur influence pour vaincre le bolchevisme. Mais se sont ou rendus à ce système, ou bien en se réfugiant à l'étranger, ont laissé des ouvriers, devenus ainsi la proie des idées, ruine du bolchevisme et de la terreur du gouvernement communard. Leurs leaders non bolchevistes, qui travaillaient à l'étranger, se sont bien procurés des connexions du côté de l'Entente, mais ne sont pas venus en aide ni aux ouvriers, ni à l'Etat; la bourgeoisie hongroise ne veut pas voir en défaut la classe ouvrière, à laquelle elle destine son rôle dans la politique de l'avenir, et ainsi c'est aux représentants des ouvriers travailleurs et non pas aux leaders professionnels des démocrates socialistes que j'adresse mon invitation dans mon Cabinet. Monsieur le Président, veuillez dans l'intérêt de la possibilité d'un travail efficace, prendre des dispositions, afin que les Missions Militaires résidant à Budapest s'abstiennent de vouloir influencer notre politique intérieure, mais qu'elles viennent en aide, en ce qui concerne le maintien de l'ordre et l'établissement de l'équilibre économique. Mon Cabinet a décidé de disposer de façon à ce que les nouvelles élections de l'Assemblée Nationale se fassent sur la base du suffrage universel (vote secret égalitaire, et par commune) dans le plus court délai possible, c'est-à-dire trois, quatre semaines. Tout hongrois reconnaîtra la légalité de ces élections. Pour qu'aucun doute ne puisse surgir, que les prochaines élections reposent [*?* sur] et expriment réellement la libre manifestation de la volonté nationale, je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, de nous déléguer une Commission de contrôle pour ces élections. Il serait désirable que les démocrates socialistes fassent partie de cette Commission; les élections auront lieu par les territoires concernant lesquels nous aurons la possibilité de nous accorder avec le Commandement des troupes royales de la Roumanie. Monsieur le Président, jusqu'à ce que nous puissions poser la gestion des affaires gouvernement [*sic*] aux mains de l'Assemblée nationale, notre Gouvernement provisoire désire réaliser les tâches suivantes: anéantissement complet du bolchevisme, restitution de l'administration et de la juridiction, sécurité de l'alimentation et continuité de la production, sûreté des biens et des personnes, restitution et protection de l'égalité politique, préparation aux élections de l'Assemblée Nationale. Monsieur le Président, nous vous prions d'avoir l'obligeance de vouloir nous appuyer dans l'accomplissement de nos devoirs et dans notre

ferme résolution de rétablir la vie constitutionnelle. Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de mon profond respect.

(Signé) Friedrich

Le nouveau Président Friedrich était à la tête de l'ancien Cabinet dont, sur quatorze, onze membres figurent dans le nouveau. Informations de plusieurs sources ainsi que constatation de certains faits ont confirmé que Monsieur Friedrich, appuyé par Archiduc, travaille activement pour rester à la Présidence du nouveau Cabinet et pour maintenir des collègues qui ne lui entravent pas trop sérieusement ses buts politiques. Commission, en se référant au télégramme du Conseil Suprême du 23 août qui a déterminé la chute du Cabinet Friedrich retient la première impression qu'un Cabinet formé la façon sus-indiquée et présidé par Friedrich ne répond pas aux nécessités reconnues par Conseil Suprême.

COMMISSION MILITAIRE INTERALLIÉE.

Document 3

Télégramme au Conseil Suprême, Conférence de la Paix, Paris

BUDAPEST, 29 août 1919.

N° 215.—Un télégramme reçu hier par un Membre de la Mission demande pourquoi, si la Mission considère que l'Armée Hongroise est réduite aux effectifs stipulés par l'Armistice du 13 novembre le Conseil Suprême n'en a pas été avisé; le télégramme ajoute que le Conseil Suprême ne pourra pas exiger le retrait de l'Armée Roumaine derrière la ligne fixée par la Conférence de la Paix jusqu'à ce qu'il puisse prouver que toute menace d'action militaire de la part de la Hongrie contre ses voisins est écartée. De nombreux messages envoyés par la Mission au Conseil Suprême ont déclaré que, à l'exception d'un petit contingent mal équipé et comptant moins de 8.000 hommes sous les ordres de l'Amiral Hortluis, à l'ouest du Danube, l'armée hongroise en tant qu'armée n'existe plus et que les forces roumaines n'ont pas évacué la Hongrie parce que leur présence est nécessaire jusqu'à ce que une armée hongroise suffisamment forte pour maintenir l'ordre à l'intérieur soit organisée. Comme les messages dont il s'agit ont pu être ambigus ou mal interprétés on veut ajouter maintenant que, de l'avis de la Mission, l'armée hongroise a été depuis un certain temps réduite au-dessous des effectifs mentionnés dans l'armistice du 13 novembre.

MISSION MILITAIRE INTERALLIÉE.

Document 4

BUDAPEST, 30-31 août 1919.

A Conseil Suprême, Paris.

N° 225.—Au sujet du télégramme envoyé par le Conseil Suprême en date du 21 août,¹³ concernant l'établissement de postes de contrôle destinés à empêcher l'exportation en Roumanie de marchandises: la Mission Interalliée n'a pas un personnel suffisant à cet effet et demande que 3 officiers supplémentaires soient envoyés immédiatement à Budapest par chacune des 4 Puissances Alliées, afin d'établir les postes de contrôle sur la Theiss.

MISSION INTERALLIÉE.

¹³ See No. 39, minute 4.

H. D. 46.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, September 3, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Mr. P. Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Capt. Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the Items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: The Hon. H. Gibson, Dr. Lord, Mr. A. Dulles, Mr. Nielsen.

British Empire: Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. Carr, Col. Kisch.

France: M. Cambon, M. Fromageot, M. Serruys, General Le Rond, M. Cheysson, M. Hermite, M. Massigli.

Italy: M. Brambilla, M. Ricci Busatti, M. Nagara.

1. M. TITTONI said that before beginning the business of the day, he wished to draw attention to a matter of considerable importance. The American Delegation had received news that on the evacuation of Koritza by French troops, General Franchet d'Esperey had ordered their replacement by Greek troops. He thought this would lead to great trouble.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not seen any report to that effect. Moreover, he did not think it likely that the information was correct. General Franchet d'Esperey had asked what he was to do after the evacuation. No orders had as yet been given.

M. TITTONI said that it was very necessary to give orders that Greek troops should not occupy Koritza when the place was evacuated by the French. The Mussulman population was preparing partly to emigrate and partly to form armed bands to resist the Greeks. He understood that the French evacuation was imminent and whether or not the news to which he had alluded was correct, he thought the question should be examined.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that French troops would certainly not stay in Koritza, but that on their departure it would be arranged that the place should not be occupied.

MR. POLK said that the news he had received was merely a rumour. He had written to M. Clemenceau to inform him.

M. PICHON said that the French Government agreed with M. Tittoni and had already informed the Greeks that they should not occupy Koritza.

M. BERTHELOT observed that Pogradek was also to be evacuated. It was

common agreement that both Koritza and Pogradek belonged to Albania. It was also an agreed policy that no occupation of contested territories should take place without an order from the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that all documents on the subject be supplied to him in order that he should be able to give an opinion on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR asked that a note on the subject be prepared as he had not been given any information.

(The question was then adjourned to the following day.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that on the previous day, Mr. Balfour had asked for an adjournment of 24 hours. He asked whether Mr. Balfour was
Roumanian Affairs able to give an opinion.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with the policy of sending a representative of the Council to Bucharest. He no longer thought, however, that Admiral Troubridge would be the best representative, as he had very rightly taken strong action against the Roumanians. He thought a civilian representative would be better. The person selected should be ready to represent the views of the Council very strongly, but he should not have been previously identified with any controversial action. He begged to suggest M. Jonnart, who had carried out very difficult negotiations in Greece with conspicuous success.¹ Should he agree to go, Mr. Balfour thought he would be the best possible representative.

M. PICHON said that he was convinced that M. Jonnart would not accept the mission. He had resigned the Governorship of Algeria in order to take up the work of reconstructing the devastated districts. He would not be ready to abandon this work.

M. TITTONI agreed that M. Jonnart would be an excellent appointment.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Jonnart whether he was willing to go, but he did not expect him to accept. He asked whether Mr. Balfour could not make a British appointment in this alternative.

MR. BALFOUR said that another plan suggested to him was that in each capital the Roumanian diplomatic representative should be summoned and that the views of the Allied and Associated Powers should be clearly explained to him.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think this course would be sufficient to meet the case. He wished to send a single individual to represent the Council in Bucharest who would return with the answer of the Roumanian Government.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Council required more than an answer. It would be necessary for their representative to make public in Roumania the point of view of the Allied and Associated Powers. This point of view appeared to be much misunderstood in Roumania.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians regarded America as their one

¹ M. Jonnart had gone to Greece as Allied High Commissioner in June 1917 during the crisis which resulted in the relinquishment of the Throne of Greece by King Constantine.

enemy. A distinguished Roumanian had informed an American of this. When told that all the communications sent to the Roumanian Government had been sent collectively from all the Allied and Associated Powers, he had, in reply, drawn attention to the views expressed in the French Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that during the incidents between France and Italy, the French Press had been consistently pro-Italian. The pro-Roumanian attitude of the French Press at the present time was, in the main, due to the activities of M. Robert de Flers. On the other hand, M. Bratiano had said that M. Clemenceau was his worst foe. The Roumanians were certainly friendly with the Italians, but he trusted that the Italian Government was not offering them any encouragement.

M. TITTONI said that he occasionally saw M. Misu. On all occasions, he had impressed on him that the Conference took a very serious view of the Roumanian situation. He had warned him that Roumania was embarking on a very risky enterprise.

MR. POLK said that on further reflection, he thought it would be a good thing to summon the Roumanian Ministers at the four capitals.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the object might be attained by recalling the Allied Ministers from Bucharest.

M. TITTONI said that this step should be reserved for a later stage.

MR. BALFOUR said that the results hitherto obtained by the discussion appeared to be (a) that a Commissioner must be found to represent the Council in Bucharest: (b) that M. Misu should be summoned to be present at the Council and that the Roumanian Ministers in Rome, London and Washington should be summoned by the Governments of those capitals. The Roumanian Ministers summoned should be warned that the Council regarded the actions of their Government with considerable disfavour and it should be explained to them that the Roumanian Government appeared to misapprehend the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers completely. (c) That they should be told that the Allied and Associated Powers were seriously considering the withdrawal of their representatives at Bucharest, as a token that they ceased to regard Roumania as one of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would see M. Jonnart on that very day. He asked Mr. Balfour meanwhile to endeavour to find a suitable Englishman for the post. He further asked that Mr. Balfour should draft a document explaining the Allied policy towards Roumania. Should the Roumanian Government reject the ultimatum addressed to them, the representative of the Council, on leaving Roumania, should bring back with him all the Allied and Associated Ministers and officers in the country.

(It was agreed that Mr. Balfour should draft a document explaining the policy of the Council towards Roumania, and that this document should be submitted to the Council on the following day.

It was also agreed that both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour should endeavour to find a suitable representative of the Council to send to Bucharest.)

4. MR. POLK said that M. Paderewski was expected in Paris on the following day. He suggested that the consideration of this Treaty should be delayed until his presence could be obtained in the Council.

*Treaty with Poland
relating to Eastern
Galicia*

(It was agreed that the question should be discussed on the following Friday.³)

5. The Council had before it the request from Dr. Benes contained in Appendix B.⁴

*Demand of the Czecho-
Slovak Delegation to be
heard on the subject of
Teschen*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that this request should be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the Czecho-Slovaks were heard it would be impossible not to hear the Poles.

M. CAMBON asked that a solution of the question be hastened, as delay was causing great anxiety both in Prague and in Warsaw.

MR. POLK thought it might perhaps be best that the experts be heard at once, in order that the Council should be prepared for the hearing of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates.

GENERAL LE ROND explained the report contained in Appendix C.

He said that on April 14th a report had been furnished by the joint Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees, in which four Delegations proposed a certain line, and the Italian Delegation suggested another line, more favourable to the Poles. This report had not been examined by the Council. The Inter-Allied Commission in Teschen had since unanimously adopted

² The Supreme Council referred to the Organizing Committee of the Reparation Commission, for study and early report, a letter from Mr. Hoover to M. Clemenceau, dated at Paris on September 3, 1919 (appendix A in original), stating that 'the amount of railway rolling stock in locomotives and wagons in Hungary is much larger than was originally surmised.' This rolling stock included equipment belonging to the Galician and East Prussian, the Bohemian, Alsace-Lorraine, Trentino, and Roumanian railways, and due respectively to the Polish, Czechoslovak, French, Italian, and Roumanian Governments. Mr. Hoover recommended 'that the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council be at once authorized to undertake the immediate control of all this railway rolling stock, subject of course to the Allied Mission at Budapest, and that they should authorize a preliminary distribution of this railway rolling stock on the basis of the actual identification of the material. . . . A decision on the above lines on your part would allay the very considerable amount of feeling now existing in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere, with regard to the large diversions now being made to Roumania'. ³ September 5, 1919.

⁴ Not printed. In this letter, dated August 22, 1919, M. Benes stated that he understood that the Czechoslovak Delegation had not secured the complete adhesion of the Commission concerned to the Czechoslovak compromise proposal as regards Teschen; he accordingly felt impelled to request a hearing of the Supreme Council and to try for the last time to persuade it of the justice and moderation of the Czechoslovak claims. M. Benes further stated: 'Le problème pour la République Tchéco-Slovaque est successivement [excessive-ment] grave; il est même absolument vital pour l'avenir de notre pays. Si l'on ne peut pas tenir compte de nos revendications, qui sont à notre avis absolument justes et légitimes, cela aura des conséquences extrêmement lointaines.'

another line, and the matter had been referred by the Council to the united Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees.⁵ The matter was examined by sub-commissions. Three delegations agreed on a line very similar to that recommended by the Inter-Allied Commission in Teschen. The French and British Delegations made certain objections. They thought that the line proposed involved certain political and economic difficulties. This was implicitly admitted by the other Delegations, as they regarded as necessary supplementary agreements between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to regulate the railway and coal situation between the two countries.

When the question had been studied in the joint meeting of the two Committees, the British and French Delegations had withdrawn their objections, and adhered to the views of the majority. The report finally made deliberately set aside the political aspect of the question, which was reserved for the decision of the Council. He was bound to point out that if the line recommended were accepted by the Council, it would be necessary for the Council to arrange for the signature of Agreements between the two parties for the regulation of the economic relations and railway communications between the two parts of the territory of Teschen. It was only on these terms that the frontier could be made acceptable to Czecho-Slovakia.

It was suggested that the study of these agreements should be referred back to the Joint Committees.

M. TITTONI said that he thought the line should be adopted, and then the means of rendering it acceptable to the parties should be studied.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was unable to accept a line until he knew what was required to render it acceptable.

MR. POLK said that the line formerly suggested would have required no such agreements as were now proposed. It gave a Polish population, however, to Czecho-Slovakia. The line now recommended broke up the economic unity of the country for ethnic reasons, and therefore required to be supplemented by economic agreements.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Council should hear Dr. Benes and a Polish representative before deciding.

M. TITTONI said that any line suiting the Czecho-Slovaks would *ipso facto* not suit the Poles. The political effect in either case might endanger the existing Governments. Nevertheless, he thought that economic and ethnic reasons should prevail, and that the Council should not be unduly influenced by the prospects of any Government in power.

(It was agreed that MM. Benes and Dmowski should be heard on the following day.)

6. M. SERRUYS said that, regarding Article 25,⁶ there had been in succession three proposals by Roumania. There was an Article in all the Treaties abrogating all Conventions made between the enemy Powers and Roumania, Russia or any portion of what had

Article 25⁶ of the
Treaty of Peace
with Bulgaria

⁵ See No. 10, minute 2, and No. 17, minute 2.

⁶ Article 25 of the draft economic clauses. Cf. No. 22, note 8.

been the Russian Empire before or since the 1st August, 1914. Roumania had first wished to be excluded from these Articles, secondly, she had wished that the Articles should be identical in all the Treaties, thirdly, she had asked that the clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria should be so framed as not to affect the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. The Economic Commission had, therefore, proposed the following text for Article 25:—

‘Bulgaria recognises as abrogated all Treaties, Conventions or Agreements concluded before the 1st August, 1914, or since that date up to the coming into force of the present Treaty, with Russia or with any State or Government the territory of which previously constituted any part of Russia as well as with Roumania, subsequent to the 15th August, 1916, up to the coming into force of the present Treaty.’

The Economic Commission had thought this text acceptable, as all the economic agreements it was desired to abolish had taken place since the war. It was unnecessary to touch the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. The Drafting Committee had been asked to examine the questions and had reached very similar conclusions. (See H. D. 31,⁷ Minute 2.) The Drafting Committee pointed out that the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest only affected States parties to that Treaty and no others. (For the report of the Drafting Committee, see Appendix D.⁸)

(At this point, the members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.)

MR. BALFOUR asked why the Roumanians wished to maintain this Treaty.

M. SERRUYS said they wished it maintained because it affected Roumanian prestige and because Roumania did not wish to give up any rights it established in her favour. In any case, these considerations were not the concern of the Economic Commission.

MR. POLK said that the Council had no reason to bind itself to recognise this Treaty, as the Roumanians had offered no satisfaction on the Dobrudja question.

M. TRITTONI said that the questions before the Council were:—

1. Could the Conference annul the Bucharest Treaty of 1913? The answer to this was in the negative.
2. Could the Conference enact economic or territorial regulations out of conformity with the Bucharest Treaty? Seeing that the Allied and Associated Powers were not party to the Treaty of Bucharest, they had the right to do so.

MR. POLK asked whether the clause, as at present framed, did not imply some recognition of the Treaty of 1913.

⁷ No. 35.

⁸ Not printed. This report, dated August 27, 1919, stated in part: ‘Les Puissances reconnaissent, simplement par *a contrario*, que le Traité de Bucarest 1913 n’est pas abrogé par le présent Traité bulgare. Le Traité de Bucarest n’étant pas abrogé garde la même valeur qu’il avait jusqu’à présent et garde cette valeur vis-à-vis des mêmes Puissances et d’aucune autre. La stipulation de l’article 25 ne doit donc pas être interprétée, en ce qui concerne les Puissances n’ayant pas reconnu le Traité de Bucarest 1913, comme impliquant de leur part une reconnaissance des clauses territoriales contenues dans cet Acte et notamment des clauses par lesquelles une partie de la Dobroudja a été cédée à la Roumanie.’

M. SERRUYS said that the clause implied no such recognition. It only stipulated for the abrogation of Conventions made since August, 1916, and was silent on the subject of the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, as the Conference had not yet settled whether Roumania was a friendly or hostile country, it might be as well to postpone the decision.

MR. BALFOUR observed that this clause was necessary to complete the Treaty with Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not wish to help the Roumanians in any way, nor did he wish to take any action against them.

MR. HURST pointed out that the Treaty of 1913 was not only a bilateral agreement. It affected Roumania, Greece, Serbia, and, he thought, Montenegro. The Roumanians did not wish it abrogated as between themselves and the Bulgarians.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether only the Roumanians had asked for the framing of the article as it was now proposed.

M. SERRUYS replied that Roumania alone had made the request, but that Greek and Serbian representatives had been present in the Economic Commission and had raised no objection to the framing of the article as now proposed.

MR. POLK said that, if the Serbians and Greeks agreed, there appeared to be no reason why the Powers should not equally agree.

M. TITTONI said that, as, in his view, the Conference had no right to abrogate the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, he could not agree to any article tending to do so.

MR. POLK said that, though he thought the Conference would have a right to abrogate the Treaty of Bucharest, he was ready to agree to the adoption of the article as proposed.

(It was decided to accept the drafting of Article 25 as proposed above.)

7. MR. BALFOUR asked what remained before the completion of the Treaty with Bulgaria.

*Completion of Treaty
with Bulgaria*

MR. HURST asked whether the Council had come to any conclusion regarding the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria in the Dobrudja.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Council had decided that Roumania could not, as she was an Allied Power, be asked to yield any territory to Bulgaria. This decision had been taken some time ago and had never been cancelled. The Council, however, had not concealed its feeling that Roumania ought to give up a piece of the Dobrudja which was clearly not Roumanian. Strained relations with Roumania would not, he thought, justify a change in this policy. If the Powers were to go to war with Roumania, the situation would doubtless be altered. He thought that, for the purposes of the Treaty with Bulgaria, it might be assumed that the old frontier in the Dobrudja was maintained, though this might be neither equitable or conducive to peace in the Balkans.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour.

M. TRITTONI also agreed.

MR. POLK said that he would give his answer on the following day.

(The members of the Drafting Committee then withdrew.)

8.

Opinion of Financial Commission on Articles 38 and 67 of M. Venizelos' proposals for the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. (See Appendix C to H. D. 22.⁹)

[Not printed]¹⁰

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Astoria Hotel, Paris,

September 3, 1919.

APPENDIX C TO NO. 50

Rapport présenté au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission des Affaires Polonaises et la Commission des Affaires Tchéco-Slovaques Réunies sur les Questions de Teschen et d'Orava

22 août 1919.

MANDAT, RAPPEL DES SÉANCES

Par deux décisions, en date des 12 et 27 [25] juillet,⁵ le Conseil suprême a renvoyé à la Commission des Affaires Polonaises et à la Commission des Affaires Tchéco-Slovaques réunies les questions d'Orava et de Teschen pour examen et rapport.

Les deux Commissions réunies, après avoir, au cours des séances des 23 et 24 juillet, procédé à une étude générale des questions d'Orava et de Teschen, ont chargé d'un examen plus détaillé une sous-commission ainsi composée:

Le Général Le Rond (*France*), Président;

Le Dr. Lord et M. Dulles (*États-Unis d'Amérique*);

L'Hon. Harold Nicolson et le Lieutenant-Colonel Kisch (*Empire britannique*);

Le Marquis della Torretta et M. Stranieri (*Italie*);

M. Otchiai (*Japon*).

Cette sous-commission a tenu cinq séances du 26 juillet au 18 août. Elle a entendu M. Benès, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la République Tchéco-Slovaque, et M. Dmowski, Premier Délégué de Pologne.

Les deux Commissions réunies, au cours de trois séances tenues les 19, 20 et 22 août, ont élaboré le présent rapport, qui a été adopté à l'unanimité, et qu'elles ont l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil suprême.

I. QUESTION DE TESCHEN

Deux faits ont rendu nécessaire de soumettre à un nouvel examen la question de Teschen:

1° L'échec des pourparlers de Cracovie a fait disparaître l'espoir d'une entente directe entre Polonais et Tchéco-Slovaques au sujet de Teschen;

⁹ See No. 26, note 6; also No. 33, minute 5.

¹⁰ The Supreme Council decided to reject both articles.

2° Les membres de la Commission interalliée de Teschen, qui ont étudié la question sur place pendant plusieurs mois, sont arrivés à un accord unanime sur une ligne plus favorable aux revendications polonaises que le tracé antérieurement proposé à Paris par la majorité des membres des deux commissions et très analogue à la ligne que la minorité avait envisagée dès cette époque.

D'autre part, depuis le 14 avril, date à laquelle la note des deux Commissions relative à Teschen a été remise au Conseil suprême, les doutes qui s'étaient élevés au sein de la Commission sur les aspirations réelles d'une partie de la population de la région de Teschen, qui, bien que de langue polonaise, paraissait plutôt opposée à une union avec la Pologne, ont disparu en raison de renseignements très précis venus de Teschen, qui représentent cette population comme faisant montre de sentiments nationaux polonais, de sorte qu'on ne peut plus contester sérieusement que, dans les trois districts de Freistadt, Teschen et Bielitz, le facteur ethnique ne soit nettement en faveur des Polonais.

En outre, la situation de la Pologne, au point de vue de la production de la houille, est devenue incertaine, par suite de l'institution d'un plébiscite en Haute-Silésie.

Tenant compte des considérations ci-dessus exposées, les membres des deux Commissions ont estimé à l'unanimité :

a) Qu'au point de vue ethnographique, les revendications des Polonais sur les trois districts de Freistadt, Teschen et Bielitz sont pleinement justifiées ;

b) Qu'au point de vue économique et ferroviaire, l'attribution à la Pologne du bassin houiller de Karwin et de la voie ferrée Oderberg-Jablunkau offrirait les plus graves inconvénients pour les Tchéco-Slovaques, qui, d'une part, se trouveraient placés sous la dépendance de la Pologne en ce qui concerne la production du charbon et du coke, et seraient, d'autre part, obligés à des raccordements coûteux pour maintenir les communications par chemin de fer entre le district minier de Mährisch-Ostrau et la Slovaquie.

Au point de vue politique, les deux Commissions ont estimé qu'il ne leur appartenait pas de faire entrer en ligne de compte les considérations de politique générale, qui échappent à leur compétence et sont exclusivement du ressort du Conseil suprême.

Les membres des deux commissions se sont bornés en conséquence à mettre en balance les considérations économiques qui militent fortement en faveur des Tchéco-Slovaques et les arguments ethnographiques qui sont nettement en faveur des Polonais. Ils ont cru devoir accorder en principe la préférence au facteur ethnique, parce qu'il n'ont aperçu aucun moyen d'amener les populations polonaises de la région de Teschen, dont le sentiment national est très ardent, à vivre pacifiquement sous la domination tchéco-slovaque, tandis qu'il leur a paru possible, par un ensemble de stipulations et de garanties qu'il resterait à déterminer avec précision, de diminuer dans une large mesure les inconvénients d'ordre économique que présenterait pour les Tchéco-Slovaques l'attribution à la Pologne du bassin minier de Karwin et d'une partie du chemin de fer Oderberg-Jablunkau.

Les deux Commissions ont, en conséquence, l'honneur de proposer unanimement au Conseil suprême le tracé décrit à l'Annexe 1.¹¹ Ce tracé ne diffère que par quelques détails du tracé proposé à l'unanimité par la Commission de Teschen.

Toutefois, les deux Commissions sont unanimement d'avis que la solution qu'elles proposent, pour être équitable, exige que l'État tchéco-slovaque obtienne de sûres garanties que la Pologne contribuera dans une large mesure à combler le déficit

¹¹ Not printed. For this trace see the map of Teschen and Orava (appended to original).

de sa production houillère et lui donnera toutes facilités de transit sur la voie Oderberg-Jablunkau, jusqu'à l'accomplissement des travaux ferroviaires nécessaires pour joindre le bassin de Mährisch-Ostrau au col de Jablunkau.

Elles demandent, en conséquence, au Conseil suprême:

a) De vouloir bien statuer sur le tracé de frontière proposé;

b) Si ce tracé est accepté, de vouloir bien:

1° Leur renvoyer la question de déterminer les concessions économiques et ferroviaires que la Pologne devrait équitablement consentir à l'État tchéco-slovaque;

2° Les charger d'élaborer les clauses d'un traité à conclure entre les principales Puissances alliées et associées, la Pologne et la Tchéco-Slovaquie à l'effet d'assurer à cette dernière les concessions reconnues nécessaires;

3° Les autoriser à consulter, en vue de la rédaction de ces clauses, des experts sur les questions de charbon et de communications par voies ferrées, ainsi qu'à entendre à ce sujet les délégués tchèques et polonais.

Le tracé décrit à l'annexe 1¹¹ suit d'une façon générale la ligne de démarcation ethnique, en laissant sur territoire tchéco-slovaque les localités dont le caractère ethnographique est indécis. Il a paru en effet, qu'en raison du fait que les Tchéco-Slovaques ont plus besoin de charbon que les Polonais, il y avait intérêt à laisser aux Tchéco-Slovaques le bénéfice du doute dans cette partie de la région minière où la situation ethnographique n'est pas parfaitement claire.

En outre, dans la région de Jablunkau, un nombre important de Polonais a dû être laissé en Tchéco-Slovaquie, en raison de la nécessité de conserver aux Tchéco-Slovaques la libre disposition du col de Jablunkau, qui leur est indispensable pour assurer les communications par voie ferrée entre les districts miniers de Mährisch-Ostrau et la Slovaquie.

La ligne proposée donnerait, au point de vue ethnographique, les résultats suivants:

Recensement autrichien de 1910

	<i>Territoire attribué aux Tchèques</i>	<i>Territoire attribué aux Polonais</i>
Population totale	185,625	249,196
Tchèques	105,161	10,443
Polonais	62,080	171,770

Les données relatives à la production du charbon sont approximativement les suivantes, d'après les statistiques de 1913¹²:

Production totale	7,595,000 tonnes.
Partie attribuée aux Polonais	3,000,000 tonnes.
Partie attribuée aux Tchéco-Slovaques	4,595,000 tonnes, soit environ 60 p. 100.

Pour le coke, les chiffres approximatifs sont les suivants:

Production totale	1,718,000 tonnes.
Partie attribuée aux Polonais	520,000 tonnes, soit 31 p. 100.
Partie attribuée aux Tchéco-Slovaques	1,198,000 tonnes, soit 69 p. 100.

II. QUESTION D'ORAVA

Un rapport présenté par un officier, à la suite d'une enquête faite sur place, a amené l'une des Délégations à demander au Conseil suprême de faire procéder à un nouvel examen de la question d'Orava.

¹² Note in original: 'Ces chiffres sont basés sur le rapport de la Commission de Teschen.'

Les renseignements nouveaux fournis par ce rapport ont paru à l'unanimité des membres des deux Commissions de nature à modifier leurs conclusions précédentes tendant au maintien de l'ancienne limite administrative entre la Slovaquie et la Galicie.

Cette limite, satisfaisante au point de vue géographique, présentait au point de vue ethnique l'inconvénient de placer sous la domination Tchéco-Slovaque la partie nord-est de la région d'Orava, que les ethnographes tant Tchéco-Slovaques que Polonais s'accordent pour reconnaître de majorité polonaise.

La frontière proposée aujourd'hui par les deux Commissions passe par une série de hauteurs et est claire au point de vue topographique. Elle suit d'autre part à peu près constamment la ligne de démarcation ethnique, sans englober en Pologne un seul village où une majorité slovaque ait été constatée.

Les deux Commissions n'hésitent pas dans ces conditions à proposer unanimement au Conseil suprême l'adoption du tracé décrit à l'annexe 2.¹¹ Ce tracé donnerait à la Pologne une population de 25,000 habitants, presque exclusivement polonais.

No. 51

H. D. 47.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, September 4, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Commander Bell. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Captain Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. Coolidge, Dr. Lord, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: Mr. Leeper, Mr. Carr, Colonel Kisch.

France: M. Cambon, General Desticker, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, M. Hermite.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi, Comm. Stranieri, M. Brainbilla [Brambilla], Baron Russo.

I. M. CLEMENCEAU drew the Council's attention to the objections of the German Government to the advanced Commissions of Control being sent at once, (see H. D. 36. 8¹ and Appx. G,² and also see Appendix A). He added that in his opinion it would be better to postpone sending out the advance Commissions of Control for a certain time. This was the opinion of General

*Allied Commissions
of Control in Ger-
many*

¹ No. 40, minute 8.

² In error for appendix J (to No. 40).

Nollet, although Marshal Foch was of another opinion. In conclusion, he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers had no positive right to send out these advance Commissions of Control if the Germans now objected.

GENERAL DESTICKER said that the despatch of the full personnel of the Commissions of Control depended upon the date of the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Marshal Foch had been of the opinion that an advance detachment of the Inter-Allied Commissions should be sent forward at least ten days before the full Commissions arrived. This preliminary measure was necessary in order to prepare the work with which the Commissions would be concerned later on. The whole question, therefore, hinged upon the probable date of the final ratification of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had thought that the Peace Treaty would be ratified by three Great Powers by 15th September.

M. TITTONI said that as far as Italy was concerned that would not be possible.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that the German objections appeared to be based on the very large number of officers who were to be sent under present proposals. Would it not be possible to adhere to Marshal Foch's proposal, and, at the same time, reduce the number of Commissions despatched, by making one nation responsible for one particular department, another nation for another branch, and so on? The large number of the personnel was due to the fact that each Department contained Inter-Allied Representatives.

GENERAL DESTICKER said that he did not think that Mr. Balfour's proposal was practicable and thought that it would be better to delay sending out the Commissions of Control for a few days in order to adhere to the original programme.

MR. POLK drew attention to the fact that the United States could not, for the moment, be represented upon the Commissions of Control.

(After some further discussion it was decided that no advance Delegation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany for the present.)

*Demand of the Austrian
Delegation for prolonga-
tion of the time allowed
for the consideration of
the Allied Reply*

2. (It was agreed that the Austrian request for a prolongation of two days of the time allowed for the consideration of the Allied reply (see Appendix B³) should be granted.)

3. The Council took note of M. Misu's letter (see Appendix C) to the President of the Peace Conference, stating that the telegrams of the Council to the Roumanian Government had, to a large extent, not been received in Bucharest.

³ Not printed. An English translation of this Austrian request (note No. 1162 dated September 3, 1919) is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 74-5.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation was rather changed by virtue of M. Bratiano's plea. He had hardly credited it at first, but had, later on, come to the conclusion that there might be a certain degree of truth in the statement made.

M. TITTONI said that M. Bratiano's statements were, to a certain extent, borne out by notices appearing in the French press, to the effect that wireless telegraphic communication from Paris was somewhat interrupted.

MR. POLK said he understood that the French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches for transmission to the Roumanian Government by telegram.

M. BERTHELOT said that this was not the case. The French Minister had not acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches under discussion, nor had he stated that they had been communicated by him to the Roumanians. In confirmation of this he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that a batch of telegrams received that morning by the French Foreign Office, from Bucharest, made no reference to the previous communications of the Council.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not understand how the non-receipt by the Roumanian Government of previous dispatches of the Council could be explained in any credible manner.

MR. POLK said that the Queen of Roumania had written a letter to Mr. Hoover, wherein she protested in the strongest terms against the United States' attitude towards her country. This was surely evidence that the Council's dispatches had been received.

M. PICHON said that the information on which the Queen of Roumania's letter had been based, might have been obtained from the public press.

M. TITTONI said that it would possibly be better to make use of the military organisation for the transmission of telegrams. He drew the Council's attention to the fact, that, according to Mr. Misu's letter (see Appendix C), the Roumanian Government was now considering the possibility of withdrawing their armies from Hungary. This was the first occasion on which they had made any statement of the kind.

MR. POLK then read a letter from an American officer, who had had an interview with one of the Roumanian authorities in Bucharest. The conversation recorded in the letter was to the effect that the Roumanians had occupied Budapest, and intended to stay there; that they intended to settle and manage their own affairs in their own way; that they had received an insulting letter from the Council, which they had answered in the most suitable way, by ignoring it; and that the Roumanians had nothing to fear from the Allies, who did not intend to follow their menaces up by effective action. This letter showed clearly that the Roumanians were conscious that they were treating the Council with contempt, and that they intended to continue to do so.

M. PICHON drew the Council's attention to a telegram received that morning from M. de Saint Aulaire,⁴ and remarked that the information it contained somewhat contradicted that received by Mr. Polk. (See Appendix D.)

⁴ French Minister at Bucharest.

MR. POLK, commenting upon the telegram circulated by M. Pichon, said he thought it was the most amazing attempt to avoid the real issue that he had ever read. In view of the fact that the Allied generals in Budapest had been urging the Roumanian Government to form a gendarmerie for the maintenance of order, and had been positively opposed by them in any such measure, the statement contained in the telegram from M. de St. Aulaire that the Roumanians were anxious to restore order, was little short of ridiculous.

MR. BALFOUR said that he found it very difficult to believe that the Roumanian Government was not playing with the Conference. The Roumanian authorities at Budapest, and the Roumanian representatives in the Allied capitals, knew by the papers, and from the Allied Generals at Budapest, what were the wishes of the Council. The Military Representatives at Budapest, in particular, had continually explained the wishes of the Council. It was folly to suppose that communications made to the Roumanians at Budapest were not sent on to the Central Government at Bucharest. The present complaint of the Roumanian Government, that they were in ignorance of the real wishes of the Conference, seemed well-nigh incredible. He had not had time to weigh the evidence in support of their plea carefully; but it seemed to him that their present arguments were only advanced as part of an elaborate scheme of ignoring the wishes of the Allies, and of acting in whatever manner they themselves thought best. There was a remarkable agreement between the conversation of the American officer, communicated to the Council through Mr. Polk's kindness, and the actual facts of the case. He was far more inclined to believe the statements made by the Roumanian official to Mr. Polk's correspondent, than he was to give credence to M. Bratiano's assurances that the Roumanian Government was still waiting for the instructions of the Council.

MR. POLK then communicated a further extract from the same letter, in which his correspondent stated that he had been informed by the Roumanian official that the Allies had made a peace which was unfair to small nations; and that the Roumanians, therefore, intended to take the matter into their own hands, and to settle the matter equitably in their section of the world.

M. TITTONI said that the difficulties were increased by the fact that there was no properly constituted government at Budapest; if there had been one it would have been possible to collaborate with it in setting up a force sufficient to maintain order, and, when this had been done, to ask the Roumanians to go.

MR. POLK said that M. Tittoni did not seem to have realised the exact nature of the difficulty. The Allied generals at Budapest had frequently urged the Roumanians to allow the Hungarians to form a police force. The Roumanian[s] had positively obstructed any such measure. The Roumanian authorities had been asked, by the Council, not to devastate Hungary. The Council had been told in reply, that it was incumbent upon Roumania to get back the material taken from her at an earlier period of the war. The

requisitions far exceeded anything that might have [? been] done under such a plea. About 4,000 sealed cars had gone across the Roumanian frontiers from Hungary, carrying everything that could possibly be requisitioned. He felt very strongly in the matter for a particular reason. There was, at the present moment, an American general officer in Budapest who was being flouted by the Roumanian authorities. The situation was, therefore, so humiliating, that he felt the President ought to be advised to withdraw the United States general officer from Budapest.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed, in the main, with Mr. Polk, but thought it was difficult to act as though the Council were absolutely certain that the Roumanian Authorities were acting in bad faith.

MR. BALFOUR said that, although some doubt might exist as to whether the Roumanian Government had received the telegrams of the Council, it was none the less certain that they were fully aware of the policy of the Allies.

MR. POLK said that a despatch had been agreed upon at the Meeting of the Council on the 23rd August (see H. D. 37,⁵ Minute 1); it had been published in the papers in Paris on the 26th August, and transmitted to the Generals in Budapest on the 27th. It must, therefore, have been sent on to Bucharest. If the Roumanian representative at each of the Allied capitals were summoned to the Foreign Office, and told that the Council was in earnest, he was certain that the situation in Roumania would improve. All information received through the United States Secret Service was to the effect that the opinion prevailed among the Roumanian Authorities that the Council was not serious in its intentions.

MR. BALFOUR then read the letter which he had drafted for communication to the Roumanian Government at Bucharest. (See Appendix E.)

M. TITTONI said that the letter had been very well drafted. He suggested that in the first sentence of the second paragraph the words 'rightly or wrongly' (not now shown in Appendix E) should be deleted. The sentence as corrected would be a more impartial expression of opinion.

A long discussion then followed as to the method of communicating the letter to the Roumanian Government and

(It was decided that the letter drafted by Mr. Balfour should be taken by Sir George Clerk personally to Bucharest, and be presented by him to the Roumanian Government.)

(It was further decided that Sir George Clerk should also take copies of all telegrams previously sent by the Conference to the Roumanian Government and should communicate them with the aforesaid letter.)

4-

*Clauses relative to
immigration for insertion
in the Treaty of Peace
with Bulgaria*

[Not printed]⁶

⁵ No. 41.

⁶ M. Berthelot commented on the report on this subject (arising out of proposals made by M. Venizelos) submitted by the Commission on New States. (Appendix F in original.

5. At this point, Dr. Benes and MM. Paderewski and Dimowski entered the Council.

Question of Teschen M. BENES explained the question of Teschen to the Council with the aid of maps. He said that the problem should be looked at from four points of view, namely, the ethnographical, the historical, the economic and the political.

(a) *Ethnographical considerations* According to the latest statistics, there were in the Teschen area, 230,000 Poles, 150,000 Czechs, and 60,000 Germans. This Polish majority was questioned by the Czechs, who doubted the accuracy of the statistics. Owing to the policy of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the resistance of the Czechs to Austrian rule had been combated by every administrative measure that could be brought against them; and in consequence, the Austrian policy had been systematically to weaken any ethnographical statistics favourable to the Czecho-Slovak population. This could be seen from the fact that the figures given varied from one census to another. The German and Polish elements were generally grouped together; because these two sections of the population were always able to agree in their opposition to the Czechs. There were [*sic*], in the mining district of the Teschen area, a large percentage of workmen, who were not, properly speaking, inhabitants of Teschen. The Austrian Authorities had assisted the Polish agitation in Teschen since the year 1873, when the centralising tendencies of the Viennese Government began to be put into effect. Since that date, Polish schools had multiplied, and a continuous effort had been made to replace the local Czech administration by Polish or German Authorities. The result of all this had been that the statistics of the Polish population had increased, but the Czecho-Slovak Government thought that false classifications had deliberately been introduced into the data on which the statistics were based. The population in Teschen did not speak the proper Polish language, but a dialectic mixture of Czecho-Slovak and Polish. It was even declared that there were no villages in which separate Polish and Czech inhabitants lived side by side. There were, none the less, centres where the Czecho-Polish dialect was universally spoken. This showed that the population of Teschen, from an ethnographical point of view, was in a transitional state. There was further to be taken into consideration the tendency of the population towards a particular form of culture, and it was certain that the tendency of the population in the area was towards the adoption of Czech customs. All these facts combined to show that the Austrian statistics could not be trusted, or at least, that they presented only one side of the question. The Czech Government maintained that there were not more than 45 per cent. of Poles in the Teschen area.

An English text is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 309-17.) After discussion, the Supreme Council decided: (i) that no clause on the subject of reciprocal immigration in the Balkans be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria; (ii) that the report of the Commission on New States be accepted, and the Commission be authorized to consult with M. Venizelos as to the best method of putting his proposals into effect.

The situation of Czecho-Slovakia in the past was of importance. That country had always identified itself with the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia, formed out of Moravia, Bohemia, and that portion of Silesia which included Teschen. The strife of the sixteenth century had almost exterminated the Bohemian population. A revival of Bohemian national sentiment had occurred later, but the moral sentiment sustaining it had been based upon the historical status of the Bohemian Kingdom, and the national unity of that country. Basing itself upon these feelings, Bohemia had always resisted the attempts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to force their country into a Central European Federation. They had never, in the past, abandoned their standpoint, that the old Kingdom constituted a historic unit, and ought never to be divided. This sentiment was very deep, and existed at the present moment; the population could not understand the projected division of Teschen, at a moment when the ethnographical problem had not been finally resolved.

The coal question affected Czecho-Slovakia very deeply. There were large masses of coal in Poland, and in those parts of Upper Silesia which would undoubtedly be ceded to that country. Statistics showed that the total capacity of the Polish coalpits amounted to 86 billion tons; the pits in Czecho-Slovakia, including Teschen, only had a capacity of 9 billion tons. Czecho-Slovakia was essentially an industrial country. It had produced 70 per cent. of the metal work of the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom, 93 per cent. of the sugar products of that country, and had worked a preponderating proportion of the blast furnaces employed in Austro-Hungarian industries. All this showed how much the Czecho-Slovak State was dependent upon a continuous supply of coal, and how little they were asking for themselves. The mines in Czecho-Slovakia were only capable of supplying the needs of the country for 250 years. Poland imported very little coal from Teschen, and statistics showed that in the past, only 25 trucks were sent into Poland every day. The industrial character of Czecho-Slovakia obliged her to import coal from Silesia.

MR. POLK then asked whether some of the coal imported by Czecho-Slovakia did not go to Austria.

MR. BALFOUR also asked whether M. Benes' figures included the importation of lignite.

M. BENES, replying to Mr. Polk, said that a certain quantity of coal was transmitted to Austria through Czecho-Slovakia, but that two-thirds of the total importation remained in the last-named country.

Replying to Mr. Balfour, he said that there was enough lignite in Czecho-Slovakia for the domestic needs of the country.

Passing to the Railway question, he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the most important railway line, maintaining communication between Slovakia and the disputed coal districts, ran through Teschen. This railway was absolutely necessary for the transport of the products of Czecho-Slovakia. (M. Benes here illustrated his statement by a reference to a diagrammatic map, showing the great proportion of Czecho-Slovakian goods

carried over the Oderberg-Kaschau line.) It was impossible for the new Czecho-Slovak Republic to build a new railway line on its own resources.

If the supply of coal upon which Czecho-Slovakia depended so greatly were taken from her, that country would have to rely upon (d) *Political considerations* Poland for the essential elements of her existence. Czecho-Slovakia was a more industrial country than Poland. Her sugar industries, her metallurgical works, and her blast furnaces could only be developed and continued by having a continuous supply of coal. If a decision were made unfavourable to Czecho-Slovakia, it would cause a great revulsion of feeling in that country. He had been surprised how deeply Czech feeling had been roused by the question. During the long negotiations of the past months, he had done everything in his power to calm the population of his country, but he had only been able to do so because his countrymen were hoping for a solution favourable to themselves. They now saw themselves faced with the possibility of a situation arising, in which they would be deprived of these things which were necessary for the reconstruction of their country. He had always attempted to advocate moderate views, but he doubted whether his influence would prevail over the growing excitement in his country.

He would like to draw attention to the economic effects of diplomatic friction between his country and Poland. In a period of strained relations, Poland would only have to hold up the railway traffic into Czecho-Slovakia, to paralyse that country in 24 hours. He would like the Polish representatives to understand that Czecho-Slovakia was not demanding rights over Polish populations, but merely putting forward a claim for things necessary for her very life. Czecho-Slovakia was surrounded by countries in a state of ferment, and the supply of materials necessary for her reconstruction was an absolute necessity to her, if she were to remain free of the existing political confusion in Central Europe. He had desired to see his country reconstituted on a firm economic basis as rapidly as possible, in order that he might make it a sort of rallying point for the political aims of western European policy. By doing so, he had hoped that her neighbours would gather round her, and that the western Powers would find a support for their policies in Czecho-Slovakia. Poland was necessarily involved in the politics of Eastern Europe. She was faced with all the difficulties of the Russian situation, in which she would be involved for a long time to come. For this reason, Poland would require the collaboration of Czecho-Slovakia, but this could not be given if the last-named country were deprived of Teschen, which was regarded as essential to her economic existence. During the war, the Czech population had adhered to their wish for the integrity of their country. They had had the deepest faith in the policy of the Entente. He feared that if a decision unfavourable to Czecho-Slovakia were given on the Teschen question, there would be a deep and general reversion of feeling. He feared that the proposed solution of the Teschen question would give rise to a deeply hostile feeling towards Poland, which might be seen from the fact that the Radical Parties in Czecho-Slovakia were now adopting an inimical attitude towards Poland.

In order to counteract this unfortunate sentiment amongst his countrymen, he had proposed a compromise, which he had hoped would satisfy both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. He had originally suggested that the line of the Vistula should be the boundary between the two countries. It had been pointed out to him that larger concessions were necessary, and he had endeavoured, with success, to make popular opinion in his country, favour the concession of the whole of the Bielitz district to Poland. His own opinions had been regarded as heretical by his countrymen: notwithstanding this, he had accepted a solution, which he hoped would have satisfied both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. More than this, he had always wished to advance conciliatory proposals in the case of Glatz. He had accepted a frontier between his country and Hungary, which placed 132,000 more Slovaks under Hungarian rule than there were Hungarians under Czech administration. He was now faced by a frontier line, proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees, which divided the mining district into two portions. Such a solution could not possibly be accepted. The artificial nature of the division proposed could be seen by the well-known fact that there was constant communication between the districts which it was proposed to separate: large numbers of workmen were continually moving from one area to another, and back. The new frontier line would interrupt free communication with Slovakia, and would oblige the Czech Government to construct a special railway line, which would practically run through one continuous tunnel. The German population were all in favour of maintaining the economic unity of the Teschen area. He did not wish to lay emphasis on this argument, which none the less, could not be completely neglected. He had recently received a Delegation, largely composed of miners and workmen, from the Teschen district. On the news being received that the Teschen Basin was going to be divided, large numbers of Polish workmen had protested against such a measure. It was to be noted that many of the Delegates belonged to political parties quite averse to chauvinistic feeling (Socialists, Socialist Democrats, etc.). None the less, they had expressed themselves strongly on the point, and had stated that they feared for the future. He did not think he was exaggerating when he said that this population, now so profoundly disturbed, would act against the wishes both of the Polish and of the Czecho-Slovak Governments, and deal with the problem by independent action on their own account. At the present moment, strikes of a political character were occurring, in which Polish workmen were taking part. He had tried to keep the population quiet, but he had begun to feel that a conciliatory policy on his part was more and more difficult in face of a general movement of protest and indignation. Teschen would always be of secondary importance to Poland. The Poles had complained that an economic argument was being brought against their ethnographical claims. The Poles, themselves, had not hesitated to do the same when they thought that such arguments would be favourable to them. He desired, in conclusion, to ask the Conference to consider with the utmost care all the arguments that he had brought forward, to weigh the grave political

consequences which might follow a decision contrary to the wishes of the Czecho-Slovak population, and to take into account the immense sacrifices which Czecho-Slovakia had made in supporting the Entente throughout the war.

(It was agreed that the Polish Delegates should be heard on the following day, and the meeting then adjourned.)

*Hotel Astoria, Paris,
September 4, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO NO. 51

Document 1

*Le Maréchal Foch, Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées, à Monsieur le
Président du Conseil, Président de la Conférence de la Paix (Secrétariat)*

G.Q.G.A. le 3 septembre 1919.

ÉTAT-MAJOR GÉNÉRAL.

4243.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint copie du compte rendu du Capitaine Laperche, Chef du Groupe de liaison près de la Délégation allemande, transmettant la demande faite par Monsieur von Lersner, au nom du Gouvernement allemand, de voir réduire l'effectif des Délégations des Commissions de Contrôle, ou tout au moins reculer la date de leur départ pour Berlin.

Je crois devoir à ce propos, faire les observations suivantes :

1^o C'est sur la demande expresse du Gouvernement allemand (lettre du 11 août de M. von Lersner à Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix) que le Conseil Suprême des Alliés a pris la résolution¹ d'envoyer '... le plus tôt possible à Berlin, une Délégation réduite, composée du Président et des membres les plus importants de chaque Commission, de telle sorte que chaque Puissance participant au Contrôle y soit représentée... pour fixer, d'accord avec le Gouvernement allemand les modalités d'exécution des clauses de la Partie V du Traité de Paix'.

2^o La composition des Délégations des Trois Commissions (60 officiers, 12 interprètes, 77 hommes, 13 automobiles) a été arrêtée par les Présidents des Commissions, en tenant compte de la mission qui leur incombe et de la nécessité d'avoir dans chacune d'elles des représentants de chaque Puissance participant au Contrôle.

Il n'est donc pas possible de réduire leur composition.

3^o La date du départ du 5 septembre a été fixée en admettant d'une part que les Délégations auraient besoin d'environ 10 jours pour préparer le travail de leurs Commissions, d'autre part, que le Traité de Paix entrerait en vigueur vers le 15 septembre.

J'estime qu'il est indispensable que les Commissions de Contrôle puissent fonctionner dès la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix.

La date de départ des Délégations ne saurait donc être retardée, à moins que la ratification du Traité de Paix ne doive avoir lieu à date nettement postérieure à celle du 15 septembre.

J'ai l'honneur de vous demander de vouloir bien me faire connaître la réponse que je dois adresser à M. von Lersner.

P. O. Le Major Général
DESTICKER

Document 2

Compte-Rendu du Capitaine Laperche, Chef du Groupe de Liaison près de la Délégation allemande

MISSION HENRY

VERSAILLES, le 3 septembre 1919.

Ce matin, au cours d'un entretien qu'il avait demandé à avoir avec moi, Monsieur de Lersner m'a donné communication d'une dépêche qu'il avait reçue de Berlin au sujet de la prochaine arrivée d'une mission militaire Interalliée, annoncée par la lettre N° 4193, du 31 août 1919, du Maréchal Commandant en chef les Armées Alliées.

Cette Mission qui doit quitter Paris le 5 septembre se compose de 60 Officiers, 12 Interprètes, 77 hommes, 13 automobiles.

Monsieur de Lersner m'a prié de transmettre, à titre officieux au Secrétariat de la Conférence de la Paix, les remarques formulées à ce sujet par son Gouvernement :

Le Gouvernement allemand fait observer que cette mission n'ayant qu'à préparer l'installation et à organiser les travaux des commissions militaires qui n'entreront en fonction qu'après la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, le nombre des membres qui la composent semble trop élevé.

Le Gouvernement allemand voit un grave inconvénient à l'envoi, dès maintenant, d'une mission aussi importante et demande instamment que :

1° dans le cas où on jugerait nécessaire d'envoyer une mission dès maintenant on en réduise l'importance.

2° dans le cas où on ne jugerait pas possible de diminuer sa composition, on retarde de quelque temps son départ.

Monsieur de Lersner a insisté en me faisant remarquer que l'arrivée actuellement d'une telle Mission augmenterait encore les graves difficultés de politique intérieure auxquelles le Gouvernement allemand a présentement à faire face. L'opinion publique en Allemagne serait surprise par l'arrivée d'une Mission Militaire aussi importante, alors que le travail des Commissions Militaires interalliées destinées à surveiller l'exécution des Clausus du Traité ne doit commencer qu'après la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, et les différents partis politiques trouveraient dans ce fait un nouvel élément de lutte contre le Gouvernement.

LAPERCHE

Destinataires : Secrétariat de la Conférence de la Paix, État-Major Maréchal Foch.

APPENDIX C TO NO. 51

DÉLÉGATION ROUMAINE À LA CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX.

PARIS, le 3 septembre 1919.

Monsieur le Président,

Je viens de recevoir un télégramme de Monsieur Bratiano, Président du Conseil de Roumanie, m'informant que jusqu'au matin du 31 août dernier il n'avait pas

reçu la Note envoyée par la Conférence dont parlaient des radiogrammes expédiés en Roumanie par les Agences télégraphiques.

Monsieur Bratiano a reçu mes télégrammes lui annonçant l'interdiction de tous transports militaires pour la Roumanie et il me prie d'attirer l'attention spéciale de la Conférence sur le caractère pernicieux et dangereux de la politique adoptée à l'égard de la Roumanie.

Quant aux affaires de Hongrie, la Roumanie avait la conviction que par l'occupation de Budapest et la destruction du bolchevisme, elle rendait un grand service à la cause générale.

A la suite des conditions qu'on veut créer à la Roumanie sans lui tenir compte de ses sacrifices en hommes et matériel, le Gouvernement roumain envisage l'intérêt qu'il aurait de retirer ses troupes en deçà de la Tissa en déclinant toute responsabilité pour l'état chaotique dans lequel sera replongée cette région de l'Europe disputée entre les bolcheviks et les réactionnaires monarchiques.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

N. MISU

Son Excellence Monsieur G. Clemenceau.

APPENDIX D TO No. 51

Le 30 août 1919.

Reçu le 3 septembre à 18 heures 40.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères m'a dit que les troupes roumaines évacueraient le territoire hongrois dès que la Hongrie aurait été désarmée et que les Roumains seraient rentrés partiellement en possession du matériel de chemin de fer qui leur a été enlevé et dont ils ne peuvent se passer pour sauvegarder les intérêts économiques du pays. Dès que ce double objectif aura été atteint, la Roumanie, m'a dit M. Bratiano, retirera ses troupes. La question hongroise lui paraît cependant grosse de menaces. L'impression générale est qu'après le départ des troupes roumaines la Hongrie sombrera dans le Bolchevisme, à moins qu'elle n'évolue vers la forme monarchique, seule capable, semble-t-il, de se maintenir sans appui extérieur. Un Gouvernement démocratique ne pourrait s'imposer que si le pays continuait à être occupé par les troupes roumaines pendant le laps de temps nécessaire pour lui permettre de s'organiser et de créer une force armée susceptible d'assurer sa défense et de maintenir l'ordre.

M. Bratiano a ajouté que c'était là une question d'ordre général, et que toutes les Puissances avaient le même intérêt à empêcher que Budapest ne redeint le centre d'un foyer d'anarchie qui s'entendrait [?] étendrait] bientôt jusqu'à Vienne et peut-être même au delà. La Roumanie toutefois n'a nulle intention de jouer le rôle de gendarme de l'Entente en dépit de celle-ci et ne s'obstinera pas à maintenir ses troupes à Budapest, alors que leur présence ne lui a valu jusqu'ici, de la part de ses Alliés, que des reproches qu'elle estime n'avoir pas mérité.

SAINT-AULAIRE

APPENDIX E TO No. 51⁷

The Associated Powers have watched with the deepest concern the recent developments of Roumanian policy in Hungary, which seem to indicate a deliberate

⁷ The letter contained in this appendix is printed by F. Deák, op. cit., pp. 492-4.

resolve of her rulers to separate themselves from their Allies and pursue an independent course of their own.

So long as the Soviet Government of Bela Kun were attacking or threatening to attack the Roumanian Army with forces in excess of those permitted by the Armistice, the Roumanian Government were able to allege that self-preservation required them to occupy a strong defensive line on Hungarian soil, notwithstanding that the Conference had requested them to retire within their own newly drawn frontier. Whatever apparent force this argument may have once possessed, it has none now. Events have demonstrated the military impotence of Bela Kun as clearly as his political bankruptcy: and assuredly no considerations of national security can any longer be urged by the Roumanian Government in defence of their recent action. Even if Hungary, under its Soviet Government, did not completely carry out the provisions of the Armistice, it was for the Associated Governments, by their collective action, to deal with the situation thus created, not for one of them in isolation to pursue a policy of its own devising. This however is exactly what Roumania has done, and in a manner which seems wholly without excuse. Hungary, suing for peace, already partially disarmed, in the throes of revolution, without allies and without food, has been overrun by troops, who under order from Bucharest, systematically strip it of every species of movable wealth, alive or dead, which seems worth the labour of transportation. Cattle, horses, agricultural implements, raw material, machinery, railway equipment, even the outfit of a children's hospital, choke the lines which lead from Buda-Pesth to Roumania. Wherever there are Roumanian soldiers, and Hungarian prisoners to work for them, everything is being taken that can be taken, however necessary it may be to provide employment in the towns or to raise food in the country. The economic problem presented by Hungary, in any case difficult of solution, is thus becoming rapidly impossible.

The Associated Powers are well aware of the provocation which Roumania has received. They make no excuses for her enemies. She was abominably treated by Hungary and the Allies of Hungary in their hour of triumph; and if she is now plundering on her own account, she has been herself most cruelly plundered. Doubtless the majority of her soldiers genuinely believe that, since they are only taking back what was once their own, their conduct needs no defence.

But though this may be true of the Roumanian soldiers, it cannot be true of the Roumanian Government. They must be well aware that this rough and ready method of exacting reparation is neither just to their allies nor expedient in the common interests. If indeed it did no more than impoverish Hungary and enrich Roumania it might be said, with truth, that both countries got what they deserved. But none knew better than the Roumanian Government that the policy of the Associated Powers takes account of far wider issues and far more complicated interests: for in the framing of that policy Roumanian delegates took their share.

The decisions then arrived at assume the truth of two principles, both of which are violated by the action of the Roumanian authorities in Hungary. The first is that while enemy countries are justly liable for all and more than all they are able to pay, this amount will be diminished not increased if they are made the victims of exactions which utterly destroy their powers of production. The second is that as the war was a common undertaking, the funds obtained for reparations should be divided on a fixed scheme among the allies who suffered loss.

Now the Roumanian Government, when they organised the plundering of Hungary, must have been well aware that they were violating both these principles.

They must have known that they were reducing Hungary to a condition in which she was much more likely to be a charge upon Allied charity than to contribute to the reparation of Allied losses; and they must have known that what was taken from Hungary, belonged as of right to the general reparation fund and not to any single one among the belligerent Powers.

These considerations are so obvious in themselves, and have been so earnestly pressed upon the Roumanian Government, that the Associated Powers are reluctantly compelled to ask themselves whether Roumania still counts herself among their number. None of the events that have occurred during the last few weeks are of a nature to reassure them. Remonstrances addressed to Bucharest have remained without reply. Remonstrances addressed to Roumanian representatives at Paris have been of no effect. Remonstrances made in the name of the Conference by the Allied generals at Buda-Pesth have been met with fair promises. But the promises have not been kept. Roumania has persistently treated Hungary as a conquered province, and herself as its conqueror, sole and irresponsible. There is no sign that she still deems herself a member of an Alliance, or that in her judgment the Five Great Powers who mainly won the war have any predominant claim to settle the terms of peace.

These are facts which the Conference note with the greatest regret. They acclaimed the entry of Roumania into the war: they rejoiced that after a succession of calamities which the Western belligerents were powerless to prevent, she was about to share to the full the fruits of their victory: they never doubted that she was to be counted among their Allies. Unhappily, they are forced against their will to doubt it now: and, in one way or the other, for good or for evil, their doubts must be resolved without delay.

They desire therefore a clear reply to the following questions:

Is Roumania prepared on a date to be fixed by the Conference to withdraw her troops from Hungary?

Is she prepared at once to cease appropriating to her use Hungarian property?

Is she prepared to surrender to the Reparation Commission the property already appropriated?

Is she prepared to co-operate loyally with the Associated Powers, and under their direction, in the task of so restoring order in Hungary as to enable a responsible Government to negotiate terms of peace?

The Conference are most unwilling to believe that the Roumanian Government will hesitate to return an affirmative answer to all these questions. Their refusal would be an immeasurable misfortune. It would shatter the hopes of those who see in the unbroken co-operation of the Associated Powers the surest security for future peace; only those would be content who hold that in the hour of victory no alliance can stand the strain of competing national interests. Whether Roumania would gain by a severance of friendly relations with her Western Associates, it is for Roumanian statesmen to determine. But the Conference must know, and know without delay, where they stand, and how they are henceforward to look upon a State they have been proud to call their Ally.

A. J. B[ALFOUR] 4. 9. 19.

H. D. 48.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, September 5, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Mr. P. Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Captain Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: The Hon. H. Gibson, Mr. Johnson, Professor Coolidge, Dr. Lord, Mr. A. Dulles.

Great Britain: Mr. A. Leeper, Colonel F. H. Kisch, Mr. Carr.

France: M. Tardieu, M. J. Cambon, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Hermite.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi, M. Stranieri.

Czecho-Slovakia: Dr. Benes.

Poland: M. Paderewski, M. Dmowski.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received a telegram from General Dupont, regarding the situation in Silesia, which was reported as being very bad. (Appendix A.) He had nothing to propose, but only wished to communicate the news to his colleagues.

MR. BALFOUR observed that nothing could be done until the Treaty was ratified. He hoped that this would take place in about 10 days.

MR. POLK said that, according to Mr. Hoover, there was a prospect of the situation in Silesia improving.

2. The Council had before it a draft Article for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria, proposed by the American Delegation. (Appendix B.)

Question of the Dobrudja

MR. POLK said, that, as his colleagues would remember, he had deferred his reply to the question of the frontier between Bulgaria and Roumania in the Dobrudja, at a previous meeting.¹ He had realised that there were many reasons against the insertion of any clause such as that suggested in the Treaty itself. The American Delegation would be satisfied if a sentence to the same effect were inserted in the covering letter to the Bulgarian Delegation. It might then be suggested that the ultimate settlement should be in the hands, either of the Allied and Associated Powers or of the League of Nations.

¹ See No. 50, minute 7.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the covering letter would only be sent to the Bulgarians after all their Notes regarding the Treaty had been received. In other words, several weeks would elapse before the letter was sent.

MR. POLK said that the Bulgarians would certainly raise the point in their comments on the Treaty. This would give an opportunity for making a statement on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Council should resolve to take up the subject again when the covering letter was considered. He was ready, himself, to state that the attribution of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria would be conducive to a lasting peace in the Balkans. Secondly, he thought that it was impossible, as long as Roumania remained an Allied Power, or, at the worst, a neutral, to insert any clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria requiring a surrender of Roumanian territory. Thirdly, he thought that it would be well to consider the matter again at the time of drafting the final covering letter. By that time, the attitude of Roumania towards the Conference would be defined. The Council would then know what advice could be given to the Roumanians and what methods it was right to employ. In any case, it would not be possible to make Roumania yield territory unless she became an enemy State.

MR. POLK said that he agreed. He pointed out, however, that according to the future provisions of the Treaty with Hungary, Roumania stood a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Transylvania and Bukovina. Her acquisition of these territories might be made contingent on her yielding ground in the Dobrudja.

MR. BALFOUR said that this might be difficult, as the frontiers in Transylvania and Bukovina had been drawn on ethnological lines. It would be difficult to alter these frontiers without violating the principles of the Conference.

MR. POLK said that a close examination of the boundaries would probably reveal some instances on which the ethnological principle had not been strictly followed.

M. PICHON said that a serious question of principle was involved. The Conference, hitherto, had never attempted to revise Treaties anterior to the war.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that dealing with the matter in a covering letter was not very practical. A promise to Bulgaria, by the Conference, that Roumania would be invited to yield territory, would amount to nothing. An invitation to Roumania to do so would equally amount to this. He wondered whether the basis of a bargain existed anywhere. Without a bargain, he thought nothing could be achieved.

M. TITTONI said that he did not think the question of the Dobrudja could be made corollary to the question of Transylvania or Bukovina. The matter of Bessarabia, however, remained. He would be inclined to ask Roumania to make a concession in the Dobrudja as a condition of obtaining what the Commission recommended in Bessarabia.

MR. POLK observed that he had not suggested making any promises at present.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the case would be the same in three weeks' time.

M. TARDIEU observed that the advantage of the procedure suggested by Mr. Polk was that the Bulgarian Treaty could be proceeded with.

M. TITTONI said that he understood that the question of the Dobrudja would be considered at a later stage, in connection with the question of Bessarabia.

MR. POLK said that he was ready to adopt Mr. Balfour's plan; namely, first, that in principle, it was accepted as desirable that Roumania should yield a part of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria; second, that no clause to this effect should be inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria; third, that the means of obtaining this result should be considered at the time of sending the covering letter to the Bulgarians. He wished it to be understood that nothing he had said committed him to an offer of Bessarabia to Roumania in exchange for Southern Dobrudja.

(It was agreed that, for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria, no change should be made in the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria, as existing at the outbreak of War.)

3. At this point, M. Dmowski and later M. Benes, and still later M. Padewski entered the room.

*Question of
Teschen*

M. DMOWSKI said that it was extremely painful to him to have to defend his cause against his friends, the Czecho-Slovaks. He had hoped that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would always stand together throughout the Conference. Now they appeared as rival litigants before the Council. He thought that the independence of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia was not yet achieved, though the Conference had given a basis for both. In return Poland and Czecho-Slovakia owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers to be the defenders of peace in Eastern Europe. He himself had always defended the Czecho-Slovak cause as if he had been a Czecho-Slovak himself. He would continue to do so. He would always endeavour to secure a friendly agreement between the two neighbouring countries. He thought that the worst cause of conflict between neighbours was the subjection of one nationality to another. Should this take place, as between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, friendship between the two countries would never be possible. M. Benes had said that full rights would be accorded to the Poles in Teschen under Czecho-Slovak sovereignty. The first right of the Poles in Teschen was to belong to Poland. M. Benes had further said that the Polish claim was based on ethnographical reasons. This was not the case. He was prepared to leave ethnography to savants and philologists. Statesmen established their claims on the wishes of peoples. The Polish claim was based on the national sentiment of the populations in question. The population of Teschen was literate. It could not be treated like an inarticulate mass. Each man knew what his national feelings were. In the first Slav Congress at Prague in 1848, the representative of Teschen had joined the Poles, and

the first newspaper published in Teschen during the nineteenth century had been written in Polish and not in Czech or in German. His thesis was that the country was not so much ethnically Polish as sentimentally and culturally Polish. The proof of this was that the Polish Delegation had suggested holding a plebiscite and this had been refused by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation. On the 5th of November of the preceding year, when the Austrian Monarchy broke up, the population of Teschen had, on its own initiative, made a provisional settlement of the country. They had divided the country into two parts, and the line thus obtained had not aroused any protest either in Poland or in Bohemia. Both nations, therefore, seemed inclined to accept it. Difficulties had been made by the political leaders. The Czech people had been led to suppose that they could obtain the whole of Teschen from the Conference. When the decision of the Commission had been communicated in vague terms to the press in Bohemia, an organised protest by means of strikes was decided on. The Czech authorities had stopped trains running from Warsaw to Paris, had used troops to force the workmen to strike, and had even threatened to flood the mines should the men go to work. A German owner, whose Polish workmen wished to work in the mines, had told them he could not guarantee their lives. In spite of pressure, nevertheless, the miners had continued work. This indicated that the country was undoubtedly Polish, and unwilling to collaborate in the plan of solving the fate of the country by strikes. M. Benes had impugned the Austrian official statistics of the population in Teschen. He had said that the figures had been falsified in favour of the Poles, because of the consistent opposition of the Czechs. This was really not the case. The Austrian Government had been more anti-Polish in Teschen than anti-Czech, because their strongest adversaries in the area were the Poles. In 1900 the census showed 60% Poles, 23% Czechs, 15% Germans. In 1910 the proportion was, 54% Poles, 27% Czechs, 18% Germans. From these figures it followed that the Polish percentage was shown as diminished, just as the Czech and German percentage rose. It might be inferred that a pro-German policy tended to minimise the Polish element, and to increase the Czechs. M. Benes had introduced a number of economic reasons. These were very strong. Bohemia, being a highly industrialised country, needed coal and therefore desired to possess the mines, but it could not be laid down that need makes ownership. The Polish Delegation maintained that the balance should be in favour of the national sentiment of the population. By a very strict application of this principle, Poland had been deprived of Danzig, which was the lungs of Poland. Danzig represented far more for Poland than the mines of Teschen for Bohemia. It would not be possible to deprive the Poles of the advantage of a rule which had been made to operate against them in favour of defeated Germany. He wished to remain the friend of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Poland would desire to sell her coal to her neighbours. In this instance it was the quality of the coal that mattered. The coal derived from the Karwin Basin was convertible into coke. In Poland there was no coal of this character. Should Upper Silesia as a result of the plebiscite go to Poland, there would

be some such coal in Poland, but not much. The gas works in Warsaw employed coal from the Karwin Basin. The Poles needed it more than Bohemia, which had coke-producing coal in other parts of the country. Bohemia needed ordinary coal. This could not be obtained from the Karwin Basin. Bohemia had always imported some of her coal from Upper Silesia. Should this country go to the Poles, Poland would now become her supplier. But the fact that Bohemia required coal from Upper Silesia was a poor reason for giving her the Karwin Basin. Bohemia would buy rather more coal than she used to, and Poland in return would import her industrial products. Poland was very ready to sign a Convention to supply Bohemia with enough coal for her industries. It would be far easier to settle the matter in this way, than by making an unfair settlement in Teschen. If the true national line were adopted, Poland would receive 51% of ordinary coal and 44% of coke out of the production of Teschen. The Polish Delegation was ready to yield a certain number of mining communes in which the population was not clearly Polish. This would reduce the Polish proportion to 39% of ordinary coal, and 22% of coke. Polish ambitions were therefore not excessive. Poland required coke perhaps in a less degree than Bohemia because less industrial, but, nevertheless, she did need some. He thought the whole coal situation could be solved on these lines and by means of a Convention between the two countries. This would be far easier than by committing an injustice in Teschen, against which Poland would always protest and which would always disturb the peace. As to the railways, M. Benes had said that the Oderberg-Kaschau line was the principal communication between Bohemia and Slovakia. He begged to point out that this line had never served such a purpose before. It was the main line between Berlin and Buda-Pest. It carried coal from Upper Silesia to Hungary and to the Balkans. It was necessary not for Bohemia, but for Poland, when Upper Silesia became Polish. There were four other lines connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. Two of these needed small connecting tracks of 8 kilometres in one case and 12 kilometres in the other. If these tracks had not been laid, geography was not the culprit. It had been Hungarian policy to stifle the development of Slovakia. Now that Bohemia and Slovakia were united in one State, no such reasons existed. The Czecho-Slovak Republic would easily construct what was required and he undertook to prophesy that, in 20 years, Bohemia would be connected with Slovakia by at least 8 lines of railway. On the other hand, Poland required the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau to export coal from Upper Silesia. The map prepared by the Commission,² which he had seen on the previous day for the first time, had somewhat alarmed him. In order to attribute to Czecho-Slovakia the southern portion of this railway, the Commission had handed over to Czecho-Slovakia the most Polish of the Polish areas in Teschen—he might almost say the most Polish population in Poland. There were few parts of Poland in which the population was 100 per cent. Polish: in this area it was. The population had another characteristic. It was protestant in

² See No. 50, appendix C.

religion. These protestant Poles had always taken a very prominent part in the Polish national movement and it was these very people whom the Commission attributed to Czecho-Slovakia on the pretext that Bohemia required the southern part of the Oderberg-Kaschau railway, which, in reality, she did not require. It had been pointed out to him by a military authority that the line suggested by the Commission would give the Czechs a dominant position over the Polish part of the country. He put such considerations aside, as he did not wish even to contemplate the thought of war between the two countries. On national and economic grounds, he considered the Polish claim was right and he would only repeat what he had said at the beginning, that the essential condition for good relations between two neighbouring States, whose independence was not yet achieved and whose function was to be guardians of the peace in Central Europe, was to avoid the subjection of the population of either to the other. All he asked for was the application of the national principle which had been applied with considerable severity against Poland in favour of Germany.

M. BENES said that the local agreement referred to by M. Dmowski between the Czech and Polish populations in Teschen had really been made according to the administrative districts which previously existed. It had not been intended that the question of ultimate sovereignty should, in any way, be pre-judged by this provisional settlement. In Bohemia protests had not arisen until the Polish Government had ordered mobilisation in the Polish part of the territory, as if the provisional settlement had established Polish sovereignty in the area. M. Dmowski had referred to various acts of Czech officials. He did not wish, himself, to go into such details, though he had numberless reports containing equivalent allegations against Poles. At Oderberg and Bogumin Polish troops had forced the Czech workmen to sign a petition in favour of annexation to Poland. However, recriminations of this kind would be endless and he preferred to avoid the subject. M. Dmowski had argued that the census had been falsified against the Poles. In fact, the Czechs and Germans had never united against the Poles; the Poles and Germans had always combined against the Czechs. He had previously pointed out that the mines in Teschen only exported 25 wagon loads of coke to Poland. Bohemia, on the other hand, had to import coal from Upper Silesia, which was to become Polish. Upper Silesia contained quantities of coke-producing coal. M. Dmowski had pointed out that Bohemia would always depend on Upper Silesia, that is to say, on Poland, for coal. This was too true, and Czecho-Slovakia only asked for what was strictly necessary, in order not to be at the mercy of every eventuality. M. Dmowski had made use of the percentage of coal Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would obtain from Teschen should it be divided between them, but had made no mention of the immense resources in Poland. But Czecho-Slovakia required 30 million tons a year and only produced 26 million tons. Moreover, the Treaty forced Czecho-Slovakia to supply Austria with coal. This would leave the industries of the country entirely dependent on Poland. As to the railways, it was true that there were communications between Bohemia and

Czecho-Slovakia [*sic*], but M. Dmowski had omitted to state that the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau was the only line going through Slovakia from west to east. The hills in Slovakia went from north to south and no other railway could be built across the country. The Teschen question for Czecho-Slovakia was analogous to the question of Alsace-Lorraine for France. The culture of the country was Czech. This was evidenced by the habits of the people, their dress and the architecture of their houses. All these resembled what prevailed in Moravia. A large part of the admittedly Polish population of Teschen had declared in favour of union with Czecho-Slovakia; in case of a plebiscite, this population would vote in the same sense.

M. PADEREWSKI said that he was almost ashamed to join M. Dmowski against M. Benes. M. Benes however was a champion who would, he felt sure, be equal to both of them. In any case, he did not mean to be aggressive. No one more than himself desired good relations with Czecho-Slovakia. It was the destiny of the two countries to live in peace and it was also their duty. They owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers who had given them independence, to humanity, and to their own exhausted peoples. Discord would not prevail between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia if M. Benes and he could make mutual concessions. The Teschen area interested Czecho-Slovakia because of its coal. It interested Poland because of its population. The arguments on one side were economic and on the other side national. M. Benes, taking as his model the judgment of Solomon, suggested cutting the country in two. Poland protested. It might be inferred on which side was real maternity. In any case, the child had reached the age of discretion and was able to say to which country it belonged. There were, in addition, impartial observers, among whom he quoted the work of two Bohemian savants. It was true that there were some villages in Teschen with a Czech majority. M. Dmowski had told the Council that Poland did not claim them. As the Polish Delegation had good reason to know, States were better off without alien minorities. M. Benes' remarks about coal might lead the Council to suppose that his country was in dire peril. Was coal so important a matter as to justify the subjugation of an unwilling population and the estrangement of a country nearly four times as big as Czecho-Slovakia? On the same lines, what should Italy do, seeing that she had neither coal, oil nor forests? In reality, was Czecho-Slovakia so poor in coal? Out of a production of 26½ million tons of lignite throughout the former monarchy, 83 per cent. had been produced in Bohemia and 86 per cent. of Austrian and Hungarian coal came from Bohemia. These figures proved Bohemia to be one of the richest coal-producing countries in the world, after Great Britain, America and Germany. These figures were derived from an authority who would not be denied by M. Benes; they were derived from the work of President Masaryk. M. Benes had stated that Czecho-Slovakia needed 30 million tons of coal and had only 26 million. If President Masaryk's figures were not accepted, he would refer to statistics. In 1913, 34 million tons of brown and black coal (23 million brown and 11 million black) had been

produced in Bohemia; divided among 13 million inhabitants, this represented two thousand kilos. per head of brown and 900 kilos. per head of black coal. Poland, in the same year, had produced 11,814,000 tons of black coal and 952,000 tons of coke for a population now amounting to 29 millions. This represented not even 400 kilos. per head. In view of the tragic situation in Upper Silesia, the Council could judge whether Poland could lightly abandon the coal of Teschen. If Upper Silesia became Polish, the situation would be different and Poland would make every concession in order to supply Czecho-Slovakia with the coal she required. This matter could be settled between the experts of the two countries. As to the railways, M. Dmowski had pointed out that all Czecho-Slovakia need do to perfect her communications was to build two lines measuring 8 and 12 kilometres. Poland wished to be a good neighbour to Czecho-Slovakia and was ready to bear half the cost of construction. Before concluding, he would like to quote an incident of his last journey to Poland. At the first frontier station in Teschen in an open field were gathered some 3,000 persons, mostly workmen, women and children. It was raining hard but he was received with songs, music and speeches. Several speeches were made. The one which struck him most was made by a workman, who said that the quarrel between the Poles and Czechs should be put an end to as soon as possible. The Czechs and Poles were both Slavs and cousins. The Czechs ought to have all the coal that could be spared, but no Polish land should be given to them and no Czech land to the Poles. The speaker might now be dead, as the place he lived in had been much oppressed by the Germans, who were shooting the Poles like rabbits. The moral of his speech had been understood in Warsaw. He hoped that it might be understood in Prague.

M. BENES said that Czecho-Slovakia was not only interested in Teschen for its coal. The country was connected with the rest of Czecho-Slovakia by history, culture and administrative bonds. Mere figures could not determine the question. The future needs of Czecho-Slovakia must be taken into consideration. The statistics quoted by M. Paderewski were not conclusive. Production had been far more intensive in Bohemia than in Poland. On the other hand, the possibilities of production in Poland were infinitely greater than in Czecho-Slovakia. He had been himself as conciliatory as possible, but it must be remembered that he was not alone and that the peoples in both countries were passionate and excitable. It was better that each should be self-sufficient, as if either depended for vital necessities upon the other, there would be no solid peace. In other cases the Conference had sacrificed small minorities in order to establish lasting arrangements. This was a case in which this method should be put in practice, as had been done in the case of Ratibor against Czecho-Slovakia. Perfection could not be attained. If Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were independent of one another in respect of their vital needs, agreement between them would be easy. In any case, whatever the decision of the Conference, he would faithfully observe it and, in so doing, continue the policy he had consistently followed from the start, that of seeking friendship with Poland.

4. The letter contained in Appendix C³ was approved and signed by M. Clemenceau.

Instructions to Sir

George Clerk on his

Mission to Bucharest

The note to the Roumanian Government (See H. D. 47,⁴ Minute 3 and Appendix E), was signed by all the delegates.

5. The draft of Article 48 for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (Appendix D)⁵ was accepted, subject to the approval of Mr. Polk to be communicated later in the day to the Secretariat-General.

*Access of Bulgaria
to the Aegean Sea*

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Astoria Hotel, Paris,

5th September, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 52

Rapport du Général Dupont

BERLIN, le 1^{er} septembre 1919

Affaires de Silésie.

D'après le Capitaine français Poupard, qui vient d'arriver de Silésie, la situation dans ce pays est lamentable.

Le pays vit sous la terreur exercée par les troupes allemandes. C'est Dinant, c'est Lille, exaspérés encore si possible par la haine farouche contre les Polonais et la rage de la défaite.

Comme partout où sévit la soldatesque prussienne, tous, Allemands compris, sauf les fonctionnaires et les Hakatistes [[?] Spartakistes], soupirent après son départ et demandent l'ordre et la paix sous une occupation alliée.

Ainsi que je vous l'ai exposé déjà, il sera difficile au Gouvernement de faire accepter cette idée par les partis d'opposition. Il dépend d'eux par l'armée qui ne consent à le soutenir qu'à condition qu'il fasse tout ce qu'elle veut. Sans doute, il faut obtenir cet assentiment, mais il faut aussi que le peuple reconnaisse que ses dirigeants sont obligés de le donner. La persuasion ne suffira donc pas, je le crains.

L'effectif des troupes à affecter à cette occupation dépendra essentiellement de l'importance des mesures prises pour forcer le consentement de l'Allemagne.

DUPONT.

³ Not printed. In this letter, dated September 5, 1919, from M. Clemenceau to Sir George Clerk the latter was formally notified of the decision as to his mission to Bucharest taken by the Supreme Council on the previous day (see No. 51, minute 3). The letter continued: 'Je vous serai donc reconnaissant de vous rendre le plus tôt possible à Bucarest en qualité d'envoyé des Puissances Alliées et Associées; ceci n'implique pas que vous soyez chargé de donner oralement au Gouvernement Roumain un commentaire officiel à la note des Alliés: toutefois vous demeurerez entièrement libre de répondre, à titre semi-officiel, à toute demande d'éclaircissements qui vous serait adressée par les autorités roumaines et de vous prêter, à cet effet, à toutes conversations que vous jugerez nécessaires.'

⁴ No. 51.

⁵ Not printed. The draft article was as in the final text of article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

Projet d'Article à insérer dans le Traité avec la Bulgarie

Les Principales Puissances Alliées et Associées se réservent le droit d'examiner l'attribution de la Dobroudja et d'inviter la Roumanie à céder à la Bulgarie telle partie de la Dobroudja où les Roumains sont en minorité et les Bulgares en majorité, dans les conditions que les Puissances Alliées et Associées estimeront justes et équitables.

No. 53

H. D. 49.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 8, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Mr. P. Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Massigli.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, Baron Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Capt. Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Hon. H. Gibson, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: Mr. Carr, Colonel Kisch.

France: M. Jules Cambon, General Desticker, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, M. Hermite.

Italy: Col. Castoldi, M. Ricci-Busati, M. Brambilla.

I.

Language to be used in the Conventions taking the place of the Acts of Berlin and Brussels

[Not printed]

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Germans had first asked the Conference to send Commissions of Control to Germany before the Treaty came into force. Consequently advance detachments had been appointed and each of the Allied Powers had been represented in each section. The Germans had then sent a request that the despatch of the Commissions should be delayed as they appeared to them to be too numerous. The Council then decided to postpone the sending of the advance detachments (see H.D. 47, (1)).¹ Now it appeared

¹ No. 51, minute 1.

that the Germans withdrew their objection to the numbers and desired the Commissions to be sent at once. He suggested that the Commissions should accordingly be sent immediately and be composed in the manner already decided on. He was informed that General Nollet was ready to begin.

MR. POLK said that it was understood that the United States could not make appointments for the present.

(It was decided that the advance delegations of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany forthwith.)

3. The Council had before it a reply from the German Delegation regarding the ultimatum of the Conference and a draft answer to this reply. (See Appendices B and C.)

Reply to the Note of the German Delegation regarding Article 61 of the German Constitution

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the draft a somewhat rough answer. It was the general desire that Germany should carry out the Treaty, but no one wished her to do so under compulsion, whether by arms or by blockade.

This would be a misfortune not only for Germany but for the Allied and Associated Powers. Germany should be given every chance of behaving reasonably. The draft said very truly that the German Government was not the final authority on the interpretation of the Treaty, but the same might be alleged against the Allied and Associated Powers. The interpretation of the Treaty had now become a subject for jurists. He did not think that the Council was the final authority regarding its interpretation.

M. TITTONI observed that two points in the German reply had not been met in the answer. The first was a legal point. Article 178 of the German Constitution declared that no Article in the Constitution should affect the Treaty of Peace. Article 61 was thereby rendered ineffective. The second was, that in threatening the extension of the occupation, the Allies were not taking their stand on any Article in the Treaty. Neither of these points were met in the draft reply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this had been deliberately done. He did not think that either of these points required a reply. It was hardly tolerable that Germany should violate the Treaty and that the Allies should remain bound by it. The question of legality should have been raised when the letter had been drafted on behalf of the Conference to the German Government. It was impossible now to withdraw from the position then taken up. He reminded the Council that the Austrians were at the moment represented in the German Assembly. This could not be tolerated. He was persuaded that if the Allies threatened to carry out what they had indicated, they would not be forced to execute their threats. Austria had not yet signed the Treaty and was not, therefore, bound in the same way as Germany, but it must be remembered that she protested against the clause that prevented her from joining Germany.

MR. POLK said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau's contention that the Allies could not withdraw from the position they had taken up. He thought

that perhaps it might be as well to begin by answering the German arguments. When this had been done the Council could be as stiff as it wished. He would like to consult the Jurists in respect to the first part of the answer.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was quite ready to adopt this method and asked Mr. Polk to prepare the draft.

(It was agreed that a new draft answer to the German reply concerning Article 61 of the German Constitution should be prepared by Mr. Polk and submitted to the Council on the following day.)

4. The Council had before it a letter from M. Pachitch, dated September 4th, 1919 (Appendix D),² protesting against certain of the provisions in the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (see Appendix E).³

Protest of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation against the Treaty for the protection of Minorities

M. BERTHELOT said that the protest of the Delegation was a long one. The main desideratum was that no mention in the preamble should be made of the year 1913, in order that Serbian sovereignty over territories acquired in Balkan wars should not be limited. The argument was that, as Serbia had settled her own affairs then without the help of Europe, the settlement she had made ought not to be called in question now.

M. TITTONI asked whether this request applied to a matter of form only or to a matter of substance. If only a matter of form was involved, he would agree. Otherwise, the effect would be that minority clauses would not apply to Macedonia.

M. FICHON observed that they would not apply to the part of Macedonia acquired by Serbia in the Balkan War.

M. TITTONI reminded the Council that the Commission had recommended the appointment of a Commissioner to reside in Macedonia on behalf of the League of Nations; the Council had decided against this. It was now asked to go much further in the opposite direction and to exclude Macedonia from the protection of the League of Nations. This, he thought, was not acceptable.

M. BERTHELOT said that, if the passage of the preamble objected to by the Serb-Croat Delegation were suppressed, the change would be a matter of form, but the change carried with it an alteration to Article 9, the last paragraph of which would have to be struck out. This would have to be a substantial change. It was questionable, however, whether the Conference could enact any measures affecting the pre-war acquisitions of any State. If the last paragraph of Article 9 were suppressed, some other Article would be inserted to make the language and educational clauses applicable to Macedonia. This however represented intrusion in another form. It was questionable whether such intrusion was legitimate.

² Not printed. The contents of this letter were as indicated by M. Berthelot. The letter is printed in English translation by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 450-5.

³ Not printed. This draft, headed '5^e épreuve-2 septembre 1919', was, apart from certain textual variation (see No. 54, minute 4 and note 4), the same as the final treaty.

M. PICHON observed that, when the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 had been called in question in relation to the Roumanians, M. Tittoni had declared that the Conference had no power to modify pre-war Treaties.

M. TITTONI explained he had maintained the Treaty could not be abrogated, but that the Conference was free to introduce stipulations into its Treaties even in contradiction of the terms of that Treaty, by which they were not themselves bound. He observed that the Commission had unanimously decided that protection for minorities was necessary in Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not feel bound by the unanimous decision of the Commission. In his opinion, the Council could attach conditions to territory which it gave; it could not attach any conditions to territory previously acquired. He suggested that M. Berthelot should draft the additional clauses intended to preserve the linguistic and educational guarantees of the population in Macedonia before discussing the matter any further.

M. TITTONI said that the view of the British Delegate on the Committee had been that the Balkan settlement in 1913 was not final until its recognition by the Powers. This recognition had not taken place, as negotiations on the subject had been interrupted by the outbreak of the Great War.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Treaty of Bucharest was valid even without a recognition by the Great Powers.

M. TITTONI observed that recognition was necessary to give the Treaty full authority from a diplomatic point of view. He reminded the Council of its previous conclusion, that the protection of minorities was even more necessary in Macedonia than elsewhere. It was now suggested that Macedonia should be excluded from the operation of the Treaties intended to protect minorities.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the problem was exactly as M. Tittoni stated. It was for this reason that he would like to see a new formula before continuing the discussion of the question.

MR. BALFOUR said that the discussion was concerned with two questions—one relating to international law and practice, and the other to the situation of the Macedonian population. In regard to the first, he thought there was no great difference of opinion between the French and British Delegations. Both thought that the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 was not a completed transaction until ratified by the Great Powers. This ratification had not taken place because of the outbreak of the Great War. The French Delegation recognised that the general situation in the Balkans, especially regarding financial arrangements, was not final before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. The French and British Delegations were, therefore, in accord in thinking that the Great War had cut into the necessary completion of the Balkan settlement. This appeared to afford some justification to those who thought that on the legal point, the Conference had a right to alter what had been agreed on in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. On the other point, he thought that all were entirely agreed. Special protection for the Macedonians was necessary. Some means might be found of affording the Macedonians special protection in a manner satisfactory to the Powers,

but it was unlikely to be satisfactory to Serbia. The Serbians thought that all they had acquired in 1913 should be outside the control of the Powers. The Powers thought that the considerable accession of territory to Serbia and the special difficulties of Macedonia justified them in exercising control.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that all he desired was to find a text which might be acceptable. The Minority Clauses were unpopular and must be made palatable by some concession.

MR. POLK said that the Council had previously concluded that Macedonia required a special guarantee.

M. BERTHELOT said it would be very difficult to find a formula reconciling (a) the absence of reference to 1913, and (b) special protection for the Macedonians. As the Treaty now stood, the Serbians would probably refuse to sign on the following Wednesday.⁴ He, therefore, suggested, that he be authorised to have an interview with M. Vesnitch. If M. Vesnitch agreed to a compromise, the situation might be saved. If not, the reference to 1913 could be preserved, and if the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation refused to sign the Treaty with Austria, the risk must be run. As to the minor points raised in the letter (Appendix D²), he suggested that the Committee be allowed to dispose of them.

MR. POLK suggested that the compromise, as suggested by M. Berthelot, should, when drafted, be submitted to the Committee also.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the Delegation also asked for a modification of Article 11. He did not think this could be accepted, and he suggested that the request be refused.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this might be considered on the following day, together with the other points raised on the subject.

(It was decided that M. Berthelot should consult with M. Vesnitch as to a formula, affording protection to the population of Macedonia, in a manner acceptable to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation. This formula, if agreed on, should be submitted to the Council after consultation with the Committee on New States, to which the other points raised in M. Pachitch's letter (Appendix D²) were also referred.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had just received a letter from the Roumanian Delegation, offering to sign the Treaty with Austria, with a reservation, regarding Article 60, concerning minorities, transit and trade. (Appendix F.)

*Roumanian reservation
regarding Article 60 of
the Treaty of Peace
with Austria*

MR. BALFOUR asked whether any power could sign a Treaty with reservations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this had not been permitted in the case of the Treaty with Germany. He thought it was necessary that a Power should sign, or should not sign.

M. PICHON observed that Article 60, which he read, covered the whole case of the protection of minorities everywhere.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the substitution of the expression 'League

⁴ September 10, 1919.

of Nations' for the expression 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers' might perhaps induce the Roumanians to be more tractable. If so, he would adopt the alteration. The Roumanian argument was, that if each of the Allied and Associated Powers considered itself the protector of minorities in Roumania, there would be no end to their troubles. If, on the other hand, the League of Nations was the only Court of Appeal, the matter could be settled without repeated diplomatic interventions at Bucharest.

MR. BALFOUR observed that if the words 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers' were deleted, and the words 'League of Nations' introduced, Article 60 would stipulate that there should be a Treaty with the League of Nations. This appeared to be impossible.

M. TITTONI said that he understood the clauses for the protection of minorities had been formulated by the Conference, and accepted by the Poles, Serbs and Czechs in the Treaties signed with these small States. The League of Nations had been introduced to supervise the execution, but the clauses had been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers and the Treaties had been signed with them. If so, it was hardly possible to mention clauses to be framed by the League of Nations, which did not yet exist, seeing that the clauses had already been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought Roumania must accept the clauses as laid down, but that she might be asked to accept the supervision of the League of Nations for the execution of these clauses. Since the other small States had agreed, Roumania must also agree.

M. PICHON pointed out that Roumania would only acquire the Bukovina from Austria. The area she was likely to obtain from Hungary, i.e., Transylvania, was far bigger. If Article 60 in the Treaty with Austria were confined to the Bukovina, possibly Roumania would accept. At all events, she would be on worse ground for refusing.

M. TITTONI said that if this would induce Roumania to sign the Treaty with Austria, the expedient might be accepted.

M. PICHON said that he was not certain that this would induce Roumania to sign.

MR. POLK said that he thought an exception in favour of Roumania could not be made. Poland had signed the minority Treaty, in spite of its extreme unpopularity in Poland. M. Paderewski had overcome great opposition before he was able to sign it. If Roumania were now allowed to evade a similar Treaty, M. Paderewski and his country would feel that they had been treated unjustly.

MR. BALFOUR agreed. He thought that Poland had deserved far better of the Conference than Roumania.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Polk's argument concerning M. Paderewski and Poland was very strong. If Roumania would not sign, he would like to know what effect this would produce on the rest of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI asked whether the Minority Clauses for Roumania were the same as those for the other new States.

M. BERTHELOT said that the clauses were the same for all. There was a

special clause for the protection of Jews in Roumania, and this clause also applied to Poland.

(It was decided to consult the Drafting Committee on the legal issues involved.)

(The Members of the Drafting Committee then entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Fromageot what legal effect would result from the absence of a Roumanian signature to the Treaty. Roumania was unwilling to sign the Treaty without making a reservation on Article 60. The Council was unwilling to allow her to sign with a reservation. What, then, was the situation, for Roumania, should her signature be refused, and for the Powers that did sign?

M. FROMAGEOT said that if Roumania did not sign, she would not be a party to the Treaty, could claim no advantages under it, and be made subject to no obligations established by it.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Roumania would still be at war with Austria.

M. FROMAGEOT said that war could cease without a Treaty, just as it could begin without a formal declaration. War was a state of fact. War, for instance, had ceased between France and Mexico without a Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what would happen to the Bukovina.

M. FROMAGEOT said that, according to his personal opinion, Roumania could claim no rights over the Bukovina on the ground of a Treaty she did not sign.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Roumanians would doubtless stay in the country without the consent of the Powers. He asked whether she could acquire any financial or economic rights.

M. FROMAGEOT said that no such rights could be acquired under the Treaty, if Roumania did not sign it.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Austrian rights in the Bukovina would be extinguished.

M. FROMAGEOT said that there was an article requiring Austria to give up her rights in the Bukovina. This article would stand, even though Roumania did not take up the inheritance. It might, perhaps, be stipulated that the abandonment of the rights in the Bukovina be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers, as it was clear that none but a signatory to the Treaty could acquire rights transferred by it.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would be possible to adopt the suggestion of substituting the League of Nations for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as it was their supervision that Roumania appeared to resent.

MR. HURST pointed out that if the League of Nations were substituted for the Allied and Associated Powers, the question regarding the protection of minorities would come before the Council of the League. By the constitution of the League, Roumania, if concerned, would have the right to be present in the Council. As no decision of the Council was operative without unanimity, the mere presence of Roumania would secure no interference with her policy.

M. TITTONI pointed out that a similar difficulty would arise in respect of

the Treaty with Hungary. Roumania might be satisfied with the actual possession of the Bukovina and Transylvania without a title *de jure* to either, because she might argue that neither Austria nor Hungary would be able for a long time to dispute her possession. But in the case of Bessarabia, unless she acquired treaty rights, it must be clear to her that Russia, once she was restored to power, would certainly wish to regain the country. In this instance, Roumania would see that she required the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers or the League of Nations. This might be pointed out to her, and she might be influenced by this argument.

MR. POLK said that he was not prepared to bribe Roumania into good behaviour. He did not think that the Council had fallen so low as to be forced to resort to such tactics.

M. TITTONI pointed out that he would not have made his proposal unless he had regarded Roumania as having a good title to Bessarabia.

MR. POLK said that he quite understood this.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the proper course was to make no mention of Bessarabia at all. He would confine himself to reasoning with the Roumanians, and pointing out that Poland, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, had all accepted similar treaties. This would put the Roumanians on bad ground for maintaining their refusal.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it might be added that Roumania had failed to carry out what she had undertaken to do under the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.

MR. POLK thought it might be stipulated in Article 59 that the surrender of the former Duchy of Bukovina should be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. BALFOUR said this would do away with any necessity for a letter to the Roumanian Delegation.

MR. POLK agreed that this might be reserved for use in case the Roumanians refused to sign. The change might be made by a special protocol added to the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought the Roumanians would be sufficiently punished if they did not sign, by the effects of their not being parties to the Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would accept any suggestion which did not involve a postponement of the signature of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI said that he would adhere to Mr. Polk's suggestion, if there were the time to spare. He pointed out that there was yet time to penalise Roumania in the Treaty with Hungary, from which she expected to receive Transylvania.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that a special protocol could be contrived, permitting Roumania to sign the Treaty with Austria, after the other Powers.

MR. POLK said that he had received visits from some of the Roumanian Delegation. He thought that the Roumanians wished to be conciliatory, but at the bottom of their attitude was a sense of grievance that they were not obtaining their due share of reparations. They thought that they were faring less well than France and Belgium in this respect.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought the best suggestion to adopt was Mr. Balfour's, namely, that an answer be sent to the Roumanians, arguing with them that Poland and the other new States had accepted the minority clauses. As to the Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia, he thought it would be better to say nothing, but to wait and see what action the Roumanians would take.

(It was accordingly decided that no alteration should be made in Article 60 of the Treaty with Austria, and that Mr. Balfour should prepare a draft answer to the Roumanian Delegation, in the spirit of the above discussion, and that the draft should be submitted to the Council on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris,

September 8, 1919

APPENDIX B TO No. 53

Translation⁵

VERSAILLES, *September 5, 1919*

The President of the German Delegation.

No. 17.

Mr. President:

The Allied and Associated Powers are of the opinion, according to their note of September 2, that the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2, of the German Constitution, on the subject of the right of German-Austria to participate in the Reichsrat, is a formal violation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, and they require the German Government to take within fifteen days appropriate measures to avoid this violation by declaring Article 61, paragraph 2, null and void. On this subject, the German Government replies as follows:

In this connection, the German Delegation at Versailles called attention to its observations on the peace conditions, during the discussion of Article 80 of the Treaty, which observation was sent to the Allied and Associated Governments on May 29, to the fact that Germany had never had and would never have the intention of changing the Germano-Austrian frontier by force, but that it could not undertake to oppose a possible desire of the population of Austria to reconstruct the unity of the state with the lands of the old German stock. The Allied and Associated Governments replied in their note of June 16, 1919, that they took note of Germany's renunciation of any violent change of the Germano-Austrian frontier. The Germans concluded therefore that they would not be going counter to the prescriptions of Article 80 of the Peace Conditions; which ends in bringing forward the future possibility of a change to be brought about in the independence of Austria with the consent of the League of Nations, if this possibility could be brought about by the friendly rapprochement of the two nations, corresponding to the right of nations to self-determination. It is this interpretation which led to

⁵ The German text of the note contained in this appendix is printed in *Verhandlungen der verfassungsgebenden Nationalversammlung*, vol. 340, no. 1793, as cited by F. Berber in *Das Diktat von Versailles* (Essen, 1939) vol. 1, pp. 542-5.

the insertion of the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2, in the German Constitution. In the first part these provisions regulate the right of German-Austria to vote in the Reichsrat, purely and simply in case the union of the country with the German Empire takes place, without in any way dealing with the facts on which such a union might depend. In the second part of these provisions, the representatives of German-Austria are granted the right to a consulting voice in the Reichsrat until the union takes place. The independence of German-Austria, as well as the hypothesis admitted by Germany in the Peace Treaty of a change in that independence, were not to be infringed, for the provisions make the right to participate in the sessions of the Reichsrat depend on the free opinion of German-Austria, and bind the country to no relations of common or international law.

In spite of this state of affairs, the Allied and Associated Powers consider the admission of German-Austrian representatives as incompatible with the guarantees of independence for the country as specified by Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, because this admission would put this country on the same footing as the countries constituting the German Empire, because it would create a political bond between Germany and Austria and because it would bring about a political action common to the two countries. This interpretation by the Allied and Associated Governments brings forward an interpretation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty which is in opposition to the interpretation hitherto admitted by the Germans. In the presence of the note of the Allied and Associated Powers, Germany is not in a position to maintain the point of view she has held up to the present. Hence a change in the contents of the German Constitution is not necessary. The Allied and Associated Governments have already brought out in their note the fact that Article 178 of the Constitution stipulates very simply that the conditions of the Peace Treaty cannot be affected by the Constitution. This article was inserted with a view to avoiding all possible contradictions that might arise between the provisions of the Constitution and the conditions of the Peace Treaty, of which the interpretation is in many cases doubtful. The reserves formulated in this article cover all the provisions of the Constitution, including the above-mentioned provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2. Therefore, if the prescriptions of Article 61, paragraph 2, in themselves are in contradiction with a clause of the Peace Treaty, it results automatically that this prescription remains null and void. The German Government declares consequently that the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2, of the Constitution are null and void, that specifically the admission of German-Austrian representatives to the Reichsrat cannot be effected until the Council of the League of Nations consents, according to Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, to a modification in the relations which political law accords to German Austria.

Although the affair in question is settled by the preceding declaration according to the desire of the Allied and Associated Governments, the German Government feels itself obliged to make the following fundamental remarks: from its point of view the German Government has never given, on the subject of the alleged contradictions between the German Constitution and the Peace Treaty, any occasion for a demand for explanation so peremptory as the terms of the note of the Allied and Associated Powers. If, in case of a refusal to meet their requirements, these Governments threaten to extend the zone of occupation, and if, in order to do this, they base their authority on Article 429 of the Peace Treaty, it is necessary to specify that the Treaty in no wise authorizes such a measure, quite independently of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments have not yet ratified the Treaty and that for this reason they cannot support their claim from the juridical

point of view. Article 429 provides under certain conditions a longer period of occupation, but no territorial extension. Consequently, the German Government can see in the menace of such a measure only an act of violence profoundly to be regretted.

Accept, . . .

APPENDIX C TO No. 53

Projet de Réponse à la Lettre du 5 août [septembre] de la Délégation Allemande au sujet de l'Article 61 de la Constitution Allemande

Par leur note en date du 2 septembre courant, les Puissances Alliées et Associées ont invité le Gouvernement allemand à prendre telles mesures que de droit pour effacer sans délai, en déclarant nul l'article 61, second alinéa, de la Constitution allemande, la violation de l'article 80 du Traité de Paix du 28 juin 1919, résultant de la promulgation, le 11 août 1919, dudit article 61 — 2° de cette constitution.

La Délégation allemande à Versailles, par sa note du 5 septembre courant, a porté à la connaissance des Puissances Alliées et Associées une explication interprétative, que le Gouvernement allemand (qui n'a aucune qualité pour interpréter valablement la Constitution) déclare donner dudit article 61 — 2° de la Constitution allemande et qui, dans l'opinion de ce Gouvernement, rendrait inutile une modification de la constitution.

Cette explication ne constituant pas la réponse que, par la note du 2 septembre courant ci-dessus rappelée, le Gouvernement allemand avait été invité à donner; les Puissances Alliées et Associées font connaître à la Délégation Allemande que, faute par le Gouvernement allemand de satisfaire à cette invitation, elles se verront contraintes, à l'expiration du délai fixé et actuellement en cours, de recourir aux moyens prévus aux fins d'assurer l'exécution stricte du Traité.

APPENDIX F TO No. 53

PARIS, le 8 septembre 1919

DÉLÉGATION ROUMAINE À LA CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX

Monsieur le Président,

La Délégation Roumaine a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de la Conférence de la Paix que, désirant témoigner toute sa solidarité avec les Alliés, elle est prête à signer le texte du Traité présenté aux Délégués autrichiens, malgré que plusieurs des justes demandes de la Roumanie aient été écartées de ce texte, mais qu'elle ne pourrait souscrire à l'article 60 de ce Traité, dont les termes actuels portent atteinte à la souveraineté de l'état roumain et à son indépendance politique et économique qui sont directement mises en question.

La Délégation roumaine a donc l'honneur de prier la Conférence de la Paix de vouloir bien admettre que la déclaration suivante soit considérée comme faisant corps avec le dit Traité:

'La Délégation roumaine, en signant le Traité de Paix avec l'Autriche, ne peut donner son adhésion à l'article 60 du Traité, relatif aux minorités, au transit et au commerce.'

Veuillez agréer, etc.

N. MISU

ALEX VAIDA VALVOD [VOEVOD]

H. D. 50.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 9, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Mr. P. Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Lt.-Commander Bell. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Captain Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the Items with which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Dr. Scott, Mr. Woolsey, Mr. A. Dulles.

British Empire: Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, Brig.-General Groves, Captain Fuller.

France: M. Tardieu, M. Jules Cambon, M. de Peretti de la Rocca, M. Fromageot, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Brambilla.

Japan: M. Nagaoka.

1. The Council took note of Mr. Polk's draft reply to the German Government's letter of 5th September. (Appendix A.¹)

*Violation of the Peace
Treaty of Versailles
by virtue of certain
Articles in the German
Constitution*

MR. POLK said that he had referred the matter to Dr. Scott, who had consulted with the legal experts of the Drafting Committee, and prepared the note. It appeared that, in the opinion of these highly qualified jurists, the German answer had been technically correct. It therefore

seemed to him that, before a further contention were raised with the German Government in a subsequent letter, the co-operation of the legal experts

¹ Not printed. The first paragraph of this draft briefly recapitulated the terms of the Allied note, dated September 2, 1919, addressed to the German Government (see No. 49, appendix A). The draft continued: 'After certain preliminary observations calculated to justify their conduct and their former interpretation of the Article and paragraph of the Constitution in question, the German Government replied on September 5, 1919, as follows to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers of September 2': there followed a textual quotation of the third paragraph of the German reply (see No. 53, appendix B). The draft continued: 'The Allied and Associated Powers take note of and accept this Declaration as an express and formal Declaration by Germany that the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2 of the German Constitution are, and that they remain, null and void.'

'In view, therefore, of this Declaration made within the prescribed period of fifteen days, the Allied and Associated Powers consider it unnecessary to enter upon a discussion at this time of the nature and extent of the obligations of Article 429 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, but the Allied and Associated Powers nevertheless deem it proper to remark in this connection that they reserve any and all rights, expressly or impliedly secured to them under this Article.'

should be called for, in order to avoid making a legal mistake. He understood that the letter drafted by him had not been agreed to by M. Fromageot, although the other jurists of the Drafting Committee had been satisfied with it. He therefore requested that the Drafting Committee should be called in to advise the Council. He had only been given his draft a few minutes before entering the Council Chamber, and had, therefore, not had time to study it closely. He was not entirely satisfied with the form of the letter.

(At this point, M. Fromageot, Mr. Hurst, Dr. Scott, M. Ricci-Busatti and M. Nagaoka entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU explained to the Drafting Committee the problem before the Council, and briefly recited the events that had led up to the problem now before the Conference; he further explained the main points in the Notes of the Allied and Associated Governments, and of the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty. Drawing attention to the proposed extension of military occupation on the right bank of the Rhine, and to the legal arguments that had been brought forward against such a measure, he said that he would rather resign his post than consent to France being left by the American and British Governments to enforce unassisted the provisions of the Peace Treaty. America, Great Britain and France had all demobilised and that was inevitable, but, if Great Britain and America refused to support France at the present juncture, the whole weight of enforcing the Peace Treaty would be thrown on his country, and a position would result which would be quite intolerable to him.

M. FROMAGEOT said that he had not agreed with the opinion of his colleagues on the legal issue for the following reasons. In a letter, dated 2nd September, Germany had been called upon by the Allied Council to make special enactments by the Entente Governments [*sic*] whereby Article 61 of the Constitution, inviting Austria to participate in the legislation and administration of the German Reich, should be rendered null and void. The demand of the Allied and Associated Powers had been clear; they had insisted upon the abrogation and nullification of Article 61. In their reply, dated 5th September, the German Government, whether knowingly or not he could not say, had repeated the request of the Allied and Associated Governments, but had repeated it in such a way as to introduce into it certain modifications. Instead of undertaking to make Article 61 of the German Constitution null and void, they had proposed to make it non-applicable and to give it no legal force. This was not meeting the Allied demand; for the Article in question remained part of the German Constitution, and could be made applicable, and given force, later on. A mere admission of non-applicability was not what had been desired. In their letter, the German Government had given a special interpretation to Article 61 by virtue of a later Article in the same Constitution (No. 178), which latter Article enacted that no provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles was affected by anything in the German Constitution. Now, the argument brought forward in this respect by the German Government might

be good or might be bad. It did not appear to him to be acceptable. The conclusion could not be avoided that, if Article 61 were made non-applicable by virtue of Article 178, the argument could be reversed, and Article 178 be cancelled by Article 61. The Allied and Associated Governments had demanded the nullification of Article 61, and had threatened to take the necessary steps to force the German Government to make the necessary enactments. They had received, in reply, an interpretation, both of their original request, and of the Article at issue, by virtue of which it was alleged, that the measures foreshadowed by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be necessary. The Council might well repeat their original request, and state clearly that they were not concerned with the interpretation of the German Constitution, given in the German Government's letter of the 5th September. He suggested, in conclusion, that the demand for nullification should be repeated in the strongest and clearest terms in any letter that might be subsequently sent to the German Government; who should also be informed that the Allies would feel themselves to be absolutely justified in taking any measures necessary to enforce their demands.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hurst to explain his standpoint to the Council.

MR. HURST said that he could only express a personal opinion, because the matter had merely been the subject of conversation and discussion in the Drafting Committee, and had never been officially referred to them. He quite felt that the prestige of the Allied and Associated Governments demanded that the German Government should be told that steps would be taken to enforce compliance with the demands that had been made to them. But a further question arose, which was whether the admission of the German Government, in their letter of 5th September, was not sufficient to afford the necessary satisfaction to the Council. The German Government had clearly admitted that Article 61 of their Constitution had no legal force. He asked whether there was a sufficient difference between this admission and the demands of the Council to justify further action. Would it not be enough to tell the German Government, that their admission of the non-validity of Article 61 had been noted and put on record? Another point arose, which was that, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, Austria could be admitted into the German Reich, subject to the consent of the League of Nations. This showed that the Peace Treaty itself did actually leave a means open to Austria, whereby she might eventually become incorporated into Germany. It might be argued that the Allied demand for the nullification of Article 61 was in contradiction to the terms of the Peace Treaty, which they themselves had drawn up. The real protection of the Allied and Associated Powers against an increase of strength to Germany, by virtue of the incorporation of Austria, came from the terms of the Austrian Peace Treaty. After signature, Austria would bind herself not to participate in the affairs of another State and to regard her independence as inalienable. This undertaking by Austria, combined with the admission contained in the German note, would, in his opinion, sufficiently protect the prestige of the Council, and the interests of the Allied and Associated Governments.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to three points, which he regarded as of primary importance. (1) He did not see why an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria, preventing that country from joining Germany, was of any protection, unless the analogous article in the German Peace Treaty were upheld and enforced. What was good for one Treaty was good for another Treaty. Why should an Article in the Austrian Treaty be of any greater protection than an Article in the German Treaty? (2) The German Government was not qualified to interpret the German Constitution. In his opinion, no Government had such a right. (3) He wished to draw attention to a further Article in the German Constitution (No. 112), by virtue of which it had been enacted that no German citizen should be surrendered to a foreign government for trial or punishment. This article, taken in conjunction with No. 61, seemed to him to show a deliberate plan to violate the Peace Treaty; and this raised at once a very grave issue. He desired to assure the Council, that he had no wish to force quarrels; it was not in his character to do so. He was none the less deeply convinced that the German Government would use every means in its power to avoid carrying out the Peace Treaty fully. This was, after all, only to be expected; since such a line of conduct was conformable to the dictates of human nature. The Allied and Associated Governments were in danger by the fact that demobilisation had been forced upon them irresistibly by public opinion in their own countries. But Germany was attempting to reassemble her forces, and would certainly continue to try to do so. He felt that he was, at that moment, testing the spirit of the Entente. If, after making a specific demand, the Council were to allow their orders not to be complied with, a succession of events would take place, which would bring about a very grave state of affairs. By trying to avoid a small crisis at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments would inevitably provoke a much graver one later on, at a date which the Germans themselves would choose.

MR. BALFOUR said that the decision which the Council was called upon to take was one of the utmost gravity and importance. He agreed with much that the President had said; but had a few remarks to offer, and a separate suggestion of his own to add. He had listened to M. Fromageot's contention with interest, although he could not quite agree with it. He had understood him to say that it lay with the Allied and Associated Powers to say exactly what the Peace Treaty of Versailles meant. But it appeared to him (the speaker) that although the Allied and Associated Powers had a perfect right, originally, to insert whatever clauses they chose into the Peace Treaty, and to disregard, if they wished to do so, any complaint that the German Government might have to make upon the projected provisions, this original liberty of action did not so extend itself, after signature, as to give freedom of interpretation to the Allied and Associated Powers. Once the Treaty was signed, it seemed to him that it became a bi-lateral agreement, and that each separate signatory to the document could argue with other signatories on equal terms. It was none the less clear to him that the persons who had

framed the German Constitution had deliberately attempted to draw it up in such a way as openly to challenge, and possibly to violate, the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Their intentions might be described in English slang as a 'try on'. Article 112, to which the President had just called the attention of the Council, appeared to be a far worse violation of the Peace Treaty than the Article upon which there had just been an exchange of notes. He felt amazed that not one of the Entente Governments had been told earlier that the new German Constitution was violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles, both in letter and in spirit.

He fully agreed with the President of the Council that a moment would arise when the issue between the Entente and the German Government would be quite clear, and would have to be fought out by argument, or, possibly, by arms, or by the re-imposition of a blockade. But he did not know whether the Entente Powers were choosing a judicious ground for a dispute with Germany, if they forced a crisis on the debatable subject of the extent to which an invitation to Austria to join the German Reich had violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Two most able and qualified men had just given divergent opinions on the legal issue. The differences of opinion, of which the Council had just taken note, would be repeated in the press of all European countries, if the present litigation between the Entente and Germany resulted in the forcible occupation of Frankfort. As soon as that important German base had been occupied by Entente troops, the press of Europe would pour out cataracts of legal and quasi-legal arguments; public opinion would take sides for and against the Entente, and, though some sections of public opinion would doubtless approve the action taken, there would be others which would bitterly dispute it. He suggested, therefore, that the conflict should be deferred, not because the Allied and Associated Governments doubted the justice of their contentions, but simply because they were not opening the conflict from an absolutely advantageous position. He proposed that a letter should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Governments, two articles of the German Constitution violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and that, although Article 178 of the same Constitution, declaring that no provisions contained therein violated the Peace Treaty, might absolve them, any argument based on such ground appeared wholly unsatisfactory to the Entente Governments. The time would soon arrive when the intentions of Germany with regard to the Peace Treaty would be absolutely clear. But so long as the Council were only concerned with a prospective agreement between Germany and Austria, requiring the active co-operation of the latter power, before it could be effected, the issue before it was doubtful and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, Article 112 of the German Constitution, declaring that no German citizen could be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, would, in a very few days, bring about a decisive issue. If this article were quoted in reply to a demand for the surrender of officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, there would be no disagreement amongst jurists, who would be unanimous in

thinking that the provisions of the Treaty were being defied and violated. As soon as the German Government should refuse to surrender military criminals, the Entente Governments would say that Article 178 had been drafted in order to throw dust in their eyes and deceive them as to the real intentions of the German Government and the German people. If Frankfurt were occupied as a reply to such an open act of defiance, no argument would be possible, and the action of the Entente Governments would receive the moral support of all mankind. He therefore suggested, in conclusion, that a letter of warning, couched in the sternest language, should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Governments, Article 178 of the German Constitution was binding upon them, and that they were expected to carry out, to the letter, the terms of the Peace Treaty signed by their plenipotentiaries, ratified by their Parliament, and agreed to by the express provisions of their own Constitution.

MR. POLK said that he agreed that a struggle with Germany for the enforcement of the Peace Treaty was inevitable. The Germans would, some time or another, make an effort to avoid its provisions; but he thought that the Council ought to choose its ground so as to be quite certain that it was technically, that is to say legally, right. In view of the legal argument advanced by the German Government, to the effect that Article 178 of the German Constitution made Article 61 of no effect, he thought that any further reply sent by the Council ought to be carefully studied by jurists before dispatch. Until such an examination could be made he felt bound to withhold his final opinion.

M. TARDIEU said that attention had been called to the divergence of opinion amongst the jurists. He had, however, been struck by the fact that Mr. Hurst had advanced arguments far more political than legal in character. Would it not be possible to deal with the question on purely political grounds? Mr. Balfour had suggested that another basis should be chosen for the conflict, but by virtue of their letter of the 2nd September, the Allied and Associated Governments had joined with the German Government on a definite issue. Would it not be possible to adhere to the line previously adopted, more particularly as the new Article to which attention had been drawn (No. 112), showed clearly that the German Government wished, and intended, to violate the Peace Treaty as far as it could?

M. CAMBON said he had had a long experience of German methods, and of the mental attitude of the German people. He was convinced that, if the Council allowed itself to be entrapped in the meshes of legal argument, it would be giving encouragement to the German Government to advance more arguments of the same kind, and to obscure the issue, whilst they themselves pursued a persistent policy of violation, behind the cloud of dust they were throwing in the eyes of the Council. By allowing doubtful legal arguments to weigh with them, the Council would be entering on dangerous ground, and would inevitably lose its authority in the eyes of the German Government.

DR. SCOTT said that as Mr. Hurst's opinion did not seem to be very popular, he desired, from motives of loyalty, to say that he agreed with his colleague.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had fully understood Mr. Hurst's argument, but that it did not weigh with him strongly, as he had asked for a legal, and not a political, expression of opinion from him. But the main question before the Council, a question which should not in any way be obscured, was whether the Peace Treaty was violated by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution. If the Council allowed itself to be blinded by the German argument on the subject of Article 178, it would very soon lose all its authority. When the Treaty was violated by one signatory, then, inevitably, the other signatory was no longer bound. He, personally, had no doubt that the German Constitution did actually violate the Treaty of Versailles. The Council had forwarded certain definite demands to the Germans, who had replied by an interpretation of the Treaty, and of their own Constitution. There was no country in the world where the Government had a right to interpret the Constitution. He wished to propose an immediate measure. Mr. Balfour had said that, by waiting two or three weeks, an issue would inevitably arise. His present proposal was to demand the surrender of certain Germans guilty of breaches of the laws of war, immediately and without delay. He desired to send a letter stating: that the reply of the German Government of the 5th September was not acceptable; that the Allied and Associated Governments had taken note of another Article in the German Constitution explicitly violating the Peace Treaty; and that the immediate surrender of certain persons, mentioned by name, should be effected. He agreed with Mr. Balfour that the position of the Council would be more advantageous if the conflict occurred on the subject of Article 112.

MR. POLK asked whether the surrender of certain German criminals should be demanded before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

M. PICHON said that no steps could be taken before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

A considerable discussion then followed as to the probable date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty by France and Italy, and it was thought that this could not take place in less than a fortnight.

MR. POLK asked whether an examination of the German Constitution could not be made, with a view to ascertaining all violation of the Peace Treaty that it might contain.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no clearer instance of violation than that now before the Council was likely to occur again. He agreed with every word of what M. Cambon had said. The Council had made a demand which had virtually been refused. He noticed that all his colleagues, with the possible exception of M. Tittoni, who had not yet expressed himself, were agreed that the demands of the Allies should be enforced. He therefore suggested that the whole question should be considered by every delegate, during the next twenty-four hours, and re-discussed at St. Germain, after the signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the following day. If any means could be

devised whereby Mr. Balfour's proposals could be connected with the present demand on the German Government, he would think such a line of action absolutely perfect.

M. TARDIEU drew attention to the necessity of making the Germans nullify the two Articles violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The best means of connecting Mr. Balfour's proposals with the demands previously made probably consisted in insisting on the nullification of the two Articles objected to.

Mr. POLK said that certain political demands had been made to Germany, and it was evident that the German Government must be compelled to comply. He proposed to refer the question to the Drafting Committee, to see whether the legal and political sides of the question could not be reconciled. The Committee could prepare a report, and submit it to the Council at their meeting at St. Germain on the following day. In conclusion, he emphasised the importance of being absolutely sure of the legal justification for any argument that might be brought forward in the next note to the German Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not see any legal difficulty, since the German Government had no right to interpret its own Constitution.

Mr. BALFOUR said that doubtless the President of the Council was a better judge of that matter than he was himself. Great Britain was protected against interpretations of her Constitution, by the fact that it had never been defined in writing. On the other hand, the Council had been interpreting the German Constitution in the notes sent to the German Government, and it seemed to him, in consequence, that the Germans had an equal right to do what the Allies themselves were doing.

M. TITTONI said that in view of the fact that the Council was called upon to take action, on account of the violation of the Peace Treaty with Germany by Articles 61 and 112 of the Constitution of that country, he wished to draw attention to two points. Firstly, he agreed that Article 61 of the German Constitution absolutely violated the Peace Treaty. Secondly, with regard to Article 112, he thought that a reply that might possibly be made later on by the German Government ought to be considered beforehand. The Germans might quite well admit that the Allies had a right to demand the surrender of certain persons guilty of offences defined in the Peace Treaty. But such an admission on their part might be made without abrogating Article 112 of their Constitution. When once the surrender of certain specified criminals had been made by the Germans, these latter might be justified in maintaining, that they had complied with the special provisions of the Peace Treaty, and could, from then onwards, give Article 112 full legal validity.

M. CAMBON said that it was not sufficient for the present German Government to say that Article 178 of the Constitution made Article 61 of no effect. The present Government might be followed by another, which would very likely maintain an opposite point of view, if it thought the circumstances favourable for doing so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that whilst everybody would be free to take opinions

from whatever quarter they chose during the next 24 hours, he did not think that his own was likely to alter.

(It was decided that the question of the violation of the Peace Treaty by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution should be discussed on the following day at St. Germain after the signature of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and that the Drafting Committee should give their opinion on the legal issues involved to the Council.)

2. The Council took note of the draft letter to the Roumanian Delegation prepared by Mr. Balfour. (See Appendix B.)

Reply to the Note of the Roumanian Delegation on the subject of the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria

(The draft submitted by Mr. Balfour was accepted. See Appendix B.)

3. MR. POLK said that he had been informed by M. Vesnitch, that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates did not intend to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, on account of their objection to the Minorities Clauses contained in it.

Possible refusal of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria

M. BERTHELOT said that he had interviewed M. Vesnitch at 8 p.m. on the preceding day. M. Vesnitch had said that it was impossible for him to sign the Austrian Peace Treaty without the express permission of his Government, and had added that he had previously interviewed Mr. Balfour. He had said that, if the Treaty on Minorities were to be applicable to the territories acquired in the first Balkan War, his Government would not allow him to sign. An agreement had been reached between them, whereby the Treaty in question might be made to apply to the whole of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State. This would avoid mentioning either Macedonia, or the date 1913, in specific terms. M. Vesnitch had promised to telegraph this proposal to his Government, and hoped to have a reply by Wednesday² morning. He had told M. Vesnitch of the grave responsibility that he would incur by not signing the Peace Treaty with Austria. Such a refusal might result in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State losing all the advantages which it stood to gain from the Peace Treaty. He had told him that it seemed hardly reasonable to resign these great advantages on account of a question of 'amour propre'. It was possible that, even when the reply came from Belgrade, it would be in the negative. The obstinacy of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates in the matter was very great.

(A long discussion then followed as to whether the signing of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be postponed to Thursday or Friday,³ and it was finally decided that the signature should take place at 10.0 o'clock on Wednesday² as arranged.)

It was further decided that a protocol should be drafted, by virtue of which any of the high contracting parties might be allowed to sign the Peace Treaty within a period of three days.)

² September 10, 1919.

³ September 11 or 12, 1919.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Vesnitch had asserted, that he might be able to persuade his Government to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, if the Council sent a letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, expressing confidence in their liberal views, and telling them explicitly, that the Article on the subject of minorities in the Austrian Peace Treaty would be an end to their engagements in the matter. M. Vesnitch had alleged that Mr. Polk had given his approval to such a line of action.

MR. POLK said that he had interviewed M. Vesnitch, who had explained that a letter on the lines described by M. Berthelot had been sent to the Polish Government when they had objected to the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M. BERTHELOT said that no such letter had ever been sent to the Polish Government.

MR. POLK said that he had no objection, in principle, to sending a letter of the kind, although he had not suggested any such measure.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection to such a letter being sent, so long as nothing contained in it could possibly modify the obligations imposed on Serbia by virtue of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and by the Minorities Treaty.

4. M. BERTHELOT said that certain alterations in the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had been agreed upon by the members of the Committee on New States.

*Treaty between the
Serb-Croat-Slovene
State and the Allied
and Associated
Powers*

(It was decided that the Report of the Committee on New States (see Appendix C)⁴ on the subject of certain modifications to be introduced into the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, should be accepted.)

5. M. TITTONI said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the contents of a telegram received by him from General Mombelli. This officer stated that three-quarters of the Hungarian people were asking for the despatch of an Inter-Allied body of troops (who would be very well received), in order to ensure that the elections in Hungary should be carried out without intervention or disturbance. Such a measure was necessary if a stable Government, with which the Allies could treat, was ever to be set up in Hungary. The Allied troops would, moreover, be very well received.

*Hungarian
Affairs*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not employ French troops on electoral business in Hungary or anywhere else. He did not think that Mr. Balfour or Mr. Polk could persuade their Governments to send British or American troops for such a purpose.

M. TITTONI said that he had merely wished to draw attention to the

⁴ This appendix is lacking in the original and is replaced by the following note: 'Appendices C and D are not yet available, and will be issued later.' The report in question is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 456-60.

question, and was quite content that every delegate, on being duly informed, should assume whatever responsibility he thought fit.

6. (It was decided that the General Act revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26th, 1885, and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, July 2nd, 1890, should be accepted, with the following modification.
*Convention replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels. (See Appendix D)*⁵ Article 11, Page 8. The words 'public order and good government' should be changed to 'public security and order'.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris,

September 9, 1919.

APPENDIX B TO No. 54

Letter to the Roumanian Delegation. Draft prepared by Mr. Balfour.

September 8, 1919.

I beg to acknowledge, on behalf of the Conference, the receipt of your letter asking whether it would be permissible for the Roumanian Plenipotentiaries to append their signature to the Treaty with the Austrian Republic, subject to a reservation with regard to Article 60.

The Conference is of opinion that no such procedure is possible. The Treaty must either be signed as a whole or not signed at all. No middle course is admissible.

If the Conference rightly understand your communication, the Roumanian Government have resolved, in these circumstances, to withhold their signature altogether.

Such a decision would be a source of deep regret to the Associated Powers. It is not for them to question the wisdom of the Roumanian Government in thus separating themselves from their number. They may, however, be permitted to express their surprise that a Treaty, involving no principle which has not been accepted by other independent and Allied powers should be considered by the Roumanian Government as inconsistent with their dignity and independence, the more so as it relieves them of obligations accepted by them, under the Treaty of Berlin.

The Associated Powers venture to express the earnest hope that even at the last moment the Roumanian Plenipotentiaries will reconsider their decision, and thus maintain, unbroken, the solidarity of the Alliance.

⁵ This appendix is lacking in the original: see note 4 above. The convention in question was signed on the following day at St. Germain-en-Laye by the representatives of the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Portugal. (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 18. Cmd. 477.)

CHAPTER II

Further Proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations)

September 10—October 15, 1919

No. 55

H. D. 51.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in the Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, on Wednesday, September 10, 1919, at 11.15 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Mr. P. Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Lt.-Commander Bell. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: Captain Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following also attended for the items with which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Dr. J. Brown Scott, Mr. Woolsey.

British Empire: Brig.-General Seely, Mr. Hurst, Brig.-General Groves, Lt.-Colonel Kisch.

France: M. Tardieu, M. Cambon, M. Fromageot, General Le Rond, Captain Ropert.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Brambilla.

Japan: M. Nagaoka.

- I. The Council took note of the following draft resolution with regard to the Air Convention:—

Air Convention

‘That the Air Convention shall be signed with the least possible delay by the Contracting States, it being understood that it shall remain open for a period of six months for signature by such of those States as are not at present in a position to sign it.’

MR. POLK drew the attention of the Council to the fact that he was unable to sign the Air Convention on behalf of the United States at the moment, and

might not be able to sign at all, on account of the Patent Laws in the United States. He would inform the Council as soon as possible.¹

(The draft resolution on the subject of the Air Convention was agreed to, subject to the reservation formulated by Mr. Polk, on behalf of the United States.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that he had closely considered the question left over at the last meeting of the Council. He had prepared a draft note for transmission to the German Government, but was not wholly satisfied with it. The conclusion was rather long and not very decisive. Mr. Hurst had devised another plan, which seemed more effective than the mere despatch of a note. After reading his own draft Note (Appendix A) he called upon Mr. Hurst to explain his plan.

MR. HURST said that he had not been able to prepare any document which could be submitted to the Council. He had, on the previous day, made out a very rough draft, and had shown it to Dr. Scott. At the previous meeting he had been aware that the desire of the Council had been to formulate some plan of action, which would combine two separate ideas. Firstly, the two separate violations of the Peace Treaty should be drawn attention to. Secondly, whatever note or communication were sent to the Germans, they should be compelled to reply immediately. In addition to this, whatever line of action were adopted it should be of such a nature as to avoid adverse criticism in neutral countries. The solution that had seemed best to him was to collect together all the admissions made by the Germans in their letter; to draw them up in the form of a protocol, which should be presented to the Germans for signature. When this had been done, their admissions would be given legal force, and be binding upon them. The Germans had admitted that the Peace Treaty and the Constitution were not in agreement. If, when presented with this admission in proper legal form, either the German Government or the Reichsrat refused to ratify it, then the intentions of the Germans would be made clear. The Drafting Committee had agreed, generally, to this proposal, at their meeting. The manner in which the protocol and the note by which it was to be transmitted were to be drafted was doubtful, and, before proceeding to work, it was necessary that his main idea should be approved.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood that the Japanese Representative on the Drafting Committee had a proposal of his own to make.

M. NAGAOKA then read his draft proposal. (See Appendix B.)

M. TITTONI said that he had understood, on the previous day, that the Council wished to force the German Government to make a special enactment, cancelling the Articles in their Constitution that were objected to. He understood M. Nagaoka's proposal to consist in demanding a declaration of nullification of the Articles in question, with the addition that the Reichsrat should itself confirm the declaration.

¹ A variant text of this statement by Mr. Polk is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. viii, p. 173. ² No. 54.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Japanese proposal effected no more than what the Germans alleged to result naturally from Article 178 of their Constitution.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with Mr. Hurst's proposal, which he considered to be the best solution of the difficulty. He proposed that the Drafting Committee should bring a draft legal instrument before the Council on the following day, of such a nature as to oblige the German Government to sign, in the form of a protocol, whatever they had admitted in their letter of the 5th September. The advantage of Mr. Hurst's proposal was that the Germans would be unable to enter into lengthy negotiations. The measures proposed, therefore, seemed to him to be the wisest and the most effective possible.

MR. POLK said that he approved of Mr. Hurst's proposal also.

M. TARDIEU said that the draft protocol, to be prepared by Mr. Hurst and the Drafting Committee, would have to be sent under the cover of a letter. He thought that some of Mr. Balfour's arguments and phrases might be put into the covering letter with great advantage.

(It was decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft protocol, giving legal force to the admissions of the German Government in their letter of 5th September, and should present it to the Council at its meeting on the following day, together with a draft letter under cover of which the aforesaid protocol should be transmitted to the German Government.)

3. M. CAMBON reported the decision of the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees on the subject of the demarcation line to be adopted in the *Teschen* area, with the aid of a map. He said that the Polish Delegates had provisionally approved of the line proposed, which was ethnographically correct.

M. TITTONI said that he had received a visit from M. Benes, who had admitted the justice of the new line, from an ethnographic point of view. He (M. Benes) had, however, argued, that if a strict ethnographic line were to be adopted in the *Teschen* area, it seemed hardly fair, conjointly with such a decision, to put four millions of Ruthenes in Eastern Galicia under Polish jurisdiction. A solution might consist in making concessions to the Czecho-Slovaks in the *Teschen* area, to balance the very great political and economic advantages that were being conferred on the Poles by virtue of the Galician decision.³

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not consider the analogy between the Galician and *Teschen* situations as very relevant, for two reasons; (1) the solution proposed for Eastern Galicia was provisional only, and was not intended to be a permanent settlement, and (2) the decision on the subject of Galicia had been arrived at because the Ruthenian population in that country could not stand alone. It was inevitable that the Ruthenians should eventually be placed under the rule of a non-Ruthenian State. Nothing parallel, or similar, to these considerations arose in the *Teschen* problem.

³ See No. 61, minute 3.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council proposed to discuss the Teschen question, which was quite difficult enough, without the Galician problem being added to it.

MR. POLK said that M. Benes had proposed to him a line of demarcation following the river Vistula. The line in question would, however, be quite unacceptable to the Poles; although M. Benes considered that, in proposing it, he was making concessions.

M. PICHON said that the Council had heard the point of view of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations. The Czech Delegates had insisted that their interest[s] in the Teschen area were centred on the coal that it contained; the Poles had asserted that their interest in Teschen was on a political basis, and was purely concerned with the Polish population in the disputed districts. It was therefore clear that the Poles were asking for population, and the Czechs for coal. A solution might be found by giving the whole of the Karwin district to the Czechs, and the indisputably Polish districts, in the remainder of the area, to the Poles. He did not think that the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees could be upheld.

MR. POLK said that, if such a line as that proposed by M. Pichon were adopted, it would separate the people working in the mines from their own homes, by a national frontier.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a situation similar to that foreseen by Mr. Polk existed in Northern France, Belgium and the Saar Basin. It had not given rise to any serious difficulties.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Poles regarded the Karwin Basin as a Polish district, as indeed it was. There was no serious objection to cutting the coal-field into two halves, because geological formations in other portions of the world were frequently divided politically. He was quite sure that the French frontier did not follow the geological structure of that country, in the northern districts, where the coal strata ran over into Belgium and into Germany. This fact did not, however, give rise to serious difficulties, but M. Pichon's proposal involved cutting off a Polish population from the place where it worked, and this constituted a grave danger for the future. His conviction on this point was not only that of the Expert Committees of the Peace Conference, but also that of the International Commission in Teschen, who had studied the question locally. It was very dangerous to try to improvise another solution, more particularly as the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees was really favourable to the Czechs, to whom it granted 60 per cent. of the coal produce, and 40 per cent. to the Poles. It could not possibly be said that, under such a solution, the Czechs were being deprived of coal.

M. TARDIEU said that it should not be forgotten that the Poles contended that they could not count on the Silesian coal-fields until the plebiscite in that country had been taken. This argument was ingenious, but it was none the less certain that the Poles would eventually obtain possession of the greater part of the Silesian coal-fields.

M. PICHON said that the Poles had repeatedly asserted that they did not care about coal.

MR. POLK said that M. Benes had stated to him that either the line proposed by him (M. Benes) should be adopted, or a plebiscite should be held in the area.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Benes had stated to him that the situation in Bohemia was now so grave that it would be preferable to the Czecho-Slovaks to risk a plebiscite rather than to consent to a solution which they regarded as so hopelessly unfavourable to them and equivalent, in their opinion, to a refusal of all their demands.

M. TRITTONI said that, if a plebiscite were to be held, the area would have to be divided into two portions, as he had proposed for Radkersburg and Marburg, when these areas were under discussion.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Czech contention was that, if they could not possess the coal, they would be dependent upon their neighbours for it, and might be cut off from their necessary supplies at a time of diplomatic tension. M. Pichon's solution gave them the coal, and the rest of the Polish population to the Poles. By adopting it, the present state of affairs would not be altered, since the coal areas were now occupied by the Czechs.

MR. POLK said that the difficulty was that, under M. Pichon's proposal, a proportion of the Polish Teschen districts would be ceded to Czecho-Slovakia.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Karwin coal district could more properly be compared to the Lens, than to the Belgian, coal district, for it was concentrated in a narrow area as in the case of Lens. The original proposals of the Joint Committees had been most favourable to the Czechs, but the proposals in question had now been withdrawn. Even by accepting M. Pichon's proposal, the Poles would be given far more than they had hoped for in the first instance. If, as he now thought possible, M. Benes could persuade his countrymen to consent to the new proposal, it was surely worth consideration.

MR. POLK said that M. Pichon's line would place 60,000 Poles under the administration of the Czechs.

MR. BALFOUR said that it should not be forgotten that even the line proposed by the Joint Committees gave a considerable number of Poles to the Czechs.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Benes had based a good many of his arguments on the solution to the Galician problem, contemplated by the Council. The proposed decision was very favourable to the Poles, and the impression left upon the Czechs was that, although the Council was ready to place 4 million Ruthenes under Polish jurisdiction, they were not prepared to make a concession far smaller from an ethnographical point of view, in favour of the Czecho-Slovak State. This would, in consequence, produce a very bad impression. M. Benes' attitude had been extremely moderate and conciliatory, and it would be a great misfortune if he found himself compelled to resign his post on account of what he considered an unconciliatory attitude of the Conference. M. Benes' resignation would be a political consideration, not entirely relevant to the Teschen problem, but the possibility of it could not be disregarded, and ought to be duly considered.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that the line described to the Council by M. Cambon had been adopted unanimously in the Joint Committees. As M. Berthelot had not been a member of either Committee, he regarded his proposals as interesting, but not of sufficient authority to outweigh a unanimous proposal by an Expert Committee.

M. BERTHELOT agreed with Mr. Balfour and said that the Committees had been unanimous, but it should not be forgotten that their unanimous opinion, for the first six months, had been to adopt a solution far more favourable to the Czechs than any now proposed. They had subsequently altered their opinion, and this, when made known, would cause a bad impression in Czecho-Slovakia. The Committees had studied the problem from its ethnographical and economical sides, leaving out political considerations, which seemed to be for the Council to decide. The French representatives on the Joint Committee had originally objected strongly to the line reported on by M. Cambon that morning, but they gave their assent to it finally, in order to facilitate a solution of some sort. The consent of the French representatives had only been given on the understanding that the Poles should be obliged, by some means or another, to grant special facilities to the Czechs with regard to the coal and to the railways.

M. TITTONI said that he understood that the line described by M. Cambon would not be adopted without a special convention, assuring to the Czechs the special economic facilities described by M. Berthelot.

MR. POLK said that he had understood that the Joint Committees had been unanimous. If they had not been, the question ought obviously to be referred back to them.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Report of the Joint Committees had only been unanimous because the French representatives had given their consent, so as not to isolate themselves from their colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not understand the reasons that had prompted the French representatives on the Joint Committee to give their assent to a proposal of which they did not approve. He retained opinions independently of whether they were shared by others or not. He had thought M. Pichon's proposal a very good one, and had hoped that it might have been adopted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he saw grave objections to the adoption of M. Pichon's solution.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, whilst agreeing with Mr. Balfour, he was convinced that the coal question in Teschen was the outstanding problem.

M. CAMBON said it should not be forgotten that, in the Karwin Basin, which M. Pichon proposed to cede to Czecho-Slovakia, there were nearly 70,000 Poles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Balfour could not agree with M. Pichon. He, himself, could not agree with the Committee's proposals. He therefore proposed to refer the whole question back to the Joint Committees, who, as they had already changed their minds several times, could certainly do so again, and present another report. He would never accept a line cutting a

coal basin into two, for such a solution would be like placing a man on one side of a frontier, his wife upon the other, and dividing the children up between the two.

M. CAMBON said that he admitted M. Clemenceau's objection, but drew the attention of the Council to the fact that it was just as unwise to devise a line giving the surface of the land to one country and the subterranean deposits to another, and this seemed to be what was required of him, the Joint Committees [*sic*].

(It was agreed that the Teschen question should be referred back to the joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees for report on the following day.)

4. MR. POLK drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Bulgarian Delegation was objecting to having the Peace Terms presented to them without a formal diplomatic ceremony.

*Presentation of the
Bulgarian Peace
Terms*

M. DUTASTA further called attention to the fact that the Bulgarians were asking for a period of thirty days, after the presentation of the Peace Terms, in which they might be allowed to draft their replies. Their request was based upon the plea, that it would be necessary for them to take the terms to Sofia, and discuss them in the Bulgarian Sobranie.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that the Peace Terms to the Bulgarians should be formally presented to them at the Quai d'Orsay at a date which should be decided upon later.)

(It was further decided that the Bulgarian Delegation should be given a period of 25 days after the presentation of the Peace Terms, for the preparation of their replies.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris,

September 10, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 55

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS.

The Conference have brought to the notice of the German Government a clause in the new German Constitution respecting German relations with Austria which is in direct contradiction with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to the same subject. The German Government in effect reply that no clause, whatever be its plain grammatical meaning, can really be in contradiction with the Treaty of Peace because there is another clause in the Constitution which says that nothing the Constitution contains can affect the Treaty. By this ingenious device the German Constitution could evidently be so amended as formally to contradict every provision which the Treaty of Peace contains. It might for example enact that a German army of ten million men was to be maintained by conscription: and when the Associated Powers pointed out that this was not in conformity with a Treaty which narrowly limited the Army and forbade conscription, the German

Government could reply that, if so, the Constitution itself in Article 178 provided a sufficient remedy for the evil by laying it down that nothing in the Treaty could be affected by the Constitution.

This case is imaginary. But it is not more extravagant than a similar experiment in legislation contained in the 112th Clause of the German Constitution. This enacts that no German citizen may be surrendered for trial before a foreign tribunal. The Treaty on the other hand lays it down that certain persons charged with grave offences against the principles of humanity and the Laws of War *are* to be surrendered and *are* to be tried by a foreign tribunal. Here then is a second case of contradiction between the Constitution and the Treaty: and presumably it will be excused in the same fashion as the first.

The German Note suggests that Article 61⁴ was introduced in order to avoid 'all possible contradictions between the Provisions of the Constitution and the conditions of peace in the Peace Treaty'. The intention is excellent if it relates to those doubtful and accidental contradictions which the ingenuity of lawyers may detect in the language of two long and complicated documents. But we are not dealing with doubtful and accidental contradictions. Those of which we make complaint are assuredly open and manifest, and can hardly be other than deliberate. No one can believe that the framers of the German Constitution when they drew up Article 61 (and Article 112) were not aware that both were absolutely inconsistent with the engagements into which Germany had solemnly entered only a few weeks before.

This condition of things cannot be allowed to endure. If, as the Germans themselves proclaim when the Constitution and the Treaty clash, the Constitution must give way, it is their evident duty to bring these two great instruments into harmony by modifying the Constitution: and the Conference must insist that this duty be fulfilled.

Since, however, the legislative machinery for effecting this object is difficult to set in motion owing to the adjournment of the Reichstag, and since the further examination of the Constitution shows that Article 110⁵ must be amended as well as Article 61, the Conference are prepared to extend the period allowed for the amendments till the expiry of the first fortnight after the Treaty has been ratified. This will have two advantages. It will in the first place meet a technical objection raised by the German Government, based on the fact that the Treaty, though signed, is not yet in force. It will in the second place put to the proof the sincerity of the German arguments based on Article 61.⁴ When the Treaty is ratified the Associated Powers will, in accordance with its provisions, demand the surrender of certain accused persons, to be tried in foreign courts. Unless the Constitution is amended, we shall then have a test case by which to determine the mode in which the German Government interpret the provisions of their Constitution when these are in conflict with their treaty obligations. If Article 61⁴ be honestly interpreted, the substantive provisions of Article 110⁵ will have to be abandoned. If Article 110⁵ be acted upon, the Treaty of Peace will be violated in the eyes of all the world. The first alternative would discredit the Constitution: the second would bring about an immediate breach with the Associated Powers. Neither alternative can be good for Germany: and the Associated Powers are acting in her interests as well as in their own when they insist that a speedy end shall be put to ambiguities and inconsistencies which seem to be designed for no other purpose than to weaken the force of the most solemn and binding obligation.

⁴ In error for article 178.

⁵ In error for article 112.

Le Gouvernement allemand, reconnaissant que la disposition de l'article 61 de la loi constitutionnelle du 11 août 1919 est en contradiction avec les termes de l'article 80 du Traité de Paix du 28 juin 1919, et que le maintien de la dite disposition de l'article 61 avant qu'un consentement conforme ait été donné par le Conseil de la Société des Nations peut donner lieu à des malentendus, malgré les dispositions de l'article 178 de la dite loi constitutionnelle, déclare, après avoir été approuvé par le Reichstag, que l'article 61 ainsi que toutes les stipulations contraires au Traité de Paix, sont nuls et non avenue.

No. 56

H. D. 52.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, September 11, 1919, at 11.0 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Mr. P. Kerr.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja¹; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. E. Abraham. *France*: Capt. A. Portier. *Italy*: Capt. Rossi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Dr. Scott, Mr. Gibson, Mr. A. Dulles.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, Colonel Kisch, Mr. Hodgson.

France: M. J. Cambon, M. Colliard, M. Fromageot, M. Laroche.

Italy: M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Stranieri, M. Brambilla, M. di Palma.

1. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an urgent matter. He did not suggest the matter should be discussed immediately, nor did he wish himself to make any statement on the subject. He wished to hand in a document which he had himself received on the previous day from General Seely.² This document gave an alarming account of the development of aircraft industry in Germany. Internal civil aviation was being developed on an immense scale and German companies were buying up old army aeroplanes. The first difficulty which arose in this connection was whether these aeroplanes belonged to the Allies or to the purchasing companies. There was the additional risk that under the guise of civil aviation Germany was merely creating a strong offensive force, more especially as civil aviation was being

*Aircraft Industry
in Germany*

¹ Italian representative on the Supreme Council in the absence of Signor Tittoni.

² Under-Secretary of State for Air.

heavily subsidised by the Government. He suggested that the French General Staff should study this matter and in the hope that this would be done, he begged to hand the document to the Chairman. (Appendix A.) It was also worth noticing that German aircraft industry had already obtained a footing in neutral markets and it was certain that the foundation of German air power was the development of the aircraft industry. It appeared that the best military brains of Germany were being employed in the construction of aeroplanes.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would have the matter examined by the French General Staff.

(It was agreed that the question of aircraft construction in Germany should be reported on by Allied experts, and again brought up before the Council.)

(The Members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.)

2. MR. HURST read the draft contained as Appendix B.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had one observation to make. In the proposals made on the previous day, it had been suggested that the German Government should be given 15 days to obtain from the Legislative Assembly a repudiation of the Articles infringing the conditions of the Treaty. He did not lay any particular stress on the period of 15 days, but he thought some fixed period should be laid down. If the German Delegation protested that the period allowed them was too short, and asked for an extension, he would agree to it, but he did not think it proper to leave it to them to estimate the period themselves.

MR. HURST asked whether M. Clemenceau referred to a period for the signature of the instrument itself.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he referred to the ratification of the instrument by the German National Assembly.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the German Government was asked to undertake and present the instrument to the Assembly at its next Meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer, instead of the words 'when it next assembles', to say 'within 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty', that was to say, upon ratification by three of the Great Powers.

MR. POLK asked how soon the German Delegation was to sign the proposed declaration.

(It was decided to introduce into the text, the word 'forthwith' in this connection.)

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the German Delegation must have time, if they required it, to telegraph to Berlin. He also informed his colleagues of a telegram received that morning to the effect that the National Assembly was being summoned at Weimar to reconsider the provisions of the Constitution complained of. This was not official news, but informal information he had received.

(After a few slight verbal alterations, the draft reply and declaration as contained in Appendix B, were accepted.)

3. (The Members of the Commissions on Polish and Czecho-Slovak Affairs entered the room.)

*Question of
Teschen*

M. CAMBON said that in accordance with the directions of the Council on the previous day, the two Commissions had met in the afternoon. The majority maintained their original opinions. He then read and explained the report of the Meeting contained in Appendix C.

MR. BALFOUR said that he feared the result of the plebiscite in Teschen would be to deprive Czecho-Slovakia not of 40% of the coal, but of 100%. The territory was Polish and the Commission had attributed it to Czecho-Slovakia, because of the railway running through it connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. This railway would almost certainly become Polish property. Surely this was far more contrary to the interest of the Czecho-Slovaks than anything the Commission had proposed. Nevertheless, as M. Benes appeared to accept a plebiscite, it must be assumed that he knew his own business best.

M. CAMBON said that neither M. Benes nor M. Dmowski could be brought to accept either of the lines suggested in the Commission. Both, however, agreed to accept the plebiscite.

M. SCIALOJA said that it was impossible for the Council to refuse the plebiscite if both claimants agreed to it.

(It was then agreed that a plebiscite should be held in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spiesz and Orava in accordance with the proposals of the Joint Commissions (Appendix C). The detailed organisation of this plebiscite was referred for examination and report to the Joint Commission.)

4. (At this point, the members of the Labour Commission entered the room.)

*Admission of German and
Austrian Delegates to the
Labour Congress at
Washington*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, on the previous day, he had come to an agreement with Mr. Barnes. It had been agreed that the Congress should be left free to invite the attendance of the German and Austrian Delegates or not.

As it was practically a foregone conclusion that the Congress would invite them to attend, the French Government would facilitate the granting of passports in anticipation to the Germans or Austrians, who might be delegated to go to Washington.

MR. BARNES said that he had received information that President Wilson was willing to invite the German and Austrian Delegates to Washington.

MR. POLK said that this was not quite correct. The President said that he was willing that the Labour Congress should decide whether or not the German and Austrian Delegates should be admitted. He, himself, as Head of the American Delegation, had undertaken that no passport difficulties would be made on the American side to prevent the Germans and Austrians from going to Washington, in the hope of being admitted to the Labour Congress.

MR. BARNES said that he was not sure that these arrangements would be satisfactory to the Germans and Austrians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they should take what was being done as a sign of goodwill. He was himself making a step in the direction of conciliation, since, in the Council of Four, he had decided adversely. Now that Peace was signed, he was ready to yield to some extent. He had been assured by the French Labour Representatives that they would be satisfied with the very thing he was now offering.

M. SCIALOJA said that Italian labour opinion required an implicit invitation to the Germans and Austrians. Otherwise, Italian working men would not attend the Congress. There were two distinct questions involved. The first was admission to the Congress and the second was admission to the International Organisation of Labour. As to the second, it must be left to the Congress to decide and each State could give its representatives instructions. The first, however, which involved the right to be heard in the Congress, could only be decided by the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that nothing would ever prevail upon him to extend an invitation on behalf of the Council to German and Austrian Delegates to attend the Labour Congress. He would not submit to pressure from Italian socialism, which had been consistently against the war and pro-German.

MR. BARNES observed that the Council had already decided that Germany would be admitted to the second meeting of the Labour Congress. Consequently, Germany would, *ipso facto*, be let into the International Labour Organisation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was no doubt the case. What he refused to do was to invite them, in the name of the Council, to attend the Congress at Washington. He was prepared to leave the question to the Congress.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was of the same opinion, but he would ask Mr. Barnes whether the abstention of the Italian Socialists would have any effect on Labour Organisations in other countries.

MR. BARNES said that it would have a certain effect. He had tried to anticipate it by telling British Labour Organisations that the admission of the Germans and Austrians depended upon the representation of Labour and Socialism in the Congress. This would be an inducement to Labour and Socialist representatives to attend the Congress.

MR. POLK said that he did not think the question was one the Council should decide.

M. SCIALOJA said that he was not a defender of the Socialists. There were in Italy, as in other countries, moderate and extreme Socialists. The Italian Government wished to support the former rather than the latter. He thought that public opinion should be made to feel that the Council was not opposing moderate demands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Congress would almost certainly invite the Germans and Austrians to attend, and he would himself state in the Chamber of Deputies that the decision taken was taken in a conciliatory spirit.

(It was decided that the question of the admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the forthcoming Labour Congress at Washington should be left to the decision of that Congress. In the meantime, the Allied and

Associated Governments would put no obstacles in the way of German or Austrian Delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington, in anticipation of a decision in their favour.)

5.

*Rights and Privileges of
Allied work-people
admitted to Enemy Terri-
tories and Vice Versa*

[Not printed]³

6. M. DUTASTA said that the Drafting Committee requested instructions as to the language in which the Air Convention should be drafted. Should it be, like previous Conventions, in French, English and Italian, the French text prevailing in case of divergence, or in French and English, each having equal authority, as in the case of the Conventions signed at Versailles?

M. SCIALOJA said that, as the Convention was very important for Italy, he desired an Italian text.

(After some discussion, it was decided that the Air Convention should be drawn up in English, French and Italian, the text in the two former languages having equal authority.)

7. After some discussion, it was agreed:—

*Presentation of the
Treaty to the Bul-
garian Delegation* That the Bulgarian Delegation should be invited to receive the Treaty in the Salle de L'Horloge, at the Quai d'Orsay, and that the Greek and Roumanian observations just received should be discussed at the next meeting of the Council.

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a letter from M. Pachitch (Appendix D)⁴ stating that, as the Government had resigned, the Delegation was bound to wait for authority before signing the Treaty of Peace with the Austrian Republic.

*Signature of the Austrian
Treaty by Representa-
tives of the Kingdom of
the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes*

³ After a brief discussion the Supreme Council decided, on the proposal of Mr. Barnes, that, subject to an announcement at a future date of the views of the American delegation, the resolution passed by the Labour Commission on June 4, 1919 (see No. 45, note 8), 'was accepted as a general principle of the Conference.' During the preceding discussion M. Clemenceau had said that 'German workmen at present engaged to work on the devastated districts of France brought with them their own rights and privileges. Mr. Balfour asked whether foreign workmen going to England were also to have their own rights. Mr. Barnes said that the case did not arise in England, as a foreign workman was granted British rights even to the extent, after a certain period, of receiving a share in the National Health and Unemployment Insurances and Old Age Pensions. Mr. Polk said that he could not, for the time being, express an opinion, but he had no objection to the principle. Mr. Barnes observed that it was only the principle of reciprocity that was involved. It did not become binding on any given State unless that State made individual agreements with another State'.

⁴ Not printed. This brief letter, dated at Paris, September 10, 1919, was as summarized by M. Clemenceau.

9. MR. POLK drew attention to a telegram received from Budapest (see Appendix E).

*Instructions to Inter-
Allied Mission at
Budapest*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not at all disposed to offer the Hungarian Government financial credits, nor was he prepared to see the Government of the country handed over to the Allied Generals at Budapest. He agreed, however, that it was desirable to send the Mission instructions.

(It was decided that the question of sending further instructions to the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest should be placed on the Agenda.)

MR. POLK observed that the Roumanians were under the impression that the United States alone, among the Allied and Associated Powers, raised objections against their conduct in Hungary. This impression had not been set right by Allied representatives on the spot. It was desirable that the Roumanian Government should be informed that the Council had acted only upon information received from the Inter-Allied representatives.

M. PICHON observed that, as M. Clemenceau signed all the telegrams sent in the name of the Council, France was incurring a great deal of unpopularity in Bucharest, where it was supposed that France was particularly antagonistic to Roumanian ambitions. It had therefore been pointed out to the Roumanian Government that these telegrams emanated from the Council of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers and not from M. Clemenceau as French Prime Minister.

MR. POLK said that he thought it was the people on the spot who had created the impression that America alone was responsible for Roumanian troubles.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris.

September 11, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 56

Document I

AS/c/595.

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS.

September 10, 1919

Dear General,

The attached letter to General Masterman from the German Aviation authorities contains the information you asked me to let you have regarding the German proposals to start civil aviation with war machines. The proposals may be summarised as follows:—

Six aerial post lines to be started from Cologne. The estimated number of aeroplanes required for *one* of these lines, viz., Cologne to Berlin, is 170. The Company has already bought 140 aeroplanes and other aircraft material from the German Government. It is claimed that these aircraft are exempt from delivery to the Allies as they are new and have never been used for warlike purposes.

As regards the above proposals, the six aerial post lines are, of course, capable of indefinite expansion. The estimated number of aeroplanes required for the Cologne-Berlin line, viz., 170, includes one-third for repair. This percentage for repair is insufficient, and the total number required would be at least 200. There would, of course, be no limit to the reserve which could be built up, and it is highly probable that several thousand aeroplanes would be required for the efficient working of these routes.

The 140 aeroplanes which the Company has bought from the German Government are the property of the Allies, as under the Air Clauses Germany is required to surrender all her naval and military aircraft, and these machines are all of military types.

The whole question, I think, hinges upon this point, namely, the type. So far as our information goes, Germany has not produced any distinctly civil types of aeroplanes since the Armistice. A Gotha which has been built since the Armistice, and has not been fitted with bomb-racks is, nevertheless, a Gotha, and could be adapted for war uses within 24 hours.

Although the Germans have consulted us with regard to the scheme outlined in the attached letter, they have already started civil aviation on a somewhat extensive basis, and there appears to be no doubt that the machines employed are converted war machines.

Furthermore, Germany has, as you are aware, carried out a wholesale exportation of her aircraft to neutral Powers, and this exportation is still in progress despite various remonstrances which have been made by the Armistice Commission and latterly by Marshal Foch, acting under instructions of the Supreme Council.⁵

Owing to the delay in the ratification of the Treaty, the Air Clauses have already been to a large extent circumvented, and if Germany is permitted to regard a military machine adapted to civil purposes as a civil machine, the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty will have little value.

A survey of the whole aeronautical position in Germany at the present moment would be lengthy, and in many respects incomplete, owing to lack of sufficient data, but I think there is sufficient information to warrant the following conclusions:—

- (1) That civil aviation in Germany is being heavily subsidised.
- (2) That the German aircraft industry, aided by the German Government, has attained considerable footing in neutral markets. It is to be remembered that Germany's aircraft industry is the foundation of her air power.
- (3) That the military brain of Germany intends to develop German air power under camouflage of civil aviation.

As regards (3), I do not think this can be prevented, as the Supreme Council was not willing to adopt the measures recommended for its prevention by the Advisory Aeronautical Commission.⁶ But I think that it is possible to delay the development of German air power by enforcing the air clauses to the letter. In order that this shall be done, it will be necessary for the President of the Inter-

⁵ Cf. No. 41, minute 5 and appendix C.

⁶ For the original views of the Aeronautical Commission as regards the prevention of the development of German air power by means of civil aviation, see the record of the meeting of the Supreme Council (Council of Ten) on March 17, 1919, printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. iv, pp. 371-2.

Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, viz., General Masterman, to be given a free hand, and to receive strong support from the Supreme Council.

Yours sincerely,

P. R. C. GROVES.

Major-General The Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely, C.B., C.M.G., etc., Under Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force.

Document 2

Memorial about the opening up of an Aerial Post Service between Cologne, Hanover and Berlin

COLOGNE, August 30, 1919

The German 'Flugverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft' has obtained the approval of the German Government to establish an aerial post service on 6 lines. The same are:—

From Cologne to Berlin.
„ Cologne „ Hamburg.
„ Cologne „ Breslau.
„ Cologne „ Munich.
„ Cologne „ Stuttgart.
„ Cologne „ Bâle.

For this purpose the Flugverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft has bought in Germany from the German Government the following *unused* aeroplane material:—

60 L.V.G. Cells.	Type C. VI.
30 „ Aeroplanes.	„ C. VI with Bz. IV ue.
100 F.D.H. „	„ C. VII „ ditto.
10 F.D.H. „	„ C. III „ ditto.
200 Motors Bz. IV ue.	

In accordance with paragraph 202 of the Peace Treaty, these machines are exempted from delivery because, being perfectly new, they were never used during the war for warlike purposes and they are not destined for warlike purposes, because the Army is demobilized.

If the flying service is to be established in the near future, it is necessary that the Allies confirm the release of this aeroplane material.

In the first place it is intended only to open up the line Cologne-Hanover-Berlin. The connections by rail and post are unreliable on account of the general condition; but the linking up of the most important places in the occupied and unoccupied territory is for the German authorities of the greatest interest. At the same time it is intended to carry not only the German post but also the post of the occupation authorities.

It is intended to organize the aerial post service Cologne-Hanover-Berlin as follows:—

1. 17 intermediate stations are to be established on the line Cologne-Hanover-Berlin. Every intermediate station has at the disposal aeroplanes as well as motor cars, in order to be able to continue an interrupted flight without loss of time for the postal service.

2. In the first place the orientation of the aeroplanes takes place by land orientation; by installing the sending off and receiving apparatuses in the aeroplanes and by erecting arrow stations, it will by Spring be possible to direct the aeroplanes automatically by means of wireless telegraphy.
3. The following aeroplane material is needed for the line Cologne-Hanover-Berlin:—

17 Stations each with 2 aeroplanes	= 34 aeroplanes.
3 Principal stations each with 15 aeroplanes	= 45 „
For every day service 2 times 12 aeroplanes = 24 aeroplanes to be changed from day to day	= 48 „
Total	<hr/> 127 aeroplanes. <hr/>

The least to be considered as being in repair is one-third, therefore 170 aeroplanes would be required. This great number of aeroplanes is necessary in order to make it possible to provide every intermediate station accordingly, and in order to be able to dispose of the necessary reserve machines.

4. The postal service will be arranged in such a way that the line will in each direction be covered 12 times per day. It is of the utmost interest that the line Cologne-Hanover-Berlin is opened up as early as possible. After release of the aeroplanes by the Allies the aerial post service will be started 4 weeks after its approval.

In order to be able to examine the correctness of the Company's statement about the material at disposal, and in order to keep control that the aeroplanes have all been rendered useless for any military purposes, it is suggested that the Allies appoint a control Officer at the expense of the Flugverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft.

SCHWINK, Captain.

German General Staff Officer,
Bridgehead, Cologne.

APPENDIX B TO No. 56

Document 17

By their Note of September 2nd, the Allied and Associated Powers have brought to the notice of the German Government a clause in the new German Constitution respecting German relations with Austria which is in direct contradiction with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to the same subject.

The German Government, by its Note of September 5th, reply that no article whatever be its plain grammatical meaning can really be in contradiction with the Treaty of Peace, because there is another clause in the Constitution which says that nothing the Constitution contains can affect the Treaty. By this ingenious device the German Constitution could eventually be so amended as formally to contradict every provision which the Treaty of Peace contains. It might, for example, enact that a German Army of several million men was to be maintained by conscription; and when the Allied and Associated Powers pointed out that this

⁷ This note is printed in translation in *Verhandlungen der verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlung*, vol. 340, No. 1793, as cited by F. Berber, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 545-6.

was not in conformity with the Treaty which narrowly limited the German Army and forbade conscription, the German Government could reply that if so, the Constitution itself in Article 178 provided a sufficient remedy for the evil by laying it down that nothing in the Treaty could be affected by the Constitution.

The above, one may say, is an imaginary case, but it is justified when one reads in Article 112 of the German Constitution, as at present drafted, that no German nationals can be surrendered for trial before a foreign tribunal, when the Treaty stipulates in precise terms that certain persons charged with offences against the laws and customs of war are to be surrendered for trial before a foreign tribunal.

According to the German reply, Article 178 was introduced in order to avoid 'all possible contradictions between the provisions of the Constitution and the conditions of the Peace Treaty'. The intention is excellent if it relates to those doubtful and accidental contradictions which the ingenuity of lawyers may detect in the language of two long and complicated documents. But, in this case it is not a question of doubtful and accidental contradictions. Those of which the Allied and Associated Powers make complaint are assuredly open and manifest, and can be hardly other than deliberate. No one can believe that the framers of the German Constitution, when they inserted Article 61 and settled the terms of Article 112, were not aware that their wording was irreconcilable with the engagements into which Germany had solemnly entered only a few weeks before.

This condition of things cannot be allowed to endure.

The German Government itself admits and declares that if the Constitution and the Treaty clash, the Constitution must give way.

In view of this admission, the Allied and Associated Powers call upon the German Government to place on record without further delay in the diplomatic instrument of which the text is enclosed herewith, the explanation which it has made to the Allied and Associated Powers in its answer of September 5th 1919. This instrument must be signed at Versailles forthwith, by an authorised representative of the German Government, in the presence of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and must be duly approved by the competent German legislative authorities within 15 days of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Document 2

Draft Declaration

The undersigned, duly authorised and acting in the name of the German Government, admits and declares that all the provisions of the German Constitution of August 11th, 1919, which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, are null and void.

The German Government admits and declares that the second paragraph of Article 61 of the said Constitution is therefore null and void, and in particular that Austrian representatives cannot be admitted to the Reichsrat, except so far as the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace should consent to such a change in the international status of Austria.

The present Declaration will be approved by the competent German legislative authority within 15 days of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Done at Versailles the _____ day of September 1919 in the presence of the undersigned representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

*Rapport Présenté au Conseil Suprême par la Commission des Affaires
Polonaises et la Commission des Affaires Tchéco-Slovaques Réunies sur la
Question de Teschen*

En exécution de la résolution prise le 10 septembre par le Conseil Suprême, la Commission des Affaires Polonaises et la Commission des Affaires Tchéco-Slovaques se sont réunies dans l'après-midi du 10 septembre pour soumettre à un nouvel examen la question de Teschen. Elles ont dû constater l'impossibilité où elles se trouvaient de fixer un tracé de la frontière entre la Tchéco-Slovaquie et la Pologne auquel toutes les Délégations pussent se rallier.

Tandis que la majorité de la Commission (Délégations américaine, britannique, italienne et japonaise) déclarait en effet s'en tenir aux conclusions du rapport du 22 août,⁸ la Délégation française a proposé un nouveau tracé, que la majorité n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter.

I. *Opinion de la Majorité.* (Délégation[s] américaine, britannique, italienne, japonaise.)

Le Conseil Suprême a critiqué sur deux points le rapport du 22 août:

- a) il divise entre la Pologne[et] la Tchéco-Slovaquie le bassin houiller de Karwin;
- b) il est moins favorable à la Tchéco-Slovaquie que le rapport du 14 avril.

Concernant le premier point la majorité de la Commission fait remarquer respectueusement que l'objection peut s'appliquer à plusieurs autres frontières qui suivent des lignes de séparations ethniques. L'objection d'ailleurs n'est pas capitale, à condition que les deux nations fassent preuve mutuellement de bonne volonté pour le règlement des intérêts économiques engagés. On peut citer comme exemple le cas du bassin houiller suivant:

1°. le bassin franco-belge qui coupe la frontière entre Valenciennes et Saint-Ghislain;

2°. le bassin houiller situé au nord d'Aix-la-Chapelle et dont les puits principaux sont répartis de part et d'autre de la frontière hollando-allemande. Quant à l'objection, tirée du fait que le rapport du 22 août est moins favorable aux Tchèques que le rapport du 14 avril, l'attention du Conseil Suprême est respectueusement attirée sur les points suivants:

a) Le rapport du 14 avril n'a pas été adopté à l'unanimité;

b) La solution proposée dans le rapport du 14 avril n'a pas été appuyée par la Commission Interalliée de Teschen.

c) Du point de vue ethnographique le rapport du 22 août est plus favorable à la Tchéco-Slovaquie qu'à la Pologne: la totalité de la population tchèque du Duché, à l'exception de 10,400 habitants, est annexée à la Tchéco-Slovaquie, tandis que 62,000 Polonais sont perdus par la Pologne.

d) Depuis le 14 avril, date du premier rapport, le traité de paix conclu avec l'Allemagne a été ratifié par la Pologne. La majorité de la Commission estime que les Polonais du Duché de Teschen, vivant sur les confins d'un territoire sur lequel la Pologne exerce d'ores et déjà des droits de souveraineté, ne sont pas disposés à accepter une solution qu'on aurait pu leur imposer en avril dernier;

e) En dehors de ses conséquences ethnographiques indiquées ci-dessus, le règlement proposé attribue à la Tchéco-Slovaquie le chemin de fer du défilé de Jablunkau

⁸ See No. 50, appendix C.

rendant ainsi possibles des relations faciles par chemin de fer entre le bassin minier de Machrisch Ostrau et la Slovaquie.

f) En ce qui concerne le charbon, le rapport attribue à la Tchéco-Slovaquie 60 % de la production du bassin de Teschen et 69 % de la production de la partie du bassin d'où on extrait le charbon à coke.

La majorité de la Commission n'estime pas pouvoir proposer un tracé plus favorable à la Tchéco-Slovaquie que celui qu'elle a proposé par son rapport du 22 août; à son avis, toute proposition dans ce sens comporterait une grave injustice au détriment de la Pologne et entraînerait une hostilité durable entre les deux pays. Dans le rapport du 22 août d'ailleurs, les deux Commissions réunies ont demandé à l'unanimité que, si la frontière proposée par elles était acceptée, on leur confiât le soin de déterminer les concessions, d'ordre économique et ferroviaire, que la Pologne, en toute justice, devrait faire à l'État Tchéco-Slovaque; ces concessions seraient garanties par un traité dont les Commissions auraient à préparer le projet.

Au cas où, en dépit des précisions qui précèdent, le Conseil Suprême n'estimerait pas pouvoir accepter la solution proposée par la majorité, celle-ci est d'avis que la seule manière de résoudre la question est de recourir à un plébiscite.

Les lignes générales de ce plébiscite, qu'accepte[nt] en principe les deux partis, sont indiquées plus loin.

II. *Opinion de la Minorité.* (Délégation Française.)

La Délégation Française estime que la frontière tracée par la majorité de la Commission ne tient pas un compte [sic] des considérations d'ordre moral, qu'elle est susceptible de laisser des germes durables de discorde entre Tchéco-Slovaques et Polonais, et qu'elle ne présente pas en conséquence, les caractères que doit revêtir une délimitation définitive entre deux pays alliés; son adoption ne donnerait pas les garanties désirables au point de vue du maintien de la paix générale.

La Délégation Française estime qu'on éviterait dans une large mesure ces graves inconvénients, si l'on modifiait de la manière suivante le tracé de la frontière proposée dans le précédent rapport de la Commission.

1^o. Au sud de Teschen dans la région de Jablunkau, la frontière serait reportée plus à l'Ouest de manière à rendre à la Pologne un territoire assez étendu où l'élément polonais domine; mais tout en laissant en territoire tchéco-slovaque le chemin de fer Oderberg-Kaschau. La ville de Teschen serait laissée à la Pologne.

2^o. Au nord de Teschen la frontière rejoindrait l'Olsa; elle suivrait cette rivière jusqu'à proximité de la ligne Oderberg-Cracovie; elle se dirigerait ensuite vers l'ouest, la ligne Oderberg-Cracovie demeurant en territoire polonais et la ville de Deutschleuten étant attribuée à la Tchéco-Slovaquie, suivant au plus près la ligne de chemin de fer, la frontière rejoindrait au sud d'Oderberg la ligne proposée dans le précédent rapport de la Commission.

Le bassin houiller de Karvin serait ainsi tout entier attribué à la Tchéco-Slovaquie.

Il y a lieu de remarquer que le nombre des Polonais qui habitent le territoire compris entre la ligne bleue⁸ (frontière proposée dans le dernier rapport) et la ligne rouge⁸ (frontière proposée le 14 avril) dans la région au nord de Teschen n'excède pas 70,000; le nombre des Polonais qui serait attribué à la Tchéco-Slovaquie, si le tracé français était adopté, serait évidemment très inférieur à ce total. La brièveté du délai laissé à la Commission pour présenter son rapport n'a

pas permis d'en établir le chiffre exact, dont il faudrait d'ailleurs déduire pour avoir une vue précise de la situation faite à l'élément polonais, le chiffre des Polonais qui, au sud, seront rendus à la Pologne.

Faute de voir accepter cette solution, et eu égard à la gravité des conséquences politiques que lui paraît devoir entraîner l'adoption de la ligne proposée dans le rapport du 22 août (ligne bleue), la Délégation française estime que la seule solution de nature à ramener l'apaisement serait la consultation des populations par voie de plébiscite; devant le résultat du vote tout le monde devrait s'incliner.

III. *Propositions de la Commission.*

Constatant l'impossibilité où elle se trouvait de recommander à l'approbation du Conseil Suprême un tracé de la frontière qui fût accepté par les cinq Délégations et désireuse cependant pour se conformer aux instructions qu'elle a reçues de soumettre au Conseil Suprême des propositions adoptées par l'unanimité de ses membres, la Commission toute entière et bien qu'elle ne se dissimulât aucun des inconvénients d'une solution de cette nature, et au cas où le Conseil Suprême ne croirait pouvoir accepter aucun des deux tracés qui lui sont proposés, a résolu de lui recommander de régler la question par un recours au plébiscite. Interrogés par elle, MM. Benès et Dmowski se sont déclarés prêts à s'incliner devant une décision de ce genre. M. Benès, à qui un membre de la Commission faisait remarquer que le plébiscite pourrait avoir pour conséquence la fixation d'une frontière plus désavantageuse pour la Tchéco-Slovaquie que la frontière proposée par la Commission, a même répondu que si on lui imposait le tracé du rapport du 22 août, il demandait le plébiscite.

Le principe d'un plébiscite étant admis par les Tchéco-Slovaques comme par les Polonais et les résultats en étant acceptés d'avance, il convient de s'y rallier.

Le plébiscite aurait lieu dans les conditions suivantes:

- a) Il porterait sur la totalité du Duché de Teschen;
- b) Le vote aurait lieu par commune, dans le plus bref délai possible;
- c) Le pays serait occupé par les forces alliées (il semble qu'un régiment à trois bataillons serait suffisant);
- d) Le Duché de Teschen serait provisoirement administré par une Commission interalliée.

Cette Commission d'après les résultats du vote fixerait la frontière qu'elle soumettrait à l'approbation de la Conférence.

e) La Commission Interalliée aurait mandat de proposer à la Conférence tel projet d'accord économique entre la Tchéco-Slovaquie et la Pologne que le résultat du vote rendrait nécessaire.

Il y a lieu de remarquer, à ce propos, que M. Dmowski a renouvelé aujourd'hui, devant la Commission, la déclaration qu'il avait faite dans une séance antérieure: *la Pologne est prête, si la Haute-Silésie lui est attribuée*, à conclure avec la Tchéco-Slovaquie tous les accords que celle-ci peut désirer pour la fourniture du charbon dont elle a besoin.

f) Enfin, il semble opportun pour donner satisfaction aux demandes tchèques d'étendre la zone du plébiscite aux territoires de Spis et d'Orava.

Si le Conseil Suprême approuve la proposition que la Commission a l'honneur de lui soumettre, il y aura lieu:

1°) de charger la Commission d'étudier les modalités du plébiscite et d'établir, à cet effet, un projet de règlement;

2°) de l'inviter à délimiter la région dite 'Territoires de Spis et d'Orava', qui ne correspond à aucune division administrative définie.

Le Président de la Commission :

J. CAMBON.

PARIS, le 10 septembre, 1919.

APPENDIX E TO No. 56

Following is text of telegram (translation) sent by the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest to the Supreme Council under date of September 9th,⁹ 1919:

'In a letter copy of which will be sent you by next mail, President Friedrich informs the Commission that his Government has the confidence of the greater part of the country but he lacks the necessary support from the Entente.

'That the Roumanian requisitions throw many workmen into idleness, compromising the next year's harvesting—that the Roumanian occupation prevents the collection of taxes, elections, organization of armed force.

'He asks that the Entente furnish him financial credit.

'He declares that if certain political parties are going to henceforth enjoy the support of the Entente and if the present Government is by this fact powerless to accomplish its duties, the Council of the Ministers will transmit the power to the Commission of Four Generals. The Commission demands instructions from the Supreme Council and considers it their duty to emphasize the embarrassing situation in which they are placed by receiving no response to their preceding telegrams. Inter-Allied Military Mission.'

⁹ See No. 57, note 3.

No. 57

H. D. 53.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Clemenceau's Room at the War Office, Paris, on Monday, September 15, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARY, Sir M. Hankey, G.C.B.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARY, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

France: M. Tardieu, Marshal Foch, General Weygand.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received information that the Emir Feisal was due to arrive at Marseilles on the 16th instant, and he had given strict injunctions that the Emir Feisal was to be taken straight through to London.¹ The French officer who was attached to him would leave him at Calais.

*Emir Feisal's
Journey*

¹ For the occasion of the visit of the Emir Feisal, see minute 5 below.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE² asked if M. Clemenceau would not like to see the Emir Feisal on his way through Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had understood that Mr. Lloyd George wished to see the Emir Feisal at once without his staying in Paris *en route*, and that was why he had given instructions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there had been some misunderstanding. He had only asked M. Clemenceau to expedite the Emir Feisal's journey because he had heard that there was a strike at Marseilles which might delay him. He had not the smallest objection to his staying in Paris on his way, and he would be very glad if the Emir saw M. Clemenceau. He said that he himself had received a telegram from Port Said to the effect that the Emir Feisal had sailed on Saturday, and that it was believed he had gone to Malta in H.M.S. 'Speedy', but he was not certain as to whether it was the 'Speedy' or a French ship.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he had no information in this regard and added that in accordance with the orders already issued, Emir Feisal would proceed to Calais. M. Clemenceau then drew attention to the Agenda which had been circulated.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the first question on the agenda was the Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria. This, however, could not be dealt with until M. Tardieu was present.

Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria (A message was sent to M. Tardieu, asking him to attend.)

3. (The Conference had before them a telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest, referring to the interference they were meeting with from the Roumanian Authorities, insisting on the embarrassing situation in which they were placed, and asking for instructions as to what action they were to take (Appendix A).³)

Demand for instructions from the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest

This was read by the Interpreter in English.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if his recollection was correct, the four Generals had been sent to Budapest in order to find out what was going on there. They had nothing to do with the form of Government in Hungary. They had received written instructions,⁴ and this was a matter which could be easily ascertained. So far as he could remember, however, the questions now raised by the Generals had no relation to their original instructions, and he thought they called for no answer.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how it was possible to deal with the Roumanians until a despatch was received from Sir George Clerk, who had been

² Mr. Lloyd George had arrived in Paris on a brief visit over the preceding weekend. He returned from Paris to London on September 16, 1919.

³ Not printed. This appendix contained the French text of the telegram in appendix E to No. 56. This text was numbered as telegram 292 and dated September 8, a day earlier than the date given in No. 56, appendix E.

⁴ See No. 28, appendix B.

sent to Bucharest. He himself was inclined to suspect the Roumanians of delaying Sir George Clerk's telegrams.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the only information he had received about Sir George Clerk was that he would like to get back home. He understood, however, that the Roumanians were taking matters into their own hands in Hungary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that according to the information he had received that morning, the Roumanians were looting the telephone receivers out of private houses. The [?Their] Mission had actually seized 4,000 private telephone receivers.

MR. POLK said he had received a telegram to the effect that the Hungarians apprehended that the intention of the Roumanians was to leave Hungary suddenly in order to create such a situation as would necessitate a speedy return. They had sent a detachment to guard the Depot of Stores left behind by Mackensen. The American General at Budapest reported that his personal relations with the Roumanian authorities had improved.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not see how the Allies could send a reply to the Commission's telegram.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they could not send a reply till they received Sir George Clerk's report.

MR. POLK suggested that the question as to what could be done for the provision of some forces for the maintenance of order in Hungary should be referred to the Military Representatives at Versailles, in order, if the Roumanians withdrew, to prevent the re-establishment of Bolshevism in Hungary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was not the concern of the Allies what action was taken in Hungary to prevent Bolshevism. That was the task of the Hungarians themselves. Each nation ought to deal with its own problem in this respect.

MR. POLK said that the Allies had a certain responsibility in the matter. The Hungarians had not been permitted to form a gendarmerie, hence, if the Roumanians withdrew in a spirit of spite, the Allies could not divest themselves of all responsibility for what happened in Hungary. If not Versailles, some one else ought to consider this problem.

M. TITTONI said that he did not think the Allies ought to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary, but they had an interest in securing a stable government. He suggested the desirability that the Allied Mission of Generals, who appeared to be popular in Hungary, without undue interference, should exercise their moral influence to assist in the formation of a coalition government and of a local gendarmerie.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE at this point intervened to say that he was only in Paris for one day. He had not had an opportunity to study the questions on the Agenda paper, and did not feel competent to deal with them. Mr. Balfour had left behind him⁵ people who were competent to discuss these matters,

⁵ Mr. Balfour had returned from Paris to London on the afternoon of September 11, 1919.

for example, Sir Eyre Crowe. He thought that the Agenda should be left for these persons to clear up. He himself could render little assistance in these questions. On the other hand, there were two or three matters which he desired to discuss. He would be very grateful if his colleagues would agree to postpone the Agenda, and to discuss certain questions that he wished to raise. As a matter of personal convenience, he asked them to do this.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if there was any objection.

MR. POLK said that he would like to be in a position to hand the Bulgarians their Treaty to-morrow.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it would be desirable to do this, but that the rest of the Agenda might be postponed.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the first question he wished to raise was that of the future of the Conference. It was impossible for the Conference to continue in perpetuity governing Europe. The British Government had a special difficulty in the matter.

Future of the Conference
Mr. Balfour could not remain any longer. Lord Milner would shortly be going to Egypt. Lord Curzon was incessantly engaged at the British Foreign Office,⁶ where there was a great deal to do, and Mr. Bonar Law⁷ had the House of Commons to look after. He could not find any Minister whom he could spare, who would be able to speak the mind of the British Government on questions of policy. There were one or two large questions which the Conference ought to clear up. After that, they would only have to deal with the Treaty with Turkey. He feared that this could not be settled finally for some months. At present the Conference was held up in the matter until President Wilson was able to declare the position of America in regard to Mandates.⁸ Until he did so, what useful purpose could be served by discussing the Treaty with Turkey? He did not know when we should be in a position to discuss it, but, in his view, it might not be until the end of November.

MR. POLK interjected that he thought the American position would be cleared up by the end of October. A Resolution had already been tabled in Congress in regard to the Armenian Mandate.

(At this point M. Tardieu entered, and explained that the Commission over which he presided was not yet quite ready to discuss questions raised by the Greek and Roumanian Delegations in regard to the Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria.)

Consequently, M. Clemenceau decided that the whole of the Agenda should be remitted until the following day.

M. Tardieu withdrew.

The discussion on the future of the Conference was then continued.)

⁶ Lord Curzon was Lord President of the Council and Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until he succeeded Mr. Balfour as Secretary of State on October 29, 1919.

⁷ Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons.

⁸ The reference was to the question whether the United States of America would be prepared to assume a mandate for a part of the former Ottoman Empire, more particularly Armenia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought that Mr. Polk was rather sanguine. President Wilson had hoped that he would be able to announce the American position on Mandates in August or September. He felt, therefore, that the Conference could not found its procedure on the assumption that the American position in regard to Turkish mandates would be clear by October.

(a) *Turkey* In any case the Conference would have to be reconstructed in November or later for the consideration of the Turkish Treaty. He did not think the Conference could be kept in continuous session until then.

Secondly, what was now important was to make provisional arrangements as regards the garrisons to be maintained in Turkey, and he would refer to this question later.

In addition, there was the question of Russia. In regard to this, he had two questions to raise. The first was as to whether M. Paderewski (b) *Russia* should be encouraged in the project he had formed for sending 500,000 men to Moscow. He himself had spent two hours with M. Paderewski on the previous day. M. Paderewski's attitude had been perfectly reasonable. He had said that if the Allied and Associated Powers wished the Poles to advance on Moscow, he was prepared to do it. The cost, however, would amount to 30,000,000 Marks a day. Later, he had said he could do it for £600,000 sterling a day, but this would really mean £1,000,000 sterling a day. Who would be willing to pay this? In addition to the sum required for maintaining the Poles, Denekin had another 500,000 men. Would these also have to be paid for, and if so, by whom?

The second question in regard to Russia arose in connection with the Baltic Provinces. As far as he could gather, Esthonia wanted independence, and did not much mind about Bolshevism. Apparently, they were at present contemplating discussing peace with the Bolsheviks. As regards Latvia and Lithuania, however, the Germans had been ordered by the Allies to quit, and had not moved. One set of people said that the Germans were a great force with which to meet Bolshevism. M. Paderewski, however, had said that to utilise the Germans was playing with fire. If Germans were employed, they would assuredly get hold of Russia. He himself did not feel sure that the Allied representatives in the Baltic Provinces, who included a British General, were sufficiently alive to the danger of using the Germans against the Bolsheviks. Hence, two problems arose:—

- (1) Were any further steps to be taken for supplying arms and money to the anti-Bolshevist forces in Russia, and
- (2) Were the Allies to use the Germans against the Bolsheviks?

In regard to the second point, if the Allies were not prepared to use the Germans, they ought to tell them to clear out. M. Paderewski's information was that the Germans had hundreds of thousands of men in the Baltic Provinces. They were constantly sending them officers and N.C.O.'s. M. Paderewski also said that the German War Office was equipping these troops. His (Mr. Lloyd George's) view was that the Germans ought to be cleared out.

M. CLEMENCEAU interjected that he was in full agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that he was anti-Bolshevist, but he did not want it to be the Germans who cleared the Bolsheviks out. He also said that the Germans were giving land to German soldiers in the Baltic Provinces and attracting volunteers there in large numbers by these means. Hence, he would ask the Conference to decide that the Germans should be cleared out of the Baltic Provinces. He believed they had a right to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had not the right until the Treaty was signed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they had a right under the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this could easily be ascertained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that another question that the Conference ought to clear up was the situation in the Adriatic.

(c) *Adriatic* M. CLEMENCEAU said that he and M. Tittoni were quite ready to discuss this, and would have a proposal to make.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said yet another question was the first meeting of (d) *League of Nations* the League of Nations.

Nations

Finally he wished to raise the question of the trial of the ex-Kaiser and of the German Officers, for he felt that the Allies ought to

(e) *Trial of ex-Kaiser and Officers* be in a position to take action immediately the Treaty was ratified.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as regards Turkey it was impossible at the present moment to discuss the question of mandates. All that could be discussed usefully was the arrangements for the military occupation of the various spheres. He had discussed this matter with M. Clemenceau on Saturday, September 13th, and had handed to him an Aide-Mémoire, which he would now place before the Conference. (Appendix B.)

(The Aide-Mémoire was handed round.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then gave a summary of what was contained in the Aide-Mémoire. He referred first to the final paragraph, in which it is stated, that the French Government having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina, for this purpose. Field Marshal Allenby had seen General Weygand on this subject on Saturday. The withdrawal of British troops from Cilicia was to take place immediately. The British troops would also be withdrawn from Syria, beginning on November 1st. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo had been included within the boundaries of the Arab State. He therefore proposed that the British troops should hand the garrisons of these towns over to the Emir Feisal. In other parts of Syria, west of the Sykes-Picot line, the garrisons would be handed over to French troops. In the first instance, British troops would be withdrawn to the line which the British Government conceived to be the boundary between Syria

and Mesopotamia, and Syria and Palestine respectively. This would be the provisional boundary line. As regards the permanent line, if the British could not come to an agreement with the French Government and with Feisal, they were prepared to submit the question to the arbitration of someone nominated by President Wilson, if the President would accept this charge. The Aide-Mémoire also contained an arrangement as regards a railway outside the British zone, but this was a matter which would have to be settled as part of the permanent arrangements.

He had taken on himself the responsibility of sending for the Emir Feisal to Europe, because the British Government had entered into certain engagements with King Hussein, on the strength of which, the latter had given strong support to our forces. In consequence of these engagements, the Arabs had greatly harassed the Turks, and had kept some thirty or forty thousand of them constantly occupied and given us very material assistance in conquering the country. The Arabs had fulfilled their engagements and we were bound to fulfil ours. There was a suggestion in the French press, that the British Government had not told the French Government of their engagements with the Arabs. Consequently, he had promised M. Clemenceau on Saturday to hand him a document clearing up this point.

(At this point, Mr. Lloyd George handed M. Clemenceau a document, prepared in the British Foreign Office, on the question of whether the French Government had been notified of the engagements made by the British Government with King Hussein.⁹)

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that the Sykes-Picot agreement had also been based on the engagements of the British Government with the Arabs. In fact, the Emir Feisal declared that, by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British Government had given away something which was promised to him, but the British Government could not accept this view, and felt certain they could convince the Emir Feisal on the matter. In their communications with King Hussein, they had always made it clear that in their view the country west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo was not Arab in character. He hoped to be able to make it clear to the Emir Feisal that this point had been explained fully to the Emir's father in the letters sent to him by the British Government. In any case, it had been necessary to summon the Emir Feisal to Europe, in order to make the same declaration to him as to the French Government, as regards the withdrawal of the British forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the solution of the Turkish problem must be considered as a whole, otherwise great difficulties would be encountered. On the first point mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson had always thought he would be ready to announce the American attitude as regards mandates by the end of September or in October. In his personal opinion, however, a matter of six weeks would make no material difference. He, himself, had read Mr. Lloyd George's Aide-Mémoire and was preparing a reply.

⁹ For Anglo-French relations generally in Syria and the Middle East see Vol. IV of this series.

He had, however, of course, not yet had time to read the document handed to him that morning, in regard to the declaration to the Arabs and the notification to the French Government thereon. In his view, the question of an Arab Empire raised great difficulties, and the Governments concerned must take time to consider it. He desired to state that he reserved the right to discuss more fully Mr. Lloyd George's Aide-Mémoire. The pressing question today, on which he wished to have an answer from Mr. Lloyd George, was as to whether the occupation by French troops of Syria and Cilicia would be considered as not merely as part of the agreement suggested in the Aide-Mémoire, but as a definite acceptance of the agreement. It would not be possible for him to promise things he could not carry out. If Mr. Lloyd George was unable to come to France later to discuss the question, then he himself would be prepared to go to London. Until this later discussion, he could accept no condition in the Aide-Mémoire, other than the occupation by French troops. As for the question of sending French troops to Armenia, this was a very serious and grave responsibility for France to take. He offered to send French troops to Armenia because the Armenians were threatened with massacre, in order to render a service to the Conference. This offer, however, could not constitute a provision of an agreement since France was not desirous of going to Armenia and it would involve an enormous burden. For the moment, he merely wished to put this question:

Does the sending of troops by France to Syria and Cilicia mean that he accepted the whole agreement?

If it was so, he could not undertake to send troops.

(The answers to M. Clemenceau's questions, summarised below, were mainly interjected by Mr. Lloyd George during the interpretation of M. Clemenceau's remarks.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Clemenceau would not be committed to the whole agreement by sending troops. It was the intention of the British Government to withdraw their troops from Syria and Cilicia in any event. The only point was that in the Syrian portion, the British Government would, in accordance with their engagements, hand over their posts to French troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it was no advantage for France to go to Armenia, which would cost them a great deal of money.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Field-Marshal Allenby had informed him that the mere presence of troops in the places now occupied, had a good effect in averting massacres in Armenia.

MR. POLK observed that the present discussion was merely an exchange of views between his British and French colleagues. It was understood that the question would be debated hereafter as a whole.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, nevertheless, in loyalty, he had felt it necessary to notify the Conference, otherwise it might be said in the newspapers that these arrangements were being made behind the backs of his colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was in agreement that Mr. Lloyd George was right to notify the Conference. In consequence of Mr. Lloyd George's remarks, he would agree to replace the British troops in Syria and Cilicia by French troops, but as regards the rest of the Aide-Mémoire, he must reserve his opinion. When the question of the future of Turkey was considered as a whole, it might be possible to grant what could not be granted when the question of Syria was considered in isolation. He would always be ready to go to London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the French military authorities should make the necessary arrangements with Field-Marshal Allenby, who was now in Paris, for replacing the British garrisons within the zone proposed. He wished to be perfectly clear that M. Clemenceau had accepted that France should occupy Syria and Cilicia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that French garrisons would take the places evacuated by the British.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that was what he had understood. This was a purely provisional arrangement for the military occupation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as the British left the French would take their places. The matter did not really affect the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it did not prejudice the settlement of mandates or boundaries.

(M. Clemenceau instructed an Officer of his Staff to summon Marshal Foch and General Weygand to meet him at 3 p.m. to take his instructions on this question.)

*For Conclusions, see summary at the end.*¹⁰

¹⁰ Annexed to the record of this meeting was the following summary of conclusions:

‘1. M. Clemenceau, on behalf of the French Government, accepted Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal for the evacuation by the British Army of Syria and Cilicia and their replacement by French troops in Cilicia and in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line, on the distinct understanding that, in accepting this proposal, the French Government was not committed to acceptance of any other part of the arrangements proposed in Mr. Lloyd George’s Aide-Mémoire, dated September 13th, 1919, “in regard to the occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia pending the decision in regard to Mandates”.

‘2. The Conference took note of the above agreement as a purely temporary provisional arrangement for military occupation without prejudice to the final settlement of mandates or boundaries, which would have to be considered as part of the general question of peace with Turkey.

‘3. It was agreed that Mr. Polk should recommend President Wilson to summon, as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the Council of the League of Nations for a meeting to be held in Europe, which will be devoted solely to the examination of questions in which the action of the Council of the League is required within a short period of the Treaty coming into force.

‘4. It was agreed that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in exacting from the German Government the delivery of the persons referred to in Article 228 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, should limit their demand to a small selected number of typical cases.’

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of Russia, to which he had already referred, was very important.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not see how we could accede to M. Paderewski's proposals.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Paderewski had stated that, if the Allied and Associated Powers did not want him to adopt the course he proposed, neither did he desire it. He, himself, suggested that M. Paderewski should be told that the Powers did not desire him to act. Otherwise, he might be requiring pecuniary support.

M. TITTONI wished to be informed on two points. First, was M. Paderewski certain that Polish troops could reach Moscow, and, second, did he merely want facilities for raising money or did he want the Allies to finance the whole expedition?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the worst thing to do was to attempt to conquer Russia by means of the Poles. If British or French forces were operating, it was known that they were merely acting in the interests of Europe, but, if Polish troops were employed, it would rally the whole of Russia against them.

(At this point it was agreed to summon M. Paderewski, Marshal Foch, and General Weygand.)

MR. POLK said that there was an American interest in this. The Poles were in a serious economic position. The United States were prepared to help them to some extent, but were not ready to find money to enable them to wage war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, replying to M. Tittoni's questions, said that M. Paderewski would require the Allied and Associated Powers to find the whole of the money. M. Paderewski was convinced he could capture Moscow. They all said that, but the question arose as to what would happen after Moscow was captured.

(The question of Russia was adjourned until the arrival of Marshal Foch and General Weygand.)

7. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not agree with Mr. Lloyd George about the future of the Peace Conference. Personally, he would be most happy to be able to leave these questions alone, but there were imminent several large questions. For example, the question as to whether Austria was to be allowed to join herself to Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was under the impression that Germany had given in.

M. CLEMENCEAU said she had not given in yet. In addition to this, there was the question of Silesia and that of the Baltic Provinces. Without a properly qualified British representative, the Conference could not sit. He suggested that Mr. Lloyd George should leave someone in Paris who should telegraph for instructions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was a matter of great difficulty. He had contemplated leaving Sir Eyre Crowe or possibly even Lord Milner. There was a great difference between Sir Eyre Crowe and Lord Milner. It was one thing to have a man who would merely telegraph for instructions, such as Sir Eyre Crowe. A representative of this type would not have the same authority as Mr. Balfour. The difficulty was that the British Government had no one to spare of the calibre of Mr. Balfour.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what he was to do if the Germans made some proposal requiring immediate decision?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would be arranged through the Foreign Offices.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was a very slow procedure.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Conference was not a very rapid method of procedure.

MR. POLK said that, as regards the German-Austrian question, and the Silesian question, he thought no decision could be reached for ten days or so. Then would come the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty, and, later, the Hungarian Treaty. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that it might be better to postpone the Turkish Treaty. For the next ten days, however, when these great questions would be arising, he thought Great Britain ought to have a plenipotentiary in Paris. It would make a very bad effect in Europe if it was thought that the Conference was constantly waiting on the decision of Great Britain.

M. TITTONI said that he had believed himself to be of the same view as Mr. Polk, but he was not sure that this was the case. He thought it desirable to postpone the Conference for ten or fifteen days, in order to enable Great Britain to send representatives with full Powers.

MR. POLK said that the present moment was precisely the one at which it was impossible to suspend the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was best to speak frankly on this matter. It was no use for one or two Powers to be represented by persons with complete authority and others by persons who were only able to take decisions *ad referendum*. He could not send anyone with full authority. For six months he had been away in [? from] England, which was a country that required a good deal of governing, and he could not stay here himself. Nevertheless, if he left a representative, a decision could always be obtained from him on any point within twenty-four hours by telegraph or even by telephone. He presumed that even Mr. Polk could not take decisions on all questions. At any rate, he was not in the same position as President Wilson had been.

M. TITTONI said that he, himself, had full powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the Conference was of no use unless all its members met on equal terms. He proposed to leave Sir Eyre Crowe here to clear up the outstanding questions of detail, but any great questions, such as, for example, one raising the possibility of a march into Germany—could clearly not be left for Sir Eyre Crowe to settle. He could only settle details when the policy had been decided. In the question of

Austria, for example, Sir Eyre Crowe could not take a decision, and would have to refer to the Cabinet. That was not a proper Conference, when only some members could take full responsibility.

MR. POLK said he agreed to some extent. He thought the Conference ought to take up no new questions. His point, however, was that, for a week or ten days, he would like to keep up the appearance of the Conference or the effect throughout Europe would be very bad.

M. CLEMENCEAU urged Mr. Lloyd George to ask Lord Milner to stay.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to discuss the matter with Lord Milner.

(At this point, Marshal Foch and General Weygand entered. M. Paderewski, who had also been telephoned for, could not be found.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU explained to Marshal Foch that M. Paderewski had made a proposal for the employment of five hundred thousand Poles to march on Moscow at a cost of 30,000,000 Mk. a day. *Russia (continued)* Mr. Polk and he, himself, thought that the result would be to set the whole of Russia against the Allies. The Conference, however, wished to know Marshal Foch's view.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Conference was face to face with a very dangerous proposal from several points of view. If it were a question of action by a great State fully settled, the matter would be different, but this was not the case with Poland; consequently, he did not think he could advise action by the Poles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the second question arose in connection with the Baltic Provinces. Germany was gathering a very big force there. Although ordered to leave, the Germans were increasing their forces. General von der Goltz had now returned there. German soldiers were being attracted there by promises of land, amounting to a regular German colonization. He understood that, under the terms of the Armistice, the Allied and Associated Powers had the right to compel the Germans to leave. He wanted to know, whether, in Marshal Foch's view, first, the Allies had the right to demand the withdrawal of the Germans, and, secondly, whether the time had come to insist on their withdrawal.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, under the terms of the Armistice, the Allied and Associated Powers had the right to demand the German retirement from the Baltic Provinces. As to the means of compelling them to do so, a difficult question arose. Of course, starting from the basis of the Armistice, it would be possible to exert pressure on Germany from the Rhine, from Poland, or from both simultaneously. It was a matter of combining the two operations, and this wanted thinking out. In addition, there was the blockade.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, in Marshal Foch's view, the time had come to take some action.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the longer it was put off the harder it would be. Consequently, the sooner action was taken the better.

M. CLEMENCEAU reminded Marshal Foch that the question of an advance

on the Rhine had been discussed in connection with the Austrian question. Did Marshal Foch think this method more efficacious than the sending of troops to disembark in the Baltic?

MARSHAL FOCH said that the latter proposal was out of the question.

M. CLEMENCEAU summed up Marshal Foch's recommendation as being to restore the Blockade and take action on the Rhine in combination with action in Poland.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Allies might also cease returning their prisoners or threaten to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the result of the discussion was that Marshal Foch regarded it as possible to undertake operations to compel the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces.

MARSHAL FOCH said that was so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE strongly urged Marshal Foch to consider the question of clearing the Germans from the Baltic Provinces, and, subject to what the Marshal might say, he pressed that the Conference should make a demand as soon as possible. The presence of Germans in large numbers in the Baltic Provinces was a real danger to the peace of Europe.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the answer of the German Government to Marshal Foch's demand for the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had been received. The point of view of the German Government was that they had given orders but their troops refused to obey. In fact, they said they had no authority. Starting from that basis, it might be a good plan to send some important person, whether military or civilian, to the Baltic Provinces to see that the evacuation took place, and it might also be necessary to send reinforcements to replace the Germans and make a barrier against Bolshevism.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Poles might possibly be more profitably employed in this manner than by marching on Moscow.

MR. POLK said that the presence of Polish troops might not prove acceptable to the Lithuanians.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the true role for Poland was to provide a barrier on the one side against Bolshevism, and, on the other side, against Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if Marshal Foch could give a considered view on this question by 4 p.m. in the afternoon.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed to do so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Marshal Foch should see M. Paderewski.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed to do so.

M. TITTONI said that General Dupont should be asked if the German reply was genuine or merely play-acting. The second suggestion he had to make was that enquiries should be made of General Gough.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that General Gough was now back in England and would not be returning to the Baltic.

M. TITTONI asked if there was anyone else there whom the Allies could consult on the subject. He would like to ask for information on the spot as to whether, after the withdrawal of the Germans, it would be necessary for the Poles to take their place in order to prevent the advance of the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this raised a question as to whether the Bolsheviks were worse than the Germans. He thought that the Bolsheviks would disappear, but the Germans would not.

M. TITTONI said that the only point he wished to know was whether it was necessary for the Poles to go to the Baltic Provinces.

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdrew.)

9. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received a letter from M. Clemenceau suggesting a meeting of the League of Nations at Washington in November. He felt very doubtful about this. He, personally, could not attend, although this was not very material. But by November, Peace would not have been made with Turkey, and probably the question of Mandates would not have been settled.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the point was that certain questions had to be settled by the League of Nations within fifteen days of the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

MR. POLK said that there were two or three questions which had to be settled by the Council of the League of Nations within 15 days of the signature of the Treaty, and the President of the United States of America was directed by the Treaty to call the first meeting of the Council. His proposal would be that the President should summon a meeting of the Council to take place in London or Paris, as soon as three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had ratified the Treaty, even though a representative of the United States could not attend; and that the sole object of this meeting should be to examine the questions which require action by the Council of the League within a short period after the coming into force of the Treaty. He did not know if the President would accept this, but he was prepared to recommend it to him.

M. CLEMENCEAU and M. TITTONI accepted Mr. Polk's suggestion, which was adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what about the Labour Conference.

MR. POLK said that that would take place anyhow.

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he supposed that on the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the Allied and Associated Powers would send their joint demand to the Dutch Government for the surrender of the Kaiser.

M. TITTONI said that he wished to notify the Conference, merely for information, that the Italian Chamber had nominated a Committee of 44 to study the Treaty of Peace with Germany. It had been decided by 20 votes against 3 socialist votes that the Treaty should be ratified, but it had been agreed that the provisions for the trial of the Kaiser did not rest on a legal basis, because the crime had been defined after the event, and the tribunal had been designated by the persons who were charging the accused. This information was only of moral value, as the Treaty would be approved.

11. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as regards the trial of officers, he was in favour of meeting the views of the German Government, that the numbers to be tried should be limited. The first British list had consisted of hundreds, and he believed the same was true of the French list. He only wanted to make an example. To try very large numbers would be to create great difficulties for the German Government, which he believed to be better than either a Bolshevik Government or a Militarist Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he agreed the trial should merely be a symbol.

12. M. CLEMENCEAU said that since Mr. Lloyd George had left the Conference, he had given much thought to this matter, and had come to the conclusion that the best way to meet everyone's wishes was to hand Fiume City over to the Italians, leaving the port and railway to the League of Nations, and the remainder of the Hinterland to the Yugo-Slavs. He had talked the matter over with M. Tittoni, and thought it best to propose that he and Mr. Lloyd George should send a proposition on these lines to President Wilson.

MR. POLK pointed out that a new scheme had been sent only the previous week to President Wilson,¹¹ and no answer had yet been returned.

M. TITTONI said that there were two alternatives. Either that Fiume should be a Free Town or that a Free City should be created, or that Fiume should be given to Italy, the port and railway going to the League of Nations, and the remainder of the hinterland to the Yugo-Slavs. The Italian Government were most anxious to settle the question, but they did not wish a wound to be inflicted on the Italian people. This was for Italy a moral reason of the first order in favour of the new plan. Italy could not think of detaching herself from her Allies. There was no question of this; and agreement must be reached. That was why he had come to this agreement with M. Clemenceau.

MR. POLK said he had sent a definite proposal to President Wilson and it was not possible now to change. He believed the new proposal had been made before, but had been refused both by America and Great Britain.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the proposal had never been put quite in the present form. Fiume, including the port and certain islands, had always been demanded by the Italians. From a private conversation he had had with M. Pachitch, he thought it possible that the new proposal might be more acceptable to him than any other. He himself would agree to anything which was acceptable both to President Wilson and the Italians. The question was not one which ought to split the nations in two. It was really too trivial. The difficulty was that it had become a 'flag' to the Italians and Mr. Polk said that the recent revolution at Fiume¹² had made it very difficult to settle on these lines.

¹¹ See No. 58, minute 2.

¹² On September 12, 1919, Fiume was occupied by Italian armed bands under Signor d'Annunzio. This enterprise was denounced on the following day by Signor Nitti in the Italian Chamber.

M. TITTONI said that the revolution would first have to be suppressed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Mr. Polk should telegraph to President Wilson to the effect that this new proposal had been made. Of course it was difficult to explain the matter in a telegram, as one could explain it in conversation. But he thought it was worth while to send the new proposal.

MR. POLK said he must know exactly what the plan was.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, broadly speaking, it was that the town of Fiume, with the river as boundary, should become Italian; that the port and railway should be handed over to the League of Nations; and that the Hinterland should go to Yugo-Slavia, and no islands would be handed over to Italy.

M. TITTONI said that the only islands to be handed to Italy were Lussin, Lissa and Pelagosa.

MR. POLK said that the Italian occupation of Lussin and the mainland would give Italy a strangle-hold.

M. TITTONI said that this region would be neutralised.

(After some discussion it was agreed that M. Tittoni should put the project in writing before the afternoon meeting.)

(The Conference adjourned until 4.0 p.m.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris,

September 15, 1919.

APPENDIX B TO No. 57

Aide-Mémoire in regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia pending the Decision in regard to Mandates

1. Steps will be taken immediately to prepare for the evacuation by the British Army of Syria and Cilicia including the Taurus tunnel.

2. Notice is given both to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal of our intentions to commence the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia on November 1, 1919:

3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs:

4. In pursuance of this policy the garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force.

5. After the withdrawal of their forces neither the British Government nor the British Commander-in-Chief shall have any responsibility within the zones from which the Army has retired:

6. The territories occupied by British troops will then be Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, the occupation thus being in harmony with the arrangements concluded in December 1918, between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.

7. The British Government are prepared at any time to discuss the boundaries between Palestine and Syria and between Mesopotamia and Syria. In the event of disagreement in regard to the above boundaries, the British Government are

prepared to submit the question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

8. In accordance with the principles of the Sykes-Picot agreement the French Government shall not object to the Arab State granting to the British Government the right to construct, administer, and be the sole proprietor of a railway line connecting Haifa with Mesopotamia on a trace to be decided on after survey anywhere as far north as the latitude of Deir-ez-Zor. The British Government shall have the right to construct oil pipe lines as well as the railway line. The British Government shall, in addition, have a perpetual right at all times to improve the facilities of these railway and oil pipe lines and to transport troops along the railway, and these rights shall be exercisable even in time of war, without infringement of the neutrality of the French Government or of the Arab State. In the event of disagreement as to the trace of the railway line and oil pipe lines the British Government are prepared to submit this question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

9. The British Government notify the French Government and the Emir Feisal of their intention immediately to carry out a survey with the object of finding, if practicable, a trace for the railway line and pipe lines entirely within the British mandate, in order to enable them to avoid the necessity of exercising the rights of construction referred to above:

10. Until the boundaries of Palestine and Mesopotamia are determined the British Commander-in-Chief shall have the right to occupy outposts in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government:

11. The French Government, having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina for this purpose.

Paris, Sept. 13, 1919.

No. 58

H. D. 54.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Clemenceau's Office at the Ministry of War, Monday afternoon, September 15, 1919, at 4.00 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M., M.P.; SECRETARY, Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G.C.B.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARY, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Paterno.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the discussion of the first item:

M. Paderewski, Marshal Foch, General Weygand.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU explained to M. Paderewski that the council had invited him to attend to state his views regarding the Russian situation.

*Evacuation of the
Baltic Provinces
by Germany*

M. PADEREWSKI stated that the Polish Government were anxious to learn the view of the Allies with respect to Russia.

At the present time the Germans were proceeding in their usual methodical and tenacious manner to extend their influence and control

in the East. In the northern provinces the German Generals von der Goltz and Prince Lieven were holding out to be the enemies of the Bolsheviki but this was mere pretence on their part. In the south General Kraus was operating, and in the centre the Germans had one thousand instructors who were extending German influence and enlisting volunteers, offering thirty-five marks per day with a bonus of a thousand marks. These activities were carried on under the instructions of the German War Office as he knew from a secret general order to this effect which had come into his hands. He pointed out that the Polish Army was the one obstacle to covetous Germany. At the present time the Polish Army consisted of 545,000 men under arms. If it were necessary 480,000 additional men could be raised in a few months. The present forces were now costing Poland some 30,000,000 marks or say 10,000,000 francs per day. If additional forces were raised there would then be a further cost to Poland of some 24,000,000 marks per day. Poland could not fight on indefinitely. He would therefore ask what were the plans of the Allies. The Polish Government will settle their plans in accordance with those of the Conference. Poland cannot afford to keep up or increase her large military establishment. She is a new State and is lacking in raw materials and war manufactories. If the decision of the Allies should be for Peace he was most anxious to know this as soon as possible for very advantageous terms of peace had been offered him by the Bolsheviki. The territorial ambitions of Riand [? Poland] had been fulfilled. Their advance against the Bolsheviki had been uniformly successful, and they had had a series of large and small victories. At present they had from thirty to thirty-five thousand Bolshevik prisoners. In conclusion he emphasized the importance of a rapid decision by the Conference, whatever it might be.

It was explained to M. Paderewski by M. CLEMENCEAU that he had asked Marshal Foch to prepare a plan of action in the Baltic Provinces. This plan was based on the co-operation of the Polish Army.

M. PADEREWSKI responded that the Polish Army was at the service of the Conference.

MARSHAL FOCH gave a brief outline of the plan now in course of preparation. His idea was to insist that the Germans should carry out their solemn engagements; first, the Armistice, and second, the Treaty when it shall have come into force. By the terms of the Armistice the Germans were required to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces at the pleasure of the Allies. He did not foresee any difficulty in meeting the situation after their withdrawal. The plan would be to substitute the control of the Germans by local governments in the several Baltic Provinces, and then to assist these local governments. It would be necessary for the Conference to select and appoint some prominent individual as their representative, who should be instructed to order the Germans to evacuate, and then advise the local governments to establish themselves. To ensure his instructions carrying weight a force would be needed, and it was therefore desirable that the Allies' representative should be able to turn to the Polish Army for this military support. It would be necessary to have a general on the spot. As a matter of fact there was a

French General there. Marshal Foch suggested that this officer might be instructed to wind up the situation and have the Polish army ready if need be.

The Marshal explained that this was but a brief outline of his plan which would be ready for submission in 24 hours.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he liked the Marshal's idea. If nothing were done the Germans would overrun the Baltic Provinces and within a short time their power would be immensely enhanced. If action were not taken immediately, the situation would become far more difficult in the future. For his part, he would support the appointment of a French General. He would like, however, before a final appointment were made, to have the opportunity of passing upon any name that might be submitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Henry[s] was now in command of the Polish Army and would be a suitable appointee.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. He inquired whether Marshal Foch contemplated sending a demand direct to the German Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU believed that the Marshal should make a demand for immediate evacuation.

MR. POLK asked for a precise statement as to the plan proposed by Marshal Foch.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the Marshal should require the Germans immediately to evacuate their troops from the territories outside of the frontiers of Germany, and inform them that if they failed to comply with his demand he would proceed to enforce it; that General Henrys should be appointed the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers to control the evacuation, and lastly, should be empowered to use the Polish Army if that were necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he agreed with this proposal. It was understood, therefore, that in the event of a German refusal Mr. Paderewski would place the Polish Army at the service of the Allies.

M. PADEREWSKI expressed his agreement.

MR. POLK inquired whether there would not be a danger if the proposed plan were followed and it were necessary to use the Polish Army, that this would bring on the Silesian difficulty, the Dantzig difficulty and a war between Germany and Poland.

M. PADEREWSKI feared that the German Government would in Silesia, as in the Baltic Provinces, decline all responsibility as regards the actions of the German troops, claiming that the latter were no longer subject to their authority.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Baltic situation and the Silesian situation were somewhat different. It was expected that the German Government would in all probability be willing to comply with the Allies' demands, but from the information in his possession it appeared that the Central Government had little control over the Eastern German Army and might not be able to enforce compliance with their orders. In that event the Eastern German forces would be outlawed and would be in much the same situation as were Morgan and Drake in the time of Elizabeth, both of whom

had been disavowed by the British Government. If the Polish Army were then to attack the German troops, how could the German Government claim that this would constitute an act of war on the part of Poland? In his opinion, the Silesian situation was quite different. Silesia was within the boundaries of Germany. The German Government was responsible for the situation there. This was very different to the Baltic Provinces which were outside Germany and within Russia.

MR. POLK admitted that in a legal sense this was true. The question in his mind was whether the use of Polish troops in Lithuania would not result in reprisals all along the line.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not see that there was any alternative to Marshal Foch's plan other than the imposition of a Blockade.

MR. POLK stated that he had raised the question in order that when war came it should be thoroughly understood that the Council was responsible.

M. CLEMENCEAU desired to make it clear that Marshal Foch will demand that the German troops evacuate the Baltic Provinces and will warn those troops that he will be prepared to enforce the demand under the Armistice.

M. PADEREWSKI called attention to the fact that it was not merely a question of enforcing the evacuation of German troops but that it was necessary also to drive out the German officers. In Kovno there was a very numerous General Staff composed of Germans. It would be necessary to force them to leave. In this relation he referred to the fact that at least two of the Allied governments had been furnishing to the Lithuanians, supplies, munitions, etc. In his opinion this should cease, the Lithuanian Government being in the pay of Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed very earnestly the hope that there would be no interference with the Lithuanian Government. It was simply a question of forcing the Germans out. If it should become necessary for the Polish Army to intervene, it must be thoroughly understood that neither the Polish Government nor the Polish Army would interfere with the local governments. The plan now proposed contemplated merely a military occupation, if that should be necessary.

M. PADEREWSKI observed that the Council should not hold him responsible if the territories to be occupied by the Polish Army should declare themselves for Poland.

Referring to M. Paderewski's inquiry as regards the question of peace or war with the Bolsheviks, M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the Council did not desire that the Poles should march on Moscow. As far as he was concerned he would not make peace nor would he make war. He suggested that Poland could carry out the first part of the proposed programme and by that time the Bolshevik situation would be clarified.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE called M. Paderewski's attention to the fact that Poland would be in a precarious position if the Baltic Provinces should become German. As it was, the Poles had advanced in the east beyond the boundaries of Poland. He understood that the Bolsheviks had only 80,000 men opposed to an army of 250,000 Poles.

M. PADEREWSKI replied that, owing to the state of the country, it was necessary for the Poles to maintain a considerable police force in that region.

MARSHAL FOCH considered that it would be very dangerous for Poland to open the Russian question on its Eastern frontier before settling the German question on its Western frontier. He believed it would be well to proceed step by step and consolidate the existing situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE declared that he was in complete agreement with M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch.

(M. Paderewski, Marshal Foch, and General Weygand then withdrew.)

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should make a formal demand on the German Government immediately to evacuate the Baltic Provinces of Russia, and to withdraw their forces within the boundaries of Germany as defined by the Treaty of Peace. He shall further inform the German Government that if they do not comply with his demand he will take the necessary steps to enforce it.

It was agreed that General Henrys should be entrusted by the Allied and Associated Powers, as their representative, with the control of the evacuation of the German troops. Acting in the same quality, he shall have authority to use the Polish Army in case the Germans do not comply with the demand for evacuation.

In placing the Polish Army at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers, M. Paderewski indicated at the same time that there should be no interference by the Polish Government or Army with the local governments of the Baltic Provinces.)

2. M. TITTONI handed to his colleagues copies of the memorandum (Appendix A) which he had promised to give to them at the meeting in the morning.¹

*Question of Fiume
and the Adriatic*

MR. POLK asked what was the difference between the proposals which M. Tittoni was now presenting and those which the Conference transmitted to President Wilson a week ago.

M. TITTONI said that the Conference had asked President Wilson to make a choice between two solutions. The first was that Fiume should be a free city in an International State placed under the control of the League of Nations. The second was that the city of Fiume should be attributed to Italy, the port and the railway to the League of Nations and that the territories which in the first proposal would be attributed to the International State would be given to the Yugoslav State. He proposed that the second solution of the question should be adopted. One of his reasons for favouring this proposal was that Mr. Polk had told him that President Wilson had favoured a plebiscite in the free state. He was unwilling to agree to such a plebiscite.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what M. Tittoni meant exactly in saying that no concession would be made to the Yugoslavs in the valley of the Drin.

M. TITTONI meant that this disposition was found in the first memorandum for the reason that, as the Fiume Railway passed directly from Yugoslav to

¹ See No. 57, minute 12.

Austrian territory, he desired that the Trieste Railway should pass directly from Italian to Austrian territory. He had asked that Italy be given the territory known under the name of the Assling triangle which was inhabited by Slovenes but the possession of which was necessary for Italy to assure direct communication between Trieste and Austria. The Serbs had recognised that in Albania the frontier of 1913 was drawn on lines of ethnic justice but they demanded that the valley of the Drin be given to them in order that they might establish a railway there which would give them independent communication with the Adriatic. He thought that there was a complete analogy between the two cases and he would say to the Serbs, if they wished to have the Valley of the Drin they should give the Italians the Assling triangle and that if the Serbs contended that the Italians should be satisfied with the guarantee of the League of Nations for Assling they should be satisfied with the same guarantee for the Drin.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in effect M. Tittoni asked that the Council should send President Wilson a telegram telling him that the Council was in favour of the second of the two proposals recently submitted to his choice and that it was their strong desire that he accept this proposal.

M. TITTONI agreed that this was what he meant.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to point out to M. Tittoni two points of his memorandum which would probably elicit objections from President Wilson. The President did not want Italian sovereignty in Fiume—though Mr. Lloyd George did not wish to insist upon this point. The President would also not be satisfied with having the diplomatic representation of Zara belong to Italy. He suggested that it would be more advisable to say that Zara should be able to choose its diplomatic representatives. Nothing would prevent its intrusting its interests to Italian agents.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objections to this solution. He wished to add, however, that this solution which Mr. Lloyd George criticized appeared in the proposals approved by President Wilson on the 7th of June.

MR. POLK said that he wished to repeat that the President had not given his definite approval to this rather summary note which had been prepared during a meeting of the Supreme Council for the purpose of serving as a basis for discussion between the Italian delegation and the Jugo-Slav delegation. He desired to say, in so far as Fiume was concerned, that he had received a telegram from President Wilson from which it appeared that the President was disposed to accept the first of the two solutions which had been presented to him in the name of the Conference. He feared that the President would be surprised to again receive a new proposal.

M. TITTONI said that it was not a question of a new proposal. The Conference would simply state that they preferred one of the two solutions between which they had asked the President to choose.

MR. POLK said that he desired to remind the Council of what had occurred. It had been agreed that M. Clemenceau, Mr. Balfour and M. Tittoni should address a joint telegram to the President. After he had made note of the text he had written to M. Clemenceau to point out to him the objections which

the President would not fail to make. After the despatch of this letter M. Tittoni and M. Tardieu had come to see him and finally they had agreed as to a new text. He knew that even in this form the proposals were not in accordance with the views of the President. He had, however, transmitted them, pointing out that the British, French and Italian delegates recommended them, and insisted earnestly that the President should consent to settle the affair on one of these bases. He could not help but wonder what would happen if he should transmit to the President the new Italian proposals after one of the former proposals had been accepted. He asked to be permitted to examine M. Tittoni's plan before telegraphing and to be given time to consider what impression this communication was likely to make upon the mind of the President.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed with Mr. Polk in thinking that it would not be fair to the President to submit a new proposal to him at the point which had now been reached.

M. TITTONI was prepared from the point of view of Italian interests to accept one or other of the two plans, even though the Italian people probably preferred the second, but only upon the condition that no change should be made in these proposals. If President Wilson should alter the first solution by introducing a plebiscite it would be necessary for him to express his preference for the second proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so far as he was concerned he was glad to accept the new Italian proposal but he wished to say again that he was unwilling to run the risk of making a new proposal to President Wilson after the latter had accepted another proposal.

M. TITTONI then suggested that the Conference wait. (*Alors attendons.*)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the sixth point of the Italian memorandum did not appear to him to be just to the Serbs. The Assling Railway was in existence and there was now a question of its use for Italian traffic only. On the other hand there was neither a railway in the Valley of the Drin nor a port at St. Jean de Medua. Certainly the Albanians would construct neither a railway line nor a port. If the Conference did not give the Serbs the opportunity of constructing them, they would be deprived of all access to the Adriatic. Moreover it should not be forgotten that it was necessary to secure the consent of the Jugo-Slavs to the arrangement which was being discussed.

M. TITTONI said that the Jugo-Slavs already had several outlets to the Adriatic and could construct the Railway line in question by another route. But, however that might be, the Italians were refused the Assling Railway because it ran through territory where the population was Slovene. He saw no reason for giving the Valley of the Drin to the Jugo-Slavs where the population was Albanian and did not desire to be placed under the yoke of the Serbs. He was also willing to agree to a plebiscite; he was quite sure that the Albanians would not vote for the Serbs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was not his intention to add the Valley of the Drin to the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, but he believed that it was necessary to give the Serbs the right to construct a railway in the

Valley of the Drin and that facilities for a port be granted them. He did not see that it would be of any use to give to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the same rights on the Drin as would be given to Italy in the Assling territory because in the first case the railway existed already, and in the second case the line had not yet been constructed.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that the Council wait until the following day for the reply of President Wilson, of which Mr. Polk had spoken.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would be at the disposal of the Conference during the morning.

3. M. TITTONI said that according to information which he had just received Italian troops had surrounded the city of Fiume, and were blockading it from the land side. He asked that the Allied and Associated Powers should assist by using their ships of war in enforcing the blockade from the sea.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they could not do otherwise than accede to M. Tittoni's wish. He considered it advisable, however, in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to the nature of the Allied intervention to issue a statement to the Press in the following language:

'On the request of the Italian Government the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to participate in the maritime blockade of Fiume, which the Italian troops have already surrounded on land.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished it understood that the Allied and Associated Powers would lend the assistance of their warships which were on the spot but that they would not send other ships.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed to this but he asked that decision should be suspended until he should have had an opportunity to communicate with M. Nitti on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed and that the Allied and Associated Powers would take no action and make no public statement until M. Tittoni had confirmed his request.

(It was agreed that as soon as M. Tittoni had obtained the consent of the Italian Government the following press notice should be published.

'On the request of the Italian Government the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to participate in the maritime blockade of Fiume which the Italian troops have already surrounded on land.')

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received good news. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had informed him that they were prepared to sign without reserve the Treaty of Peace with Austria and the special treaty for the protection of minorities.

Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Treaty for Protection of Minorities by Delegates of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
Roumanian affairs

M. TITTONI asked whether the intentions of the Roumanian Government were yet known. He added that for the past two weeks he had not received a single telegram from the Italian Ministry at Bucharest.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was quite likely that the Roumanians

stopped the telegrams of the Allied and Associated representatives. But the question confronting the Council was more general. It was to find a means of forcing the Roumanians to obey the decisions of the Conference.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that the Roumanians would not refuse openly to obey the demands of the Conference. They found a means of obeying without obeying. In any case it was necessary to wait before taking action until there was a government with which to deal in succession to that of M. Bratiano, whose resignation had been announced.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was quite useless for the Conference to give orders if these orders were not heeded by the Allies. If this state of affairs continued the entire work of the Conference would be doomed to failure and the League of Nations would be condemned to impotence in advance, for the Conference was the predecessor of the League of Nations. He wished to add that it was most important not to permit the view to be held at Bucharest that the United States and Great Britain were the only great powers hostile to Roumania. He felt that he should say, as the deliberations were entirely frank, that the attitude of the French Minister at Bucharest was not such as to remove this impression.

MR. POLK said that it was desirable that the French and Italian Ministers at Bucharest should be seriously cautioned against these tendencies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he felt that this applied equally to the Quai d'Orsay.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, as his colleagues knew, he was in entire agreement with them as to the policy to be followed in regard to this matter.

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5. MR. POLK said that he considered it important to reply to the request for instructions which had been addressed to the Council by the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest.

*Instructions to the
Inter-Allied Mis-
sion at Budapest*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he believed that the Council had decided in the morning to await the return of Sir George Clerk.

MR. POLK said that he was raising a different question. Sir George Clerk's mission related only to Roumanian affairs. It was necessary for the Conference to inform the Allied Generals at Budapest without delay that they should encourage the formation of a local police force for the preservation of order after the departure of the Roumanian military forces. The Roumanian commander should at the same time be asked, so long as his occupation of Roumanian [?Hungarian] territory continued, to facilitate the constitution of these forces. Finally the Conference could not omit replying to the request for a loan which had been addressed to it by the Mission on the part of the Hungarian Government.

(After further discussion between different members of the Council it was agreed that the following telegram should be sent to the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest:

'We do not intend to interfere at all in the internal affairs of Hungary.

² Thus in original.

Our only wish is the constitution of a stable government, if this is possible, and to this effect we invite you to let the Hungarian authorities know that we desire the speedy constitution of a gendarmerie force capable of maintaining order after the withdrawal of the Roumanian Army.

'We therefore direct you to inform the Roumanian authorities of our intentions and at the same time to invite them in the most categorical way to give every facility so long as they keep Hungarian territory, for the formation and armament of this Gendarmerie.

'In no case can there be any question of a loan.'

The meeting then adjourned.

Hotel Crillon, Paris.

September 15, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 58

The Question of the Adriatic

1. *Fiume.* The city (*Corpus Separatum*) shall be placed under the sovereignty of Italy. There shall be no independent state of Fiume. Jugoslavia shall receive all the territories included in this state according to President Wilson's line (Island of Cherso included and Albona excepted).

All the territories that would have made part of the independent state shall be permanently demilitarised.

The Port of Fiume, with all facilities for its development as well as for the railways terminating there, shall be given over to the League of Nations, which shall make such arrangements as it shall see fit, both for the country of which this port is the outlet and for the city of Fiume itself.

The rights of ethnic minorities shall be guaranteed.

2. *Dalmatia.* All Dalmatia shall go to the Jugoslavs, except the city of Zara, which shall be a free city under the guarantee of the League of Nations, which shall recognise and encourage its intimate connection with the Italian State and Italian culture. *The city shall be represented diplomatically by Italy.*

Every facility shall be given to the commerce of the hinterland. The economic interests of Italy existing in Dalmatia and the rights of Italian minorities shall be guaranteed.

3. *Islands.* The only Italian islands shall be Lussin, Unie, Lissa and Pelagosa.

4. *Albania.* To be independent, with a mandate given to Italy.

5. *Vallona.* Italian sovereignty over the city, with the hinterland strictly necessary to its economic life and its security.

6. *Railways.* For the Assling Railway Italy no longer makes any territorial demands, but demands only definite guarantees for the use of the line in Jugoslav territory. On the other hand, no territorial cession shall be granted to the Jugoslavs in the Valley of the Drin, but they shall receive there, as to the use of the railway to be constructed, the same guarantees as are given to Italy for the Assling Railway.

7. *Neutralisation.* Italy demands the general neutralisation of the entire coast and of the islands from the Southern point of Istria to Cattaro, inclusive.

8. A Commission appointed by the Conference, on which each of the five Powers shall be represented by a delegate and an expert, shall as soon as possible trace the frontiers on the maps and draw up all details.

No. 59

H. D. 55.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, September 17, 1919, at 11.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe¹; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Chapin. *France*: Cmdt. A. Portier.
Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. A. W. Dulles, Mr. E. L. Dresel, Mr. F. K. Nielsen.

British Empire: Mr. Nicolson, Mr. Waley.

France: M. Tardieu, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, M. Jouasset, M. Serruys.

Italy: M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Galli, Colonel Castoldi, M. Pilotti.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had requested Marshal Foch to be present at this meeting of the Council for the purpose of further studying the question of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by the German troops. He had received a letter from Mr. Polk regarding this matter. (The letter contained in Appendix A was then read to the Council.) He would like to know what answer had been given by Mr. Lloyd George in the course of his conversation with Mr. Polk.

MR. POLK stated that he did not like to quote the words of another person, but that he understood Mr. Lloyd George to say that he preferred to let matters stand as they were. Mr. Lloyd George had thought that the question should not be brought up again until the Germans had indicated a refusal to carry out the withdrawal, should they so refuse. He had answered Mr. Lloyd George that he believed the question should be brought up at once, and for this reason had written the letter to M. Clemenceau, which had just been read.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Marshal Foch might read the instructions which he proposed to send to General Henrys.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had sent the instructions to General Henrys in accordance with the decision reached by the Council. He had told him

¹ Henceforth the British representative on the Supreme Council.

that the principle of an ultimatum to Germany had been decided upon, but that his opinion was asked before the same should be transmitted to Germany.

MR. POLK asked whether it was agreed that the Council should take no decision until the receipt of the answer from General Henrys.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that his instructions to General Henrys had been based on the fact that the principle of an ultimatum had been decided upon. If this ultimatum was now considered as conditional, it would be necessary for him to modify the instructions which he had sent.

MR. POLK pointed out that he was not opposed to an ultimatum, but wished solely to formulate objections to the use of the Polish troops.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the sending of an ultimatum without deciding upon the means to carry it into execution would be a useless procedure. He had made a study of this question and believed that the Polish troops constituted the only force which could be used. If the Council were of the opinion that no use could be made of these troops, it was unnecessary to send an ultimatum.

MR. POLK stated that the feeling of the American Delegation on this question was that the use of Polish troops against Germany in the Baltic provinces would be to cause hostilities, which had been suppressed in Upper Silesia with great difficulty, to spring up again. A military operation of this character would certainly lead to war between Germany and Poland. It was extremely necessary to maintain the situation in Upper Silesia in a calm state, in order not to increase the actual difficulties of the coal shortage. After the Treaty had been ratified by three great Powers, Upper Silesia would be occupied by Interallied troops. When this occupation became a fact, and when no further disorders in the coal districts were likely, the Council might then decide to use the Polish forces. He was not opposed to their eventual use, should the need arise.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in view of Mr. Polk's statement he believed the best course at present was to adjourn the discussion and to take the question up again when Upper Silesia should be occupied by the Interallied troops.

MR. POLK said that the matter seemed to him particularly serious. The Council was obliged to decide whether it was preferable to allow the Germans to remain in Lithuania for the moment, or drive them therefrom even at the risk of shutting down the production of coal in Upper Silesia. He had talked with Mr. Loucheur and with Mr. Hoover, who had both stated that the cutting off of the coal supply would have very serious consequences. He had talked with Mr. Tittoni on the previous evening regarding the matter and the latter had agreed with him that an unnecessary risk would be run through this operation.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the Conference alone was capable of choosing between these two political courses of action.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he personally regretted that this operation, which he believed excellent, should not take place. In the face of the opposition of the American Delegation, however, the matter must be suspended, for it was exceedingly dangerous to commence it without being sure of carrying it to a successful completion.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on three separate occasions threats had been sent which had not been followed up.

MR. POLK said that the gravity of the situation in Silesia appeared worthy of considerable thought and should compel the Council to hesitate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would hesitate if he believed that the proposed action in the Baltic provinces would have an effect on the situation in Silesia, but he was not of this opinion.

MR. POLK answered that he had recently interviewed the different American representatives, who had arrived from Poland, Silesia and the Baltic provinces, namely, Mr. Gibson, Colonel Goodyear and Colonel Greene. These gentlemen were all of the opinion that the coal situation would be seriously aggravated and threatened should the proposed action be taken. He had also seen Mr. Paderewski and had asked him whether he was ready to bear the expenses of the operation in question. Mr. Paderewski had replied that France was to bear the expense. He had then informed Mr. Paderewski that the United States would not incur any obligations therein. He believed, however, that it would be well to ask General Henrys what his opinion in the matter might be.

MARSHAL FOCH said that General Henrys could only report on one element of the problem, namely, the condition and state of the Polish Army. It should not be lost sight of, however, that the Council, in insisting upon the evacuation of the Baltic provinces, was simply carrying into effect one of the clauses of the Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers should stand together on this matter. It should be understood that the Polish Army would be in charge of the operation, but it would be supported both by the Czecho-Slovak troops and the Allied detachments on the Rhine. General Henrys would answer that he could not defeat Germany with the Polish forces alone—more particularly should Germany be able to concentrate all her troops against Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Poles had notified the Council that they possessed an army of 450,000 men.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that these figures were accurate but that this force would not be sufficient to defeat Germany and that the Allies would risk seeing Poland severely dealt with, which was obviously not a situation to be desired.

MR. POLK said that he had no objections to the sending of an ultimatum, but only to the use of Polish troops. He believed that another method of pressure to compel the execution of the ultimatum could be found, either from an economic standpoint through the Economic Council, or by the retention of prisoners of war. He did not think that the risk of starting a new war between Poland and Germany should be run, because no one of the Powers was at present disposed to render financial aid to Poland. On the other hand, economic pressure might be exceedingly effective. For example, the Germans at the present time are in the process of borrowing money from the United States through the agency of private banks. The Council might put a stop to this procedure. The recent example of Roumania, who had

acted as an agent of the Allied and Associated Powers, seemed to him extremely unsatisfactory and should not lead the Council to stir up a similar operation elsewhere. He suggested therefore that an ultimatum might be sent, making use of economic pressure.

M. TARDIEU said that the retention of the prisoners of war constituted an excellent means of pressure as well, for their immediate repatriation was necessary to the internal political situation of Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that Marshal Foch should read the text of an ultimatum which he had prepared, and that if such text were satisfactory to the Council, it might be modified in the way suggested by Mr. Polk.

MARSHAL FOCH then read his proposed letter to the German Government (see Appendix B).

MR. POLK stated that he found this text satisfactory.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the steps which had been discussed as a method of pressure would be sufficient to bring about the execution of the matters covered in the note.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Polk was favourable to an economic means of pressure, such as a blockade.

MR. POLK said that he was particularly anxious not to commit the Council at the present time to the use of the Polish Army. He did not wish to intimate that this Army might not be made use of at some future time, but he wished to leave the decision of this question open.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on three different occasions ultimatums couched in mild language had been sent to the German Government on the following dates: June 18, August 1 and August 24.²

MR. POLK remarked that as the Council had already sent three ultimatums a fourth was scarcely necessary. The best method of procedure would be to notify Mr. von Lersner that the Council insisted upon the carrying out of the Armistice in question, and that in case of refusal certain measures, such as blockade, other means of exerting economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and, as a last resort, the use of the Polish Army, had been decided upon.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this notice should be in writing.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he was prepared to draft the text of such a letter, as he was familiar with the question. An answer had been received from the Germans to the effect that they were willing to evacuate the territory in question but that they could not enforce the execution of their orders.

(It was decided that General Weygand should submit to the Council, at its next meeting, a draft letter to the German Delegation demanding the withdrawal of the German forces from the Baltic provinces. This letter should draw attention to the means of exercising pressure on the German Government proposed by Mr. Polk, viz., blockade and other economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and possible use of the Polish forces.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdrew.)

² See No. 23, minute 4 and appendix C, and No. 38, minute 3 and appendix A.

2. Upon the proposal of M. Scialoja the resolution taken on September 11 (H. D. 52,³ minute 6) regarding the languages used for the convention on Aerial Navigation was modified to read as follows:

*Languages to be used
in the Convention on
Aerial Navigation*

‘It was decided that the Convention on Aerial Navigation should be drafted in English, French and Italian, each text to be of equal authority.’

3. (At this point the members of the Central Territorial Commission entered the room.)

*Peace Conditions
with Bulgaria*

M. TARDIEU stated that the Greek Delegation had sent a letter to the Central Territorial Commission on September 13 relative to certain points with regard to the territorial clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty (see Appendix C).⁴ The Central Territorial Commission had been of the opinion:

1. That the request put forward by the Greek Delegation is ethnographically just.

2. That the line proposed by the Greek Delegation should, from a geographical point of view, be modified in accordance with the red line on the map annexed to the Commission’s report.

The Italian delegate, in view of the principle put forward by the Greek Delegation, suggested a change in the line of Western Thrace to the advantage of Bulgaria.

The American delegate, while not denying the weight of the opinions of the other delegations, drew attention to the inconvenience which would result from changing a line already unanimously decided upon and it [*sic*] further did not believe itself to be in a position to advance an opinion without a more careful study of the whole question.

MR. POLK said that he had certain objections to formulate. President Wilson, before his departure, had personally proposed a line of demarcation. He had already agreed to a considerable modification of this line and did not feel that he had authority to make a further change therein. He pointed out that he had already consented to the taking of certain territories in the region of Adrianople from Bulgaria, although there was a large population of Bulgarians in such territories. He could do nothing further along these lines and in addition felt that the proposed change, even though ethnographically just, was unsound from a geographic point of view.

(It was decided to reject the proposal of the Greek Delegation with regard to a further modification of the frontiers of Bulgaria in Western Thrace.)
(See Appendix C.4)

³ No. 56.

⁴ Not printed. In this letter the Greek Delegation requested a rectification of the proposed Bulgarian frontier in Western Thrace south of the river Arda (which frontier followed that of 1913 between Bulgaria and Turkey) on the ground that it was ethnologically undesirable to leave to Bulgaria ‘the upper valley of the Kisildi, taking in the principal part of the casa of Orta-Koui’, which was stated to be preponderantly Mussulman and Greek in population.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the necessity of asking the Bulgarians to withdraw their troops from Western Thrace as they were still occupying that region as well as the Stroumitza salient. This occupation might last for a long time, as the Bulgarian delegation had requested a period of twenty to twenty-five days in which to prepare their answer to the Peace Conditions of the Allies. The Bulgarian occupation compelled the Allies to maintain troops in the neighbourhood which were not absolutely necessary. He suggested that the Bulgarians might be told that the Allies were likely to grant them the delay requested, on condition that they would evacuate the territories in question immediately.

MR. POLK asked what forces would relieve the Bulgarian troops.

M. TARDIEU answered that the military experts believed that three battalions only would be necessary to maintain order in Thrace. This force was already on the ground and there was in addition a division in Sofia which could profitably be recalled. He pointed out that there was no question of inserting a clause in the Bulgarian Treaty regarding this matter.

MR. POLK said that as the matter had no place in the Bulgarian Peace Treaty he proposed the consideration of the Treaty itself be terminated and the proposition of M. Tardieu be adjourned to the following day.

(This proposal was accepted.)

(M. Tardieu then withdrew and M. Kammerer entered the room.)

M. KAMMERER said that the Greek Delegation had, on September 15, sent to the Secretary General some additional remarks relative to the political clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. (See *Political clauses, Article 56* Appendix D.⁵) The Committee on New States had prepared a report on the matter which had been submitted to the various delegations (see Appendix E⁶).

(It was decided to accept the following clause proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 56, with regard to the protection of minorities and voluntary emigration:

Article 56, paragraph 2: 'Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Allied and Associated Powers shall deem opportune relative to reciprocal and voluntary emigration of ethnic minorities.')

⁵ Not printed. These observations by the Greek Delegation are printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 469-70. The Greek Delegation proposed: (i) the addition to article 56 adopted by the Supreme Council; (ii) the following addition to article 50: 'Les Grecs Patriarchistes qui voudront continuer à résider en Bulgarie sont rattachés au point de vue ecclésiastique au Patriarcat Œcuménique de Constantinople. Leurs Communautés en Bulgarie sont reconnues comme des personnes morales, capables notamment d'avoir des propriétés et d'entretenir des églises et des écoles de langue grecque, dont la libre fréquentation est garantie.'

⁶ Not printed. This report is printed with verbal variation by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 471-2.

M. KAMMERER continuing said that the Greek Delegation had also asked that a paragraph be added to Article 50 dealing with the protection of minorities. (See Appendix D.⁵) The Committee on New States believed that the Treaty should be limited to general provisions with regard to the different religious sects, and therefore that by accepting the addition proposed by the Greek delegation the risk would be incurred of entering into details and thereby creating a precedent. For this reason the Committee on New States had recommended that the Council reject the Greek proposal.

(It was decided to reject the paragraph proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 50 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.)

[Not printed]⁷

Article 44

M. KAMMERER said that the Greek Delegation had formulated certain objections with regard to Article 46 by which Article Greece agreed to execute a special treaty for the protection of minorities. The refusal to execute the article was based on the fact that no additional territory was given to Greece by the Bulgarian treaty. The committee on New States was of the opinion that this point was well taken and therefore proposed that Greece, while agreeing to sign the clause of the Bulgarian treaty obligating her to execute the minorities treaty, should not be compelled to sign the latter treaty until such time as she should be assured of the grant of new territories.

(It was decided that a letter should be sent by the President of the Peace Conference to the Greek Delegation requesting the latter to accept Article 46 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty and notifying them that the special treaty provided for in this article would not be submitted for signature until such time as the Conference should be able to make known to the Greeks the territory which might be attributed to them.)

M. KAMMERER said that the Greeks had in addition raised certain objections with regard to the signature of special clauses in the treaty with Greece. The Committee on New States had rejected all the Greek proposals with the exception of that dealing with the option of nationalities. Should the Council accept the proposal of the Committee a simple modification of Article 3 of the proposed treaty with Greece would give effect to the objection.

*Special Treaty
with Greece*

(It was decided that Article 3 of the proposed treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece should be so modified as that the first paragraph should read as follows:

'Greece recognizes as Greek nationals with full rights and without any formalities Bulgarian, Turk (or Albanian) nationals domiciled at the date

⁷ It was decided that, in accordance with a request of the Greek Delegation (appendix F in original), the following paragraph be inserted in article 44 of the treaty of peace with Bulgaria: 'Bulgarian nationals, however, who became resident in this territory after October 18, 1912, will not acquire Greek nationality without a permit from Greece.'

of the entry into force of the present treaty, on territory transferred to Greece since January 1, 1913.’)

(At this point M. Laroche and M. Kammerer withdrew, and M. Jouasset entered the room.)

M. JOUASSET said that the Greek Delegation had formulated certain objections relative to the reparations clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (see Appendix F⁸). The Commission on the Reparation of Damages had studied these criticisms and had submitted its report in the matter to the Secretary General. (See Appendix G.⁹)

It was decided to accept the proposal of the Reparations Commission with regard to Article 121, the sixth paragraph of which should be amended¹⁰ to read as follows:

‘These sums shall be remitted through the Interallied Commission referred to in Article 130 of this part to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919, such as it is constituted by the Treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919. (Part VIII, Annex II, Paragraph 2.) This Commission is referred to hereinafter as the Reparations Commission. It will assure the effecting of payments in conformity with the arrangements already made.’

After a short discussion it was decided to accept the proposal of the Reparations Commission and to add the following additional paragraph to Article 127:

‘In addition to the deliveries mentioned above, the Interallied Commission shall have the authority, should they recognize it as possible, to attribute to Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during the two years which shall follow the entry into force of the present Treaty, such quantities of livestock as may appear to them justified; the value of these deliveries shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria.’

M. JOUASSET then read that portion of the report of the Commission on Reparations dealing with this question. (See Appendix G,⁹ Paragraph II.) He said that the French Delegation had made a proposal which, after liquidation of the debts and credits of Bulgaria to Germany, gave the Reparations Commission the right to decide whether the remainder of the Bulgarian debt should be demanded or whether Bulgaria should be granted certain terms or intervals of payment, or a complete remission of the debt. Such a formula

⁸ Not printed. This appendix contained observations by the Greek Delegation, as indicated in the text, on draft articles 44, 46, 121, 124, and 127 of the treaty of peace with Bulgaria.

⁹ Not printed. This report, dated September 12, 1919, considered, as indicated below, certain criticisms of draft articles 121, 124, and 127.

¹⁰ The amendment was the addition of the words ‘such as it is constituted by the Treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919 (Part VIII, Annex II, Paragraph 2)’; this amendment permitted Greece, Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to be represented by a common delegate on the Reparation Commission when the Commission should take up the application of the treaty; on the other hand it was not considered possible to agree to the Greek request for a special representative on the Commission.

would be simple and would not commit anyone to a fixed course of action in the future. It would have the further advantage of giving satisfaction to the five small States and of nullifying any pretext which the latter might have to refuse advance payments accorded them by the Allies. On the other hand, if a part of the debt were remitted in the first instance to Bulgaria, an enemy Power, the small States might take advantage of this precedent and refuse to settle their debts to the Allies.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the debt of Bulgaria in relation to Germany and Austria should not be compared to the debt of the different small States with relation to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The British Delegation was of the opinion that changes in the text of the Treaty would constitute a sign of weakness and that the most simple course to pursue was to uphold the text in its present form.

MR. POLK said that it was certain that Bulgaria could not pay more than it was actually called upon. To make a change in the article in question would be to raise false hopes in the minds of the small Powers, that they might obtain something which they were certain not to receive. He therefore believed that the text as drafted should be upheld.

M. SCIALOJA said that the French proposal simply transferred the difficulty to the Reparations Commission. This would lead to a delay of three months, during which time Bulgaria would not be able to obtain the credit which she needed. It was to be feared that in addition she would dispute certain of her debts, and such a loss of time might even result in the enhancement of the payment of such sums as she indisputably owed for the purpose of reparations.

(After a short further discussion, it was decided to make no change in the text of Article 124 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)

(At this point M. Kammerer and M. Jouasset withdrew, and M. Serruys entered the room.)

M. SERRUYS said that the Roumanian Delegation had presented three proposals regarding Articles 171, 175 and 177 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. (See Appendix H.¹¹) The Economic Commission had studied these proposals and had submitted a report thereon to the Secretary General indicating its opinion. (See Appendix I.¹¹)

(After a short discussion, it was decided to accept the report submitted by the Economic Commission:

Article 171: The English text of Article 171 being the only one which is accurate, it was decided to revise the French and Italian texts to conform therewith.

Article 175: It was decided to maintain the text of this Article without change. The benefit of capitulations in Bulgaria in favour of Japan is upheld but is not to be extended to all the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 177: The Roumanian proposal was rejected and the Article maintained without change.)

¹¹ Not printed.

4. On the proposal of M. Clemenceau, it was decided that the text of the conditions of the Peace with Bulgaria should be presented to the Bulgarian Delegation at the meeting of the Supreme Council on Friday, September 19, 1919, at 11.00 o'clock, in the Salle de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay.

*Presentation of the
Treaty of Peace
to the Bulgarian
Delegation*

The Meeting then adjourned.

Hôtel de Crillon, Paris.

September 17, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 59

PARIS, September 16, 1919.

Dear Mr. Clemenceau:

I have been giving a good deal of thought to the subject we discussed yesterday, namely, what to do with the German forces in Lithuania. After taking the matter up with our experts and with my colleagues I have come to the conclusion that it would be most unwise at the present moment to authorize the use of the Polish troops against the Germans in case of their refusal. It would, in our opinion, probably bring on trouble in Silesia, thereby threatening, if not destroying, the coal supply of Central Europe, a serious thing in itself, but it would also bring on a conflict between the Poles and the Baltic Provinces. Mr. Gibson, our Minister to Poland, is convinced that General Henrys will be of the same opinion. It would seem, therefore, wiser not to commit ourselves to the use of the Poles at present, but to wait until we see what attitude the Germans will take and then decide the question.

In the light of existing circumstances I think this has a further advantage, inasmuch as after the Treaty is ratified the German military forces will be reduced and Allied occupation of Silesia will be possible.

I saw Mr. Lloyd George this morning and told him what our view was and attempted to see you, as I thought it was important that you should know our decision at the earliest possible moment. I will tell Mr. Tittoni this afternoon and will bring the matter up at the Conference tomorrow so that our views can be formally recorded. I regret to have to change my views, but under the circumstances I feel I made a mistake yesterday in consenting to this arrangement.

Believe me, &c.

FRANK L. POLK

APPENDIX B TO No. 59

Note pour le Gouvernement Allemand

3^e Section.

16 septembre 1919.

10) L'article XII de l'Armistice du 11 novembre stipule que: 'Les troupes allemandes se trouvant actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de la Russie devront rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne telles qu'elles étaient au 1 août 1914, dès que les Alliés le jugeront utile, compte tenu de la situation intérieure de ces territoires.'

L'article 433 du Traité de Paix confirme en tous points ces dispositions.

2°) Les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés qui, à plusieurs reprises, ont demandé à l'Allemagne de réaliser l'évacuation de ses troupes des Provinces Baltiques,¹² ont décidé que cette évacuation devait être effectuée sans aucun retard.

Ils se réservent d'ailleurs de prendre, d'accord avec les Gouvernements des Provinces Baltiques, toutes mesures utiles pour assurer le maintien de l'ordre et la sécurité dans les territoires baltiques après le retrait des troupes allemandes.

3°) Le Gouvernement allemand est, en conséquence, invité par la présente Note à procéder immédiatement à l'évacuation complète de ses forces militaires des Provinces Baltiques, dans les conditions et délais dont la détermination est prévue au § 5 ci-après.¹³

Cette évacuation complète s'applique non seulement aux unités constituées, mais encore aux États-Majors, Services et à tous les militaires allemands isolés actuellement stationnés en territoire russe.

4°) Le Gouvernement allemand est tenu pour responsable de l'exécution de ces dispositions.

En cas de non exécution, les Gouvernements alliés et associés ont arrêté les mesures nécessaires pour imposer le respect de leur décision.

Dans l'hypothèse où ils devraient recourir à ces mesures tous les militaires allemands restés en territoire russe seraient faits prisonniers de guerre.

¹² Note in original: 'Notes du 18 juin No. 3039, du 1^{er} août No. 3637, et du 24 août No. 4050.' See note 2 above.

¹³ Not included in the original.

No. 60

H. D. 56.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Thursday, September 18, 1919, at 11.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *France*: Captain Portier.

Italy: M. de Carlo.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items with which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Hon. H. Gibson, Lt.-Col. Greene, Major Tyler, Mr. A. Dulles.

British Empire: Hon. H. Nicolson, General Gough, General Sackville-West, Colonel Kisch, Captain Abraham.

France: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, M. Tardieu, M. Laroche, M. de Montille.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi, M. Galli, M. Dell'Abbadessa.

M. PICHON said that M. Clemenceau would not be able to attend the meeting and that he had asked him to make his excuses for him.

*Admission of German and
Austrian Delegates to the
International Labour Con-
gress at Washington*

2. M. PICHON said that on the preceding day General Weygand had been asked to prepare a text of a note to be addressed to the German Delegation.²
- Draft note to the Ger-
man Delegation rela-
tive to the evacuation of
the Baltic Provinces* GENERAL WEYGAND then read the draft of the note.
(See Appendix B.)

¹ This discussion arose out of two letters addressed by Mr. Barnes to M. Clemenceau (appendix A in original). In the first of these, dated at London, September 12, 1919, Mr. Barnes referred to the decision of the Supreme Council of the previous day (see No. 56, minute 4) and observed that 'it makes no provision for America or any other Government taking the initiative in inviting the Germans and Austrians to proceed to America; and as you heard yesterday, Mr. Polk declined to commit his Government, although to you and me the day before, he indicated that it might be done. My suggestion is that the decision of yesterday should be sent on to the German and Austrian Governments by your Secretariat.' In the second letter, headed: 'In course of transmission . . . telephoned from London 5 p.m. September 17', Mr. Barnes stated with reference to his above suggestion: 'It is not too much to say that the whole future of the Labour Organisation may depend on the decision to be taken on this subject tomorrow. Yesterday I saw the leading members of the Parliamentary Committee of Trades Union Congress who told me they could take part in the Washington Conference if the suggestion I had made to you were adopted; otherwise they definitely assured me they must abstain, and this would entail the abstention of representation of organised labour from Great Britain and probably elsewhere. This would mean the shipwreck of the Washington Conference. The Parliamentary Committee meet to decide the question finally tomorrow, and I beg that I may be placed in a position to assure them that my suggestion to you has been adopted.'

In the course of the discussion of these letters Mr. Polk stated that 'Mr. Barnes had not exactly understood him when he said that the American Government were prepared to invite the delegates. . . . He did not wish to continue a discussion which concerned only a question of form. He was ready to inform the German and Austrian delegates unofficially, in the name of the American Government, that they would receive every facility for their journey. He thought the time might be saved if Mr. Barnes, Mr. Gompers and their French and Italian colleagues informed the German and Austrian delegates unofficially that they would undoubtedly be permitted to participate in the Conference.'

'Sir Eyre Crowe said that he agreed with Mr. Polk that it was simply a question of form. He desired to say, however, that Mr. Barnes, in his letter of the 12th September, proposed simply that the decision taken by the Council on the preceding day be communicated to the German and Austrian Governments through the medium of the Secretariat General.'

'M. Berthelot pointed out that it had been said that the notification in question should be communicated unofficially. Any communication from the Secretariat General would, of necessity, be official.'

'Mr. Polk said that the American Delegation were prepared to make this communication, if they were directed by the Council to do so. . . .

'It was agreed that the American Delegation should be requested in the name of the Conference to communicate to the German and Austrian Delegations the decision of September 11, 1919, regarding the admission of German and Austrian delegates to the International Labour Congress at Washington.'

² See No. 59, minute 1.

MR. POLK said that the note provided for the evacuation not only of German units, but also of individual Germans, who, after being demobilized, had joined Russian units. He thought that the Allied and Associated Powers would be taking a risk in making a demand which the German Government might not be able to fulfil. He did not know what the United States Government would be able to do, if a situation arose where American citizens had enlisted in Mexican and Cuban units. He felt considerable doubt as to the legal obligations of the Germans in this matter.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had received documentary proof to show that the German Government encouraged enrolment of Germans in Russian military units, and paid them by giving them land in Russia. This land did not belong to the German Government and the position of that Government was clearly illegal. General Gough was present and could give the Council much interesting information.

MR. POLK said that he had also received the same information as to the action of the German Government. He thought that action, such as had been described, could be provided against in the future. But he did not know whether the Council could demand that the Germans now there could be given up. It was a complicated legal question and he would be very glad to hear the views of M. Berthelot and M. Fromageot.

M. BERTHELOT said that entire companies had passed into the Russian Army. The draft could however be modified, so that note would be taken of Mr. Polk's remarks.

MR. POLK said that the question was one of international law, so far as facts were concerned. Mr. Paderewski had shown him documents which proved that these acts were abetted by the War Office at Berlin. He was satisfied with General Weygand's draft in many respects, but he thought the text too broad.

M. PICHON asked Mr. Polk whether he would be prepared to accept the draft in principle. It would be given to M. Fromageot, who would revise it from a legal point of view.

MR. POLK said he was prepared to do this, if M. Fromageot collaborated with Mr. James Brown Scott.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the military authorities thought that the threat in the last paragraph of the note was strong enough to have the desired effect.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he did not think so. It was the fourth communication on this subject, which had been made to the German Government. He saw no reason why it should be treated differently from the others. He suggested that the Council hear the opinion of General Gough.

MR. POLK asked whether Marshal Foch thought that the threat to use Polish troops would have the desired effect.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was not only the question of the use of Polish troops; that the Allied Governments should bring pressure to bear with all their power and all their troops. Thus, there would be a beginning of action

and the Allied and Associated Powers would be quite ready to march forward if the necessity therefor should arise.

MR. POLK said that there was a threat of military measures in the last lines of the draft note. There were objections to sending this fourth note, and he thought that the end desired could be accomplished by bringing economic pressure to bear. He was ready on his part to inform the German bankers that they would not be permitted to borrow money in the United States.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had nothing to say in regard to this suggestion.

(At this moment General Gough entered the room.)

M. PICHON said that the Council would be grateful if General Gough expressed his views on the subject of the Baltic Provinces.

GENERAL GOUGH said that in his opinion the greatest danger in Northern Russia was the German danger. It was far more serious than the danger of Bolshevism. There was no doubt that there was a military plot in this region, and that General von der Goltz was at the head of it. The plan consisted in colonizing the Baltic States and raising a strong Russo-German Army, which would be outside of the territory of the Allies, and, in a certain degree, independent of the German Government. The persons responsible for this movement aimed at joining certain Russian parties, who were represented by General Yudenitch, or if not by General Yudenitch himself, then by persons surrounding him. A great many people were ready to accept the German authority, as they considered it a means of regaining their rights and privileges at Petrograd, and in the surrounding regions. The German authorities did not hesitate to make promises to these people in this sense. If the Allies permitted this force to become constituted, the first result would be destruction of the happiness and liberties of the people of the Baltic Provinces. Then, the independence of Finland would be threatened. If the Allies permitted this plot to succeed, a series of murders and fighting and a state of tyranny would result in the Baltic Provinces and perhaps in Russia. These peoples, instead of being given peace, would be given a sword. There was also a great danger that this Russo-German force would some day be used against the Allies themselves. It was not impossible, in view of the demobilization of the Allies, that the Russo-German forces would outnumber the Allied forces in a few years, and a very grave menace for Europe would consequently result. He believed that the Allied and Associated Governments should insist upon the immediate withdrawal of the German Military Government and of the German forces. It would next be necessary to establish order and to lend assistance to the Governments of the Baltic Provinces, not only in giving them money, but in lending money, to let them pay for the goods which they would need from the Allied and Associated Powers. In other words, commerce should be restored. The Baltic peoples were rich enough to pay. He added that the peoples of the Baltic Provinces were well disposed towards the Allies. They differed very radically from the German and Russian population as well as from their own aristocracy, the

Baltic barons, who were the descendants of the former German conquerors. The great middle-class population was well disposed towards the Entente and had a cordial hatred of Germany. If the Allies assisted them in organizing, there would be a barrier, not only against Germany, but against Bolshevism as well. These people were radicals and democrats, but had no liking for Bolshevism. They would not accept Bolshevism, unless they were overrun by Germany or deserted by the Allies. In the latter event, they would undoubtedly prefer Bolshevism to German rule. If the Allied and Associated Powers established peace and restored the prosperity of the Baltic peoples, it would be possible to give these peoples a free hand as regards Central Russia, and even to authorize them, if they wished it, to make peace. The Bolshevik danger was nowhere more threatening than in the interior of Russia, and the populations of these districts were desirous of resuming trade relations with the Baltic populations. Such relations would have a desirable effect.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question before the Conference was to consider the best means of compelling the German Government to withdraw its troops from the Baltic Provinces. It had been said that the German authorities favoured the enrolment of their demobilized soldiers in Russian units. He wished to know what power the German Government had over the army of General von der Goltz, and its commander. He questioned whether Germany had really disarmed. He asked whether, if the demobilization should take place on the spot, it would not facilitate enlistments into Russian units.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that the army of General von der Goltz would obey the orders of his [?its] commander. It was not a fact that the German Government had no authority over these troops, nor that they had favoured demobilization on the spot and filled the country with military workmen. The Letts would murder these workmen, if they were left alone. The Germans in Latvia were soldiers. They were not demobilized and obeyed the orders of General von der Goltz. They could impose themselves on this region only by force. It had been intended to found colonies of these men in the Baltic Provinces, but this had not as yet been done.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the orders of General von der Goltz would also be obeyed by isolated soldiers in Russian units.

GENERAL GOUGH said that he believed that they would. He held this opinion on account of a similar case, which had occurred previously. When the Germans had evacuated Riga, they had provoked numerous conflicts. There existed at that time a Landwehr battalion composed of 9,000 men, of whom 5,000 were Germans. The Commander, Fletcher, was a German, as were most of his officers. In spite of protest from certain persons in the Baltic Provinces, it had been possible to send Fletcher, his officers and men, to Mitau, to join their army, and Fletcher himself had returned to East Prussia. Today this Landwehr battalion was commanded by a British officer, Colonel Young, and there was not a single German in it. There was nothing to be feared on that side. It would be enough if the Germans left the country and

the Lettish Government were thoroughly installed, so as to be able to ward against any dangers. There was no doubt of the fact that no German civilian could remain in these regions after the German army had left. They would be massacred by the population immediately.

MR. POLK asked whether the situation in Esthonia and Lithuania was different.

GENERAL GOUGH said that Lithuania [*sic*] had received more assistance from the Allies and was in a position to restore herself more rapidly. Esthonia [*sic*], on the other hand, had been abandoned to the Germans for many months.

MR. POLK asked General Gough what he thought would be the effect if the Allies used Polish troops to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that the use of Polish troops would lead to great confusion in the country and there would be ceaseless fighting. In his opinion, it would be advisable to search for other means, for the Allies ran the risk of seeing the Poles defeated and Poland reconquered by Germany. It was necessary to seek means of establishing peace and not of provoking new wars.

MR. POLK asked General Gough whether he thought that economic pressure could be brought to bear.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that he thought this could be done, but both economic and moral pressure should be used at Berlin. If the German Government acted in good faith and really desired to withdraw these troops, there was nothing to prevent the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. At the moment, the German Government was really waiting to see which was the stronger, the Peace Conference at Paris, or General von der Goltz. There was no doubt that a plot existed and that the German Government were the masters of its fate, for the German Government were in a position to recall General von der Goltz, if they wished to do so.

M. MATSUI asked how large the German forces in question were.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that it was difficult to give the exact numbers. The Germans had organized a sort of military cordon which prevented contact with the populations of the regions which the Germans occupied. He believed that the army was composed of from 40,000 to 100,000 men. He believed that the latter figure was too high, but he was not sure. He called attention to the fact that the German forces in the Baltic Provinces were supplied by a railway crossing East Prussia and terminating at Mitau. It would be a simple matter to stop this traffic and thereby endanger the rationing of the German forces. On the other hand, the evacuation of the German troops could be effected by way of Riga, although the Germans alleged that this was impossible. In the Libau district there were five German ships, which could be used for this purpose.

MR. POLK said that there was also at New York a number of German ships, which would be available.

M. MATSUI asked whether there would be a danger of Bolshevism in these regions after the Germans had withdrawn.

GENERAL GOUGH said that this danger would not exist, because the population was anti-Bolshevist, and, furthermore, because the Bolsheviks were anxious to conclude peace with the Baltic Provinces, and were to recognize their independence up to a certain point. In any event, the Baltic Provinces were able to defend themselves by force of arms.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if the German troops were dependent upon East Prussia for their supplies, the situation would improve after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, which provided for the occupation of Memel and the neighbouring districts by Allied troops. The Treaty also provided for Interallied occupation of Allenstein. The army of General von der Goltz would consequently find itself isolated and without liaison with East Prussia, for it could communicate only with a small part of East Prussia, which would itself be isolated. He expected that the treaty would be ratified in about three weeks' time and suggested that it might be advisable to await the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

GENERAL GOUGH said that this was the case, but that General von der Goltz was not a person who would ignore these facts, and it was quite likely that he had availed himself of the delay by organizing stocks of provisions and munitions which would enable him to maintain himself for several months. It would be preferable to act immediately, for delay gave the Germans two advantages:—in the first place, it constantly diminished the moral influence of the Allied and Associated Governments in the country, by showing that the decisions of the Conference were not obeyed; in the second place, it gave the Germans time to prepare an offensive, if they intended to make one, and to accumulate all that was necessary for this operation.

(M. PICHON thanked General Gough for his statements and General Gough then withdrew.)

M. PICHON said that he had received the amendments prepared by M. Berthelot based upon the observations of Mr. Polk.

M. BERTHELOT said that the article concerning the Germans isolated in the Russian forces could be changed so as to read as follows:

'mais encore à tous les militaires allemands en groupe ou même isolés, qui sur la suggestion ou avec l'appui des autorités allemandes, ont nominale-ment pris du service . . . '

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it was proposed that this text be adopted. He found himself in a somewhat delicate situation, for the original proposal concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had come from his Prime Minister. It was Mr. Lloyd George, who had proposed that Polish troops be utilized. After these proposals had been made, it had been decided that a note should be prepared in this sense. The information, which had been given that day, showed that it would not be advisable to utilize Polish troops. The situation therefore was now quite different. If the Allied and Associated Governments did not add a threat and were not prepared to carry it out, the

ultimatum would not be effective. Under these circumstances, he hesitated to agree to its being despatched. He asked whether it would not be more advisable to write a note to the German Government, saying that the Allied and Associated Powers did not believe the arguments which the German Government had used, that these Governments knew that the German Government were in a position to insist upon the evacuation being effected, and that they were convinced that the German Government could carry it out. The German Government should be further informed that as they had not effected the evacuation nor paid any attention to the previous notes of the Council, the Allied and Associated Governments proposed to sever all commercial relations with them and to decide upon other measures of a similar nature. In his opinion, it was advisable to make no further demands, but to put the German Government face to face with a *fait accompli*. Before deciding upon this course, it would be necessary for all the Governments to agree as to the steps which they were prepared to take. So far as he was concerned, he would be glad to consult his Government, for it was probable that there would be complications, so far as interrupting certain steps, which were already being taken, such as the repatriation of prisoners of war, was concerned, and he was not certain that the British Government would agree to the imposition of the blockade. If a decision were taken after forty-eight hours, the members of the Council would have an opportunity to consult their Governments and they could then decide upon the action to be taken.

MR. POLK said that in awaiting this decision, he would confer with members of the American Delegation and have it made known to Baron von Lersner at Versailles, that the American Government would suspend all financial agreements.

(It was decided to postpone the decision concerning the despatch of a Note to the German Government, relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, for 48 hours, in order to permit the various Delegates to consult their Governments as to the various means of pressure which could be brought to bear.)

(At this point Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdrew.)

3. M. PICHON said that the question had been raised on the preceding day and that Mr. Polk had then asked that it be postponed until the following day.³

*Immediate occupation
of Western Thrace by
Inter-allied Military
forces*

M. TARDIEU read the draft resolution which he had prepared, which was worded as follows: 'It is decided that the Bulgarian Government evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d'Esperey will give the necessary instructions for the evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory by Greek troops (in the region of Xanthi and Gumuldjina), and for the occupation of the remaining territory by Allied troops.'

MR. POLK said that he believed that the line went too far. Xanthi and Gumuldjina were beyond the line. He could not agree to have Greek troops

³ See No. 59, minute 3.

occupy regions other than those which were to be attributed to them by the Peace Treaty.

M. TARDIEU said that he was of the same opinion.

MR. POLK said that General Bliss and the American Delegation believed that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it would lead to incidents similar to those which had occurred at Smyrna. He thought that trouble in this region was bound to occur and that the Allied Governments did not have the troops at their disposal, which it would be necessary to send there. He objected to the entire proceeding and wished to protest and he would take no responsibility for what might happen, for there would be no American troops in that country. He proposed that in the first place the territory should be occupied by French troops and that the Greek occupation should take place after the French occupation.

M. TARDIEU said that General Franchet d'Esperey, whom he had consulted, did not believe that trouble would result. He thought, however, that the text of the draft resolution should be altered so as to be satisfactory to Mr. Polk.

MR. POLK said that General Cretien [Chrétien]⁴ held the same view that he did. So far as he was concerned he could only accept the proposal with the reserve already expressed and because of the fact that no American troops were to be sent. He asked whether it was proposed to maintain the local administration.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it would be inadvisable for the Council to bind themselves, for the Bulgarians might refuse to take the responsibility.

MR. POLK suggested that the matter be referred to the Central Territorial Committee.

M. TARDIEU said that he proposed to suppress the last two lines of his proposition, from the words 'by Greek troops', and to add a second paragraph, which would be worded as follows: 'The occupation will be undertaken first by Allied troops, who will be replaced by Greek troops in the zone indicated on the map enclosed herewith. The local administration will be continued.'

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the words 'by Allied troops' meant that Greek troops would participate equally in the occupation of the other zone.

M. TARDIEU said that this was not meant and that he referred to troops of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

M. SCIALOJA said that it should be clearly understood that occupation by Greek troops was to be limited to the zone in question, and that these troops would not participate with the troops of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the occupation of the other zone.

MR. POLK said that it was important that the line should be definitely established before it was brought to the attention of the military authorities.

M. TARDIEU said that this matter could be left to the Committee.

(After a short discussion, in the course of which Mr. Polk renewed his reservation and declared that the proportion of Greek troops appeared to

⁴ French General in command of Allied forces in Bulgaria.

him too great in proportion to that of the Allied troops, the following resolution was adopted:

1. It was decided that the Bulgarian Government should evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d'Esperey should give the necessary instructions for this evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory.
2. The occupation should be effected by Allied troops.
3. These troops might be Greek in the zone indicated in the map, attached herewith⁵, when the Commander in Chief should consider it possible; the rest of Western Thrace should be occupied by Allied troops, other than Greek troops.
4. The local administration would be continued.)

4. M. PICHON said that the Conditions of Peace would be delivered to the Bulgarian Delegation on the following day at the Quai d'Orsay at 10.30 a.m.

*Delivery of Conditions
of Peace to the Bul-
garian Delegation*

MR. POLK said that representatives of the American Press had asked him whether they would be admitted to

this ceremony.

M. PICHON said that the meeting would be different from those which had taken place with the German and Austrian Delegates. It had not been anticipated that representatives of the Press would be present. It had been intended to transmit the conditions of peace to the Bulgarians through the medium of M. Dutasta, the Secretary-General of the Conference, without any ceremony of any kind. M. Stancioff, the Secretary of the Bulgarian Delegation, had said that he thought this procedure somewhat uncomplimentary to the Bulgarian Delegation. The Supreme Council had then decided that the delivery of the Conditions of Peace should take place at the Quai d'Orsay in the presence of the Council.⁶

MR. POLK said that he was willing to accept the opinion of the majority, but he wished to place himself upon record as saying that he believed that the Conference had throughout shown a tendency to ignore the presence of the other Delegations. He knew that the heads of some of these Delegations felt that they had been ignored. The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and other Delegations particularly interested felt that the matter was one which concerned them very closely and that they should be present at the ceremony.

M. PICHON said that it would be possible to invite the Head of each of the Delegations.

(After a short discussion, it was decided to invite to the Ceremony of the Delivery of the Conditions of Peace to the Bulgarian Delegation:

Two Representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and one Representative of each of the other Allied Powers who were signatories of the Treaty.

⁵ Not attached to original.

⁶ See No. 55, minute 4.

It was also decided that Representatives of the Press should be authorized to be present at the Meeting and that there should be five Representatives of each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and two of the other Powers.)

The meeting then adjourned.

Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,

September 18, 1919.

APPENDIX B TO NO. 60

Monsieur le Président,

La Note du Gouvernement allemand du 3 septembre ajourne à nouveau, sous des prétextes inacceptables, l'exécution des engagements souscrits par l'Allemagne en vertu des dispositions de l'Article XII de l'Armistice du 11 novembre 1918, confirmées depuis par l'Article 433 du Traité de Paix.

Les Gouvernements alliés et associés se refusent en particulier à admettre que le Gouvernement allemand puisse, pour décliner la responsabilité qui lui incombe, se retrancher derrière l'impuissance où il prétend se trouver d'imposer l'obéissance à ses troupes des régions baltiques.

Ils invitent en conséquence le Gouvernement allemand à procéder sans aucun nouveau retard à l'évacuation de leurs troupes des Provinces Baltiques, en appliquant cette évacuation non seulement aux Unités allemandes constituées et à leurs États-Majors et Services, mais encore à tous les militaires allemands isolés y compris ceux qui, après démobilisation, ont pris du service dans les rangs des Corps russes organisés dans les Provinces Baltiques.

L'évacuation devra être entreprise immédiatement, poursuivie sans arrêt et complètement achevée dans le délai d'un mois, prenant fin à la date du 20 octobre.

En cas de non-exécution dans les conditions et délai prescrits, les Gouvernements alliés et associés se réservent de prendre, sans nouvel avis, toutes mesures de coercition qu'ils jugeront utiles et de les maintenir en vigueur jusqu'à complète exécution, telles que: la reprise partielle ou totale du Blocus de l'Allemagne, — la cessation immédiate de toutes facilités d'ordre économique ou financier dont l'Allemagne bénéficie actuellement auprès des Puissances Alliées et Associées ou de leurs ressortissants, — la suspension du rapatriement des prisonniers de guerre, — au besoin, des mesures d'ordre militaire destinées à assurer directement l'exécution de leurs décisions.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

Son Excellence Monsieur von Lersner,

Président de la Délégation allemande, Versailles.

H. D. 57.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, September 19, 1919, at 11.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *France*: Commandant Portier. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Hon. H. Gibson, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, Colonel Kisch.

France: M. Tardieu, M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, General Le Rond.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi, M. Galli, M. Brambilla.

1. MR. POLK asked whether any news had recently been received from the Military Mission in Hungary.

Situation in Hungary M. PICHON said that he had received a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated September 12-13. (See Appendix A.) Several cypher telegrams had also arrived but had not yet been decoded. In view of this fact he proposed that the question be adjourned until the meeting of the Council on Monday.

MR. POLK said that he was in favour of M. Pichon's proposal because he had received word from General Bandholtz to the effect that the latter was in process of organizing a police force for Budapest and hoped to conclude the negotiations on that day. Undoubtedly information on this subject would be available by Monday.

(It was decided to adjourn the discussion on this question until Monday, September 22nd.)

2. (At this point M. Tardieu entered the room.)

Occupation of Western Thrace by the Allied Troops M. TARDIEU stated that, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Council on the previous day,¹ he had received from Messrs. Dulles and Nicolson a paper indicating a line of demarcation of the zones in Western Thrace. (See Appendix B.) This note, to which a map had been annexed,² he was not able to accept, for he had understood that the region of Gumuldjina was to have been incorporated in the area in question.

MR. POLK said that he had no fundamental objection to the eventual attribution of this territory to Greece, but that he could not consent to its occupation at the present time by Greek troops.

¹ See No. 60, minute 3.

² Not attached to original.

(After a short discussion it was decided to delay action on the resolution taken by the Council on September 18th and to further study the question of the occupation of Thrace by the Allied troops at a future meeting of the Council.)

(M. Tardieu then withdrew.)

3. M. CAMBON read from and commented upon Report No. 5, transmitted to the Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs, on the subject of the status of Eastern Galicia. (See Appendix C.³)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in view of the fact that Poland, within its present boundaries, did not comprise all the territories which it possessed prior to its partition, he believed that it would be preferable to omit the second paragraph of the Preamble, which read as follows:

‘Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter.’

(It was decided to delete the following paragraph from the text of the Preamble to the Treaty:

‘Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter.’)

- M. CAMBON said that the Commission had been unanimous upon the draft of Articles 1 to 11 (inclusive) of the Treaty.

(It was decided to accept the first eleven articles as drafted by the Polish Commission for insertion in the proposed Treaty regarding Eastern Galicia.)

- M. CAMBON read the text of Article 12 as proposed by the Polish Commission, together with the additional paragraph to this article proposed by the British delegation.

MR. POLK said that he wished to ask M. Cambon a question regarding this article. In the first phrase the following clause appeared, ‘The Diet of Eastern Galicia shall legislate on the following matters’. He wanted to know whether, in the opinion of the Commission, this gave the Galician Diet the exclusive power to legislate upon the subjects enumerated in the article in question.

M. CAMBON said that such was the intention of the Commission.

M. PICHON added that the Diet would have complete sovereignty for the questions involved.

M. CAMBON said that the Commission had been unanimous upon all the paragraphs in question. Nevertheless, the British delegation had asked that the following clause be added to the text: ‘Agrarian legislation passed by the Polish Diet shall only become applicable to Eastern Galicia if and when it is confirmed by the Eastern Galician Diet.’

³ This appendix is lacking in the original. The text of the report in question has been supplied from the official record of the proceedings of the Commission on Polish Affairs and is printed as appendix C.

He added that agreement had not been reached upon this clause. The American, French, Italian and Japanese delegations had been opposed to inserting it and the British delegation had insisted upon its being put in. The Council was therefore obliged to decide the question.

On July 6th the Polish Diet had passed an agrarian reform law of extreme importance which marked the beginning of the social transformation in Poland. By the provisions of this law the State became the owner of all forests in Poland. The agrarian organization of the Polish Republic was to be based primarily on the peasants' farms, the creation of new farms by colonization and the enlarging of those actually in existence. The State was to decide upon the division of the land and in this process was to create large reserves by the following means:

- (1) From lands of which it was the owner;
- (2) Lands belonging to members of old reigning families or to branches of the latter;
- (3) Domains of the Russian Peasants' Bank and of the Prussian Colonization Commission;
- (4) Domains of the Bishopricks, Congregations, Convents, Monasteries or other public institutions;
- (5) Domains formerly belonging to congregations, but not yet partitioned;
- (6) Lands acquired through speculation and belonging to persons who had been convicted of having participated therein.

The six categories of lands above mentioned were to furnish the basis upon which the distribution should first be made. Thereafter the distribution was to continue by withdrawing land from each large owner. Right of ownership was to be limited, no one individual to be allowed to possess a farm larger than 180 hectares. In certain regions, however, where the interests of agriculture might make it necessary, this maximum area could be increased to 400 hectares.

He pointed out that these were the principles of reform which had been imposed upon the party of the Right, which represented the large landed proprietors. The latter did not appear to have accepted their defeat and were already preparing to contest viciously the passage of each of the organic laws necessary to effectuate this scheme. He added, for the information of the Council, that the above law had only received a majority of two votes.

It appeared that the above provisions, which were very broad and diametrically opposed to the ideas regarding private property which had been held up to the present time, were not considered liberal enough by the majority of the Galicians. However that may be, the question is to know whether these provisions can be applied 'hic et nunc' to Galicia by the Polish administration or, whether, at the time a Diet shall be constituted in Galicia, the latter should give its opinion upon the application of this legislation or itself enact a special law. The British delegation believed that it was necessary for the Galician Diet to be called upon to give its opinion. The other dele-

gations thought that this agrarian law gave sufficiently favourable terms and adequately upheld the rights of private property owners vis-à-vis to the peasant class.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was in reality a larger one than the mere enforcement of a particular law, the merits of which he did not wish to pass upon at the present time.

The main idea which had guided the Council in all its discussions on the autonomy of Eastern Galicia had been that a people was being dealt with who had retained marked sympathy for certain of its neighbours, more particularly Russia. It had always been the desire of the Council to look to the future with the possibility that this people might wish to ally itself with a regenerated Russia or any Ukrainian state which might be formed. It had been desired to allow the separation to be made from Poland, if such state of affairs became possible, and consequently the autonomy of the country was preferable to a mandate over it entrusted to the Poles. He thought that a line should be drawn between those matters on which uniformity of legislation could be obtained without difficulty and issues on which the people of Eastern Galicia should be permitted to legislate alone. Uniformity on agrarian questions was difficult to attain. No obstacle should be placed in the way of an ultimate union of Eastern Galicia with Russia, and it therefore should not be made impossible for this province to separate itself from Poland. He did not wish to argue in favour of such a separation, but believed that the door should be left open for a move in the direction of Russia. By so doing the Powers would give Galicia a free hand and would avoid creating difficulties, of which agrarian legislation might well be one.

He pointed out that the Council might be guided by England's experience in relation to Ireland, in which country agrarian questions had always been the most difficult of solution. England had never imposed its agrarian legislation on Ireland and was thankful that the same had not been done. England could never be charged with having forced its own system of laws on the Irish. The United States furnished another example of a country for whose well being uniformity of laws was not necessary.

He did not wish to criticize the law in question, but pointed out that no guarantee existed against its repeal. The Poles might be tempted to enact legislative measures hostile to the interests of the Galician people, and it was for that reason that he believed all laws of an agrarian nature should be submitted to the approval of the Galician Diet. The most simple method to obtain this result would be to add agrarian questions to the list of matters within the jurisdiction of the Diet of Eastern Galicia, which are set out in Article 12. Great danger would be run through the imposition of legislation purely Polish in character because many of the large property holdings in Galicia were actually in the hands of Poles and the temptation to impose a system favourable to their interests would be very great.

M. CAMBON said that he would like to refer to Article 16 for discussion with Article 12, for the two stood together and a decision of the Council on one would have its effect on the other. He then read the two texts proposed for

Article 16 and pointed out that this Article in substance brought up the question as to whether or not Eastern Galicia was to be allowed representation in the Diet of Warsaw.

He was fundamentally opposed to the British proposal for the reason that, whether it was desirable or not, the fact that the government of the Galician state was entrusted to Poland placed in the hands of the Polish Government representation of Eastern Galicia abroad. All questions of general administration would be settled at Warsaw. It was therefore necessary that Eastern Galicia be permitted to take part in all questions of high policy in the Polish Diet. The Diet of Galicia could deal with the other matters as indicated in Article 12. It was therefore necessary not to state in the decision that representation of Galicia with Poland should be disregarded.

With reference to the agrarian legislation, he pointed out that this question was bound up with the decision which would be taken on Article 16, for if the Council granted Galicia representation in the Polish Diet her representatives in this body could make themselves heard to good effect.

M. SCIALOJA said that, although the Italian representative on the Polish Commission had supported the majority opinion, he thought it would be well to make a slight change. He did not favour the addition proposed by the British delegation however, but inclined to the second proposal made by Sir Eyre Crowe, namely, to insert agrarian legislation in the list of matters included in Article 12. If such a change were not made Eastern Galicia might be deprived of all rights of enactment of agrarian laws, should she refuse to accept the legislation of the Polish Diet. According to M. Cambon's statements, it was probable that the Galicians would go further in the matter than the Poles had already done. This meant that they were not satisfied with matters as they stood and it would therefore do them an injury to crystallize the present situation and prevent them from improving it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with M. Cambon in believing that Articles 12 and 16 were closely allied. All the points raised by the British delegation were intimately connected one with another, and the same arguments as had been brought forward for agrarian questions prevailed in regard to compulsory military service. He wished, however, to further discuss the representation in the Polish Diet. Assuming that this representation existed, the danger might arise that certain Polish members of the Diet would wish to impose on the Galicians an agrarian scheme favourable to Polish interests. The Galician representatives, being in a minority, could not effectively block the measure. In cases where matters of general interest arose it was probable that Galicians and Poles might vote on the same side, but in cases of special legislation the Galician minority would be absolutely powerless. If this argument were true, the Commission was correct in saying that the question of representation had a direct bearing on Article 12. He further wished to call attention to the meaning of Article 13, and the right of temporary veto accorded to the Governor therein. This article provided sufficient guarantees to prevent the legislation of the Galician Diet affecting Poland adversely.

M. PICHON asked whether M. Paderewski had not stated that Poland could not accept the Treaty under these conditions.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the Sub-Commission had heard the Polish delegation on the subject four times. In the first place, M. Paderewski, later M. Dmowski, and later M. Dabsky, the author of the Polish agrarian law had appeared before it. M. Daiko, representing the Ruthenians, had also appeared before the Commission. This body was therefore entirely alive to all the difficulties which Sir Eyre Crowe had brought up and to all the arguments in answer thereto.

The agrarian reform was based on a general banking scheme which was to be uniform throughout the country. It appeared difficult to organize a similar system within a country so limited as Galicia, and of such a small population. The reform was also based upon a system of local committees, giving guarantees to the people analogous to those existing in Posnania and other provinces. The points raised by the British delegation were irreconcilable with the solutions proposed by the majority. The representatives of the Polish Government had stated that they could not accept a Treaty in which their government would be deprived of the right to dictate agrarian reform.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that there was much to be said for the arguments presented by General Le Rond, but he did not believe that they went to the root of the matter. He was fully alive to the difficulties from a practical point of view which would result from allowing Galicia to legislate independently, in the event that she should exercise her rights in a manner which did not meet with the approval of the Polish Diet. He believed that the people themselves would be competent to avoid all complications of this nature and they might even declare themselves favourable to uniformity of legislation. It did not devolve upon the Council, however, to force them to such uniformity. Furthermore, Galicia was not such a small country as General Le Rond had given the impression, for it contained practically four and one-half million inhabitants. There would, consequently, be no insurmountable difficulties in establishing an agrarian system for this country even though certain complications might arise from the banking point of view. The argument put forward by General Le Rond did not therefore seem to him of sufficient weight to overthrow his proposal of granting the Galicians a voice in the legislation.

MR. POLK said that he was greatly influenced by the arguments put forward by Sir Eyre Crowe. He wished to submit a proposal which had just been made by Mr. Gibson, which might help the situation to a certain degree: This would consist in adding the following clause to the addition proposed by the British delegation: 'In case of a rejection of the Polish law by the Galician Diet, the latter will have the right to legislate on this question.' This solution would have the advantage of permitting the Galician Diet to adopt the Polish legislation should this body so desire.

M. CAMBON pointed out that it was perhaps unwise to anticipate a refusal and base the Galician right of legislation upon this. He suggested that it would be sufficient to provide: 'The Galician Diet shall give its opinion on

the possibility of applying Polish law.' In this way the body would of necessity be consulted.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Mr. Cambon's proposal appeared rather vague and would open the way to misunderstandings, while clearness in the matter was greatly to be desired. The danger might be that the Poles could say that they had asked the opinion of the Galician Diet, that the latter had not agreed, and nevertheless it made no difference to them.

M. PICHON suggested that the agrarian laws might be settled by agreement between the two Diets.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the fact remained that Article 13 gave the Polish Governor an absolute right of veto.

MR. POLK said that he approved the second British solution, namely, the insertion of agrarian questions in Article 12. The difficulty could be covered by adding that, if the Galician Diet had not legislated on the matter within a given period, the Polish law would apply.

M. SCIALOJA said that it might be also added to the laws of Article 13, which are subject to an absolute veto of the Governor.

M. CAMBON drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the agrarian law might lead to disturbances within the country, and that the Polish Government might charge the Allies with turning over to them the administration of a country without granting them the means of handling disturbances which might arise through the application of agrarian laws. The majority of large estates in Galicia were in the hands of the Poles. These estates were to be partitioned in favour of Ruthenes. This was a fruitful source of conflicts between different interests and of dangers which might easily lead to a revolution. He thought, therefore, that the Polish Government should be left the means of exercising its authority. Too much importance should not be given to these details, however, as the system which was being inaugurated was only temporary.

M. PICHON said that he had a proposal which he believed would settle the matter. This was to adopt the proposition presented by Sir Eyre Crowe, and add the following paragraph thereto:

'In case of persistent dispute between the two Diets, the question will be brought before the Council of the League of Nations.'

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this proposal would, in effect, permit the League of Nations to enact the agrarian laws.

M. PICHON said that the Covenant of the League contemplated arbitration as one of the essential roles of that body.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the League of Nations would therefore be called upon to decide between two bodies of law. To bring this about it was necessary that the Galician Diet should be given a legislative power by the Treaty.

(After a short discussion, it was decided:

- (1) that legislation on agrarian questions should be included within the competence of the Galician Diet, and inserted in Article 12 of the proposed Treaty;

- (2) that agrarian legislation should be included among the laws over which the Polish Governor has the right of veto (Article 13), but that if the Governor's veto be maintained for more than one year the question should be automatically brought before the Council of the League of Nations for decision.

It was further decided that the above resolution should be referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs for insertion of its provisions in the Treaty.)

- (d) *Articles 14 and 15* These two Articles were accepted without change.

M. CAMBON read and commented upon Article 16. He said that the organization provided for therein, which was to protect the rights of Galicia, would lack a proper foundation if Galicia were not represented in the body of the Polish Diet. It should be understood that the Galician representative would take no part in the matters which were exclusively Polish.

(e) *Article 16* SIR EYRE CROWE said that he recognized the weight of the arguments put forward by M. Cambon, but that he did not wish to express an opinion as to the root of the matter. He wished particularly to remark that the question had been the object of much academic discussion up to the present time, and that the idea involved had rarely been applied from a practical point of view. Under the former German Constitution Bavaria was granted special rights, but in practice it had been found impossible to prevent the Bavarian representatives from taking part in the body of the Reichstag, in the discussion of matters which were entirely foreign to the special interests of Bavaria. The question of knowing whether States with partial autonomy can obtain representation in a larger Parliament is one of the most contentious which can be found, and has given rise to much discussion and often contradictory conclusions on the part of men of high intelligence in all countries of the world. Mr. Balfour, who had special experience of Government in Ireland, had more than once called attention to the grave difficulty of finding a satisfactory solution of this question. Several bills proposed on the Home Rule question had broken down precisely on the point of the Irish representation in the British Parliament. It was, therefore, very natural that his Government should feel a certain hesitancy in imposing a fixed and definite scheme on another people in a matter which is so much a matter of controversy. The British Delegation felt that a solution along the lines proposed by Mr. Cambon might perhaps be reached. He did not wish to criticise it, nor to exclude the possibility of its eventual adoption, but he did not wish to force it at the outset on the people concerned. It was within the province of these people to decide the question in the last analysis.

MR. POLK said that the British proposal contemplated the intervention of the League of Nations if desired by 'both parties'. He wished to suggest for consideration of the Council, a substitution of the words 'either party' for the words 'both parties'. He wished also to propose for the consideration of the Council that Galicia be granted two or more representatives in the

Polish Diet, until such time as a definite decision in the matter might be arrived at. These representatives might have a consultative voice, with the right to take part in the discussion of matters concerning Eastern Galicia but would not be accorded a vote. Representation of this kind would be similar to that enjoyed by the Territories in the United States, as distinguished from the active and voting representation of the States. This proposal was a temporary measure solely and he thought the Council might deliberate profitably thereon.

The discussion of Article 16 was then adjourned.

(At this point M. Loucheur entered the room.)

4. M. PICHON said that a letter had been received from the Austrian Delegation with regard to the shortage of coal in Austria. (See *Coal Supply of Austria* Appendix D.⁴)

M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to inform the Council at once that he had not waited for the ratification of the Treaty before giving orders to increase the coal supply in Austria as soon as possible. He had personally given orders in this matter but he could not guarantee that he would be completely successful, for the shortage of coal in Central Europe was so great that the industries of Czecho-Slovakia were likewise threatened. He suggested that he might draft a letter to the Austrian Delegation informing them of the steps which have been taken.

(It was decided that M. Loucheur should submit to the Council a draft letter to the Austrian Delegation, informing the latter of the steps which have been taken to offset as far as possible the coal shortage existing in Austria.)

(M. Loucheur then left the room.)

⁴ Not printed. This letter from Dr. Renner to M. Clemenceau, communicated by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires on September 18, 1919, stated that 'Austria, and especially its capital, are in a desperate situation on account of the disastrous fuel shortage. From next Sunday public life will be partially paralyzed by the most rigorous measures of economy: service on the street railways [*sic*] will be suspended, the use of electricity by private individuals will be reduced to the minimum; moreover, unless some relief comes at the last moment, it will be absolutely necessary to close all the factories fed by the Vienna power stations. By this fact, more than one hundred thousand workmen will be thrown out of work.

'The Austrian Government has up to the present worked desperately to keep the people supplied with work and to prevent the disastrous consequences of the lack of employment. Now, this sudden and enormous increase in the number of men out of work would make the maintenance of social order impossible. The results of such a condition would be incalculable, and there would be no limit to its action.'

Dr. Renner observed that this state of affairs had arisen despite the provisions of article 224 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which sought to ensure to Austria a basic coal supply from Poland and Czechoslovakia. He therefore appealed to 'the noble intentions revealed in the Peace Treaty' and to the Supreme Council 'to exercise its great power over the states in question, in order to save the Austrian nation from collapse, as well as from the dangers of anarchy, thereby preventing the catastrophe with [which] Central Europe is seriously threatened. Knowing that Your Excellency and the Supreme Council are not deaf to the appeals of a suffering nation, I have the firm hope that at this fateful and decisive hour for new Austria the Powers responsible for the new order of things in the world will give it aid.'

The Meeting then adjourned.

Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,

September 19, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 61

*Telegrams from Sir George Clerk transmitted through the French Minister
at Bucharest*

September 12, 1919.

On account of the delay incident to the formation of the new Cabinet⁵ I have on this day presented the note of the Conference to M. Bratiano.

September 13, 1919.

The note was presented yesterday to M. Bratiano. M. Bratiano informed me today that he had decided not to publish the text of the note fearing that, because of public sentiment, this publication rendered it more difficult to reach a complete accord with the Entente, which he is extremely anxious to attain.

I therefore request that steps be taken to prohibit publication in Paris or elsewhere.

I am transmitting by special report the result of my interviews, but the Rumanian Government declares that its only wish is to work in complete agreement with the Supreme Council on the Hungarian question.

APPENDIX B TO No. 61

Note from British and American Experts

OCCUPATION OF WESTERN THRACE BY ALLIED TROOPS

The American and British Delegates to the Central Territorial Commission having been asked by their French and Italian colleagues to arrive at an agreement regarding the line of demarcation of the zones of Western Thrace which may be occupied respectively by the Greek army and the other Allied Contingents, have agreed on the following:

'A line (such as indicated on the map hereto annexed²) starting from point 1900 on Kartal Dag and running toward the South to a point where the Aksu river enters the Aegean Sea (see the British map, scale 1:1,000,000).

'The detachments of Grecian soldiers should occupy no territory to the East of this line.

'It is understood that this temporary fixing of the zones of military occupation for the Greek and Allied troops shall in no wise prejudice the decisions which may be eventually taken concerning the future Eastern frontier of Greece in this region.'

September 18, 1919.

DULLES.

NICOLSON.

⁵ M. Bratianu resigned from office on September 12, 1919: cf. No. 63, appendix A.

*Rapport No. 5 présenté au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission
des Affaires Polonaises*

STATUT DE LA GALICIE ORIENTALE

23 août 1919.

MANDAT, RAPPEL DES SÉANCES, DIVISIONS DU RAPPORT

La Commission a l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil suprême des Alliés le présent rapport qui est divisé en trois parties:

La première expose les principes généraux dont la Commission s'est inspirée dans l'élaboration du projet de traité.

La seconde donne le texte même du projet de traité⁶, ainsi qu'une proposition relative à l'établissement du régime définitif.

La troisième indique, pour les articles du Traité sur lesquels un accord unanime [? n']a pu se faire, d'une part les arguments à l'appui du texte proposé par la majorité de la Commission, d'autre part les considérations en faveur du texte proposé par la minorité.

En ce qui concerne la seconde partie, il y a lieu d'observer que le mandat de la Commission ne lui donnait pas mission d'inclure dans le Traité une clause relative à l'établissement du régime définitif. La Commission estime cependant devoir proposer l'insertion dans le Traité d'une clause fixant l'échéance à laquelle les Puissances détermineront la date et les conditions de la consultation des habitants. L'audition des représentants du parti ruthène de Galicie orientale qui ont insisté sur la nécessité d'une semblable disposition pour que le régime établi par le Traité soit accepté sans troubles par la population ruthène a confirmé la Commission dans cette opinion. Elle attire, en conséquence, l'attention du Conseil suprême sur la proposition insérée à la page 256.⁷

I. PRINCIPES GÉNÉRAUX

En élaborant, sur la base des instructions qui lui ont été données, le projet d'organisation de la Galicie orientale qu'elle a l'honneur de présenter ci-dessous, la Commission a été guidée par les principes suivants:

a) *L'autorité que le Gouvernement polonais exercera en Galicie orientale, pendant la durée du régime provisoire, doit être assez forte pour lui permettre de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans ce pays divisé et agité, de mener à bien la grande tâche de reconstitution économique dont la Galicie orientale a tant besoin, et de mettre un frein dans une certaine mesure aux abus possibles de la part des corps locaux autonomes, élus par une population très insuffisamment préparée à se gouverner entièrement par elle-même.*

De ce principe résultent, notamment, les pouvoirs relativement étendus qui sont conférés au Gouverneur de la Galicie orientale, et en particulier le droit de veto qui lui est accordé en ce qui concerne les lois votées par la Diète.

⁶ Note in original: 'Le projet de traité a été présenté au Comité de Rédaction qui l'a approuvé après y avoir apporté certains changements de forme.'

⁷ The reference is to the proposal relative to the establishment of a definitive régime, inserted in the report after the text of the draft treaty.

b) *Les habitants de la Galicie orientale doivent recevoir toutes les garanties nécessaires relativement à leurs droits civiques, nationaux et religieux, et à tous les intérêts spéciaux qui les différencient des Polonais.*

La Commission croit avoir répondu dans une large mesure à cette nécessité:

Par l'article 5, qui accorde aux Galiciens toutes les libertés conférées aux citoyens de l'État polonais, et particulièrement une liberté religieuse complète;

Par l'article 6 (garanties concernant la liberté de parole, de presse, de réunion et d'association);

Par l'article 7 (égalité complète des langues polonaise et ruthène, stipulation concernant les écoles);

Par l'article 8 (qui étend à la Galicie orientale toutes les garanties se rapportant aux minorités contenues dans le Traité séparé avec la Pologne du 28 juin 1919);

Par l'article 9 (garanties contre une colonisation systématique du pays par immigration).

c) *Il convient d'accorder aux habitants de la Galicie orientale une large autonomie.*

En application de ce principe, le projet présenté par la Commission prévoit:

Une Diète de Galicie orientale ayant une compétence plus étendue que ne l'était celle de la Diète de Galicie sous le régime autrichien (art. 10 à 15);

Un cabinet de Ministres responsables devant cette Diète (art. 22 et 23);

Un statut judiciaire particulier comportant une Cour suprême siégeant à Lemberg (art. 27 à 29).

d) *Pour tracer les limites de l'autonomie de la Galicie orientale, il y a lieu de tenir un compte équitable des considérations suivantes:*

1. *Étant donné l'étendue relativement faible de ce territoire, et la durée comparativement restreinte du régime provisoire, il ne paraît ni sage ni pratique d'instituer en Galicie orientale le mécanisme entier nécessaire au fonctionnement d'un État complètement distinct.*

2. *Un grand nombre de questions d'ordre gouvernemental, touchant à des intérêts généraux considérables, et nécessitant des connaissances techniques et une expérience politique étendue seront résolues d'une manière plus adéquate par le Gouvernement et la Diète de Varsovie que par la Diète de Lemberg.*

3. *La Pologne doit être mise en mesure de s'acquitter des obligations qu'elle assume en ce qui concerne la Galicie orientale.*

Ces considérations ont amené la Commission à proposer que les questions se rapportant à la représentation à l'étranger, aux douanes, aux chemins de fer, aux postes et télégraphes et, en général, toutes les affaires qui ne sont pas expressément réservées à la Diète de Galicie orientale, soient considérées comme étant communes à la Galicie orientale et à la Pologne, et comme rentrant dans la compétence législative de la Diète de Varsovie, où la Galicie orientale sera mise en mesure de faire valoir ses droits.

II. PROJET DE TRAITÉ CONCERNANT LA GALICIE ORIENTALE⁸

Les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon, Principales Puissances alliées et associées, et la Pologne,

Soucieux de mettre fin au conflit malheureux qui, pendant longtemps, a désolé la Galicie orientale, et d'établir dans ce pays un régime qui devra en assurer,

⁸ Note in original: 'Pour les articles sur lesquels l'unanimité n'a pu se faire, le texte proposé par la majorité de la Commission et le texte proposé par la minorité sont placés en regard l'un de l'autre.'

autant que possible, l'autonomie, et sauvegarder les libertés individuelles, politiques et religieuses de ses habitants, jusqu'au moment où ceux-ci seront appelés à exprimer par une consultation, actuellement différée en raison de l'état troublé de l'Europe orientale, leurs désirs relativement au statut politique définitif de ce territoire;

Considérant que la Galicie orientale a fait partie de l'ancien royaume de Pologne jusqu'au démembrement de celui-ci;

Que la Pologne est aujourd'hui, de l'avis des Principales Puissances alliées et associées, l'État le mieux qualifié pour restaurer un Gouvernement libre et bien ordonné en Galicie orientale;

Et désirant conclure un Traité à cette fin;

Ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu les stipulations suivantes:

Chapitre premier.—*Statut de la Galicie orientale*

Article premier

Les Principales Puissances alliées et associées transfèrent à la Pologne, sous réserve des conditions stipulées dans le présent Traité et notamment dans l'article 2, tous les droits et titres qu'elles tiennent de l'Autriche en vertu de l'article 91 du Traité de Paix en date du. sur la partie ci-dessous définie des anciens 'Kronländer' autrichiens de Galicie et de Bukovine:

A. *Limites Ouest*

En partant de l'ancienne frontière entre la Russie et l'Autriche, au point où la limite administrative orientale de la commune de Belzec la rencontre et vers le Sud-Ouest:

Cette limite administrative, puis la limite administrative entre les districts de Cieszanow à l'Ouest et de Rawa-Ruska à l'Est:

De là vers le Sud la limite administrative entre les districts de Cieszanow et Jaworow, tout en coupant le saillant formé autour du village de Lipowiec par une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain passant à 2 kilomètres environ au Nord de cette localité:

De là vers le Sud la limite administrative entre les districts de Jaroslaw et de Jaworow puis entre les districts de Przemyśl, d'une part, et Mosciska, puis de Sambor, puis de Stary-Sambor de l'autre, puis entre les districts de Dobromil et Stary-Sambor jusqu'au saillant à 2 kilomètres au sud-est de la cote 519 (Radycz):

De là vers le Sud jusqu'au saillant de la limite administrative entre les districts de Dobromil et Stary-Sambor, à 15 kilomètres au sud-ouest de Chyrow et à 4 kilomètres au sud-est de la cote 733, une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain coupant le chemin de fer Chyrow-Sambor, à 2 kilomètres environ à l'est de Chyrow et suivant la ligne de crête entre les bassins du Strwiaz et du Dniester:

De là vers le Sud cette limite administrative, puis la limite entre les districts de Lisko, d'une part, et de Stary-Sambor, puis de Turka de l'autre, jusqu'au point de rencontre avec la frontière de Tchéco-Slovaquie. La frontière s'écarte toutefois de ces limites en deux points où le tracé sera à déterminer sur le terrain:

a) Lorsque la limite administrative passe à l'ouest de la route de Chyrow à Lutowska, de façon à laisser cette route entièrement en territoire polonais:

b) Aux environs de la localité de Bobrka, de façon à laisser cette localité en territoire polonais.

B. *Limites Sud-Ouest*

A partir du point de rencontre de la limite occidentale de la Galicie orientale avec la frontière de Tchéco-Slovaquie et vers le Sud-Est:

Cette frontière jusqu'à son point de rencontre avec l'ancienne limite administrative entre la Galicie et la Bukovine.

C. *Limites Sud-Est*

Du point ci-dessus défini et vers le Nord-Est, l'ancienne limite administrative entre la Galicie et la Bukovine jusqu'au point où elle rencontre la limite entre les districts de Horodenka et de Sniatyn, à environ 11 kilomètres au Sud-Est de Horodenka:

de là et vers le Nord-Est et jusqu'au Dniester en un point à environ 2 kilomètres en aval de Zaleszczyki:

une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain passant par les cotes 239, 312 et 317:

de là et jusqu'au point où l'ancienne frontière entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie se détache du Dniester vers le Nord à environ 3 kilomètres à l'Ouest de Jvanets:

le cours principal du Dniester.

D. *Limites Est et Nord-Est*

Du point ci-dessus défini sur le Dniester, l'ancienne frontière entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie jusqu'au point où la limite administrative orientale de la commune de Belzec la rencontre.

Une Commission composée de six membres, dont cinq seront nommés par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées et un par la Pologne, sera constituée dans les quinze jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, pour fixer sur place le traité des limites ci-dessus prévues et à la fixation desquelles il n'aurait pas été pourvu par ailleurs. Les décisions de la Commission seront prises à la majorité des voix, étant entendu que le Président aura droit, en cas de partage des voix, à émettre un second vote; ces décisions seront obligatoires pour les parties intéressées.

Les frais en seront prélevés sur les revenus de la Galicie orientale.

Article 2

La Pologne s'engage à organiser, dans les limites fixées à l'article 1^{er}, la Galicie orientale, qui constituera un territoire autonome.

La Pologne s'engage, en outre, à faire ou laisser procéder à une consultation des habitants, sur le statut définitif du territoire, à la date et dans les conditions qui seront déterminées par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées, ou par tout autre organisme qu'elles auront désigné. Elle reconnaît par avance les limites et le statut qui, à la suite de cette consultation, seront définitivement fixés par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées ou par l'organisme qu'elles auront désigné.⁹

Article 3

Pendant la durée du régime établi par le présent Traité, les Traités et Conventions conclus ou à conclure par la Pologne s'appliqueront à la Galicie orientale à moins de dispositions contraires.

⁹ Note in original: 'Voir la proposition relative à l'établissement d'un régime définitif.'

Article 4

Les agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la Pologne protégeront à l'étranger les intérêts des ressortissants de la Galicie orientale.

Article 5

Toutes les libertés d'ordre privé et public, tous les droits politiques et les droits réservés aux minorités, assurés en Pologne par les lois polonaises, seront assurés en Galicie orientale. En particulier, la plus complète liberté religieuse sera garantie. Le rite catholique grec bénéficiera des mêmes droits que le rite catholique romain.

Article 6

La Pologne s'engage à ce que les lois applicables en Galicie orientale, concernant les libertés de réunion, d'association, la liberté de la parole et de la presse, tiennent compte du régime spécial du territoire et assurent aux habitants les plus larges libertés avec le maintien de l'ordre et l'observation des stipulations du présent Traité.

Article 7

La langue polonaise et la langue ruthène seront reconnues, au même titre, comme langues officielles en Galicie orientale et jouiront des mêmes droits.

Sans préjudice des garanties assurées aux minorités par l'article 8, il appartiendra à chaque commune ou municipalité de décider si la langue polonaise ou la langue ruthène, ou les deux langues, seront enseignées dans les établissements publics d'enseignement primaire.

En matière d'instruction publique dans les établissements d'enseignement primaire, secondaire et supérieur, et sous réserve de la disposition de l'article 13, le pouvoir législatif appartiendra à la Diète de Galicie orientale, prévue à l'article 10.

Dans l'attribution des fonds publics aux trois ordres d'enseignement, il sera fait une part équitable de l'enseignement donné en langue polonaise et à l'enseignement donné en langue ruthène.

Article 8

Les dispositions du Traité conclues le 28 juin 1919 entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont applicables en Galicie orientale et seront interprétées en ce sens : 1^o les obligations que ce Traité impose à la Pologne seront également à la charge des autorités de la Galicie orientale dans la mesure de leur compétence ; 2^o les garanties qu'édicte ce Traité en faveur des minorités ethniques en vue d'une majorité polonaise sont assurées également dans le cas où la majorité serait ruthène.

Article 9

Il ne devra être procédé, en Galicie orientale, à aucune colonisation systématique au moyen de colons venus du dehors.

Chapitre II.—*Diète de la Galicie orientale*

Article 10

Il y aura en Galicie orientale une Diète, qui sera composée d'une seule Chambre élue au suffrage universel secret avec représentation proportionnelle. Le droit de vote appartiendra, sans distinction, à l'un et l'autre sexe.

Des élections générales auront lieu tous les cinq ans. En cas de dissolution de la Diète, les élections auront lieu dans un délai de trois mois après la dissolution.

Les lois électorales polonaises s'appliqueront à l'élection de la Diète de Galicie orientale, sous réserve des dispositions qui précèdent.

Article 11

La Diète sera convoquée par le Gouverneur prévu à l'article 1^{er}[19]. Le Gouverneur pourra également l'ajourner, prononcer la clôture de la session ou dissoudre la Diète.

La Diète tiendra chaque année deux sessions ordinaires.

Article 12

*Texte proposé
par la majorité de la commission
(Délégations Américaine,
Française, Italienne et Japonaise).*

La Diète de la Galicie orientale légifèrera sur les matières suivantes :

- 1^o Exercice du culte public;
- 2^o Instruction publique;
- 3^o Assistance publique;
- 4^o Hygiène publique;
- 5^o Voies de communications régionales, communales et vicinales, y compris les chemins de fer d'intérêt local;
- 6^o Tous encouragements à l'agriculture, au commerce et à l'industrie, y compris les mesures propres à faciliter le crédit, les achats et les ventes, à développer l'emploi des moyens techniques nouveaux, à favoriser les recherches et les expériences;

7^o Application des lois générales sur l'aménagement des eaux en vue de l'irrigation ou leur utilisation comme force motrice;

8^o Application des lois générales sur l'organisation et l'administration des municipalités et districts;

9^o Impôts à percevoir pour le compte propre de la Galicie orientale;

10^o Toutes autres matières, pour lesquelles la Diète de Pologne lui aura attribué compétence.

Chaque année, la Diète de Galicie orientale votera, sur la proposition du

*Texte proposé
par la minorité de la commission
(Délégation Britannique).*

La Diète de la Galicie orientale légifèrera sur les matières suivantes :

- 1^o Exercice du culte public;
- 2^o Instruction publique;
- 3^o Assistance publique;
- 4^o Hygiène publique;
- 5^o Voies de communications régionales, communales et vicinales, y compris les chemins de fer d'intérêt local;
- 6^o Tous encouragements à l'agriculture, au commerce et à l'industrie, y compris les mesures propres à faciliter le crédit, les achats et les ventes, à développer l'emploi des moyens techniques nouveaux, à favoriser les recherches et les expériences;

7^o Application des lois générales sur l'aménagement des eaux en vue de l'irrigation ou leur utilisation comme force motrice;

8^o Application des lois générales sur l'organisation et l'administration des municipalités et districts;

9^o Impôts à percevoir pour le compte propre de la Galicie orientale;

10^o Toutes autres matières, pour lesquelles la Diète de Pologne lui aura attribué compétence.

Chaque année, la Diète de Galicie orientale votera, sur la proposition du

Gouverneur, le budget des services correspondant aux matières rentrant dans sa compétence.

Gouverneur, le budget des services correspondant aux matières rentrant dans sa compétence.

La législation agraire votée par la Diète de Pologne ne sera applicable en Galicie orientale qu'après un vote conforme de la Diète de Galicie orientale.

Article 13

Toute loi votée par la Diète sera transmise au Gouverneur par le Président de la Diète; elle pourra, dans le délai d'un mois à dater de cette communication, être frappée de veto par le Gouverneur agissant de sa propre autorité. Ce droit de veto sera épuisé si, dans le délai d'un an après qu'il aura été exercé, la loi est votée à nouveau par la Diète à une majorité des deux tiers. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne les lois relatives à l'instruction publique dans les établissements d'enseignement secondaire et supérieur, le veto du Gouverneur est absolu.

Article 14

Aucun membre de la Diète ne pourra être poursuivi ou recherché en aucune manière à raison de discours, opinions ou votes émis à la Diète ou dans ses commissions.

Aucun membre de la Diète ne pourra, pendant la durée d'une session, être arrêté ou poursuivi devant les tribunaux répressifs qu'avec l'autorisation de la Diète, sauf en cas de flagrant délit. La détention ou poursuite d'un membre de la Diète sera suspendue pendant toute la durée de la session, si la Diète le requiert.

Article 15

La Diète établira elle-même son règlement. Elle élira son Président et son Bureau.

La Cour suprême de Lemberg, visée à l'article 27, statuera sur les réclamations formées contre la validité des élections à la Diète.

Chapitre III.—*Représentation de la Galicie orientale dans la Diète de Pologne et dans le Gouvernement polonais*

Article 16

Texte
proposé par la majorité de la commission
(Délégations Américaine, Française,
Italienne et Japonaise).

Les électeurs de la Galicie orientale participeront aux élections à la Diète de Pologne. A cet effet, les lois polonaises sur les élections à cette Diète s'étendront à la Galicie orientale sous cette réserve que la représentation proportionnelle devra être maintenue dans le territoire.

Texte
proposé par la minorité de la commission
(Délégation Britannique).

Un arrangement ultérieur entre le Gouvernement polonais et le Ministère de Galicie orientale, conclu avec la participation de la Société des Nations, si les deux parties le désirent, décidera de la question de savoir si et comment la Galicie orientale sera représentée à la Diète de Pologne. Cet arrangement

Les députés élus en Galicie orientale ne participeront pas, dans la Diète de Pologne, aux délibérations sur les matières législatives du même ordre que celles attribuées à la Diète de Galicie orientale.

sera soumis à l'approbation de la Diète de Pologne et de la Diète de Galicie orientale.

Article 17

La Diète de Pologne aura le droit de légiférer, pour la Galicie orientale, sur toutes les matières qui ne sont pas de la compétence de la Diète de la Galicie orientale.

Article 18

Le Conseil des Ministres de Pologne comprendra un Ministre sans portefeuille, qui sera nommé par le Chef de l'État polonais parmi les habitants de la Galicie orientale et qui représentera celle-ci.

Des bureaux spéciaux aux affaires de Galicie orientale seront organisés dans chacun des ministères polonais ayant compétence pour s'occuper desdites affaires.

Un haut fonctionnaire ruthène sera attaché au Conseil des Ministres polonais pour lui servir de conseiller dans les affaires concernant spécialement les Ruthènes et dans celles du rite catholique grec.

Chapitre IV.—*Administration de la Galicie orientale*

Article 19

Le pouvoir exécutif en Galicie orientale sera confié à un Gouverneur, qui sera nommé par le Chef de l'État polonais et pourra être révoqué par lui.

Article 20

Le Gouverneur veillera au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique. Il assurera l'exécution des lois votées par la Diète de Pologne et la Diète de Galicie orientale.

Article 21

Sous réserve du droit de veto prévu à l'article 13, le Gouverneur promulguera les lois votées par la Diète de Galicie orientale, dans le délai d'un mois, à dater de la transmission qui lui aura été faite par le Président de cette Assemblée.

Article 22

Les affaires ressortissant à la Diète de Galicie orientale seront dirigées par des Ministres nommés par le Gouverneur et responsables devant la Diète. Celle-ci fixera le nombre, les fonctions et le traitement de ces Ministres.

Article 23

Les affaires ne ressortissant pas à la Diète de Galicie orientale seront dirigées en Galicie orientale par des chefs de service, placés sous la direction du Gouverneur.

Article 24

Les actes du Gouverneur se référant aux matières visées à l'article 12, devront être contresignés par un Ministre responsable, à l'exception du décret de veto.

Article 25

Le Gouverneur nommera les fonctionnaires publics. Toutefois, la loi polonaise ou galicienne, suivant le cas, pourra prescrire pour des fonctionnaires subalternes un autre mode de nomination. Elle pourra également établir les conditions requises pour être admis à telle ou telle fonction.

Les fonctionnaires des services correspondant aux matières visées à l'article 12 seront nommés sur la proposition du Ministre responsable.

Article 26

L'aptitude aux fonctions publiques ne devra, en principe, être subordonnée ni en droit, ni en fait, à des conditions de race, de religion ou de langue.

Les fonctionnaires devront, sauf exception nécessaire, être recrutés en Galicie orientale. Des règlements arrêtés par le Gouverneur sur la proposition du chef de service intéressé ou sur la proposition du Ministre responsable, suivant le cas, pourront déterminer les fonctions qui seront réservées exclusivement à des candidats originaires de la Galicie orientale ou y remplissant les conditions de domicile qui seront fixées par ces règlements.

Dans le choix des fonctionnaires on devra, à mérite égal, tenir compte de l'importance numérique des divers groupes nationaux.

Chapitre V. — *Organisation judiciaire de la Galicie orientale*

Article 27

La Cour de Lemberg constituera une Cour suprême pour le territoire entier de la Galicie orientale.

Article 28

Les juges de la Galicie orientale, à l'exception de ceux pour lesquels un système électif serait adopté, seront nommés par le Chef de l'État polonais sur la proposition du Gouverneur. Ils seront inamovibles et ne pourront être destitués que sur avis conforme de la Cour de Lemberg, statuant comme Conseil suprême de discipline de la magistrature.

Article 29

Les peines prononcées par les tribunaux de la Galicie orientale seront exécutées en Galicie orientale.

Article 30

Le Chef de l'État polonais aura le droit de grâce à l'égard des individus condamnés par les tribunaux de la Galicie orientale.

Chapitre VI. — *Régime financier de la Galicie orientale*

Article 31

Le régime financier, spécial à la Galicie orientale, sera fixé par une loi polonaise conformément aux distributions du présent Traité.

Article 32

Les biens situés en Galicie orientale et appartenant antérieurement au Gouvernement autrichien, au 'Kronland' de Galicie ou à la Couronne autrichienne, ainsi que les biens situés sur ce territoire et appartenant, à titre privé, à l'ancienne famille

souveraine d'Autriche-Hongrie sont, dans les conditions visées à l'article 204 du Traité de paix entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes et l'Autriche, transférés à la Pologne, qui en assurera l'administration.

Article 33

Les biens actuellement affectés à un service public conserveront cette affection. Ils ne pourront être désaffectés à l'avenir que dans les formes légales et sur avis conforme de l'autorité qui dirige ce service.

Pendant la durée du régime temporaire établi par le présent Traité, les biens visés à l'article 32 ne pourront être aliénés ni grevés de charges dont l'effet dépasserait la durée dudit régime; les baux qui dépasseraient cette durée cesseront en tout cas d'être en vigueur trois ans après l'établissement du statut définitif prévu à l'article 2, s'ils n'ont pas été expressément confirmés pendant ce délai. Toutefois, cette stipulation n'empêchera en rien de disposer de ces biens en vue de l'accomplissement de la réforme agraire ou de travaux reconnus d'utilité publique.

Les dispositions du présent chapitre ne préjugent point de l'attribution à faire par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées desdits biens, dans le cas où la Galicie orientale viendrait à être, en tout ou partie, détachée de la Pologne.

Article 34

Les adjonctions aux biens domaniaux ou aux biens affectés à des services publics seront administrés conformément aux dispositions des articles 32 et 33; elles donneront lieu à l'établissement d'un compte à régler lors de la fixation du régime définitif de la Galicie orientale.

Article 35

Dans le cas où certains services, dont la charge incomberait à la Galicie orientale, seraient en Pologne à la charge du budget de l'État, la législation polonaise fixera la quote-part correspondante du produit des impôts généraux perçus en Galicie orientale, qui devra être versée au budget de celle-ci.

Article 36

Le budget de la Galicie orientale comprendra :

1° En dépenses :

Les dépenses concernant les matières visées à l'article 12 ;

2° En recettes :

a) La quote-part du produit des impôts généraux déterminée conformément à l'article 35 ;

b) Le produit des suppléments aux impôts généraux, dont la quotité sera fixée par la Diète de Galicie orientale ;

c) Le produit des impôts des taxes établis par la Diète de Galicie orientale.

Article 37

Le Gouvernement polonais assurera le service des dettes qui, en vertu des articles 199 et 200 du Traité de Paix entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes et l'Autriche, doit être à la charge du territoire de la Galicie orientale. Au cas où ce territoire viendrait à être, en tout ou en partie, détaché de la Pologne, la part contributive lui incombant sera déterminée conformément au principe établi par l'article 199 dudit Traité.

Chapitre VII. — Organisation militaire

Article 38

*Texte proposé
par la majorité de la commission
(Délégations Américaine, Française,
Italienne et Japonaise).*

La législation sur le service militaire en vigueur en Pologne pourra être appliquée par la Pologne en Galicie orientale.

Le contingent ainsi recruté formera, dans le cadre de l'armée polonaise, des unités spéciales qui, en temps de paix, tiendront garnison en Galicie orientale.

*Texte proposé
par la minorité de la commission
(Délégation Anglaise).*

Il n'y aura pas de service militaire obligatoire en Galicie orientale.

Chapitre VIII. — Dispositions transitoires

Article 39

Jusqu'à la réunion de la Diète, le Gouverneur de la Galicie orientale administrera le territoire en se conformant aux dispositions du présent Traité.

En ce qui concerne les matières qui, d'après le présent Traité, sont de la compétence de la Diète polonaise, les lois polonaises seront introduites en Galicie orientale par une promulgation par le Gouverneur. En ce qui concerne les matières qui sont de la compétence de la Diète de Galicie orientale, les lois et règlements en vigueur au 28 juillet 1914 seront appliquées sans nouvelle promulgation.

Le Gouverneur prendra les mesures nécessaires pour la constitution initiale des services administratifs. Il fixera le nombre des ministres et leurs attributions respectives et il en sera ainsi jusqu'à décision contraire de la Diète.

Le Gouverneur prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que la Diète de Galicie orientale soit, dans les conditions prévues à l'article 10, élue le plus tôt possible, et de façon à ce que la Diète puisse se réunir, au plus tard, dans un délai de neuf mois après la mise en vigueur du présent Traité. Il appartiendra au Gouverneur d'assurer la liberté du vote en se conformant notamment aux stipulations de l'article 6 et à procéder sans délai à la convocation de la Diète.

L'ensemble du régime établi par les chapitres I^{er} à VI du présent Traité fonctionnera dès la réunion de la première Diète. Le service militaire obligatoire ne pourra être introduit en Galicie orientale avant cette date.

Article 40

Aucun des habitants de la Galicie orientale ne pourra être inquiété ou molesté en raison de son attitude politique depuis le 28 juillet 1914 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

PROPOSITION RELATIVE À L'ÉTABLISSEMENT DU RÉGIME DÉFINITIF

En ce qui concerne l'établissement d'un régime définitif, la Commission croit devoir soumettre à l'unanimité au Conseil suprême des Alliés la proposition suivante qui, si elle recevait l'approbation du Conseil, pourrait être insérée à la fin de l'article 2 :

Dix ans après l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, les Principales Puissances alliées et associées, ou tout autre organisme qu'elles auront désigné, fixeront, après examen de la situation, la date à laquelle la population de la Galicie orientale sera appelée à se prononcer sur son statut politique définitif, ainsi que le mode de cette consultation.

III. DISCUSSION DES ARTICLES SUR LESQUELS L'UNANIMITÉ N'A PU SE FAIRE

La Commission est unanime à proposer 37 des articles du projet de statut de la Galicie orientale. En ce qui concerne les articles 12, 16 et 38, les raisons qui ont amené la majorité (Délégations américaine, française, italienne et japonaise) et la minorité (Délégation britannique) à soumettre des propositions différentes sont exposées ci-dessous :

Article 12. — *Législation agraire*

Opinion de la minorité. — La minorité estime que les conditions de la possession de la terre en Galicie orientale diffèrent si considérablement du régime existant en Pologne et que la question agraire est si intimement liée à celle des nationalités que la législation envisagée pour la Pologne devra être profondément modifiée pour s'adapter à la Galicie orientale. Elle estime en outre que, tout en tenant compte des objections que soulève le fait de laisser la législation agraire dans les attributions exclusives de la Diète de la Galicie orientale, ce serait commettre une injustice manifeste envers les habitants de cette région que de permettre à un Gouvernement extérieur de refondre entièrement leur régime agraire sans leur consentement et cela au cours d'une courte période de transition. Comme aucune forme de représentation à Varsovie ne pourrait en soi garantir aux représentants de la Galicie orientale une influence décisive dans aucune question particulière, la minorité estime que la législation agraire votée par la Diète polonaise ne devrait être appliquée en Galicie orientale qu'avec le consentement de la Diète de la Galicie orientale.

Opinion de la majorité. — Les autres Délégations estiment qu'il serait à la fois imprudent et inutile de donner à la Diète de Galicie un droit de veto sur la législation agraire votée par la Diète de Varsovie.

La réforme agraire que vient d'adopter la Diète polonaise présente un caractère si libéral et si satisfaisant qu'il semblerait être de l'intérêt même des Galiciens d'assurer sa prompte et complète application en Galicie orientale.

Les habitants de ce territoire auront l'occasion de faire respecter leurs desiderata et leurs intérêts pendant la mise à exécution de cette réforme, car son application dépendra des commissions locales qui seront créées à cet effet.

Dans une question aussi complexe que la législation agraire, il pourrait dans la pratique être très difficile d'arriver à un accord complet entre les deux Diètes de Varsovie et de Lemberg, et tout manque d'entente entre celles-ci ne ferait qu'entraver ou mettre en danger la totalité de la réforme agraire en Galicie orientale.

La nécessité d'un accord en pareille matière entre deux organes parlementaires si différemment composés et si éloignés l'un de l'autre semble être une nouveauté en droit constitutionnel et, probablement, n'aboutirait qu'à créer un système inopérant.

Article 16. — *Représentation de la Galicie à la Diète Polonaise*

Opinion de la majorité. — Quatre Délégations estiment que, pour des raisons de justice aussi bien que de nécessité pratique, la Galicie orientale doit être représentée dans la Diète polonaise, et qu'elle doit y être représentée par des députés élus d'après les règles mêmes qui s'appliquent aux élections ayant lieu en Pologne.

En effet, selon les principes acceptés par toutes les Délégations, la Diète de Varsovie aura compétence pour lever des impôts en Galicie orientale, et pour voter beaucoup de lois d'ordres divers qui s'appliqueront à ce territoire. La juridiction de la plupart des départements ministériels de Varsovie s'étendra, dans une mesure plus ou moins grande, à la Galicie orientale. Donc, à moins que les

habitants de cette province n'envoient des députés à la Diète polonaise, il n'aurait pas de moyen effectif de faire entendre leur voix dans les questions qui sont pour eux d'un intérêt vital. Cette représentation doit être considérée comme un droit indispensable qu'on leur accorde plutôt que comme un fardeau qu'on leur impose.

La contre-proposition d'une Délégation tendant à ce que cette question soit réglée par un accord conclu de gré à gré entre le Gouvernement polonais et le Ministère de Galicie, sous réserve de la médiation possible de la Société des Nations, prête à de graves objections.

Le présent Traité repose sur l'idée que les questions fondamentales concernant les relations entre la Galicie orientale et la Pologne doivent être réglées par le Traité lui-même. La question de la représentation de la Galicie orientale à la Diète polonaise est certainement l'une des questions essentielles et il ne semble pas qu'il y ait de raison pour régler par un accord ultérieur de gré à gré cette question plutôt que la plupart des autres questions rentrant dans le cadre de ce Traité.

Le Gouvernement polonais serait fondé à présenter des objections, même au seul point de vue de la forme, à l'éventualité de la médiation de la Société des Nations en pareille matière. Car pendant la durée du régime provisoire, la Galicie orientale ne sera qu'une province partiellement autonome sous la souveraineté de la Pologne, et il est douteux qu'un Gouvernement quelconque, à l'heure actuelle, puisse être amené à demander que la Société des Nations intervienne comme médiatrice entre ses sujets et lui.

Enfin, aux termes mêmes du projet de Traité, le Ministère de Galicie orientale a sa compétence définie par les articles 12 et 22. La question qu'il aurait, d'après la rédaction britannique de l'article 16, à traiter, sort entièrement de sa compétence, d'où des difficultés, peut-être sérieuses, à prévoir, résultant des conséquences que certains chefs de parti ruthènes pourraient essayer de tirer de cette discordance.

Opinion de la minorité. — La minorité estime qu'il y a intérêt à attirer l'attention du Conseil suprême sur le fait que les représentants à Paris de la population ruthène, qui constitue la majorité de la population de Galicie orientale, se sont exprimés dans un sens nettement opposé à toute représentation directe à la Diète polonaise, représentation qui leur semble impliquer l'annexion à la Pologne.

La Délégation estime, à la lumière de l'expérience des Assemblées législatives où des minorités de race ont été représentées, qu'une telle représentation n'assure à la minorité aucune influence effective dans les questions qui la concernent et n'engendre qu'une obstruction préjudiciable au bon fonctionnement de l'Assemblée. Étant donné qu'en ce qui concerne la Galicie orientale la population ruthène s'oppose résolument à une représentation directe à la Diète polonaise, la Délégation estime qu'il n'y aurait aucun avantage à envoyer contre son gré un parti nationaliste siéger à Varsovie: cela ne ferait qu'envenimer les relations entre les deux races. Il serait infiniment préférable que la question fût différée de six mois jusqu'à la réunion de la Diète de Galicie orientale; on pourrait alors élaborer un système de représentation qui recevrait l'assentiment des deux parties.

La Délégation estime donc que cette question, d'une nature particulièrement compliquée, ne saurait être tranchée d'une façon satisfaisante que par un accord conclu sur place entre le Gouvernement polonais et le Ministère de la Galicie orientale, en collaboration, si le désir en est exprimé, avec la Société des Nations.

Article 38. — *Service militaire*

Opinion de la minorité. — La minorité estime qu'étant donné que la population ruthène a résisté pendant six mois par la force des armes à l'occupation polonaise,

on ne saurait obliger par la force les habitants de la Galicie orientale à servir dans l'armée polonaise. On pourrait lever un contingent de volontaires sous le contrôle des Polonais pour la défense du territoire.

Opinion de la majorité. — Aussi longtemps que la situation troublée de l'Europe centrale et orientale rendra le système du service obligatoire nécessaire dans la plupart des pays de cette partie du monde, et étant donné le danger résultant spécialement de la menace bolcheviste, il semble difficile de refuser en principe au Gouvernement polonais le droit d'introduire en Galicie orientale la forme même de service qui existe en Pologne, dans la mesure qu'il trouvera juste et prudente. La Galicie orientale jouira de la protection polonaise, et de tous les droits que possèdent les autres provinces de la Pologne. Il semble qu'il serait contraire aux notions élémentaires de justice de dispenser la Galicie orientale de toute participation à sa propre défense et de sa juste part des charges communes.

Un système de volontariat, fonctionnant à l'exclusion de tout autre, ne donnerait probablement pas de résultat concret au point de vue des effectifs, et serait certainement regardé par les autres populations sujettes de l'État polonais comme constituant une faveur absolument injustifiée accordée à la Galicie orientale.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 62

H. D. 58.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 22, 1919, at 11.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire:* Captain Hinchley-Cooke. *France:* M. Massigli. *Italy:* Lieutenant de Carlos.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Mr. A. Dulles.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, Hon. H. Nicolson, Mr. Carr, Lt.-Col. Kisch.

France: M. Cambon, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Tardieu, M. Hermitte, Colonel Roye.

Italy: M. Castoldi, M. Galli, M. Brambilla, M. Dell'Abbadessa.

1. M. TARDIEU read the joint proposal of the British and American Representatives upon the Central Territorial Committee, who had asked their French and Italian colleagues to agree to the line of demarcation of the zones of Western Thrace, which could be occupied by the Greek Army and by the other Allied Military Forces (see Appendix A¹).

*Occupation of Western
Thrace by Inter-Allied
Troops*

¹ Not printed. This appendix contained a French text of the note in appendix B to No. 61.

He proposed to alter the last paragraph in the following manner:

'The zones of occupation thus fixed do not prejudice in any degree attribution of territory either to Greece or to the International State.'

This proposition was accepted.

(It was decided to accept the text (see Appendix A)¹ as modified.)

2. M. CAMBON said that the Commissions for Polish and Czecho-Slovak affairs had submitted for the approval of the Council a plan for the organization of the plebiscite in the Districts of Teschen, Spiecz and Orava. The Commissions were unanimous in proposing the addition to Article 4, first paragraph, of the following:

Plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen, and in the districts of Spiecz (Spis) and Orava

'and in any event within a maximum period of three months after modification of the present decision as foreseen by Article 9.' (See Appendix B.)

He read a letter which he had received from M. Benes (see Appendix C²) asking that the arrangements for the plebiscite include special provisions concerning the right of option of the populations in the territory where the plebiscite was to be held. The Commission in agreement with the Drafting Committee thought that the question raised by M. Benes ought not to be dealt with in the draft which was submitted for the approval of the Council. It was for the Allied and Associated Powers to enter into such agreements with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, after the plebiscite had taken place, as appeared to them necessary, and to take such steps as they considered advisable as regarded the right of option of the population. The Commission desired to call attention to the urgent need of sending an Inter-Allied Commission, and for Inter-Allied occupation of the country where the plebiscite was to take place.

SIR E. CROWE said that he had no objection to the report of the Commission, but he desired to state that the British Military authorities disapproved of occupation by small forces from several of the Allied States. They believed that it would be far more advantageous, if the powers divided the zones of occupation, and each Power were charged with the occupation of a particular zone. The question had been discussed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and by General Weygand. The French Military Representative thought that the resolution already taken by the Supreme Council prevented a discussion of the problem as a whole. Under these circumstances he suggested that the Council reconsider its former decision and authorize the Military Representatives at Versailles to discuss the matter. It would be necessary to give the Military Authorities full latitude.

GENERAL LE ROND said that at the meeting of August 25 between General Weygand, representing Marshal Foch, Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson and General Bliss the subject of the organization of the Inter-Allied Armies of Occupation had been discussed. The occupation of the Klagenfurt Basin and of Thrace had been foreseen, but not the occupation of Teschen. Under

² Not printed.

these conditions they had estimated that five Divisions would be sufficient. The Army of Occupation could be Inter-Allied. The contingents of each of the Powers would be autonomous and the Supreme Command designated by the Supreme Council. General Weygand, acting for Marshal Foch, had maintained that the Allies had a collective responsibility. The occupation would be an Inter-Allied occupation everywhere. He had considered the political view. For reasons of a practical nature the British Representative on the other hand believed that the occupation of a fixed zone should be confided to a single power. England would occupy the Balkan [?Baltic] territory, France, Upper Silesia, Italy, the Klagenfurt Basin, and America, Dedeagatch. He wished to add that, in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Council, the occupation of Klagenfurt and of Dedeagatch no longer entered into the question. On the other hand, General Bliss, who was present at the Conference, had made no communication exposing the American point of view.

SIR E. CROWE said that the British Military Authorities felt so strongly that they hesitated to send troops to any part of the world, until this principle had been settled.

MR. POLK asked whether there was any provision in the Treaty on the subject of occupation.

SIR E. CROWE replied that there was no such clause, insofar as Inter-Allied occupation was concerned.

MR. POLK asked whether the question had been considered by the Military Authorities at Versailles.

SIR E. CROWE said that he believed that the question had not been considered. The Military Authorities were not in a position to examine the question in view of the previous decision of the Council.

MR. POLK said that the question could be referred to the Military Representatives again as an open question for report on the advantages of the two systems.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Treaty with Germany provided for occupation by Inter-Allied Military Forces. There was an obvious necessity. It was evident, from what had taken place in Roumania and Hungary, that a single power, which had been in fact only the mouthpiece of the decisions of the Council, could be given by public opinion the entire responsibility. It was the Conference which took the responsibility and it was therefore absolutely necessary that the responsibility should be divided, in the same manner as the authority.

MR. POLK said that he realized that the question had a political importance, but in certain cases, and the case of Teschen was one, there was no political difficulty to be feared. It was absurd from a practical point of view to send a mixed contingent from three different Powers. This entailed a special organization for provisioning each contingent and created a complicated situation. He asked whether it would not be possible for a single Power to represent in the District of Teschen. Dantzig would be occupied by a naval Power, but on the other hand, the occupation in Silesia would be Inter-Allied.

M. BERTHELOT said that he laid great weight on the moral side of the question and that to decide that the occupation of a certain territory should be entrusted to the troops of a single power was equivalent to creating a sphere of influence to the advantage of that Power. The equilibrium between the Powers would be far better maintained by a joint occupation. He thought that a formula could be found by which the great majority of the troops could be furnished by a single Power, and that the other Powers would be represented in the Inter-Allied forces by officers.

MR. POLK said a result of this nature could be reached. The Inter-Allied representation would be assured by delegates of the Powers in the Commissions for which the Treaty provided. These Commissions would each have an escort furnished by their countries; the main part of the forces of occupation would remain furnished by a single power.

GENERAL LE ROND said that there was no particular difficulty in the case of Teschen. It should be remembered that the District of Teschen was adjacent to Upper Silesia, which was to be occupied by two divisions. The troops sent to Teschen could easily be rationed from Upper Silesia.

MR. POLK said that he believed that Mr. Balfour had never admitted the principle of the Inter-Allied occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. BERTHELOT said that Mr. Balfour had raised the question, but he had never formally pronounced himself against Inter-Allied occupation. He (M. Berthelot) wished to again emphasize the importance of not creating a sphere of influence or zones of action in which one Power was particularly interested.

SIR E. CROWE said that he agreed on this point, but he wished to add that the zones of occupation were under the authority of Inter-Allied Commissions. It was these Commissions which were responsible; the troops placed at their disposal were only police forces. The principle of joint responsibility was clearly safeguarded.

M. BERTHELOT said that so far as Upper Silesia was concerned the treaty called for Inter-Allied occupation. If this occupation were confided to the troops of a single Power, there was a danger that the Germans would have cause for complaint. In addition, the Supreme Council had taken a definite resolution on this subject on 8th August.³ It had specified at that time that Marshal Foch, in agreement with the Allied General Staffs should weigh, on the one hand, the advantage to be gained by representation by all the Allies in all the forces of occupation, and, on the other, the disadvantages which might result both from eventual differences between soldiers of Allied contingents as well as from difficulties in connection with the provisioning of each force. Marshal Foch was to present a report on the subject to the Supreme Council.

MR. POLK asked whether the report had been sent.

M. BERTHELOT replied that it had been sent and distributed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the date of the report was a matter of importance. He asked whether the force, whose organization had been discussed

³ See No. 31, minute 7.

at that time, had not been intended, not for the mere occupation of Upper Silesia, but for the purpose of driving out the Germans.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was a question of the Peace Treaty.

GENERAL LE ROND said that it was agreed that the total strength should be two divisions (four brigades), and that each of the Powers was to furnish a brigade. Each brigade would be assigned to a special sector. The practical difficulties which might arise would therefore be less difficult to deal with. In addition, the Allied and Associated Powers would be complying with the terms of the Treaty and the principle of joint responsibility would be safeguarded.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Treaty with Germany provided for the occupation of Upper Silesia by troops of the Allied and Associated Powers, but that that did not necessarily mean by troops of all the Allied and Associated Powers. The troops of a single Power could in fact act as the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. BERTHELOT said that to admit this would be to put the text of the treaty on the rack.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not agree, nor did he see why it would not be necessary to send Japanese troops as well.

GENERAL LE ROND said that Japan was not represented on the Commission for the occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. PICHON said that the appendix to Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace provided that Japan should not be represented on this Commission. It might be possible to refer the question again to the military representatives at Versailles pointing out to them that they should take note both of the text of the Treaty, which could not be changed, and of the views of the British delegation.

M. BERTHELOT said that in the meeting of the Supreme Council of August 8th³, Mr. Balfour had not opposed the system of Inter-Allied occupation. He had merely pointed out the difficulties of provisioning an Inter-Allied force and proposed that the General Staffs study a system of compensation by which England, for example, could furnish a larger portion of the Inter-Allied contingent along the coast, and a smaller one in Upper Silesia. The total strength of the force furnished by each of the Allies would remain the same. It was only the redistribution in the zones of occupation which would change. He wished to repeat that it was most important not to put the material and political question on the same footing and that the difficulties ought not be exaggerated. The political question was of extreme importance. It was necessary that the responsibility should be supported equally by all and that no spheres of influence, where one nation would benefit more than another, should be created. There were possibly districts where the difficulties, as well as the possible advantages, were greater than in others, and it was not possible to admit the principle that a single nation should be in occupation there. As far as the material question was concerned, he thought that it could be solved without much difficulty. As an example, where difficulties and responsibility had fallen upon a single Power he wished to cite the example of Bulgaria. The French had acted as a police force of the

Allies and they were the only ones who had incurred expense and burdens. England had expressed the intention of coming to the assistance of France, but France had received nothing beyond the offer of forty Hindu soldiers. He understood that so far as the United States was concerned, there were serious moral and material difficulties, but he believed strongly that it was advisable for the Great Powers to be together in the same zones.

M. CAMBON said that it was important to remember that in the eyes of the people the International Commissions did not count and that it was the military command, and that only which in their eyes was responsible. He wished to recall to Sir Eyre Crowe's mind, without any intention to criticize, an incident in history. In a certain century a distinguished prisoner had been placed under the surveillance of an Inter-Allied Commission, in which even France was represented, but it was England which was charged with the custody of the prisoner and it was England which bore the weight of the responsibility.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the two cases were not quite the same, for here the Council was dealing with a part of Germany. He understood in regard to the question before the Council that the military representatives at Versailles were limited by a decision of the Supreme Council. If the question were again referred to Versailles, no result would be reached unless the former resolution of the Council were modified. It was necessary to authorize the military representatives to study the matter as an open question and to ask them to make a report.

M. BERTHELOT agreed, but said that the question of principle would first have to be regulated. The military representatives at Versailles were not in position to decide. It was for the Supreme Council to give instructions when a decision had been made as to whether or not the occupation was to be Inter-Allied, the contingents from the various powers being proportioned according to some system to be devised.

M. PICHON said that the Versailles Council had never studied this question. The subject had been examined in a special conference between General Weygand, representing Marshal Foch, Field-Marshal [Sir] H. Wilson and General Bliss. He suggested that no decision be taken until Sir Eyre Crowe had had an opportunity of consulting his Government and receiving new instructions.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions in regard to the plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen, and in the districts of Spis and Orava;
- (2) to add at the end of the first paragraph of article 4, respecting the plebiscite at Teschen, the following:
'(within the shortest possible time . . .) and, in any event, within a maximum period of three months after notification of the present decision as foreseen by Article 9';
- (3) that the members of the Inter-Allied Commission charged with organizing the plebiscite should not be chosen from among the members of the Inter-Allied Commission now at Teschen;

- (4) that members of the Inter-Allied Commission be nominated as soon as possible, with the reservation that the American representatives would only participate unofficially until the Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate.)

3.

*Allowance[s] for Inter-
Allied Commission of
Control in Germany*

[Not printed]

4. M. SCIALOJA said that it had been announced that French troops would evacuate Koritz at the end of the month of September. There would be serious inconveniences, unless this city were occupied after the departure of the French troops.

*Evacuation of
Koritz by
French troops*

M. PICHON said that the evacuation had been decided upon, but that no date had been fixed, and that for this reason it was not necessary for the Council to discuss the question.

5. M. BERTHELOT said that M. Benes was most anxious that the question of the repatriation of Czech troops in Siberia should be finally settled. He was leaving on that day. The question was an important one for if the state of things existing was allowed to continue Bolshevik propaganda would make headway among these troops. Public opinion in Czecho-Slovakia attached great importance to the repatriation of the troops in question. There were a number of difficulties, but if the repatriation could be begun it would have a very good effect. The Czechs were endeavouring to obtain the necessary tonnage from Japan, but they were in doubt as to whether they would be able to succeed. On the other hand, they did not have the means of making payment at Vladivostock to cover the cost of transportation of these troops. They had asked the British government to advance the amount necessary, just as France had advanced the cost of the maintenance of these troops in Siberia. It was for Great Britain and the United States to regulate the question of tonnage. M. Benes did not ask for a definite reply. It would be sufficient if he could be told that the subject was being favourably considered by the two Governments.

*Repatriation of
Czecho-Slovak
troops from Siberia*

MR. POLK said that he was not able to give a definite reply on that day. He had suggested to Washington that the American Government undertake a third of the expenses of repatriation, the two thirds being paid by Great Britain and France. In regard to ships, there were the German ships which had been used for the repatriation of American troops. The use to which these ships could now be put would have to be decided by the Supreme Economic Council, or by the Maritime Transport Council at London. He felt that the United States had a great responsibility, and he would do everything on his part to secure a solution of the matter which would satisfy the Czechs.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government would advance the money necessary for the cost of repatriation by sea. The British Government

had accepted the principle and there were only questions of detail to be settled.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that in view of the political importance of the question, Sir Eyre Crowe should point out to his Government the importance of bringing the matter to the attention of the Maritime Transport Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was somewhat delicate. The French and British Governments had not come to an agreement as to the use to which the ships which had become available should be put.

M. BERTHELOT said that in view of the importance of the political interests at stake, he did not doubt but that the French Government would make every effort to reach a solution which would make it possible to give the Czechs satisfaction.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government shared this view.

MR. POLK said that he would not cease to emphasize the political importance of the question.

6. M. PICHON said that the declaration by [? which] the Allied and Associated Governments had required of the German Government in regard to Article 61 of the German Constitution⁴ would be signed that afternoon at Versailles, at four o'clock.
German reply in regard to Article 61 of the German Constitution
(The Meeting then adjourned.)

APPENDIX B TO No. 62

17 septembre 1919.

Les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon, Principales Puissances alliées et associées,

Soucieux de placer le duché de Teschen et les territoires de Spisz et d'Orava, tels qu'ils sont délimités ci-après, sous une souveraineté conforme au vœu des habitants;

Ont résolu d'y procéder à une consultation populaire présentant toutes les garanties nécessaires de loyauté et de sincérité;

Et ont décidé ce qui suit:

I. Dans le territoire constituant au 1^{er} avril 1914 le duché de Teschen et dans les territoires de Spisz et d'Orava, tels qu'ils sont délimités ci-après, les habitants seront appelés à désigner par voie de suffrage s'ils désirent être rattachés à la Pologne ou à l'État tchéco-slovaque.

1^o Région de Spisz.

a) Toutes les communes du district politique de Starawies (Szepesofaiu ou Altendorf).

b) Les communes de la partie du district de Kesmark (Kiez Mark) qui se trouvent au Nord-Ouest de la ligne de partage des eaux entre les bassins de la Dunajec et du Poprad, y compris les communes dont le territoire est traversé par cette ligne.

2^o Région d'Orava.

Toutes les communes des districts politiques de Trsztena (Trzciana) et de Nameszto (Namiestow).

⁴ See No. 56, appendix B (document 2).

II. Les territoires, visés au paragraphe I, seront placés sous l'autorité d'une Commission internationale chargée d'en assurer provisoirement l'administration impartiale et d'y organiser le plébiscite.

Ces territoires, à la date fixée par la Commission, seront évacués par les troupes polonaises et tchéco-slovaques qui s'y trouveraient et seront occupés, en tout ou en partie, par les troupes des Principales Puissances alliées et associées.

La Commission aura son siège à Teschen et sera composée des représentants des Principales Puissances alliées et associées, à raison d'un représentant par Puissance.

Ses décisions sont prises à la majorité des voix, celle du Président qu'elle nommera étant prépondérante en cas de partage.

Les Gouvernements polonais et tchéco-slovaque sont priés de désigner chacun un représentant à titre consultatif auprès de cette Commission.

La Commission aura pleins pouvoirs pour statuer sur toutes les questions auxquelles l'exécution de la présente décision pourra donner lieu. Elle se fera assister de conseillers techniques choisis par elle parmi la population locale.

III. La Commission aura tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour lui permettre d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre public et l'administration régulière du pays. Elle disposera, à cet effet, des troupes d'occupation et, si elle le juge utile, d'une police recrutée parmi les habitants originaires du pays.

Il sera de la compétence de la Commission d'interpréter elle-même les pouvoirs qui lui sont ainsi confiés et de déterminer dans quelle mesure elle les exercera et dans quelle mesure ces pouvoirs seront laissés aux mains des autorités locales existantes.

IV. La Commission organisera le plébiscite en se conformant aux dispositions de la présente décision et y fera procéder dans le plus bref délai possible.

Elle devra prendre toutes les mesures propres à assurer la liberté, la sincérité et le secret du vote. Elle pourra notamment prononcer l'expulsion de tout agitateur ou de toute personne qui aura, d'une façon quelconque, tenté de fausser le résultat du plébiscite par des manœuvres de corruption ou d'intimidation.

V. Le droit de suffrage sera accordé à toutes personnes, sans distinction de sexe, satisfaisant aux conditions suivantes:

a) Avoir eu vingt ans révolus au 1^{er} janvier 1919;

b) Avoir son domicile ou l'indigénat (*Heimatsrecht*) dans la région soumise au plébiscite, depuis une date antérieure au 1^{er} août 1914;

Les personnes exerçant une fonction publique ou ayant, comme fonctionnaire, acquis l'indigénat, ne seront pas admises à voter.

Les personnes condamnées pour délit politique antérieurement au 3 novembre 1918 pourront être mises à même d'exercer leur droit de vote.

Chacun votera dans la commune où il est domicilié ou dans laquelle il a l'indigénat.

Le résultat du vote sera déterminé par commune, d'après la majorité des votes dans chaque commune.

VI. A la clôture du vote, le nombre des voix dans chaque commune sera communiqué par la Commission aux Principales Puissances alliées et associées, en même temps qu'un rapport détaillé sur les opérations du vote et qu'une proposition sur le tracé qui devrait être adopté comme frontière entre la Pologne et l'État tchéco-slovaque, en tenant compte du vœu exprimé par les habitants ainsi que de la situation géographique et économique des localités.

La Commission devra, en outre, faire connaître aux Principales Puissances alliées et associées les termes, dans lesquels un accord économique entre la Pologne et

l'État tchéco-slovaque devrait désormais assurer à ces deux pays les communications et la fourniture du charbon au mieux de leurs intérêts respectifs.

VII. Aussitôt que la ligne frontière aura été fixée par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées, celles-ci notifieront à la Pologne ou à l'État tchéco-slovaque, selon le cas, que leurs autorités ont à prendre l'administration du territoire qui serait reconnu comme devant être polonais ou tchéco-slovaque; lesdites autorités devront y procéder dans le courant du mois qui suivra cette notification, de la manière prescrite par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées.

Dès que l'administration du pays aura été ainsi assurée par les autorités polonaises ou tchéco-slovaques, selon le cas, les pouvoirs de la Commission prendront fin.

VIII. Les frais de l'armée d'occupation et les dépenses de la Commission, tant pour son fonctionnement que pour l'administration de la zone, seront supportés par la Pologne et l'État tchéco-slovaque proportionnellement à l'étendue des territoires qui, à la suite du plébiscite, seront reconnus comme devant être placés sous la souveraineté polonaise ou tchéco-slovaque; la répartition en sera faite par la Commission.

IX. La présente décision sera notifiée dans la huitaine au Gouvernement polonais et au Gouvernement tchéco-slovaque par les soins du Gouvernement de la République française.

Fait à Paris, le 1919.⁵

⁵ Thus in original.

No. 63

H. D. 59.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 23, 1919, at 11.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. British Empire: Captain Hinchley-Cooke. France: M. Massigli. Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: Mr. Carr, Hon. H. Nicolson, Lt.-Col. Kisch.

France: M. Cambon, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Hermit[t]e, Colonel Roye.

Italy: M. Galli, M. Brambilla.

1. MR. POLK said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to a matter of extreme importance before the order of the day should be taken up.

German
tank ships

At the time of the Armistice the German Government had been in possession of fourteen oil tank ships which had not been disposed of under

the terms of the armistice. At a conference in Brussels in March, 1919, the Germans had asked to be allowed to retain these ships on account of the pressing need for oil existing in their country. It had been agreed that they should be allowed to keep them. Simultaneously the Supreme Council had agreed that Germany should be allowed to receive shipments of oil and for that purpose to retain the fourteen ships. Later, when the question of the reparations to be made for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow had arisen, the question of the fourteen ships had again been raised. At this time also the Germans were allowed to retain them. These ships had been prepared for use and were to be sent to the United States for transport of oil, the delivery of which had been contracted for and partly paid. On August 15th Admiral Charlton, President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, had directed that these ships be delivered to the Firth of Forth to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Interallied Maritime Transport Council. Some time about September 1st the American representative on the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission had protested against this delivery, and the question had been raised at a meeting of the Interallied Maritime Transport Council. The American representative had urged that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers was alone competent to deal with this question, but his protests had not been heeded. At the meeting of the Supreme Economic Council held at Brussels on September 20th the question of the disposition of these ships had been raised. He had sent a telegram to the Council, asking them to delay action on the matter, but this wire had not been received and presumably had been lost in transmission.

The Supreme Economic Council, on which the United States was not represented, had upheld the decision of the Interallied Maritime Transport Council and had ordered the ships to be delivered to the Firth of Forth. The American Government believed that this constituted a breach of the agreement made with Germany and, furthermore, that neither the Interallied Maritime Transport Council nor the Supreme Economic Council had jurisdiction in the matter. The Supreme Council alone was the body competent to decide on the disposition of the ships and he urged that instructions be given that the order of the Supreme Economic Council be held in abeyance pending the decision on the question by the Supreme Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had been present on the previous evening at a meeting which had taken place at M. Clemenceau's room, at which M. Berenger, who was one of the representatives of the French Government at the meeting in Brussels on September 20th, had made a report on the matters discussed at this meeting. In the light of M. Berenger's statements it was clear that he was not aware of the points which had been raised by Mr. Polk. He had gathered the impression from the conversation that there was disagreement between the British and French Governments on the subject of the disposition of the tank ships, but he wished to add that he was not cognizant of the matter which Mr. Polk had presented to the Council.

MR. POLK said that it was necessary to stop delivery of these ships being

made from Hamburg until the Council had arrived at a decision in the matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was not familiar with all the aspects of the question, and that he would have to consult his government.

MR. POLK said that an order of the Supreme Economic Council had actually been given in the matter and that it would be necessary to suspend the execution of this order until a decision had been reached.

M. BERTHELOT said that he believed the action would be taken in London, and it was therefore necessary to advise the authorities in that place.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the matter seemed to him slightly involved. There had been so many bodies which had dealt with this question that it was not exactly clear to which body the order should be sent.

MR. POLK said that to make sure the order should be sent to every body which had dealt with the question.

M. PICHON said that he was in favour of having the order for the delivery of the ships held in suspense until the matter had been decided upon by the Supreme Council. He pointed out, however, that the holding up of this order did not affect the question of the final distribution of the ships.

MR. POLK said that this was also his understanding of the matter. The United States had not been represented on the Supreme Economic Council. The Interallied Maritime Transport Council had felt that it had no authority to order the delivery of the ships and had consequently referred the matter to the Supreme Economic Council, despite the protest made by the United States. The Economic Council had taken jurisdiction of the matter and had given the orders for the delivery of the ships to the Firth of Forth. It was to this body that the resolution of the Council should be sent without delay.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would notify the authorities in London in any case.

(It was decided that the fourteen oil tank ships, which Germany had been allowed to retain at the time of the armistice, should not be delivered to the Allies until such time as the Supreme Council has agreed upon their ultimate disposition.)

(It was further decided that the Supreme Economic Council, which had given the orders for the delivery of the ships in question, should be instructed to take immediately the necessary steps to cancel these orders.)

2. SIR EYRE CROWE said that in paragraph three of the resolution, taken by the Supreme Council on the previous day, (H. D. 58¹, Minute 2), *Question of Teschen* he thought that a slight error had occurred. This paragraph, which read as follows:

‘That the members of the Interallied Commission, charged with organizing the plebiscite, should not be chosen from among the members of the Interallied Commission now at Teschen,’

had appeared in the report submitted by the joint Czecho-Slovak-Polish Commission as a mere expression of opinion of that body.

He did not understand that the Commission had taken a definite resolution on this point and he did not wish to criticise it as a decision. He was not in a position to agree that it should be carried out, but would be obliged to refer to his government. It was possible that sufficient personnel might not be found to send a different British representation for the Plebiscite Commission than that of the Interallied Commission now at Teschen. He thought it would be well for each government to have free hand in the matter of this resolution.

M. LAROCHE said that at the meeting of the Joint Czecho-Slovak and Polish Commission on September 10th Colonel Kisch, the British representative, had suggested that the Interallied Commission actually at Teschen should be reinforced with additional members for the purpose of supervising the plebiscite.

He, M. Laroche, had answered that the Commission now at Teschen should be completely withdrawn and a new Commission sent there for the purpose of the plebiscite. His reasons in so urging were that the commission at present in Teschen had been there for such a long time, and had been so mixed up in local quarrels and difficulties that it was possible it would not have sufficient prestige to carry into effect its orders regarding the plebiscite. Colonel Kisch had agreed with this opinion. This agreement had enabled M. Cambon to state that even though no decision had been taken by the Commission on the point, this body was strongly in favour of the paragraph referred to by Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. CAMBON said that he was all the more determined to maintain his recommendation of the previous day for the reason that two letters had been received in the interval; one was from M. Paderewski and the other from M. Benes. M. Benes had said that the Czecho-Slovak Government could not agree to the continuation in power of the present Commission at Teschen, because of the numerous complaints which had been received against that body, as well as the complaints which it had made against the local authorities. It was highly desirable that a new Commission should be installed for the purpose of the plebiscite. M. Paderewski, in a letter written to M. Clemenceau, had spoken of the warlike atmosphere which existed throughout Upper Silesia and which necessitated a military intervention. He earnestly requested the immediate organization of a commission to carry out the plebiscite in that region, and further stated that such a body should send an appreciable number of officers ahead as an advance detachment. In this instance both the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles were in accord, and the Council should conform to their desires and send a new Commission there immediately.

M. PICHON said he understood that Sir Eyre Crowe would recommend this proposition to his government.

MR. POLK said that, in order to spare the feelings of the present members of the Commission in Teschen, it would be as well that the matter should appear in the form of a recommendation of the Czecho-Slovak-Polish Commission, rather than a resolution of the Council.

(It was decided that the third paragraph of the resolution taken by the

Council on the previous day (H. D. 58¹, Minute 2) be amended to read as follows:

'3. That it was preferable that the members of the Interallied Commission charged with organizing the plebiscite should not be chosen from among the members of the Interallied Commission now at Teschen.'

3.

*Allowances for Officers of
the Interallied Commis-
sions of Control*

[Not printed]

4. M. PICHON said that each delegation had received copies of the telegrams sent by Sir George Clerk and that it might be well to await the return of the latter to Paris before discussing the information contained in his telegrams.

*Situation in Hun-
gary. Telegrams
from Sir George
Clerk*

(The Council had before it the telegrams from Sir George Clerk, dated Sept. 16th and 19th.—See Appen-

dices A, B, and C.)

M. BERTHELOT said that he had been instructed by M. Clemenceau to inform the Council that he, M. Clemenceau, considered M. Bratiano's answer, as expressed in Sir George Clerk's telegrams, as conciliatory.

This opinion was further strengthened by the fact that the Roumanian Government had made several proposals seeking to conciliate their position with the demands made by the Council. Colonel Antonesco had arrived in Paris to settle the military questions with the Council. In addition, M. Bratiano had stated that he was prepared to release the material for the reconstruction of the bridge across the Save River, which he had held up pending the return by the Serbians of the material which they had removed from the Banat. Furthermore, in order to avoid being charged with stirring up Bolshevism in Hungary, and for the purpose of assisting the Hungarians to form a police force, the Roumanian Government was prepared, on withdrawing its forces from Hungary, to leave one division in Budapest under the command of the senior Allied General in that city. This measure would be for the purpose of maintaining order until the Hungarians were in a situation to guarantee it. Lastly, M. Bratiano was prepared to furnish a list of the requisitions made by the Roumanians in Hungary and agreed that these should be thrown into the general pool for the purpose of the reparations to all the Allies.

In view of the conciliatory nature of these proposals, M. Clemenceau had believed that the delivery of arms and munitions to the Roumanian Government, agreed upon with the French in 1917, which had been temporarily held up, should be resumed. He had accordingly given orders that these shipments be resumed.

MR. POLK said that he was somewhat surprised that M. Clemenceau had taken this responsibility alone, as the decision to stop all shipments of material to Roumania had been taken by the Five Powers constituting the Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had not understood that the Council had reached a decision on this matter. He believed that M. Clemenceau had simply made an offer to suspend the French shipments, which were being made in execution of a contract entered into in 1917, and that this offer had been accepted by the Council. In addition, M. Bratiano had given the impression that France alone had suspended its shipments, for the British Government was actually negotiating with the Roumanians for the delivery of naval material and the transport of Roumanian material from Archangel. Italy was also in the process of establishing an economic agreement with Roumania.

MR. POLK said that on August 25 (see H. D. 38², Minute 3) the Council had taken a formal resolution to suspend shipments of material of all kind to the Roumanian Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Sir George Clerk had telegraphed to the effect that the shipments of British war material to Roumania had been stopped by virtue of the resolution of the Council referred to by Mr. Polk. The former had recommended, however, that, if the answer of the Roumanian Government was considered satisfactory by the Council the embargo on the shipments should be raised.

M. BERTHELOT admitted that there had been a resolution which had slipped his memory for the time being, and that this placed a different aspect on the situation.

M. PICHON suggested that the Council would do well to await the arrival of Sir George Clerk.

MR. POLK agreed with M. Pichon, but drew attention again to the fact that the French Government had issued orders to recommence its shipments. He said that this placed him in an embarrassing position as he had stopped all American shipments immediately after the resolution referred to had been passed. It was extremely necessary for all the Allies to act together in this matter. M. Bratiano and his representatives had promised much, but up to the present had done nothing. In the communication made to Sir George Clerk on the subject of requisitions, the Roumanians had distinctly reserved everything which they had taken during the fighting. This reservation might be extended to include everything which they had removed from Budapest. They also said that they would retain all material which had formerly belonged to them. The Allied Generals in Budapest were in an undignified position, and he could not agree with his colleagues that the Roumanian answer was conciliatory.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it would be well to adjourn the matter pending the return of Sir George Clerk. He had received information by telegram to the effect that the Roumanians had made exorbitant requisitions in Hungary and that the actual situation in Budapest was very different from that which the Roumanians themselves described.

M. BERTHELOT said that it would not be difficult to suspend the order given by the French Government to continue the shipments to Roumania.

MR. POLK said it would be better that this should be done.

(It was decided that the resolution of the Council of August 25 (H. D. 38², Minute 3) be upheld, and that no shipments of material to Roumania should be authorized at the present time.

It was further decided to adjourn the discussion of the question of Roumania until the arrival of Sir George Clerk from Bucharest.)

5. (At this point M. Paderewski entered the room.)

*Hearing of
M. Paderewski
on question of
Eastern Galicia* M. PADEREWSKI said that the Polish Government had studied the question of Eastern Galicia, on which the Council had deliberated. In this matter it had been guided not only by reasons of State, but also by the sincere desire to ascertain in what measure the provisions of the Polish Commission had carried out the wishes of the Supreme Council. He had consulted the Parliamentary Commissions of the Polish National Assembly, and numerous delegates from the people of all parts of the country, and also the Ruthenians, and he was sorry to inform the Council that the results had not been satisfactory. Galicia was one of the regions which had been greatly devastated, and more civilians had been killed therein than in any other country. Since the armistice a civil war had deluged Poland with blood and the Ukrainians, led by the Germans, had carried havoc into the country. At the moment when the Allies were silencing the German guns on the Western Front, the Germans had been in process of devastating Poland and Galicia.

Moved by the sufferings of these people the Peace Conference had endeavoured to establish order, security, and justice in Galicia, and had, therefore wished to grant autonomy to that country. He pointed out, however, that Poland itself had already granted autonomy to Galicia, by virtue of the Polish Diet. As this was the case, and the province in question had been completely restored to order, Poland was at a loss to understand the decision taken by the Peace Conference.

It was not easy for him to translate the feelings of a multitude of people, but intense pain had been caused to Poland by the rigour of the Council's decision to cut out of its body politic a province which had been a part of Poland since the 14th century. He realized that his country was too weak to enforce its historic rights. Poland once extended from the Baltic to the Danube, from the Elbe to the Dnieper, but it was not the wish of that country to claim Moravia and Slovakia from its good neighbours the Czecho-Slovaks.

Poland's rights to Galicia were not based upon past history, but upon the present and future. It was not a correct statement that only the urban population in Eastern Galicia was Polish and that the rural population was Ruthene. The population of the rural districts was largely Polish and in certain regions the proportion was as high as 50 per cent. At the time of the Austrian domination, 85 per cent of the direct taxes in Eastern Galicia had been paid by Poles. Poland, while not basing its claims on the past,

was obliged to insist upon the present, as its national existence was at stake.

The city of Danzig, and the railway line leading from Warsaw there, an essential outlet for the Polish State, had been denied to Poland on the question of nationality because the population was largely German. On the other hand in Upper Silesia, on the request of the Germans, a defeated enemy power, a plebiscite had been granted—in a region which was essentially Polish, as admitted by the Germans themselves. And now Poland was faced with the loss of Lemberg, the population of which was 85 per cent Polish, for the temporary regime proposed for Galicia meant a certain loss of that country.

This temporary regime proposed by the Council brought joy to the hearts of the Germans. Instead of law and order existing in the country, its results would be continual conflicts of all kinds. A permanent electoral campaign would be carried on. German agents, the very men who had killed Polish women and children, would constitute the members of the Galician Diet. The temporary regime furthermore, from an economic point of view, would prevent the exploitation of Polish resources in Galicia, especially in the oil districts where much Allied capital had been invested. It would be Poland's duty to furnish the help necessary for the reconstruction of the country. If at the end of the temporary period provided for Galicia be snatched from Poland, from what source would Poland draw its reimbursement?

He further pointed out that neither Admiral Koltchak, as representing Russia, nor General Petlioura, as representing the Ukraine, disputed Poland's just claims to Eastern Galicia. He had only heard of the proposed Treaty by rumours as he had not seen the proposed text of the document. He believed, however, that it comprised three clauses which were extremely prejudicial to Polish interests.

These were: First, the entrusting of the agrarian reform to the Galician diet; second, the fact that Galicia was not to be represented in the Polish diet; and lastly that the inhabitants of Galicia were not to be submitted to the compulsory military service of Poland.

On the first point he said that the Polish Government alone should be entrusted with the agrarian reforms in Galicia, as otherwise the Galician diet, inspired by German influence, would only look to the despoiling of their Polish neighbours.

On the second point he felt that it was impossible that two million Poles living in Eastern Galicia should not have a voice in the Diet at Warsaw.

As regards military service it would not be just to accord the Galicians all the rights and privileges of the Polish government without subjecting them to its obligations.

The general scheme of the Treaty seemed to him to be to detach Galicia from Poland at the earliest possible moment. The temporary regime provided for meant the loss of Lemberg and all Eastern Galicia, a loss which Poland could not endure and survive. Poland would never forgive its delegates to the Conference should it lose Eastern Galicia. It was obliged

to defend this territory as it would defend its own body. Galicia had given poets, heroes and statesmen to Poland. He entreated the Council not to impose on Poland the temporary regime for Eastern Galicia provided by the Treaty. He asked that the treaty be not upheld, if the Council desired to see a firm allied state in Central Europe.

In conclusion he asked that Galicia be granted to Poland and promised that the latter would govern it in the interests of humanity and justice, and that no complaints, except from the German interests, would be heard.

6. MR. POLK suggested that the Council was not making much progress with the agenda at each of its meetings. He therefore suggested that the meetings should take place earlier in the day, or twice a day, or that Committees may be made use of to a greater extent. *Work of the Council* In addition, he proposed that where unanimity had been reached upon a question in the discussions of any Commission, this matter be placed at the head of the agenda each day and the reading of the report of the Commission be omitted.

M. PICHON said that he and M. Clemenceau would be unable to attend meetings of the Council in the afternoon as they were both engaged at the French Chamber.

(After some further discussion, it was decided:

- (1) that the meetings of the Council should take place at 10.30 o'clock each morning.
- (2) that matters upon which unanimous decisions had been reached at the Commission hearings, should be placed at the head of the agenda for each day and the reading of the Commission's report thereon be omitted.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,
September 23, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO No. 63

Decypher of telegram from General Bandholtz, Bucharest, transmitted from United States Signal Corps, Paris.

D. September 16, 1919. R. 10. 20. September 19, 1919.

[?N]o. 74. Following from Bucharest; request transmission to Supreme Council:—
No. 2 (R).

I arrived at Bucharest Thursday September 11th but owing to Ministerial crisis and absence of Ministers, summoned by the King to Sinaia, was unable to transmit communication on that day.

Mr. Bratiano resigned from Office on the morning of September 12th but told me that he would continue to direct affairs until his successor was appointed and that he considered it incumbent on him to do all in his power to hasten an agreement with the Supreme Council although he no longer held political position

qualifying him to give formal and final reply to the Note from the Supreme Council.

I accordingly delivered the Note and copies of the previous telegrams to Mr. Bratiano at the same time explaining my position as defined in my instructions from M. Clemenceau. I also assured Mr. Bratiano of the desire of the Supreme Council to reach friendly understanding and cordial co-operation with the Roumanian Government.

This morning Mr. Bratiano gave me a summary of his views on the Note. His Excellency said that some of it both in form and substance (French—*fond*) seemed to him unjust to Roumanian Government and founded on evidence that required corroboration; if it lay with him to give a formal reply he would be obliged to refer to points which did not correspond to the situation of Roumania and which misrepresented her actions. It was not, however, under such a discussion that he intended to set forth his conclusions for he neither wished nor intended to say anything that might further embitter the situation as he was most anxious to re-establish relations of mutual and friendly confidence. Roumania had always realised (? 'importance of' omitted) good relations with Allies and had never intended to depart from them. Isolated acts of abuse might have occurred during the Roumanian advance as happened in every similar case, but they were entirely against Mr. Bratiano's policy and instructions, and, where proved, would be punished. Roumania most of all of the Allies required settled and prosperous Hungary on her frontiers and self-interest alone urged moderation.

As regards requisitions Mr. Bratiano gave me an explanation which I am sending in separate telegram. He added that Colonel Antonesco, D.M.O., left for Paris on (? August 22nd) and would give all necessary information on the subject.

For one thing Mr. Bratiano assumed full responsibility. When last Hungarian advance failed and became retreat he ordered Roumanian army not to stop until they had taken Budapest. Mr. Bratiano felt that for security of Roumania and Europe generally this was essential and his action seemed to him, though unauthorised, so patently in general interest that he had not hesitated to take it rather than refer to Paris and risk refusal such as he had experienced before. As regards the four questions put to Roumania in the Note:

(1) Mr. Bratiano was not only ready but anxious to withdraw Roumanian forces who were heavy charge on the Government and who ought to be at home for the harvest. Failing any arrangements for close co-operation of Allies presence of Roumanian Army aroused resentment of certain parts of Hungarian people without gaining in return the gratitude of Hungarian Government and of the elements of order who, thanks to the army, could organise themselves. On the other hand Allied powers suspected and fettered the action which the Roumanian army thought to take in the general interest. Bratiano had accordingly issued instruction for withdrawal to begin at once though he was not confident what the result would be in Hungary. I said, presumably Hungarian authorities would be given facilities to constitute police force in evacuated zone for maintenance of law and order.

(2 and 3) No requisitions were allowed beyond military and railway material and supplies for army of occupation while payment in money or requisition bonds was always made for supplies. Bratiano was ready to agree that reparation commission should make an inventory of all requisitions which had not been carried out by Roumanian forces under arms and that value of such as belonged to general stock should be subtracted from Roumania's share but he considered that in view

of Roumania's particular interest he was justified in making condition that Roumania should be represented on commission charged with this duty.

(4) Order and responsible Government in Hungary were more essential to Roumania than to anyone but he, Mr. Bratiano, insisted that collaboration ought to be real and that Roumania should not be asked to carry out orders without previous consultation and consideration, and he further dwelt on the fact that Roumanian army could only help Hungarian Government which while having understanding with the Powers must also be in agreement with Roumania.

(I understand this somewhat obscure phrase to mean that Roumania's interests are so (geographically? decidedly) concerned with future relations with Hungary that a Hungarian Government must give guarantees which will satisfy Roumania as well as the Great Powers.) Mr. Bratiano to whom I have shown this telegram authorizes me to say it conveys in summarized form his attitude towards the 4 questions asked of him by the Supreme Council.

(Signed: CLERK)

APPENDIX B TO No. 63

Telegram. Translation.

September 19, 1919. Received: September 20, 1919.

From: Sir G. Clerk, Bucharest. To: Supreme Council, Paris.

Mr. Bratiano, much excited by the story of the children's hospital, asks me to inform the Conference that he has received from Budapest a report proving that the doctors directing the children's hospital in this city have declared in writing that neither the Roumanian authorities nor any Roumanian subject in this hospital has taken away any medicine, dressings, or other sanitary objects, and that consequently the children's lives have not been endangered. The military authorities at Budapest have requested the Inter-Allied Commission to investigate this affair.

APPENDIX C TO No. 63

Telegram. Translation.

BUCHAREST, September 19, 1919.

Received: September 22, 1919.

From: Sir G. Clerk.

To: Sir Eyre Crowe, Hotel Astoria, Paris.

Although I have not received a reply to my telegrams addressed to the Supreme Council, Mr. Bratiano tells me that he has learned indirectly from Paris that these telegrams have been considered as forming the basis of an agreement.

I propose, therefore, to leave here Monday.³ A longer stay on my part might be used by political parties to further their own interests. Mr. Bratiano has moreover explained to me his opinion on the situation in Hungary with more detail and more precision, and has asked me to take his declaration to Paris. I am going to Budapest, where I will arrive Tuesday evening, and where I hope to see Mr. Diamandi and the Allied Generals. I will leave for Vienna and Paris the next day by the fastest way.

³ September 22, 1919.

H. D. GO.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, September 25, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Tardieu; SECRETARY, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Captain Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: Commandant Portier. *Italy*: Lieutenant de Carlo.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. A. Dulles, Mr. F. K. Nielsen.

British Empire: Mr. Carr, Mr. Nicolson, Lt.-Col. Kisch, General Sackville-West, Commander Lucas, R.N.

France: M. Cambon, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Lazard.

Italy: M. Brambilla, M. Dell'Abbadessa.

I.

*Convention of the Plenary
Labour Commission*

[Not printed]

2. MR. POLK said that at the last meeting it had been decided¹ that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to take immediately the necessary steps to guarantee the delivery to the Allies of fourteen German oil tank ships. According to information which he had received no orders on the subject had been given in London.

M. TARDIEU said that he was informed that the Supreme Economic Council had been acquainted with the decision of the Council, but he was without information as to whether the order had been carried out or not.

MR. POLK said that it was necessary for the Supreme Economic Council to immediately carry out the measures which were asked of them, as in the meantime the ships would be delivered.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he telegraphed to London to arrange that an expert be sent to him to furnish information on the subject.

MR. POLK said that in any event Admiral Charlton should be directed to keep the ships where they were until further orders were received.

M. TARDIEU said that the situation appeared to be as follows: The Supreme Economic Council, which was in possession of the resolution of the Supreme Council, thought that there was something to be said in connection with the matter. The French Government held the same view. In 48 hours the Conference would be in possession of the Supreme Economic Council's proposals.

¹ See No. 63, minute 1.

MR. POLK said that in awaiting this decision it was most urgent that the ships should not be moved.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had telegraphed to London in regard to the matter.

M. LAROCHE said that only the Armistice Commission was in position to stop the delivery.

MR. POLK said that he considered it essential that the Supreme Council should act, for up to the moment it appeared to him that the only steps taken in the matter had been through the kindness of Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. TARDIEU said that if a resolution was taken in a sense of what Mr. Polk asked, the Council would be doing exactly what had been done on the preceding day.

(M. Tardieu then read the resolution taken on September 23rd, H. D. 59.¹)

MR. POLK said that in any case it would be necessary for the Supreme Council to take steps which had been asked of it. If they had not done this, it was necessary to know the reasons. The Armistice Commission should be asked to suspend all action.

M. TARDIEU said that that had been decided at the previous meeting. He would ascertain in the afternoon just what the Supreme Economic Council had done and whether they had executed the order of the Conference and in what manner.

3.

Question of Spitzberg

[Not printed]²

4. M. TARDIEU read an extract of a letter from Lord Milner to M. Dutasta dated August 14th, 1919. (See Appendix D.) The Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting in London on August 5th had unanimously proposed that the Portuguese claims to the triangle of Kionga should be recognized. (This proposal was adopted.)

It was decided:

to accept the proposal made by the Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting of August 5th, and to recognize Portugal as the original and legitimate proprietor of this part of the former German Colony of East Africa, situated south of the Rovuma and known as the 'Kionga Triangle'.

5. M. TARDIEU read a letter of September 14th, 1919, addressed by M. Tittoni to the President of the Conference asking that the Military Representatives at Versailles should be directed to study the question of organization of a military,

*Organization of Inter-
Allied Commission of
Control in Austria*

² The Supreme Council approved the draft of the treaty relative to the archipelago of Spitzbergen which was unanimously recommended by the Commission on Spitzbergen (cf. No. 4, note 14). The treaty was signed at Paris on February 9, 1920, and is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers (1920)*, vol. cxiii, pp. 789-97.

³ Not printed.

naval and air control for Austria. (See Appendix E.³) The proposal was adopted.

It was decided:

that the permanent Military representatives at Versailles should be directed to prepare, together with the Naval and Air representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, a detailed proposal in view of the constitution of Interallied Commissions of Military, Naval and Air Control, which should be charged to see to the execution by Austria of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

6. SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had received a telegram from Sir George Clerk who had proposed returning to Paris unless the Supreme Council directed him to remain. He had telegraphed to Sir George Clerk that the Supreme Council would undoubtedly desire to discuss the matter. Upon receiving this telegram Sir George Clerk decided to remain. He finally telegraphed him to come to Budapest and from there to Paris. He thought that this telegram had not reached him.

M. TARDIEU said that he was grateful for this information, but he could not see that anyone was to blame for the delay.

MR. POLK said that the Relief Administration had a telegraph line to Budapest and that he would be glad to place this wire at Sir Eyre Crowe's disposal for any telegrams which he might desire to send to Sir George Clerk.

7. SIR EYRE CROWE said that Mr. Lloyd George was more than ever convinced that firm action should be taken to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces. Mr. Lloyd George wished, but he would not press the point, that Polish troops should be utilized. He was now charged by the British Government to make a new proposal. The Allies had pledged themselves in previous conversations with the Germans to facilitate the importation into Germany of food-stuffs of which Germany was in great need, and they had authorized the Germans to communicate to the Supreme Economic Council a list of articles which they particularly needed. He proposed that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to stop the shipment of food-stuffs and other necessities to Germany and that the German Government be notified accordingly. Mr. Lloyd George thought that this would have a very good effect. He thought also that the American Government were prepared to stop all financial transactions with Germany. If these measures were insufficient it would be necessary to take whatever further steps seemed advisable. Mr. Lloyd George had always advocated the utilization of the Polish Army and he now proposed that the head of the British Naval Mission in France place himself at the disposal of Marshal Foch to study with him the question of what military and naval measures might be advantageous at a future date. He had prepared the draft of a note (see annex F⁴), the

⁴ Not printed. The first three paragraphs of this draft were identical with those in that prepared by General Weygand (see No. 60, appendix B), subject to a note to the third

first three paragraphs repeating the words of the note prepared by General Weygand, which had already been discussed. It would be necessary to change the end of the third paragraph in such a way as to take into account the remarks which Mr. Polk had made at the last meeting.⁵ The end of the note would be drafted in the manner which he had pointed out. If the American Delegation consented, it would be possible to insert a supplementary paragraph respecting the suppression of financial transactions.

M. TARDIEU said that if he understood the British proposal correctly, it called for immediate action, first, the refusal of the German demands for the furnishing of food for Germany; second, the refusal of credits. If these measures were insufficient the British Government were willing to consider the question of military action. He agreed with this proposal, but wished to make two remarks, one as to form, and the other as to substance. In regard to form, the British Delegation proposed that the Allies reserve the right to take further steps. This was the fourth time that the question had been raised, and, in view of this fact, it seemed to him that the least which could be done, if the Allied and Associated Governments wished to make a real threat, was to take actual steps. He proposed, therefore, that the note should say that, if the Allied and Associated Governments did not receive satisfaction, they would take other steps.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would accept this modification.

M. TARDIEU said that he remembered that Mr. Polk had said that it might be advisable to stop the repatriation of German prisoners of war. He asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe had referred this matter to the British Government, and whether he had received any instructions.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that he had received no instructions from his Government on this point.

MR. POLK said that he was convinced that something ought to be done. He preferred action to a threat. In a conversation which had recently taken place at Versailles between Colonel Logan and Baron von Lersner, Colonel Logan had not failed to call attention to the bad impression which the attitude of the German Government had made upon the American Govern-

paragraph as to the desirability of an amendment to take account of Mr. Polk's remarks (see below). The draft continued (French text as in original):

'L'évacuation devra être entreprise immédiatement, poursuivie sans arrêt et complètement achevée dans le plus bref délai possible.

'Les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés font connaître par la présente note, que tant qu'ils ne seront pas assurés que leur demande a reçu entière satisfaction, ils ne prendront en considération aucune des demandes du Gouvernement allemand, touchant le ravitaillement de l'Allemagne en vivres et en matières premières, que le Conseil Suprême étudie actuellement. Ils ont, en conséquence, donné ordre au Conseil Suprême Économique de ne pas examiner ces demandes.

'(Ici, on insérerait un paragraphe analogue concernant l'arrêt des transactions financières).

'Si le Gouvernement allemand continuait à ne pas donner satisfaction à leur demande, les Puissances Alliées et Associées se réservent le droit de prendre toutes autres mesures qu'elles pourront juger nécessaires pour veiller à l'exécution des clauses de l'armistice.'

⁵ The reference was apparently to the remarks by Mr. Polk on a legal point, recorded in No. 60, minute 2.

ment. Colonel Logan had pointed out that it was most important that Germany should take action, and had let him understand that if the action were delayed, America would take definite steps. Baron von Lersner had replied that it was a political question and that the Army which was in the hands of the reactionaries would not obey the Government which was powerless. Colonel Logan then said that this explanation was not satisfactory and that if the German Government had no power it had better withdraw. It was necessary that that Government should take immediate measures to prove its good faith. He added that Colonel Logan had not spoken in the name of the Council, but the Germans had learned unofficially the view of the United States.

M. TARDIEU asked whether the Council were in agreement as to the first three paragraphs.

MR. POLK said that there remained the question of the alteration of the last phrase and that he would propose a draft.

M. TARDIEU said that he thought that it would not serve a useful purpose to fix a delay and to say at the soonest possible moment for from the present moment the Allied and Associated Governments proposed to take action.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would ask his Government whether it would be possible to make any statement in the note regarding the holding-up of the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, but he wished to ask if the repatriation of the prisoners of war were stopped it would [*sic*] necessarily apply to all the Allied Powers and whether it would not be possible to speak of a total of [or] partial holding-up of the repatriation. He did not think that the British Government were prepared, so far as they were concerned, to stop the repatriation completely for the work of repatriation was in operation and it was difficult to stop it.

M. TARDIEU said that this would nevertheless be a most efficacious method of action.

M. SCIALOJA said that he agreed that this method could be most usefully employed.

M. TARDIEU said that for the sake of their own peace it was most necessary for the German Government that the repatriation be continued. If the repatriation were stopped pressure would be brought upon the German Government by the German people themselves. It was, therefore, highly important that an expression of this threat be made in the note.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if the proposal was accepted he thought it would be advisable that the decision of the Council be made known to the public through the press. He wished to ask, however, what Powers had consented to the proposed repatriation of the German prisoners of war in their custody.

M. MATSUI said that Japan was in a difficult situation. The repatriation had begun. He asked whether the prisoners' transports should be held up en route, for instance at Singapore. That would be difficult. He thought that it would be preferable to adopt the formula: 'total or partial suspension of repatriation.'

M. TARDIEU said that the American, British and Japanese Governments had consented to the repatriation, but that the German Government had received a communication in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers. He wished to recall the terms of the note which had been addressed to the German Delegation and which had been prepared by Mr. Balfour.

(M. Tardieu then read the text of the declaration of the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the repatriation of prisoners of war. See H. D. 41.⁶)

He said that it would be possible to insert in the reply the following phrase: 'at the same time the Allied and Associated Powers, with reference to Paragraph 2 of their declaration of August 28th last, pointed out that the benevolent measures respecting the anticipated repatriation of German prisoners of war was [*sic*] to take place either for all the prisoners or for part of them.'

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to make it quite clear that if the British Government did not interrupt the repatriation of prisoners of war they were not acting counter to the resolution of the Council.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to point out that if the British Government continued to repatriate the prisoners, the threat of the Council would be vain, and, in that event, he thought it would be better to make no threat. It would be necessary to ascertain from Sir Crowe [*sic*] and Mr. Polk whether Great Britain and America were prepared to interrupt the repatriation of prisoners.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to point out that the interruption of the repatriation would be far more prejudicial to Great Britain than to Germany.

M. TARDIEU asked whether Mr. Polk was in a position to furnish a paragraph in regard to the refusal of credits.

MR. POLK said that he would take up the matter on that day.

M. TARDIEU said that in any event it would be possible to refer the draft reply to the Drafting Committee in order that the Committee could agree upon a reply which would include Mr. Polk's draft paragraph and the proposal of the British Delegation.

MR. POLK said that he wished to point out that it would not be possible for him to receive a reply by the following day.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the Drafting Committee should prepare a note to the German Delegation concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee should take as a basis for its work the note prepared by General Weygand and modified by the British Delegation (Appendix F⁴) with the changes in text approved by the Council;
- (3) that the text prepared by Mr. Polk should be noted; and,

⁶ No. 45 (minute 2).

- (4) that in case the American and British Governments agreed to an interruption of the repatriation of prisoners of war, an additional paragraph should be prepared to notify the total or partial interruption of the repatriation of German prisoners of war.)

8. M. TARDIEU said that the Council had received new proposals from the Blockade Commission (see Appendix G⁷).

*Blockade of
Soviet Russia* MR. POLK read and commented upon the annex to this proposal (see Appendix H).

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his experts did not consider the American proposal sufficient. They thought that the following text should be adopted. (See Appendix I.) The British experts thought that this proposal would renew [? remove] a number of difficulties. There would be no blockade. There would be no capturing of ships. Vessels would be instructed to turn back. They would be informed that there was danger ahead. If they still persisted they would be made to turn back.

MR. POLK asked what would happen if the ships refused to obey the orders given them.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they would not refuse.

M. MATSUI said that he thought that it was quite probable that they would refuse.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that the British proposal was a make-shift. If a ship wished to pass there was no method of stopping it. He desired to point out that from the day when peace was signed with Germany no warship had any longer the right to stop a merchant ship. If a merchant ship wished to pass in spite of the injunctions of the Allied warships there was nothing that could be done. The former proposals made it possible to avoid these dangers. He asked what would happen if a cruiser should meet a German convoy escorted by destroyers which insisted upon passing. He thought that this was a question which ought to be carefully studied.

M. TARDIEU said that it was most important to avoid taking decisions which could not be applied. The British proposal undoubtedly presented serious inconveniences. He thought that so far as the American proposal was concerned it would be inconvenient to permit the Commander of each warship to judge as to the action which he chose to exercise. In both cases there was no impression of an operation well conceived and likely to be pressed to a successful conclusion.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that in the proposals formerly presented the Commanders of ships of war were vested with the authority of all the Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that would also apply to the British proposal. It would be communicated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the neutral Governments.

⁷ Not printed. This appendix contained a draft dated August 25, 1919 which was the same as the draft dated August 21 in Appendix D to No. 41 apart from two drafting amendments and the omission of the penultimate paragraph of the first draft.

M. TARDIEU agreed, but said that in the British proposal it was the means of execution which were inadequate.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not agree, for the British proposal gave vessels of war the right of turning back merchant ships.

M. SCIALOJA said that the proposal would not foreshadow any possible action in the event that merchant ships refused to obey the order.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that he thought that in preparing the proposal for which he acted as spokesman, provision was made for the right of turning back ships.

M. TARDIEU said that in fact there was a blockade without the right of capturing cargoes.

MR. POLK said that he thought that there was danger of creating a new kind of blockade which would not be recognized in International Law. In view of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments were not at war with Soviet Russia, they would be creating a dangerous precedent. The United States would not give clearance to vessels desiring to leave American ports for Russia. The danger lay in the case of leaving Scandinavia or Germany.

M. TARDIEU asked Mr. Polk whether the reserve contained in the American proposal was sufficient to satisfy him.

MR. POLK replied that it was. He added that if a neutral ship were stopped in its course, for example a Danish ship, the Allied and Associated Governments exposed themselves to the payment of damages.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that the note of the Allied and Associated Governments would be addressed to the neutral Governments. If these Governments accepted the contents no difficulty would arise.

M. TARDIEU said that the agreement of these Governments would serve as the basis for this new form of blockade.

MR. POLK asked what the situation would be if the neutral Governments did not accept. The notification would not bind them or protect the Allies against claims for damages.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that in one case as in the other the situation would be the same. It was a question of a blockade which was not a blockade.

MR. POLK said that he would be equally frank and that if they wanted a blockade, the best means would be to declare war against Russia.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it should be remembered that the warships were carrying on hostile operations in the Baltic against the Bolsheviks according to the orders of the Allies. It was necessary to give them means of fulfilling their mission.

M. TARDIEU agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the difficulty should not be exaggerated. A few ships would be stopped, they would learn that they could not pass and soon no ships would appear.

MR. POLK said that the United States hesitated to create precedents. In the present war they had had difficulties with the precedents of the American Civil War.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to call Mr. Polk's attention to the observation of Sir Eyre Crowe with which he entirely agreed. The Allied fleets in the Baltic were in fact playing the role of war vessels on war service. That being the case, he could not see how it was less serious to stop merchant ships than to bombard Cronstadt. A difficult question of form ought not to be sufficient to prevent a solution of the question. In view of these facts, he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe, that even if the Allied and Associated Powers ran the risk of having to pay damages, they should be willing to take the risk in view of the present situation. There were many examples in history of pacific blockades, for example the case of Greece and of China. The pacific blockade had a recognized place in International Law.

Mr. POLK said that it was not a question of a pacific blockade.

M. TARDIEU said that he did not agree. The blockade in question was a means of coercion.

M. SCIALOJA said that in order to conform to the regulations of International Law, it would be necessary to communicate the state of blockade to the Soviet Government, but in view of the fact that that Government was not recognized, he did not see that strictly speaking it was a question of blockade. He thought that it was rather a question of international police and that the precedents in this sense should be examined.

M. TARDIEU said that the Council agreed as to the practical utility of the measures proposed. But Mr. Polk objected to the precedents which would be created. He suggested that the legal advisers be asked to study the precedents and find a formula to which all could agree. So far as the execution of the blockade was concerned the proposals of the Naval representatives would be adopted. He did not wish to delay the solution of a question which had already been too much delayed, but what he proposed appeared necessary.

M. CAMBON said that he wished to recall precedents which existed. Great Britain and France had often used the pacific blockade as a means of coercion. The examples of Greece and of China had recently been mentioned. The difficulty in the present case was that there was no Government in Russia to which a notification of the blockade could be communicated.

M. LAROCHE said that the very fact of there being no Government would justify a measure of international police.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to sum up the situation as he saw it. It would be possible to impose a pacific blockade if a Government existed to which a notification of the blockade could be made. No such Government existed. It was therefore necessary to trust to the ingenuity of the legal advisers to find a means of justifying a measure of international police.

Mr. POLK agreed that the question should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(It was decided:

- (1) to request the Drafting Committee to immediately examine the arguments in International Law upon which the blockade of Soviet Russia could be based; and,

- (2) to call to the attention of the Drafting Committee the fact that the absence of a Government in Soviet Russia recognised by the Powers prevented the Powers from notifying that Government in the regular way of a state of blockade.)

9. M. CAMBON read and commented upon the proposal of the Commission on Polish Affairs which it was hoped would be consistent with the opinion formerly expressed by the Supreme Council on the subject of agrarian legislation in Eastern Galicia. (See Appendix J.)

MR. POLK said he had no objection to make to this text.

M. TARDIEU recalled the declarations which M. Paderewski had made before the Supreme Council. M. Paderewski had stated that he could not admit that the agrarian question was not one for the National Assembly at Warsaw to decide.

M. CAMBON said that he wished to add that, in a private conversation, M. Paderewski had told him that he was in favour of the League of Nations scheme. M. Paderewski had insisted that the attribution of Eastern Galicia be made in a definite way. If he (M. Cambon) might express a personal view, he wished to add that the Council were going beyond their rights in entrusting the fate of an entirely agricultural district to a population the majority of which was not Polish.

MR. POLK said that M. Paderewski had opposed, above everything else, the provisional character of the statute. He (Mr. Polk) thought that it would be possible to satisfy M. Paderewski in suppressing the provisional character and in altering certain points of the proposal. With this end in view he had prepared a memorandum (see Annex [Appendix] K). He felt that in establishing a provisional regime the Council were allowing the existence of a region in the Central Europe which would become a dangerous centre of discord.

M. CAMBON said that he shared this view, but that he thought there was still another reason for giving Galicia more complete autonomy. Poland would be much more disposed to accept a more complete autonomy for Galicia if she knew that there was a question of definite organization. The question could not be solved on that day and it would be necessary to send the American memorandum to the Commission, but on this point it would be necessary for the Council to express an opinion by which the Commission could be guided. They should give their view as to whether East Galicia should be definitely attributed to Poland. He wished to point out that the American memorandum (Chapter I, Sec. B) dealt with this subject.

M. SCIALOJA said that in effect Eastern Galicia would be placed under a Polish mandate.

M. TARDIEU said that this would not be altogether the case for this mandate would not have a temporary character.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not agree to the Council's sup-

pressing the temporary character of the statute. He recalled the fact that the British Government had originally opposed the union of Eastern Galicia with Poland. He had accepted a compromise because a plebiscite had been promised. Now the idea of the plebiscite had been given up. He could not, without instructions, accept this solution in view of the fact that it completely altered the principles which had been previously raised.

MR. POLK proposed that the American memorandum be simply referred to the Commission.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to hold to what he had previously said, purely as his own opinion.

M. SCIALOJA said that it conformed to the proposal previously made by M. Sonnino.

(It was decided:

to refer to the Committee on Polish Affairs the memorandum presented by the American Delegation (Appendix K).)

10. GENERAL LE ROND read and commented upon Report No. 6 of the Commission on Polish Affairs.⁸

*Eastern Frontiers
of Poland*

MR. POLK said he approved the proposals of the Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he also approved of these proposals, but he wished to ask in what form the Council intended to communicate the decisions which they had taken to the Polish Government. He thought that the question of form was most important.

M. LAROCHE said that it would be sufficient to inform the Polish Government that the territories lying west of the line traced by the Commission would be definitely attributed to Poland.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it would not be necessary to include a Treaty.

M. LAROCHE said that in any case it was not a question of a Treaty defining the eastern frontiers of Poland but a Treaty according certain territories to Poland.

MR. POLK said that it would be possible to give Poland her choice between two solutions:

- (a) The acceptance of the minimum line proposed in the Committee's reports, with the assurance that this line would not prejudice any future negotiations regarding this frontier after the reestablishment of Russia or the obtaining of satisfactory information regarding the desires of the people to the east of this frontier; or
- (b) leaving the determination of this eastern frontier entirely open until such time as Russia and Poland considered it possible to make a definite settlement.

⁸ This report was annexed to the original as appendix L, q.v.

M. LAROCHE proposed that the Drafting Committee be requested to find a formula, taking the Report of the Commission as a basis.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the conclusions of Report No. 6 of the Committee on Polish Affairs; and,
- (2) to request the Drafting Committee to study, in taking the report as a basis, the means by which these decisions should be communicated to the Polish Government.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

APPENDIX H TO No. 64

Blockade of Russia

(1) The Blockade Council has modified the draft note regarding blockade of Russia (hereto attached⁹) as indicated thereon. There was no agreement, however, on the final paragraph which was left for the action of the Supreme Council.

(2) It is suggested that the final paragraph be: (a) deleted entirely, or (b) made to read: 'It will be understood that each of the Allied and Associated Powers will lend its sanction to the measures taken by the war vessels of any one of them to carry out this policy insofar as such measures are not in its opinion contrary to international law.'

APPENDIX I TO No. 64

'On account of the military operations which are taking place in the Gulf of Finland, mariners are warned against the dangers to themselves of going there.

'With a view to avoid [*sic*] accidents, for which they cannot be responsible, the Commanders of the Allied and Associated Forces in the Baltic will direct all merchant ships, which are found proceeding up the Gulf of Finland, to stop and turn back.'

APPENDIX J TO No. 64

Proposition de la Commission des Affaires Polonaises

(Additif à l'article 12 du Projet de statut pour la Galicie)

Toutefois, en ce qui concerne la législation agraire, la Diète ne pourra passer outre au droit de veto, mais si une mesure de cet ordre, après avoir été arrêtée par le veto du Gouverneur, est votée de nouveau dans le délai maximum d'un an par la Diète à la majorité des 2/3, la question sera immédiatement soumise au Conseil de la Société des Nations qui décidera, à la majorité des suffrages, de l'action à poursuivre et des ordres à donner, suivant ce qu'il estimera utile et convenable en la circonstance.

En ce qui concerne les lois relatives à l'instruction publique dans les établissements d'enseignement secondaire et supérieur, le veto du Gouverneur sera absolu.

⁹ This annex (not printed) was an English text of the draft note (see note 7 above) with the omission of the last paragraph.

*Memorandum**September 25, 1919.*

The following suggestions are submitted with a view to reconciling as far as possible the present draft of the Treaty on East Galicia including both the views of the majority and of the minority, and the objections which Mr. Paderewski expressed as regards:

- I. The Provisional Nature of the Settlement.
- II. Agrarian Legislation.
- III. Representation in the Polish Diet.
- IV. Military Service.

I. The Question of the Provisional Nature of the Settlement.

A. In the preamble the following phrase is to be omitted entirely: 'until the time when they are called upon by a plebiscite, which is for the present postponed by reason of the disturbed condition of Eastern Europe, to declare their wishes with regard to the final political status of the territory.'

B. In Article 2 the second paragraph is to be omitted. This paragraph reads: 'Poland further undertakes to hold or allow to be held a plebiscite of the inhabitants with regard to the final political status of the territory on a date and under conditions to be fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by any other body which they may appoint. She recognizes in advance the limits and status which, as the result of this plebiscite, may be definitively determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by the body appointed by them.'

C. In Article 33 the word 'temporary' is to be omitted from Paragraph 2, and Paragraph 3 is to be entirely omitted. Paragraph 3 reads:

'The provisions of this Chapter in no way prejudice the allocation of the said property to be made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the event of Eastern Galicia being in whole or in part separated from Poland.'

D. To replace the provisions which have been dropped, it is suggested that the following clause be inserted as Article 39:

'The stipulations in this Treaty are matters of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Poland hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification whatsoever of this Treaty in whole or in part which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.'

'Any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction of any of these obligations, and the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.'

'Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Polish Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands,

be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.'

(This article is borrowed with modifications from the minority treaties and is similar to an obligation which Poland had already assumed in its minority treaty.)

II. *Agrarian Legislation.*

It is suggested that the arrangement proposed by the Supreme Council be maintained namely: agrarian legislation should be included in Article 12 as a subject of legislation in the Diet of Eastern Galicia. However, Article 13 should be modified in such a way as to include agrarian legislation in the category for which the Governor's veto cannot be overridden by the Diet and to provide for a reference to the League of Nations in the event of a dead-lock. The second paragraph of Article 13 would then read:

'However, with regard to agrarian legislation the right of veto cannot be overridden by the Diet, but in case any such measure, vetoed by the Governor, is again voted by the Diet with a majority of two-thirds, the question shall be immediately referred to the Council of the League of Nations which shall by a majority vote take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.'

III. *Representation in the Polish Diet.*

As on this point Mr. Paderewski is especially insistent, it is proposed to accept the article suggested by the majority, which provides for the representation of East Galicia in the Polish Diet.

IV. *Military Service.*

It is proposed to accept the majority report, providing for Polish military service in Eastern Galicia, with the following changes:

Original Text.

'Article 38. Laws of [in] force in Poland relating to military service may be applied by Poland in Eastern Galicia.

'The contingent thus recruited shall form special units in the Polish army. In time of peace these units shall perform garrison duty in Eastern Galicia.'

Revised Text.

'Article 38. Laws in force in Poland relating to military service may be applied in Eastern Galicia.

'The contingent thus recruited shall form special units which in time of peace shall perform garrison duty in Eastern Galicia and in time of war shall be available for national defence.'

APPENDIX I. TO No. 64

Rapport N° 6 présenté au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission des Affaires Polonaises

FRONTIÈRES ORIENTALES DE LA POLOGNE

Dans son rapport n° 2 en date du 28 avril 1919 adressé au Conseil suprême et relatif aux frontières orientales de la Pologne,¹⁰ la Commission des affaires polo-

¹⁰ Report no. 2, as included in the official record of the proceedings of the Commission on Polish Affairs, is dated April 22, 1919 (cf. part II of the present report). Report no. 2

naïves avait cru devoir différer toute proposition touchant le tracé de la frontière au sud de la latitude de Kholm: elle avait estimé que cette frontière ne pouvait être fixée aussi longtemps que n'aurait pas été réglée la question de la Galicie orientale.

En même temps, la Commission proposait:

- a) Que dans certains territoires situés à l'est de la frontière soumise par elle à l'approbation de la Conférence, une enquête fût faite sur les caractères ethnique, linguistique et religieux et sur les vœux des populations;
- b) Que cette enquête fût faite, si possible, sur les lieux mêmes;
- c) Qu'une solution définitive fût donnée à la question de la frontière orientale de la Pologne, aussitôt que serait établi un Gouvernement russe, avec lequel les Grandes Puissances seraient en mesure de traiter cette question.

Sur les points qui étaient ainsi demeurés en suspens, la Commission croit devoir soumettre aujourd'hui au Conseil de nouvelles propositions.

I. *Frontière au sud de Kholm.*

En vertu de la résolution prise le 25 juin par le Conseil des Ministres des Affaires étrangères, la Commission a étudié un projet de statut pour la Galicie orientale; ce statut a fait l'objet du rapport n° 5 qu'elle a eu l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil suprême.

Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime qu'elle est aujourd'hui en mesure de proposer un tracé de la frontière polonaise au sud de la latitude de Kholm.

recommended a trace for the eastern frontier of Poland from the border of East Prussia southwards to the confluence of the rivers Bug and Neretwa in the latitude of Kholm (see note 11 below). This line constituted the northern part of what subsequently became known as the Curzon Line. The line recommended in report no. 2 was designed as a minimum and provisional eastern frontier for Poland within which the Polish Government should be authorized to organize a permanent administration (cf. part II of the present report): this was in accordance with the principle followed by the commission in drawing up its report no. 2 that 'the districts in which doubt arises as to the ethnographical character or wishes of the population cannot at present be assigned to the Polish State'.

No decision upon the line recommended in report no. 2 was taken at that time by the Supreme Council, but on April 26, 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers authorized the Commission on Polish Affairs to proceed with the examination of the frontier to be assigned to Poland in Eastern Galicia and to submit a report (see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iv, pp. 624-6). This report was submitted by the commission as its report no. 3 dated June 17, 1919. The report put forward two alternative lines for the Polish frontier in Eastern Galicia. Of these alternatives 'line A' was the frontier subsequently incorporated in article 1.A of the draft treaty relative to Eastern Galicia (see No. 61, appendix C); this line constituted the southern part of what subsequently became known as the Curzon Line. 'Line B' ran approximately from just west of Sokal southwards by way of Dobrotwór to Bóbrka whence it ran generally south-westwards to the Czechoslovak frontier slightly northwest of Klimiec, thereby including in Polish territory Lemberg (Lvov) and Drohobycz. The American, French and Italian delegations recommended line A if Eastern Galicia were to be attached to Poland with a form of autonomous status, and line B if Eastern Galicia were to be independent of Poland: the British delegation recommended line A in all cases.

The question of Eastern Galicia was considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 18 and June 25, 1919 (op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 828-33, 848-55, 859-62). In the light of the decisions taken at the latter meeting the Commission on Polish Affairs, as stated in part I of the present report, submitted to the Supreme Council its reports nos. 5 (see No. 61, appendix C) and 6.

L'Annexe I du Rapport n° 2¹¹ devrait, en conséquence, être complétée comme suit (avant-dernière ligne de la page 8) :

‘ Suivant cette limite administrative, puis le thalweg de la rivière Bug vers l'amont, jusqu'au point où elle rencontre l'ancienne frontière entre la Russie et l'Autriche (Galicie).’

La ligne de Bug, proposée par le Rapport n° 2 et le présent Rapport, a formé,

¹¹ Appendix I to report no. 2 gave the detailed trace of the frontier recommended in the report, i.e. of the northern part of what subsequently became known as the Curzon Line (see note 10 above). This appendix read as follows in the official French text:

‘Description de la frontière orientale de la Pologne depuis la frontière orientale de la Prusse Orientale jusqu'à la latitude de Kholm.

Une ligne:

quittant la frontière de la Prusse Orientale à son point de rencontre avec la limite administrative septentrionale du district de Suwalki, suivant cette limite administrative jusqu'au point le plus méridional du rentrant qu'elle forme à 7 kilomètres au Nord-Ouest de Punsck, se dirigeant approximativement vers le Sud-Est et atteignant la pointe Nord-Ouest du lac Galadusya en laissant la localité de Punsck en Pologne, traversant le lac suivant un tracé à déterminer sur le terrain jusqu'en un point à 2 kilomètres au Nord de Zegary, puis tournant à l'Est pour atteindre la rive Est du lac, se dirigeant vers le Sud à peu près parallèlement à la ligne des petits lacs qui se trouvent entre Zegary et Berzniki et à 2 kilomètres à l'Est de ces lacs, coupant la route de Berzniki-Kopciowo à 2 kilomètres au Sud-Est de Berzniki, se dirigeant vers le Sud jusqu'au point où elle rencontre la rivière Chernohanja (Marycha) qui vient de Zelwa, suivant le thalweg de cette rivière jusqu'à Sztudjanka puis un affluent de gauche et se prolongeant vers l'Est-Nord-Est jusqu'à ce qu'elle rencontre la rivière Igorka qui passe à Warwis-chki, suivant le thalweg de cette rivière jusqu'à son confluent avec le Niemen (Nyeman), suivant le thalweg de Niemen vers l'amont jusqu'à son confluent avec la Lososna puis le thalweg de la Lososna jusqu'en un point à environ 2 kilomètres et demi à l'Ouest-Sud-Ouest de son confluent avec le Niemen, prenant la direction approximative du Sud-Est et coupant la voie ferrée Grodno-Kuznitas à 500 mètres au Nord-Est de la bifurcation de Kielbasin, tournant vers le Sud-Sud-Est de façon à atteindre la rivière Likowka en un point à 1 kilomètre et demi Ouest de Baranowo, suivant le thalweg de la Likowka puis de la Laszanka vers l'aval jusqu'à la rivière Svisloch puis le thalweg de la Svisloch vers l'amont jusqu'au confluent à 4 kilomètres au Nord de Yalowka de la rivière passant par cette ville, suivant un tracé à déterminer sur le terrain de façon à atteindre la voie ferrée Gainowka-Svisloch au point où la route Narev-Narevka coupe cette voie ferrée, se dirigeant de façon à atteindre la limite administrative entre le district de Byelsk et de Brest-Litovsk au point où elle forme un angle aigu à 9 kilomètres au Nord-Est de Melnik, et en laissant aux Polonais les villages de Wolka, Piesczathka, Stulbee et Wierpole, suivant cette ligne administrative puis le thalweg de la rivière Bug vers l'amont jusqu'à son confluent avec la Neretwa à l'Est de Kholm.’

de 1815 à 1912, la frontière entre le Royaume de Pologne et la Russie. Au point de vue géographique, elle constitue une frontière satisfaisante, incontestablement supérieure à toute autre ligne qui pourrait être envisagée dans cette région plate et dépourvue d'accidents naturels. Elle attribue à la Pologne un territoire occupé par une population mixte, assez fortement mélangée au voisinage du Bug d'éléments petits-russiens, mais qui ont toujours vécu et qui vivent encore en complète harmonie avec les Polonais, sans manifester de sentiments séparatistes. Encore convient-il de remarquer que, depuis le début de la guerre, une partie de la population petite-russienne a quitté le pays où des éléments polonais ont remplacé les émigrants; la majorité des habitants, à l'heure actuelle, est probablement de race polonaise.

D'ailleurs, depuis près de six cents ans, cette région fait partie de la Pologne; elle n'en a été séparée qu'à deux reprises, en 1912, par l'ancien Gouvernement russe qui poursuivait dans le pays de Kholm une politique de russification que, en Russie même, l'opinion libérale a condamnée, et en 1918 par l'intervention des Gouvernements allemand et autrichien, lors de la conclusion du traité de Brest-Litovsk.

Au point de vue économique enfin, le territoire est étroitement lié à la Pologne et c'est beaucoup plus vers l'ouest que vers l'est que s'orientent ses relations.

Pour ces raisons, la Commission est unanime à proposer au Conseil suprême le tracé ci-dessus indiqué.

II. Territoires situés à l'Est de la frontière proposée le 22 avril.

Ayant achevé, dans sa séance du 27 août, la détermination des limites des territoires indiscutablement polonais qui peuvent être immédiatement attribués à l'État polonais, la Commission a recherché s'il convenait de traiter, dans les circonstances actuelles, la question des régions mixtes, situées à l'est de la frontière proposée le 22 avril, et au sujet dequelles elle avait formulé dans son rapport n° 2 les principes qui ont été rappelés au début du présent rapport.

La Commission a été unanime à estimer que, depuis le 22 avril, des faits nouveaux étaient intervenus qui rendaient impossible, dans un délai prochain, de pousser plus avant aucune étude sur l'attribution de ces territoires.

a) La plus grande partie des territoires en question est occupée par les troupes polonaises engagées dans la lutte contre le bolchevisme.

b) Dans sa note du 27 mai, adressée à l'amiral Koltchak, le Conseil suprême a stipulé que, 'dans le cas où les frontières ainsi que les questions concernant les relations entre la Russie et la Pologne, ne seraient pas réglées par un accord, toutes ces questions seraient remises à l'arbitrage de la Société des Nations.'

Dans sa réponse, dont les Puissances alliées et associées ont pris acte, l'amiral Koltchak a indiqué d'autre part que 'la sanction définitive de la délimitation des frontières entre la Pologne et la Russie doit être remise jusqu'à la convocation de la Constituante'.

Or il est impossible de prévoir à quelle époque pourra se constituer le Gouvernement russe régulier, dont l'intervention est nécessaire pour la fixation définitive des frontières orientales de la Pologne.

La Commission ne se dissimule cependant pas que la prolongation de l'état d'incertitude actuel présente les plus graves inconvénients, aussi bien pour les populations que pour le Gouvernement polonais; il importe d'y mettre fin. La frontière orientale de la Pologne, telle qu'elle est déterminée dans le rapport n° 2 et dans le présent rapport, représente une frontière provisoire, en ce sens que, dans

l'avenir, d'autres territoires situés à l'est de cette ligne pourront être rattachés à la Pologne. Mais la Commission estime que cette frontière devrait être déclarée définitive par rapport aux territoires situés à l'ouest de la même ligne, où la souveraineté de l'État polonais serait, dès à présent, complète et définitive.

En résumé, la Commission, à l'unanimité, propose au Conseil suprême que la frontière orientale de la Pologne, telle qu'elle est décrite dans les rapports nos 2 et 6 de la Commission des Affaires polonaises, soit considérée comme marquant la ligne à l'ouest de laquelle le Gouvernement polonais peut, dès maintenant, exercer légalement tous les droits qui résultent de la souveraineté.

Paris, le 1^{er} septembre 1919.

Le Président de la Commission:

J. CAMBON.

No. 65

H. D. 61.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, September 26, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Tardieu, later M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire:* Captain Hinchley-Cooke. *France:* M. Massigli. *Italy:* M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Mr. F. K. Nielsen.

British Empire: Hon. H. Nicolson, General Sackville-West, Lt.-Col. Kisch.

France: General Weygand, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, M. Pieyre.

Italy: M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Pilotti.

1. M. TARDIEU read the following memorandum of the Secretariat-General with regard to the action taken on the resolution of the Supreme Council of September 23rd:¹

*German Tank
Steamers*

'The resolution of the Supreme Council dated September 23rd in regard to the German oil steamers was transmitted on the 23rd to the Supreme Economic Council by the Secretariat-General.

The Supreme Economic Council forwarded the resolution on the morning of September 24th to its permanent Committee in London.

The latter body immediately brought the matter to the attention of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission which functions likewise in London. This body gave the necessary orders at once to suspend the departure of the ships in question.'

¹ See No. 63, minute 1.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had received a telegram from Lord Curzon dated September 25th (see Appendix A). He pointed out that the important portion of this telegram was that the Allied Maritime Transport Executive believed that the question of the disposition of the ships was one for the Supreme Council. The A.M.T.E. had recommended that the tank steamers be allocated to Allied management along with other vessels to which claim had been put forward under the terms of the Armistice. The first voyage, however, would be for the transport of oil to Germany. He added that in the event that the steamers had already left for the Fifth of Forth they would be diverted and allowed to proceed to the United States for their cargo of oil.

MR. POLK said that he was happy to hear of the measures which had been taken.

M. TARDIEU said that he would at once communicate Lord Curzon's telegram to the French members of the Supreme Economic Council.

2. (The Council had before it the proposed Treaty with New States prepared by the Commission on Political Clauses, together with the report of that Commission accompanying the Treaty. See Appendices B and C.²)

*Proposed Treaty with
New States. Clauses
relating to Reciprocal
Relations in Trans-
ferred Territories*

M. LAROCHE in commenting upon the Treaty and the report, said that the Commission was unanimous in the text of the clauses of the Treaty. It had not been unanimous on the question of what Powers should be parties to, and signatories of, the Treaty. The majority of the Commission had thought that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the document, but the United States had formulated an objection to its participation in the signature. The United States Delegation had felt that the matters embraced in the proposed Treaty were not broad questions resulting from the breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and therefore of direct concern to all the Allied and Associated Powers, but were rather questions of local interest concerning only the new States and the States possessing ceded territory. If the Treaty came into force it would import a specific legal obligation only on the directly interested Powers. The United States felt therefore that it was neither desirable nor advisable that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should be signatories to the Treaty, although representatives of these Powers, in participating in the framing of the proposed articles, might be

² Not printed. The report, dated September 2, 1919, stated that the draft treaty was the outcome of the proposal of Baron Sonnino referred to the commission by the decision of the Supreme Council of July 11, 1919 (see No. 9, note 9). The commission further reported that in drafting the treaty account had been taken of observations made by delegates of the New States in hearings before the commission, but drew attention to certain reservations formulated by the Yugoslav and Roumanian delegations. In conclusion the report raised the question of which Powers should be signatories of the treaty, for which see the discussion on this item in the Supreme Council. The draft treaty submitted under cover of the report was, with the exception of provision for signature by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and minor drafting variation, the same as the final text of the treaty concluded at Sévres on August 10, 1920, between Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia: for which see *British and Foreign State Papers (1920)*, vol. cxiii, pp. 959-65.

able to assist in facilitating the negotiations among the Powers directly interested.

As opposed to this point of view, the majority of the Commission had felt that it would be necessary for all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to sign, for otherwise the Treaty would be deprived of its authority in the eyes of the New States. Although the Commission felt that the interests of the New States had been carefully safeguarded by the Treaty and that the clauses were for the common good of all, the latter might distrust a Treaty which did not carry the signatures of all the Allied and Associated Powers. Should the United States refuse to sign, the important point arose as to what steps the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers should take. It was possible for the Four Principal Allied and Associated Powers to sign, even though the United States did not do so. The second method of procedure would be to make a united presentation of the Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the New States and jointly recommend that the same be signed by them.

MR. POLK said that this was a matter which Secretary Lansing had had before him, prior to his departure for the United States. Mr. Lansing had felt that the Treaty was one between friendly Powers and involved no enemy states. He had taken the position that it was not necessary for the American signature to appear, as he felt that it was difficult to justify the interests which United States might have in signing.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, following out the reasons advanced by M. Laroche, he believed that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty. The British Empire had no immediate interests in the matter but he believed that it should be a signatory power. He thought that, even in the absence of a United States signature, all [*sic*] the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign. A joint action of this kind would give the smaller States the impression that all the large Powers were interested in the matter, because the Treaty formed a portion of the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He was willing, however, to be guided by the wishes of the majority of his colleagues.

M. SCIALOJA said that he believed a refusal of the United States to sign the Treaty was a pure matter of internal interest. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers had taken part in Treaties in which they had no direct interest, as for example, in the case of Spitzbergen. He pointed out that the United States had been represented on the Commission on Political Clauses, had taken an active part in the framing of the Treaty, and presumably had therefore felt that matters of general interest were being settled. He was unable to urge Mr. Polk to sign the Treaty against the wishes of his Government. He would like to ask Mr. Polk, however, whether he would agree to a joint presentation of the Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the small States urging the latter to sign the same. In this way the Treaty would be given moral force.

MR. POLK said that he had no objections to this method of procedure.

M. MATSUI said that the Japanese Empire had no particular interest

involved, but as the Treaty concerned the general liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign. In view of the United States's objection, and by taking advantage of the period of twenty days proposed between the presentation of the Treaty and the signature, he would obtain the instructions of his Government in the matter. He would recommend that the Japanese Empire be a signatory party. Should M. Scialoja's proposition be accepted, however, he would have no difficulty in joining on behalf of Japan in the common presentation by the five Principal Powers.

M. LAROCHE said that he gathered from the discussion that the Council agreed to approve the text of the Treaty and that the Treaty itself should be presented to the new States by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers jointly with a recommendation that it be signed by the former. Furthermore a period of twenty days was to be accorded the New States between the time of presentation and the signature of the Treaty. He added that it was extremely necessary to decide upon a fixed period in order to prevent the matter being drawn out and any of the New States taking advantage of this to avoid signing.

M. TARDIEU said that as it was better for all the great Powers to take the same attitude on the question, he proposed that M. Laroche's solution of the matter be adopted.

It was decided:

- (1) That the text of the proposed Treaty with the New States (Clauses Relating to Reciprocal Relations in Transferred Territories) prepared by the Commission on Political Clauses should be accepted.
- (2) That the proposed Treaty should be presented to the Delegations of the interested states by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers jointly. The latter should impress upon the Delegations of the New States the necessity for the signature of the Treaty in question, and should request them to obtain the consent of their Governments as soon as possible, but in any case within a period of twenty days, at the expiration of which the Treaty should be signed in Paris by the plenipotentiaries of the interested States.

(At this point M. Tardieu left the room and M. Cambon took the chair.)

3.

Repatriation of Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia

4.

Distribution of Allied Troops in the Plebiscite Areas

5.

Report of the Commission on Baltic Affairs on the occupation of Memel

(These Questions were adjourned.)

6. (The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch, dated August 21st, 1919. (See Appendix D.³))

*Recommendation of
Marshal Foch that the
military Experts under
Article 163 of the German
Peace treaty should be
members of the Inter-
Allied Commission of
Control under Articles
203 and 210 of the Treaty*

MR. POLK said that there was no objection to the proposals contained in this note from the point of view of the United States.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British representatives agreed with Marshal Foch's proposals.

M. SCIALOJA said he had no objections to formulate.

M. MATSUI said that he was not entirely familiar with the question.

GENERAL WEYGAND commented and explained briefly the note in question.

M. MATSUI said that he had no objections to present.

It was agreed that:

The Conference of Military Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers provided for by Article 163 of the Peace Treaty to determine the reduction of effectives to be imposed on Germany for each period of 3 months following the coming into force of the Treaty, should be composed of the presidents and of the most important members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control constituted in conformity with articles 203-210, and chosen in such a way that all the Allied and Associated Powers be represented in the said Conferences.

The President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control should be charged with deciding the composition of this Conference and the dates of its sessions in agreement with the presidents of the Naval and Aerial Commissions.

7.

*Communication to Ger-
man Government relative
to the Evacuation of the
Baltic Provinces*

(This Question was adjourned.)

8. (The Council had before it a note from the Commission on Execution of the Treaty Clauses, asking that the German Government be requested to notify the Allied and Associated Powers of the Government property in German territory to be ceded to Poland. (See Appendix E.))

*Note from the Commis-
sion on Execution of the
Treaty Clauses relative
to German Property in
Territory to be ceded to
Poland*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was prepared to accept the proposals contained in the note.

MR. POLK said that he was likewise prepared to accept the same, but

³ Not printed. In this note Marshal Foch cited the first sentence of the third paragraph of article 163 of the Treaty of Versailles, and referred to articles 203-10 providing for the constitution of Interallied Commissions of Control. The note continued: 'It seems indispensable to select these military experts provided for by Article 163 from amongst the Interallied Commissions of Control which, by the very reason of their mission, shall be in possession of all the elements intelligently to decide the reductions of effectives to be fixed for Germany for each period of three months.' In conclusion Marshal Foch submitted to the Supreme Council the resolution which it adopted.

wished to reserve his final decision until he had consulted the United States expert in the matter. (Mr. Polk later notified the Secretariat-General that he had no objections to formulate.)

It was decided : to accept the proposals in the note of the Commission on Execution of the Treaty Clauses. (See Appendix E.)

It was further decided to request the German Government to furnish the Allied and Associated Powers all information relative to all Government property, which is required to be turned over to Poland within the territory to be ceded to the latter, under the terms of the Treaty with Germany.

9. (The Council had before it two notes of the German Delegation dated respectively August 1st and August 5th (see Appendixes *The Question of Eupen and Malmedy* F and G), together with a proposed reply thereto submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty. (See Appendix H.))

MR. POLK said that he had a slight change to propose in the text of the reply. In the 3rd paragraph (English text) the expression, 'with the sole reservation that the League of Nations *might* later order the return to Germany of the whole or part of these territories', appeared. He believed that the use of the word '*might*' in this connection was not strictly in accordance with Article 34 of the Peace Treaty and the covering letter sent to the German Delegation on June 16th, 1919. As the text now stood the proposed reply stated in substance that the League of Nations might disregard the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of Eupen and Malmedy, whereas, the covering letter referred to had said that, in the cases of the territories which it was proposed to transfer from Germany to Denmark and Belgium, this transfer would only take place as the result of a decision of the inhabitants themselves taken under conditions which would insure complete freedom of vote.

He proposed that the word '*might*' should be changed to read '*will*'.

M. LAROCHE said that Article 34 of the Treaty with Germany did not impose a fixed obligation upon the League of Nations to return the territory in question to Germany, should the majority of the population express its wish in that direction. He thought that a moral obligation was imposed upon the League of Nations but not an absolute one. The text of the reply as it stood seemed to him to clearly express the obligation created by the article in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with M. Laroche's interpretation of the matter.

M. LAROCHE added that the change proposed by Mr. Polk might result in adding something to the Treaty which was not included therein.

(After some further discussion on the matter Mr. Polk withdrew his proposal for the change in question, and

It was decided that the reply to the German notes on Malmedy and Eupen, as submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty, be accepted.)

10. (The Council had before it a letter from the British Delegation dated August 26th. (See Appendix I.))

*Question of Publication
of Documents connected
with the Treaty with
Germany*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the matter in question was of small importance but that he wished to obtain the decision of the Council before taking any action thereon.

It had been originally agreed that the final text of the German treaty should alone be made public, and that the preliminary conditions of peace as handed to the Germans should be kept secret. However, the different notes which had been exchanged between the German Delegation and the Allies had appeared in the newspapers of several countries. Some of the passages in these notes were rendered unintelligible by the fact that they referred to clauses which had been proposed for the Treaty and later modified or withdrawn. These clauses had not been made public coincidentally with the notes. The British Government wished to publish the clauses referred to in the notes as Annexes to the latter, but before so doing was anxious to obtain the approval of the Supreme Council.

M. CAMBON asked whether it was desired to publish all the clauses which had been omitted from the final Treaty or only those to which reference had been made in the notes in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that only those referred to in the notes were contemplated.

MR. POLK asked whether the Treaty as originally presented to the German Delegation had not been published in the Allied countries, as it had been made public in Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE answered that it had not been possible to publish it in the British Empire because by so doing the Houses of Parliament would have been entitled to have the Treaty before them and to discuss the same even before it was known whether or not Germany would accept it. The mere fact that the preliminary Treaty had appeared in Germany did [?not] render its presentation to the British Parliament necessary.

M. CAMBON asked that the decisions might be adjourned until he had had an opportunity to consult M. Clemenceau.

M. SCIALOJA pointed out that this was a mere question of form in view of the fact that publication had actually been made in many countries.

M. CAMBON said that there was a difference between official and unofficial publication.

(It was decided to adjourn the decision of this question until the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,
September 26, 1919.*

Telegram from Lord Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe. September 25, 1919

GERMAN TANK STEAMERS

The Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission referred this question to the A.M.T.E. on August 29th, with the knowledge of the American Representative on that Committee, Mr. F. J. [sic] Dulles. At the meeting of the A.M.T.E. held on September 17th, Mr. Anderson, who represented the United States, handed in to the Supreme Economic Council a memorandum with reference to the question. This memorandum was signed by Captain Tobey, U.S.N.

It was accordingly decided by the A.M.T.E. that the questions should be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council. Mr. Anderson concurred in this decision. The recommendation which the A.M.T.E. forwarded to the Supreme Economic Council was substantially as follows:—

'Allocate the tank steamers to Allied management along with other vessels to which claims were put forward under the terms of the Armistice, and, at any rate for their first voyage, use them for the transport of oil to Germany.'

The representative of the United States on the A.M.T.E. intimated that if the Supreme Economic Council, by adopting this resolution, should approve the revocation of the clause in the Brussels Agreement⁴ whereby these German tank steamers were provisionally exempted, no objection would be raised and on September 30th⁵ the Supreme Economic Council confirmed the resolution by the A.M.T.E.

No promise has been given to Germany with respect to these steamers nor have the Germans raised any objection to surrendering them but have, on the contrary, prepared them for surrender and have furnished them with coal only for the journey to the Firth of Forth. No breach of faith with Germany is therefore involved.

Neither the A.M.T.E. nor the Supreme Economic Council has any knowledge of the decision of the Supreme Council mentioned in your telegram of yesterday.

A full report is being sent for the information of the Supreme Council by the President of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

In view of a report received from H.M.S. Coventry that a seaman's strike is imminent at Hamburg the tank steamers were ordered to the Firth of Forth on September 23rd, and the Ministry of Shipping put forward a strong plea that the action already taken should not be interfered with.

The following is the passage referred to:—'This action was in contradiction with the resolution of the Supreme Council, which had decided, in view of the pressing need of oil in Germany, to leave these ships in German hands.'

APPENDIX E TO No. 65

Document I

COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION OF THE POLITICAL CLAUSES OF THE TREATY WITH
GERMANY

Translation

PARIS, *September 5, 1919.*

The circular hereto annexed⁶ from the German Financial Minister, remitted to the Peace Conference by the Polish Delegation, expressly states (Article 3): 'It is

⁴ See No. 66, appendix A.

⁵ In error for September 20.

⁶ Document 2 in this appendix.

necessary to supervise as regards these acts . . . ⁷ etc., which establish the exact value of all the property before being remitted (to Poland) does not fall into Polish hands, [sic] etc.⁷

The Committee on the Execution of the Political Clauses of the Treaty with Germany estimates that, on the contrary, the German Government is obliged to communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments all information concerning this property, and is of the opinion that the Conference should inform the German Delegation of it.

Document 2

MINISTER OF FINANCE.

S. J. 1657.

Copy. Translation.

BERLIN, July 14, 1919.

According to Article 256 of the Peace Treaty, the States which are to take possession of German territories will also take possession of all the domains and of all the property of the German Empire and of the German States which is found on the said territories.

The domains situated in the territories which are not yet occupied by the Poles shall be ceded to the Polish Government according to a method established beforehand. As it is possible that the cession will take place very soon, it is necessary to take the necessary measures at this time for the determining of the bases according to which the beneficiary state will pay indemnities for the domains acquired. Therefore, in accord with the cointerested parties, I draw up the following:

1. All the services are instructed to prepare as soon as possible two copies of the Conventions concerning the delivery of all state property administered over by them. As instructions have been given concerning this matter on several occasions, a regulation of uniform indications is judged as superfluous. However, it is none the less necessary to be guided by the following indications:

- (a) It is absolutely necessary to avoid specifying the value of the domains in the course of the negotiations; it is necessary, on the contrary, to make a summary exposé of the general condition, an exposé in which account could be taken in the appraisement, of the location, extent of the lands, number of buildings, rooms in the buildings, condition of the culture in the property and in the forests.

- (b) An exact and separate list must be made of the objects to be delivered. A short explanation must be given concerning objects of special value. These documents should not be considered as inventories.

- (c) The office through which the delivery is to be made must be accurately indicated on the first page.

2. The two copies concerning the delivery negotiations must be signed by the assignor and assignee. A copy shall be remitted to the Service of State which takes possession of the domains and the second immediately returned to the competent Minister. Should it be difficult to obtain the signature of the service representing the assignee, the two copies of the *pourparlers* must be returned to the competent Minister.

3. *It is necessary to supervise as regards these Acts, etc., which establish the exact value of all the property before being remitted, does not fall into Polish hands [sic]. It is necessary*

⁷ Punctuation as in original.

therefore that all the documents concerning this question be remitted to the service which should retain the documents not destined to be remitted. In returning the documents concerning the negotiation to the competent Minister the place where they had been sent must be designated at the time.

4. All these provisions refer as well to all the domains of the State which belonged to the former Kingdom of Poland and which according to Chapter 92, Art. 3, of the Peace Treaty shall be returned to Poland without indemnity. Everything relating to the elucidation of the appurtenances of the domain of the former Kingdom of Poland must be brought to the attention of the said service under No. 3.

5. It is not necessary, for the time being, to prepare the negotiations concerning the delivery of the domains in the districts submitted to a plebiscite or in the arrondissement of Memel.

But all these provisions are applicable to the territories attributed to the free city of Dantzig.

6. Regarding the property of the administration of the railroads, a special order of the Minister of Public Works is to be followed.

Signature.

Court of Appeals at Marienwerder.

July 17, 1919.

To The Judge of the Court of Appeals.

To The Procureur of the Court of Appeals. i. A. 49.
10265.

This copy is brought to the attention of the Court in order that the necessary measures may be taken. Referring to Chapter No. 3 it should be not[ed] that all the acts and all the documents concerning the matter as well as the elucidations annexed should be sent to the Court of Appeals at Elblong [? Elbing].

SHELHAN [sic].

APPENDIX F TO No. 65

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

VERSAILLES, August 1, 1919.

To His Excellency, M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference.

Mr. President:—

Following up my note of July 13,⁸ I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian administrative controller at Eupen has sent the following notice to the Council of the Circle and to the Mayor of the town of Eupen:

'Since the signature of Peace and by its ratification, Germany has renounced all its rights over the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, since from that time it has been necessary to direct administrative affairs while awaiting other more complete measures, I feel called upon to ask you to avoid treating further, insofar as possible, with the German administrations. I think that you should only treat with the German administrations in liquidating your business affairs or in asserting your rights. In any event, all the orders of Berlin have no value whatsoever. Insofar as the regency of Aix-la-Chapelle is concerned, I deny it all jurisdiction in the circle of Eupen. I dare to hope that you will immediately try to follow out this

⁸ Not included in original of this appendix.

measure; I declare myself entirely disposed to direct you in the affairs under your jurisdiction and this in the interest of your administration and that of Belgium.

'The administrative controller of the Circle of Eupen

Signed: Leon Xhaflaire [*sic*']

The German Government requests that the substance of this notice be brought to the knowledge of the Belgian Royal Government. The German Government believes that the Belgian Royal Government will inform the administrative controller that such interference in the administration of the Circle of Eupen is not admissible until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, and that, particularly, the relations of the local authorities with the Regency of Aix-la-Chapelle and the other administrative authorities must not, until then, be hindered in this way.

Accept, etc.

FREIHERR VON LERSNER.

APPENDIX G TO No. 65

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

VERSAILLES, *August 5, 1919.*

To: His Excellency, M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference.

Mr. President:—

Referring to my note of August 1, I have the honour to communicate the following to Your Excellency:—

According to information from Herbesthal, the Belgian local Commander in that place has notified the Director of the railway station that the Herbesthal station and the other stations situated in the Eupen Circle were, in the next few days, to be taken under Belgian Administration. At the same time, he requested that the station officials be informed that, in case they desired to enter Belgian service, the Belgian Administration would continue to pay them their customary salary and allowances. Since the Local Commander has been contemplating the transfer, in the next few days, of the stations to Belgian Administration, he seems to be under the erroneous impression that the provisions of the Peace Treaty regarding the Circles of Eupen and Malmédy had already come into force, by the signing of the Treaty.

The German Government begs that the request be transmitted to the Royal Belgian Government to instruct the officer mentioned, as well as the other Belgian Military and Civil Authorities in Eupen and Malmédy, among whom similar erroneous impressions seem to exist, concerning the legal status, and to call their attention to the fact that all measures, contemplated on the part of Belgium as a result of the present relinquishment of sovereignty over the two Circles by Germany, can only be carried out when the Peace Treaty in its relations between Germany and Belgium, has come into force.

With regard to the possible taking over of the railroad officials, the German Government calls attention to the fact that the officials are not in a position, independently, without the approval of the Government which appointed them, to dispose of their services. The officials have been informed that negotiations concerning the question of officials are in the hands of the Imperial Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, and that special negotiations by individual authorities and officials would not be binding for the Government.

The German Government would, on its side, deem it expedient if, during the period until the decision of the people as to the final lot of the Eupen and Malmedy Circles, the smallest possible number of changes would be made in the railway personnel as well as in the rest of the Civil Service. It is of the opinion that, according to the agreements referred to in the note of July 13,⁸ concerning the execution of the provisions of the Peace Treaty pertaining to the district of Moresnet and the Circles of Eupen and Malmedy, precisely the taking over of the railway personnel and such railway questions should be dealt with, as demand a punctual settlement, in order that, after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, the desired orderly continuation of traffic on the lines and of rail communications across the frontier may be assured, which would also be in the interest of the other Powers concerned with the occupation of Rhine territory.

Accept, etc.

FREIHERR VON LERSNER.

APPENDIX H TO No. 65

Proposed Reply to German Notes on Malmedy and Eupen, as submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty

Document 1

Translation

The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Peace Treaty has the honour to recommend for the approval of the Supreme Council the appended draft of answer to the notes of the German Delegation dated August 1 and 5 relative to the measures adopted by the Belgian authorities in the circles of Eupen and Malmedy.

September 5, 1919.

Document 2

Mr. President:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of August 1 and 5.

The measures adopted by the Belgian authorities in the circles of Eupen and Malmedy seemed to have caused the German Government an emotion which is hard to understand.

According to Article 34 of the Peace Treaty, Germany renounces in favour of Belgium all rights and titles over the territories which are making up the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, with the sole reservation that the League of Nations might later order the return to Germany of the whole or part of these territories, if, according to formalities determined by the same article, the majority of the population expresses the desire to do so.

According to these provisions the sovereignty over those territories in question shall pass effectively to Belgium as soon as the Treaty goes into force, namely the day of the signing of the first *procès-verbal de dépôt* of ratifications, if on this day the Belgian ratifications have been deposited. The obligation to proceed to a proper consultation within the forms fixed by Article 34 in no way effects [*sic*] the sovereign rights of Belgium.

The Belgian Government shall therefore, from the going into force of the Treaty, have to provide for all the public positions in the ceded territories; the railroad employees are among the officials whose nomination it will have to see to.

In taking at once the measures for the transfer of sovereignty and in preparing measures which are of a nature to facilitate that transfer later, the Belgian authorities, far from overstepping their rights, have only in view the interest of the populations of the territories which will soon pass under Belgian Sovereignty.

Besides, while waiting for the going into force of the Treaty, it is perfectly right for the Belgian authorities, as occupying power, to get into direct relations with the employees of the administration of Prussian railroads.

The Belgian Government does not refuse however to negotiate with the German Government regarding the questions relative to the execution of the Treaty, either within the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, or within the neutral Moresnet and the Prussian Moresnet. The only condition placed upon such negotiation is that the German government does not contest in any way the value of the sovereign rights of Belgium as they are recognized by the Treaty of June 28 over the territories dealt with in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of that Treaty.

Please accept, etc.

APPENDIX I TO No. 65

BRITISH DELEGATION.

PARIS, *August 26, 1919.*

To Secretary-General Dutasta.

It has been promised to the British Parliament that the publication of the Peace Treaty with Germany in its final form would be completed by that of the other annexed documents so as to constitute a complete historical document. However, in order to make certain later documents fully intelligible, it would be well to publish at least certain parts of the first draft of that treaty.

It is however difficult to proceed thus in view of the fact that the former Supreme Council has decided that the Peace Treaty with Germany should be published only in its final form. To conquer this difficulty it is now proposed to place in a column opposite the corresponding part of the final text the parts of the first draft [?which] were later modified. This proposal has been submitted to the Prime Minister and has received his approval. Consequently, I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to kindly submit it to the examination of the Supreme Council in view of obtaining, if possible, the adhesion of the other representatives to the procedure suggested.

I can add that the German Society of the League of Nations has published the primitive text of the Treaty in English, French and German, that it seems certain that that publication has met with a great success in Germany and in the neutral countries and that a great number of copies have been introduced into the Allied countries. It is therefore evident that the publication of the excerpts of the primitive text would reveal nothing which is not already known.

Please accept, etc.

H. D. 62.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, September 27, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Hon. H. Nicolson.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. J. B. Scott, Mr. E. L. Dresel.

British Empire: General Groves, General Sykes, General Sackville-West, Lieutenant-Colonel Kisch, Lieutenant-Commander Dunne, Mr. Ibbetson-James, Mr. Brigstocke.

France: M. Claveille, M. Loucheur, M. Berenger, M. Laroche, Commander Levavasseur, M. Fromageot, Captain Roper.

Italy: M. Galli, M. Ricci Busatti, Admiral Orsini, Lieutenant-Colonel Guidoni, Lieutenant-Colonel Piccio.

Japan: M. Nagaoka.

1. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation of September 24th (see appendix A).

German Oil Tank Ships

M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to make a brief summary of what had taken place. The Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council had taken decisions in regard to the distribution of the German Oil Tank Ships which had, in accordance with the Brussels decision, been left temporarily to Germany. At a meeting which had taken place in London, it had been decided upon request of the American Delegate that the question should be referred for a definite decision to the Supreme Economic Council. The Council had met at Brussels on the 20th September. Unfortunately an incident had occurred which was the cause of the present discussion. A telegram sent to Brussels by the American Delegation had arrived in a mutilated condition. It was necessary to ask for a repetition which had arrived too late. When the Supreme Economic Council confirmed the resolution of the A.M.T.E. it believed that it was acting in full accord with the views of the American Delegation. He wished to call the attention of the Council to the following points: (1) The German Oil Tank Ships had been left to Germany only temporarily and the Inter-Allied Council at London was alone competent to decide as to their allocation. It was not a matter for the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission. It was a question of a distribution made by virtue of the Armistice. The American

Delegation held that it had been decided to leave these ships to Germany to assure the transport of oil. There was a disagreement on this point. The ships had not been left indefinitely to Germany and the proof of this lay in the fact that, far from protesting against giving up the ships, the German Government had given orders for their delivery. (2) That the Standard Oil Company claimed that the ships belonged to it because the Company owned all the stock of the German Company which owned the ships in question. He wished to say with reference to this point that that was a question which could not be dealt with at the moment and was a matter for the Reparations Commission.

MR. POLK said that he agreed that the question should not be discussed at present.

M. LOUCHEUR said that his next point was: (3) That the ships ought not to lie idle. There was a shortage of tonnage from which all the world, including Germany, suffered. There was no doubt but that Germany needed oil and it was necessary to furnish it. The Standard Oil Company was prepared to furnish credit to Germany for oil and asked that the ships in question be placed at its disposal for the purpose of effecting the delivery. He wished to suggest, as his own opinion, the following:

The German ships in question would be turned over to the Powers in accordance with the decision of the A.M.T.E. They should immediately undertake a voyage to transport oil furnished by the Standard Oil Company to Germany with the understanding that the Standard Oil Company should open a credit of sufficient length of time to make it unnecessary to ask Germany at an early date to use part of its gold supply to pay for the oil.

MR. POLK said that he would like to ask whether the decision taken in London provided for a definite or only temporary allocation of these ships.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that it was only a question of temporary allocation.

M. HENRY BERENGER said that the distribution had been made in the following manner and that with the exception of the American Delegate there had been a unanimous opinion. The percentage of losses during the war had been taken into consideration and on this basis France had received 50 per cent of the tonnage (30,000 tons dead weight and 23,000 tons gross weight), Italy 10,000 tons and Belgium 12,000 tons. It had been decided that Great Britain should receive three-quarters of the remainder, and America one-quarter. The reasons for this decision were as follows. Of the 47 German Oil Tank Ships existing at the outbreak of the war, 17 had taken refuge in American ports; 5 had been destroyed; 14 were discovered at Hamburg and 7 had not been found. The Shipping Board had opened an investigation to ascertain where these ships were. They were the ships which were to be divided between Great Britain and the United States and their value was considerable. The distribution had been made in accordance with the terms of the Armistice and were [*sic*] effective until the moment when, after the Treaty of Peace became effective, the Reparations Commission should take definite steps as to the final division of the ships in question. Of the 14 ships found at Hamburg, only 11 were available. Of these 7 belonged

to the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, two to the Deutsche Erdoel Gesellschaft, and two to Messrs. Albrecht.

MR. POLK asked whether the 11 ships would be used for a voyage to Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that they would, and that, if the question of making a second voyage should arise, it would be necessary for the Supreme Council to re-examine the question.

M. HENRY BERENGER said that M. Loucheur's proposal was in conformity with the resolution taken by the A.M.T.E. He wished to make certain points clear, and to ask whether it was the Standard Oil Company alone which should furnish Germany with the oil which was needed. There were other American Companies. He asked whether a contract existed and whether part of the price had already been paid. Mr. Polk had said so a few days before and the 'New York Herald' had published his statement. He also wished to ask whether the Standard Oil Company was prepared to make a long term credit. The representatives of that company, who had called upon him on the preceding day, had made no definite statement on that subject.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to point out that Germany could not dispose of her funds without the authorization of the Financial Commission. It was proposed to notify Germany that she should make contracts with whatever American company she wished to and it was the duty of the Financial Commission to examine the conditions of payment. It was there that the question of a long term credit would be passed upon.

MR. POLK said that he was certain that no money had passed but he would ask for complete information and would be glad to furnish such information to the Council. He wished to ask under what conditions the ships would be navigated and by what crews they would be manned.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the ships would fly the flag of the nation to which they had been allocated temporarily and also the Inter-Allied flag.

M. HENRY BERENGER said that, so far as the officers and crews of these ships were concerned, it had been decided, and Germany had made no objections, that they should be manned by officers and crews of the Allied nations in question.

MR. POLK said that, if he understood correctly, there was no question of the ships being allocated to the United States. The suggestion had been made that the United States guarantee their return. He was willing, if the Naval Armistice Commission desired it, to give an assurance on this subject. It was understood that the Standard Oil Company could not keep these ships which they claimed as their property.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he considered it important that the Armistice Commission should be notified without delay and that a telegram should be transmitted to them on that day.

It was decided:

- (1) that the provisional exemption of tankers granted at Brussels on the 14th March, 1919, should be cancelled. This cancellation should be without prejudice to any previous action taken by the A.N.A.C.;

- (2) that the vessels should be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision decided on by the A.M.T.E. on the 17th September, 1919, under the usual armistice terms which should in no way prejudice the final decision to be made by the Reparations Commission provided for by the Treaty of Versailles;
- (3) That, should the German Government so desire, the said ships should be employed under the above terms for one voyage for the conveyance of oil to Germany; should a second voyage be asked for by the German Government, the matter would be again referred to the Supreme Council;
- (4) that in consequence the said vessels should be sent forthwith to the Firth of Forth in compliance with the instructions of the A.N.A.C.¹

The Council also took note of Mr. Polk's declaration to the effect that he was prepared

- (1) to give assurance that no payment had as yet been made by Germany for the delivery of the oil in question and
- (2) to furnish to the Naval Armistice Commission, if they should desire it, an assurance that the vessels in question would not be retained by the United States.

2.

Authorization for German ships to proceed to Turkish ports

[Not printed]

3. MR. POLK brought to the attention of the Council the résumé of certain conversations which had taken place at Versailles between an American Representative and Baron von Lersner (see Appendix C). He wished to add that Baron von Lersner desired to emphasize the point that the Allied and Associated Governments should make a distinction between the German Government and the German people. They should make the threat to the German people in such a form as to make them understand the harm which their Government was doing in supporting the military party. Baron von Lersner said that the movement in the Baltic Provinces was clearly reactionary in character. He (Mr. Polk) desired to make it clear that the American Delegation did not agree with what Baron von Lersner had said. He (Mr. Polk) felt strongly that it was entirely possible for the German Government to stop rationing the army of General von der Goltz by closing the East Prussian frontier.

M. BERTHELOT said that there was serious grounds for doubting the good faith of the German Government in this matter.

M. PICHON said that on that very morning the newspapers had published a telegram from Berlin which contained a report from the German Con-

¹ The above resolution is printed with verbal variation in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii, p. 547. Cf. passim for American documents relating to this question.

servative Press in regard to an exchange of letters between the British General Burt² and General von der Goltz.³ General von der Goltz had used most insolent language to General Burt. He had threatened to break all relations with him and to expel British subjects from the territories under German occupation. He expressed the hope that the German Government would reply to the 'injurious pretensions' which the Entente Mission thought themselves able to address to a German General in a foreign country, in a befitting manner.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this letter only strengthened the opinion of his Government that it was necessary to take action as quickly as possible.

M. FROMAGEOT read the draft note to the German Delegation prepared by the Drafting Committee in accordance with the resolution taken by the Council on the 25th of September (see Appendix D). He said that in the first paragraph on the second page⁴ the Drafting Committee had substituted the words, 'all troops' for the words, 'these troops', which appeared in the draft previously prepared by the British Delegation. The Committee had desired in this manner to refer to all German troops, no matter under what authority they were. They desired also to omit the last sentence of the third paragraph on the second page,⁵ which actually dealt with a matter of interior arrangement. It was hardly necessary to notify the Germans of the instructions given to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. POLK said that America was not represented on the Supreme Economic Council⁶ and for this reason he wished to ask if the German demands in question were pending before the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

M. FROMAGEOT said that if there was any question the words 'Supreme Economic Council' could be removed wherever they appeared.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it had been decided to act immediately. The use of the future tense as in the words, 'they will be forced', tended to weaken the weight of the action.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Committee had had a scruple upon the subject. They remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had promised Germany in July that the blockade would be raised after Germany had ratified the Treaty. The Committee had wished to use an expression which would show that they were not unmindful of the former engagement which had been taken and that they took recourse to these measures only because Germany had failed to live up to her obligations. It would be

² Head of the British Military Mission at Riga.

³ This exchange of letters was published in the British press on September 29, 1919. See Vol. III of this series.

⁴ Seventh paragraph of the draft note.

⁵ The reference was evidently to the ninth paragraph of the draft note (the fourth, not the third, paragraph on the second page of the original).

⁶ For the withdrawal of American representation from the Supreme Economic Council after the departure of Messrs. Hoover and Dulles from Paris, see Mr. Polk's telegram No. 4197 of September 13, 1919, to Mr. Lansing and the reply thereto, printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919* (Washington 1934), vol. i, pp. 8-9.

simpler to say, 'they will take into consideration', at the end of the paragraph; they would suppress the words 'Supreme Economic Council' wherever they occurred.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council had just decided to furnish oil if the supply of foodstuffs under discussion was to be stopped.⁷ It should be understood that the Supreme Council were in a position, if they considered it advisable, to cancel the decision which they had just taken.

M. PICHON said that the Council were in agreement on this point, but that he did not consider it advisable to notify the Armistice Commission of this reservation.

M. FROMAGEOT said that in case the Council decided to hold up the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, the Committee had prepared a formula which could be inserted before the last paragraph on page two and which stated that the repatriation of German prisoners of war would be stopped from that day.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought this formula was too definite. In spite of his repeated telegrams, he had so far not received instructions from his Government. When the subject had been previously discussed,⁸ the Council had spoken of a total or partial suspension of repatriation.

M. PICHON said that he thought it would be better to make no mention of prisoners of war.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was an efficacious means of pressure, even though it was somewhat objectionable.

MR. POLK said that he thought it would be advisable to make some intimation on the subject through the Press.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that at the meeting at which Mr. Lloyd George had been present, it had been decided to send the ultimatum through the intermediary of Marshal Foch.⁹ Later they had thought of addressing the German Delegation. Now they had returned to the formula of the ultimatum. He thought it would produce a stronger effect if it was communicated to the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch. From a technical point of view, he wished to say that all questions concerning the Armistice had been taken up with the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch and in this particular case the question was one relating to the terms of the Armistice.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the note of September 23rd¹⁰ had been addressed to Marshal Foch.

MR. POLK said that he had no objections to this procedure.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he suggested the advisability of making the note public.

M. PICHON said that the Press could be informed of the note on that day, and the terms could be published on the following Monday.

⁷ The punctuation here is apparently defective. A possible emendation would be a full stop after 'oil' and a comma after 'stopped'.

⁸ See No. 64, minute 7.

⁹ See No. 58, minute 1.

¹⁰ Apparently in error for September 3. See appendix D and note 16 below.

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft note to the German Government respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces prepared by the Drafting Committee with the modifications in text approved by the Council (see Appendix E).
- (2) to transmit this note to the German Government through the intermediary of the Marshal, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies;
- (3) to notify the press of the transmission of this note and to make public the text on the 29th of September.¹¹

It was also decided:

that the Council, in conformity with the spirit of this note, should reserve the right to stop, if they should consider it advisable, the cargoes of oil, the delivery of which to Germany had been authorized by the Council.

4. M. FROMAGEOT read and explained a note of the 18th of September addressed by the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council on the subject of the Air Convention which had been adopted by the Supreme Council at its meeting of September 10th. (See *Note from the Drafting Committee on the Air Convention* Appendix F.)

The Proposals of the Committee were adopted except in regard to Article 18 respecting which the following discussion took place:

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Article raised very delicate questions. If the Article were entirely suppressed the result might be that aircraft might, upon landing in a foreign country, be prevented from flying for an indefinite period, on the ground that some breach of patent had taken place. He wished to have it stated definitely that in a case of this kind the aircraft would not be detained.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the same question had arisen in the Automobile Convention and at that time it was considered advisable to omit the Article. In point of fact there was no danger that aircraft would be detained for months. It would be sufficient to avoid detention to deposit a bond. It was possible to maintain the article under discussion, but there was no doubt that certain of the Powers would make reservations.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that the French Delegation had made a reservation in respect of this Article for the purpose of protecting industrial property. They could not agree that a foreigner knowingly committing a breach of patent should land in France and leave without being disturbed. The detention of the aircraft in question appeared to be the only method of dealing with the situation, but in view of the fact that the Legal Advisers of the Conference were of the opinion that industrial property would be equally well protected if after their detention the deposit of a bond were called for, the French Delegation would withdraw their reservation against Article 18 upon condition that the last sentence, concerning suits to be brought in the country of origin against the aircraft, be eliminated.

¹¹ The note was published in the British press on September 30, 1919. This English text was not identical with that in appendix E; the published text appears to have been a slightly variant translation of the French text.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was willing to accept the suppression of such a statement. He suggested that the Article be referred to the Drafting Committee which should endeavour to modify it, so that the right of detention or seizure should be limited by the right to set the aircraft free upon the deposit of a bond.

M. PICHON said that he would agree to this.

M. MATSUI said that he was obliged to make a reservation. His Government was not yet in possession of the text of the Convention. A period of six months had been allowed in which each Power might say whether or not it agree.

MR. POLK said that the United States had also made a reservation and understood that they would be given a period of six months in which to communicate their reply.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Drafting Committee should be called upon to modify the text of Article 18 of the Convention Relative to Air Navigation in such a manner as to make it possible for aircraft to avoid detention for violation of patent by depositing a security.
- (2) to accept, with reference to Articles 15, 22, 24, 34, and 36 the proposals of the Drafting Committee. (See Appendix F.)

5. M. BERTHELOT said that he was directed by M. Clemenceau to say that he considered it inadvisable to publish portions of the Conditions of Peace in their original text. He was not opposed to the publication of all of the text and of the notes which had been exchanged in the premises with the German Government.

Publication of Documents Annexed to the Treaty of Peace with Germany

SIR EYRE CROWE said he agreed in principle, but the publication of the whole of the text might be somewhat expensive. He would refer the matter to his Government.

(The question was adjourned.)

6.

[Not printed]¹²

Insertion in the Treaty with Hungary of an Article identical with Article 310 of the Treaty with Austria

7. (The Council had before it a memorandum from Mr. Hoover asking that a Committee be formed to make arrangements for and undertake the repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia. (See Annex H.¹³)

Creation of a Commission to Study the Repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian Prisoners in Siberia

M. BERTHELOT said that the Council would, without question, be unanimous in approving Mr. Hoover's

¹² On the proposal of the British delegation it was decided to request the Drafting Committee to insert an article in the treaty of peace with Hungary identical with article 310 of the treaty with Austria.

¹³ Not printed. In this memorandum, dated July 26, 1919, Mr. Hoover stated: 'It

proposal. It was a question of humanity, but he felt that it should be understood that, before repatriating the Germans and others, it would be necessary to repatriate the fifty thousand Czecho-Slovak troops who were at present in Siberia.

MR. POLK said he agreed with M. Berthelot. There were a number of difficult questions in connection with the repatriation of these prisoners, just as there were in the case of the Czecho-Slovak troops, but as the question of the repatriation of the latter was being considered at the present time, it would be possible to study at the same time the questions relating to the Germans and Austrians.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he felt some doubt as to whether the nomination of a Commission would bring about practical results.

M. PICHON thought that there might be favourable results and that they would lead to a means of repatriating the Czecho-Slovak troops.

(It was decided:

that a Commission composed of one American, British, French, Italian and Japanese officer should be created to deal with the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.

It was also decided:

that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.)

8. (The signature then took place of the decision previously taken by the Council for the organization of a plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spis and Orava.¹⁴ The decision was signed by Mr. Polk, Sir Eyre Crowe, M. Pichon, M. Scialoja and M. Matsui.)

Signature of the Decision taken by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for the Organization of a Plebiscite at Teschen

(The meeting then adjourned.)

appears that there are some 200,000 German-Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia, and that these prisoners are suffering greatly and are a constant menace to the Siberian Government. There are also certain Polish prisoners and civilians now scattered all over the world who will require more systematic assistance at repatriation, but there is an entire deficiency of funds with which to pay the incidental expenses. There are probably also other odd lots of expatriates of various nationals as the result of the war, who need systematic repatriation. It would appear to me that this problem requires definite organization.' Mr. Hoover went on to propose 'that a Commission, comprising a British, French, American and Italian military officer, should be set up and undertake the management of this repatriation' in consultation with the Governments concerned. Mr. Hoover enclosed a British memorandum on Ex-Enemy Prisoners of War in Siberia and a memorandum on Polish Repatriation as 'indicating the volume of the problem' outlined by him.

¹⁴ See No. 62, minute 2 and appendix B.

*September 24, 1919.**Origin of the Question*

The Brussels Protocol concerning merchant tonnage is only the result of several interviews, notably those of Treves of January 15-17 [1919] and of Spa of March 4.

The surrender of the German merchant fleet was stipulated by Article VIII of the Convention renewing the Armistice signed at Treves on January 16. This article provided, to settle the details of execution, the conclusion of a civil agreement, which was signed in the same place on January 17.

The Germans not having fulfilled their obligations, a meeting of experts was held at Spa. Admiral Hope, Chief of the Allied Delegation, submitted a note with two memoranda annexed, one relative to finances and the other dealing with tonnage. This latter memorandum defines the nature of the exemptions accorded and confirms clearly their revocability.

The Germans, without raising objections to the terms of the memorandum, declared that they could not deliver their vessels without obtaining precise guarantees of food.

Therefore the whole question of food supply, tonnage and finance was treated again at Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919.

The exemptions accorded, whose provisional character is emphasized in every particular case, form the subject of the first paragraph of Annex V/a (tonnage) of the Brussels Protocol.

Concerning the tank vessels the drafting is perfectly clear; it is in fact stipulated that 'for the moment, the Associated Governments would not insist on the delivery of the tank-steamers'.

Other exemptions granted at that time have since been revoked, for example those covered in paragraph 3 of § 1 of said Annex V/a.

*Point of Law**A. Status of the vessels.*

Consequently the tank-steamers in question, included in the German fleet that is to be handed over to the Allies, remain still at their disposal.

In March the Allies agreed not to insist on the immediate delivery solely because of the abundance of tank tonnage at that time available (on this subject see the English and German stenographic reports of the discussions).

The Allies are therefore perfectly justified, in law, in demanding the delivery of these steamers, and the Germans moreover cannot refuse them (see on this subject the telegrams exchanged between the 'Coventry' and the Admiralty).

B. Competence.

On February 4, the Allied Council of Maritime Transports asked the Supreme Council to sanction the creation of an organism charged with dealing with all questions relative to enemy vessels.

The Supreme Council referred this letter *for decision* to the Supreme Economic Council, which in the meantime had been constituted, to decide among other questions those brought up by the application of the armistice (other than strictly naval, military or political questions).

It is under these conditions that the Supreme Economic Council decided the question in its session of February 25, 1919 (paragraph 17 of the minutes).

Since that time numerous questions brought up—not only on the subject of the assignment or reassignment of the enemy vessels, but also on the extension of the restriction of exemptions granted—were always decided without reference by the Supreme Economic Council (notably the exemption of the vessels between 1600 and 2500 tons and the withdrawal of the exemption of food for the German army in C[o]urland).

There is so little question about this that in the note that the American Delegate addressed to the Allied Executive of Maritime Transports on September 17, this Delegate asks that the question be decided by the Supreme Economic Council.

The Supreme Economic Council and the A.M.T.E. have therefore received explicit powers from the Allied and Associated Governments for all enemy vessels, whatever their status.

Point of Fact

The inclosed note of the Allied Executive of Maritime Transports¹⁵ sums up this point perfectly, and the French Delegation has accepted it completely.

On receipt of this note, the Supreme Economic Council took the decision which is entered as follows in the minutes of the meeting of September 20th:

'315 [316]—*Delivery of German Tank Steamers to the Allies.*

'The President of the Transport Executive states the question and asks the Council to ratify the proposals contained in the note of the Transport Executive (document 291).¹⁵

'He calls especial attention to the note of the American Delegate (annex B)¹⁵ in this document, requesting that the Supreme Economic Council be asked to decide on the revocation of the provisional exemption in regard to these vessels granted by the Brussels Agreement.

'The Council, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Supreme Council at the time of the Brussels Agreement, decides to approve the proposal of the Transport Executive, as follows:

'1. That the provisional exemption of the German tank steamers granted at Brussels shall be revoked. This revocation shall go into force without affecting any measure previously taken by the permanent Naval Armistice Commission.

'2. That the vessels shall be delivered to the management of the Allied and Associated Governments under the ordinary Armistice conditions.

'3. That if the German Government desires, the vessels shall be employed, at least for one voyage, in carrying petroleum destined for Germany.

'It is recalled that the American Delegate of the Transport Executive declared that if the Supreme Economic Council approves of the revocation of the exemption, no objection would be raised by his Government to these resolutions.

'The French Delegation declares that it will insist to the French Ministry of the Navy that the *Vesta* be sent to Italy.'

The present situation is therefore as follows:

1. The Supreme Economic Council, ratifying the proposition of the A.M.T.E., presented in agreement with the Permanent Naval Armistice Commission (P.A.N.A.C.), has decided that the vessels in question could not in any case be authorized to fly the German flag.

2. These organizations agree with the Germans that the vessels in question be

¹⁵ Not annexed to original of this appendix.

delivered to the Allies and fly the Interallied flag, under the general conditions fixed for the German boats delivered to the Associated Powers after the Armistice. (See telegrams P.A.N.A.C.)

3. The Supreme Economic Council, ratifying the proposals presented by the A.M.T.E. at the request of the Committee of Organization of the Reparations Commission (itself acting at the instigation of the American Delegate), has decided that if the German Government so desires, these vessels shall be assigned to carrying petroleum bought by Germany.

The interests of the German supply are thus safeguarded in the method favoured by the American Government for the food supply.

In fact the transport of petroleum is assured under the same conditions as that of the American supplies, and, since the furnishing depends only on the transport, Germany's supply of mineral oils is assured.

In point of law there can be no connection between the delivery of petroleum to be made by American private interests and the execution of Armistice Clauses.

APPENDIX C TO No. 66

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

VERSAILLES, *September 26, 1919.*

The German Government has for weeks been taking the greatest pains to withdraw the insubordinate troops from the Baltic provinces and Lithuania. The troops, in case of their continuing to disobey orders, have been threatened with the stoppage of food supplies, pay and all canteen service. General von der Goltz had summoned to this effect the leaders of all detachments to his headquarters. General von der Goltz has in point of fact followed all the instructions of the Government. He is now recalled, because he failed to carry through the orders of the Government. It must be admitted that in military quarters they fear that his successor will have still greater difficulty to succeed in obtaining the necessary authority against the insubordinate troops. The troops in the Baltic Provinces are partly demoralized.

In order that the Allied and Associated Governments may form a correct idea of the situation in the Baltic Provinces, and in order to further the prompt evacuation of the Baltic Provinces as desired by the German Government themselves, the latter agree that a mixed German-Interallied Commission should proceed to the Baltic Provinces.

The German Government deem it desirable that this Commission should travel via Berlin and should ascertain by direct negotiations with the German Government that Germany is willing to further the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces in every way.

In order to hasten the evacuation the German Government have proceeded to execute the decision taken in the former Cabinet Council to stop the pay of the troops, and have given orders that all troops, who refuse to obey the command to return, are to receive no more pay. Orders have been likewise given that all refractory troops shall lose their claims to maintenance or pension. The Minister for Public Defence has, already a few days ago, despatched a special officer to Courland, who sends daily reports on the situation there and receives orders from Berlin.

It is of great consequence to the German Government that Interallied representa-

tives should cooperate in the German-Interallied Commission, also on account of the fact that German Nationals established in the Baltic Provinces to flee [sic] from the country together with the retreat of the German troops. They do not wish to experience another summer there under Bolsheviki rule. It is a case of 170,000 people, whose lives and property have to be protected. Germany is in no way in the position to procure, within the Empire, dwellings and food for these German subjects, established up to the present in the Baltic Provinces. After the retreat of the German troops they would have to be placed under the protection of the Entente.

Up to the present time adventurers from all parts of the Empire have been trying, contrary to the wishes of the German Government, to join the troops in the Baltic Provinces. Sharp admonitions have been issued against these tendencies. The frontier has been closed; soldiers, who, nevertheless, endeavour to pass the frontiers are fired upon. All supplies of ammunition to the Baltic troops have been strictly prohibited for weeks past.

The Government have for the present deemed it preferable not to publish in the German press, as had been proposed, the menace of American reprisals, in order that no panic should arise from the impending occupation of further German districts. However, orders have been given to acquaint the troops of the Baltic Provinces at once with the threatened reprisals, in order that they may see the extent of the danger in case that they should not return.

It is absolutely erroneous that a great proportion of the German people by open or clandestine means are supporting the troops in their insubordination. On the contrary the opinion prevails in Germany that the troops can in no case hold out any longer in the Baltic Provinces. Even the leading Conservative paper 'Kreuz-Zeitung' wrote last Wednesday that it is wise and necessary to put a stop to the existing state of affairs in the Baltic Provinces, and drew the attention to the necessity of good German relations with the Lettish and Lithuanian people, as well as with their newly arising states.

A further question to be discussed with the Interallied Commission is the following:

What is to become of the Russian detachments which remain in the Baltic Provinces, standing partly between the German troops.

APPENDIX D TO NO. 66

Projet de Note à la Délégation Allemande au Sujet de l'Évacuation des Provinces Baltiques

(Proposition du Comité de Rédaction.)

Aux termes de l'article XII de l'armistice du 11 novembre 1918, l'Allemagne souscrit l'engagement suivant:

'Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie, avant la guerre, de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la Roumanie, de la Turquie, doivent rentrer immédiatement dans les frontières de l'Allemagne telles qu'elles étaient au premier août 1914;

'Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie, avant la guerre, de la Russie devront également rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne définies comme ci-dessus, dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu, compte tenu de la situation de ces territoires.'

A la date du 27 août,¹⁶ le Maréchal de France commandant en Chef les armées alliées et associées, a fait connaître que le moment était venu pour l'Allemagne d'évacuer lesdits territoires et a mis le Gouvernement allemand en demeure d'y procéder immédiatement.

Par sa note du 3 septembre,¹⁶ le Gouvernement allemand cherche à se soustraire à l'engagement ci-dessus rapp[elé] en alléguant des prétextes que les Puissances alliées et associées ne sauraient admettre.

Les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés se refusent notamment à admettre que le Gouvernement allemand puisse, pour décliner la responsabilité qui lui incombe, se retrancher derrière l'impuissance où il prétend sera pouvoir [?] s'en trouver] d'imposer l'obéissance à ses troupes des régions baltiques.

Ils invitent, en conséquence, le Gouvernement allemand à procéder, sans aucun délai, à l'évacuation de toutes troupes allemandes, États-Majors et services compris, dans les provinces baltiques. Le Gouvernement allemand devra prendre également, sans délai, les mesures nécessaires pour faire rentrer, dans les limites prévues, tous militaires allemands, qui, après démobilisation, ont pris du service dans les corps russes organisés dans lesdites provinces baltiques, s'abstenir de toute autorisation et imposer rigoureusement l'interdiction d'y prendre du service.

L'évacuation devra être entreprise immédiatement et poursuivie sans interruption.

Les Gouvernements alliés et associés font connaître que, jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient constaté que leur demande reçoit entière satisfaction, ils ne prendront en considération aucune des demandes actuellement soumises au Conseil Suprême Économique par le Gouvernement allemand, concernant le ravitaillement de l'Allemagne en vivres et en matières premières. Ils ont, en conséquence, donné au Conseil Suprême Économique l'instruction de ne procéder à l'examen d'aucune de ces demandes.

En outre, les Gouvernements alliés et associés refuseront toutes facilités financières, dont actuellement le Gouvernement allemand profiterait ou qu'il recher[cher]ait auprès des Gouvernements alliés et associés ou de leurs ressortissants.

Si le Gouvernement allemand continue à ne pas remplir ses engagements, les Puissances alliées et associées prendront toutes autres mesures qu'elles jugeront nécessaires pour assurer l'exécution desdites clauses de l'armistice.

APPENDIX E TO NO. 66

Note to the German Government from the Allied and Associated Governments

September 27, 1919.

According to the terms of Article XII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, Germany subscribed to the following engagement:

All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria, Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

Under date of August 27, the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, made known that the time had come for Germany

¹⁶ For this correspondence see Vol. III of this series.

to evacuate the said territories and summoned the German Government to proceed thereto immediately.

By its note of September 3, the German Government endeavoured to evade the engagement above referred to, by alleging pretexts which the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to consider.

The Allied and Associated Governments refuse particularly to admit that the German Government can, in order to avoid the responsibility incumbent upon it, shield itself behind the alleged inability to enforce obedience of its orders by the troops in the Baltic regions.

They therefore request the German Government to proceed without delay to the evacuation of all German troops, staffs and services included, now in the Baltic provinces. The German Government will immediately take the necessary steps to withdraw within the aforesaid boundaries all German officers and soldiers, who have enlisted, since demobilization, in Russian corps organized in the said Baltic provinces and will withhold authorization for and strictly forbid enlistment in the said corps.

The evacuation must be started immediately and must continue without interruption.

The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed they will not entertain any of the applications put forward by the German Government for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. They have consequently given instructions not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications.

Furthermore the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities which the German Government is enjoying at the present time or which it is seeking from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals.

In the event of non-compliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the Armistice.

APPENDIX F TO No. 66

II [*sic*] *Note to the Supreme Council*

Translation

PARIS, September 18, 1919.

The Drafting Committee has finished drawing up, in view of its signature, the Convention on Aerial Navigation, adopted by the Supreme Council in its Session of September 10.¹⁷

On that subject, the Drafting Committee has the honour to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the reservations made by several Delegations which are in disaccord relative to the following articles:

1) *Article 18* — That article solves certain questions of International Law in matters of industrial ownership (exemption of seizure in case of counterfeit, attribution of judicial jurisdiction).

Nothing seems to prevent the signatory powers from making reservations on that article. The pure and simple suppression of that article can be conceived. The silence of the convention as regard automobiles creates a precedent.

2) *Article 22* — Alineas 1, 2, and 5 (Right of Police for the States over their atmosphere) are the result of the principle of sovereignty established by article 1. Their maintenance is therefore not necessary.

¹⁷ See No. 55, minute 1.

The Drafting Committee considers that it is not necessary to solve those general questions, a propos of a technical regulation of aerial navigation which makes the subject of the present Convention.

Later agreements can regulate these questions of a purely judicial nature, if need be.

3) *Article 34* — (International Commission on Aerial Navigation.)

Cuba protests against the mode of the Constitution of that Commission.

The Drafting Committee considers that this provision adopted by the Commission is the basis of the Convention, which each state is free to sign or not—and that reservations on that score are practically equal to a refusal to sign.

4)—The United States have made reservations on articles 15, 24 and 36; the objections refer to questions of an internal nature and of customs.

But a time limit of six months has been provided for the signing of the Convention, precisely to settle these difficulties.

Under these conditions, the Drafting Committee has the honour to propose to the Supreme Council:

1.—*Article 18*. Either suppress that article, or accept the reservations which the signatory powers wish to add to their signature.

2.—*Article 22*. Suppress that article.

3.—*Article 34*. Take no account of the Cuban protest.

4.—*Articles 15, 24 and 35*. Make no objection to the provisional reservations made by the United States.

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT.

No. 67

H. D. 63.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 29, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Galli.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Colonel Browning, U.S.A., Mr. James Brown Scott.

British Empire: Major-General Sir F. Sykes, Major-General Groves, Mr. Brigstocke, Lt.-Colonel Kisch, Commander Macnamara, Mr. Sherman, Commander Lucas.

France: General Belin, M. Laroche, M. Seydoux, M. Kammerer, M. Fromageot, Commander le Vavasseur, Captain Roper.

Italy: Admiral Orsini, Lt.-Colonel Piccio, General Cavallero, M. Ricci-Busatti.

1. (The discussion on the British memorandum on this subject was postponed to enable Sir Eyre Crowe to receive instructions from his Government. Mr. Polk also wished to consult his Government before the matter was brought before the Council.)

German Ships sold during the War to Dutch Navigation Companies

2. CAPTAIN ROPER said that Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany specified that war material should be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers after the Treaty came into force. In order that this article might be carried out after the Treaty came into force, it was important that this war material should not be alienated in any way or exported from Germany. The Allied and Associated Governments had addressed two notes to the German Government on the subject.¹ The German Government had replied by a letter dated September 8th sent through the Armistice Commission declining to agree to the obligations placed upon the article by the Allied and Associated Governments. As information was constantly received to show new breaches by Germany, Marshal Foch proposed to the Supreme Council that a resolution be taken that all air material in Germany should be considered as war material and should be stored as war material until such time as the Interallied Air Control Commission had decided as to its nature.

(Captain Roper then read and commented upon a letter from Marshal Foch of September 25th (see Appendix A).)

MR. POLK asked whether the question was one of the Armistice.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that it dealt with Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace.

MR. POLK asked whether what was now said was not broader than the statements of the resolution of August 6th.² The words used were, 'destroyed and used'. He questioned whether the use of the word 'used' was not beyond the powers of the Council.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that if the Germans used the material in question they would take occasion to destroy it, if they could, on the ground of accidents, or they would be able to use the material for other purposes. If they were given a free hand they would undoubtedly transform the material. There had been examples of repeated infractions by the Germans, and in order to avoid these it was essential that the material should be stocked.

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission of Control would have the power to decide as to what material was civil and what military.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that the Commission would have this power.

M. SCIALOJA said that it was important that the position of the Council should be founded on firm ground. It was not possible to apply the Treaty before it was ratified. He suggested that a Provisional Commission of Control might permit the Germans to use aircraft which were not military. He

¹ See document 2 in appendix A below.

² See No. 29, minute 14.

thought that the Council were asking for more than under the Treaty they were entitled to ask.

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission had arrived in Germany.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that the advance party had arrived. The Germans were anxious to postpone the discussion of the subject until the Treaty came into force. Under these circumstances the procedure proposed by M. Scialoja would not be applicable. In its resolution of August 6th² the Supreme Council had declared its right of property over this material; they therefore had legal rights. During the last month the Germans had several times violated their engagements and Marshal Foch had declared that, unless the Supreme Council took firm and determined action, he was not in a position to obtain any results.

M. SCIALOJA asked whether it was proposed to stop [?stock] all the aircraft in question.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that the Technical Experts who had discussed the subject in the Commission on Aerial Clauses, had unanimously declared that there were no civil aircraft in Germany, if by that aeroplanes constructed since the Armistice and upon new plans were meant. Today the Germans had requested permission to use seven hundred aeroplanes for the Postal Air Service and this request was undoubtedly made to conceal their real purpose in endeavouring to keep back from the Allies a large number of aeroplanes.

MR. POLK asked whether M. Scialoja was satisfied as to the legal right.

M. SCIALOJA replied that he would withdraw the reservation he had previously made.

MR. POLK asked Captain Roper if he referred to aeroplanes built since the Armistice.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that he referred to aeroplanes built before the Armistice.

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission would have the power to discriminate between aeroplanes built before or since the Armistice. He also asked whether General Weygand had any objection to the German Postal Air Service.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that he had no such objection after the Treaty became effective, but he wished to point out that at present it was only a manoeuvre on the part of the Germans to avoid fulfilling their obligations under the terms of the Treaty. In the opinion of the Technical Experts, there was no defence for the scale upon which the German Postal Air Service was being planned.

MR. POLK said that there was no legal obstacle of prohibiting [*sic*] the Germans building and exporting aeroplanes which had been built since the time of the Armistice upon new plans.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that in the first place it would be necessary for the Commission to examine these plans and that pending the ratification of the Treaty the material in question should be stopped [stocked].

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Supreme Council had decided on August 6th² that the price of all material sold from the supplies which, according to

the terms of the Treaty of Peace, were to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers, should be refunded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought that it was time to apply this resolution.

CAPTAIN ROPER explained that in a telegram of August 23rd³ sent to the German Authorities by Marshal Foch through the medium of General Nudant there was no mention of refunding this sum because the telegram contained a special authorization for the delivery of certain material to General Yudenitch and to the Czecho-Slovak Government. Marshal Foch had been desirous of assuring the delivery of this material in view of the fact that he had no other means at the moment and it seemed at the time advisable to make no mention of the amount of the sum collected. He thought that the moment had now arrived and that Germany should be required to refund the money.

It was decided:

- (1) that all air material now in Germany should be considered as war material and as such could neither be exported, sold, loaned, utilized or destroyed, but should be stocked until such time as the Inter-Allied Air Commission of Control should have taken a decision to determine its nature;
- (2) that the German Government should pay to the Allied and Associated Governments the amount of the sales already made.

It was also decided:

that Marshal Foch should be charged with communicating this decision to the German Government.

3.

*Report from the Military
Representatives at Ver-
sailles on the distribution
of air material*

[Not printed]⁴

³ See No. 41, appendix C.

⁴ After discussion the Supreme Council decided to accept the report 'of the 5th of September regarding the principles which should govern the distribution of the aeronautical material given up or to be given up by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey' in accordance with the treaties of peace (appendix B in original). The more important recommendations of this report were: (i) All such material to be entered on a single list divided under headings such as '(a) Complete aircraft, (b) Aircraft engines of all types, (c) Aircraft instruments of all kinds, (d) Airships, (e) Kite balloons, (f) Hangars, (g) All other aircraft parts specified in the Treaty': the material to be classified under each heading by the Inter-allied Commission of Control. (ii) 'The Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Belgium shall participate in the distribution.'—The American Air Adviser, Admiral Knapp, entered a reservation (subsequently waived by Mr. Polk) stating in part: 'Belgium has been admitted and there would appear to be no reason either on ground of right or justice why one small Power should be included and the remainder excluded. As far as he is aware none of the small Powers except Belgium have been consulted, and he refuses to subscribe to any recommendations which do not contain any reference to the wishes of those small Powers, and which appear almost to treat the Allies as enemies.' (iii) Any captured aircraft, etc., to be returned to the nation originally owning it. (iv) The participating powers to receive samples

*Removal of Rolling Stock
beyond the Armistice
frontier in violation of the
Armistice of Villa Giusti*

[Not printed]

*Distribution of Ger-
man Submarine
engines and parts*

[Not printed]⁵

6. M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon a memorandum with reference to the draft note previously prepared (see H.D. 60, Appendix G⁶), in regard to the blockade of Soviet Russia. (See Appendix E.) He proposed to add in the third paragraph⁶ the words 'in conformity with the measures contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations'.

MR. POLK said that before the United States Government would be in a position to take action it would be necessary for internal action to be taken in the United States.

M. FROMAGEOT said that Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant was framed to meet a situation like that which existed at present. It provided for the rupture of commercial and economic relations. In cases where the League of Nations did not wish to resort to war the Covenant of the League of Nations foresaw the use of economic pressure when war was not to be employed. He felt that the difficulties in regard to the question of blockade would be removed in this way.

MR. POLK said that M. Fromageot's suggestion raised difficulties in his mind. The League of Nations did not yet exist, and the machinery for which the Covenant of the League provided, could not become effective until the League of Nations was actually in force. He did not see how the United States could adopt the policy proposed at the present time as the

of aeronautical material, and 'drawings of each type of aircraft and all other aeronautical matériel shall be supplied on demand' to such powers, 'whether the same have or have not received a sample of the matériel in question.' (v) 'The two best airships of the 70 class of above shall be allotted, the first to France, the second to Great Britain'; other airships to be entered on a single list for distribution among all participating powers. (vi) 'Aircraft and material left over after the above-mentioned distribution—that is to say, aeroplanes, sea-planes, engines, spares, armament, instruments, etc.' to be classified and distributed 'on the following percentage basis': France, 30%; Great Britain, 30%; U.S.A., 15%; Italy, 15%; Japan, 5%; Belgium, 5%.

⁵ The Supreme Council accepted a report of September 13, 1919, by the Naval Advisers on the 'subject of submarine engines and motors surrendered by Germany in place of certain submarines which were broken up in German yards or sunk on passage to England' (appendix D in original). The distribution of this material was to be made as an *ad hoc* measure since 'owing to lack of space this material cannot all be placed under cover, and in view of the approach of winter weather it is liable to serious deterioration. . . . This division should form no precedent for the division of other naval material surrendered by enemy Powers.'

⁶ See No. 64, note 7.

United States had never agreed to a pacific blockade. The Council were endeavouring to meet the situation by the establishment of a pacific blockade. In his opinion it was a declaration of war which was really needed.

M. PICHON said that the Council found themselves in the same position as at the time of the last discussion. They would have no commercial relations with Soviet Russia themselves and they did nothing to ask the neutral countries to adopt the same policy.

MR. POLK said that he thought that the best plan would be to wait until after the winter, and see how the situation was by that time.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was necessary to give some instructions to the Allied Naval Officers in the Baltic Sea. He asked what action these officers could take with ships which they were stopping. The report of the Drafting Committee did not cover the question of instructions. The Naval Officers were acting upon their own authority. He recalled that it had been previously proposed to make a collective request to the neutral Governments. He wished to ask his United States Colleague whether he would have any objection to such a note being sent. He thought that a step would be taken if a collective representation were made to the Swedish Government. He had a suggestion to make, but at the moment he had no authority for committing his Government. He wished to ask whether the British and French Governments were willing to authorize their Naval Commanders to turn ships back. If, for example, a Swedish ship were stopped, the Naval Commander would be in a position to state that the subject had been formally communicated to the Swedish Government by the Allied and Associated Governments, who were awaiting a favourable reply.

MR. POLK said that he was willing to accept the draft if the last paragraph were omitted. He had suggested a substitute for the paragraph.⁷

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not answer for the decision of the British Admiralty, but he would refer the subject to them.

M. PICHON suggested that the Drafting Committee be directed to prepare a note to the Neutral Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Council were already in possession of a draft of such a note.

M. PICHON said that the note could be transmitted with the omission of the proposed paragraph respecting the League of Nations, and the last paragraph.

M. SEYDOUX read to the Council two communications received from the French Legation at Stockholm. (See Appendix F.) After reading these communications, M. Seydoux said that he thought that they contained matters of great interest. It was evident that the Swedish Government not only considered that a blockade existed, but that they had notified their own nationals that navigation was prohibited in the Gulf of Finland.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that these communications tended all the more to show that the reply of the Swedish Government to the note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be favourable.

⁷ See No. 64, appendix H.

M. PICHON said that, pending a decision, the British and French warships in the Baltic should turn back ships bound for Soviet Russia.

M. SEYDOUX said that it would be possible, either by adding a paragraph to the note or by making a verbal communication to the neutral Governments, to say that British and French war vessels would continue to act in respect to ships entering the Gulf of Finland as they had been acting up to the present.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the attached note (see Appendix G) should be transmitted to the neutral Governments in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers;
- (2) that the neutral Governments should, at the same time, be notified verbally that the British and French warships in the Gulf of Finland would continue to turn back ships bound for seaports in Soviet Russia.)

7.

Insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of an Article providing for the Constitution of a Commission to Delimit the Frontier between Austria and Hungary

[Not printed]⁸

8. MR. POLK read a telegram dated September 24th from General Bandholtz, American Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission at Budapest, in regard to Roumanian seizures (see Appendix I). He said that the information contained in this telegram showed only too clearly that the Roumanians were not willing to obey the wishes of the Allied Powers. The Roumanian Representative told one thing to one Allied Representative and another thing to another. They were apparently entirely unwilling to obey the orders of the Allied Generals who represented the Council.

M. PICHON said that it was most important to await Sir George Clerk's arrival before taking any action in regard to Roumania.

MR. POLK said that, while waiting, statements made by the Roumanians themselves should not be entitled to much consideration.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Roumanian Government was trying to stir up trouble between the Allies. There was a serious situation between Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

⁸ Arising out of a memorandum, dated September 29, 1919, prepared by the Drafting Committee (appendix H in original), it was decided: (i) to request the Drafting Committee to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary clauses providing for the constitution of a commission to delimit the frontier between Austria and Hungary; (ii) to request the Drafting Committee to insert in the treaty articles relative to the nationality of the inhabitants of Hungarian territory ceded to Austria.

M. PICHON said that according to information which he had recently received from Belgrade the situation between Roumania and Serbia was better and might improve.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,
September 29, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 67

Document 1

Translation

G.H.Q., September 27, 1919.

General Staff. 1st Section,
No. 4665.

From: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: The President of the Council.

Pursuant to your letter of September 26, 1919, transmitting to me copy of the letter of the Chargé d'Affaires of France to the Netherlands relative to suspicious importations of German planes in Holland, I have the honour of asking you, with a view to putting an end to the illicit traffic in aeronautic material, which Germany continues to practise, in spite of the notification which was given her of the resolution of August 22, to be kind enough to submit to the approval of the Supreme Council of the Allies the following resolution:

'All aeronautic material existing in Germany should be considered as war material and as such cannot be exported, alienated, lent, utilized, destroyed, but must be *stocked* up till the moment when the Interallied Commission on aerial control will have pronounced itself on its nature.'

I have already addressed a request of this kind to the President of the Council, the Minister of War (Army Staff, G-3, September 25, number 2644⁹ (copy of which is enclosed)).

Major-General
WEYGAND

Document 2

Translation

STAFF OF THE MARSHAL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
First Section.
No. 4644.

September 25, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch,

To: The President of the Council. Ministry of War (Army Staff G-3.-A.).

Enclosed herewith¹⁰ I am returning the report of September 20 of the General Director of Aeronautics, relative to the opening of an aerial postal service in

⁹ Apparently in error for 4644 (cf. document 2 below).

¹⁰ Not included in original of this appendix.

Germany, which you transmitted to me September 23, 1919, under number 8712. 13. S/3.¹¹

I am of the opinion that it is not possible to inform the German Armistice Commission of this question, such as it is set forth.

The decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Allies to forbid the sale, cession or exportation of all German aeronautic material has already been notified twice to the German Government (enclosed herewith¹⁰ copy of notes number 3765, of April [August] 7², and 4111 of August 26³).

To these two notifications the German Government replied by the note Wako No. 641, copy of which is enclosed,¹⁰ in which it makes all its reserves on our way of interpreting the aerial clauses of the Peace Treaty, and proposes to leave this question in suspense until the moment when it can be solved by the Commission of Control.

To address a protest relative to the establishing of an aerial postal service in Germany, would be to again desire to open a discussion on this question with the German Government. This discussion would be fruitless. To be brief, I have the honour of asking you to be kind enough to submit to the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Allies the following resolution which I shall then communicate to the German Government.

'All aeronautic material existing in Germany should be considered as war material and as such cannot be exported, alienated, lent, utilized, destroyed, but must be *stocked* up till the moment when the Interallied Commission on Aerial Control will have pronounced itself on its nature.'

Major-General
WEYGAND.

APPENDIX E TO No. 67

The Drafting Committee have the following observations to make:

(1) In the actual circumstances it is perhaps difficult to speak of a blockade, it being understood that the Powers have different views of the legality of a blockade without the existence of a state of war.

(2) The measures proposed, involving the prohibition of all commerce, of all financial relations and of all communications, extend beyond the naval measures commonly called blockade.

(3) On the other hand, if the Supreme Council is of opinion that coercive measures, quite outside any war action, are necessary against Soviet Russia, the principle enshrined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations justifies as a means of coercion, the adoption by the Powers, who do not wish to resort to armed force, of economic pressure which consists in the immediate rupture of all financial or commercial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse, the cessation of all communications, financial, commercial or personal.

The proposed scheme appears to be in conformity with the principle referred to above.

The Drafting Committee add that in its opinion it would be advantageous to refer to this in the third paragraph of the scheme.

¹¹ For the question of the opening of a postal air-service in Germany see No. 56, minute 1 and appendix A.

*Blocus de la Russie des Soviets*I. *Note du Stockholm Dagblad, N° du 15 août 1919*

Le 1^{er} août est arrivé à Björkö le bateau à moteur suédois 'Per' de Sölderberg, faisant route pour Pétrograd. Le capitaine dudit bateau, John Fröberg, s'est adressé aussitôt aux autorités militaires de Björkö, en leur demandant si la position exacte du champ de mines entre Björkö et Pétrograd était connue d'elles.

Le navire en question paraissant suspect, on a procédé à une inspection de sa cargaison et l'on a découvert qu'il y avait à bord 111 tonnes de conduites à gaz (en argile) destinées au Gouvernement des Soviets. Comme la Finlande se trouve en état de guerre avec les Bolcheviki, la cargaison a été saisie. Dans la journée de samedi dernier on a, en conséquence, conduit le navire suédois à Viborg, où la cargaison a été débarquée. Les conduites étant soudées entre elles, on va les ouvrir aux fins d'examen. L'équipage se compose de 10 personnes, dont 2 femmes (toutes ces personnes sont de nationalité suédoise).

II. *Communiqué donné à la Presse par le Gouvernement Suédois (14 août)*

'Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a annoncé qu'il avait, il y a quelque temps, pris les informations nécessaires pour connaître la manière de voir des autorités anglaises et américaines au sujet de l'interdiction faite aux navires suédois de se rendre à Pétrograd; les Américains considèrent que l'interdiction de toute navigation du côté de la Russie des Soviets subsiste toujours et déclarent que le bruit qui a couru qu'un navire américain était arrivé à Pétrograd avec une cargaison de produits alimentaires était dénué de tout fondement. Aucune réponse définitive n'a été encore donnée par les Anglais, cependant il ressort des renseignements que les Affaires Étrangères ont pu recueillir que toute navigation vers la Russie est en fait impossible, les mines sous-marines rendant impraticable l'entrée de Pétrograd.'

III. *Communiqué paru le 17 septembre*

'Suite aux informations déjà données concernant l'impossibilité pour les navires suédois à se rendre en Russie le Svenska Telegram Buro, après en avoir interrogé le Département des Affaires Étrangères, a appris que les autorités françaises ont également fait connaître que le blocus du golfe de Finlande était maintenu et que les navires de guerre français empêcheraient les navires à destination de Pétrograd de continuer leur route.'

IV

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Suède a dit au Ministre de France à Stockholm qu'en fait, aucun navire suédois n'aurait tenté de forcer le blocus, sauf un bâtiment trop petit pour être soumis aux obligations d'une autorisation de sortir des eaux suédoises, l'*Eskiltuna III*; depuis qu'il est parti à destination de la Russie avec un chargement de faucheuses, personne n'a eu de ses nouvelles. Le commandant de notre division navale que j'avais interrogé, à la demande du Gouvernement suédois, m'a dit n'avoir rien appris du sort de l'*Eskiltuna* qui n'aurait donc pas été capturé; vraisemblablement aura-t-il été coulé par une mine ou victime d'une tempête.

Note aux Gouvernements Neutres

L'hostilité avouée des bolchevistes contre tous les Gouvernements et le programme de révolution internationale qu'ils répandent constituent un grave danger pour la sécurité nationale de toutes les Puissances. Tout accroissement de la force des bolchevistes augmenterait le danger et serait contraire au désir de tous les peuples qui cherchent à rétablir la paix et l'ordre social.

C'est dans cet esprit que les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés, après la levée du blocus de l'Allemagne, n'ont pas autorisé leurs ressortissants à reprendre les relations commerciales avec la Russie bolcheviste; ces relations, en effet, ne pourraient avoir lieu que par l'entremise des chefs du Gouvernement bolcheviste, qui, disposant à leur gré des produits et ressources que leur apporterait la liberté commerciale, y puiseraient une augmentation considérable de leur force et de la tyrannie qu'ils exercent sur les populations russes.

Dans ces conditions, les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés demandent au Gouvernement [...] de bien vouloir prendre immédiatement, d'accord avec eux les mesures indiquées ci-après pour empêcher ses ressortissants de se livrer à tout commerce avec la Russie bolcheviste et donner l'assurance qu'il mettra rigoureusement à exécution cette politique:

- A) Refus des papiers de départ à tout navire se rendant dans les ports russes entre les mains des bolchevistes ou venant des dits ports;
- B) Établissement d'une mesure similaire sur toutes les marchandises destinées à être envoyées par toute autre voie en Russie bolcheviste;
- C) Refus des passeports à toutes personnes allant en Russie bolcheviste ou en venant (sauf entente pour des cas spéciaux avec les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés).
- D) Disposition en vue d'empêcher les banques de traiter des affaires avec la Russie bolcheviste;
- E) Autant que possible, refus par chaque Gouvernement à ses propres nationaux de facilités de correspondance avec la Russie bolcheviste par la poste, le télégraphe ou la télégraphie sans fil.

APPENDIX I TO No. 67

*American Commission to Negotiate Peace**Telegram received*

BUDAPEST.

Dated Sept. 24, 1919. Recd. 7.03 p.m. 26th.

1-AP.

Ammission, Paris.

88. Despite promise to deliver rifles and machine guns for distribution by Mission as needed to organize police, Roumanian Commander today sent letter stating there would be additional delay of a week or more, and furthermore attached such conditions to delivery as to nullify its value. The Mission wrote him a letter to effect; that on nineteenth it had been explained to him that immediate organization of the local Police was urgent necessity, that he had promised to deliver ten thousand rifles and forty machine guns by twenty-third for distribution to

Hungarian Police by this Mission assisted by Roumanians, that he had not kept his promise and that new and unheard of conditions he had now attached to arms delivery were tantamount to refusal to assist, and that this Mission would hold him responsible for any disorder that might result from lack of suitably armed police and would notify the Supreme Council accordingly. It was proposed to add he could show his good intentions by giving at once three thousand rifles. I refused positively to place myself or nation in a position to [of] dickering for three thousand rifles which might likewise be refused and was sustained by Colleagues. Roumanians have removed Friederich private telephone and seized auto. General Gorton requests that copy of foregoing as well as copy of my number 87 be furnished British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ.

No. 68

H. D. 64.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 30, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY¹

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Captain Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Rear-Admiral McCully, Colonel Logan, Colonel Browning, Major Tyler, Mr. E. L. Dresel.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, Lt.-Col. Kisch, Mr. McFadyean, Mr. Ibbetson-James, Mr. Forbes-Adam, Mr. Bourdillon.

France: M. Loucheur, M. Clémentel, M. Tardieu, General Weygand, General Belin, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer.

Italy: M. Brambilla.

1. (The Council had before it a report of the Supreme War Council dated April 22nd, 1919, on the subject of cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation in Rhenish territory. (See Appendix A.))

*Cost of Allied
Armies of Occupa-
tion in Germany*

M. LOUCHEUR explained that the question under discussion was the cost of the armies of occupation from the signing of the Armistice until the ratification of the Peace Treaty. He then read and commented upon the report of April 22nd, summarizing the present status of the matter.

An Allied Subcommission which had met at Spa had undertaken to define the phrase 'expenses of maintenance of the troops of occupation' ('dépenses

¹ Name omitted in original.

d'entretien des troupes d'occupation'). This body had decided upon the following definition for this phrase:

'During the present Armistice, which includes war occupation, by expenditures for the upkeep of the troops of occupation of the Rhenish territories, are meant all the expenditures imposed upon the Allied Governments for the daily life of the occupying troops as well as all those brought about by the obligation of maintaining constantly the fixed effective of these troops and to keep them in such a state as to allow them at any time to resist an aggression or to resume hostilities immediately.'

Upon the basis of this definition, the expenses of maintenance had been determined upon at the following rates per man per day:

For the French Army, Fcs. 16.60

For the Belgian Army, Fcs. 16.13

For the British Army, Fcs. 17.06

For the American Army, Fcs. 31.14 (The dollar figured at Fcs. 5.70).

During the course of the discussions the Belgian and, later, the British delegates had agreed upon the adoption of an average uniform figure for all the occupying armies, and which would be the cost of maintenance of one man per day for the French Army. The American delegate had inclined to adopt this solution, but General Pershing subsequently rigorously opposed the same. The Conferences at Spa, therefore, had resulted in a disagreement.

The question thereafter came before the Reparations Commission, but the same differences of opinion arose in this body. In his capacity as president of the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, he now wished to bring the matter before the Council for decision.

The opinion of the French delegation was based on the following arguments: In the first place, when the Council created the Commission for the Left Bank of the Rhine, in which the United States was represented by General Bliss and Mr. J. W. Davis, the British Empire by Lord Robert Cecil and Field-Marshal Wilson, France by Marshal Foch and M. Loucheur, the question of the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation had arisen. At various times during the discussion the Commission had thought that it would be well to adopt the French price as an average figure. Marshal Foch had even suggested that it would be well to adopt a lower figure for the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and only include within the phrase 'expenses of maintenance to be borne by Germany', the cost of food and billeting. It had been upon this basis that the calculations had been made to reach the sum of 240,000,000 marks gold yearly, as the maximum cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty. This figure had been agreed upon in a proclamation which had been signed on June 16th, 1919, by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George (C.F. 73 A.² Minute 2 and Appendix). Mr. Lloyd George had even expressed the opinion that it would be well to reduce the cost of this maintenance to the minimum.

² The notation is that of the later records of the Council of Four.

These arguments appeared to him to be sound, and he added that wherever the question of reaching an average figure had arisen in the Peace Treaty, the French figure had been adopted, as, for example, in the matter of pensions and allowances. He therefore strongly urged that the French rate be adopted in this instance, and that it be taken as a basis for calculating the cost of maintaining the armies, not only before the ratification of the Treaty (total maintenance), but also after such ratification (partial maintenance).

MR. POLK asked whether the figures agreed upon by President Wilson applied to the cost of upkeep of the armies after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR answered that this was the case, and added that it applied more especially from the moment at which Germany carried out the military obligations incumbent upon her by the Treaty.

MR. POLK said that he had always believed that the question at issue was the same during the entire period of occupation; namely, that each occupying country should be paid its expenses of occupation by Germany. The cost of maintenance of the American Army during the armistice had amounted to a certain figure, and this Germany was called upon to repay. M. Loucheur's suggestion appeared to him to place a new interpretation upon the matter, as he had always believed up to the present time that the total cost of maintenance was under discussion, and not merely the cost of food and billets.

M. LOUCHEUR said that a slight misunderstanding was apparent. The French proposition had been that it was necessary to make a distinction between the maintenance prior to the ratification of the Treaty and that subsequent thereto. The difficulty of the situation lay in another direction. The fact existed that the American soldier cost his Government Fcs. 31.14, while the French soldier cost only Fcs. 16.60. What he asked was that, in order to make a calculation as to what Germany should pay each occupying Power, the same figure should be taken as a basis for each of the Allied Armies. He remarked further that when the same question had arisen regarding the pensions called for as part of the reparations, it had been agreed that the calculation should be made on the basis of the French rate.

MR. POLK said that the matter resolved itself into ascertaining how much the American Armies cost the United States. The question was not one between the United States and its Allies, but rather between the United States and Germany. The situation would not be helped by the fact that the French and Belgian Governments were reimbursed in full for their expenses, while the United States was but partially repaid. The result would be that the American Treasury Department would be obliged to pay the difference, with the consequent danger that further burdens might be placed upon the American taxpayer. The moment the latter discovered that they would be obliged to pay a portion of the expenses of maintaining an army of occupation, they would demand the recall of this force.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the matter was one which interested all the Allies in general, for it was Germany who was called upon to pay. The more

money which Germany [*sic*] was obliged to use in paying for the armies of occupation, the less she would have for the reparations claims.

MR. POLK answered that he believed the United States would consent to accept reimbursement for the time being upon the basis of the average figure determined upon (French rate). The difference between the sum thus reimbursed and the actual cost of maintenance might be included in the sums due the United States by way of reparations.

M. LOUCHEUR called attention to the fact that, as the Treaty imposed an absolute priority for the sums representing the costs of maintaining the armies of occupation, the difficulty would not be done away with.

MR. POLK replied that he would be willing to waive the priority for that portion of the expenses of maintenance which would be included in the reparations figure. The all important point was that the American Treasury Department should not have to defray any of the expenses of the armies of occupation.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in view of the propositions which Mr. Polk had put forward, he would like to study the matter somewhat more fully. His only wish in that question had been not to prejudice the reparations account.

M. PICHON drew the attention of the Council to the fact that, at the time the rate of allowance for the officers of the Commission of Control had been determined upon, it had been expressly stated that Germany would be called upon to pay the same, but not the salaries of the officers.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British delegate on the subcommission at Spa had stated that he would accept the compromise figure if the same were accepted by all the Governments involved, but that no definite decision had been given in the matter. He thought that in view of the attitude of the United States, the British Government would stand by its first proposal, as it was not favourably disposed to sustaining a burden for the maintenance of its armies of occupation. The question at issue was very complicated and raised many technical points. He wished to know to what competent body the Council thought of referring the matter.

M. LOUCHEUR said that there was a body already in existence; namely, the Subcommission for the Cost of the Armies of Occupation, which was attached to the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

(It was decided:

that the question of the cost of the armies of occupation should be referred to the special subcommission of the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission for further examination and report.)

2. GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated September 24th (see Appendix B³).

*Proposed Supply of
Oil by Germany to
Lithuania*

The Lithuanians had asked for permission to receive 50,000 litres of fuel oil which Germany was in a position to

³ Not printed. General Weygand's explanation of the question to the Supreme Council was in accordance with the terms of this brief memorandum, which further stated that Marshal Foch had been informed of the matter by the Military Section of the British Dele-

turn over to them. From a military point of view, Marshal Foch had raised no objections to this request, but a political question was involved therein; namely, that of trading with the enemy, and this was beyond the Marshal's jurisdiction. Should the delivery be sanctioned, it was necessary that adequate steps should be taken to insure the fact that the Germans themselves should not be benefited by this fuel oil.

MR. POLK asked whether any guarantee actually existed that a military organization under German control would not profit by the delivery.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the matter could await the ratification of the Peace Treaty, at which time the Allies would be in a position to supervise the delivery.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Military Authorities agreed with General Weygand, but that there were two difficulties in the situation. In the first place, the Council would be deciding to authorize a delivery of fuel oil at the same moment that it had resolved upon the exercise of economic pressure on Germany; and in the second place, no information was at hand as to whether an actual guarantee could be had that the oil would not benefit Germans in the Baltic Provinces. He proposed that the Allied Representatives in these provinces should be asked whether, if the Council were to authorize the delivery, they could guarantee that it would not benefit the Germans.

(It was decided:

to request the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to ascertain from the Allied Military Authorities in the Balkan [*sic*] States whether the latter were able to guarantee that such oil as the Allied and Associated Governments might authorize to be delivered to the Lithuanians, should not fall into the hands of German organizations.)

3. (The Council had before it a memorandum of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 29th, 1919. (See Appendix C.))

*Proposal of the
Economic Commission
relative to the procedure
to be followed for the
Supply of Foodstuffs
and Raw Material to
Germany and Austria*

M. CLÉMENTEL said that the Supreme Economic Council had created a Supply Committee whose function was to insure that the Allies should not become competitors in the world markets for the purchase of articles of prime necessity. At the time when the Germans and Austrians are to be allowed to make purchases on their own account the Supreme Economic Council believed that it would be advantageous to prevent the former enemies from competing with the Allies in the markets, and thus contributing to a rise in the prices of indispensable articles. For this reason the Supreme Economic Council believed that the Committee of Supply should be consulted regarding the German requests. The problem had already arisen in matters of finance and shipping, at which time it was decided that the competent Commissions should be responsible to the Supreme Economic Council with regard to the requests of the Allies, and gation, and that the Lithuanian authorities requested that the oil be supplied for use by the Lithuanian army.

to the Reparations Commission relative to the applications made by the Germans, because it was to the latter Commission that the German requests would be made. The United States of America was not represented at the present time on the Supreme Economic Council, a most regrettable fact, but they were represented on the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission. They might, therefore, be represented on the Supply Committee on behalf of the Reparations Commission. The other Allies might be represented both from the point of view of the Reparations Commission and of the Supreme Economic Council. In this manner one single Commission, on which all the Allies were represented, would be competent to deal with the situation.

MR. POLK said that he regretted his inability to accept at the present time the proposal put forward by M. Clémentel. He had talked with Mr. Hoover prior to the departure of the latter and they had both been of the opinion that the United States should not be represented on the Supreme Economic Council. On the other hand, they should be represented for all questions of reparations. The matters within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Council, such as division of foodstuffs and coal, were questions which were of vital importance to Europe but not of interest to the United States. Consequently, the latter had no need of representation in this body. It was only on the Reparations Commission that the American Representatives could advantageously function. Therefore, in view of Mr. Hoover's opinion, and also that of the American Treasury Department, he was unable to agree with M. Clémentel at the present time.

M. CLÉMENTEL replied that it was not a question of asking the United States to take part in the work of the Supreme Economic Council, however greatly this might be desired. The matter was simply to know whether the buyers of the Supreme Economic Council were to ignore the German and Austrian purchasers, and whether or not these two groups were to become competitors.

MR. POLK said that he had realized that the question would come up for discussion in the Council and had therefore telegraphed his Government for instructions in advance. These had not yet been received, and until they should be he was unable to take any decision in the matter. He therefore requested that the discussion be adjourned, but said that in the interval Mr. Dresel and Colonel Logan might discuss the matter with M. Clémentel.

(The discussion of the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the procedure to be followed for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria was adjourned.)

4. (The Council had before it a note of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 20th, 1919. (See Appendix D.))

*Note of the Supreme
Economic Council on
the General Economic
Situation of Europe*

(At the request of Mr. Polk, the detailed examination of this note was adjourned until such time as the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria should be considered.)

6. (The Council had before it two letters from M. Venizelos dated August 22nd and September 28th respectively. (See Appendices F and G⁴.))

Protest from the Greek Delegation regarding the composition and functioning of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the letter of September 28th.

MR. POLK remarked that the question had been raised, while Mr. Balfour was sitting in the Council, as to the exact powers of the Greek Officer who had been authorized to follow the labours of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that a resolution in this matter had been taken by the Council on August 14th (see H. D. 31,⁵ Minute 3), as follows:

‘It was decided:

that the previous decisions of the Council (see H. D. 12, article 5)⁶ should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna. All necessary data should be communicated to him, however, and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed.’

M. BERTHELOT answered that M. Venizelos maintained that the Allied Commissioners had kept Colonel Mazarakis completely in ignorance of their labours and have not even furnished him with the minutes of their meetings.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this appeared excessive. A telegram should be sent at once to Constantinople instructing that the minutes should be communicated to the Greek Representative and, should the latter have any complaints to make thereon, he should present the same to the Commission. The attention of the representatives should also again be drawn to the former resolutions of the Council in the matter.

It was decided:

- (1) that the minutes of the meetings of the Commission on [of] Inquiry at Smyrna, including the testimony of witnesses, should be communicated to the Greek Representative attached to this Commission;
- (2) that said Representative should be asked and permitted to notify the Commission of any criticisms which he desired to formulate regarding the matters in question.

⁴ Not printed. In these letters M. Venizelos protested against the allegedly insufficient extent to which Colonel Mazarakis, the Greek representative, was associated with the work of the Commission of Inquiry (cf. M. Berthelot's statement below).

⁵ No. 35.

⁶ No. 16, minute 5.

7. (The Council had before it a memorandum from the British Delegation dated August 11th, 1918,⁷ (see appendix H⁸).)

British proposal for the investigation of complaints arising through the incidents at Smyrna

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the events at Smyrna had indisputably called forth a certain number of complaints against the Greek and Turkish Governments. The Commission of Inquiry which had been appointed might form a sub-commission on the ground to deal with these protests. It might be, however, that such a proposal was now too late as a telegram had been received from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated September 8th, stating that the Greeks had already formed such a Commission. In view of this fact he asked that the Council permit him to telegraph Constantinople for further information and to await the receipt of this before formally presenting his proposal.

(The study of the British proposal was adjourned until such time as Sir Eyre Crowe should receive additional information.)

8. MR. POLK said that it would be as well to adjourn this matter pending the receipt of an answer from the Swedish Government on the subject of the Blockade of Soviet Russia.

Question of the Åland Islands

(The question was adjourned.)

9. (The Council had before it a report of the Baltic Commission dated August 25th, 1919, in this matter (see Appendix I).)

Questions of Karelia and Petchenga

M. KAMMERER read from and commented upon the report in question and said that the Commission had not made any proposal to the Council. They asked merely whether, despite the absence of a responsible Russian Government and regardless of the fact that Petchenga was situated in Russian territory, they might be allowed to study the means of giving satisfaction to the desires of Finland.

M. CLEMENCEAU answered that he was prepared to authorize the Commission to make such a study, but that neither he nor any of his colleagues at the present time recognized their right to dispose of Russian territory.

M. KAMMERER remarked that in 1862 a discussion had taken place between the Governments of Finland and of Imperial Russia for the cession of the port of Petchenga to Finland. An agreement had been reached but had not been executed and its validity was even open to doubt.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council might later have to discuss the question with the Finns and it would be well to have a solution ready at that time.

⁷ In error for 1919.

⁸ Not printed. The British proposal was for the appointment of a sub-commission of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate claims against the Greek and Turkish Governments for compensation for damages and losses.

(It was decided:

that the Baltic Commission should be authorized to make a study of the ways and means by which the claims of Finland for a modification of its frontiers in Karelia and the district of Petchenga might receive satisfaction.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hotel Crillon, Paris,
September 30th, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 68

Translation

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

VERSAILLES, April 22, 1919.

Report relative to the Cost for the Maintenance of the Troops of Occupation in Rhenish Territory

According to the terms of Article 9 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, 'the upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhenish territories (not including Alsace-Lorraine) is at the charge of the German Government.'

An Interallied sub-Commission sitting at Spa was asked by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to define the exact meaning of the expression 'upkeep of the troops' and to determine the scope of the obligation which would thus result for Germany.

Definition of the Expenditures of Upkeep

The members of the sub-Commission have unanimously decided upon the following terms:

'During the present Armistice, which includes war occupation, by expenditures for the upkeep of the troops of occupation of the Rhenish territories, are meant all the expenditures imposed upon the Allied Governments for the daily life of the occupying troops as well as all those brought about by the obligation of maintaining constantly the fixed effective of these troops and to keep them in such a state as to allow them at any time to resist an aggression or to resume hostilities immediately.'

'It results from this definition that the expenditures of upkeep must include not only those pertaining to the alimentation of the personnel and of the animals, their lodging and their cantonment, but also those caused by their salary and the accessories.—Salaries, quarters, heat, light, clothing, equipment and harnessing, armament and rolling material—aviation, treatment of the sick and wounded, veterinary service and remount service, service of transport of every kind (railroad, maritime and fluvial transportation, motor trucks, etc.) that of communication across France and, in a general way, all the expenditures for all the administrative or technical services whose functioning is necessary for the instruction of the troops and for the maintenance of their effectives and of their military power.'

This definition gave rise to no observation on the part of Marshal Foch nor on the part of the members of the Peace Conference.

Evaluation of Costs

The sub-Commission of Spa has, according to this definition, determined the average daily cost in each army per officer, per man and per animal and by multiplying it by the effectives have [*sic*] determined the cost by day and by month.

The total expenditure per month has thus been evaluated at a little more than 600,000,000 francs⁹. No difference of opinion came out on the subject of that calculation.

Conditions in which the payment shall be made by Germany

Considering the amount of the costs which, at the end of the fourth month of occupation, will have reached about two and a half billion francs, and considering that it is materially impossible to ask Germany for the immediate payment of such a sum, the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies was led to look for the means of establishing a distinction between the various expenditures included in the definition of the upkeep costs:

- a first category of expenditures corresponding to the alimentation of [men] and animals should alone be immediately paid by Germany.
- a second category including all the other expenditures brought about by the upkeep of the troops of occupation should be paid later by the enemy as war costs.

For the evaluation of the expenses of the first category, the Marshal considered that an average daily evaluation of 6 francs per man and 3 francs per animal could be admitted, the same for all the allied armies.

⁹ A note in the original here referred for detailed figures to the following table appended to the report:

Expenses

<i>Armies</i>	<i>Average Daily Cost</i>				
	<i>Per Officer</i>	<i>Per Man</i>	<i>Per Horse</i>	<i>Per Officer</i>	<i>Per Man</i>
				<i>Not including expenses of animals</i>	<i>Including expenses of animals</i>
French Army	33.60	13.92	6.56	14.54	16.61
Belgian Army	26.22	13.81	6.15	14.319	16.127
British Army	38.96	14.34	6.19	15.52	17.06
American Army	52.48	28.34	8.63	29.38	31.14

‘(1) The expenses included in the above table are as follows:

Subsistence of personnel and of animals—lodging and cantonments—(a) pay and accessories—quarters, heat and light—clothes—equipment and harness—armament and rolling stock—(Maintenance and normal wear)—aeronautics (Maintenance and normal usage)—care of sick and wounded—veterinary and remount services—transport services of all kinds—lines of communication.

‘(a) [*sic*] Are not included in the valuation of the expenses only the accessories and small objects that the Allies are called upon to furnish, it being understood that lodging and cantonment in the full sense of the word are furnished in kind by the German Government and according to proceeding in force in the German army.

‘*Note.* These figures are subject to modification following increases in pay and the cost of living.’

This solution was studied by the sub-Commission of Spa.

In a first session held at Spa, on February 23rd, the Delegates of the various Allied Armies agreed without any serious objections.

But in the two later sessions of the same said sub-Commission, held in Paris on February 27 and 28th, various Delegates raised objections.

The British Delegates considered that, from the point of view of payment, it was not advisable to make a distinction between the various categories of expenditures included in the definition of upkeep expenditures.

If the Germans cannot pay in its entirety every periodic payment, the sums that they shall be able to pay shall be received as payment on account to be deducted from the total periodic payments, but not as a complete liquidation of certain categories of expenditures.

They accept the adoption of a single daily price for all the armies, and which shall be the French price.

The British Military Representative at Versailles calls attention to the fact that the transaction proposed by the British representative on February 28th is valid only if all the armies of occupation accept the French daily rate. That rate has not been accepted by General Pershing in his letter of March 8th. As a consequence, the British proposal is not maintained.

The British thesis is the following: the integral bill for upkeep cannot be divided, such as it has been established and distributed for each of the Allied and Associated Armies, no part of that bill of upkeep can be settled by payment on account by Germany. In other words, the upkeep bill as a whole is entitled to the priority of the German payment.

This opinion seems to have been adopted by the Supreme Council since: article V of the clauses relative to the reparations, accepted by the Supreme Council, stipulates the payment of a certain sum in gold in 1919 and in 1920; 'out of this sum the expenditures of the army of occupation since the Armistice shall first be paid, provided that the supply in food and raw materials which the Allied and Associated Governments shall deem essential to allow Germany to meet their [*sic*] obligations of reparation, can be paid out of the said sum, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments.'¹⁰

The American Delegate is of the opinion that the expenditures of the troops of occupation should be established *en bloc* according to the definition admitted and the immediate payment of the greatest possible part of the sum to be paid on that account by Germany should be insisted upon immediately and divided among the Allies proportionally to the total claim for each army.

On March 6th [*sic*], in a letter to Marshal Foch, General Pershing writes what follows:—

'March 8, 1919.

'My dear Marshal:

'Since the question of the upkeep of the troops of occupation has been submitted to me, I have the honour of informing you that my ideas on that subject are the following:—

'1. The upkeep expenditures such as they are defined in the minutes of the session of the Armistice sub-Commission of January 9, 1919, representing [?represent] the obligations assumed by Germany toward the United States,

'2. Considering that the average daily upkeep of the American Army is

¹⁰ For the official text of this provision see article 235 of the Treaty of Versailles.

higher than that of the other armies, the United States cannot accept that the French average daily upkeep expenses be taken as a base in estimating the German obligations towards the United States.

'3. Considering that Germany is not in a position at the present time to assume the total of her obligations towards the United States, the United States accepts, for the time being, to receive payments from Germany on account, in the same proportion as those that Germany is to pay per man and per horse to the Allied Governments.

'4. The sums received from Germany in execution of the provisions specified in paragraph 3, shall be credited by the total of the sums due, but shall not be imputed as complete or partial liquidation of certain accounts or of special expenses.

'5. The United States reserves, and shall reserve the right to collect from Germany all balances due at the present time or in the future on German obligations which shall not have been already liquidated; this collection may be made from any source; either from the funds or properties in possession of the United States, or any others which might in the opinion of the United States be or become available.

'The preceding conclusions have the approbation of the Financial Councillor of the United States at Paris.

Pershing.'

General Bliss, American Military Representative at Versailles, wishes to have the following considerations added:

The solution of the question as to how much each Allied or Associated Power should receive according to the Armistice terms with Germany, for the upkeep of their armies in occupied German territory, seems to me to have been the object of a confusion resulting from the introduction of an outside question. I understand that an objection might be raised by the Germans against this or that interpretation of the French word upkeep (*entretien*), but I cannot understand why there should be any difference of opinion among the Allied or Associated Governments.

This difficulty seems to have arisen from the fact that our efforts have been directed to arriving at a definition of the Interallied word '*entretien*' while in reality, for each Government this word means: the cost of, 'the upkeep' of its [own] army. All that this Government has the right to exact under the heading 'upkeep' should be collectable by this Government, notwithstanding the fact that the sum collected might vary according to the army.

Another difficulty seems to arise from the belief on the part of some that whatever amounts may be recovered by the respective Governments constitute a credit for these Governments, when they are simply reimbursements of justified expenses which they have incurred. Therefore, I observe in one of these documents that it is stated if we exact under the heading 'Maintenance' anything else but subsistence and lodging, the British and notably the American Government will receive more considerable sums than the French Government. This fact deserves consideration if the sums thus levied by the respective Governments are to go to their treasuries as profit, thus increasing the total sum which was already on hand. Truly, the payments effected by each Government under the heading 'Maintenance' of its army of occupation, produce a void in the coffers, more considerable in one coffer than in the other. But in any case the sums collected simply fill the gaps, whatever they are, leaving each treasury in the state where it was before. For the needs of

the special question interesting us, it is of little importance that the pay of an army be more or less higher than that of another army; it is of no more importance that an army of occupation be more important than another. The fact pure and simple is that the occupation ended, unless all the expenses be reimbursed by Germany, the deficit created in the coffers of a Government could virtually be filled by means of a reimbursement effected by Germany, when the deficit of the treasury of another Government would continue to exist.

The acceptance of the proposed French definition on the meaning of the word 'Maintenance' really means that the United States are requested to contribute to [*sic*] a certain considerable sum taken from its treasury. To whom shall this sum be paid? Certainly not to the Germans, for it is known that we have the intention of exacting from the Germans the very last cent that we can get from them. To whom then shall be destined this contributed sum? Evidently to those Allies who are expecting according to the conditions of the Peace Treaty to obtain a contribution on the part of Germany.

The question therefore becomes not a question of definition of 'Maintenance', but of policy. As [an] American, and in order to reach a decision on the line of conduct to follow, I should like to know what proportion of the contribution that I must impose upon myself will go to Great Britain, what proportion will go respectively to Belgium, France, Italy, and to Japan. I should like to know if I must impose upon myself a contribution to the profit of these Powers with the exception of Belgium and France, and for these two latter countries, for what sum I should tax myself to the profit of one and how much to the profit of the other.

My opinion is the following: the United States participate to [*sic*] the common cause under the form of the totality of their expenses in the maintenance of their armies during the war. I do not see why the United States should pay the maintenance expenses of their army of occupation during the armistice and after the signing of the Peace Treaty, when these expenses should be paid by Germany. I am of the opinion that like the other Governments, the United States had the right to exact the payment of all their expenses for their army of occupation and to recover as much of the amount of these expenses that we can make Germany pay. I beg you to recall that there is another considerable expense that the United States would have the right to exact payment from Germany. The United States are beginning to replace gradually their considerable army raised by conscription, at present in German territories, by volunteer troops taken from the regular army. These troops must be transported at great expense from the United States to Germany. When their presence in Germany will no longer be needed, they must be transported back to the United States. These operations are in a large measure effected to the profit of the Allied and Associated Powers and not to that of the United States. Nevertheless, the United States have not the intention of presenting the bill for this transportation to Germany. If after the settlement effected by Germany, the United States desired to attribute this sum to one or the other of their Allies, they will have the option of doing so; but they will have the privilege of choosing which one of the Allies shall bear this contribution. To insist that these just expenses remain unpaid by Germany, simply to allow our Allies to take possession of them and to share them amongst themselves, does not seem reasonable to me, nor to any other American. The American Military Representative adheres therefore to the meaning of the phrase 'maintenance costs' such as has been defined in the minutes of the Session of the sub-committee on the Armistice of January 9, 1919, and accepted by the Commander-in-Chief of the American

Expeditionary Corps in his letter addressed to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, under date of March 8, 1919.

Belgian opinion. The Belgian Delegate while accepting the definition on January 9, and preferring the immediate payment of all expenses if possible, is disposed to accept the immediate payment of the expenses of the first category, such as defined by Marshal Foch and to postpone to a later date the payment of the other expenses which would be inscribed under the chapter 'War Expenses'. If the solution to divide the expenses into two categories were accepted, the Belgian Delegate is disposed to accept a general and average rate based upon the average rate of the French army.

French opinion. The French Delegate shares the viewpoint of the Belgian Delegate.

Italian opinion. The Italian Military Representative set forth today that the Italian contingent having been [?pre]sent in the occupied territory since March 12, 1919, there is reason to comprise the maintenance costs of these troops in the total of the expenses which Germany shall reimburse as costs for the maintenance of the armies of occupation in Germany.

On this subject, the Italian Military Representative states that he is of the same opinion as the French Delegate, that is to say that the expenses should be divided into two categories:

A—one of which is payable immediately (food and cantonments).

B—the second shall be paid later as 'War Expenses'. The average daily cost of each category can be figured for the Italian troops in the same measure as for the French troops.

The French Military Representative to the S.W.C. BELIN.

The British Military Representative to the S.W.C. SACKVILLE-WEST.

The Italian Military Representative to the S.W.C. RENZO TONI.

The American Military Representative to the S.W.C. BLISS.

APPENDIX C TO No. 68

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL.

PARIS, September 29, 1919.

Note for the Supreme Council

The Supreme Council has forwarded to the Supreme Economic Council, with a request for their views, a note, copy of which is hereto annexed,¹¹ and which was addressed to the Council by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, on the procedure to be followed for the examination of the German demands for supplies in alimentary stuffs and raw materials.

The Supreme Economic Council examined, at the same time, a report which was made to them by the Interallied Consultative Committee on Provisioning regarding the same request which had been entrusted to it by the French and British Governments. The Council also examined a letter from the Austrian Delegation relative to the needs of that Country, in which a report had been established [*sic*] by the Consultative Committee on Provisioning.

¹¹ Not annexed to original of this appendix.

These different documents are annexed hereto.¹¹

In the course of the discussion which is exposed in the minutes hereto annexed,¹¹ it was recognized that a close coordination was necessary between the labours of the Reparations Commission and the different Committees attached to the Supreme Economic Council which the Allied Governments had appointed to examine the questions relative to the food supplies and the provisioning in raw materials.

The Supreme Economic Council believes that the requests presented by the Central Empires are susceptible of affecting not only the interests confided to the Reparations Committee provided for by the Peace Treaty, but also, as is evident, the supply interests of all Europe on account of the limited margin available for the provisioning.

Consequently the Supreme Economic Council deems it expedient to present the following demand to the Supreme Council:

'The Supreme Economic Council requests the Supreme Council to give instructions to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission and also to the Reparations Commission itself to proceed in the following manner in all the questions which concern authorization for the purchase of supplies and raw materials in execution of Article 235 of the Peace Treaty with Germany and similar clauses contained in the other Peace Treaties.

'The programs drafted, and the purchase orders of material and supplies to be given by virtue of these Articles should be submitted to an examination by the Committee on Raw Materials and by the Consultative Provisioning Committee attached to the Supreme Economic Council.

'These Committees shall, at the same time, determine the conditions of purchase which shall seem to them particularly suitable to prevent speculation and unjustified increase in the cost of living throughout the world.'

APPENDIX D TO No. 68

General Economic Situation of Europe

(Note by the French Delegation for the Permanent Committee.)

I. The labours of the Consultative Food Committee have established the fact that it is not because of any insufficiency in foodstuffs that the world is threatened with famine. As regards Raw Materials (the report of the Raw Materials sub-committee was not to hand at the time of drafting this Memorandum) it does not seem as if the deficits, which may cause grave difficulties to certain industries, are such as to threaten the general stability of the world.

Neither does it appear that sea-going tonnage, although there are grave obstacles to its utilisation, caused by the bad working of the land transport, is at the moment insufficient to the needs of international relations. Amid the ruins and disorders resulting from five years of war, one general cause can be isolated. If this cause were to disappear many of the difficulties would remain to be overcome. But if [it] persists, all efforts will be in vain.

II. All over the world, the vast operations of credit necessitated by the war have depreciated currency. But the disproportion between the respective depreciations of each national currency is considerable. Each country has depended to a different degree on the outside world for its war supplies. Some countries have been able to maintain a great part of those of their industries which are productive

of exchangeable securities. Others have had to divert the greater part of their industries [to] the production of war material. These latter are dependent on the former for their Raw Materials and for a great part of their manufactured products. This break in the former equilibrium of exchange has caused a break in monetary relations. The disparity in value between the various national monetary tokens is daily increasing in proportion to the unstable equilibrium of exchange. Their mutual relations vary from day to day. It is sufficient to follow the exchange quotations of countries which have the same monetary system (e.g. French francs, Belgian and Swiss francs, pesetas, lire, lei, etc.) to realise that their enormous variations make international exchange impossible.

III. Money having virtually ceased to be exchangeable between them, or rather money having ceased to perform its function as a medium of exchange, each country which has available products, or services possessing an international value, tends to place them under its control, in order to use them for the regulation of its own imports. On the other hand, in order to limit at home as much as possible the rise in the cost of life, which is a consequence of the general monetary depreciation, each government is tending to use this control either to limit exports and create an artificial abundance or to fix double prices, the lower price for its nationals, the higher price for foreign countries, the latter calculated so as to compensate the loss made by the effect of the former.

IV. The solution of European difficulties is, therefore, above all a financial solution. It is necessary that a current of credit should be able to develop in a continuous circuit throughout Europe. No European country can be the source of this current. Each of these countries is itself confronted with great difficulties, almost all are under the necessity of borrowing on their own account. Many of them, whose resources, though unequal, are great, can only utilise those resources for themselves. But if they were themselves propped, some of them would be able to place their experience and their organisation at the disposal of Europe.

To sum up, the supply of the greater part of Europe, above all of the new states of Eastern Europe, of Germany and of Austria, cannot, it seems, depend on the European Powers in their present state for these Powers are all at the moment debtors.

It is the business of the Supreme Economic Council to affirm that the well-being and security of the two hemispheres are closely related and interdependent, and the work of reconstruction is obligatory upon all, each to the measure of his power.

September 20, 1919.

APPENDIX I TO No. 68

ITALIAN DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE,
Hotel Edouard VII.

PARIS, August 25, 1919.

From: M. Torretta

To: Secretary General Dutasta.

The Commission on Baltic Affairs has recently heard the Finnish Delegation which exposed to it the desire of the Finnish Government to obtain a modification of the frontier of Finland in Carelia and in the district of Petchenga.

It seemed to the majority of the Commission that according to the 4th condition contained in the note addressed to Admiral Koltchak on May 27 and saying that 'in case the frontiers and the other relations between Russia and Finland could not be regulated by an agreement between the two parties, these questions should be submitted to the arbitration of the League of Nations', the Commission is therefore not competent to recommend a final solution of the questions themselves.

The minority of the Commission, however, while recognizing the [?]possibility of arriving for the present to a final settlement, is of the opinion that the Commission should proceed to the examination of these questions in order to submit to the Supreme Council proposals for a provisional settlement of the questions concerning the district referred to.

In order to decide the line of conduct to be followed, the Commission has examined the preceding declaration of the Conference on this question.

1. At the session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of May 3, when it was a question to recognize the independence of Finland, it was decided that: 'After the recognition of the independence of Finland., the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France shall instruct their representatives to insist with the Finnish Government so that it accept the decisions of the Peace Conference regarding the Finnish frontiers.'¹² This indication and others have encouraged the Finnish Government to expect from the Peace Conference some manifestation on the question of the frontier referred to. It seemed to the minority of the Commission that, for these motives, it would be difficult for the Conference not to take interest completely in this question.

2. The decision of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, May 3, last, is however previous to the communication made to Admiral Koltchak, which bears the date of May 27 and contains the following passage: 'the independence of Finland and Poland shall be recognized and in case the frontiers as well as the questions concerning the relations between Russia and those countries should not be regulated by an agreement, all these questions should be submitted to the arbitration of the League of Nations.' This communication clearly indicates that the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has modified its original point of view. It is indeed after the adoption of this new point of view that the Commission on Baltic Affairs abstained from tracing the frontier of Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, etc.

3. Finally the Commission on Baltic Affairs expressed, in its meetings with the Supreme Council on August 1, the opinion 'that there was no need to grant a hearing to the Carelian Delegates'¹³ since a decision on their requests could not be taken in view of the fact that, for the present, there exists in Russia no legal government whose opinion would be necessary.'

Under these conditions, it seems to the majority that the Commission should not be authorized to handle a possible change of the Finnish frontier in the very region aimed at by the requests of the Carelians.

The minority of the Commission remarked however, that while sharing the opinion expressed in its answer, it did not exclude the possibility of some declaration of a general order on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments

¹² Note in the original: 'No Italian Representative was present at this meeting. The Japanese representative had reserved the opinion of his Government, which, however, adhered later to the decision adopted.' (For this meeting see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iv, p. 662 f.)

¹³ Cf. No. 19, minute 9.

regarding the frontiers of Carelia and that, besides, this answer in no way affected the Petchenga question which was the most important.

The Commission also took into consideration other arguments pro and con the examination of this question:

The majority remarks that, during the discussion of the proposal to make a declaration to the Governments of the Baltic States, the Supreme Council had, in its session of July 26,¹⁴ raised among other objections that of the susceptibilities of the Russian elements. The question of Carelia and Petchenga, which are Russian territories situated beyond the present frontier of Finland, would raise much more serious questions. Indeed, it will be a question of infringing upon the territorial integrity of Russia, without taking into account that any modification of the frontiers in Carelia would inevitably threaten the safety of the Mourmansk Railroad which is the sole means of communication of Russia with the open sea in the north. The importance of this line has however been sufficiently proved during the war.

The minority of the Commission made the following remarks:

a.—that the Conference had already taken up a question which touched to [*sic*] the territorial integrity of Russia when it recognized the independence of Finland.

b.—that it would be difficult to leave entirely undefined, for an equally undefined period, the duration of which is impossible for the present to foresee, the 'Status' of these regions. In the case of Petchenga, notably, the Government of Finland was anxious to proceed as soon as possible to the development of the harbour and to the construction of a railroad connected with the Finnish lines, but it was impossible to do so as long as there were no indications on the opinion of the principal Allied and Associated Powers concerning its claims in this district.

c.—that it shared entirely the opinion of the majority of the Commission on the importance to preserve to Russia a complete control over the Mourmansk railroad and that it wished that this point be put in evidence in all the declarations of the Allied and Associated Governments on the questions.

d.—that, however, since Petchenga, whose district was the principal point of the discussion, was situated about 60 miles (95 kms) from the Mourmansk Railroad, and since the present Finnish frontier did not approach that railroad at any point less than 40 miles (65 kms), it seemed to it that the safety of this line of communication should in no way be threatened by a modification of these frontiers.

In view of the uncertainty of the decision to be taken in this matter, the Commission on Baltic Affairs unanimously recognized that it was opportune to ask the Supreme Council for instructions, and notably if it should study the question of Carelia and Petchenga and formulate recommendations.

Begging you to kindly notify the above to the Supreme Council, please accept, etc.

TORRETTA

¹⁴ See No. 19, minute 8.

H. D. 65.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 2, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Chapin. *British Empire*: Captain Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Colonel Logan.

British Empire: Lt.-Col. Kisch, Major Money, Mr. Ibbetson-James.

France: General Weygand, M. Tirman, M. Max Lazard, M. Seydoux.

Italy: Maggiore Rugiù.

I.

Negotiations with Holland regarding Article 354 of the German Peace Treaty, relative to modification of the Convention of Mannheim

[Not printed]¹

2. (The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch dated September 29th, 1919. (See Appendix C.))

Note from Marshal Foch supporting a request for military supplies from the Polish Government

GENERAL WEYGAND in explanation of the note in question said that the Polish Authorities had addressed a request for supplies to Marshal Foch in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Forces. This request appeared to Marshal Foch in all respects worthy of satisfaction, for according to

¹ The Supreme Council considered a letter dated August 9, 1919, from the Netherlands Legation in Paris (Appendix A in original) requesting that the Government of the Netherlands should participate on an equal footing in the elaboration of the General Convention referred to in articles 338 and 354 of the Treaty of Versailles, and in the negotiations in connexion therewith. After some discussion it was decided:

- (i) that the President of the Peace Conference should invite the Netherlands Government to take part in the negotiations provided for in article 354, relative to the modification of the Convention of Mannheim of 1868 (navigation on the Rhine);
- (ii) that these negotiations should take place under the auspices of the Supreme Council, between the interested Allied Powers (represented on the Central Rhine Commission in accordance with article 355 of the Treaty of Versailles) and the Netherlands Government;
- (iii) that the Swiss Government should later be invited to take part in the negotiations.

the statements of General Henrys and other officers of the Inter-Allied Staff who had been in Poland, the Polish Army was in great need of the supplies asked for. With the exception of General Haller's troops, the army was insufficiently equipped. For example, in one regiment there were only two overcoats per company. A continuation of this state of affairs, in view of the approaching winter, would lead to an exceedingly critical situation from the point of view of the morale of the Polish Army and might cause a retreat of this force from the line of the Beresina. Marshal Foch, believing that it was to the interest of the Allies to maintain the Polish Army intact, wished to support the request which had been formulated. In the letter to the Council he had included only such requests as he believed to be of prime importance and which should be granted at once if the situation were to be saved.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how it was planned to transport this material to Poland, assuming that it was available.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Allied Headquarters had already studied this problem. The transportation question was indeed a difficult one. The Port of Danzig was only available for the supply of food for the civilian population. Germany, of course, would not be prepared to permit supplies for the Polish Army to cross its frontiers. It had, therefore, been necessary to search out other routes. At the present time one regular train was running daily to Poland via Italy, which might be made use of. In addition the Italian Government was prepared to permit four trains per week to pass by way of the Brenner. Furthermore by using the route through Switzerland, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia it was possible to obtain two trains per day. For the latter transport, however, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia had asked that France should guarantee the expenses and furnish the coal. It was impossible for France to do this alone and it would consequently be necessary to add this charge, in addition to the expenses for the supply of material, to the account of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The total transport under this scheme would be twenty-five trains per week or about one hundred monthly. He had figured that the 600,000 uniforms requested would take approximately ninety-five trains or, in other words, that the shipment of these could be completed in somewhat less than a month's time.

M. SCIALOJA asked whether the four trains proceeding by the Brenner route would interfere with the shipments of material which were now being made to Poland under contract between that country and Italy. Should the arrangements as outlined by General Weygand be put into effect he would like to have it understood that they should not prejudice the shipments which Italy was now making.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that there would be no difficulty in continuing the shipments referred to by M. Scialoja, and that the four trains which he had mentioned would be in addition to those shipments. It was first necessary that Marshal Foch's Staffs should agree with the Headquarters of the other Allied Armies as to what material could be shipped to Poland. Unquestionably this material would not all be concentrated at one point. He was

anxious to obtain the authorization of the Council to consult the other Allied Headquarters in this matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had not yet been able to take this question up with his Government. He believed that the best method of procedure would be to instruct the Council of Military Experts at Versailles to study the question. This body had already formulated a general scheme for the supply of material to troops fighting the Bolsheviks, and it was therefore probable that they could quickly arrive at a solution in the matter. In the meantime he would consult his Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he feared much time would be lost by referring the matter to Military Experts at Versailles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the difficulty might be overcome by instructing the Versailles Council to act without delay.

MR. POLK said that the question from his point of view was largely a financial one. He agreed in the main with General Weygand's remarks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that during such time as Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe were discussion [discussing] the matter with their Governments the Military Experts at Versailles could be studying the practical means of executing the matter. The Polish Army was of great importance to the Allies as it constituted one of the best means of coercing Germany. It was very necessary to maintain this army in the field owing to the fact that Great Britain, the United States and France had so largely demobilized their troops.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Council at Versailles should be instructed to turn over the matter to Marshal Foch's Headquarters for execution. He would collaborate with General Belin throughout the examination of the question.

(It was decided: to refer the request for material received from the Polish Ministry of War and approved by Marshal Foch, to the Allied Military Experts at Versailles and to instruct the latter to make an examination of the question with the least possible delay and report thereon to the Council.

It was further decided: that the carrying out of the recommendations of the Allied Military Experts, if and when approved by the Supreme Council, should be entrusted to the Headquarters of Marshal Foch.)

3.

*Designation of members of
the Commission for the
repatriation of German,
Austrian and Hungarian
prisoners of war from
Serbia [Siberia]*

[Not printed]²

² After a brief discussion it was decided that the Commission should function in Paris and should be constituted as follows: U.S.A., Colonel Logan; British Empire, Lt.-Col. Black; France, Lt.-Commander Fabre; Italy, member to be designated; Japan, Major Katsuki.

4. (The Council had before it a note from General Weygand relative to the repatriation of Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Roumanian troops in Siberia (Appendix D).³

*Repatriation of
Polish, Jugo-Slav and
Roumanian troops from
Siberia*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the note in question suggested a modification of the second paragraph of the resolution passed by the Council on September 27th in this matter.

(The paragraph in question (H. D. 62,⁴ Minute 7) read as follows:

'It was also decided: that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.')

As there were a considerable number of the troops of other Allied Nations in Siberia in addition to the Czecho-Slovak forces, it was proposed to substitute the following paragraph for that quoted above:

'It was also decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Roumanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.'

He was of the opinion that this procedure should be adopted.

MR. POLK said that he had just received word from Washington that the German Government had been negotiation [negotiating] for the repatriation of its prisoners of war from Siberia, and had arranged with a Japanese steamship company for the chartering of six vessels for this purpose.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that M. Matsui ascertain the truth of this information, and if the facts were exact, the six vessels in question should be turned over for the use of the Allied Governments.

M. MATSUI said that he had no information on the subject but that the repatriation of German prisoners in the hands of the Japanese was going on, and the negotiations referred to by Mr. Polk might conceivably be for this matter.

(It was decided to modify the second paragraph of the resolution taken by the Council on September 27th (H. D. 62,⁴ Minute 7) so that the same should read as follows:

'It was also decided: that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Roumanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.')

5. (The Council had before it a proposal submitted by the British Delegation, dated September 30th, 1919, asking that the Russian Battleship 'Volva' be transferred to General Denikin (Appendix E).)

*Proposal to deliver
the Russian battle-
ship 'Volva' to
General Denikin*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this matter had been brought up before the Council on account of the fact that the Russian

³ Not printed. The note, dated September 28, 1919, was as summarized by M. Clemenceau. General Weygand gave the following approximate figures for the additional Allied troops in Siberia: Poles, 10,700; Yugoslavs, 4,300; Roumanians, 3,000.

⁴ No. 66.

Battleship involved had been turned over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918. The consent of the Council to its transfer to General Denikin was therefore necessary.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he personally had no objection to this transfer taking place.

MR. POLK said that he personally had no objection to formulate, but that he would consult the American Naval experts and notify the Secretary-General of his decision in the matter later in the day.

(Mr. Polk later stated that the American Delegation had no objection to the procedure proposed.)

(It was decided: that the Russian Battleship 'Volya', handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, should be transferred by the British Admiralty to General Denikin.)

6.

*Applications from Finland,
Norway and The Netherlands
for admission to the
Labour Congress at
Washington*

[Not printed]

7. SIR EYRE CROWE said that there were two possible ways by which the Neutral Governments might be informed of the decision of the Council regarding the blockade of Soviet Russia. First, a joint notification might be made in each of the neutral capitals by the diplomatic representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Secondly, a note might be sent by M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, to the Diplomatic Representatives of the neutral countries in Paris.

MR. POLK said that the second solution proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe seemed to him to be the more practical one.

(After a short discussion, it was decided that M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, should address a note to the Diplomatic Representatives of the Neutral Powers at Paris informing them of the decision of the Council regarding economic pressure to be exercised upon Soviet Russia.)

8. (The Council had before it a note from the Austrian Delegation dated September 17th, regarding the disturbances that had occurred in the Comitats of Western Hungary. (Appendix G⁵.)

*Note from the Austrian
Government regarding
the situation in the
Comitats of Western
Hungary*

M. BERTHELOT said that the Austrian Government asked that Allied Officers be sent to Western Hungary to

⁵ Not printed. The note was as summarized by M. Berthelot. It further stated that several deputations of the population of Western Hungary had laid before the Austrian

protect the population from the disturbances which were occurring there at the present time. They further asked that an Interallied Commission might be sent to Oedenburg to prevent a repetition of the acts of violence which had occurred there, and to supervise the conduct of the Hungarian troops at the time of the evacuation of the territory in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was a question of enforcing certain terms of the Austrian Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that officers might be detached for this duty from the Allied Military Missions at Vienna.

M. SCIALOJA said that there were still Hungarian troops in this territory because the new boundary between Austria and Hungary had not yet been officially notified to the Hungarian Government.

M. PICHON admitted that this was the case, and stated that the reason therefor was that no recognized Government had as yet been set up in Hungary.

MR. POLK suggested that the Allied Generals in Budapest should be informed officially as to the frontier between Austria and Hungary and should be instructed to convey this information to the Hungarian authorities.

(It was decided:

- (1) that an Interallied Military Commission, composed of officers to be drawn from the Allied Military Representatives at Vienna or Budapest, should be sent to the Comitats of Western Hungary to assist in the maintenance of order in the territories granted to Austria by the Treaty of Saint Germain;
- (2) that this Mission should be under the orders of the Allied General Officers at Budapest;
- (3) that the Allied Generals at Budapest should be officially informed of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, as defined in the Peace Treaty of Saint Germain.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,

October 2, 1919.

Government 'the following grievances: on September 6, 1919, a Hungarian military detachment presented itself to the commune of Gols, situated in the Comitats of Wieselburg, to take possession of the conscripts of the said commune. The conscripts having fled, the soldiers raged against the peasants who had been but spectators: a number of persons were wounded by shots and by blows from the butt[s] of the guns. The following day, a more numerous [sic] detachment penetrated into the village, arrested the fathers of the conscripts and transported them to the prisons of Deutsch-Altenburg. At Oedenburg, the Hungarian troops, under the command of Colonel Boze, exercised a regime of terror. More than 600 workmen were arbitrarily arrested; they were abused in the prisons to such an extent that several among them succumbed to the torments to which they were subjected.'

Document 1

OFFICE OF THE MARSHAL COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

General Staff, G-2

PARIS, Sept. 29, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch. To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honour to transmit you herewith a memorandum from the Polish Government stating the needs of Poland and how urgent it is to satisfy them.

Since the beginning of the war, Poland, the theatre of active operations, has been subjected to the ebb and flow of the opposing armies. Little by little, it has been despoiled of all the things which are necessary to her existence: food, clothing, railroad material, factory material, raw materials; there remains to her no reserves.

Until now, by utilizing her last resources, and thanks to the favourable season, Poland has been able to form and maintain an army of 500,000 men, which, with the greatest valiance, has interposed between the Russian and Hungarian Soviets and has forced the Russian red armies to a quick and important withdrawal. That army is more than ever necessary to her; none of her frontiers is as yet settled, her internal situation has not been stabilized. The Russian Bolshevism still sees in her the principal obstacle which stopped its march towards the West; for Germany she is the obstacle which prevents her from colonizing Russia. Indispensable as it is to Poland, that army is none the less necessary to the Entente.

Now, that army is at present in the most complete destitution, as President Paderewsky stated and as it has been noted by General Henrys and the officers sent by him on mission.

A large part of the army is still dressed with cotton uniforms; shoes, linen, overcoats, blankets are lacking. That destitution has already had a bad influence on the health and the morale of the men which had both been maintained excellent until now. The results will be very much more serious when the first cold shall be felt in those regions where winter comes early is frightfully severe [*sic*].

Munitions are lacking: the Polish army has at its disposal only from 50 to 80 rounds per gun.

Means of transportation are insufficient. There remains on the Polish railroads only 1/3 of the locomotives and 1/2 of the cars which circulated before the war; add to that that materials is [*sic*] in bad condition.

Taking into account from the request of the Polish Government only those of an immediate need, in order to exist the Polish Army should receive: about 600,000 equipments and especially warm clothing and overcoats, half for the beginning of October and the other half before the middle of December.

—munitions, first, cartridges for infantry and machine guns, 75 and 155 shells and caissons;

—100 locomotives and 1,500 cars for the special service of the army.

Poland can procure that material only by appealing to the great Allied and Associated Powers.

That help was favourably considered by the Supreme Council on June 27.

I have the honour of asking you to kindly communicate immediately to the Supreme Council the request of the Polish Government, on account of the approaching bad season, and to prevent [present] to it the following resolutions:

1. The Great Allied and Associated Powers agree to contribute, as far as possible, to satisfy immediately the material needs of the Polish army.

'2. As a consequence, the General Staff of Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, is charged with:

(a) fixing, after agreement with the Allied General Staffs, the participation of each of the Allied and Associated Powers to the delivery of material to the Polish army;

(b) to study and to execute the shipment of that material to Poland in the best conditions of safety and rapidity.'

p.o., Major General
WEYGAND

Document 2

Memorandum on the Necessity of a Prompt and Effective Help from the Allies to Poland

The Polish armies have reached the line Berezina-Horyn. Pushed back by force, the soldiers of the Republic of the Soviets are withdrawing rapidly.

The Polish State, hardly reborn, has made danger disappear on that side, the danger which threatened the results of the Peace of Versailles.

But that success reached until now by Poland's own means has no longer a local character today: it is already an event whose political scope increases from day to day, whose result is growing constantly; at the same time the efforts required by it are becoming too heavy for the rather small forces of the young State.

Poland, surrounded on all sides by her enemies, deprived of natural strategic frontiers, Poland, ruined by the war, with a very insufficient net of means of communications, engaged in a struggle on two fronts, has done her best to continue that struggle and to liberate the invaded regions, but she no longer can stand the weight alone.

Her army is suffering from lack of munitions and foodstuffs; her soldiers, to [with] the exception of the units organized in France, are badly and insufficiently clothed, often barefooted, without linen. Under these conditions, how can they spend the rigorous winter of Volainia, where in the marshes and in the forests cold, famine and diseases are going to attack them? Already now, the mobilization of the classes called cannot be finished for lack of material. Besides, on account of the lack of armament and munitions, clothing and equipment, Poland shall be forced to demobilize very soon part of her divisions.

Consequently, the present state of affairs can be resumed in these words: 'Necessity of an urgent and effective help.'

That help must bear on three essential points whose necessity is very urgent.

I. Clothing and equipment for the troops.

II. Sufficient reserves of munitions (taking into account the very different systems of armaments).

III. Improvement of communications so that the necessary transport might arrive in Poland still on time, before the beginning of winter.

The rapid solution (before winter) of those questions alone will allow Poland to fulfil her task up to the end.

The Polish Army comprises at the present time 540,000 soldiers whose morale is excellent in spite of the above mentioned privations.

On November 15, Poland shall call the class of 1900 whose effectives might give 101,500 recruits.

On January 15 and March 15, part of the class of 1901 which is estimated at 75,000 men.

I. Taking into account the indispensable equipment for the army at the front for the winter season and the necessity to complete it before the month of October, 1919, Poland shall need before March 31, 1920, the material enumerated below:

	<i>Complete Uniforms and Linen</i>	<i>Complete Equipment</i>
For the recruits called on January 15 and March 15	78,200	75,200
For the recruits already called and trained but not yet equipped	66,000	76,000
For the Winter	540,000	108,000
Wear and tear and exchange of the old equip- ment on account of the bad quality of the cloth	417,300	27,300
Total	1,200,000 [sic]	378,000 [sic]

To cover those needs we have at present in our warehouses about:

30,000

Bought but not yet delivered (from France) 50,000 complete.

Part shall be furnished by the country. Aside from that we must receive from abroad within the following time limits:

	<i>1. X. 1919</i>	<i>15. X. 1919</i>	<i>1. XI. 1919</i>
Coats	400,000	100,000	100,000
Pants	400,000	100,000	100,000
Blouses	100,000	100,000	200,000
Loll bands [sic]		100,000	50,000
Ear laps			200,000
Flannel shirts	300,000	200,000	100,000
Under-drawers	300,000	200,000	100,000
Sock[s] (pairs)	600,000	400,000	200,000
Gloves	100,000	100,000	100,000
Shoes (large size)		200,000	
Soles (pairs)	100,000	100,000	100,000
Sweaters	200,000	100,000	100,000
Blankets	300,000	100,000	100,000
Haversacks or bags	200,000	200,000	100,000
Break [? bread] sacks	200,000	200,000	100,000
Cantine with cup	200,000	200,000	200,000
Cartridge boxes	400,000	400,000	200,000
Mess kits	300,000	150,000	150,000
Belts	300,000	200,000	100,000

Considerable clothing stocks which the Americans have left in France could at least satisfy part of the above mentioned needs.

II. *Armament and Munitions.* Table below indicated on the one hand the number of arms and munitions already ordered (but not yet delivered) and on the other hand the necessary material not yet bought for lack of credit.

Designation	Ordered but not yet de- livered	Necessary but not bought for lack of credit	Number of cars	
			Transport total	Per month
Rifles and muskets of various types and systems	36,000	150,000	180	60
Machine guns and am- munition wagons . . .	220	400	120	30
Ammunition for muskets and machine guns . . .	220,000,000	120,000,000	1,000	200
75 mm. guns . . .	400		200	50
Ammunition wagons . . .	750		400	100
Ammunition for 75's . . .	400,000	800,000	1,200	240
Ammunition wagons for 105's	50		30	
155 shells (short) and ammunition wagons . . .	240		120	40
Cartridges for 155 shorts	10,500	220,000	1,000	100
Mountain Guns 65 m/m	30		30	10
Shells for 65 m/m moun- tain guns	30,000		60	20
Cartridges size 120 . . .	4,000		20	10
Different Artillery Material			100	20
Total			4,660 [sic]	900 [sic]

Aside from these needs of war material properly speaking, the absence of many other things is especially felt in the country.

In the first place, medical products and sanitary articles, rubber, automobiles (especially trucks), motors, spare parts, tools, harnesses, leather articles, etc.

III. For all those needs it is very important that the delivery should be assured before winter in a sure and rapid manner.

For that purpose, the first necessity for Poland is to be connected with the west by arteries of communication whose output shall insure the transportation of all the articles bought by Poland.

Up to the present those transportations arrive in Poland through 4 routes of a small output, notably:

I. Two trains daily (Polish) through Modane, Turin, Leoben, Vienna, Bogumin, Warsaw (lately stopped).

II. From two to four trains daily through Glansk [? Gdansk], Mlawa, Warsaw, reserved exclusively for foodstuffs.

III. One train weekly from Italy with artillery material and ammunitions.

IV. From three to six trains daily through Coblenz, Ems, Wilhelmshöhe, Halle, Glogau, Leszno.

At the present time only the first three of those lines are functioning, not very satisfactorily. The line across Germany is no longer used.

Since those lines of communication are very insufficient, it would be extremely necessary in order to insure a rapid liaison with the West:

I. To enlarge or eventually to build freight stations and tracks for unloading in the most important points of Poland, as for example Warsaw, Lodz, Cracow, Lwow, Yaroslavl, Modlin, a work which Poland could undertake herself.

II. Increase the output of the existing lines, above mentioned, by more frequent

trains, using especially the German line Glansk [?Gdansk], Mława, and the Italian line. One could for example have 3 or 4 Polish trains daily. By utilizing for the transportation of foodstuffs the waterway of the Vistula, one could use to a maximum the Glansk [?Gdansk] line which could thus render great service.

III. Open new lines of communications as for example through Braila (15 locomotives will be necessary for that purpose), or through Switzerland.

IV. To reinforce the rolling stock of the Polish railways which at present is in a pitiable state, namely;

for a number of kilometres of:

In the Warsaw districts	3,226 kms.
In the Radom	„	1,546 „
In the Cracow	„	1,924 „
In the Leopold	„	2,050 „
In the Stanislaw	„	1,128 „
Total							9,834 [<i>sic</i>] kms.

and military railways:

wide gauge	1,138 kms.
normal gauge	2,735 „
narrow gauge	936 „
Total							4,809 kms.

Poland only owns at present: 4,525 passenger cars, 1,269 box-cars, 244 mail cars, 21,901 covered freight cars, 7,178 uncovered freight cars, 21,272 coal cars, 56 refrigerator cars, 100 'foudre' cars, 114 poultry cars, 234 cattle cars, 2,474 tank cars: 60,375 [*sic*] cars, 2,110 of which must be returned abroad since they do not belong to the Polish Government.

For that number of cars we have at our disposal only 2,354 locomotives, 1,200 of which are worn and cannot be of service without serious repairs.

The above mentioned figures which do not include the Posnania system, nor that of the reoccupied regions in the East, but include only the central part of Poland within the limits of the Congress of Vienna and Galicia; they show the imperious and urgent necessity of reinforcing the railroad material of Poland by at least:

2,500 locomotives and 70,000 freight cars.

It is only through a similar reorganization that the arteries newly created, as well as those already existing, would form a system of communication by which Poland would receive the supplies indispensable for the maintenance of the present situation and for her advance to the East.

Poland appreciates at its true worth the support which has been given her up to the present time.

The arms, munitions and generous assistance furnished by France, have permitted her to attain a brilliant success of very important extent.

The aid furnished by the United States and Great Britain in the form of hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies has saved millions of people from death by hunger.

It is with a heart full of gratitude that the Polish people agree to offer payment in blood for the maintenance of world peace as fixed in the basis of the Congress at Versailles.

But the necessity of the assistance explained above becomes each day more and more urgent. The result of this assistance would be the definite assurance of peace in the Orient.

Without this assistance, it is the needless loss of efforts and sacrifices: Poland would be placed on the eve of an inevitable crisis which could well be followed by the entire ruin of the country and of the army.

This is the reason why Poland, once again in a difficult situation, appeals to her Allies and calmly and confidently awaits their energetic assistance.

SOMKOWSKI,
General and Vice Minister of War.

APPENDIX E to No. 69

Proposal to hand over the Battleship 'Volva' to General Denikine.

The British Admiralty has proposed that the Russian Battleship *Volva* which was handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, should be transferred to General Denikine.

The Admiralty point out that the *Volva* is held in trust until there is a stable Government in Russia to which she can be returned. The Russian destroyer *Derzki* which is now in the keeping of His Majesty's Government and two Russian destroyers in the possession of the French Government have been transferred to General Denikine, while the Italian and Greek Governments have been asked similarly to transfer the Russian ships which they hold.

The overhauling and repairing of the *Volva* has involved considerable work and expense on the part of His Majesty's Government, and the Admiralty hope that money and trouble will be saved if the *Volva* is sent to Sebastopol to be handed over to General Denikine. The British Delegation has the honour to recommend this proposal to the favourable consideration of the Supreme Council.

Submitted by the British Delegation,
September 30, 1919.

No. 70

H. D. 66.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, October 7, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. British Empire: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. France: M. Massigli. Italy: Lieut. de Carlo.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. E. L. Dresel, Colonel Logan, Colonel Browning.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, General Mance, General Groves, Lt.-Col. Kisch, Major Money, Mr. Ibbetson-James, Mr. Forbes-Adam, Mr. Herbert-Brown.

France: Marshal Foch, M. Loucheur, General Weygand, M. Laroche.

Italy: General Cavallero, M. Brambilla.

1. (The Council had before it the Note of the German Government of October 3rd (see Appendix A).)

Reply to the Note of the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

MARSHAL FOCH said that he thought the members of the Council had already taken note of the contents of the German Note. The German Government protested its good faith and asked for the appointment of a mixed Commission which should take the necessary steps to effect a speedy evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. He proposed that a reply be made stating that the Allied and Associated Governments were willing to work with Germany, but this must not be interpreted as meaning that they were willing to relieve Germany of her responsibilities. The Allied and Associated Governments agreed to the appointment of a mixed Commission, but maintained the view that this Commission should be particularly charged with seeing that the German Government took the necessary steps to guarantee the evacuation. This method of procedure seemed to him all the more necessary, because the German Government had enumerated a series of steps which it had taken, which were in fact only half steps. The Commission would be charged with seeing that the promises, which had been made to the Allied and Associated Governments, were kept. On the other hand, it was to be understood that, if the results were not forthcoming, these Governments would be obliged to put into effect the means of coercion which had been decided upon.

MR. POLK said that he fully agreed with Marshal Foch. He asked whether the German Government had up to the present paid the troops in question. If this was in fact the case it created a ridiculous situation. He was not surprised that the German Government paid these troops, but he was very much surprised that they confessed to the fact so openly.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Germans not only continued to pay the troops in question but they also were supplying them constantly with provisions of every kind.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he approved of Marshal Foch's proposals. He desired to add that he thought it necessary to state in the reply to Germany that the Allied and Associated Governments were not satisfied with the explanation which had been made. It was important to point out that the recall of General von der Goltz had been demanded three times and that it was only now that such a step had been decided upon by the German Government. The German reply was drafted to a great extent for public opinion at home and for purposes of propaganda, and for this reason the Allied and Associated Governments were also entitled to state their views fully. He had

just received a telegram from the British Mission at Riga, dated the 4th October, and consequently despatched after the German Note had been transmitted. The telegram pointed out that movements of German troops in the direction of Jacobstadt were continually being reported. There was not a single sign to indicate that evacuation was contemplated. In the neutral zone to the east, the Germans had been replaced by Russians, and finally General von der Goltz had assumed a most threatening attitude towards the Letts.

M. PICHON suggested that Marshal Foch should be requested to draft a reply to the German Government taking note of the remarks made by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe. He considered it important to point out to the Germans that the Allied and Associated Governments held them entirely responsible for what had occurred.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the appointment of a Commission did not raise particular difficulties; the Commission existed in fact in the form of the Inter-Allied Mission, at the head of which General Gough had been placed. General Gough, however, was no longer at Riga, and it would therefore be necessary to place an energetic officer at the head of the Commission. He wished to ask from what army the Council desired that the officer in question should be chosen.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government would have no objection to the appointment of a French General.

M. PICHON suggested that Marshal Foch submit his views to the Council on the following day.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Germans had asked in their Note that the means of economic pressure decided upon by the Allied and Associated Governments be abandoned. He desired to express the hope that in the Note which Marshal Foch was about to prepare, it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures in question would only be suspended when the Commission had been submitted satisfactory reports.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch should present to the Supreme Council at its next meeting the draft of a reply to the Note from the German Government of the 3rd October, respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, in which Marshal Foch should take into consideration the views expressed by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe.)

2. (The Council had before it a memorandum from the British Delegation of the 30th September, 1919 (see Appendix B).)

*Maintenance and
Repatriation of
Russian Prisoners
of War in Germany*

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon this memorandum. He said that there was first the general question of policy to be decided. The Supreme Council in a resolution taken on the 2nd August¹ had said that the German Government should be given full liberty in regard to the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war and that the Allied and Associated Governments would not intervene either in the repatriation or in the maintenance

¹ See No. 26, minute 7.

of these prisoners. The resolution in question had not been sufficiently far-reaching. Marshal Foch had pointed out in a number of notes addressed to the Conference, that serious difficulties might arise, if the Allied and Associated Governments abandoned all control and left the field entirely open to German action. He had pointed out that without undertaking the entire control, it would be possible to appoint an International Commission upon which there would be, in addition to representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, German and Russian representatives. This would create a means of dealing with German manœuvres. It would be a simple matter to organize such a Commission in view of the fact that there were already officers at Berlin, who were dealing with the question. The Germans could easily appoint a representative, but insofar as the Russians were concerned, the question was somewhat delicate, for it might perhaps be difficult to find a man who was not affiliated with a particular faction. If the Council decided to appoint such an International Commission, that Commission could be directed to liquidate the routine matters which required action and which had been mentioned in the memorandum of the British Delegation.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Council should decide as to the questions of principle and leave it to the Commission to insure their application. If the Commission were left too much to itself, its first act would undoubtedly be to address a new report to the Supreme Council. It would therefore be necessary to give full directions.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed, and said that this matter could be dealt with in the instructions to be prepared for the Commission. In reply to a question asked by Mr. Polk, he stated that the Commission would sit in Berlin.

MR. POLK said that he agreed in principle, but that so far as he was concerned, there was a difficulty in regard to detail. General Harries, who had been the head of the American Mission at Berlin, had left, and the officer who would be appointed would necessarily be without information on the subject.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the questions for the Commission to decide were chiefly of a financial nature, and which financial representatives could study at Paris. It would be sufficient if an officer, who was informed as to the questions, such as Colonel Kisch, could supply the necessary information. There was one question, however, which was somewhat delicate, and that related to the refugees from Kieff. The Germans maintained that the Allies had guaranteed the maintenance in Germany of four hundred Russians who had left Kieff with the German troops in order to escape the Bolshevists. The German Government added that their action had been taken at the request of the Entente. The amount expended amounted to about two millions. So far as the French authorities were concerned, they were without information as to the action which the Germans claimed had been taken by the Allies.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government were equally without information in regard to the matter.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch should present to the Council at its next meeting a draft resolution respecting the organization of an Inter-

national Commission to deal with the maintenance and repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.)

3. (The Council had before it a note from the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission of the 27th September, 1919. (See Appendix C².))

Organization at Vienna of a Sub-commission of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon the proposals of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. He said that the proposal was most urgent, particularly in view of the fact that the situation became worse each day. He wished most strongly to urge that the principle of the appointment of the subcommission should be approved upon that day and that the members of the commission should be ready to act at the earliest possible moment.

(It was decided:

- (1) that a subcommission of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission should be established at Vienna at the earliest possible moment to study the questions relating to the revictualling of Austria;
- (2) that this subcommission should be composed of a delegate from each of the Powers represented on the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. The presidency of the subcommission should be held at each meeting by each of the delegates in turn; the secretary should be permanent. There should be added to the subcommission for purposes of consultation and following the nature of the subjects dealt with, representatives of the States bordering upon Austria: Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Hungary;
- (3) that the subcommission should determine the foodstuffs and raw materials needed by Austria and ascertain all the available means of developing the greatest amount of production in Austria itself;

² Not printed. This note opened with the following preamble:

'In conformity with the instructions of July 17, 1919, of the Council of Five;

'In view of the provisions of Article 181 of the Peace Treaty;

'By reason of the interest attached by the Commission on Reparations to the resumption of economic activity in Austria as soon as possible, so that she may compensate by her exports into the neighbouring countries the importation of goods which they shall furnish her, and later, in a general way, pay her debt to the Allies;

'Considering the necessity, on account of the present weakness of Austria's own resources, to incite the neighbouring States to send her supplies so as to reduce as much as possible the shipments of the Allied and Associated Powers;

'Considering, on the other hand, the advisability of instituting in Vienna a sub-Commission which would be charged by the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations to study on the spot the conditions of sending supplies to Austria;

'The Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations proposes to the Council of Five to take the following resolution.'

There followed, in all details of substance though not of drafting, the resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council.

- (4) that the subcommission should examine and propose the means which should appear best to facilitate and to guarantee the delivery and transport from the countries bordering upon Austria of such merchandise as was necessary as well as the payment by Austria to its vendors. The subcommission should see to it that its views were adopted by all the interested states.

It was also decided that the subcommission should be established at Vienna by a member of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission, who should present his credentials from the Supreme Council to Dr. Renner.)

4. (The Council had before it the draft of a telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission. (See Appendix D.))

*Telegram to the
Czecho-Slovak and
Polish Governments
respecting the supply
of coal to Austria*

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon this telegram. He said that he proposed to add at the end of the text an appeal to the good will of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to call the attention of the Council to the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph of the text in which the words [sic], 'tout retard nouveau à partir de ce jour devra être rattrapé dans le délai minimum.' This phrase appeared unnecessary on account of the difficulty of execution and he proposed that it be omitted.

(It was decided:

- (1) to transmit the telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission (see appendix D) to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and to the Government of the Polish Republic;
- (2) to omit in the telegram the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph.

It was further decided that M. Loucheur should add to the text a supplementary paragraph appealing to the good-will of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments.)

5. (The Council had before it a telegram addressed to General Haking by the British Delegation at Paris (see appendix E).³)

*Despatch of Allied
Officers to Upper
Silesia to ensure the
normal output of coal*

M. LOUCHEUR said that he did not agree with the European Coal Commission, which had brought to the attention of the Council with a favourable recommendation, the telegram addressed to General Haking,³ which had embodied a suggestion made by M. Paderewski. He thought that the despatch of a large number of officers to Upper Silesia would provoke serious difficulties on the part of the Germans.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with the view expressed by M. Loucheur.

³ The telegram in appendix E, q.v., was headed as being addressed in the first instance to General Malcolm in Berlin.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his experts were not convinced that the despatch of a Commission of Officers would have the practical results which had been anticipated.

MR. POLK said that Colonel Goodyear, who had come from Upper Silesia, thought that it would serve a useful purpose to send a Commission composed of a small number of members. The despatch of such a Commission would make it possible to obtain definite information as to the situation in the mines. General Dupont shared this opinion.

M. LOUCHEUR said that if it were possible to send a representative of each of the Powers, the Allied Missions at Berlin could be directed to take the necessary steps, and it would be understood that the Commission would be under the orders of the Missions at Berlin, but it should keep in close touch with the Coal Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau.

MR. POLK said that the American Delegation would be obliged to send one of its representatives from the Coal Commission at Paris. He wished to mention this fact simply as a matter of detail.

(It was decided:

- (1) to despatch to Upper Silesia a sub-commission composed of a Representative of the United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy to ensure the normal output of coal;
- (2) that the members of this Commission, with the exception of the American Representative, should be chosen by the Chiefs of the Entente Missions at Berlin from among the officers attached to these Missions;
- (3) that the Commission should be placed under the orders of the Military Representative of the Entente at Berlin.

It was further decided that the Commission should keep in touch with the Coal Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau.)

6.

*Commission charged with
the provisional re-
distribution of the rolling
stock of the former Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy*

[Not printed]⁴

⁴ In opening the discussion of this item 'M. Loucheur read and commented upon Colonel Logan's proposal [see appendix F]. He thought that the distribution of the Austro-Hungarian rolling stock ought not to be delayed any longer than necessary. If the transports had been suspended and traffic was practically interrupted, it was not because the material was lacking, but because the distribution of this material had not yet been made.' After some discussion of method of procedure 'it was decided: (1) to appoint in advance a Commission of experts to deal with the re-distribution of the rolling stock as prescribed by Article 318 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria; (2) that the Hungarian Representative attached should be appointed by the Allied Generals at Budapest from the staff of the Hungarian State Railways; (3) that upon the appointment of the Commission, instructions should be given to the President in a [sic] sense of the resolution prepared by Colonel Logan (see appendix F).'

*Allowances for the
Presidents of the
Naval and Air Com-
missions of Control
in Germany*

8. M. LAROCHE said that the decision of the Supreme Council to hold a plebiscite at Teschen had been communicated to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments. In accordance with the terms of this decision, the plebiscite was to be held within a period of three months after notification. It was therefore most urgent that a Commission should be appointed. He wished to add that it was important that the Commissioners should leave at as early a date as possible in order to put an end to the unrest which was showing itself in the Duchy.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had telegraphed his Government but, probably on account of the recent disturbances in England,⁵ he had received no reply.

MR. POLK said that he had also received no reply up to the present.

M. SCIALOJA said that the Italian Government, in view of the fact that the resolution of the Supreme Council did not make it obligatory to change their representative on the Teschen Commission, had thought it advisable to appoint their present representative at Teschen.

M. PICHON said that he was informed that the authorities at Prague were most desirous that the Inter-Allied Commission should be composed of new members. The question was an important one for the Czecho-Slovak Government in view of the demonstrations which had been made against it within the course of the last few weeks. He believed that the wishes of the Czecho-Slovak Government should be met in this matter.

M. LAROCHE said that the French Representative would be M. de Manneville, Minister Plenipotentiary.

M. SCIALOJA said that if the other Powers appointed new representatives the Italian Government would do the same.

M. LAROCHE said that it was further necessary to arrange for the Military occupation of the Duchy; it was an urgent matter, but the Council would have to await the reply of the British Government on the general question of the constitution of the forces which were to undertake Inter-Allied occupations.

(The Council decided to postpone the discussion of the question until the American and British Representatives had received instructions from their Governments.)

⁵ The reference was to a widespread British railway strike. The strike had ended on October 5, 1919.

9. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated the 2nd October, 1919. (See Appendix H.))

*Limitation of Greek
and Italian Zones of
Military Occupa-
tion in Asia Minor*

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon the note presented by the British Delegation of the 2nd October. He recalled that General Milne had been asked by the Supreme Council to fix a line which neither the Turks nor the Greeks should pass.⁶ The General had gone to the spot. He thought that the present line could not be held. It was necessary for the Greeks either to advance or retreat. If they advanced they could not avoid a conflict with the Turks. The Greeks were aware of this fact. General Milne thought that it would be possible to advance the line, but in this event, it would be necessary to take armed resistance into consideration. General Milne had summarized the situation in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the Note which was before the Council. Before M. Venizelos had left Paris he had been sounded as to whether he was willing to accept a withdrawal of the Greek line under the conditions fixed by General Milne. M. Venizelos appeared to be willing to agree, but upon condition that a withdrawal in the region of Aidin should call for occupation of the territories evacuated by the Greeks by Interallied contingents.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that from a military point of view he had no objection to the proposals of General Milne as a whole. He objected only to those proposals which dealt with the southern part of the line held by the Greeks. General Milne appeared to desire a withdrawal in the region of Aidin. From a military point of view, this proposal was the better one, because the situation of the Greeks at Aidin was precarious, and, if it were to be improved, a conflict with the Turks was inevitable. He wished also to state that the line drawn on the map annexed to the British report⁷ did not entirely correspond to the conclusions of the report. So far as the occupation of the valley of the Meander was concerned, he thought the proposals contained in the fourth paragraph of the British Note did not quite agree with the terms of General Milne's report. There was in this report nothing to show that the actual line of demarcation should continue to form the northern limit of the Italian occupation. If the valley of the Meander was to be occupied by Allied troops it was natural that the occupation should be effected by Italian troops, in view of the fact that they were on the spot, and also as the refugees from the region of Aidin were concentrated in the territories occupied by the Italian troops, it would be easy for the Italians to return them to their homes. The character of the Italian soldier was such as to make incidents impossible. The Italian soldier lived on good terms with the local population and this was a guarantee that the occupation could be made under the best conditions.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the proposals contained in the British Note were based upon General Milne's report. There was no reason for believing that the General had thought of advancing the Italian line. He knew an

⁶ See No. 14, minute 4.

⁷ Map not annexed to original of appendix H.

agreement had been made between the Greeks and the Italians; an agreement approved by the Supreme Council in regard to the limits of the respective zones of occupation.⁶ He wished to state, with all due deference to the Italian Government and its military authorities, that he did not feel that the idea of replacing Greek troops by Italian troops would meet the situation. If the Greek withdrawal were followed by an Italian advance, he feared that the effect would be disastrous from a Greek point of view. The proposal to which M. Venizelos had finally agreed looked to a Franco-British occupation. Such an occupation seemed possible of realization, but if the Greeks learned that they were to be replaced by Italians the situation would be worse than at present.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that in examining the resolution taken by the Supreme Council on the 18th July, he did not see that it was a question of defining a neutral zone nor that any similar definition was necessary.

M. PICHON said that the reasons given by Sir Eyre Crowe appeared to him most grave. If the Italian proposal were accepted there was great danger that the end which the Council sought, which was the pacification of the region, would not be achieved.

M. SCIALOJA said that so far as the pacification of the region was concerned experience was in the favour of the Italians. There would be no complaint from the Turkish populations in the region of the Italian occupation. He ventured also to remark that the line of the 18th July was a line of demarcation between the Greeks and the Italians. If the Greeks were no longer there, it would be natural, to establish contact, for the line to go farther north. The Greeks would have no reason to complain. It would be possible to hear the Greeks first or to postpone the settlement of the question until an agreement with them had been reached.

MR. POLK asked what would be the result if the line were moved farther east.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked the Council to put themselves in the place of the Greek Government. At M. Clemenceau's request, M. Venizelos had endeavoured to reach an agreement with M. Tittoni. If M. Scialoja's proposal were now adopted, the Council would appear to be taking sides with the Italians against the Greeks without having consulted the latter, and would also be failing in their engagements. So far as he was concerned, he could not associate himself with such a course.

MR. POLK said that he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe. The Greeks would be put in a humiliating situation, because a line of agreement had already been fixed with them.

M. SCIALOJA said that if the principle of Interallied occupation of the neutral zone were adopted it would have to be understood that an Italian contingent would form part of the army of occupation. He recalled that the refugees from Aidin had been placed under the protection of Italian troops.

M. PICHON said that he saw no reason to object to this proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in taking this action the Council would be precipitating difficulties which would inevitably provoke trouble between

the Italians and the Greeks. The Council had assumed obligations towards the Greeks because they had asked them to go to Smyrna. He asked whether any similar resolution had been made requesting the Italians to go to Asia Minor.

M. SCIALOJA said that there had been a resolution of the 18th July which, by fixing a line between the Italians and Greeks, had recognized the principle of Italian occupation.

MR. POLK said that the Council had testified to an occupation in fact, but he did not believe that they had accepted the principle of Italian occupation.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that General Milne had only been instructed to fix a line of demarcation.

M. SCIALOJA said that all occupation was occupation in Asia Minor and occupation in fact and did not constitute a definite right. For the moment he held that Italian occupation had been recognized.

MR. POLK said that he had heard nothing to the effect that Italian occupation had ever been recognized. The Council, in fixing a line of demarcation, had never sanctioned Italian occupation. It had only been a question of avoiding conflict.

(He then read the resolution of the 18th July. (See H. D. 10, Minute 4⁶.)

M. SCIALOJA said that this resolution constituted a virtual recognition, particularly because of the fact that the line of demarcation had been communicated to the Turkish Government in the name of the Conference. The Italian troops were in Asia Minor in the name of the Conference.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if M. Scialoja should insist upon this declaration being inserted in the procès-verbal he would be obliged to make a formal reservation. His Government had undoubtedly never recognized Italian occupation.

M. PICHON said that the Council had to pronounce upon a definite proposition. The question was in what manner the zone between the line drawn in accordance with the resolution of the 18th July and with the new line, which General Milne proposed, should be held by the Greeks. He asked whether the territory was to be occupied by Inter-Allied troops, which should include Italian representatives. It must be understood that the Inter-Allied occupation of the new zone could not have the effect of sanctioning the situation created by the landing of Italian troops in Asia Minor.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to add that General Milne advocated the representation of Greek troops in the army of occupation of the zone which they were about to evacuate. It was, in effect, the Greeks who were retiring from a territory to which they had gone with the approval of the Conference.

M. PICHON asked whether it would be possible to send Italian troops as well to this zone.

MR. POLK said that he was ready to refer the matter to his military advisers, but he could not consent to this arrangement if it meant that the present position of the Italians in Asia Minor was to be recognized. The situation

would then be quite different. The presence of Italian troops had never been recognized as resulting from a mandate given by the Conference.

M. PICHON said that it would be possible to state in the decision that the steps which the Council proposed to take should in no way prejudice the final decision. The question now was to decide if the Inter-Allied Army of occupation should contain Greek troops and no Italian troops, or if the occupation should be truly Inter-Allied and if, at the side of the American, British and French troops, Italian and Greek troops would be represented.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought that he should make his point of view more definite. The Greeks were in occupation. They were being asked to retire for military reasons, to stop their advancing in order to avoid conflict with the Turks. M. Venizelos had said that the Greek troops should be left where they were, but should be joined by British and French units. This would be sufficient to prevent the Turks from attacking. He asked just what the Council desired; whether it was to prevent the Turks from attack and nothing else. If the situation were complicated in allowing the Italians to enter the Inter-Allied Army, new difficulties would be created. The very fact of putting Italian and Greek troops in contact would place them on the verge of an incident.

M. PICHON said that he recognized the weight of the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe and that he was in agreement with him.

M. SCIALOJA said that he too would agree.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to take the occasion to express to his Italian colleague his thanks for the conciliatory attitude which he had adopted. There was another matter about which he desired to speak. He did not wish any doubt to exist as to the position of General Milne. General Milne had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in Asia Minor by a decision of the Supreme Council. It appeared, however, that the French authorities at Constantinople were unwilling to recognize this situation. They stated that they had received no instructions on the subject. It might be possible to inform them of the decisions of the Conference.

M. PICHON said that there was no question but that General Milne was in command in Asia Minor. As to the question of the command at Constantinople, that was another matter, and had formed the subject of negotiations between the British and French Governments, and an agreement had been reached in regard to the matter in the month of December last. He asked that Sir Eyre Crowe should permit him to consult with M. Clemenceau, who was Minister of War, in regard to the matter before any actions were taken.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the proposals made by General Milne in his telegraphic report to the Supreme Council (see Appendix H);
- (2) that in the sector of Aidin the southern limit of the zone of Greek occupation should be changed to a line running to the northeast along the frontier of the sandjak of Smyrna to a point where this line intersects the said frontier;

- (3) that the zone between the line established by the decision of the Supreme Council of the 18th July and the new line (frontier of the Sandjak) should be occupied by British, French and Greek troops.)

10.

Observations of the Roumanian Delegation respecting the Ports, Waterways and Railways clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary

(The question was adjourned pending the receipt of a new Roumanian note.)

11.

Committee for the execution of Colonial Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany

(At M. Pichon's request the appointment of a Committee was postponed.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,
7th October, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 70

Translation

Note from the German Government, under date of October 3, relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Regions by German Troops

In reply to note No. 1755/G dated September 28, 1919,⁸ the German Government points out that it attaches the greatest importance to the determination taken regarding the retreat of the troops in the Baltic and in Lithuania, and that it is continually making the most energetic efforts to accomplish this operation.

An order was issued, among others, to this end, under date of September 25, 1919, ordering that the soldiers' pay, as well as other advantages accorded to the units who would refuse to conform with the order of retreat, be withheld, and furthermore, in order to prevent reinforcements joining these troops, the German frontier on the Courland side has been closed. Orders were given to fire on the troops who despite this precaution would attempt to cross the line. The furnishing of munition supplies was formally forbidden. General von der Goltz has been recalled from his post. The supreme command is confided, in replacing General von der Goltz, to Major General von Eberhardt, over all the troops which are at the present time East of the frontier of the Empire until such time as the complete retreat of the troops shall have been effected. Finally, the German Government has addressed a proclamation to these troops pointing out their duty, and indicating the dangers and sufferings of which they seem to be unaware, and which they might cause for the German people if they persist in their disobedience.

All those measures should protect the German Government against the unjustified reproaches which the Allied and Associated Powers have judged necessary to

⁸ See No. 66, minute 3, and appendix E.

address to Germany (basing the judgment upon the refusal of the German troops to obey orders) accusing them of not trying to fill [*sic*] their obligations relative to the evacuation of the former Russian territory.

The Allied and Associated Governments have a sufficient idea of the position in which the Peace Treaty places Germany to realize that the German Government is unable to have recourse to more energetic military measures.

Referring to the enlistment of German troops in Russian formation[s], the German Government completely declines any participation in this affair, and adds that it has again clearly expressed its point of view to those concerned. The German Government has never authorized these enlistments and has every desire to do all in its power in the accomplishment of its evacuation obligations.

The German Government must protest energetically against the severe measures contained in Marshal Foch's note, the object of which is the renewal of the blockade of Germany with a view to cutting off supplies. The Allied and Associated Governments cannot have forgotten that this blockade caused not only the death of hundreds of thousands of women, children and patients, but further introduced a weakening in the labour output as a result of insufficient nourishment, which produced a direct influence upon the disorder under which Germany is seriously suffering at this time.

The German Government has every hope that the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing its good faith, and in consideration of this, will forego the application of these inhuman war measures against the German civil population which is in no wise responsible for the actions of the troops now in the East.

But, in order to furnish the Allied and Associated Governments with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the intensity of its intervention, the German Government requests that they enter into pourparlers concerning the measures it would be advisable to adopt.

To this end, the German Government proposes the early constitution of a commission composed of representatives of the German Government and representative[s] of the Allied and Associated Governments. In the view of the German Government, the duty of this Commission would be, after an examination of the situation, to take the necessary measures to bring about a rapid execution of the evacuation of these territories, and to supervise and force their execution. The German Government respectfully requests an early reply in this matter.

WACHENDORF

Düsseldorf, October 3, 1919.

APPENDIX B TO No. 70

Note by the British Delegation

Russian Prisoners in Germany

On August 2nd the Supreme Council decided¹ to impose on the German Government the obligation (which has always existed) to maintain the Russian prisoners in Germany. At the same time, the German Government was to be informed that all restrictions on the repatriation of these prisoners would be removed.

There are a number of matters which have arisen from this decision which need to be settled.

It will be necessary to review the case of these prisoners from July 18th, 1919, at which time their food supply and support was being carried out through the French Government, the American Red Cross and the British Red Cross. On the above date the Supreme Council decided that, pending repatriation (which was to be studied by an Inter-Allied Commission), the feeding of the prisoners should be taken over by the Commissariats of the Allied Armies of Occupation. This arrangement continued until August 2nd, when all responsibility for the prisoners was, by the decision already referred to, transferred to the German Government.

This decision involved elaborate arrangements in connection with the transfer of the prisoners' camps from the charge of the Allied Commission of Control to that of the German Government, and it was not found possible to effect this transfer until August 23rd. The Inter-Allied Commission continued to issue food to the prisoners on the same scale as previously until the camps were actually handed over. The Commission considered that it was morally bound to hand over the camps for which it was responsible in good order, and it is submitted that the period of 21 days from the date of the Supreme Council's decision (17 days from that on which the order was received by the Inter-Allied Commission) was the minimum possible.

In order to enable the Inter-Allied Commission as at present constituted to be wound up, definite rulings are required on the following points:

1. *Question of Repayment in Kind to German Government for Flour Supplied by them for Russian Prisoners of War.*

One of the arrangements in force at the date of the Supreme Council's decision of the 2nd was that the German Government should furnish the Russian prisoners with bread on a scale of 600 grs. per day, the flour required to provide the difference between this amount and the ordinary German civilian ration of 300 grs. a day being refunded by the Inter-Allied Commission. The amount of flour owing to the German Government by the Inter-Allied Commission on August 23rd under this arrangement was 2,495 tons of wheat flour or 2,745 tons of rye flour. The Commission ask that these quantities should be furnished and handed over to the German Government as early as possible.

2. *The Question of Settling the Accounts of the Inter-Allied Commission.*

The President of the Inter-Allied Commission has reported that the amount of money required to meet the financial liabilities actually incurred by the Commission is 400,000 marks; that all accounts are in order, but that these accounts cannot be closed until the above sum is received.

3. *The Question of the Formation of an International Commission to take the Place of the Former Inter-Allied Commission.*

On being informed of the decision of August 2nd, the German Government at once pointed out that this decision placed them in a most difficult position, and that the Russian prisoners would inevitably suffer considerably as a result of it. These contentions were supported by General Malcolm as President of the Inter-Allied Commission and Marshal Foch in a letter addressed to the Peace Conference dated August 22nd urged that the Inter-Allied Commission should be replaced by the International Commission of Control on which Germany would be represented. General Malcolm urges that it is essential that the Entente should re-assume some sort of control, both for the sake of their own prestige, and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism amongst the Russian prisoners. He reports that in spite of the arrange-

ments which are being made to proceed with the repatriation of the prisoners by sea during the coming winter, there will still remain about 90,000 Russians who cannot at present be repatriated owing to the conditions prevailing in Russia, and for whose care the Entente at one time made themselves responsible.

4. *The Question of the Appointment of a Fully Accredited Russian Mission to Berlin.*

This question is closely connected with 3 above. At present there is at Berlin a Russian Colonel Brandt looking after the interests of Russian prisoners of war. He has, however, no official status, and the Germans do not recognise him. Colonel [*sic*] Malcolm points out that it is essential that some Russian official be appointed to act as a channel of communication between the Russian prisoners of war and the authorities responsible for their care and repatriation. He does not consider Colonel Brandt of sufficient weight and reliability to act in that capacity, and urges the appointment of a Russian representative whose integrity and authority are beyond dispute.

5. *Question of Repayment to German Government of Expenses (2 million Marks) incurred in the Care of Kiev Refugees.*

The following is an extract from a report by General Malcolm, dated August 17th, explaining this question:—

‘These refugees were brought to Germany by the request of the Entente Representatives at Kiev in January 1919, in order to save them from Bolshevik reprisals. On 18th March, General Nudant notified the Inter-Allied Commission that they were to be responsible for the care of these people, and were to study the means of reimbursement of expenses to the German Government. The German Government was informed of this decision, and denied all responsibility for the care of these refugees. There are at present some 600 of them in camps supervised by the Inter-Allied Commission, and expenses to date amount to about Marks 2,000,000.

‘It is essential that a definite arrangement should be made with the German Government for the repayment of past and future expenses incurred on behalf of these refugees, or that the German Government should be informed that they are held entirely responsible for their maintenance.’

In reply to above, General Malcolm was informed by Marshal Foch that the Secretariat of the Peace Conference had no knowledge of any decision of the Supreme Council on this subject, and that the German Government who had allowed these Russians to enter Germany, should themselves take any measures which they might think necessary in order to recover in the future from the Russian authorities the expenses incurred in this connection.

In a further letter dated September 24th (copy attached marked A)⁹ General Malcolm has asked that the matter may be referred to the Supreme Council for decision. General Malcolm contends that the Entente accepted the responsibility for these refugees and are repudiating their responsibility. In his opinion the amount involved is small as compared with the breach of faith with which the Entente can be charged.

BRITISH DELEGATION,

September 30, 1919.

⁹ Not printed. This letter was as summarized, and enclosed, in support of General Malcolm's contention, a copy of General Nudant's above-mentioned notification to the Inter-Allied Commission on March 18, 1919.

[Translation]

PEACE CONFERENCE

European Commission on Coal

PARIS, October 1, 1919.

Secretariat AR/AF.

Project of Telegram

The Supreme Council to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to the Government of the Polish Republic

The European Commission on Coal has just examined the question of the supplying of coal to Austria and especially to the City of Vienna. It has come to

¹⁰ The original of this appendix contained also:

(i) A note dated October 1, 1919, from the secretariat of the European Commission on Coal to that of the Peace Conference, transmitting for submission to the Supreme Council (a) the printed draft telegram; (b) a supporting report by a subcommission appointed by the European Commission on Coal on September 27, 1919, to study the question of supplying Austria and especially Vienna with coal; this report had been approved by the European Commission on Coal; (c) a draft resolution, presented by Colonel Logan of the American Delegation and approved by the European Commission on Coal, proposing the immediate nomination of a commission charged with the provisional distribution of the rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: see appendix F.

(ii) The above-mentioned report by the subcommission of the European Commission on Coal. This report stated that Czechoslovakia had contracted to deliver to Austria approximately 8,746 tons of coal and lignite per working day, or 218,650 tons per month, and that Poland had similarly contracted to deliver approximately 2,000 tons per working day, or 50,000 tons per month, this supply being 'independent of that promised by Poland for the transportation called "Polonia".'

The report continued: 'If Czecho-Slovakia and Poland have [?had] fulfilled and still continue to fulfil their engagement towards Austria, the latter would have about 50 per cent. of her needs. But on account of previous delays, the execution, even complete, from now on, would still leave Austria for a very long time with a very much smaller quota, probably lower than 33%. This remark is increased by the fact that it is a question for the best part for domestic and urban needs. All the witnesses agree as to the distressing situation of the City of Vienna and to foretell[sic], if immediate measures are not taken, such a state of misery that the Allied and Associated Powers could tolerate neither politically nor humanely.

'Now, Czecho-Slovakia, with her present production, can satisfy both her engagements toward Austria and her own needs to the amount of 77%, according to the figures of 1913. Poland is in a more difficult situation since Upper Silesia has stopped shipments. But even so, she can fulfil her promises to Austria and cover 35% of her own domestic and industrial needs without any importation, according to figures furnished by the Polish Delegate; the suspension of shipments from Upper Silesia for any length of time is however a very unfavourable hypothesis; finally, it appears, although the Polish Delegate expressed an opinion quite contrary, that it would be rather easy for Poland to increase her production.

'The sub-commission considers therefore that, *from the point of view of production*, there exists no prime motive neither [sic] for Czecho-Slovakia nor for Poland preventing these countries from fulfilling their engagements towards Austria; the amount promised must therefore be delivered.'

The report of the subcommission proceeded to consider the argument of the Czecho-slovak and Polish delegations resting upon transport difficulties due to lack of rolling stock. After reviewing the existing position the subcommission concluded 'that *from the point of*

the conclusion that immediate measures must be taken to remedy the intolerable situation resulting for that country and for its capital, especially from the fact that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia did not fulfil their contracts to furnish coal. The Mission declared itself convinced that nothing in the present state of affairs opposes the execution of those contracts, and that if it is opportune to look for the means to give to the furnishing states the rolling stock they are asking for, it remains well understood that the execution of the contracts in question could not be subordinated to the improvements to be expected in that respect.

Adopting the conclusion of the European Commission on Coal, the Supreme Council invites you therefore in the most pressing manner to take without delay the necessary measures to execute integrally, from the date of the present communication, the promises to supply coal to Austria: any new delay henceforth will have to be made up within a minimum time limit.

The contract now in force shall be valid until new arrangements have been made, either by an agreement between the Governments concerned, or drawn up by the Commission on Reparations in execution of Article 224 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

APPENDIX E TO No. 70

Cypher telegram to General Malcolm, Berlin

From Astoria, D. 17:30. *September 25th, 1919.*

No. 60.

M. Paderewski suggests immediate despatch of a considerable number of allied officers to Upper Silesia to safeguard the interests of inhabitants and ensure normal output of coal.

Telegraph your views as to practicability and desirability of above proposal, and state number of allied officers already in Upper Silesia. This suggestion is entirely distinct from question of dispatching plebiscite Commissioners who could not in any case now proceed prior to ratification.

APPENDIX F TO No. 70

During the meetings of the Sub-Commission of the European Coal Commission considering the Austrian coal situation it was clearly brought out that the shortage of railway equipment contributes largely to the existing coal shortage in Central Europe. The production at the mines is in general increasing and has now reached a point where the coal actually mined cannot be moved due to shortage of railway equipment.

view of rolling stock no prime motive can be opposed to the execution of the engagements made.' The report continued: 'the sub-commission is not informed of the last provisions made by the Marish[sic]-Ostrau [Coal] Sub-commission. It appears however from the latest news received that new agreements between Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Austria have been concluded or are about to be concluded. In order to avoid any action contrary to the Marish-Ostrau Sub-commission, the Sub-commission deemed it its duty to limit itself to the examination of the contracts in force and to their execution.' In conclusion the sub-commission recommended that the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments be formally invited 'to furnish to Austria the *total* amount of coal and lignite mentioned in the agreements.'

Roumania has removed to date over 1,000 locomotives and over 20,000 railroad cars of all classes from Hungary. It appears needless to point out that Roumania by these seizures has not only secured the restitution of railway equipment belonging to herself, but in addition has also removed equipment belonging to Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Notwithstanding these Roumanian seizures there still remains in Hungary and in that portion of Hungary just ceded to Austria, railway equipment considerably in excess of local requirements, which should be put into movement as soon as possible. The coal situation as well as the general economic situation in Central Europe does not permit of any of this railway material resting idle any longer.

The European Coal Commission, therefore, recommends the immediate passage of the following resolution by the Supreme Council:

First: That a Special Commission of Experts be established without delay for the purpose of determining and effecting an immediate distribution of surplus railway equipment now in Hungary and Austria as between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and such of the other Allied and Associated Powers as may have interests therein. That this Special Commission in effecting this distribution shall have regard to the amount of material registered on these lines in the last inventory before November 3, 1918, the length of track (sidings included) and the nature and amount of the traffic. That this Special Commission shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case, and shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in Austrian and Hungarian workshops. The provisions of the foregoing shall be applied to lines of former Russian Poland converted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities to the normal gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian and Hungarian State systems.

That a full report of the determinations arrived at and the distribution effected by this Special Commission will be reported to the Supreme Council at the earliest practical date. It will be understood that the primary reason for the creation of this Special Commission is to provide the means for placing surplus and idle railway equipment now in this territory into economic activity without delay. The findings of this special commission will in no way prejudice the determination of the Commission of Experts contemplated by Article 318 of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and similar provisions included in other treaties.

Second: That this Special Commission will report to the Supreme Council the quantities by classes of rolling stock taken out of Austria or Hungary by any Power in excess of its proper proportion as determined under the first paragraph of this resolution. This same report will include a detailed statement as to the monetary value of the rolling stock thus removed.

Third: That this Special Commission of Experts will include one representative appointed by each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The Governments of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, may each designate a representative who will represent the interests of the respective governments before this Special Commission.

That a representative to be designated by the Austrian Government and a representative of the Hungarian State Railways to be designated by the Allied Council of Generals at Budapest will represent the interests of Austria and Hungary respectively before this Special Commission.

*Limitation of Greek and Italian Troops in Zones of Occupation in
Western Asia Minor*

1. The Supreme Council decided on July 18th to direct the Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possession of Turkey to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval officer at Smyrna and Italian and Greek Generals, were to fix the military limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops should be permitted to move.⁶

2. In pursuance of these directions General Milne has telegraphed the following report for communication to the Supreme Council:—

I have arrived at the following conclusions as a result of the report of the Commission who have been visiting the Turco-Greek front at Smyrna.

1. That a state of active warfare exists between the Greek and Turkish forces.

2. That the greater portion of the Turkish forces is composed of organised bands of brigands, reinforced by armed peasants driven from the villages by the Greeks and determined to prevent further advance of the Greeks. These armed forces which are secretly receiving reinforcements from the regular units are in considerable strength.

3. That the Turkish Government has no control over these forces, which are pledged to drive the Greeks out of Asia, and hence cannot insist on their withdrawal from any stipulated line.

4. That generally speaking the civil administration is overruled by the military authorities, the latter being secretly in support of the national movement, which is gaining strength, and the Turkish Government are powerless to exercise any restraining influence.

5. That the Greek forces having advanced in many places to a purely Turkish area and an extremely difficult country, are from a tactical point of view badly placed but that any further advance to gain better positions will be resisted to the utmost and can succeed only after severe fighting.

6. That it is of little practical value to define a tactical defensive line, since it would be respected by neither one side nor the other, the Turks because they are determined to drive back the Greeks, the Greeks because no line will satisfy them until they obtain the line asked for by Mr. Venizelos.

7. To concede this line to the Greeks would be to give them territory which is purely Turkish and where a bitter resistance would be offered by the inhabitants. In addition it will precipitate an outbreak elsewhere in Asia Minor.

8. Should the Greeks not be allowed to advance, and should they be driven back by the Turks, they will undoubtedly lay the blame on the Entente.

9. Guerilla warfare will continue so long as Greek troops remain in Sanjak, and any further advance will tend to create greater difficulties.

10. For the present best solution is for Greeks to remain practically in the present position with exception of certain minor rectifications and that mentioned in para. 13.

11. I recommend that the Greek occupation should extend approximately along following line starting from North (ref. 1/250,000 Asia Minor). (?)As point on coast 7 miles north east of Aivalik to watershed at Osmanlar (P. 1558) thence following along summits of Kestene Dag, Akmaz Dag to village of Dushme, due south along watershed between the Eurkut Dere and Monteshe

Dere to junction of Bekir Chai and Sumali [Jumaali] Dere, the summits of Fughlajik and Saritash respectively, along straight line in south-southwest direction to Urpek Kaya point 1804; through villages Karasigrlı, Yenije, Tepejik, Tatarkoui, Munteveli, Yenichiftlik, Papazlı; southwest [? southeast] over point 1804 and Belen Dag; to village[s] of Kester[I]i, Yarishlik (3 miles east of Ahmedli)—Sart; south along ridge to Ardijak-Yaila to villages Kemer, Tabaklar, Semit, Bujak; south to Cha[i]li; southwest to Bademma. Question of further boundary will depend on decision given to my proposals in para. 13. All villages mentioned are being taken as inclusive to Greeks.

12. I have considered in suggesting above delimitation Greek point of view and advance to line east of Soma Akhissar railways but, as it included occupation of further country inhabited almost entirely by Turks, occupation of which would lead to further fighting and bitterness, until reasons produced by Greeks carry sufficient weight this could not always be admitted. Generally I have selected best tactical line in vicinity of line at present occupied.

13. As a whole Greek division is practically employed defending Aidin area on 3 sides in close contact with Turks, Greek position in vicinity of Aidin is tactically unsound. An advance will be necessary to secure a good and safe position but this will be stoutly resisted by Turks. If Peace Conference raise no objection to further hostilities and to occupation of further Turkish villages Greeks might be allowed to advance to line (? Kochak) Chai but in view of fact that Greeks are at Aidin to [? in] defiance of orders, and that if they remain there there will be constant fighting, I recommend that they may be restricted to Sanjak area and that allied troops occupy Meander valley as bitterness here is more marked than elsewhere. Advances to Manissa and to Aidin have been carried out contrary to orders and it is in these two places that all the trouble is arising, and so long as Greek troops remain there will continue.

14. It is highly desirable that an early and clear decision from the Peace Conference on above points should be given. Such a decision will carry much weight and should do much to establish tranquility before the conclusion of harvest when unless some solution be found Turkish forces will be considerably increased.

3. The point in General Milne's telegram which appears to require special consideration and a decision by the Supreme Council is that raised in para. 13 respecting the south eastern portion of the line, the northern and eastern portions of the line being satisfactorily fixed by para. 11 of the telegram.

4. The Supreme Council approved on July 18th an agreement between M. Venizelos and M. Tittoni fixing the line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations from the mouth of the river Meander as far as Keushk on the Smyrna-Aidin Railway.⁶ What General Milne proposes is in effect that this line should either remain as the southern limit of the Greek zone of occupation, or be modified so as to follow the boundary of the Smyrna sanjak from the point where it cuts the boundary of the sanjak, but that in either case the line should remain as the Northern boundary of the Italian occupation, the area between the Venizelos-Tittoni line and the boundary of the Sanjak being occupied by Allied troops.

5. Copies of a sketch map of the area in question showing the boundary of the Sanjak in purple and the Tittoni-Venizelos line in red, are attached hereto.⁷

October 2nd.

Note: Map referred to in Section 5⁷ routed with original papers as follows—S-G; S-D; S-H; I-F.

H. D. 67.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, October 10, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. Drcsel, Colonel Logan, Mr. Shepardson.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, Lt.-Colonel Kisch, Sir George Clerk, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Carr, Capt. Fuller.

France: Marshal Foch, M. Loucheur, M. Tardieu, General Weygand, M. Laroche.

Italy: M. Brambilla, M. Vannutelli-Rey.

I.

Admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the International Labour Conference at Washington

[Not printed]¹

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Bulgarian Delegation of the

Request of the Bulgarian Delegation for the Prolongation by Ten Days of the time allowed for the Presentation of its Observations on the Conditions of Peace

7th October requesting an extension of ten days to the time limit for the transmission of the reply to the Conditions of Peace. (See Appendix B.²)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in view of the circumstances he did not feel that the Council could refuse the request of the Bulgarian Delegation.

(It was decided to accede to the request of the Bulgarian

¹ Mr. Polk reported receipt of a note from Baron von Lersner, dated October 4, 1919 (appendix A in original), thanking him on behalf of the German Government for the communication concerning this matter which Mr. Polk had made to the German Delegation in accordance with the Supreme Council's decision of September 18 (see No. 60, note 1). In his note Baron von Lersner proceeded to enquire whether the German delegates to the International Labour Conference would be invited and admitted with rights equal to those of other delegates. Mr. Polk submitted to the Supreme Council a draft reply and asked that, if there were any objections to its contents, they might be brought up at the next meeting (see No. 72, minute 1 and appendix A).

² Not printed. The Bulgarian request was made on grounds of 'difficulties of a technical order, notably in the work of translation and printing' and 'the great distance separating Paris from Sofia'.

Delegation for the prolongation by ten days of the time allowed for the presentation of its observations on the Conditions of Peace.)

3.

*The Question of German
and Austro-Hungarian
Ships in Spanish Ports*

[Not printed]

4. (The Council had before it the draft of a note addressed to the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces *Draft of a reply to the note of the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces* (see Appendix D), prepared by Marshal Foch, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of October 7th, 1919 (H. D. 66³).)

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the draft of the note in question. He added that, in view of the fact that information had just been received to show that German troops were conducting active operations in Latvia, he proposed that a sentence be added to the end of the third paragraph pointing out that information had just been received to show that the German troops had attacked the army of the Letts.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with the terms of the note prepared by Marshal Foch. There was one point, however, which he wished to raise. The German Government would undoubtedly publish the note and cause public opinion in Germany to feel that the Allied and Associated Governments were acting in a brutal manner towards Germany. He considered it of equal importance that the note should be published by the Allied and Associated Governments, and that a paragraph should be inserted to make the reasons clear why these Governments considered the German reply to be unsatisfactory. He proposed that a paragraph in this sense should be inserted after the second paragraph of Marshal Foch's draft. Sir Eyre Crowe then read the draft of the paragraph in question. (See Appendix E.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would have no objection to the insertion of Sir Eyre Crowe's paragraph in the reply to the German Government.

MR. POLK said that he had referred the matter to General Bliss and that he could not express his final opinion at the moment. He would, however, communicate his reply at the first opportunity.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be also necessary to name a General to act as head of the mixed Commission mentioned in the note.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the General could be named after a reply to the note had been received from the German Government.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft note prepared by Marshal Foch relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces with the addition to the text proposed by Marshal Foch, and with the addition of the draft paragraph submitted by Sir Eyre Crowe (see Appendix E);
- (2) to publish the text of the note.⁴)

³ No. 70 (minute 1).

⁴ The text of the note in final form was published in the British press on October 13, 1919.

5. (The Council had before it the draft of a resolution on the subject of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany (see Appendix F) prepared by Marshal Foch in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council of the 7th October, 1919 (H. D. 66⁵).)
- Draft of a resolution respecting Russian Prisoners of war in Germany*

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the draft resolution.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not help but feel that the Council were going back on their previous decision. In the first instance they had decided to wash their hands of the Russian Prisoners in Germany, and they had later decided that an International Commission should be appointed upon which there should be both German and Russian Representatives. If the present draft were accepted, the Council would be going still further, for they would be again assuming responsibility. He pointed out that in the second paragraph of the note there was a clear expression of the acceptance of responsibility and that in the paragraph numbered 1, the Allied and Associated Governments spoke of re-establishing an Inter-Allied Commission for the control of Russian Prisoners. He thought that it was important to avoid the use of the word 're-establishment'. Paragraph No. 2, Section B, spoke of regulating the ways and means for the repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War. This paragraph also was a clear expression of the re-establishment of responsibility, and he considered it necessary that the responsibility of the Allied and Associated Governments should not be re-established in regard to Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he thought it possible that the expressions which had been used in the draft resolution went somewhat too far, but the question was one of the intention of the Allied and Associated Governments. The Russian Political Conference at Paris had been informed by General Denikin that it was necessary to avoid at all costs the repatriation to Bolshevist Russia of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany, who came from those parts of Russia, which were under the control of the Soviet Government. He could not help but feel that the Allied and Associated Governments had an important interest in this matter, and he did not believe that they could wash their hands of the affair and leave the matter entirely to the Germans. He felt that the Council should not be willing to consider themselves bound by the resolution in regard to Russian Prisoners of War which was taken on the 2nd August.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, at the present time, the German Government were not in a position to repatriate the Russian Prisoners of War by way of Poland and the Ukraine.

(It was decided: to request General Weygand and General Sackville-West to modify the draft resolution relative to Russian Prisoners of War in Germany (see Appendix F), taking into consideration the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe.)

6. GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had just received a telegram from General Dupont according to which the situation in the Baltic Provinces⁶ was regarded by the War Office at Berlin as being very grave. General von der Goltz was unable, or rather unwilling, to return. A new Government had been formed at Mitau, at the head of which was Count Pa[h]len.

M. BERTHELOT said that this information was similar to that which he had received, and, according to which, a Russo-German reactionary Government had been established.

7. SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he had little to add to the written report which he had made to the Council. (See Appendix G.) He ventured to express the hope that his report would be kept wholly to the Council as he had expressed a number of opinions. He had endeavoured to ascertain in Roumania the real meaning for the attitude of the Roumanian Government on the Hungarian question, and the result had been to convince him that M. Bratiano had thought that by playing for time the Allied waters would become sufficiently troubled for him to catch many excellent fish. He therefore considered it essential to make the Roumanian Government understand that the Allied and Associated Governments were both absolutely united and absolutely definite in their decisions in regard to Roumania. He considered it advisable to point out to the Roumanian Government that the decisions taken in regard to Roumania, both as regarded the line of the frontier and the principle of the minorities treaty, were definite. He considered that this would put an end to the Roumanian hopes, which were founded on delay in settling with Turkey, arranging the Adriatic question and other difficult points upon which M. Bratiano was counting. In regard to Hungary, he considered that the first step necessary was a provisional recognition of a Hungarian Government which could maintain order, hold elections and negotiate peace. As soon as such a Government existed, the Roumanian troops could be asked to evacuate, and this alone could definitely put an end to the requisitions about which there had been so much discussion. He proposed that the Hungarians should be told the conditions upon which a Hungarian Government would be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. He thought that M. Friedrich should be told what he must do, that his present Government no more corresponded to the views of the Allied and Associated Governments than the Government of Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Friedrich should be invited to broaden the bases of his Government. It was necessary to have some solvent to loosen the crystals concerned in Hungarian affairs. For instance an Allied Commission of a political character, holding direct and locally supreme authority from the Allies, should negotiate with the various Hungarian political parties. He thought that upon such a condition [? commission] Roumania should be represented at least in a consultative character.

⁶ See Vol. III of this series.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Sir George Clerk prepare draft notes to the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments.

MR. POLK asked whether the Supreme Council had received a reply to the message decided upon by the Supreme Council at its meeting of the 22nd August (H. D. 367), instructing the French Minister at Bucharest in the name of the Supreme Council to ask for further information on the intentions of the Roumanian Government with regard to the Banat, and directing him to inform the Roumanian Government that the frontiers laid down by the Council in the Banat and elsewhere were final.

M. BERTHELOT said that no reply had been received from the Roumanian Government.

M. LAROCHE said that, as the first telegram did not appear to have reached its destination, a second telegram in the same sense had been despatched about a month before the present date. The French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of this second telegram and had stated that he had brought it to the attention of the Roumanian Government. Up to the present, however, the Roumanian Government had made no reply.

MR. POLK said that the American Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest had been unable to discover whether the communication in the sense of the telegram in question had been received at the Roumanian Foreign Office. He thought that M. Bratiano appeared convinced that he could improve his position by waiting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said, with reference to Sir George Clerk's first memorandum,⁸ that on the 20th September, M. Bratiano had stated that the Roumanian Government claimed new frontiers.

⁷ No. 40 (minute 5).

⁸ The reference was to a memorandum by Sir G. Clerk dated from Bucharest on September 20, 1919. This memorandum read as follows:

'At an interview which I had with Mr. Bratiano today, His Excellency made to me a statement of his views on the Hungarian situation in the following sense.

'Mr. Bratiano began by saying that he had heard, not from Mr. Misu but indirectly from Paris that my reports to the Supreme Council had been at any rate so far accepted as showing the possibility of an understanding between Roumania and the Allies. He therefore desired to set forth in more precise detail in this question[sic].

'Mr. Bratiano felt that as regards requisitions etc., especially as all requisitions from private individuals had been stopped and as some of the charges made against the Roumanians could be shown to be unfounded, there would be no real difficulty, certainly none in principle, in reaching an agreement satisfactory to both parties.

'The point on which it seemed to Mr. Bratiano that agreement had still to be reached was that of the conditions of, and time for, evacuation by the Roumanian troops.

'The withdrawal should be so carried out as to ensure in the evacuated territory a Government of order in being, so that the work done by the Roumanian army when it demolished bolshevism at Buda-Pesth should not lack permanence.

'The individuals who could form such a Government of order should be supported by the Peace Conference and the Roumanian military authorities in agreement.

'The declaration of the Conference that the choice of these individuals was the exclusive concern of the Hungarian people was a theoretical formula. In practice, the Allies could not remain indifferent to the character of these individuals, as regards either their tendencies in internal politics or their international relations. This was proved by the

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at the present time the Roumanians and the Serbs were in agreement as to the Banat.

M. BERTHELOT added that the question dealt with the evacuation of the

objections of the Conference to the Arch-Duke Joseph and by the presumably certain fact that the Conference would not support partisans of bolshevik ideas.

'Mr. Bratiano thought that the representatives of the Conference and the representative of the Roumanian Government should go into this question at Buda-Pesth and seek in agreement how to enable a Government, which would guarantee the general political interests of the Entente as well as the interests of Roumania, to surmount the difficulties in front of it.

'Roumanian interests could be summed up as follows:—

- (a) Friendly relations with respect to the new Roumanian frontier, as regards which Hungary should renounce all claims.
- (b) The new frontier should leave to Roumania the mouths of the River Marosh, the junction of the Békés Csaba railway, and a zone of territory sufficient to ensure the safety of the railway from Oradea Mare to Szatmár.

'As regards *b*, Mr. Bratiano observed that possession of both banks of the Marosh to its mouth was an economic necessity of the first order for Roumania, since this river, whose whole course otherwise flows in Roumanian territory, is the only navigable waterway that penetrates to the centre of the Kingdom.

'Békés Csaba is the central junction of the railways on which the whole economic life of the Arad region depends. Moreover the majority of the inhabitants are Slovaks, who have on several occasions expressed their desire to remain united to Roumania.

'So far as concerned the zone of territory necessary to secure the safety of the railway from Oradea Mare to Szatmár, the frontier should not come nearer than 20 kilometres to a line on which the life and security of all the Western part of Transylvania depended.

'Mr. Bratiano believed that the Conference only drew the frontier which it selected under fear of the dangers which the trace which he proposed offered from Magyar hostility and opposition, but he had serious reasons to know that assent could be found at Buda-Pesth to the frontier he suggested.

'Hungarian statesmen of every political shade, from the most reactionary to the most extreme left, had made proposals for a special understanding with the Roumanian Government. The latter had refrained from making any engagement outside of an understanding with the Conference, for they considered, as had already been said, that a sound policy could only be carried out in sincere agreement with the Allies.

'Without such agreement, the Roumanian Army could not help to set up a Hungarian Government which, after having been made master of the situation, would not give the guarantees necessary for peace in Central Europe and tranquillity in Roumania.

'Mr. Bratiano hoped that the Allies would recognise the vital interests of Roumania in this matter, and thus enable him, or his successor, to work as he wished to do loyally and wholeheartedly with the Allies. It was his duty to defend what he held to be Roumania's interests to the utmost of his powers, but if he failed then only two policies remained for him. One was to carry on an individual Roumanian policy in Hungary, working separately from the Entente. That he could not, and would not, consent to do, and therefore he would be forced to adopt the only other alternative, namely, to evacuate Hungary forthwith and leave her to settle her own fate. The chaos and disorder which would ensue would at least leave Roumania free from the fear of any attack from Hungary, while the internal condition of Roumania would benefit by the return of much needed labour and the lifting of a heavy financial burden, and Mr. Bratiano would free himself from the charge, now being made against him, of deliberately keeping the army mobilised so that it might not vote at the forthcoming elections.

GEORGE R. CLERK.'

Banat and that both the Roumanian and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments were withdrawing their troops.

MR. POLK asked Sir George Clerk whether he had had a copy of the telegram based upon the resolution of the 22nd of August.

SIR GEORGE CLERK replied that he had not had a copy of this telegram.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that Sir George Clerk and M. Berthelot be directed to draft notes to the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments.

MR. POLK asked for information as to the attitude of the Roumanian Government on the subject of the requisitions which had taken place.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the note to the Hungarian Government should be addressed to M. Friedrich.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that it should.

MR. POLK said that he felt considerable doubt on the subject.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the relations between the Interallied Generals at Budapest and the Roumanian authorities had become very strained, and that for this reason he believed there was a great deal to be said for the appointment of a civil Commission, which should be authorized to speak in the name of the Council.

MR. POLK said that he had grave doubts as to the advisability of recalling the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest. The Mission were in a most unenviable position, and there was no question of the fact that the Roumanian authorities at Budapest had lied to them continually.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with Mr. Polk as to the unenviable position of the Inter-Allied Military Mission. He had not intended to recall that Mission, but considered that to send a Mission of higher rank would have many advantages.

MR. POLK said that he thought this proposal was worthy of serious consideration.

M. BERTHELOT said that it would be necessary to tell M. Friedrich that the Allied and Associated Governments considered that he was acting as a mask for the Archduke Joseph, and that they considered it impossible for him to remain.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought that M. Friedrich might be asked to resign or else to broaden the basis of his Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought it would be preferable to have M. Friedrich retire. The Governments of the States bordering upon Hungary had no confidence in him and he thought that they considered him reactionary and Anti-Semitic and that in occupying his present position it was to act as a mask for the Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Friedrich should consequently retire as the head of the Government, but this did not mean that he should not occupy a position in the Government.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he felt that he ought to point out that in the opinion of the Allied Generals at Budapest, M. Friedrich was the best person.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had no objection to M. Friedrich as a man but considered him, however, merely as a symbol. If the Conference adopted

the course of treating with him, they would give the appearance of treating with the Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Heinrich was a person with whom the Allied and Associated Governments could enter into negotiations. He was undoubtedly a man of the same sort as Friedrich but there was a difference. His Government might be more democratic, and in entering into negotiations with him, the Allied and Associated Governments could not be charged with entering into negotiations with the Archduke as he did not think that M. Heinrich represented the Archduke.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said he agreed but there was a question of form to be considered. He proposed that the Conference inform M. Friedrich that they were not satisfied with the Government as constituted under him. He suggested that M. Friedrich be asked whether he was prepared to broaden the basis of his Government in such a form as to be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. If he were not prepared to do this he should be informed that he must go. It would then be a question of a Government under Heinrich or Peidl.

M. BERTHELOT said that he felt that there was danger in treating with M. Friedrich in any form whatsoever.

MR. POLK said that he was confident that M. Berthelot and Sir George Clerk could prepare a text which would be satisfactory to the Council. He then asked Sir George Clerk where the difficulty in arming the police of Budapest lay.

SIR GEORGE CLERK replied that the Roumanian Government said that if the police at Budapest were armed, there was danger of a White Terror. M. Diamandi had said that at the time when the Roumanians should evacuate Budapest it would be necessary for them to arm the police.

MR. POLK said that he thought they had no intention of arming the police.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that in his opinion the only means of improving the situation lay in appointing a Commission or in despatching a note. He wished to add, confidentially, that M. Friedrich had informed him, but asked him in no event to let the Roumanians become aware of the fact, that if the Roumanians should leave, he had sufficient police and arms. He thought that M. Friedrich undoubtedly had some scheme in view.

MR. POLK said that Colonel Antonesco, a Roumanian officer, who had recently been in Paris, had assured him in a conversation which had taken place a few days before that the police at Budapest would be armed upon the following day. In point of fact nothing had occurred. He thought that it was most important that the blockade preventing the shipment of arms to Hungary should not be removed. He also wished to say that the conduct of the Roumanians in Bessarabia had called forth strong adverse comment. He was informed that the Roumanian authorities were holding elections and enforcing conscription. He thought that the action of the Roumanian Government in Bessarabia should be considered by the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed and that the matter should be discussed at the next meeting.

8. (The Council had before it a memorandum of 23rd September prepared by the American Representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.⁹)

Proposal of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission for the despatch of a Sub-Committee to determine the reparation value of material removed from Hungary by the Roumanians

M. LOUCHEUR said that the American Delegation proposed that a sub-committee be sent to Budapest to ascertain what material had been requisitioned and what could be placed to the account of the Allies. Sir George Clerk was informed in regard to the matter, and, in his report, he had expressed the opinion that it would be inadvisable to put the Roumanians before a tribunal. If this were done Roumanian opinion would be unnecessarily offended and it was important to treat the Roumanians as Allies. He proposed that the Roumanians should be admitted to representation on the sub-committee in a deliberative capacity. He added that in taking this action the Allied and Associated Governments would only be giving to Roumania what was due her, because, according to the regulations of the Treaty of Peace in regard to the Reparations Commission, the Allied States interested, and Roumania was one, were to be admitted to the meetings of the Reparations Commission in the discussion of the questions affecting them. The sub-committee could also study the food question in Hungary, but the immediate question before the Council was that of appointing a sub-committee with a Roumanian member.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he would suggest that the sub-committee be placed under the orders of the Reparations Commission rather than of the Allied Generals at Budapest.

MR. POLK said that he agreed. He wished to submit an amended proposal which he thought would meet the objections which had been raised. (See Appendix I.)

M. LOUCHEUR said that he agreed in principal [*sic*] to the proposed resolution submitted by Mr. Polk, but desired time to examine it carefully.

(It was decided:

- (1) to send to Budapest a Sub-Committee to determine the reparation value of material removed from Hungary by the Roumanians;
- (2) that this Sub-Committee should be composed of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers and to which should be added a Roumanian Representative, who should sit in a deliberative capacity;
- (3) that the Sub-Committee should be under the orders of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.)

(It was further decided:

to refer to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission the proposed resolution (see Appendix I), relative to the constitution and functions of the Sub-Committee, submitted by Mr. Polk.)

⁹ This memorandum, annexed in the original as appendix H, is not here printed. It is printed by F. Deák, op. cit., pp. 499-502.

9. MARSHAL FOCH said that it was of urgent importance to decide as to the composition of the Armies of Occupation, which should be furnished by the Allied and Associated Governments in the plebiscite and other areas.

*Composition of
Interallied Forces
of Occupation*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had just sent Sir Eyre Crowe a communication in regard to the matter.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,
October 10, 1919.*

APPENDIX D TO NO. 71

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

G.H.Q. October 7, 1919.

General Staff

G-3

*Draft of a Note to be sent to the German Government regarding the evacuation
of the Baltic Countries*

The Allied and Associated Governments note the formally expressed pretensions of the German Government, in its note of October 3, to undertake and to pursue in the most energetic manner, the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic regions and Lithuania.

They also consider as opportune the measures decided upon by the German Government for that purpose.

However, they call attention to the fact that those measures will have value and be efficacious only if they are fully and strictly executed by the German troops. Experience proves indeed that certain agreements already made have not been respected—notably on the subject of stopping reinforcements for the East.

The Allied and Associated Governments could not therefore admit that the German Government can be considered as having done all that was in its power to fulfil its obligations of evacuation.

As a consequence, they maintain the principle of the full responsibility of that Government in the execution of the evacuation, and they mean to maintain integrally the coercive measures announced by their telegram of September 27th, as long as the evacuation has not been undertaken and pursued with all the desirable celerity.

However, for the purpose of encouraging the execution of that operation and lending assistance to the German Government, the Allied and Associated Governments accept to send Allied representatives whose mission should consist:

in receiving from the German Government information regarding the measures decided upon by it, in view to regulating the conditions of the evacuation, as well as in proposing measures which they themselves may deem advisable;

in exercising on the spot and, with all freedom of action, the effective control of the execution of said measures.

The Chairmanship of the Allied Commission should be in the hands of a superior officer appointed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Only when that superior officer has informed the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments that the operations of evacuation are progressing normally, can the stopping of the measures provided for by the telegram of September 27th be considered.

The German Government is asked to kindly send its answer as soon as possible.

APPENDIX E TO NO. 71

But when the German government contends that the action they have taken must absolve them from the charge of having neglected to fulfil their honourable obligations under the armistice, it is necessary to point out that the orders of the German government have, notwithstanding the repeated demands and remonstrances on the part of the Allied and Associated governments, been so long delayed that the German government now claim to be practically powerless to enforce them. It is difficult not to believe that their long delay has been deliberate, calculated as it was to lead to the very results which the German government now affect to deplore. It seems indeed impossible otherwise to explain their refusal to recall General von der Goltz who has been their official instrument in creating the present situation in open defiance of the legitimate representations of the Allied and Associated governments. Why was the General's recall thrice demanded, refused? Why was he, after being summoned to Berlin only recently, sent back deliberately to the scene of his activities except to complete under the authority of his official command the organization which now affords to the German government the pretext that the troops hitherto paid, clothed, and transported by them have passed out of their control? Has General von der Goltz acted contrary to their instructions? If so, why has not his insubordination been punished either by formal dismissal or in any other way?

Unless some very much more satisfactory explanations of these matters than those hitherto afforded are given by the German Government the Allied and Associated governments cannot admit the contention that the German government have, as they assert, continually made the most energetic efforts to withdraw the German troops from the Baltic states.

APPENDIX F TO NO. 71

Draft of a Resolution on the subject of the Russian Prisoners of War in Germany

By its resolution of August 2nd, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments has charged again the German Government with the supplying and the upkeep of the Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany, and accorded to that Government full liberty of action regarding the ways and means of repatriating those prisoners.

The application of those provisions, creating certain difficulties of such a nature as to aggravate the material and moral situation of the interned Russian prisoners of war, the Allied and Associated Governments, in a spirit of humanity, have decided to adopt all measures guaranteeing to those prisoners decent conditions of life, and to pursue their repatriation within the limit compatible with the internal situation of Russia.

For that purpose, and taking into account the request expressed by the German Government itself, it has been decided:

1st: The interallied Commission for the control of the Russian prisoners of war, created in execution of the Armistice of January 16, 1919, shall be reestablished and transformed into an International Commission by the adjunction of a German representative and a Russian representative.

2nd: That International Commission, operating in Berlin under the Chairmanship of one of the Allied representatives, shall have as mission:

(a) to control the material situation of the interned Russian prisoners of war (food, clothing, hygienic conditions of installation, sanitary treatment);

(b) to regulate, in accord with the German Government, and taking into account the instructions of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the ways and means for the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war.

(c) to send to the Supreme Council all useful proposals concerning the help which might be granted, in case of urgency, to the German Government by the Allied and Associated Governments, (improvement of the material situation of the prisoners, facilities for the transportation for their repatriation), being understood that the cost for the upkeep of the prisoners of war falls entirely upon the German Government, and that the cooperation considered above would have to be reimbursed by Germany.

3rd: a special Interallied Commission, operating in Paris, shall be charged with the final settlement of the questions of a financial nature, of supplies and of transportation which remain unsettled at the time of the dissolution of the Interallied Commission of Control, namely:

Reimbursement for flour to the German Government. Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission (500,000 marks).

Reimbursement to the German Government of its expenditures made for the Kiev refugees.

Utilization of the Russian money which remains in the hands of the German Government (20,000,000 rubles).

That Commission will be qualified to prepare the decision of the Supreme Council regarding those questions and to follow its execution in connection with the Interallied or national organs concerned.

Besides, in the future, it shall have to follow, in the same conditions, the proposals which the International Commission might send to the Supreme Council in conformity with the provisions of Par. 2, Alinea c.

APPENDIX G TO No. 71

Document 1

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS.

October 7, 1919.

Monsieur Le Président du Conseil,

I have the honour to submit herewith to Your Excellency and the Supreme Council a report of my Mission to Bucharest and Buda Pesth, from September 24th last, when I sent Mr. Leeper back to Paris with M. Bratiano's latest proposals,⁸ to the 4th instant on which day I left Buda Pesth. Attached to my report is a note by Mr. Leeper¹⁰ dealing with the questions of the minorities treaty and the internal political situation in Roumania.

¹⁰ Document 3 in this appendix.

My mission was, strictly speaking, confined to taking the communication of the Supreme Council to M. Bratiano, with such verbal comments as he might seek from me, and, on subsequent instructions, to comparing the evidence as to Roumanian requisitioning collected by the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Buda Pesth with the assurances given to me on this head by the Roumanian Government. I have therefore throughout considered and declared myself as simply a messenger from the Supreme Council, and if my report seems to go beyond the functions of a messenger, it is because I thought it my duty to give the Supreme Council as clear an appreciation as possible of the Roumanian and Hungarian situation, an appreciation derived from conversations with those most qualified to speak in both countries.

In the same spirit, I have ventured to make certain suggestions, not because I consider myself qualified to put them forward, with any authority, but in the hope that, in a very complicated question, they may at least serve to help the Supreme Council to take their decision.

I venture to observe that, if I have in any way succeeded in faithfully representing the Roumanian situation to the Supreme Council, it is mainly, if not entirely, due to the assistance I received from Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, the Secretary of my Mission. His experience of the Roumanian question in all the forms in which it came before the Peace Conference, his great knowledge of Roumanian men and parties, and his objective and impartial insight into their real aims and intentions, were of the highest value. Moreover, Mr. Leeper was able, while in Bucharest, to correct in many quarters misunderstandings and misrepresentations of the attitude of the Allies, and, if Roumania does once more co-operate loyally with the Allied Powers, the credit will be in no small measure due to him.

In conclusion, I should add that the Roumanian Government welcomed and assisted my mission in every way possible. They showed the greatest readiness to help, and they manifestly desired to express their sincere wish to re-establish complete friendship and understanding with the Allies.

I have the honour, etc.,

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Document 2

Report¹¹

The Supreme Council is already aware of the situation in Roumania up to September 24th last, on which date I sent Mr. Leeper to Paris with M. Bratiano's detailed views,⁸ and it is perhaps unnecessary to recapitulate anything before that date.

But in order to give a clear appreciation of the Hungarian situation I must travel somewhat outside the actual object of my mission, as political developments in Roumania interact closely upon her attitude in Buda-Pesth.

When Mr. Leeper left, a pro-Bratiano Government had been formed under M. Manolescu but it collapsed that same day owing to the sudden refusal of the Transylvanian Ministers to participate. Bucharest is a small place, and in view of the general political excitement, which made it impossible for me to greet a Roumanian statesman without immediate rumours that the Supreme Council

¹¹ This report is printed by F. Deák, op. cit., pp. 503-12.

were supporting his party, I judged it best to withdraw to the country while waiting for the instructions which were to be sent to me after the meeting of the Council on September 25th.¹²

On September 28th I received the telegram instructing me to proceed to Buda-Pesth,¹² and I arranged to leave next morning. Meanwhile, after the collapse of the Manolescu Government, the King sent for M. Take Ionescu, who also spoke for General Avărescu and M. Maniu, and agreed to their forming a joint Government, whose foreign policy was to be based on complete understanding with the Allies, including, in M. Take Ionescu's intention, acceptance of the Minorities Treaty, but with, if possible, modifications of some of the most obnoxious clauses. The same afternoon M. Bratiano had a long interview with the King, with the result that His Majesty suddenly formed a Government of six Generals on the active list, under General Vaitoianu with M. Misu as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This Government took office next day, and was in being on my return to Bucharest. The King was under the impression that he has happily solved his difficulties by creating a neutral non-political Government that could hold the elections with complete freedom and impartiality, but in fact it is only a form of a Bratiano Government, for the President of the Council, who was Minister of War under M. Brati[a]no, is bound by many ties to M. Constantinescu, who is the political shadow of M. Bratiano.

Before leaving for Buda Pesth on September 29th, I saw M. Bratiano and General Vaitoianu. Both assured me, as the King had repeatedly done, the [?] that Roumania intended to stay in the Alliance and to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Entente. The difficult point was the Minorities Treaty, to yield on which was impossible for Roumanian honour and independence, but the intention was to keep this burning question floating until the Roumanian people had pronounced upon it at a free election. I wondered what would happen if the Allies, who were perhaps less interested in the skilful moves of M. Bratiano's internal policy, could not keep their decision waiting for the Roumanian elections, which have, I think, been successively postponed since last January, and should demand a definite answer from Roumania in the near future. Neither M. Bratiano nor General Vaitoianu—who told me he absolutely accepted M. Bratiano's foreign policy—could answer more than that a very serious situation would arise. On the other hand, both gave me the most satisfactory assurances as regards Hungary. All requisitions, beyond those of railway and war material, and food supplies for the army of occupation, had been stopped, and the Roumanian Government were most anxious, in their own interests to establish good relations with Hungary. It was only a question of finding a Hungarian Government with which both the Allies and Roumania could work in accord.

I left Bucharest on the morning of Monday, September 29th but only arrived at Buda Pesth on Wednesday morning, October 1st. I could not see the Allied Generals until the afternoon, so I visited M. Diamandy, the Roumanian High Commissioner, first. He repeated what M. Bratiano had said about the stopping of requisitions, and maintained that care had been exercised to leave the agricultural population supplies sufficient for their needs, and gave me the attached report on the supplying of Buda Pesth,¹³ to show what had been done for the inhabitants of the city. As regards the breaking up and removal of machinery, with the consequent loss of work and danger of disorder, he maintained that Roumania was justified in protecting herself against her enemy being able to

¹² Cf. No. 64, minute 6.

¹³ Document 5 in this appendix.

manufacture masses of war material, and inevitably the Roumanian action was on a large scale, since practically every Hungarian factory turned out war material.

With respect to his relations with the Hungarian Government, he said that M. Friedrich would neither resign himself, nor accept colleagues in his Ministry from other political parties, so that a coalition Government, which alone gave the guarantee necessary for a free electoral choice of the Hungarian people, did not exist. M. Friedrich was, after all, the man who called the Archduke Joseph to take charge of the Government, and stood for a reactionary and anti-Roumanian policy. M. Diamandy had been much impressed, during a recent visit to Vienna, by the anxiety with which M. Renner and the Austrian Government were watching developments in Hungary. They, and to some extent he too, professedly dread reaction and a White terror.

Lastly, M. Diamandy complained that he got but little help or support from the inter-allied Mission, though he recognised that this was largely due to the fact that they were soldiers, rigidly bound by, and adhering to, certain definitely limited instructions. He could therefore never get from them any wider political consideration, but he felt that while he, whatever differences there might be amongst ourselves, always tried to maintain outwardly the solidarity of the Allies, the Generals tended to look on themselves as the protectors of the Hungarians against the Roumanian oppressor—an attitude of which the Hungarian was not slow to avail himself.

Subsequently I attended a meeting of the Commission of the four (4) Allied Generals, of which a procès-verbal is attached.¹⁴ Their instructions from the Supreme Council were:—¹⁵

1. to see that the conditions of the November armistice were properly carried out;
2. to protect such Hungarian property as would form the common reparation stock of the Allies and to prevent it from being taken out of the country;
3. to organize a Hungarian police and gendarmerie.

To these instructions they have rigidly adhered, but say that they have found nothing but obstruction from the Roumanians. They cannot get Roumanian officers detailed to help them in checking requisitions, they get promises, but nothing else, of rifles wherewith to organize the police, and they live in a cloud of polite lies. In view of the Roumanian attitude, it has been impossible for them to carry out their instructions, and their position in Buda Pesth is helpless until there is either an Allied dictator, with force at his back which the Roumanians must respect, or the Roumanians evacuate. The first solution being improbable, the Generals strongly advocate immediate evacuation, the more so as they are confident that, whatever might have been the case 3 or 4 weeks ago, M. Friedrich could now keep order from the moment the Roumanians leave. But they urge strongly that they should have authority from the Conference to give the amount of support, which provisional recognition by the Conference would confer, to such a Government, as they, with their experience of the situation, consider adequate for a temporary administration and for preparing the elections. Such recognition would both oblige the Roumanians to loosen the bands with which they have tied the Hungarian Government hand and foot, and would enable that Government to exercise real authority and so escape having to improvise it at the last moment.

As regards the question of requisitions, the Generals consider that the Roumanians, who were at first gratefully welcomed by the Hungarian people as their

¹⁴ Document 4 in this appendix.

¹⁵ Cf. No. 28, appendix B.

saviours from the Bolsheviks, have seriously if not irretrievably, spoilt their position by the persistence, extent and stupidity of their requisitioning, and they have further lost Hungarian sympathy by the way in which they have blocked all attempts of the Hungarian Government to administer the country.

The inter-Allied Mission has accumulated a mass of evidence which it is quite impossible to ignore on the subject of requisitions. I annex to this report some of the instances which the Mission have given to me.¹⁶ It is believed to be true that the Roumanian Government have given official orders to stop all requisitioning of private property and is requisitioning only railway material, war material, and food-stuffs necessary for the army of occupation. Indeed, the Roumanians are actually by way of sending back into Hungary, locomotives in excess of the thousand they have already taken. Now while the Roumanian idea of 'war material' is very large, if these orders were rigorously applied, the Hungarians would at least know where they stand and could make a beginning of a fresh industrial and agricultural life. But the facts carefully compiled by the inter-Allied Mission leave little doubt that in practice requisitioning of all sorts is continued. Cases brought to the notice of the Roumanian authorities such as M. Diamandy, the High Commander [? Commissioner] or General Mardaescu, the Commander-in-Chief, are indeed dealt with at once by them and an order is immediately issued for investigation, reparation, and, if necessary, punishment. But the experience of the Allied Mission is that, with the writing of the order, the matter ends and the members of the Mission have neither time nor personnel to drive the Roumanians into full investigation of the large number of cases that are reported daily. In fact, the Roumanian, who is after all a Balkan and therefore an Oriental, and who has been pillaged and looted by the enemy and by his Russian ally, sees here, in the occupation of Hungary, an opportunity which he will consider himself a lunatic to forego. From the private soldier who 'requisitions' the umbrella of a passenger leaving the station, to the officer who 'requisitions' a motor car or a carpet to be sold for cash to a Jew and re-sold by the latter at a higher price to its original owner, they intend to leave this country with their pockets full. The Roumanian Government, and those responsible for the conduct of its affairs, do realize that Hungary, stripped bare of all necessities of life, is entirely contrary to the interests of Roumania, and are possibly sincere in their intention to take, with a little interest, only what they consider to be their lawful property, stolen from them, and to limit their requisitions to the quantities they have laid down. But unfortunately they have neither the authority nor the energy to suppress with a rigorous hand the mis-doings of their subordinates.

While it is hard to believe that the Roumanians can really have stripped the country to the extent presumed in the Memorandum of September 23rd, 1919, by the American Representatives on the Organisation Committee of the Reparation Commission⁹—after all, the Hungarian peasant is as good as others in hiding his possession from the looter, and the Roumanian has many more accomplished rivals in the art of looting—there is no shadow of doubt that the common property of the Allies has been diminished by Roumanian action, and that owing largely to that action, the Allies have the additional burden of helping Hungary to regain her economic existence.

I also had an interview with M. Friedrich, the head of the Hungarian Government. He is a young man, the son, I believe, of a small doctor, and not, I should say, a man of big political imagination. But he has shown strength and courage

¹⁶ Not annexed to original of this appendix.

in holding on to an office which is neither lucrative nor comfortable, and he has by now probably more or less established himself in the opinion of a great mass of Hungarians. He is frankly against a coalition government, which in reality, according to him, really means giving a wholly disproportionate representation to the 8 or 10 per cent. of Socialists among the workers of Buda Pesth. He admits that his strength does not lie in Buda Pesth, but claims that the country outside is wholly with him. In fact one reason why he has not resigned, in face of the impossible position in which he is kept by the Roumanians, is that, were he to do so, the peasants would see in it a Jewish manoeuvre and would start local retaliation, with fatal results. He is frankly anti-Roumanian: in fact, he is—like the leaders in all these countries in regard to their neighbours—pessimistic about the stability of all the new and aggrandized States of Southern and Central Europe, except Hungary, whose geographical position, command of the Danube, and industrial population ensure her recovery and eventual prosperity. But to recover, Hungary needs help, and M. Friedrich looks to the Western Powers to provide it. Hungary entered the war, not because she liked it nor for gain, but because in honour bound to Austria and Germany. She has lost and must pay the price, but now asks for help to win back her rightful place among the nations of Europe. For the moment, M. Friedrich does not ask the Supreme Council to grant him provisional recognition, for fear they should refuse, and thereby undermine such moral authority as he possesses. But he does ask that the Council should allow him to hold the elections, under the control and supervision of Allied officials, so that there may be no accusations of pressure or unfairness. The elections will provide a Government which Roumania cannot completely ignore, and will allow Hungary to make a beginning of her new life.

M. Friedrich further assured me that he could maintain order in Buda Pesth when the Roumanians left.

I also received a visit from M. Garami, a leader of the Social Democrat party.

He said that Hungary had two pressing needs; social quiet and order at home, and an early peace with the Allies. M. Friedrich's Government was unable to secure one or the other. It was unrepresentative, for it included neither the commercial nor the industrial nor the working sections of the community. Its strength was among the peasants, and it represented those who belonged to the three 'Christian' parties who were well under 50 per cent. of the population and the majority of the territorial magnates, but it did not even include the small landholders, the strongest peasant organisation in Hungary. It was avowedly royalist, and M. Friedrich was merely keeping a place warm for the Archduke Joseph. Such a Government could not bring social quiet, nor did it correspond to the demand of the Peace Conference for a Government representing *all* parties. But so long as M. Friedrich was there, the way for any other Government was blocked. Therefore M. Friedrich must go.

There were two ways to effect this.

One, by a popular rising in Buda Pesth, but M. Garami, himself an avowed Social Democrat, would deplore this, for it would be a disaster for Hungary and Europe. Who could say where such a rising would end? And what would be the effect on the workers of Western Europe of the Hungarian proletariat, who had rejected Bolshevism, being driven back towards it as the only reply to the reactionary Government by which it was now replaced?

The other way, the only way, was for the Supreme Council to repeat to M. Friedrich the message they had sent to the Archduke. It was no longer possible to be

rigid about nonintervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. The principle had already been broken in the case of the Archduke, and only intervention could save Hungary now.

All classes, if they knew that the Allies' view, as stated to the Archduke, held good for Friedrich, were ready to form a Government answering to those views. But it would want a week or ten days, and, in the absence of any international force, must therefore be done while the Roumanians were still in occupation. Otherwise, Admiral Horthy's force would come, and the incidents of Trans-Danubia would be repeated on a larger scale in Buda Pesth, until the workers, in self-defence, brought out *their* hidden arms, and revolution and anarchy broke loose.

Unless Hungary got a new Government, which the Allies would accept until the elections, or unless an *international* gendarmerie could be created to replace the Roumanians, Hungary was doomed.

M. Garami said that in such a representative Government the workers, about 20 per cent. of the population, would not insist on having their members, and would in no case accept more than two offices, provided always that the basis of the Government was republican and democratic. Moreover, if, when the elections came, and provided they were really free, the result was a majority in favour of a monarchy, the workers would loyally accept the voice of the country, though they would continue to fight the decision with all possible legal and constitutional weapons.

M. Garami's practical proposal was that the 'bourgeois' parties should visit the inter-allied Mission with a list of a coalition Government, corresponding to the demands of the Allies, for immediate communication to Paris. If the Supreme Council assented to the formation of such a provisional Government, it would come into being forthwith, provided the Roumanians were still in occupation to maintain order. The important thing was to obtain as soon as possible from the Allies a clear statement of their intentions and of how they viewed those suggestions. Otherwise, everyone in Hungary was working in the dark.

Before seeking to draw any conclusions from these various expressions of opinion and desire, I venture to submit that the general foreign policy of Roumania is also a factor that must be taken in account.

At present, the policy of M. Bratiano holds the field. That centres on refusal to accept the principle of the Minorities Treaty, and it is there that the Allies will have to apply most pressure. Their weapons are not many, and they cannot afford to dissipate them, and M. Bratiano is possibly counting on this. That is, he means to use his positions in Roumania to the utmost to extort the territorial concessions he has demanded. But if the Allies are firm, it is to be hoped that in his turn M. Bratiano will not carry his bluff so far as to break with the Allies over this Hungarian question. It would not pay him in the end.

The two problems in regard to the Hungarian question that have to be solved are:—

1. To stop the requisitions.
2. To find a Hungarian Government with which the Allies and Roumania can alike deal.

The question of requisitions has again two sides to it:—

- (a) Cession.
- (b) Restoration to the Allies of their common property or its value, and to Hungary of the means to live.

As regards (a), I fear that orders from the Roumanian Government however sincerely meant, will continue to be evaded, and that evacuation is the only real remedy. But it may be expected that the Roumanians, as their time draws to a close, will increase their activities, and it may be possible to put some check on this.

There are only the two roads from Hungary to Roumania over the Szolnok and Csongrad bridges.

At present, a French and Italian officer, with half a dozen men each, are doing most useful work in checking the trains as they go over, but they have no control over the contents of sealed wagons, of which over 6,000 have been sent across. These officers are there with the consent of the Roumanian authorities, and it would seem desirable to extend the system, *in collaboration with the Roumanians*. The officers and personnel should be largely increased and Roumanian officers must work with them. They should have a copy of the way-bill of every train, with full authority to verify the loads, and to open and inspect sealed wagons. This would at least check and put on record the depredations that are being committed; it would facilitate the making up of the bill against the Roumanians; it would be a test of the good faith of the Roumanian Government; and it might even, by exposures and their consequences, deter some of the looters from their proceedings.

It would, of course, be even better if such a commission could unload or detach trucks containing goods that should not have been taken, but I fear that difficulties of storing, and lack of sidings, make this impractical.

I may add that M. Diamandy expressed his personal assent to this suggestion, though he could not commit his Government, but pointed out a practical objection from the delay and blocking that inspection of sealed wagons might cause. It is an objection that would have to be over-ruled.

With respect to (b), the American Representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission have, in a paper dated September 23rd, last,⁹ suggested the establishment of a Special Commission at Buda Pest to make out the bill against Roumania. So far as it goes, the proposal seems to be useful and practical, though more provisions might perhaps have been made for Roumanian collaboration. What the Roumanians feel, and feel very deeply, is that from the outset they have been pre-judged by their Allies as criminals and put into the dock. They ask for collaboration and co-operation, and, instead, are haled before the tribunal for sentence. This does not make them any more ready to sink their own interests in the common stock, and if they were treated more as Allies, who have fought and suffered, and less as criminals, things would probably go far more easily. They feel bitterly such implications as that their action alone has turned Hungary into a burden on the Allies. They ask that allowance should be made for other factors: Bolshevism, moderate harvest, the peasant's general mistrust of the future, the general dislocation of economic life in Europe; all these are factors in the Allies' disappointment at Hungary proving to be not self-supporting, but the whole sin is visited upon Roumania.

In any case, while the American plan provides a means for restoring common property, or its value, to the Allies, it contains no definite scheme for helping the Hungarians, though presumably it is to be inferred that the suggested Commission will study that aspect of the question, and no doubt make Roumania foot the bill. That would provide a solution, but if the Commission is to work under the Allied Generals, it will possibly be looked on by the Roumanians as absolutely anti-Roumanian, and they will continue their Oriental obstruction. The best chance is for an independent Allied and Roumanian Commission.

Even more difficult is the solution of the second problem, the discovery of a possible Hungarian Government.

I have set down, as faithfully and impartially as I can the views of those most qualified to speak. The Generals, disgusted by their experience of the Roumanians, are on the whole for the recognition of M. Friedrich. The Roumanians themselves, and democratic Hungary, look sourly on Friedrich and hold that his recognition in any form by the Supreme Council would be a mortal blow to the moral influence of that body, after their action against the Archduke, for whom Friedrich is but the 'Locum tenens'.

It is for the Supreme Council to decide, and it is only with the greatest deference that I put forward any suggestions.

The first point seems to me to make clearly known to Roumania what the decision of the Supreme Council is in regard to the territorial adjustments asked for by M. Bratiano. Whether these requests be granted in whole or in part or refused altogether, the Roumanian Government should be informed at once, as it will then have no motive to coquet with various Hungarian parties, in the hope of getting the concessions out of them in return for recognition as a Government, and possibly even a separate Alliance.

It is, I think, the hope of finding a more pliant Hungarian administration that is a main cause of the Roumanian objections to Friedrich and one of their principal reasons for not leaving Hungary. If the Roumanians knew that they have nothing to hope for in this respect, they might be more ready to carry out immediate evacuation. The only plea the Roumanian Government could urge for remaining would be the maintenance of order, and that could be met by insisting on the provision of sufficient arms to the Hungarian Police.

The difficulty is, however, to decide what provisional Government is to control that police force, and the choice must precede any steps that may be taken to ensure Roumanian evacuation. Though M. Garami's fears may be exaggerated, there is force in the case he makes against M. Friedrich from the point of view of the Peace Conference. On the other hand, the Generals believe in Friedrich and Horthy, and on the evidence before them have no fear of a white terror or reactionary excesses.

But could not M. Garami's proposal be applied to M. Friedrich first? He is, at present, opposed to widening the basis of his Ministry, but if he realised that only so could he comply with the Allies' conditions and secure recognition, he might accede. Pressure might have to be put on the other parties to come in, but if they are really moved by patriotism, a Coalition Government should not be an impossibility.

If M. Friedrich refuses, then the support of the Supreme Council might, as suggested by M. Garami, be offered to a Coalition Government without him, which would be prepared to meet the Allies' conditions.

There is also another alternative, which it might be worth while to consider. I believe that, technically, the Upper and Lower Houses of the Hungarian Parliament have never been abolished and still have a legal existence. The two Houses (or rather those members whose seats are included within the present frontiers of Hungary) might be summoned for the purpose of adding members from other parties to the Hungarian Ministry and of appointing dates for the elections and for a plebiscite as to the form of government which Hungary is to have. The objections seem to be (a) that such a Parliament has no real relation to the political feeling of Hungary to-day, and (b) that the summons must be through the

Hungarian Government and therefore provisional recognition of M. Friedrich is involved, though it would be confined to this one purpose alone.

None of these solutions may commend themselves to the Supreme Council, and other and better ones may be found, but I venture to submit the urgency of imposing some solution from the outside. On that point all parties are agreed: that Hungary can only be saved, if the Allies intervene and by their recognition of some Government, enable that Government to exert the authority necessary to preserve the country from ruin and anarchy. This is an interest of all Europe.

Document 3

Note by Mr. Leeper

The Minorities Treaty

The burning question in Roumania at the present moment is that of the Minorities Treaty. It is a burning question not because the majority of Roumanians, or even of Roumanian politicians really have any practical objections to the conditions contained in the treaty, but because the Bratiano Government and its agents have misrepresented the issue and so misled and inflamed public opinion that many Roumanians are under the impression that the treaties proposed are quite different from what they really are. After the explanations which we were able to furnish to different Roumanian politicians with whom we talked, many of these misunderstandings were cleared away. The treaties with the different new States themselves have now been published in the Roumanian press, and consequently the atmosphere of ignorance prevailing about them has been to some extent dispelled. Roumanians who have discussed the matter with an open mind are quite willing now to admit the Treaty itself involves no infringement of Roumanian sovereignty or violation of Roumanian interest, and if they still object to certain clauses and articles in the Treaty, fortunately the clauses involved are precisely those which could most easily be altered or omitted without affecting the character and force of the Treaty. It is for consideration whether it would not be good policy if both in any demand addressed to the Roumanian Government relative to the signature of the Treaty, and in any communication made by the Peace Conference thereafter to the Roumanian Government, a cordial invitation were addressed to it to discuss the actual text of the Treaty, provided always that the principle of the Treaty, contained above all in Article 13, was accepted as unconditionally binding.

I went through the text of the Treaty with M. Bratiano, with the Opposition leaders, and with the Transylvanian ministers. M. Bratiano's objections were mostly founded on a curious misunderstanding both of the object and actual text of the Treaty. He particularly protested against the economic clauses to which he ascribed the most sinister intentions but he also found fault with most of the articles of the Treaty except that automatically emancipating the Jews. He refused, in particular, to accept Article XIII, providing for the control of the League of Nations. M. Take Ionescu and General Averescu expressed themselves as perfectly ready to sign the Treaty. M. Take Ionescu declared himself wholeheartedly in favour of the economic clauses, he considered the minority clauses as a whole as the logical consequence of the foundation of the League of Nations and as in themselves in no way prejudicial to Roumanian sovereignty and interests, and objected only to two paragraphs in the preamble and to Articles 10, 11 and 12

which, as I have suggested above, may be quite easily removed from the Treaty without impairing its force. The Transylvanian leaders, M. Maniu and others, were more cautious about the matter and anxious, while not like M. Bratiano refusing absolutely to sign, to obtain a preliminary discussion of the Treaty before accepting the principle.¹⁷ I have every reason to believe, however, from conversations both with them and with others who know them well, that their opposition to acceptance to [? of] the principle is most unlikely to be an obstinate one if the attitude of the Conference towards the discussion of detail is clearly shown to be a friendly and conciliatory one.

It has in our several conversations always been made perfectly clear that there can be no question of a relaxation of the principle of control by the League of Nations in favour of Roumania; that this principle has already been imposed as binding on Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and various enemy countries, and the Transylvanian leaders can have no possible loop-hole of excuse for hoping that more concessions will be given to them than the Conference is likely to give. In any case I feel no doubt at all that the agitation against signature of the Treaty which has been artificially inspired and kept alive would subside at once were the demand made on Roumania publicly presented in a firm but friendly fashion. The urgent necessity for prompt action on this subject can perhaps hardly be over-emphasized.

Document 4

Annex 2 to Sir George Clerk's Report of October 7th, 1919

Translation

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION, BUDAPEST

BUDAPEST, October 1, 1919.

Minutes of the Session of October 1st (afternoon)

Under the Presidency of General Mombelli

1. The Commission assembled at 4.00 p.m. to hear Sir George Clerk who having returned from Bucarest where he had been sent on a mission by the Peace Conference, was in Paris [*sic*].

2. Sir George Clerk exposes to the four Generals the purpose and result of his mission to Bucarest.

3. The purpose may be resumed by the four following questions:

- (a) Has Roumania decided to remain with the Entente?
- (b) Is Roumania ready to cease requisitions in Hungary?
- (c) Will Roumania agree to have an Entente Commission regulate the distribution of the spoils taken from Hungary by the Roumanian troops?
- (d) Has Roumania the intention to cooperate in the establishment of a stable Government in Hungary which would be disposed to enter into friendly relations with the Entente?

¹⁷ Note in original: 'Two days after our conversations with Mr. Maniu an obviously inspired article appeared in the official Transylvanian organ headed "We wish to treat". It obtained considerable prominence in the Roumanian press.'

4. Regarding the first question, Sir George Clerk is convinced that the Crown, the Government, as well as the political circles, are all animated with a desire to have Roumania remain faithful to the Entente.

5. Relative to the requisitions (question *b*) Mr. Bratiano—President of the Roumanian Council—has stated that the requisitions in Hungary would cease immediately, with the exception of those strictly necessary for the needs of the occupation troops.

6. Concerning the third question (*c*) Mr. Bratiano has stated that Roumania agrees that the distribution of the spoils, removed from Hungary by their troops, be settled by an Entente Commission, provided that their rights to the material removed by the enemy during the occupation of Roumania and to the spoils 'captured by the Roumanian Army' be safeguarded.

7. Concerning the last question (*b*)¹⁸ Mr. Bratiano declared that Roumania is ready to give her support for the establishment in Hungary of a Government such as the Entente desires; on condition, however, that certain special rights of Roumania—which she judges of great importance—be protected.

A condition which would lend [? lead] to the establishing and entertaining of friendly relations with Hungary, is that Hungary accept, and that the Entente sanction the frontier boundaries which Roumania esteems as indispensable in the protection of her economic interest and her strategical security.

Roumania requests, consequently, that within her territory be included:

- (a) the mouth of the Maros, the possession of which represents an economic necessity of the first order for Roumania, as the Maros is the only navigable way leading to the centre of Transylvania.
- (b) The Bekescsaba railway system, which is the outlet for the entire Arad region.
- (c) A tract of land to the depth of 20 kilometres to the West of the Oradiamare-Scatmar railway line, in order to ensure the strategic security of the line.

8. Sir George Clerk reads a memorandum which he had sent to the Peace Conference,⁸ and in which the above mentioned questions are exposed in detail.

He afterwards calls attention to a letter which he addressed to Mr. Bratiano, in which—while reserving all decisions regarding the Roumanian provisions for the Supreme Council—the principal objections which the Supreme Council might raise are pointed out, and also the eventuality of a refusal.

9. Sir George Clerk expresses his opinion to the Commission that the Supreme Council will not accept the frontier rectifications proposed by the Roumanians. In this case the relations between Roumania and Hungary might be more difficult, and Sir George Clerk wishes to know if these relations are at the present time friendly or strained.

Following is the reply of the Commission:

The Roumanians, by their requisitions, have compromised the very favourable situation which they had created in Hungary by delivering the country from Bolshevism.

Mr. Diamandy—representing the Roumanian Government at Budapest—many times affirmed the good intentions of Roumania to establish a friendly understanding with Hungary, but this understanding was seriously impeded by the excessive requisitions which developed feelings of bitterness among the Hungarians.

¹⁸ In error for (*d*).

It is said that Hungarian statesmen are now making advances to the Roumanians with a view to establishing an understanding, but the importance of these pour-parlers is not known.

The Commission is unaware, in particular, if the question of frontier rectification was brought up. On this subject Sir George Clerk remarks that it would not be inopportune to inform the Roumanians that any decision relative to the rectification of the frontiers appertains exclusively to the Peace Conference, and that, for this reason, the responsibility for a refusal of the proposals formulated in this matter by Roumania, would in no wise devolve upon the Hungarian Government.

10. Sir George Clerk wishes to know if the Roumanians would be disposed to recognize—in accord with the Entente—the Friedrich Cabinet and to give it their support.

The Commission replies on this subject:

Under the present circumstances the Friedrich Cabinet is as good as any other. It has remained in power for more than one month and has the confidence of the agricultural masses who form the majority of the Hungarian population; it has undergone many alterations as a result of which it today presents a more liberal base. It is, however, but the continuation of a government which, having come into power by a *coup d'état* at the same time as the Archduke, has never given satisfaction to the Entente and which—after the abdication of the Archduke—has remained as an emanation of that source.

Furthermore, this government has evidenced reactionary tendencies, which, although exaggerated by its opponents, might nevertheless be dangerous.

Finally, the Government compromised itself with the Roumanians by clandestine organizations of armed forces which the Roumanian military command at Budapest had strictly forbidden. Consequently, the Roumanians proposed its overthrow to the Entente and, not having obtained the necessary consent, they are trying in every way to impede its action and to perhaps cause its overthrow by its political opponents to whom the Roumanian Government has granted—for the last several days—a liberty of reaction which before had been strictly forbidden them.

At the same time they refuse to support a Government which is not accepted by them and consequently continue in every fashion to hinder the formation of the police at Budapest and the reorganisation of the Hungarian Army, which is absolutely indispensable to ensure order in the country at the time the Roumanian troops shall decide to evacuate.

Under these circumstances the labour of the Commission of Generals becomes daily more difficult and may soon become impossible.

The Commission did not fail to inform the Supreme Council of these circumstances and proposed that it either recognize the Friedrich Cabinet or, if unable to do so, to furnish their precise intentions regarding a new Hungarian Cabinet. But the Supreme Council did not answer.

Therefore, the Commission can only wish for the sending of that answer, confirming that it is indispensable that the formation of a decent Hungarian Government be made in common agreement between the Entente and the Roumanian Government.

11. Sir George Clerk asks the Commission if, in its opinion, the Roumanians would be willing to accept the Friedrich Cabinet in case the latter declares itself ready to follow them in their intentions.

The Commission is not in a position to express an opinion on that subject.

If the Roumanians do not make the Hungarian Government responsible for a refusal on the subject of the delimitation of the future common boundary, an agreement with the Friedrich Cabinet would perhaps be facilitated.

But there would remain the difficulties represented by the presence of one Head and several members of the Cabinet who are personally compromised by their clandestine actions against the prescriptions of the Roumanian Military Command.

It is therefore possible that Mr. Friedrich be accepted for lack of a better person. But even in that case, modifications in the cabinet, with the exclusion of some of the present Ministers is [*sic*] to be foreseen.

12. Sir George Clerk asks if, in case they had a free hand, the Four Generals would be in a position to propose the list of a new cabinet.

The Commission remarks that, according to its instructions, and since it must not intervene in the internal questions of Hungary, it has not until now given its special attention concerning the persons who might form the new cabinet.

Nevertheless, it has already had the opportunity to state to the Supreme Council that a list proposed by Mr. Heinrich would fulfil the conditions of the Entente and that, consequently, in its opinion, the Supreme Council could have given its approval. But the Supreme Council did not answer.

In the present circumstances the Commission thinks that, in agreement with the Roumanians, the composition of a fitting list would not be difficult.

13. Sir George Clerk begs the Commission to kindly deliver to him as soon as possible the minutes of the meeting so that he might draft his telegraphic information to the Supreme Council.

14. The meeting is adjourned at 17.20.

The President for the day,
General Mombelli.

E. MOMBELLI

Document 5

*Annex 3 to Sir George Clerk's Report of October 8 [*sic*], 1919*

Summary Report relative to the Provisioning of the City of Budapest

1. The Roumanian Command has authorized free circulation throughout all Hungary to all agents officially entrusted by the Hungarian Ministry of Supplies. The number of these agents surpasses 1200.

In spite of these authorizations given on August 12th, the trains which run expressly for provisioning, return to Budapest almost empty.

The reason is that the agents of the Hungarian Ministry spend their time in speculating and in frauds instead of in the purchase and transportation of cereals. One proof of this is shown in the falsification of an authorization given, by hundred copies [*sic*], authorizing the carrying of foodstuffs for the Hungarian functionaries of the supply Ministry, and with which the respective agents secured great quantities of foods which they did not share among the famished population, but placed in express hidden warehouses for speculation purposes.

We are annexing¹⁶ a copy of one of these falsified authorizations which are now being examined in the Roumanian military courts, as a proof.

2. All the Roumanian troop Commanders were ordered to permit and facilitate the transportation of cars and carts, as well as boats, which are being sent with foodstuffs to Budapest, and to give them priority over military transports.

3. The supply warehouses captured from the Bolshevik army have all been placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Ministry.

4. From the commencement, approval was given to have all assistance utilized in procuring foodstuffs for Budapest; with the same purpose the Roumanian Command furnished 11 pairs of trains daily, named 'supply trains' which run in all directions and transport foodstuffs into the city.

A *train* schedule, such as is published in all the small stations with an aim to facilitate the task of the supply purchasing agents, is annexed hereto.¹⁶

5. The entire region between Tisza and the Danube has been divided into administrative supply departments, under the direction of the Hungarian Department Préfets, who are directed to furnish general statistics of all the foodstuffs which remain available in their department, aside from the needs of the local population, in order that these foodstuffs may be sent to Budapest under the control of the Roumanian Command.

The Departments are further divided into sub-Departments, then into centres and sub-centres, the country people being obliged to thresh the grain with the aid of Bolshevik prisoners so that the surplus may be sent to Budapest. In this way 10-15 carloads of grain, vegetables, and other foodstuffs were sent to Budapest daily by the Roumanian army.

6. The Roumanian Command has formally prohibited all sorts of food requisitions in Budapest for the needs of the Roumanian army and it has placed the central bakery of the Hungarian army at the disposition of the city in order that bread might be obtained for the population.

7. The 'Haditelmin' supply society belonging to the Hungarian Supply Ministry had hidden the following meats in their local refrigerators:

50,000 kilograms of frozen meat
20,000 ,, of pork and veal
20,000 ,, of salted meat

and 10 carloads of fat which was distributed by the Roumanian Command among the population.

8. 60,000 hogs in the suburbs of Budapest were placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Minister in order that 300 might be killed per day with a view to filling the needs of the population, but the Supply Ministry suspended this measure, although the hogs in question weigh more than 100 kilograms each.

9. 10,000 carloads of potatoes from the region East of Tisza were placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Ministry by the Roumanian Command, but on account of the negligence of the Ministry nothing has been transported up to the present time, although every facility possible has been offered for the execution of this transportation. The Hungarians claim that they have not enough locomotives, but in the organization region of the Hungarian army (Szombathely) there are 500 locomotives and in spite of all the guarantees of the Roumanian Government, stating that these machines will not be requisitioned, the Hungarian authorities refuse to have these locomotives used for the transportation of foodstuffs.

10. Because the Hungarian Supply Ministry agents do not pay the farmers for the grain which they buy, they have commenced to hide all the grain in their possession by burying it or depositing it in places hidden from view.

In order to remedy this inconvenience the Roumanian Command has made arrangements to have the mills do the farmers' grinding on condition that they pay in kind. The wheat which is collected in this fashion, at the mills, is bought by the Roumanian Command and distributed at the same price among the population at Budapest. Furthermore, the Roumanian Command has arranged for the paid requisition of exposed and hidden wheat by Roumanian Delegates to be later sold to the population at Budapest.

11. The Hungarian Supply Ministry forbids the purchase of wheat by individuals and permits these purchases by the local supply society of the Ministry only, but the retail sale of the wheat flour is untrammelled. This society speculates largely as a result of this privilege, in such a way that the flour is sold in retail in numerous stores of the capital at a price of 25 kronen a kgr.

The Roumanian Command intervened to permit the free sale of grain and flour by anyone, which has certainly helped greatly to prevent speculations.

12. In order to assist the population of Budapest the Roumanian Command requested the Government and Roumanian G.H.Q. to sell the surplus grain in Roumania to the Hungarians.

13. The Roumanian Command has authorized, and has given orders to this effect, the Roumanian troops to facilitate by every possible means the transportation of every sort of combustible [? comestible] by railway and in carts. Furthermore, the Roumanian Command has permitted Hungary to export her wine and to receive in exchange any nature of foodstuffs.

14. The Roumanian Command has never refused any request of the Hungarian Supply Ministry. On the contrary, they have tried to facilitate the labours of this Ministry and have given their entire assistance in the provisioning of Budapest. Unfortunately, they are forced to affirm with regret that instead of facilitating the provisioning of the population the Ministry in question tolerated the most flagrant speculation, and that furthermore the excessively precarious situation of the city concerning supplies is the direct result.

15. From the occupation of the city of Budapest by the Roumanian troops, these troops, in their ardent desire to assist the poor population and in order to protect them from certain famine, established 14 canteens for the poor where the children and aged daily receive free nourishment.

The Roumanian Command possess photographs of these canteens taken at the time of the distribution. They also possess a great number of letters of thanks sent by the mayors, city authorities and individuals in Budapest, in which the gratitude of these people is expressed for the large-heartedness of the Roumanians in these days of famine.

16. Furthermore, each troop corps nourishes a great number of poor, especially children, each soldier has from one to three guests daily which he nourishes from his own allowance. The Roumanian Command is in possession of photographs confirming this.

17. The Budapest hospital patients were suffering the blackest misery on account of hunger and want at the time of entry of the Roumanian troops. The Roumanian Command immediately took the necessary measures to abolish this state of affairs. They distributed among the hospitals the foodstuffs captured from the Bolshevik army as well as other supplies brought to the city by the Roumanian troops themselves. A few days after the installation of our troops in Budapest, thanks to the cares [sic] above referred to, the situation of the hospitals has become normal.

18. When the Roumanian Command became definitely convinced of the poor

faith of the Hungarian official supply organizations, they nominated special delegates from the Roumanian army whose mission was to collect foodstuffs, transport and distribute them among the population. Our delegates received precious aid from the English Supply Commission under Colonel Cope.

19. As a result of the lack of foodstuffs in Budapest the Roumanian Command arranged for the reservation of 40 communes, in the surrounding district, for city supplies alone and forbade all army requisitions in the territory of these communes.

20. Despite the repeated and precise orders which the Roumanian Command issued and published, totally forbidding transports from leaving Budapest, persons engaged in contraband with written authorization of the Hungarian Supply Ministry were discovered in the act of clandestinely sending out great quantities of foodstuffs with a view to increasing the heavy task of the Roumanian Command and to favour an extended speculation.

APPENDIX I TO NO. 71

Proposed Resolution

First: That a Special Commission composed of a Delegate from each of the Powers represented on the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, be established at Budapest without delay. The Presidency of this Special Commission should be held at each meeting by each of the Delegates in turn; the Secretary should be permanent. There should be added to this Special Commission for the purpose of consultation following the nature of the subject dealt with, representatives of the neighbouring States who have reparation interests in Hungary, viz:—Roumania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia.

Second: That this Special Commission should proceed without delay in listing all values and property removed from Hungary by any of the Allied and Associated Powers in contravention of the reparation policies laid down in the various Treaties of Peace.

Third: That this Special Commission will establish the values on the lists provided for in the second paragraph and will forward the lists so prepared without delay to the Committee on Organization of the Reparations Commission, so that upon the establishment of the Reparations Commission the values so reported may be appropriately entered on the reparation accounts under the various Treaties of Peace which have or are to be formulated.

Fourth: That this Special Commission is empowered to cancel or propose to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission for cancellation, any charges raised in accordance with the provisions of the second and third paragraphs of this resolution for values and property restored to Hungary up until the time of the closing of this Special Commission's operations.

Fifth: That this Special Commission should investigate and report to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission or the Reparations Commission, the direct or indirect financial effect on Allied and Associated Governments, individually or collectively, by individual acts on the part of any of these Governments who have appropriated values or property in Hungary. In making this report the Special Commission will include their recommendation as to the compensatory adjustment of the various reparation accounts that should be made by the Reparations Commission on this account.

H. D. 68.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, October 11, 1919 at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt.

Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

U.S.A.: Mr. Dresel, Mr. Shepardson, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, Sir George Clerk, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Carr.

France: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, M. Laroche.

Italy: M. Brambilla, M. Vannutelli-Rey.

1. (The Council had before it a draft of a reply to the letter of Baron von Lersner prepared by Mr. Polk.¹ (See Appendix A.))

Admission of German and Austrian Representatives to the International Labour Congress at Washington

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, if he understood Mr. Polk's proposition correctly, it was a question of saying to the Germans that everyone would have full rights at the Conference.

MR. POLK said that this was not what he meant. The proposal, which he submitted for the approval of the Council, stated that the question would be decided by the Congress itself. His letter contained no promise whatever.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council were in agreement in regard to the matter.

(It was decided to accept the draft of a letter prepared by Mr. Polk in reply to the letter of Baron von Lersner of 4th October. (See Appendix A.))

2. (The Council had before it a draft of a telegram for transmission to the French Minister at Bucharest and for communication to the Roumanian Government (see Appendix B), as well as a draft of a telegram to M. Friedrich (see Appendix C.))

Notes to the Roumanian Government and to M. Friedrich

MR. POLK said that he wished to raise a question in regard to the draft telegram to M. Friedrich. He questioned whether it was advisable to send a written communication expressing the views of the Entente. He did not think that the Allied and Associated Governments should dictate to Hungary as to her internal policies. It was true that the Council had taken such action at the time the Archduke Joseph had assumed power, but in that case they were dealing with a Hapsburg. Today the situation was not quite

¹ See No. 71, note 1.

the same; they were dealing with Hungarian political parties. He thought that it would be preferable to send to Budapest a representative who should be charged to communicate with the various parties. He feared that the action proposed would create an unfavourable impression in the United States. He wished to ask whether it would not be possible to send Sir George Clerk to Budapest.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the telegram should be addressed to the Allied Generals at Budapest and that they should be directed to take the necessary action.

MR. POLK pointed out that the Generals would not be in the same position as a special representative. Up to the present time they had played a somewhat different role.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation would be the same whether the communication were in writing or were communicated in person by a special representative; all the world would know of it just the same.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought all the world should know of it. It was important that the note should be published in all the Hungarian newspapers.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that M. Friedrich was the man who had called the Archduke to power. What the Allied and Associated Governments had criticized in his Government was the fact that it was a continuation of the Government of the Archduke. It was that which the Council opposed. There was no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary.

(It was decided: to postpone the discussion of this question until the following Monday.² Mr. Polk reserved the right to propose certain modifications to the draft telegram before the Council.)

MR. POLK said that so far as the note to be transmitted to the Roumanian Government was concerned, he approved of the contents. He wished, however, to make two remarks. He asked what the Council proposed to do in the event of a refusal by the Roumanian Government. It was most important that the Allies should be in entire accord.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the question could not be discussed at the present time, but that he agreed with Mr. Polk that it was necessary for the Allies to stand together. He wished to ask M. Scialoja if he shared this view.

M. SCIALOJA replied that he was in entire agreement.

MR. POLK said that in the first paragraph of the second page of the draft telegram he thought that it would be better to say instead of, 'the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to consent to any change in their original decision' to [*sic*] 'the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to modify in favour of Roumania their original decision'.

M. BERTHELOT asked whether the note to the Roumanian Government should be published.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought it should not be until it had reached its destination.

² October 13, 1919.

MR. POLK asked whether the note should be transmitted to the Roumanian Government by the four Allied Ministers at Bucharest.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was entirely in favour of common action in order that every means should be taken to assure the note reaching its destination.

M. BERTHELOT said that the note could also be transmitted to the Roumanian Delegation at Paris.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft telegram to the French Minister at Bucharest prepared by Sir George Clerk and M. Berthelot (see Appendix B);
- (2) to substitute in the text of the telegram (page 2, paragraph numbered 1) for the words 'unable to consent to any change in their original decision,' the words 'unable to modify in favour of Roumania their original decision';
- (3) that the note of the Supreme Council should be transmitted to the Roumanian Prime Minister by the four Allied Ministers at Bucharest.)

(It was further decided to publish the text of the note after it had been transmitted to the Roumanian Government.)

3. (The Council had before it a note addressed to the President of the Peace Conference by two Bessarabian Delegates. (See Appendix B.³))

*Roumanian action
in Bessarabia*

M. BERTHELOT said the question had been placed on the agenda by the American delegation.

MR. POLK said that M. Misu had informed him on the previous day that the Roumanian Government were about to hold elections in Bessarabia.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Bessarabian question had not yet been settled. He thought that the note of the Bessarabian delegates could be examined at the time that the question of Bessarabia was discussed.

MR. POLK pointed out that the question was somewhat important in view of the fact that according to the information which he had received, the Roumanians were holding elections, applying conscription, and confiscating large properties.

M. LAROCHE said that the Bessarabian question was somewhat peculiar. It was at the request of the Russian General Tcherbatcheff that the Roumanians had been asked, at the beginning of the Russian debacle, to occupy the country. In order to stop the development of Bolshevism, it had appeared to be the simplest method to favour the autonomist element in Bessarabia. Soon afterwards Bessarabia had declared herself independent. Later the National Assembly pronounced itself in favour of a union with Roumania. The Council were now faced with the wish expressed by the population. The Conference had not yet decided the Bessarabian question, but it should take account of all that had occurred, for there was no doubt that 'the journey which M. de Martonne⁴ recently made in Bessarabia had brought new proofs'⁵

³ In error for appendix D, q.v.

⁴ Technical expert on ethnographic questions on the French Delegation to the Peace Conference.

⁵ Inverted commas as in original.

to show that the country was really a Roumanian land. As far as the agrarian question was concerned, the matter was most important. The distribution of landed property was particularly unequal in Bessarabia, and the majority of the population was in favour of a necessary reform. The persons who protested were Russified landowners, whose interests were menaced.

MR. POLK said that he did not intend to ask the Council to take a decision. He had simply wished to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Roumanians were exercising rights of sovereignty in Bessarabia, and that the silence of the Conference in regard to this matter might give the Roumanians grounds for believing that the Council consented to their having assumed this sovereignty. In a conversation which he had had with M. Misu on the preceding day, he had pointed out the possible danger to Roumania, if Roumania tried to make a *fait accompli*. He had asked him what would happen when Russia was reconstituted and when she claimed Bessarabia. Roumania would have to rely upon a position of fact. In order to retain Bessarabia, Roumania depended upon the good will of the League of Nations and of the Conference. Roumania should be discouraged from making any attempt, apart from the decisions of the Conference, to annex Bessarabia definitely. He thought that M. Misu would, in all probability, transmit a communication to the Conference on this subject.

4. (General Weygand presented to the Council the text of the resolution which he had prepared with General Sackville-West in accordance with a resolution taken by the Supreme Council⁶ (see Appendix E).)

*Russian Prisoners of
War in Germany*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he approved of the text as a whole. He desired, however, to point out that in the second paragraph (Section C) the International Commission at Berlin was to be directed to make all necessary proposals to the Supreme Council. On the other hand, it was said that the Special Interallied Commission sitting at Paris should be charged 'with bringing matters to the attention of the Supreme Council'. He thought that it was unnecessary to make the Supreme Council intervene throughout. It would be enough to say that the Commission at Berlin should be charged with making 'all necessary proposals'. The Commission could bring matters to the attention of the Special Commission at Paris and not to the Supreme Council. At the same time, as regarded the Commission at Paris, the text could be modified by saying that the Commission could 'request a decision of the Supreme Council when necessary'. These changes in the text would give the Commission greater freedom of action.

MR. POLK asked how the Council proposed to regulate the question of funds.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, so far as he knew, there was no question but that the German Government would be obliged to furnish the money.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that there were difficulties as regarded the past arising from the time when the Allied and Associated Governments had assumed charge of the prisoners.

⁶ See No. 71, minute 5.

M. SCIALOJA said that he wished to recall that Italy had borne heavy expenses in respect of several thousand Russian Prisoners of War. He wished to ask that this observation be referred for examination to the Financial Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council were in agreement.

MR. POLK said that so far as the financial question was concerned, he was not in a position to make a definite engagement. He did not know whether his Government had funds to pay for the deficit. Only the American Congress could vote new credits and he could not bind his Government.

(It was decided:

- (1) to approve the draft resolution prepared by General Weygand and General Sackville-West on the subject of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany (see Appendix E);
- (2) to substitute for the words, 'd'adresser au Conseil Suprême' paragraph II, Section C, the words, 'de faire' and for the words, 'de préparer la décision', paragraph III, last line the words, 'de provoquer au besoin la décision'.

The American Representative in approving this resolution remarked that so far as a question of a deficit was concerned, he could make no engagement without instructions from his Government.)

5. (The Council had before it a report from the Military, Naval, and Air Representatives at Versailles of the 6th October, 1919. (See Appendix F.))

Interallied Commissions of Control in Austria

In view of the fact that the Supreme War Council were unanimous,

(It was decided: to approve the report presented by the Military, Naval and Air Representatives at Versailles respecting the organization of Commissions of Control for Austria.)

6. (The Council had before it a note transmitted by the Russian Political Conference dated Paris, 6th October, 1919. (See Appendix G.))

Restoration of Russian War Material taken by Germany

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in view of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments were sending war material to Russia, it seemed only logical not to refuse their request for war material which had formerly belonged to them.

M. SCIALOJA thought that a difficulty might arise on account of Article 169 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was not one of German war material which the Allies were to divide, but concerned Russian war material taken by the Germans.

M. BERTHELOT said that according to the article 169 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, German war material was to be delivered to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments to be distributed or destroyed. So far as war material coming from a foreign country was concerned, it was to be

delivered to these Governments, who should decide as to what was to be done with it. The Russians asked that the war material should not be destroyed, but given to them.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Commissions of Control could be directed to settle this question.

(It was decided that the Interallied Commissions of Control created by articles 203 to 210 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany should direct, if they found it possible, that Russian arms, munitions and war material retained by Germany should be delivered to the Russian Armies recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments.)

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Italian Delegation of the 8th October, 1919. (See appendix H.7))

Insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of an article identical with article 36 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria

M. SCIALOJA read and commented upon the note from the Italian Delegation.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether Hungary was to cede territory to Italy.

M. SCIALOJA replied that this was not the case, but Hungary had had certain claims to Austrian territory. His proposal was intended to regulate the situation of Hungarian citizens residing in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ceded to Italy, in the same manner as the situation of Austrian citizens residing in these territories had been regulated. So far as cessations [*sic*] of territory were concerned, the only question at the moment between Italy and Hungary was the cession of the Palais de Venise at Rome. The question could be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(It was decided to refer to the Drafting Committee for report the note from the Italian Delegation, asking for the insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of articles equivalent to articles 36 to 45 of the Treaty of St. Germain. The Drafting Committee was to be directed to submit to the Supreme Council a draft article in this sense.)

8. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation of the 9th October, 1919. (See Appendix I.))

Disposal of Western Galicia

M. LAROCHE said that the question raised here was one of secondary importance, which had been asked by the Legal

⁷ Not printed. The note (dated October 6 in the appendix) was as indicated in the minute of this item. The note drew attention to the consideration 'that from an international point of view the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom constituted a single power' and proposed the insertion in the treaty of peace with Hungary of the following provision:

'Hungary renounces, in all that concerns her, in favour of Italy, all rights and titles over territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy recognized as being part of Italy by the Peace Treaty concluded on September 10, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria or by any other Treaties concluded with a view to regulating the present affairs.

'Are applicable, in their relations with Hungary and with Hungarian nationals, the provisions of Section I of Part III of the said Treaty of September 10, 1919, in so far as they may interest her.'

Advisers, who had pointed out that no arrangement had been made as to the disposal of Western Galicia. The question could be settled at the same time as that of Eastern Galicia. The best method would be to refer the question to the Commission on Polish Affairs.

(It was decided to refer to the Commission on Polish Affairs for examination and report the note from the French Delegation of the 9th October, 1919 concerning the attribution to Poland of Western Galicia (see appendix I).)

9.

[Not printed]⁸

Allowances to the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany

10. MR. POLK said that M. Misu had informed him on the preceding day that, at the request of the British and French Governments, the Roumanian Government had despatched large quantities of Russian war material, which were in Roumania, to General Denikin.

Question raised by Mr. Polk in regard to alleged delivery of war material by the Roumanian Government to General Denikin

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was without information as to any such action on the part of the British Government, but he would inquire of his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch should be consulted.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Bratiano had always refused to give arms to General Denikin, because he (M. Bratiano) was supporting the Ukrainians. It was, therefore, possible that several months before and through the intermediary of the French Military Mission in Roumania, a small part of the Russian war material deposited in Roumania, amounting to about 60,000 rifles, had been sent to Russia. But since that time no action of this kind had been taken, as M. Bratiano had refused to make any deliveries whatsoever.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians had informed him that the British and French had asked them to send 60,000 rifles to General Denikin, but they had said quite the opposite to the American Minister at Bucharest, who was in Paris at the present. He had raised the question simply to ascertain what had actually happened.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,
October 11, 1919.*

⁸ Mr. Polk withdrew a reservation on this subject which he had made on October 7, observing 'that the United States had no Representatives on the Commissions of Control, and, for this reason, he was not voting'.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 72

Draft

Sir:

I am directed by the Supreme Council to reply to your letter of October 4, concerning the membership of the Labour Conference which will shortly be held in Washington at the invitation of the Government of the United States.

Owing to the urgency and importance of the questions to be considered by the Conference, the Supreme Council is of the opinion that the States named in the annex to the Covenant of the League of Nations, whether signatories of the Treaty of Peace or neutral states, should be privileged to participate in the first meeting of the Conference from the outset, in spite of the fact that the League of Nations has technically not yet come into being. By direction of the Council, I am communicating this interpretation to my Government for its guidance.

At the same time, the Council is making a recommendation to the Organizing Committee of the Labour Conference (within whose competence the matter lies) that the question of the admission of German and Austrian delegates to full participation in the Conference shall be considered by the Conference as the first item on its Agenda.

Please accept, etc.

APPENDIX B TO NO. 72

Telegram to British Chargé d'Affaires, Bucharest.

October 11th, 1919.

The Supreme Council to-day decided on following joint communication to Roumanian Government. You should concert with your colleagues in presentation to Roumanian Government, whether as identic or collective note.

Text follows:—⁹

'Supreme Council have received with great satisfaction the assurances of the Roumanian Government, reported by Sir George Clerk, that they have always intended, and still intend, to adhere firmly to the Alliance. The Supreme Council never doubted that such was the real wish of Roumania, and they are happy to think that the Mission of Sir George Clerk has only served to confirm the conviction they already held.

The Supreme Council feel however that recent events have once more demonstrated the necessity of avoiding, so far as possible, all ground for misunderstanding. Such has been the experience of all the Allies during the war, and perfect frankness on even the most difficult and delicate points of difference such as are bound to arise in the complicated relations and conflicting interests of a group of Allies has proved to be the only way to secure harmonious and successful progress.

The Supreme Council therefore desire to put before their Roumanian Allies their decisions on the three questions which form the principal subjects of divergence between Roumania and the Allies to-day. These decisions will be expressed quite definitely and frankly, but the Supreme Council trust that the Roumanian Government will realise that they have been taken, not with any desire to foster other interests at the expense of Roumania nor without the most sympathetic

⁹ The following communication is printed by F. Deák, op. cit., pp. 517-20.

consideration of the Roumanian case, but because the Supreme Council firmly believe that they correspond most nearly to the general interests of peace and well-being.

The three points may be entitled: 1. Territorial Frontiers. 2. The Minorities Treaty. 3. Hungary.

1. After renewing and [*sic*] careful study of the requests made by Monsieur Bratiano for both banks of the river Marosh up to its mouth, for Bekes-Csaba, and for a frontier line 20 kilometres outside the Szatmar-Arad railway and of the arguments put forward by Monsieur Bratiano in favour of these modifications, the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to modify in favour of Roumania their original decision taken after the closest examination of all the relevant factors and made known as definite to all the parties interested.

2. The Allied Powers represented on the Supreme Council are absolutely united in their determination to uphold the principle underlying the Minorities Treaty. They feel that this principle is one of the vital elements in removing the causes of further wars and they intend to maintain it intact. It underlies the whole spirit which has led the world to accept a system of a society of Nations and it cannot be abandoned. This principle finds its expression, so far as Roumania is concerned, in Article 71¹⁰ of the Treaty with Austria and in Article 13 of the Draft Treaty respecting minorities submitted to the Roumanian Government.

The Supreme Council feel that possibly these two Articles have been misinterpreted in Roumania. In the view of the Supreme Council there is nothing derogatory to the independence of Roumania. She is only asked, in common with other status [states], which like herself have, as the result of the war, profoundly altered the extent and nature of their dominions, to accept such obligations towards the Society of Nations as arise from membership of that body to which she is already pledged.

But as soon as the Supreme Council learn that the Roumanian Government is prepared to sign the Treaty with Austria without reservation, they, for their part, will be happy to consider in common with Roumania, such modifications of those clauses as affect Roumania individually, as apart from the general principle, in order to see whether it is not possible to meet the views of the Roumanian Government. The Supreme Council had the advantage, while the text of the Minorities Treaty with other Powers was being drafted, of the collaboration of representatives of other Powers, to the great advantage of both parties.

Hitherto this collaboration has been denied to them by the Roumanian Government, but the Supreme Council hope that if the Roumanian Government will now discuss the clauses with them, an equally satisfactory result may be reached.

Lastly the Supreme Council trust that their Roumanian Allies will announce their decision on this point forthwith. It is essential for the establishment of conditions of peace and for the renewal and restoration of economic life in Europe, that the treaties of peace with the enemy powers and the various agreements and arrangements arising out of those treaties, should be brought into force at once.

3. The Hungarian question has two main issues. The first is the question of requisitions by the Roumanian Army of Occupation. The general view of the Supreme Council with regard to the action of the Roumanian requisitioning for herself, without consultation and agreement with her Allies, supplies of material which should, by the agreement to which Roumania herself is a party, form part of the common reparation stock of the Allies has already been expressed to the

¹⁰ Apparently in error for article 60.

Roumanian Government. The Supreme Council have received and considered the Roumanian point of view as expressed by M. Bratiano, and it seems to them there is now no difference of opinion about the general principle. As regards the application of that principle, the Allies propose the following machinery for deciding what material shall be definitely allocated to Roumania and what part, or its value, assigned to the common stock. They are despatching an Inter-Allied Sub-Commission of the Commission on Reparation to Buda-Pesth with authority from the Supreme Council to investigate and examine all the requisitions that have been made and to report on the distribution to be effected between Roumania and the Allies. The Supreme Council trusts that the Roumanian Government will appoint a representative with full authority to speak for them, to act on this Commission.

There is, however, an aspect of the question, which the Supreme Council feel that they cannot ignore. The Supreme Council recognizes that the Roumanian Government have given orders to confine their requisitions to those of railway materials, materials of war and supplies to the Army of Occupation. Unfortunately, the Supreme Council have in their possession a mass of evidence which leaves no room for doubt that the orders of the Roumanian Government to this effect are deliberately and continuously disobeyed. They do not question the good faith of the Roumanian Government, but on the other hand, they cannot suffer because the subordinates of that Government do not carry out the orders given to them. The Supreme Council accordingly propose that an Inter-Allied Organization, including Roumanian officials, should be established at once at the bridges of Szolnok and Czongrad to check and verify the way-bills of all trains passing over those two bridges into Roumania. This organization should have full powers to open sealed wagons and to remove all goods that have been improperly despatched to Roumania. At the same time, the Sub-Commission of the Commission on Reparation will have authority to receive all complaints already filed by the Inter-Allied Commission of Generals, or that may subsequently be made as to improper requisitions, and the Supreme Council has no doubt that the Roumanian Government will, in such cases as are definitely established, be prepared to make full reparation.

The other important point in the Hungarian situation is the establishment of a Hungarian Government which can maintain law and order, can hold the elections freely and impartially, and can negotiate peace with the Allies. The Government, of which M. Friedrich, as the titular Minister President of Hungary, is the head, does not, in the opinion of the Supreme Council, fulfil the conditions necessary to ensure these requirements. The Supreme Council consider that M. Friedrich should include in his Government representatives of the various political parties in Hungary, and should he be unwilling or unable to do so, the Hungarian people must realize that the Allies can only recognize and deal with a Government which fulfills these conditions. The Supreme Council are confident that this is also the view of their Roumanian Allies, since it appears that to them that what they desire is as much in the interests of Roumania as of the Allies generally.

Finally, the Supreme Council would be glad to receive assurances that the rifles for the Hungarian police and gendarmerie already promised by the Roumanian authorities in B. P. to the Mission of Allied Generals, will be immediately delivered and that the Roumanian forces will at once evacuate the country. They know that Roumania herself wishes to be relieved of this heavy charge upon her resources,

and they consider that the burden which it also lays upon the impoverished State of Hungary should, in the interests of the Allies generally, be lifted as soon as possible.'

APPENDIX C TO No. 72

Draft Telegram to Monsieur Friedrich, Budapest, by Wireless

October 1919.

On August 18th last the Allied and Associated Powers informed the Archduke Joseph, through the Mission of Inter-Allied Generals at Buda-Pest, that they could not recognise nor make terms of peace with a Government which did not represent the country.¹¹ On receipt of this intimation the Archduke Joseph resigned his position as head of the Hungarian State. But the Government which represented him and his views remained in Office. The Allies have waited in the hope that that Government, recognising its inability to meet the conditions required by the Allied and Associated Powers, would either arrange itself so as to include representatives of all parties in Hungary, or would withdraw from Office and leave the way open for a Government more in consonance with the requirements of the Allied and Associated Powers.

As there are no signs of such action on your part and as it is vital to the existence of Hungary that she should as soon as possible, have a Government capable, in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers, of maintaining law and order, of holding free and impartial elections within the territorial limits assigned to Hungary by the Peace Conference, and of concluding peace with the Allies, the Allied and Associated Powers are constrained to invite you either to combine with all the other parties in Hungary to form a representative Government, whose constitution will be a guarantee of its ability to satisfy the conditions of the Allied and Associated Powers or to withdraw from Office and to allow some other statesmen to undertake the task.

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to receive your reply within 3 days.

APPENDIX D TO No. 72

Document 1

September 26th, 1919.

From: The Delegates of Bessarabia.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

In the official statement of the organ of the Roumanian Government in Bessarabia, the 'Cassa Nostra', published in the newspapers of Kishinef of August 10, 1919, the Bessarabian land proprietors are informed that a time limit of one month has been fixed to obtain their subjection to Roumania, as well as to name chargés d'affaires to replace them to assist in the work of the Commission on the expropriation of their lands.

The Bessarabian Delegation has already once before protested on this subject before the Peace Conference on April 15, 1919.

¹¹ See No. 36, appendix C.

The Russian Political Conference addressed on April 20, 1919, a memorandum on this subject to the Peace Conference.

At the present moment we are forced to make another plea to the Peace Conference in the hope of obtaining its support in the just cause which we are defending.

It is to be observed that the official statement, a translation of which is attached,¹² clearly indicates that those proprietors who accept Roumanian subjection [*sic*] will be treated differently from those who refuse. The difference will evidently be in favour of those proprietors who bow to the desires of the Roumanian Government.

Speaking in the name of all our mandatories, we consider the exactions of the Roumanian Government as tending to force the proprietors in Bessarabia to swear oath of allegiance to the King of Roumania, as an act profoundly unjust and outraging their dignity of citizens of a country which does not form part of the Kingdom of Roumania. It is also an outrage to international law as well as to the respect due to the decisions of the Peace Conference which has not accorded to Roumania the possession of this Russian province.

The regime established by the Roumanian Government in Bessarabia is truly intolerable for the population, and if the Peace Conference does not raise its voice against the Roumanian abuses of power in the name of justice and with the authority that it alone possesses, bloody uprisings in the Bessarabian population will be inevitable.

In defiance of all justice and rights of peoples, the Roumanian Government forces all the population, under the penalty of heavy fines, to take part in the parliamentary elections of Roumania, that is to say of a country which, until today, was foreign to her.

Through you, M. President, we ask the Peace Conference to condemn the illegal and unjust acts of the Roumanian Government and to declare them as such before the civilized world.

Delegates of Bessarabia

ALEXANDRE N. KRONPENSKY

ALEXANDRE CH. SCHMIDT.

Document 2

Journal 'Bessarabia'

August 10, 1919.

The 'Cassa Nostra' informs the landed proprietors abroad that a time limit of *one month*, dating from the day of the present notice, is accorded them in order to make a request to obtain Roumanian subjection [*sic*] and in order to name *chargés d'affaires* duly qualified to represent them during the course of the work of the Commission on Land expropriation if they cannot come in person.

In case neither the proprietor nor the *chargé d'affaires* is present, the expropriation will take place in their absence.

The present notice shall be the last invitation.

Director (Signed)

Secretary (Signed)

N.B. Without speaking of the juridical nullity of this order, it can have no value, not even formal, for the sending of Bessarabian newspapers abroad is prohibited

¹² Document 2 in this appendix.

and in order that Bessarabians living abroad be informed, it would be necessary that a like notice be printed in all the large foreign newspapers, as the majority of the landed proprietors of Bessarabia were forced to leave their native country and take refuge abroad.

APPENDIX E TO No. 72

Projet de Résolution au sujet des P. G.¹³ Russes d'Allemagne

Par sa résolution du 2 août 1919, le Conseil Suprême des Gouvernements Alliés et Associés a remis à la charge du Gouvernement allemand le ravitaillement et l'entretien des P. G. Russes internés en Allemagne, et a rendu à ce Gouvernement sa liberté d'action en ce qui concerne les modalités de rapatriement de ces prisonniers.

L'application de ces disposition[s] soulevant certaines difficultés de nature à aggraver la situation matérielle et morale des P. G. Russes internés, les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés ont décidé, dans un esprit d'humanité, et tenant compte de la demande formulée par le Gouvernement Allemand lui-même, de prendre les mesures suivantes :

1^o) Une *Commission internationale* sera constituée, comprenant un représentant de chacun des Gouvernements Alliés et Associés intéressés, ainsi qu'un représentant allemand et un représentant russe.

2^o) Cette Commission internationale fonctionnant à Berlin sous la présidence de l'un des représentants Alliés, aura pour mission :

a) de contrôler la situation matérielle des P. G. russes internés (alimentation, habillement, conditions hygiéniques d'installation, traitement sanitaire).

b) d'assister le Gouvernement allemand dans l'exécution du rapatriement des P. G. russes.

c) d'adresser au Conseil Suprême toutes propositions utiles concernant le concours qui pourrait être prêté *en cas de besoin urgent*, au Gouvernement allemand par les Gouvernements alliés et associés (amélioration de la situation matérielle des prisonniers, facilités de transport pour leur rapatriement), étant entendu *que la charge de l'entretien et du transport du rapatriement des P. G. incombe entièrement au Gouvernement allemand, et que le concours envisagé ci-dessus donnerait lieu à remboursement de la part de l'Allemagne.*

3^o) Une Commission *Interalliée spéciale*, fonctionnant à Paris, sera chargée de procéder au règlement définitif des questions d'ordre financier, de ravitaillement et de transport restées en suspens au moment de la dissolution de la Commission interalliée de contrôle savoir :

1^o Remboursement de la farine avancée par le Gouvernement allemand jusqu'au 23 août;

2^o Liquidation du passif de la Commission Interalliée soit 500.000 marks.

3^o Remboursement au Gouvernement allemand des dépenses faites pour les réfugiés de Kiev.

4^o Utilisation de l'argent russe resté entre les mains du Gouvernement allemand (20.000.000 de roubles).

En ce qui concerne les question[s] 1 et 2, qui se rapportent au passif de la Commission de Berlin, la Commission spéciale aura tout pouvoir pour assurer directement et dans le plus bref délai la liquidation de ce passif, par remboursements en

¹³ Abbreviation for *prisonniers de guerre*.

nature ou en espèces, en procédant à cet égard, d'après les règles suivies jusqu'ici en matières d'avances ou de cessions à la Commission de Berlin.

Pour les autres questions (3 & 4), comme pour celles qui pourraient se poser dans l'avenir en conformité des prévisions du paragraphe 2° — alinéa c — la Commission spéciale aura qualité pour préparer la décision du Conseil Suprême et pour en poursuivre l'exécution auprès des organes interalliés ou nationaux intéressés.

APPENDIX F TO No. 72¹⁴

VERSAILLES, 6th October, 1919.

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

Military, Naval and Air Representatives.

s.w.c.472] *Organisation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control Provided for in Articles 149-158 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.*

GENERAL

Article 1

3 Inter-Allied Commissions of Control shall be established:—

A Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control;

A Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control;

An Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

They shall represent with the Austrian Government the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in everything that concerns the carrying out of the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Clauses (Article 149) respectively.

These Commissions shall enter on their duties on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 2

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged with supervising the execution of the Military Clauses (Article 149) and particularly with carrying out the stipulations contained in Article 153.

It will be presided over by an Italian General.¹⁵

Article 3

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses (Article 149) and particularly with carrying out the stipulations contained in Article 154.

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission shall be presided over by an Italian Admiral.

¹⁴ The original of this appendix also contained a covering note (not printed) dated October 6, 1919, and signed by the British, French, Italian, Japanese, and United States Military, Naval, and Air Representatives on the Supreme War Council. This note stated that they had that day held a meeting at Versailles in pursuance of the decision of the Supreme Council of September 25, 1919, recorded in No. 64, minute 5, and had 'agreed to draw up the attached Draft Organisation'.

¹⁵ Note in original: 'In view of the capital importance of this Commission, the Military Representatives are of opinion that its President should be a General Officer chosen for his Military standing and reputation, as well as his energy and activity. It is advisable that he should be selected from among the General Officers holding at least the rank of Commander of an Army Corps.'

Article 4

The *Aeronautical* Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged with the supervision of the execution of the Air Clauses (Article 149), and particularly with the carrying out of the stipulations in Article 155.

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be presided over by a French General.

Article 5

The General Officers and the Admiral mentioned in Articles 2, 3 and 4 shall each of them attach to the two others a Permanent Representative (assisted if necessary by other officers), charged with ensuring liaison between them.

POWERS OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

Article 6

The Powers of each of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control are defined in Articles 149-155 of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 7

The General Clauses (Articles 156-158 of the Treaty of Peace) shall be under the supervision, in so far as each of them is concerned, of the Presidents of the Military, Naval and Air Inter-Allied Commission[s] of Control.

EXPENSES OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

Article 8

The Maintenance and Expenses of the Commissions of Control and their working expenses are chargeable to Austria in accordance with Article 152 of the Treaty of Peace.

These expenses shall be paid direct through the Presidents of the Commissions to the parties concerned, by the Allied and Associated Governments, who shall obtain repayment of such expenses from the Austrian Government.¹⁶

Article 9

The Austrian Government will be notified of the accommodation required for the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, and of the duty incumbent upon it of providing such accommodation in accordance with Article 151 (paragraph 1) of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 10

The Officers and Men forming part of the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, shall receive financial assistance which shall be identical to that fixed for the corresponding Commissions in the case of Germany.

The question of the Transport in Austria of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control (Military, Naval and Aeronautical) as well as that of their accommodation, and of the provision of their supplies during their stay in this country shall be regulated and co-ordinated by the Staff of General Diaz.

¹⁶ Note in original: "The American Representatives made the following Reservation with regard to this Article:—"Before the United States can adopt the proposed procedure, legislative action by Congress will be necessary".'

The amount of the allowances to be arranged for in these conditions ought to be a generous one and ought to be chargeable to the first payment to be made by Austria. It is in the general interest to reduce as far as possible in attaching to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control it¹⁷ no more than the absolutely indispensable number of officers.

DURATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

Article 11

The Duration of the Activities of each Commission shall be limited to the complete execution of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses under its supervision, in the time limit fixed by the Treaty of Peace.

In case the execution of these clauses be not completed within the period fixed, this fact will be reported by the Commission concerned to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, who will decide on the measures to be adopted.

Until a decision is reached, the Commission will continue to supervise the execution of the particular clause in question.

ORGANISATION OF THE MILITARY INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 12

The General Officer presiding over the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Staff which shall include officers of each of the armies of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

He shall, moreover, be assisted by the necessary technical personnel (legal, financial, etc.).

The Commission shall sit at Vienna.

Article 13

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall include 2 *Sub-Commissions*:—

- (a) A Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament, Material and Fortifications;
- (b) A Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training.

SUB-COMMISSION FOR MUNITIONS, ARMAMENT, MATERIAL AND FORTIFICATIONS

Article 14

This Sub-Commission shall include in its duties the supervision of the execution of Articles 129-135 and Table V of the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by an Italian General, assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies:

It shall sit at Vienna.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

This Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Gratz [*sic*], Linz, Innsbruck, and other places which may be considered necessary.

¹⁷ This word, inserted here in the text of the original, should have been inserted after 'reduce' above.

Article 15

This Sub-Commission shall include in its duties the execution of Articles 118-128 and Tables I, II, III and IV of the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Peace. It shall be presided over by a French General assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; it shall sit at Vienna.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

This Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Gratz, Linz, Innsbruck, and other places which may be considered necessary.

Article 16

The number of Officers who are to form part of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control might be fixed, in principle, on the following proportion:—

The United States of America	4/20.
France	4/20.
Great Britain	4/20.
Italy	6/20.
Japan	2/20.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 17

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control, which is charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses of the Treaty of Peace, will consist of:—

The Main Commission with necessary Staff, with headquarters in Vienna:—

A Sub-Commission to deal with the questions contained in Article 20.

Article 18

The Main Commission shall be presided over by an Italian Admiral, and shall be composed of an Admiral or other Senior Officer of each of the other principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 19

The Sub-Commission shall be composed of 4 Senior Naval Officers of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (with the exception of Japan), and an Italian Interpreter.

It shall be presided over by a French Captain.

The Sub-Commission, moreover, shall be entitled to consult the technical Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers if the presence of the latter is considered necessary by the Commission.

Article 20

The Sub-Commission shall be concerned with:

- (1) The destruction of ships under construction.
- (2) The surrender of stocks of munitions and Naval War Material, in accordance with Article 142 of the Treaty of Peace.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AERONAUTICAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 21

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control charged with the supervision of the carrying out of the Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace shall be composed as follows:—

A Main Commission with staff which shall sit at Vienna.

A Sub-Commission for Production.

A Sub-Commission for Military and Naval Aeronautics.

Article 22

The Main Commission shall be presided over by a French General and shall be composed of a General or Senior Officer of each of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 23

The Sub-Commission for Production shall supervise in particular the execution of the clauses contained in Article 147.

It shall be presided over by a British Colonel, and shall sit at Vienna.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

Article 24

The Sub-Commission for Military and Naval Aeronautics shall supervise in so far as each of these branches is concerned, the carrying out of the clauses other than those contained in Article 147. It shall be presided over by an Italian Colonel and shall sit at Vienna.

Article 25

The proportion of Officers to sit on the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be the same as that fixed in Article 16.

APPENDIX G TO No. 72

PARIS, October 6, 1919.

(From the Russian Embassy).

In addition to the considerations exposed in its memorandum of August the 20th and September 27th, concerning the supplying of General Youdenitch's Army, the Russian Embassy has the honour to inform the Government of the United States that it appears from the last information that there are actually certain stocks of war material, of Russian origin, at the arsenals of Koenigsberg and Graudentz; these stocks contain several hundred cannons, 400,000 rifles, the correspondent quantity of shells and cartridges, a certain number of military camions¹⁸ and so on.

The Russian Embassy, transmitting this information to the United States Government hopes that these data will be taken into consideration and will contribute to give a satisfactory solution to the request exposed in the above mentioned memorandum.

To The United States Delegation.

¹⁸ i.e. lorries.

Note

PARIS, October 9, 1919.

FRENCH DELEGATION.

Attribution of Western Galicia to Poland.

By virtue of Article 91 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, that Power ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers those of her territories which were not specially attributed. Among the territories thus ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers is Galicia.

Until now the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have not yet disposed of that province. As regards *Eastern Galicia*, the draft of a treaty with Poland is being studied, but its drafting depends on the decision which the Supreme Council shall take on the point of whether Eastern Galicia shall be attributed to Poland provisionally or finally.

Nothing has been done concerning *Western Galicia*, the attribution of which to Poland is however contested by no one.

There results from it:

1.—That at present Polish sovereignty is recognized over the territories ceded by Germany to Poland; (Treaty of June 29 [28]).

2.—That it is going to be recognized over the former Russian territories, by virtue of the draft of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland which is now being prepared by the Drafting Committee in conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Council.

3.—That the sovereignty of Poland over *Eastern Galicia* shall be the subject of a special treaty;

4.—That nothing has been provided for *Western Galicia*.

It would be advisable, however, to put an end, as soon as possible, to that state of affairs, as far as this last region is concerned, which is unquestionably the one whose character is the most exclusively Polish.

The French delegation considers that the Supreme Council should come to a decision in that respect as soon as possible.

Several solutions could be considered:

1.—Unite the attribution of Western Galicia with that of Eastern Galicia, that is to say to make it the subject of a single treaty in which it shall be specified that the Western part is ceded in full sovereignty, without any conditions, while the Eastern part is subjected to certain conditions.

2.—To make it the subject of a special treaty.

3.—To take advantage of the separate treaty with Poland for the attribution of the former Russian territories, to add to it an article relative to the attribution of Eastern [? Western] Galicia to Poland.

It would seem preferable to adopt this last solution in order to leave its special character to the question of Western [? Eastern] Galicia.

H. D. 69.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, October 13, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. E. L. Dresel, Col. Logan, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, General Groves, Captain Fuller, Commandant Dunne, Mr. Leeper.

France: Marshal Foch, M. Loucheur, General Weygand, M. Laroche, M. Tirard, Captain Roper.

Italy: General Cavallero, M. Vannutelli-Rey.

Japan: M. Shigemitsu.

1. M. PICHON said that he had just received a note from the British Delegation asking if there were any objections to the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, as well as the other diplomatic instruments signed at St. Germain. So far as he was concerned, there was no objection.

MR. POLK asked what had been decided in regard to the publication of the first draft of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

M. PICHON said that it had been decided that there was no objection to its publication.

(It was decided: that the Council had no objection to the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, as well as the other diplomatic instruments which were signed at St. Germain.)

2. MR. POLK said he wished to make two remarks in regard to the minutes of the meeting of the 10th October (H. D. 67).¹ According to the text which he had before him, he had said on page 15 (English text)², that he thought that it was important that the blockade preventing the shipment of arms to Hungary had been [?should not be] removed. He had not spoken of Hungary, but of Roumania, and had not spoken of arms, but of supplies of all kinds. He desired that it should be mentioned in the minutes of the meeting that M. Clemenceau had expressed agreement. In the minutes of the same meeting the Council had decided (page 16, English text)³ that the Roumanian representative on the Subcommittee to be sent to Budapest

¹ No. 71.

² Penultimate paragraph of minute 7.

³ Decision (2) in minute 8.

for determining the reparations value of material removed by the Roumanians should sit in a deliberative capacity. He had wished to give them only a consultative capacity.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he had insisted on the word 'deliberative'.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what was the difference between the two expressions.

M. LOUCHEUR said that if one said 'consultative' that excluded the right of vote, whereas the expression 'deliberative voice' implied the right of vote. In the beginning he had favoured giving the Roumanians a consultative voice, but Sir Eyre Crowe had said that this means of procedure would be offensive to the Roumanians as it seemed to place them before an Allied tribunal. He had recognized the justice of this argument and had then advocated the idea of a consultative [? deliberative] voice. The question should be examined again. He, himself, was strongly in favour of the solution which had been adopted at the meeting of the 10th October, as otherwise the Roumanians would be given new grounds for grievance against the Allies. He wished to add that he saw no inconvenience in giving the Roumanians a deliberative voice. They would have one voice against four. If their demands were unjustified they would be in the minority.

MR. POLK asked whether the Hungarians would also have a deliberative voice. He wished to know too what was the position of the Czecho-Slovaks.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Hungarians would not have a deliberative voice in the Reparation Commission any more than did the Roumanians [? Germans] and Austrians. That was specified in the Treaty of Peace. On the other hand, the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Poles, and Roumanians were given a voice. The Treaty of Peace provided that a representative of these four Nations and of Greece should in turn sit for a year with a deliberative voice.

MR. POLK asked whether Sir George Clerk had discussed the subject before the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had.

M. LOUCHEUR said that Sir George Clerk was present when he had formulated his proposal, which resulted from the very conclusions of Sir George Clerk's report.

MR. POLK asked whether it would not be possible to put the Poles, Jugo-Slavs, and the Czecho-Slovaks on the same footing as the Roumanians.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that it would be possible to draft a new text which would put these four Powers on the same footing and give all of them a deliberative voice in the Subcommittee at Budapest for the questions in which they were interested. He could agree with Colonel Logan upon the text of a draft which would define the functions of the Subcommittee.

(It was decided: to take note of the corrections in the minutes of the meeting of the 10th October (H. D. 67)' in accordance with Mr. Polk's remarks.)

(It was further decided that M. Loucheur and Colonel Logan should be requested to alter the text of the resolution of the 10th October, respecting

the despatch to Budapest of a Sub-Committee under the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission, in such a manner as to provide that representatives of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on this Sub-Committee, should be placed on an equal footing with the Roumanian representative. The text as altered should be approved by the British and Italian Delegations.)

3. M. PICHON said that he had not been present at the last meeting of the Council. If he had correctly understood the notes of the meeting, the Council had accepted the draft note to M. Friedrich, with the reservation that Mr. Polk would suggest modifications.

*Draft note to
M. Friedrich*

MR. POLK said that he had had a conversation with Sir George Clerk and he could suggest certain changes in the text, but he did not believe that that was essential. The important point was whether the American Delegation were convinced that the Council were not making a mistake in addressing the note to M. Friedrich. It was always a delicate matter to intervene in the internal affairs of a country, particularly by transmitting a written document. He would greatly prefer that a special representative of the Supreme Council, authorized to enter into relations with the Hungarian political parties, should be sent to Budapest. The instructions given this representative should be identical with those contained in the draft note to M. Friedrich.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he recognized the weight of Mr. Polk's argument. He had thought the same thing and had proposed that the Allied Generals at Budapest be charged to take the action proposed. If it was thought that the Generals, on account of their relations with M. Friedrich, were not qualified to take this action, it would be possible to send a special representative of the Council. It was of great importance that Hungarian opinion should know of the steps which the Entente were taking. If a means of making the matter public were found other than by transmitting a note by wireless telegraph, he had no objection to the despatch of a special representative of the Supreme Council.

M. SCIALOJA said that he agreed.

M. PICHON said that if the Council should decide to send a representative to Budapest, Sir George Clerk would appear to be the person to send.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Sir George Clerk had left on Saturday⁴ for London, but he had spoken with him and it would be possible for Sir George Clerk to return in two days' time.

M. PICHON said that he thought there would be no inconvenience in awaiting Sir George Clerk's return.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if the Council decided to send Sir George Clerk it was important that the Allied Generals at Budapest should be notified, in order that they should be aware of the fact that Sir George Clerk was charged by the Supreme Council with carrying out a special mission.

(It was decided: that the Supreme Council, instead of transmitting a Note to M. Friedrich, should send a representative.)

⁴ October 11.

(It was also decided: that, upon the appointment of a representative, the Allied Generals at Budapest should be notified of his mission.)

4. SIR EYRE CROWE said that before the Council passed on to another subject, he had a point to raise. He wished to ask what had been decided on the question of the publication of the Note of the Allied and Associated Governments to the Roumanian Government. The Joint Secretariat had thought that the Council had decided to publish the Note after it had reached the Roumanian Government. He had not understood this to be the case and he thought that M. Clemenceau had been of the opinion that the note should not be published.

MR. POLK said he thought that the Council had decided to publish the Note after its receipt by the Roumanian Government.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN said the resolution was worded as follows:

It was further decided to publish the text of the Note after it had been transmitted to the Roumanian Government (H. D. 68,⁵ minute 2, page 4, English Text).

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he proposed that the Note should not be published until the Supreme Council had taken a new decision on the subject.

(It was decided: that the Note of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government should not be published without a special decision of the Supreme Council.)

5. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council were aware of the fact that the British Government believed that to avoid the inconveniences of an excessive subdivision of military contingents and the resulting difficulties of provisionment, it would appear more convenient that the Interallied zones of occupation, provided for in the Treaty of Peace, should be divided between the Powers in such a way that each zone should be occupied by the troops of a single power. It was objected to on the French side, that it was important to emphasize the Interallied character of the occupation and the collective responsibility of the occupying Powers. When the question had last been discussed by the Supreme Council,⁶ he had recalled a suggestion made by Mr. Balfour to the effect that the preponderance in a particular zone should be given to a particular army, but that small detachments from other armies could be added in order to assure the Inter-Allied character to the occupation.⁷ He had conveyed this suggestion to London, but the British Government did not agree with the first suggestion although they were prepared to accept the second. If this system were adopted, it would be necessary for the Council to agree as to the distribution among the various Allied armies before requesting Marshal Foch to regulate the practical details of application.

MARSHAL FOCH said that there was a question of principle to be considered. He was thinking of the question of the occupation of Upper Silesia. The Treaty of Peace provided that the plebiscite in Upper Silesia should take

⁵ No. 72.

⁶ See No. 62, minute 2.

⁷ See No. 31, minute 7.

place under the guarantee of occupation by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers. These troops would not be equally divided and one Power would assume command in Upper Silesia. It was necessary for the Governments to inform him, whether they desired an Allied solution, or, what he called, a solution of a single Power. If the spirit of the Treaty of Peace were to be carried out by all the Powers, it was necessary that all participate in its execution; if not, it was not a Treaty of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, but the Treaty of one Power.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the remarks made by Marshal Foch were leading the discussion in another direction. He should remember that the British Government had accepted a compromise which was to leave in one particular zone an army, which should have a preponderance, but that there should also be representation of the other armies. As long as the occupation were Inter-Allied, the principle would be safeguarded. He wished to remark that there would have to be one Commander of the troops of occupation in each zone, and this Commander would be in charge. The argument, that if one recognized the preponderance of one Army, that Army was given the supreme power, did not seem to him exact. The compromise guaranteed a division of responsibility.

MARSHAL FOCH said that before accepting a compromise he would have to know what it was. What the proposition contemplated was he did not know. For the moment he knew nothing but the Treaty of Peace, which had to be applied immediately, if it were not to break down. It had been decided that Upper Silesia should be occupied by two divisions, one division being sent first. The Versailles Council, on the basis of a decision by the Supreme Council, had drawn up the composition of this division, in determining the minimum which each Allied Army should furnish. To that he agreed. He wished to insist upon the urgency of the matter, and upon the fact, that, at the present time, the only document upon which he had to act was the draft of the Versailles Council. He wished to add, that, if the territories to be occupied and the conditions under which the occupation were to take place, were considered, the charges of occupation were unequal. It had been thought advisable to send two divisions to Upper Silesia for a fixed period; elsewhere occupations could be made with much smaller forces. Was Danzig to be occupied and for how long? He did not know. In any case it was a question of a small force. The same applied to Memel. There was a question of unequal charges for an unequal period of occupation.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he recognized the force of Marshal Foch's arguments. It was a fact that the only text which Marshal Foch had was the Versailles draft. It was to be regretted that Marshal Foch had not been present at the last meeting of the Council where the question had been discussed.⁶ At that time he had said that the British Government did not accept the draft prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles. In the course of the same meeting there was a question of a suggestion made by Mr. Balfour on the 8th August.⁷ He (Sir Eyre Crowe) thought that the French Representatives agreed in principle with this suggestion. He had

informed his Government, which had agreed to the compromise. The entire question could not be brought up again to-day.

M. PICHON said that this was not quite what had occurred. He had before him the notes of the meeting of the 22nd September (H.D. 58).⁶ The Council had admitted the general principle that in a fixed zone one power could have a larger number of troops than the other Powers, but they had not admitted that the units to represent the other Allies could be very small. The whole subject was dominated by the political question. Inter-Allied occupation proved that the Allies were in agreement as to guaranteeing the execution of the Treaty of Peace. The French Delegation did not desire to see a situation raised, such as had arisen in Bulgaria.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought there had been a misunderstanding. M. Pichon had again expressed the French point of view. He knew that point of view. On the other hand he wished to recall that on the 22nd September, when they had alluded to Mr. Balfour's suggestion, a French Representative, he thought that it was General Le Rond, had said that by this means it would be possible to arrive at a solution similar to that which the French Delegation advocated. It was this proposal which he had submitted to London and it was that proposal which he was in a position to accept.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he desired to place the question on its true ground. Upper Silesia was to be occupied at once; that was to say in fifteen days after the Treaty of Peace went into force. He asked what was the contingent of each of the Allies in this occupation; as for the rest, he wished to remark, that the Treaty of Peace did not provide for the occupation of Danzig any more than it did for that of Allenstein and Marienwerder. If there were not a firm occupation, the Treaty would become useless. It was a definite question, and there were three questions which arose, if one wished to ask them. He wished to propose that a special meeting, for the regulation of these problems, be called, where the matter should be treated both from a political and from a military point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to state that the Military Experts had asked for one division for Upper Silesia and not for two. In any event, the despatch of the second division remained uncertain. They had thought that the occupation of the other regions where plebiscites were to take place would require a total of one division. It was true that the occupation of Danzig was not provided for by the Treaty, but there was little doubt but that this occupation would be necessary. With regard to Allenstein and Marienwerder, the Treaty provided that the Inter-Allied Commissions, who were charged with presiding over the plebiscites, should have at their disposal a sufficient military force. There was little doubt but that, in view of the information received, it would be necessary to send troops to these districts. There existed there a problem as urgent as that of Upper Silesia.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Treaty of Peace was very vague upon certain points. It was necessary for the Supreme Council to attend to this. When that had been done, he would know how many effectives were

needed. It was further necessary for the Council to inform him what Power would have the preponderance in a particular place. It was only when the Military Experts had this information that they would be in a position to say whether it would be possible to make a distribution of the forces which would impose upon each of the interested Powers an equal expense.

M. PICHON said that it would be necessary to first settle the occupation of Upper Silesia. The Council could direct Marshal Foch to prepare a draft in agreement with the Military Representatives of the other Powers. Then it would be possible to examine the other questions.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council could now decide as to whether or not Danzig and Allenstein should be occupied. He believed, moreover, that this had already been decided.

M. PICHON said that nothing had been decided. The question had been adjourned every time it had come before the Council. The Polish Commission should be requested to make an urgent report on this subject, but at present a project for the occupation of Upper Silesia was what was wanted.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked why the question of the occupation of Danzig, Allenstein, Marienwerder, and Memel could not be decided at once; and why the modalities of the occupation should not be studied by Marshal Foch at the same time as those for Upper Silesia.

M. PICHON agreed that in adopting this course the Council would be taking into consideration the questions raised by Marshal Foch.

MR. POLK said that he thought in any event the Council should hear the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs. He thought that the Commission were not unanimous on the subject of Danzig and Memel.

M. PICHON said that it would be possible to make a provisional reservation on the subject of Danzig and Memel.

GENERAL WEYGAND asked whether a decision had been taken on the question of Klagenfurt. When the Allied Generals had made their report on this question, they had provided for Inter-Allied occupation where the plebiscite was to take place.

M. LAROCHE said that the question was settled in the Treaty of St. Germain. Article 50 provided that the first zone should be occupied by the troops of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the second by Austrian troops.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that it was therefore necessary to settle only the question of Danzig and Memel. When the Council had reached a decision the General Staffs would need a few hours to prepare a draft.

(It was decided:

- (1) that in the portions of East Prussia, where plebiscites were to be held, in accordance with Articles 94 to 98 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, there should be occupation by Inter-Allied troops;
- (2) that the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Baltic Affairs should inform the Council, at its meeting on the 15th October, whether they considered that Danzig and Memel (Articles 99 to 108 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany) should be occupied by Inter-Allied forces.)

6. (The Council had before it the German notes of the 7th August, 1919, and draft replies to these notes prepared by the Commission, on the left bank of the Rhine (see appendices A and B).)

Reply to the notes of the German Government respecting the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine

M. TIRARD said that the draft note submitted to the Council was a reproduction of the stenographic text of the declarations made by M. Loucheur to the German Delegates. However, M. Loucheur proposed an alteration to make the text more clear. On Page 13 (French text) he suggested that for paragraph 13 the following be substituted: 'Special Arrangements. Special arrangements shall be made in accordance with the request in the German note for the regulation of the reception by the various railway administrations in consequence of the modification of the frontiers.'

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the draft replies to the five German Notes transmitted from Versailles on the 7th August, 1919, respecting the administration of the occupied territory;

(2) that paragraph 13 of the fourth reply (administration of railways in the occupied territory) should be altered as follows: 'Paragraph 13. Special Arrangements. Special arrangements shall be made in accordance with the request in the German Note for the regulation of the reception by the various railway administrations in consequence of the modification of the frontiers.')

7. (The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation of the 10th October, 1919 (see appendix C).)

German ships acquired during the war by Dutch Navigation Companies

SIR EYRE CROWE commented briefly upon the Note from the British Delegation. He insisted upon the importance of a decision being taken by the Council in regard to this matter, for otherwise, it might become impossible to obtain the delivery of the vessels in question.

M. SCIALOJA said that he agreed in principle with Sir Eyre Crowe, but he wished to raise a question of competence. It was provided in Section VII of Annex 3 of Part VIII (Reparations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, that Germany agreed to take any measures that might be indicated to her by the Reparation Commission for obtaining the full total for all ships which had during the war been transferred or were in the process of being transferred to neutral flags, without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments, and to ask Germany to obtain full right of property in these ships. He thought that the question which had been submitted belonged to the Reparation Commission, otherwise there was a danger that Germany might raise objections of a legal nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had considered this article in the Note which the Council had before it, but in this case, it was not a question of the definite attribution of these ships; it was simply a question of their being handed over.

M. SCIALOJA agreed, but pointed out that Germany might say that she awaited the decision of the Reparation Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the only matter which concerned the Council at the moment was to prevent the ships passing into the hands of the Dutch.

M. PICHON said that it was not a question of getting to the root of the matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Germany should be justified in demanding a decision from the Reparation Commission for the settlement of the question of the ownership of the ships. The present question was to force the German Government to make sure of the possession of these ships and to deliver them to the Allies.

MR. POLK proposed that Sir Eyre Crowe prepare a draft note to the German Government which the Council could examine at its next meeting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this note would demand:

- (1) that the five ships in question should be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers at the Firth of Forth;
- (2) that the Dutch crews should be removed;
- (3) that the Dutch names of the ships and mark of port of origin should be removed;
- (4) that the Allied and Associated Governments could, if they desired, make an inspection of the 'William Oswald';
- (5) that the 'Nassau' and the 'Braunschweig' should be taken to Bremerhaven by German crews.

M. SCIALOJA asked what part the Reparation Commission would play.

M. PICHON said that its President, M. Loucheur, was in agreement with Sir Eyre Crowe.

(It was decided: that Sir Eyre Crowe should submit to the Council at its next meeting the draft of a Note to the German Government demanding the delivery to the Allies of the five German merchant ships sold to Dutch firms during the war.)

8. (The Council had before it a draft resolution of the 10th October prepared by the American Delegation (see appendix D).)⁸

Execution of Articles 100 to 104 of the Treaty of Versailles respecting the free city of Danzig

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the Council had the right to decide as to measures which should be taken to assure the rapid execution of Articles 100 to 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. Article 104 of the Treaty of Peace provided for a Treaty between the free city of Danzig and Poland, but the free city of Danzig did not yet exist.

M. PICHON said that the American proposal was intended merely to request the Commission on Polish Affairs to study the question and

⁸ Not printed. The draft resolution was, with verbal variation, that adopted by the Supreme Council.

make a report to the Supreme Council. The proposal did not go beyond that.

(It was decided: that the Commission on Polish Affairs should be requested to examine Articles 100 to 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, relative to the creation of the free city of Danzig, and to submit a report as soon as possible as to the measures to be taken to secure the speedy execution of these articles, upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace.)

9. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated 7th October, 1919 (see appendix E).)

Sale of Air Material
to Sweden by Germany (In view of the fact that no remarks were made it was decided:

- (1) that the German Government should be required to provide the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control with full particulars of all aircraft and aircraft material sold or exported since the Armistice, and that the value of this material should be estimated by the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, and should be paid to him by the 31st January, 1920;
- (2) that Marshal Foch should be instructed to enquire into Mr. Ranft's transactions and the reported gift of two aeroplanes to the Swedish Army and shall also request the German Government to forward a statement with regard to these matters.)

10.

Admission of Luxembourg
to the International Labour
Congress at Washington

[Not printed]

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,
October 13, 1919.

APPENDICES A AND B TO NO. 73

Dossier of Correspondence between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Delegation relative to the Administration of the Occupied Territory of the Rhine.

Five Notes from von Lewald, of August 7, 1919, and replies thereto, under the following subjects:—

- I. The occupation of the Left Bank of the Rhine.
- II. Accommodations for the German Imperial High Commissioner.
- III. Questions of Procedure.
- IV. Administration of Railroads.
- V. Regime of Navigation.

Translation

*German Notes relative to the Administration of the Rhenish Territories delivered by
M. von Lewald, August 7, 1919.*

FIRST NOTE

Relative to the Occupation of the Left Bank of the Rhine

Gentlemen:

In the name of the German Government I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the answer to the two German memoranda concerning the military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.⁹ I note with satisfaction that the Allied and Associated Governments intend to make the military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine as light as possible for the populations.

I take the liberty to make detailed comments on the following paragraphs of the answer:

I interpret the answer concerning paragraph 3 to mean that the laws of the Empire and of the Federative States promulgated for the territories in question, as well as the executive decrees, shall be enforced as long as the High Commission does not make use of its right of veto by a communication to the Commissioner of the Empire, because their application would affect the safety and the needs of the military forces of the Allied and Associated Powers. That right of veto should be expressed in a decree to be issued in conformity with Article 3 of the agreement.

In order to make the situation of public right perfectly clear, it would be advisable that the decrees of the High Commission be published in an official paper by the Commissioner of the Empire. Thus the stipulations of article 3a of the agreement would be fulfilled for the German Government.

The answer concerning paragraph 4 guaranteed to Germany that the populations shall enjoy the free exercise of its personal and civic rights, religious freedom, freedom of the press, vote, association, and that the political, administrative and economic relations between the occupied territories and between those territories and the non-occupied territories shall not be hindered any more than circulation. A great calm has come over the occupied territory caused by the fact that now the provincial, communal and municipal elections can take place freely and that these assemblies as well as the ecclesiastical assemblies of the provincial synod will be allowed to meet. The special authorization to travel from one part of the occupied territory to another and from the occupied territory to the non-occupied territory of Germany is therefore suppressed. Simultaneously with the guarantee of free circulation, the sale of newspapers from the non-occupied territories of Germany in the occupied territory shall be authorized, as for example the importation of the *Frankfurterzeitung* in Rhenish Hesse which was forbidden until now.

Concerning paragraph 5, I take the liberty of making the remark that the Governments of Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Hesse and Oldenburg have given their consent to the nomination of Herr von Starck as Commissioner of the Empire, with the meaning that the Commissioner of the Empire shall equally represent the rights of those states and of their population at the High Commission.

Concerning paragraph 5a, I remark that the new constitution adopted by the National Constituent Assembly under date of July 31, 1919, contains a considerable

⁹ See No. 15, appendix A.

increase of the jurisdiction of the Empire as compared with that of the Federative States. I shall take the liberty of sending four copies of the new constitution to the President of the Commission.

I would be grateful if acceptance of M. von Starck's nomination was granted as soon as possible so that he might be in a position to enter into relations with the Interallied High Commission at Coblenz. Numerous administrative measures adopted in the various occupied territories show the necessity of it.

Supposing that the High Commission has its seat in Coblenz, the Commissions [? Commissioner] of the Empire must also reside there. For the buildings which must be placed at his disposal and which are at present occupied by the American Military authorities, I take the liberty of delivering the following note.¹⁰

Concerning paragraph 6, I ask again to kindly let me know as soon as possible the effectives of the troops to be maintained in the occupied territory, the number of officers, men and horses, together with the name of places where the troops will have to be stationed; since according to article 8b of the agreement, the troops have to be exclusively housed in barracks and not quartered in private houses, the old garrison cities will have to be considered first. It is very important for those cities to be informed as soon as possible of the effectives of the troops which they shall have to house. On that subject, may I be allowed to state that before July 31, 1914, there were only 70,000 men stationed in the occupied territory. Since, according to the Peace Treaty, Germany is authorized to maintain only an army of 100,000 men, distributed all over the territory of the 'Reich', the German Government hopes that the effectives of the occupying troops will not exceed a number equivalent to the capacity of the fixed barracks. It will be especially desirable that an order be issued so that the military authorities of the Allied and Associated Powers do not require from cities which are not considered in the future as garrison towns, such things as electric installations, aqueducts or others which would cause great expenses and would not be used later.

To give an example of the serious inconveniences resulting from the extremely high effectives now stationed in the occupied territory, I take the liberty of mentioning that for the present it is impossible for foreigners to find room in Cologne although it is essentially a city of foreigners and it has at its disposal excellent hotels with 5,000 beds. The Commission represented here and the members of the parliamentary council of the Commissioner of the Empire who met in Cologne last Sunday could not be housed, or were only able to find absolutely insufficient rooms for one night only, and only upon the request of the Commissioner of the Empire did the military authorities place a few very modest rooms at their disposal.

The repression of the hotel service in the great Rhine towns is incompatible with the development of commerce and industry.

The answer concerning paragraph 7 states that the High Commission is to regulate the organization of the police forces. I take the liberty of remarking that article 1, alinea 2, of the agreement stipulates that it is only the number of the police forces which is to be determined by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Following the troubles caused by the war and the difficult economic situation among the working classes of Germany, and which are well known by the High Commission, the number of police forces will have to be superior to that of peace time because then, in case of need, one could have recourse to the military forces for the maintenance of public order. That is especially important because of the

¹⁰ Document 2 in this appendix.

fact that, according to the Peace Treaty, it is forbidden to maintain in the future troops in a zone 50 kms. wide and bordering the occupied territories.

Concerning paragraph 9, I take account of the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers recognize that the privilege of jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon German citizens, so that German citizens, even in a case where they are employed by the troops or are in their service, shall remain subjected to German jurisdiction. In alinea 2 of paragraph 9, the answer remarks that the Allied and Associated Governments, not wishing perturbation to be caused in the occupied territories, could not admit that the competent German authorities begin judicial actions for political or economic facts pertaining to the period of the Armistice, unless those facts have already caused the Allied and Associated Governments to begin judicial actions. I cannot see on what provisions of the agreement that pretention of the Allied and Associated Powers can be based. I interpret the remark to mean, in short, that the creators of the so-called Rhenish Republic, that is to say M. Dorten and his friends, together with the people who are making propaganda in the Palatinate for the creation of the autonomous state 'free Palatinate', namely Dr. Haas and acolytes at Lindau [Landau], shall therefore be protected, from a point of view of penal law, from any judicial action of any kind on the part of Germany.

Consequently, I feel obliged to remark that for those agitations and machinations of M. Dorten and his friends at Wiesbaden, of Dr. Haas and his friends at Landau, as well as M. Hompa at Kehl, it is only a question of small groups without any importance who are pursuing aims directed against the German Constitution such as no Government can tolerate in time of peace. Without the protection of the military authorities at Wiesbaden and in the Palatinate, as at Kehl, those tendencies would not have had the least succession [*sic*]. I have in my hands a rather voluminous dossier concerning M. Dorten's acts and the protection accorded him by the military authorities. As to the Palatinate, I have also at hand documented material. The situation is quite analogous in the Principality of Birkenfeld where the military command attempted to push the small country in a determined political path. All those tendencies do not find the least support in the agreement. I beg you to kindly confirm that as soon as the agreement goes into force, the High Commission, conforming itself to the intentions which have inspired the Allied and Associated Powers in their answer to paragraph 28, see that this interference in the internal affairs of Germany be stopped. The agreement does not give the right to the Germans who thus violated the German law to be immune from legal action. The German Government could not declare itself in accord with that and could only renounce any judicial action in occupied and non-occupied territories in case the Allied and Associated Powers declare themselves ready to grant a complete amnesty to the persons condemned for having committed infractions to the orders of the occupying powers and in case all the cases pending for such reasons are stopped. I believe that that would correspond to the spirit of conciliation invoked on several occasions in the answer. The same measure would apply to the economic decree[?] enacted either by the occupying authorities or by Germany.

Concerning paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, I take the liberty of delivering a statement of the German Minister of Justice which I beg you to kindly take into consideration.

As for paragraph 10, I beg you to kindly enlighten me on a few points. Since the German military legislation does not grant any jurisdiction in civil affairs to the military tribunals, even during the state of war, and since I did not succeed in finding the laws enforced among the Allied and Associated Powers allowing military tribunals to try civil affairs, I would be grateful to receive a copy of the stipulations

in question from the various occupying Powers. I am grateful that the answer recognizes the jurisdiction of the German courts to decide differences resulting from contracts made privately either by soldiers, or by their families, with the restriction that the High Commission shall have the right to decide in case of abuses. Since the word 'evocation' is used both in the French and in the English text, they seem to have in mind the 'jus evocandi' unknown to German legislation for many years and for the explanation of which it is necessary to have recourse to very old German judicial institutions. Consequently, I conclude from the text that to the High Commission shall be reserved the right to take away from German courts cases brought before it and to transfer to the military tribunals of the occupying Powers. That would constitute a serious infringement on the independence of jurisdiction and would be considered by the whole German magistrature as a doubt cast on its absolute impartiality.

Concerning paragraph 14, I had asked if a declaration of the receipts of the Empire and of the Federative States, received in the occupied territory, could also be deposited in the non-occupied territory. The answer to paragraph 14 does not make that very important point clear and that is why I take the liberty of asking for an express confirmation of my interpretation.

Concerning paragraph 16; the Allied and Associated Powers did not accept my proposal to trust the German authorities to determine and pay reimbursements in conformity with German law; however, they have declared themselves ready to study a regulation of application together with the German authorities. I wish to believe that the regulation will neglect neither the interests of the population concerned nor those of the German finances. That is why I believe I can limit myself, in that respect, to point out a few wishes, leaving all the rest in the good care of the High Commission. The following points are of a very special importance.

1. The creation of two instances and that in such a way that a second instance shall have the jurisdiction over the whole occupied territory so that the uniformity indispensable to the application and the interpretation of the regulations and in the fixation of the amount of the reimbursement be guaranteed.

2. In both instances the admission as attorney general of a representative of the financial administration of the Empire, to the proposals of whom the Commissions shall grant a hearing before arriving at the decision and who should also be authorized to make an appeal to plaintiff against the decision of the first tribunal.

3. Reimbursement shall be fixed in conformity with the current prices at the place and at the time of the presentation.

On the other hand I take once more the liberty of calling the attention of the Commission of [?]to the state of affairs now existing in the various zones of occupation regarding the reimbursement of requisitions and including the burdens caused by the housing of soldiers. I took the liberty of stating in my supplementary memorandum to paragraph 32 that the situation had become intolerable. According to the answer, the High Commission will have to take care of the establishment of a uniform order of things by the promulgation of regulations; it is possible that the precautions required to guarantee the future have been taken, that is to say after the going into force of the agreement, against the return of a state of affairs as intolerable as that which existed during the armistice but no solution has yet been found as to how the population shall be indemnified for the requisitions including the housing of soldiers during the armistice period.

The present state of affairs cannot be maintained because of the differences of the stipulations, notably regarding the amount of reimbursements in the various

zones of occupation, which have given rise to a marked dissatisfaction among the population and that besides a great many requisitions, among the most expensive ones, have not been paid as I have already had the honour to state with more details. As regards the British zone of occupation where the German authorities were allowed to enforce the law of the German Empire of March 2, 1919, I earnestly beg to maintain the present state of affairs because the financial administration of the German Empire has already paid, in conformity with German law, a sum of more than 100 million marks on account of the claims for indemnities and because a change in the decree and in the procedure during the execution would bring disturbances in the juridical situation as well as in the finances of the Empire. As to the other zones, one could perhaps guarantee the indispensable homogeneity notably [?notable] as regards the British zone, by authorizing there also the German authorities to enforce the German law, all the more so that part of the urban and rural circles and the communes have already paid rather large sums on account of the titles to indemnity which have not been paid as yet neither by the occupying troops nor by the German Empire. However, my Government will be ready to accept also another procedure analogous perhaps to the regulation which the High Commission will promulgate in the future, under the only condition that the population already seriously affected and the communes overwhelmed with taxes be soon reimbursed.

Concerning paragraph 17: the explanations of paragraph 17 seem to take into account especially the second part of my memorandum relative to those points. I am glad that the legitimate needs of the public services at the time of the requisition of public and private establishments shall be satisfied in a conciliating spirit. It will be especially desirable to allow the buildings intended for teaching of all grades to be used for that purpose. I hope that the question to know [*sic*] if a great part of the localities occupied at present shall be again placed at the disposal of the population, will be examined in the same conciliatory spirit.

The question of the housing of officers and their families pre-occupies and worries very much the inhabitants of the occupied territory. If it is a fact that during the period of armistice the population felt already as a heavy burden the restrictions inherent to the housing of troops, those feelings will become unbearable if—in view of the long years of occupation to come—a conciliatory solution of that question could not be found. The wealthy families would leave the occupied territory, to the detriment of the communes where they were domiciled, and a spirit of vexation, highly undesirable, would get hold of the middle and lower classes. The housing should be made on the basis of the regulations in force in the various armies, it would therefore be agreeable to me to know those regulations so as to be in a position to take sides regarding the various methods of their application. May I be allowed, however, to express right now the desire that, in general, the housing be regulated so as not to jeopardize the family life of the inhabitants. The complete eviction of the latter or their obligation to use only a few small rooms,—that the exactions of the intensive billeting made often necessary during the period of armistice—should not take place again; in the same way the installation of messes in private houses where they were a great inconvenience to the inhabitants. The billeting of officers' families is a problem particularly difficult to solve. I suppose that it would be a question of placing at their disposal unfurnished rooms since those families have their own furniture. The requisitioning of the whole furniture including house linen, table material, kitchen utensils and other household goods seems all the more heavy during the long period of occupation because a great many of

those objects are lacking now, especially linen, and that the inhabitants would be unable to replace. I presume that in the future domestic articles shall no longer be required.

For the purpose of avoiding annoyances on both sides, I consider it indispensable to state with precision the objections of the hosts who, up to the present, often found themselves in a situation which was not clearly defined. In any case, it would be practicable that the billeting should be made through the municipal authorities.

Finally, I take the liberty of calling your attention to the fact, that, according to the especially difficult situation of the building industry since the war, there exists a great shortage of apartments as well in non-occupied Germany as in occupied territory, and that that situation has been only increased by the billeting of the troops of occupation. May I not also be allowed to express the hope that the requisition of living rooms shall be made within the limits of the absolutely indispensable necessities.

According to my information, the moving of officers' families in the occupied territory has already taken a certain development; allow me to insist on the necessity to authorize those moving only after a solution to the question of billets has been found.

Paragraph 18 recognizes that a control shall be established by the Interallied High Commission as regards the privileges and customs exemptions conferred by article 19 to the troops of occupation and their personnel both civil and military. The request expressed in my memorandum that no German national and no neutral be granted the privilege of the exemption of taxes by entering in the service of the troops of occupation has received no answer. Consequently I take the liberty of reiterating my request to kindly give me a statement on that subject such as it was given in paragraph 9 of the answer concerning the privileges of jurisdiction.

I ask you to kindly grant a hearing to the Commissioner of the Empire before taking the prescriptions for the measures of control considered by the High Commission concerning the privileges and the customs exemptions. It would be indispensable to give an active part to the competent German authorities at the time of the execution of the control.

19. The customs frontier[s] of the West show deficiencies. They prevented the installation of German customs officers on German territory at the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Basin. There are customs officers at the frontier of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland, but they cannot act according to the regulations of the German administration regarding the traffic of merchandise and especially they cannot apply freely the German regulations on importation and exportation. Any German commercial, economic and financial policy, in conformity with the legitimate German interest, becomes impossible so long as the Empire is not master of its customs frontier. The Allied and Associated Powers recognized, at the time of the negotiations of the Finance Commission, that Germany cannot fulfill her economic and financial obligations if she is not allowed to dispose freely of her customs frontier. It is urgent to settle those questions rapidly. If Germany cannot organize as soon as possible the customs service of the Western frontier, not only will enormous amounts of useful and necessary goods enter Germany during the next few weeks, Germany deprived of goods and hungry, but also objects of luxury and other goods, hundreds of millions of marks worth, and which Germany does not need for the present, and which shall enter without paying any duty. It is not doubtful that Germany will not be able to stand such a useless drain in view of the anaemic state of her economic body.

In view of the importance and urgency of those questions, it is necessary to begin their study as soon as possible and to find solutions favourable to Germany.

In the answer, paragraph 20 is omitted. I should be grateful to receive an answer and I take the liberty of placing in the hands of the President the desiderata of the railroad administration and those of the navigation on the Rhine.

According to paragraph 21, the liberty to communicate by letter, telegraph and telephone shall be guaranteed. I suppose that the strict observance of the postal secret such as it is provided by the German law shall also be guaranteed, under reservation of an eventual decree of the state of siege, and that consequently any postal censorship such as is now in course will be suppressed.

Concerning paragraph 24, I take the liberty to remark that I interpret it to mean that all the various decrees of the various military authorities issued during the armistice, shall be cancelled and that consequently in the future there will be only two sources of public law in the occupied territory: the legislation of the Empire and of the Federative States and the decrees of the High Commission.

Concerning paragraph 25, I take note of the fact that all the interdictions of sojourn shall be examined in a conciliatory spirit. It would be desirable that the requests of the persons who have been expelled and whose purpose is to return to their country should be submitted to the High Commission through the Commissioner of the Empire.

In order that the amnesty which I proposed in paragraph 9 be complete it would be necessary especially that all the people who were expelled from the occupied territory because they opposed M. Dorten at Wiesbaden and Haase at London [Landau], etc., may be allowed to return to those territories. Public opinion in Germany places a great importance on that question as I was assured very lately by deputies of all parties.

28. Those explanations rest only on a misunderstanding. It [?goes] without saying that nothing was further from the mind of the German Government, supreme and scrupulous guardian of the Constitution of the Empire, than to submit to the Allied and Associated Governments proposals incompatible with international law or with the Constitution of the Empire and the rights of the various Federative States. I do not believe I must insist on the subject, but I note with satisfaction that the Allied and Associated Governments did not mention the Central Governments of the various Federative States in article 3 of the agreement for the simple reason that they concluded peace exclusively with the Central German Government and that it is not their intention to interfere with the internal organization of Germany and that they respect the legal hierarchy. That was the aim of my speech.

Par. 29. The institution of the administrators and supervisors who, in certain zones, operate with the German administrative authorities forms a particularly painful chapter of the Armistice. It is therefore with pleasure that I learn that after entry into force of the peace Treaty, there shall be no more administrators or supervisors directed to control the German administration. If the High Commission reserves the right to maintain fixed representatives directed to establish a liaison between the local German administrations, the local military authorities and the High Commission itself, it would be expedient to take the necessary measures to have these fixed representatives limited to the facilitation of communication between the authorities and to the transmission of the desires of one to the other. All right of interference of the interior affairs of the German authorities, of the control of incoming correspondence, of the examination of shipments, of authority to give orders, shall be excluded in the future.

It would be desirable if the High Commission would make use of its authority to communicate directly with the local German administration in exceptional cases only because this would greatly facilitate relations between the High Commission and the German administration if the Commission, in principle, operated through the intermediary of the Empire Commissioner who is, in reality, a representative of all the German administrations which enter in the question.

Par. 32. I am indebted to the Allied and Associated Governments for the declaration that requisitions should be but little practiced, and only operated in particular circumstances.

However, I believe it my duty to call the attention of the Commission to the fact that importance [*sic*] deliveries through requisitions have been ordered for the coming economic period and surpassing the probable duration of the Armistice. For example, the High Commands of the 8th and 10th Army Corps have recently ordered the delivery of 40,000 tons of hay per Army Corps, quantities considerably surpassing the productivity of these districts under their orders. The same districts, last year, only succeeded in delivering for the needs of the German Army a portion of the quantity now demanded, and this under serious pressure on the part of competent authorities. The rural population, suffering under a great shortage of fodder, has been greatly irritated by this hay requisition, as it necessitates a consequent restriction in livestock.

According to reports which I have just received, all the horse owners in the fourth zone have received a circular indicating an intention to operate an important requisition of horses.

I would be grateful if the Commission would kindly assure me that the requisitions would not surpass the means and resources of the occupied countries and that the commune[s] would not be of necessity forced to obtain their supplies in non-occupied territory in order to be able to effect the deliveries demanded or to replace their stocks which, as a result of these requisitions, would be insufficient for their own needs.

In conclusion I take the liberty to especially request that you accord favourable attention to a petition of the Commission assembled here: according to the Peace Treaty a state of peace will not be recognized until the Treaty will have been ratified by three of the Principal Powers. We are unable to say when this time shall arrive. The population believes and supposes that, Germany having signed and ratified the Treaty as well as this arrangement, they should enjoy the facilities elaborated in the reply and that the military regime, of a severe and hard nature, might be replaced by civil organization of the High Commission. I do not wish to mention here the multitude of complaints relative to the oppression of economic and political life, such as exists at the present time, as I hope that we are on the eve of the new era referred to in the reply, which shall put an end to arbitrary procedures and which, without prejudice toward the attributions conferred to the Allied and Associated Powers by the agreement, shall guarantee political liberty, shall reestablish without hindrances free traffic on both sides of the Rhine and which, finally, shall, provided [*sic*] an arrangement for the requisition and the billeting of troops, which arrangement shall endeavour to establish a just and equitable compromise between the interests of the occupying military forces and those of the population. Would it not be possible for the High Commission to be authorized at the present time by the occupying Powers interested to commence its work in order that the arrangement and that the method intended for its execution by the occupying Powers, which has been agreed upon here, could enter into

application, if possible, on August 15, or at the latest by September 1st? This would correspond with the general point of view developed by the Allied Powers, particularly in their declaration of June 16th, that is, to as soon as possible place Germany in a position to fulfil the obligations which she has assumed by virtue of the Peace Treaty.

LEWALD.

VERSAILLES, August 7, 1919.

Document 2

SECOND NOTE

Relative to Accommodations for the High Empire Commissioner

Mr. Minister:

VERSAILLES, August 7, 1919.

As it is assumed that the Interallied High Commission on Rhenish territories shall be installed at Coblenz, it would be advisable to have the German Empire Commissioner locate[d] there also. Now, in that city there are not many buildings suitable for the installation of the Offices of such an important administration, and in this number, there are certainly some which will be requisitioned for the needs of the American military authorities and by the High Commission itself.

There appears, therefore, that there only remains the building of the former General Commando which would be suitable for the installation of the offices of the Empire Commissioner. The American troops have no further need of these accommodations and are ready to evacuate them. However, they declare that this evacuation cannot take place without the consent of the General Commanding the Allied and Associated Armies.

I would be deeply grateful, Mr. Minister, if the consent of the General could be obtained, in order that the accommodations in question might be prepared for the Empire Commissioner.

Accept, etc. . . .

LEWALD.

Document 3

THIRD NOTE

Relative to Miscellaneous Questions of Procedure

I

According to article 3 c,¹¹ by tribunals, is understood, aside from the ordinary regular courts, the special courts, such as the Council of Experts and the commercial courts, administrative courts, including civil cases, as well as the arbitration committees destined to regulate work and labourers' differences, established on December 23, 1918 (Bulletin of laws of the Empire, p. 1456) on a basis of the decrees of the conventions on tariffs, etc.

II

The prescription of Article 3 d applies only to nationals of the Allied and Associated countries and shall decide only the question of penal competence.

¹¹ The references in this note are to the articles of the Agreement of June 28, 1919, with regard to the Military Occupation of the Territories of the Rhine (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 7. Cmd. 222).

In civil procedures, the executions concerning the persons referred to in article 3 d shall be admitted by the administrations of the occupants at the request of competent German tribunals. The execution requests should be addressed to the following administrations:

For Belgium:

For France:

For Great Britain:

For the United States:

III

The prescription of Article 3 e applies only to acts committed in occupied territory after the entry into force of the conventions of June 28, 1919, in case the accused was domiciled in occupied territory at the time the act was committed. The judgments of similar acts shall be judged according to German jurisdiction.

IV

Cases in litigation in the courts of the Allied and Associated Powers and which are not within the competence of these courts, according to the convention of June 28, 1919, upon the entry into force of the above mentioned Convention, shall be within the competence of German courts, in so far as it is a question of cases not already judged. Details shall be fixed by special convention.

V

According to article 4, only officers in possession of written authorization from one of the authorities cited below may operate concerning extradition demands:

For Belgium:

For France:

For Great Britain:

For the United States:

If at the time of the extradition of a person according to Article 4, a penal trial or a penal execution by German courts was being examined against this person in occupied or non-occupied territory, after the liquidation of the trial by the courts of the occupying forces, the person is to be delivered to the German authorities.

Document 4

FOURTH NOTE

Desiderata of the Administration of Railroads concerning the Application of the Agreement on Occupation

1st. If the economic life in occupied territory is to resume its pacific evolution, it is indispensable that, in principle, the railroads, as in times of peace, serve in the first place the economic interests in order that they be able to fulfill their pacific mission. We hope, therefore, that military exigencies may be regulated in such a manner as to permit the railroads to accomplish their true task.

2nd. In the interest of the maintenance of a well ordered service, it would be greatly desirable to create, for each railroad system, a *single* direction (on the order of the German Linien-Commandantur) who would assume the transmission of the orders of the High Command of the Allied and Associated troops to the competent organisms of the railroad administrations, in accordance with Article 10,

alineia 1, of the Agreement. Transportation of troops, special trains and other service prestations should be announced and taken over after notice corresponding with their importance, in order to assure their execution without interrupting their normal service.

3rd. It is to be presumed that the civil administrations of the railroads will remain in the hands of the German authorities with all the consequences attached thereto.

4th. Under reserve of the requisitions of the High Command of the Allied and Associated Armies within the bounds of military exigencies, the German authorities shall enjoy full independence concerning the management and the exploitation, establishing of time tables and utilization of the stations. The uniform direction of the service shall not suffer any interruption at the frontier of occupied territory. The employment of the rolling stock, etc., shall be entirely subject to the arrangements between the different railroad administrations.

5th. All the orders and regulations concerning the railroads shall become ineffective at the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. The orders and regulations formerly in force shall remain so only on condition of having maintained by order of the High Commission in accordance with Article 3, or by special order of the High Military command, for military needs, in accordance with Article 10.

6th. The regime of the personal subordination [*sic*] of employees and railroad help, as well as the obligations and restrictions resulting, shall be abolished. The German prescriptions regulating the status of employees and railroad help, their professional representations and committees, shall again be effective.

7th. The German language shall remain official for all service needs, timetables and public schedules, etc.

8th. West-European time shall not be reestablished.

9th. The maintenance of the complete material shall be interpreted to mean that the necessary material shall remain available, without prejudice to the general service resulting from an eventual lack of cars and locomotives on account of the participation of occupied territories. In the same way, the complete maintenance of the civil personnel shall be understood to mean that the number and nature of the personnel necessary at a given time shall be always maintained available.

10th. As to the free transportation of troops, soldiers, officers, and particularly the method of controlling orders of transport, it would be fitting to adopt special dispositions. A desire is emitted that this control right by the personnel of the German trains be recognized. It is considered as agreed that the parents of soldiers and officers shall not have the right to free passage.

11th. The transportation to be effected without charge will not be considered as contracts of transport. For that matter, the transportation of occupation troops shall fall within the application of the German prescriptions. Regarding responsibilities not covered by contract, the German civil laws shall apply to members of the armies of occupation as well. They shall also be responsible for damages which they might cause to the railroad administrations, whether directly or indirectly.

12th. The use of the German telephone and telegraph installations, as well as the mail service, for railroad needs, shall not be subject to any restrictions. It is hoped that the railroad lines requisitioned at the present time will be returned to the German authorities, insofar as they are not required simultaneously for military needs.

In the same way, we desire to see the restitution, insofar as possible, of the installations and premises requisitioned up to the present time for military needs

and in view of the fact that these installations and premises are generally indispensable to the service, that no more requisitions be effected.

13th. The regulations of reconciliations between the administrations of neighbouring railroads—in view of the frontier changes—especially the Belgian frontier, should be subject to special negotiations. The temporary utilization of the Herbesthal station shall also necessitate a special arrangement in case of the cession of that station.

Document 5

FIFTH NOTE

Relative to the Navigation Regime in Occupied Territories

As in the case of the railroads, it shall be necessary to clearly define, concerning navigation on the Rhine, the services of a military nature for which this navigation may be employed by the orders of the High Command of the Allied and Associated troops, and to fully designate the authority which may issue orders of this nature in the name of the High Command, in order that the exercise of this right may interrupt as little as possible the regular navigation traffic. In the interest of the regular functioning of fluvial traffic it would also be advisable to have the orders of the High Command addressed to the Directors of the Navigation Companies, and not individually to their many subordinate functionaries. I also believe I may presume that, as is the case regarding freedom of circulation provided for by paragraph 4, the control of the navigation personnel shall be suppressed after the entry into force of the agreement regarding Rhenish territories, that is to say that the passports, control of merchandise traffic, as well as the restrictions issued concerning the circulation of merchandise between the right and left banks of the Rhine, shall be abolished. It would appear to me that upon the establishment of this free traffic, the Interallied Navigation Commission could be dissolved or that, at least, this Commission limit the field to its activities to purely military transportation, having for purpose the assurance of supplies for the Allied troops in occupied territory and that the Commission discontinue the intervention which it has exercised up to this time regarding the economic and technical conditions of Rhine navigation and over the ports on this river. The reestablishment of free communication by telegraph and telephone consented to in Par. 21 would logically entail the right of the Rhine navigation service to use the telephone and telegraphs for the needs of their organisms.

Document 6

Translation.

Reply to the five German notes delivered by Mr. Von Lewald, August 7th, at Versailles, relative to the Administration of the Occupied Territories

I. Reply to the Memorandum relative to the Occupation of the left bank of the Rhine

Paragraphs 1 and 2. Preliminary remarks.—In a general manner the Allied and Associated Governments refer to their memorandum of July 29, 1919, replying to the two memorandum [*sic*] delivered by the German Government dated July 11 and 12, 1919, on the same question, and to the reservations formulated in the last paragraph of the reply memorandum.⁹

Paragraph 3. Application of German legislation.—It is understood that the High Commission shall exercise its veto right by ordinances with the least delay

possible. To this end, German laws and regulations should be communicated to the Commission prior to their promulgation. The High Commission reserves at all times the right to suspend the application of a law if circumstances demand it. The High Commission shall itself assure the publication of these laws and regulations in which they should be assisted by the German authorities.

Paragraph 4. Public liberties and circulation.—Public Liberties; the freedom of the press shall be assured in conformity with German Legislation. If a publication infringes on the public order or the security of the troops, administrative and judiciary punishments shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Circulation: circulation shall be free between the occupied and non-occupied territories, but an identification card should be carried by the interested, which they shall be obliged to present when requested according to conditions fixed by the High Commission. The High Commission, furthermore, reserves the right to order expulsions justified by the maintenance of public order or the security of the troops of occupation.

Paragraph 5. Institution of an Empire civil Commissaryship.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply. The Empire Commissioner cannot be officially accepted until after the ratification of the Treaty by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Paragraph 6. Effectives of the troops of occupation.—The effectives of the troops of occupation shall be communicated to the German Government as soon as possible. The German Government can attenuate the burden of the occupation for the Rhineland population by calling on the resources in material and supplies from the rest of the Empire.

Paragraph 7. Strength of the police force.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply.

Paragraph 9. Jurisdiction privileges.—The Allied and Associated Governments insist on the terms of their previous reply. They do not admit the principle of reciprocal amnesty which would favour one or another case of the German nationals. They mean to oppose judiciary actions of a nature to disturb the public order, in accordance with the terms of the convention and of their above-cited reply. On the other hand, they shall examine with favour and in each case the remission of sentences pronounced in the course of the Armistice by military jurisdiction.

Paragraphs 10, 11, and 12. Legal questions.—The memorandum of the German Minister of Justice shall receive a special reply. The High Commission shall decide by ordinance regarding the questions introduced.

Paragraph 14. Finances.—No objections.

Paragraph 16. Payment of requisitions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply. It is mentioned that the requisitions effected by the German troops in France and Belgium have not been settled.

Paragraph 17. Billeting of troops.—The High Commission shall make efforts to obtain friendly arrangements with the local authorities for the billeting of officers and men. It is pointed out that the German authorities may facilitate these arrangements both by evacuating the population which emigrated to the occupied territories in the course of the war, and by calling upon the general resources of the Empire.

Paragraph 18. Tax exemptions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply.

Paragraph 19. Duty questions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply. Concerning the Lorraine-Palatinate frontier the German authorities have already been invited to establish customs posts on that frontier, although it has not yet been officially recognized.

Paragraph 20. Railroads.—The note remitted by the German Delegation calls for a special reply.¹²

Paragraph 21. Telegraph and Mail Service.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply.

Paragraph 24. Orders for military authorities.—The High Commission has full and exclusive competence in the regulation of this question.

Paragraph 25. Persons expelled.

Paragraph 28. Authorities of the Governments of the federated States.

Paragraph 29. Functionaries.

Paragraph 32. Requisitions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply and to paragraph 4 of the present reply.

The occupied territories must aid in the feeding and other needs of the troops of occupation. The German Government should, in order to prevent the requisitioning of supplies and fodder, examine the participation of the resources of the entire Empire with a view to satisfying the needs of the troops of occupation.

Special Questions

1st. Preparatory labours of the High Commission.—The Commission on Rhineland territories, operating at the present time, is preparing the labours of the High Commission which shall commence operation only on the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. It may enter into unofficial relations with the Empire Commissioner.

2nd. Distribution of Coal.—A special reply has been addressed to the German Government on this question.

Document 7

II. Reply to the Letter of the German Peace Delegation relative to the Installation of the German Imperial High Commissioner

The Interallied Commission on Rhineland territories has constituted a Committee directed, in accord with the American Command, to proceed to a complete revision of the cantonments in Coblenz. The Burgomaster of Coblenz represents German authority.

A personal lodging and office accommodations shall be provided for the German Imperial Commissioner, when those of the High Allied Commissioners shall have been determined. The consent of the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, is not necessary.

Document 8

Translation.

III. Reply to the Note of the German Peace Delegation, A.D.H.F.H. No. 13561, relative to the Interpretation of the Agreement concerning the Military Occupation of the Rhenish Territories.

1. As regards paragraph 1 of the German note:

'The Allied and Associated Governments agree with the German Government for the interpretation which it proposes. Article 3 c of the agreement concerns all the tribunals.'

¹² See document 9 in this appendix.

2. As regards the first alinea of paragraph 2, there is nothing to add to the text of the memorandum already transmitted.

As regards the second alinea, it is a question of a regulation of detail which shall be the subject of an ulterior examination of the High Commission.

3. Paragraph 3, as well as paragraph 4, cannot be favourably received.

4. As regards paragraph 5:

(a) The officers mentioned in article 4 of the agreements are the officers whose juridical competence is defined by the regulations of the various armies of occupation.

(b) The Allied and Associated Governments have no objections to the trying by the tribunals of the non-occupied parts of Germany of the delinquents already on trial before those tribunals, after the closing of the procedure before the tribunals of the armies of occupation. However, the guilty party must serve his term in the occupied territories if the heaviest condemnation has been pronounced by the Allied or German judiciary tribunals of said territories.

Document 9

IV. Answer to the German Note relative to the Control of the Railroads in the Occupied Territories.

1. *General use of the Railroads.*—It is understood that the Allied and Associated authorities shall take all measures so that the railroads be, as the German note asks, in a position to satisfy the economic interests of the occupied territories, in a measure compatible with military exigencies.

2. *Organs of transmission of the orders of the High Command.*—As it is proposed in the German note, the orders of the Allied High Command shall be transmitted to the railroad administration by a single special Organ.

The Interallied Commission on Field Railroads is competent to fill that function. Subcommissions of the system and the military organs empowered by it to that effect shall facilitate the accomplishment of that task.

The Commission has with it a German delegate to whom instructions are transmitted.

That Organization corresponds to the organization of the Allied railroads in time of peace.

The Interallied subcommissions on field railroads act as the *Linien Kommandantar* [*sic*] considered by the German note.

3. *Civil administration of railroads.*—It is understood that the civil administration of railroads shall be exercised by the German authorities with the reservations provided for by Article 10 of the agreement of June 28.

4. *Exploitation.*—With the same reservation, it is understood that the German authorities shall have full liberty as far as the exploitation of the systems is concerned. However, in execution of alinea 2 of article 10, the Commission of Interallied Railroads shall be in a position to control at any time that the necessary personnel and material for the upkeep and the exploitation of all lines of communication are maintained in full in the occupied territories.

5. *Orders and regulations.*—It is understood, as the German note requests, that the orders and regulations concerning the railroads and emanating from the Command shall be maintained by decree of the High Commission, in conformity with article 3 of the agreement, or by express order of the High Military Command for the military needs, in conformity with article 10.

6. *Subordination of the personnel to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.*—The German regulations concerning the situation of the employees and workmen of the railroads, as well as their professional representation and the committees shall be made valid under the reservation of the right of previous examination by the Interallied High Commission, as it was provided for all the laws and regulations in occupied territories. However, the Interallied Commission on field railroads, in application of alinea 1 of article 10, and to insure the execution of the orders of the High Command can pronounce or cause on the part of the German authorities any useful sanctions. It pertains, however, to the High Commission, in execution of Article 5 of the agreement, to pronounce the revocations and expulsions which are recognized as necessary.

It shall notably be necessary to report without delay to the Interallied Commission on Field Railways all incidents of a nature to disturb the exploitation such as: agitation among the personnel, attempts to strike, etc.

7. *German language.*—It is understood that the German language shall remain the official language for the needs of the German civil services. For military orders, the rules now in force shall be followed.

The documents informing the public of the schedules for passenger trains and the conditions for the transportation of merchandise shall be drawn up in three languages; French, English and German.

8. *Western Europe Time.*—That question shall be regulated later by the High Commission after examination of the High Command's proposals by reason of the eventual necessities of troop movements concerning the ensemble of the systems in Allied and in occupied countries.

9. *Full Maintenance of the personnel and material.*—Article 10 provides formally that by reason of military needs and the necessity of eventual troop movements, the material and the personnel must be maintained in full for the upkeep and the exploitation of all the lines of communication in the occupied territories.

The request contained in the German notes and tending to make use of the material to remedy the shortage of cars and locomotives in the non-occupied territories cannot be accepted.

Changes in personnel are subordinated to the observation of the general rules edicted on the subject by the High Commission for the other administrative personnel of the other occupied territories.

10. *Free transportation of troops.*—That question shall be the subject of the regulations by the High Commission upon proposals of the High Command.

The exemption shall apply to transportation with a regular order of transportation, including the transportation of the families of the soldiers and officers and that of the men on leave belonging to the corps of occupation, in conformity with the regulations of the various Allied Armies.

11. *Responsibility of the railroad administration as regards transportation.*—The responsibility of the German administrations as regards transportation cannot be affected by the fact that the transportation is made free of charge, since the agreement of June 25, 1916? June 28, 1918?¹³ is in itself a contract.

That rule, however, is that observed in similar cases on the Allied systems in spite of the reductions and special tariffs of military transportation.

12. *Use of the telephone and telegraph installation and requisitioned buildings.*—The High Command shall examine, according to the request contained in the German note, how the utilization of the lines and buildings now requisitioned can be

¹³ Thus in original.

regulated for the best of the interests of the civil service and the needs of the armies of occupation.

13. *Rectification of frontiers.*—Special agreements shall be made as requested in the German note.

Document 10

V. Answer to the German Note relative to the Navigation System in the Occupied Territories.

The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their answer to the German note relative to railroads.

1. *Use of waterways.*—It is understood that the military authorities shall take the necessary measures so that the use of the waterways of military needs disturb as little as possible the economic traffic.

2. *Transmission of the orders of the High Command.*—As the German note requests, a single organ shall be charged with the transmission of the orders of the High Command. The Interallied Commission on Navigation shall be charged with that function. Its functioning and its organs are similar to those provided for the Interallied Commission on field railroads.

3. *Navigation personnel.*—Same remarks as for the railroad personnel.

4. *Restrictions enacted concerning the circulation of merchandise between the left and the right banks of the Rhine.* It is understood that these restrictions are abolished.

5. *Function of the Navigation Commission.*—It is understood that the Navigation Commission shall not have to intervene in the economic traffic. However, it shall have to supervise the execution of the provisions of article 10 of the agreement.

6. *Use of telegraph and telephone line.*—Same remarks as for the lines affected to the railroad service.

APPENDIX C TO No. 73

Memorandum submitted by the British Delegation

Amended Version¹⁴

By the terms of the Armistice Convention signed at Trèves in January, 1919, Germany agreed to place the whole German Merchant Fleet under the control and under the flags of the Allied Powers.

The 'Johann-Burchard', 'William Oswald', 'Brauns[c]hlweig', 'Denderah' and 'Nassau' have not been delivered. All except the 'Oswald' are ready for sea. Continued demands have been made by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to the President of the German Armistice Commission to surrender these vessels. These demands were simply ignored and remained unanswered until quite recently when Admiral Goette stated that the ships, having been sold in 1915-1916 by the Hamburg-Amerika Line and Kosmos Line to Dutch Shipping Companies, were consequently not German but Dutch ships.

In fact, these ships were, without question, originally built for German companies and were German property. Their transfer admittedly did not take place until

¹⁴ Note in original: 'The last paragraph of the original version has been altered.'

considerably after the outbreak of hostilities. The Germans as well as the Dutch were already well aware that this transfer was invalid, as the ships have not in fact dared to put out to sea in view of the certainty of their capture by the Allies.

The impression gained by the naval officer who inspected the vessels on behalf of the Interallied Armistice Commission is that the Germans fully realise that the ships would have to be surrendered under the Peace Treaty. They hoped to be able to evade their obligation by supporting the Dutch claim and handing over the ships to the Dutch before the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

The German contention, if accepted, would amount to the recognition of the right to transfer the property in these belligerent vessels to a neutral after the outbreak of hostilities. It is a contention which is not accepted by the Allied Powers.

The substance of the Allied view was brought to the attention of the Neutral Governments by a circular dated November 7th, 1918, issued by the British Government, in which it was recalled that no transfer of enemy tonnage during or after the War to neutral flags or ownership would, except by special consent, be recognized before the final conclusion of Peace.

This view has been finally endorsed and confirmed by all the Allied and Associated Powers in virtue of the express stipulation of the Treaty of Peace. Under the head of Reparations, Annex 3, Section 7, it is provided that:—

‘Germany agrees to take any measures that may be indicated to her by the Reparations Commission for obtaining full title to the property in all ships which have during the war been transferred, or are in process of transfer to neutral flags without the consent of the Allied and Associated Powers.’

It is thus definitely established by common agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany that German vessels transferred to a neutral flag during the war without Allied consent must be regarded as German vessels. The obligation on the part of the German Government to deliver them up under the terms of the Armistice cannot therefore be called in question. The Germans are perfectly well aware of this and they are only having recourse to a transparent subterfuge in order to escape the obligations imposed upon them by the Armistice and by the Peace Treaty to hand over the vessels.

In these circumstances it is suggested that instructions be given to the Armistice Commission to require the German Government to hand over the ships without further delay.

October 10, 1919.

APPENDIX E TO No. 73

Note by the British Delegation

Sale by the German Government to Sweden of Aerial Material

On August 22nd Marshal Foch, acting under the instructions of the Supreme Council, sent a telegram to General Nudant for transmission to the German Government, forbidding the sale or export of German aircraft and aircraft material.¹⁵

On September 30th as a result of further infringements of the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty, the Supreme Council instructed Marshal Foch to send a further telegram to the same effect, adding that the German Government would be

¹⁵ See No. 41, appendix C.

required to hand over to the Allies the proceeds of all sales already made.¹⁶ This telegram was despatched on the same date.

Information has now been received to the effect that early in September a Swede by the name of Mr. Ranft was arranging to purchase 30 aeroplanes in Germany and was placing other orders for aircraft in Germany, also that the Autofesselshcraft[?Autogesellschaft] had in Berlin offered the Swedish Army two German aeroplanes as a gift and had requested permission for aeroplanes to be flown from Germany to Stockholm.

In order to put a stop to these transactions and to prevent further infringements of the Air Clauses the following resolution is proposed. . . .¹⁷

October 7, 1919.

¹⁶ See No. 67, minute 2.

¹⁷ The proposed resolution comprised the two clauses approved by the Supreme Council: see minute 9 above.

No. 74

H. D. 70.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, October 15, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Mr. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Mr. E. L. Dresel, Major Tyler, Captain Gordon.

British Empire: General Sackville-West, Lt.-Col. Kisch, Mr. Carr, Captain Fuller, Commandant Dunne, Mr. Shearman.

France: Marshal Foch, M. Loucheur, General Weygand, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Fromageot, M. Escoffier.

Italy: General Cavallero, M. Brambilla, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Pilotti.

Japan: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. (The Council had before it a draft note addressed to the German Government to be communicated by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission (see Appendix A). This note was prepared by the British Delegation.)

Note to the German Government relative to German Ships transferred during the War to Dutch Navigation Companies

SIR EYRE CROWE said that pursuant to his instructions from the Supreme Council in the preceding meeting the British Delegation had prepared a draft note to be sent to the President of the German Naval Armistice Commission. The principles enunciated in this note had already been approved by the Council at its preceding meeting.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the French Delegation did not agree to our demand being based on the terms of the Armistice, as the Armistice would cease to be operative in a few days. The Reparation Commission, and not the Armistice Commission, would have to take possession of these vessels. He therefore thought that it would not be well to act on the basis of the Armistice.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that we were still subject to the terms of the Armistice; the only proper procedure therefore was that proposed by him.

M. LOUCHEUR said that, assuming that on the day when our note would reach Germany the Peace Treaty should already have become operative, the Reparation Commission alone would then be qualified to take possession of the vessels. He proposed to add a paragraph to the effect that if when our demands should be met the Peace Treaty had become operative the Reparations Commission would take possession of the vessels.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the matter had dragged on long enough and that it was important to settle our difference with the Dutch Government as soon as possible. He feared that the draft proposed by M. Loucheur would be apt to result in the Germans doing nothing. We should inform them of the reasons upon which our claim is based and that it is formulated by virtue of the terms of the Armistice. Moreover, he found no difficulty in admitting that if our note should not arrive until such time as the Armistice would cease to be operative, the Reparations Commission would take the matter in hand.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he could accept the terms of Sir Eyre Crowe's note as far as the Germans were concerned, but as regards relations between Allies he could not admit that it should be specified that the vessels should be delivered to the Armistice Commission. At least he could only admit this on one condition; to wit, that it should be clearly understood that if, at the time of the delivery of the vessels, the Peace Treaty should be operative the Reparation Commission would take possession thereof.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

MR. POLK also agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that a question of form still remained to be settled. It seemed to him desirable that the note should be published and a copy thereof be delivered to Baron von Lersner.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft Note to be transmitted to the German Government through the intermediary of the Naval Armistice Commission, prepared by the British Delegation;
- (2) that in the event of the Treaty of Peace coming into force before the delivery of the ships in question, the Reparation Commission should be charged with taking possession of them.)

(It was further decided: to publish the Note and transmit a copy to Baron von Lersner.)

2. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the British Naval Representative had received a telegram from the Commander of the naval forces in the Gulf of Riga. According to this telegram the Commander of the naval forces had ordered the Germans to evacuate the Dvina front before noon of October 15th, failing which he would open fire on them. The Council was evidently face to face with a *fait accompli* in view of the fact that this ultimatum had actually been sent. The British Admiralty wished to know the views of the Supreme Council in this respect. The situation was evidently abnormal inasmuch as there was no definite information as to what had taken place and as to what the Germans had done.¹ According to the latest British information the Letts were still holding out in Riga, but no one knew how long they could resist.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he knew the situation of the Letts and Esthonians as well as one could know it from Paris, but that it was difficult to tell from here what should be done.

M. PICHON stated that it seemed to him that the Council should confine itself to taking note of this communication; it should consider that the officers on the spot had taken the necessary measures.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that he desired to call the attention of the Council to the great importance of the Allied and Associated Powers being represented at Berlin or at Riga by a General Officer, whom it had already been proposed to the German Government to send.² The departure of this officer should be hastened.

M. PICHON stated that according to the telegram which he had received that morning the National Assembly would that day take action on the reply to be made to our note. As soon as this answer was received measures would have to be taken and our representative would have to be sent.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that this representative should have instructions from the Council defining the attitude which he should adopt toward the German Government.

3. (The Council had before it a note from the Committees on Polish and on *Occupation of Baltic Affairs*, drafted at a joint meeting, relative to the military occupation of Dantzic and Memel. (See Appendix B.)³)

M. LAROCHE read and commented on the note of these Committees and directed the attention of the Council to the last paragraph of this note respecting Memel.⁴ It seemed to the Committees, sitting in joint session,

¹ For the situation in Latvia see Vol. III of this series.

² See No. 71, minute 4 and appendix D.

³ Not printed. The recommendations in this undated note were as summarized by M. Laroche.

⁴ The note stated that 'as regards Memel, the Commission considers that the territory should be occupied by Interallied troops until such time as its final disposition shall be definitely fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers' but proposed in the last paragraph that 'the local administration will continue to function, subject to powers conferred upon the commander of the forces of occupation, under international law, for the maintenance of order.'

that it was not proper to interfere with local administrative functions in view of the uncertainty of the future fate of Memel. Therefore it had seemed advisable to specify that the Commanding Officer of the forces of Occupation should only have such powers as would be conferred upon him by International Law with a view to the maintenance of order. When the Commission had settled upon a battalion and a half of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and a machine gun section—a total of about 1,700 men—as the strength of the forces for the occupation of Memel, it had taken a strictly local point of view. It had not thought itself qualified to consider the question raised by virtue of the presence of German forces in the Baltic provinces. The Allied High Command would be competent to reinforce the troops of occupation if it should deem it necessary in view of the actual situation existing in the neighbouring territory.

With respect to Dantzig, the situation was different. There was no question in that case of a plebiscite region, and forces of occupation had not been provided for by the Peace Treaty. The Allied Powers were only to send a delimitation commission there at first; the League of Nations was to appoint the High Commissioner. In view of this situation the Supreme Council some time ago, on the motion of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty, decided to send an administrative commissioner to Dantzig, but in the actual state of affairs no one was able to say whether it was necessary to send troops there.

In order to solve the difficulty therefore, the Council had adopted the following expedient: in its last session it decided to send troops to Allenstein and Marienwerder.⁵ A base at Dantzig was necessary for the supply of these troops and this base would have to be strong enough to insure its own safety. It was only in this manner and on such grounds that troops could be sent to Dantzig at once, but the troops at this base were not to interfere to maintain public order in the free city itself unless commanded to do so by the High Commissioner of the League of Nations. However, if trouble should break out before the High Commissioner's arrival, the Administrative Commissioner could bring to the attention of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the necessity of occupying Dantzig with Interallied forces. In such a contingency the base troops could be used for police duties in the city.

(It was decided: to accept the proposal made by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Baltic Affairs in regard to the occupation of Dantzig and Memel.)

4. MARSHAL FOCH observed that as the Council now had a more or less solid base on which to work, he wished to revert to his suggestion made the previous session; to wit, that a commission composed of military and diplomatic representatives must be formed for determining the composition of forces of occupation.

⁵ See No. 73, minute 5.

M. PICHON said that he did not see the necessity for appointing diplomatic representatives; he thought it would suffice if Marshal Foch should assemble the Military Representatives.

MARSHAL FOCH dissented and said that the point which he always found troublesome was above all the question of Upper Silesia. He wished to know to what extent the British Government was disposed to take part in the occupation of this region.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not minimize the importance of the question of Upper Silesia, but it seemed to him that the question of Allenstein, for instance, was of equal importance and that all similar problems should be considered together.

GENERAL WEYGAND wished to insist on the appointment of diplomatic representatives. He felt that if the Allied and Associated Powers were to let themselves be guided by purely military considerations they would, for instance, be tempted to have the same corps occupy Upper Silesia and the Duchy of Teschen; if this were done, however, he thought it would contravene the spirit of the Treaty. Similarly, they might think of grouping under the same command the forces of occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder; whereas, politically, the situation of these regions was entirely different.

M. PICHON agreed with this opinion and thought that each of the Allied Powers could designate a diplomatic representative to be attached to the military representatives. He designated M. Laroche.

(It was decided: that Marshal Foch, together with the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, with whom diplomatic representatives of these Powers might collaborate, should study the question of the Interallied forces which should occupy the districts which, under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, were to be or might be occupied by Interallied forces, and that these representatives should submit their proposals to the Supreme Council at the earliest possible opportunity.)

5.

*Organization of Com-
missions of Delimitation*

[Not printed]⁶

⁶ The Supreme Council considered (i) a note dated October 6, 1919, from the Commission on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany (appendix C in original) recommending the prompt designation, appropriate composition and early meeting in Paris of the several commissions for the delimitation of the new frontiers of Germany and Austria in accordance with the terms of the treaties of peace; (ii) a set of draft instructions to the commissions of delimitation (appendix D in original) as regards organization, procedure, administration and technical matters. After discussion the Supreme Council approved both documents 'with the reservation that Sir Eyre Crowe should request the agreement of the British Government to the opinion, expressed by the four other Delegations, that the members of the Commissions of Delimitation should be paid by their respective Governments.' During the preceding discussion Sir Eyre Crowe had stated that the British Government was still of the opinion that according to the terms of the Peace Treaty, all charges arising out of delimitations should be borne by the interested parties and not by Allied countries. This was a question of principle and the payment of these salaries was one of these charges. If this point of view were not admitted, the matter

6. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation dated the 13th October, 1919. (See Appendix E.))

*Putting into force of
the Versailles Treaty*

M. LAROCHE desired to call the attention of the Council to the importance of not proceeding to the deposit of ratifications before being assured that the coming into force of the Treaty would find the Allied and Associated Powers prepared. The Committee on the Execution of the Treaty could be instructed to immediately draw up a list of the measures which have to be taken during the first weeks following the taking effect of the Treaty, as well as the Commissions to be appointed, and to ask each Government if it had prepared the nominations which it had to make under the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he agreed fully to what M. Laroche had suggested, and added that he desired to take advantage of the presence of Marshal Foch to submit an even more general question. He wished to ask if the Allied and Associated Powers were inclined to substitute the means of action given by the Treaty of Peace for those obtaining under the Armistice. He thought that they should particularly ask themselves in view of the situation now existent in the Baltic Provinces, whether it would be to the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers to ratify the Treaty. There was no doubt that this ratification would deprive them of weapons which the Armistice gave them. At the present moment German ships could be stopped in the Baltic; this could no longer be done were the Treaty in effect. If more energetic action in the Baltic Provinces became necessary, were they better armed by virtue of the Treaty or of the Armistice? He recognized that the question had two sides; thus the use of Polish troops in the Baltic Provinces had formerly been opposed for fear that their use might have unfortunate results with respect to Upper Silesia and might cause new disturbances in the coal districts.⁷ The Allied occupation of Upper Silesia prescribed by the Treaty would obviate that difficulty. A problem was here presented which should be carefully studied.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe.

(It was decided:

that the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty should be requested

- (1) to submit to the Council at the earliest possible opportunity a list of the measures to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers in the first weeks following the entry of the Treaty into force, together with a list of the Commissions to be appointed in these first weeks;

would have to be taken to Parliament, as a fiscal measure was involved.' General Le Rond stated that the other four delegations did not agree with this British interpretation of the treaty and 'M. Pichon observed that the French delegation had to take account of the fact that all additional expenses imposed upon Germany diminished by so much the amount remaining available for reparations. France being the country most interested in this question, since she had suffered the most in the war, felt that Germany should be charged with as few expenses of this kind as possible. If Sir Eyre Crowe were right in using the parliamentary argument, the French were also justified in doing so.'

⁷ See No. 59, minute 1 and appendix A.

- (2) to notify the Supreme Council as soon as possible of the steps taken by the Allied and Associated Governments and those which remain to be taken, in view of the entry of the Treaty into force, pointing out those measures which these Governments were not in a position to take immediately;
- (3) to compare the value under present conditions of the means of action placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Versailles with those now available to them by virtue of the terms of the Armistice.)

7. (The Council had before it a note from the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference (see Appendix F).)

*Adhesion of Neutral
States to the
Covenant of the
League of Nations*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the General Secretariat. The question of adhering to the Covenant of the League of Nations was especially important with respect to Spain, inasmuch as she was a member of the Council of the League of Nations and the latter had immediately to make a large number of decisions. If Spain were given two months to signify her adhesion to the Covenant she would not be able to take part in the meetings of the Council, or at least she could not take part in the deliberations which would have to take place immediately.

M. PICHON remarked that Spain had already indicated that she would adhere to the Covenant.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that she had only done so unofficially; in order to avoid all difficulty it was necessary that as soon as Spain had received the official invitation addressed to her she should immediately signify her adhesion. With respect to the other neutral Powers, it was equally urgent that their adhesion should be obtained as soon as possible. Two methods of procedure might be used: first, either the Minister of Foreign Affairs should deliver to the heads of the diplomatic missions of the interested Governments in Paris a certified copy of the Treaty of Versailles, notifying them of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty; the neutral states would have a two months period within which to signify their adhesion to the Covenant by a declaration addressed to the General Secretary of the League of Nations. Or, secondly, the President of the Peace Conference should telegraph the heads of the various neutral Governments in question, while at the same time a certified copy of the Treaty of Versailles should be delivered to the heads of their diplomatic missions in Paris. The second procedure seemed to him less practical.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that both methods might be employed at the same time.

M. FROMAGEOT agreed. He desired to insist upon the fact that a certified copy of the whole Treaty of Versailles, and not only a copy of the Covenant of the League, should be transmitted. Indeed, the Treaty in its different parts contained a series of measures to be taken by the Council of the League of Nations. In accepting membership in the League the Governments in

question would have to take note of and must accept all obligations arising out of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the neutral States which, under the terms of the Annex to the Covenant of the League of Nations were to be invited to agree to the Covenant, should be informed officially of the contents of the Covenant and the obligations of the League of Nations relative to the execution of the Treaty of Peace;
- (2) that these States should be notified of the entry of the Treaty into force, as soon after such entry as possible.)

(It was also decided: that these two notifications should be made at the same time by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting under the authority of the Supreme Council, to the Chiefs of the diplomatic missions in Paris of the Governments interested, and by a telegram from the President of the Conference to the Heads of the neutral Governments interested. A certified copy of the Treaty should be transmitted to the Representatives of the neutral Governments at Paris.)

8. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council of the League of Nations must immediately after the coming into force of the Treaty formulate a complete series of measures to be taken. The President of the United States must call this Council. Could he do it before the Treaty had been ratified by the American Senate?

*Convocation of the
Council of the
League of Nations*

MR. POLK stated that the question had already been settled at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the 15th September (H. D. 53)⁸. It had been agreed that he should suggest to President Wilson the calling of the Council of the League for a meeting which could be devoted entirely to the consideration of questions demanding the action of the Council a short time after the coming into force of the Treaty. He thought that he could obtain a formal assurance to this effect. He added that he would welcome any suggestions which the Drafting Committee might deem opportune.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that before the coming into force of the Treaty there should be no doubt on the point of President Wilson's calling the Council. Otherwise, everything would remain unsettled.

MR. POLK said that he would immediately communicate with Washington.

M. FROMAGEOT called the attention of the Council to the very delicate situation which the coming into force of the Treaty would create at Dantzig, Memel and in the Sarre Basin. The day the Treaty would come into force Germany would lose all authority in these districts. If trouble should arise the Allied and Associated Powers would be entirely responsible.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the League of Nations should begin to operate and formulate decisions the very day of the coming into force of the Treaty. He would almost say that the minutes of the first meeting of the

⁸ No. 57 (minute 9).

Council should be drawn up beforehand. He suggested that the Secretary General of the League of Nations should now be notified of the questions on which the Council would immediately have to take decisions.

M. ESCOFFIER said that the Secretariat of the League of Nations had itself to be confirmed by the Supreme Council.

M. MANTOUX observed that this was not true of the Secretary General, who was designated by the Treaty.

(It was decided:

- (1) that Mr. Polk should obtain an assurance from Washington, that, without awaiting the ratification of the Treaty of Peace by the United States Senate, President Wilson would convoke the Council of the League of Nations for a meeting, which should be held in Europe;
- (2) that the Secretary General of the League of Nations should, at the present time, be notified unofficially by the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference of the questions which, upon the entry of the Treaty of Peace into force, would require immediate action by the Council of the League of Nations.)

9. (The Council had before it a note from the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference, dated 14th October, 1919. (See Appendix G).)

*Wearing of Uniform
by the Members of the
Interallied Missions
of Control in Germany*

M. PICHON commented briefly on this note of the Secretariat General. He remarked that in the opinion of the French Delegation there was no possible analogy between the position of members of the Commissions of Control and Military Attachés. Moreover, Military Attachés wear the uniform when on duty and officers of Commissions of Control are always on duty. The French Government was entirely opposed to the personnel of these Commissions of Control being obliged to wear civilian clothing. Moreover, among this military personnel there were noncommissioned officers and men. If they were obliged to wear civilian clothing difficulties would arise. There was no intention of riding roughshod over German prejudices or of abusing our victory; nevertheless, Germany must accustom herself to the idea that she was beaten. Allied officers in Germany have a definite military mission to fulfil. They cannot be expected to wear civilian dress in the execution of their duties.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed entirely with M. Pichon. He added that in his mind there was no doubt that the German demand was not aimed at preventing possible friction alone. It was a question of something more. Whoever knew Germany knew that a man in uniform is far more respected than a civilian. The idea of the Germans was to diminish the prestige of Allied officers.

(It was decided not to grant the wish expressed by the German Government that, upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace, the members of the Interallied Missions of Control should wear civilian clothing.)

10. (The Council had before it a draft note addressed to the German Delegation, prepared by the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty (see Appendix H), in reply to the note of the German Delegation prepared at Versailles 22nd September, 1919.)⁹

GENERAL LE ROND read and commented briefly upon the note of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty.

(It was decided: to accept the draft reply to the Note of the German Delegation respecting the District of Memel, prepared by the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty. (See Appendix H).)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hôtel de Grillon, Paris,
October 15, 1919.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 74

Draft Note from the Supreme Council to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission for communication to the President of the German Armistice Commission

PARIS, 15 October 1919.

You are requested to transmit the following note to the German Government on behalf of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, with as little delay as possible.

By the terms of the Armistice Convention signed at Trèves in January, 1919, Germany agreed to place the whole of the German merchant fleet under the control and under the flag of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In particular five vessels, namely the 'Johann Heinrich Burchard', 'William Oswald', 'Braunschweig', 'Denderah' and 'Nassau' have not been delivered on the pretext that these ships, having been sold in 1915-1916 by the Hamburg-Amerika

⁹ This German note, addressed to M. Clemenceau and dated from Versailles on September 22, 1919, read as follows in translation:

'Sir, Representatives of the Memel territory—which, according to Section X, Part III of the Treaty of Peace, is to be handed over to the principal Allied and Associated Powers—have repeatedly petitioned the German Government to obtain an early decision as to their future political and international fate.

'While the overwhelming majority of the population desires no change in the present state of affairs, but claims that the people themselves must in any case decide their own national status according to the principle of self-determination, all inhabitants of the Memel territory find the present state of uncertainty both troublesome and harmful. The economic life of a territory dependent on active trade suffers greatly; enterprise is weakened; national and social differences become more acute. The Government itself is faced by considerable technical and administrative difficulties arising out of this state of affairs.

'All these disadvantages would be removed if the principal Allied and Associated Powers adopted as soon as possible a policy with regard to the Memel territory which took the wishes of the population into account.

Accept, etc.
Baron von Lersner'.

Line and Kosmos Line to Dutch Shipping Companies, were consequently not German but Dutch ships.

The German Government have been repeatedly informed, through the President of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission, that the Allied and Associated Powers do not recognise any transfer of enemy tonnage to neutral flags or ownership during the war, except by special consent.

Under the head of Reparation, Annex 3, Section 7, in the Treaty of Peace, it is provided that:—

Germany agrees to take any measures that may be indicated to her by the Reparation Commission for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which have during the war been transferred, or are in process of transfer, to neutral flags, without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments.

It is thus definitely established by common agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany that German vessels transferred to a neutral flag during the war without Allied consent must be regarded as German vessels. The obligation on the part of the German Government to deliver them up cannot, therefore, be called in question. In consequence the German Government is required:—

- (1) to send without further delay the five vessels above named to the Firth and [of] Forth for delivery to the Allied and Associated Powers.
- (2) to remove the nucleus Dutch crews now on board and to substitute for them German crews.
- (3) to have removed forthwith the Dutch name and Dutch port of registry at present temporarily painted on each vessel.
- (4) to permit a free inspection of the 'William Oswald' by officers representing the Allied and Associated Powers whenever desired by them.
- (5) to have the 'Nassau' and 'Braunschweig' brought down the river Weser from Bremen to Bremerhaven by German crews, and berthed wherever directed by the Allied Senior Naval Officer in German waters.

The German Government is requested to acknowledge this communication immediately on its receipt and to reply to it.

BRITISH DELEGATION,

October 14th, 1919.

APPENDIX E TO NO. 74

Note from the French Delegation regarding the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles

October 13, 1919.

Putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles.

The official report on the ratification by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers involves the entry into force of the Treaty, and from then will be dated all the delays in the execution, which are to be guarded against.

Before drafting this report, it would therefore be necessary to determine whether the interested Powers are ready to execute the provisions which should enter into force immediately after the going into force of the Treaty, or with the shortest possible delay.

It is advisable to ascertain whether the International Commissions provided for are nominated and ready to operate, whether the troops of occupation are ready to accomplish their task, whether all the measures have been taken to effect the execution of all other provisions, especially of the obligations imposed on Germany.

APPENDIX F TO No. 74

Document 1

PEACE CONFERENCE.

Secretariat General.

Note

Article 1 of the Treaty with Germany and the Annex to Part I of this Treaty provide that certain neutral States, not signers and enumerated in the said Annex, are invited to accede to the Covenant of the League of Nations within the two months from the going into force of the Covenant, that is to say of the Treaty.

The date of the going into force being near, it would seem necessary for the Supreme Council to take preparatory and necessary decisions that:

1. The States invited to accede to the Covenant be officially informed of the tenour of the Covenant and of the obligations of the League of Nations relative to the execution of the Treaty:

2. The said States receive notification of the putting into force of the Treaty with Germany, at as early a date as possible.

The two notifications (tenour of the Covenant and of its obligations and date of the going into force) can be made:

Either by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, by delegation of the Supreme Council, to the chiefs of diplomatic Missions of the states interested at Paris,

Or directly by telegram from the President of the Conference to the chiefs of the different Governments.

In either case, the double notification could be made only on the day of the signing of the authentic minutes of the filing of the ratifications, and a certified copy conformable to the Peace Treaty with Germany should be addressed to the neutral Governments invited to accede to the Covenant.

The double notification by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic to the Chiefs of diplomatic Missions at Paris could be made in the form of a letter, a draft of which is appended.¹⁰

If the procedure of notification by the President of the Conference were adopted, it would be advisable to mention, in the telegram to the Chiefs of Neutral States interested that [a] certified copy conformable to the Peace Treaty with Germany has been handed to their respective representatives at Paris.

Document 2

Project of a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in Paris

PARIS (date of signing of minutes on file of the ratifications)

Mr. Minister:

By delegation of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, I have the honour of enclosing herewith a certified copy, conformable to the Peace

¹⁰ Document 2 in this appendix.

Treaty signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and beg you to be kind enough to bring it to the attention of the Government of¹¹

I have also been charged with calling your attention to certain clauses of this Treaty.

Article 1 of the Treaty and the Annex to Part I provide that the (State. . . .)¹¹ is invited to accede to the Covenant of the League of Nations within two months after the going into force of the Covenant, that is to say of the Treaty.

In conformity with the final clauses of the said Treaty, I have the honour of informing you that the Treaty having been ratified by Germany on the one hand, by the British Empire, France and Italy on the other, a first official report of the filing of these ratifications has been drawn up under date of¹¹ and that all delays provided for by the Treaty will be counted beginning from this date, among the High Contracting Parties.

Please accept, etc.,

The Minister of the Argentine Republic,
Republic of Chili,
Republic of Columbia,
Kingdom of Denmark,
Kingdom of Spain,
Kingdom of Norway,
Republic of Paraguay,
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Kingdom of Persia,
Republic of Salvador,
Kingdom of Sweden,
Swiss Republic,
Republic of Venezuela.

APPENDIX G TO NO. 74

Request made by the German Delegation that officers of Control in Germany wear civilian clothes after the coming into force of the Treaty

PARIS, Oct. 14, 1919.

PEACE CONFERENCE.

Secretariat General.

Baron von Lersner on October 13 visited the Secretary General of the Peace Conference. He expressed to him in the name of the German Government the desire, that beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace, Allied officers belonging to Missions of Control in Germany should adopt the wearing of civilian clothes which is customary for officers exercising their functions in foreign countries, for example, for Military Attachés. In this manner incidents would be avoided which the German Government states it is powerless to prevent in view of the present state of feeling among the people.

M. Dutasta replied to the President of the German Delegation that the request of the German Government would be submitted to the Supreme Council at an early meeting.

¹¹ Thus in original.

*Draft reply to note of German Delegation of September 22, (S-H Bulletin No. 944),
regarding Memel*

October 14, 1919.

PEACE CONFERENCE.

Project

Mr. President:

I have the honour of acknowledging receipt of the note which you addressed to me September 22 regarding the territory of Memel.⁹

In reply to this communication, I have the honour to inform you that Article 99 of the Peace Treaty having allowed no bond to exist between this region and Germany, the Allied and Associated Powers could not enter into discussion with the German Delegation on the future fate of the territory of Memel.

Please accept, etc.

Baron von Lersner,
President of the German Delegation,
Versailles.